Dharmakirti on the Existence of Other Minds

RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

D HARMAKIRT I ON T HE EX ISTE N CE O F O T HER M IN D S 1

1 . Although a strictly solipsist position cannot be consistently

maintained,

the difficulties involved in giving an account of other minds are formidable, and are in no way diminished by our natural inclination, however compelling, to believe in their existence. Dharmakirti is perhaps the first ever thinker to make a systematic attempt to come to grips with this problem; otherwise the problem, as a major piece of philosophical concern, is only recent. The context in which Dharmakirti takes on the problem is the familiar realist­ idealist controversy over the ontological status of the external world. The challenge for Dharmakirti becomes particularly strong in view of his total denial of the reality of the external world 2 and the consequent charge of solipsism levelled against him. He therefore has the two-fold task of (i) defending his essentially mentalist position, and (ii) given this position, doing the necessary logical exercise so as to justify his belief in the existence of other minds. I shall, in this paper, be more particularly concerned with the latter aspect of Dharmakirti's effort without however excluding all reference to the former. Although the classical setting in which the debate originally takes place has largely been ignored, it was not possible to altogether suppress the polemical flavour of some arguments. I have first attempted an argument­ by-argument examination of Dharmakirti's treatment, and then by way of a codicil, offered some cursory remarks on the analogical approach taken in its more ideal form.

2.

To Dharmakirti, the problem of the existence of other minds is on an

equal footing with the problem concerning the existence of the external world. Within his idealist framework, other minds enjoy the same status as objects in general. But one important difference needs to be marked here. While other objects exist as direct representations - their independent existence being unacceptable to Dharmakirti -, cognition of the existence of other minds becomes possible through the representations in consciousness of the outward physical movements and purposive actions of others. That is, the existence of other minds is inferred from the representations of others'

Journal ofIndian Philosophy 13 (1985) 55-71. 0022-1791/85/0131-0055 $01.70. © 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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bodily states by virtue of an analogy with (the representations of) our own bodily behaviour. Inference for Dharmakirti can yield valid cognition only on the basis of the invariable concomitance

(avintibhtiva) established between

two terms, and in this case between overt bodily behaviour and consciousness. It is clear that the inference in question cannot be deductive. For the sound­ ness of the dedcution will depend upon our knowledge of the premiss, "That person is experiencing," but if that premiss is known, no further argument will be required to prove the existence of other mind. Of course we are familiar with the idea of what is it to have experiences or thoughts, but the element of ownership intervenes. Thus the starting point can only be the ideas of one's own self and one's own thoughts. And this position is acceptable to the realist (as also to Dharmakirti). We will note that we also have an idea of body, even other bodies, and we also further know that while our own body has some intimate relationship to our mind, another body does not bear the same special relationship to our mind. This leads the realist to claim that the conviction of the body as expressing our conscious acts or mental states is first obtained in case of one's own self, and then with this correlation between mind and body once established, the way is cleared for the inference of other minds on the basis of other bodies. 3 The other person's feelings and thoughts which get manifest in his bodily behaviour are never experienced in our consciousness, for had they been so felt, they too would have been known as belonging to our self. Not only that, in that case the other's inten­ tions would also have been expressed in the same manner as our own, viz., "I go," "I speak", etc. 4 And since this is not the case, the other's existence stands automatically proved. As an extension of the argument, the realist places the other in external space as something distinct from my own body, and occupying a different space from what my body does. And that is why, he continues, we say "He goes", "He speaks", etc.5 This spatial separateness of bodies, already assumed in respect of our relation to externally given objects, posits, for interaction between my consciousness and the other's consciousness, my body and his body as mediating agencies. The resultant situation is one where the proposition "other minds exist" already seems presupposed before it begins to be established, and then through a verbal legerdemain we are persuaded that these minds and their activities are ex­ pressed through 'expressive' bodily behaviour. That this latter is susceptible of intelligible communication and can be formulated in a judgement like "He goes", "He speaks", is cited as a further proof.

DHARMA KIRTI ON OTHER MINDS 3.

57

Interestingly, Dhannakirti accepts the realist position that the external

marks (physical movements, purposive actions, etc.) are caused by, and hence express, other consciousness, and that this conviction rests on what turns out to be the case in respect of one's own self. Otherwise, he too feels, the marks of other's conscious motivations will have to exist independently of the latter.6 And since this does not hold true in one's own case, it cannot be maintained in respect of others. Accepting the 'argument from analogy,' he goes the whole hog with the realist in assuming the spatial distance that separates the other's body from one's own, and also further accepts that the judgement like "He goes", "He speaks", is basically different from the judgement "I go'', "I speak", etc. 7 At the same time, however, Dhannakirti seeks to subsume this argument under his 'representation theory'. The other person's bodily movements as expressive of his consciousness are also given to us in representations much like our own bodily behaviour. Knowing the former set of representations as not caused by our conscious will, in contrast to our experience of the representations of our own bodily acts as caused by our volitions, we infer that these must have been actuated by a consciousness other than our own;8 else, we are faced up with a none-too-agreeable situation of having to have representations which remain unaccounted for. In other words, Dharmakirti regards himself quite justified in inferring to the actual existence of other minds on the evidence not of the actual external bodily movements but of the representations of them. 4. Now at this point it seems necessary to remark that our appreciation of

Dharmakirti's approach and his arguments for other minds is greatly hand­ icapped by his total denial of the reality of the external world. The task becomes particularly hazardous when one has to reckon with a doctrine which sees all subject-object distinction as arising from within consciousness itself and ultimately traceable to

vasana (subconscious impressions) without

any reference to the extra-mental world. This view of the external world which comprises not only obejcts but also other spirits - makes Dhannakirti's refutation of solipsism less than convincing not only with regard to the arguments employed but also with regard to his professed belief. It should be obvious from the nature of the problem that, whatever procedure one ultimately adopts for establishing other minds, their reality as independent existents has to be admitted. And if the procedure be analogical reasoning as in the present case, other bodies too will have to be granted this status.

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And once this concession is made in respect of other bodies, there is no withholding it in case of other objects. Dharmakirti seems reluctant to face this logical consequence of the situation, and hence finds himself in an impasse the way out of which would mean compromising his position. The question is, if no degree of reality is assignable to the external world, why can't it be that the representations of foreign movements and speech exist as something not caused by any conscious will. 9 In other words, what are the means available to the idealist on the basis of which to establish with finality that the 'objective' images of others' overt bodily behaviour are different from those of one's own, and hence must have been caused by some other consciousness. Dharmakirti does nothing more than dogmatically assert that the certainty of the invariable relation between the two having been established from one's own experience, the way is cleared for inferring by analogy other consciousness operating at the back of the other person's bodily movements.10 But this is only begging the question. Because how to precisely distinguish the objective images of others' outward behaviour from those of one's own. It should be obvious that for our knowledge of images to be true, there also must be an awareness of something, of some 'archetypes' of which they are supposed to be images, and without which they cannot even be known to be images. And this would require us to step outside of the images into some other standpoint to do the needed comparison. But this course is not available to Dharmakirti because the external objects,

ex-hypothesi, lie beyond the reach of knowledge. His

reply on the 'differentia' question therefore suffers from serious inadequacies.

5.

But this is not the end of the matter. Dharmakirti has other important

things to say which require careful attention. From his initial premise of the invariable concomitance between consciousness and bodily behaviour (which holds in respect of all individuals), he leaps to another drastic conclu­ sion, viz., that while presentations of physical movements and speech etc. must have their source in conscious motivations, both of these need not belong to the same individual. Thus he conceives of presentation of move­ ments in external space as not belonging to the body of the person whose conscious will alone should normally cause such movements. Likewise there can be movements of our own body but not caused by the activity of our consciousness. And the obvious paradigm representing such cases is the hypnotic situation.11 Actions of a person under the influence of hypnosis are

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involuntary, but have been caused by our conscious will in case we are the hypnotizing agency in question. Contrariwise, in a situation of somebody else rocking me, though the movement is mine, it is not caused by my conscious will.12 Thus it is not some specific consciousness which is inferred on the basis of external marks - presence of bodily actions and speech - but con­ sciousness in general, in other words, the 'essence of consciousness'. This has the inevitable consequence that purposive activity and verbal marks are deprived of their particularity in so far as it consists in being connected with some particular body. Thus, in one stroke, through the operation of hypostatic abstraction, all meaningful distinction between one's own body and another body, between one's own consciousness and another consciousness is removed. What now remains is not some body and some consciousness but a body and a consciousness. In a like manner, the 'argument from analogy' is also rendered infructuous. Analogy was seen as proceeding from certitude in regard to the invariable causal relation between conscious­ ness and its outward mainfestation obtained first in one's own case; and since my movements and speech can now have their cause in somebody else's conscious will, analogy goes by default. The external 'ideal' space which was earlier supposed to separate two bodies or two consciousnesses now gets filled in a mysterious way, so that now my conscious intentions do not necessarily need my body but any body to get expressed and in fact even inferred. In observing someone's bodily movements I may not be necessarily inferring his mind but any mind. Likewise, in feeling my own bodily states I am not necessarily cognizing my own mind but any mind, because who can tell that my bodily movements were not caused under the spell of some conscious will other than mind. We have thus moved full circle and find that we remain where we are. The invariable relation between consciousness and bodily behaviour now stands eviscerated of all such subjective conviction on which rested analogical reasoning, with the result that even the certainty of this relation now comes under question. 6. Taking now the problem to a different plane, it can be asked, what sort

of account is possible of the existence of others in a state of dream. The question is crucial, for the idealists of a certain variety have themselves let it be believed that our waking perceptions are analogous to those in dreams

(svapnavat). The exterior world having been denied any reality at the waking

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plane, and the dream-state being no different in this respect, the question that naturally presents itself is: If inference of a foreign mind at the waking plane is grounded in the evidence of the other's body which so to say corresponds to its representation (in consciousness), in what way can the other's mind be apprehended in the dream in the absence of the other's body (corresponding to its representation)? The dreams, the opponent can urge, after all constitute a different order of reality in the sense that there appear no external objects including foreign bodies in this state. In such a situation, he is afraid, the operation of analogical reasoning in inferring other minds gets drastically restricted, or in case of its applicability, which is what the idealist himself maintains, the dream-objects should also be granted the same status as they enjoy in the waking state. To these posers, Dharmakirti's reply is somewhat strained and ingenious. Maintaining that the inference of other mind in the dream takes place, as in the waking state, on the basis of images of the other's purposeful bodily behaviour etc., he points out that while the waking images of foreign motions and purposeful acts are directly dependent upon other minds, this dependence in dreams is mostly indirect. Now, what is it that Dharmakirti means by

indirect dependence here?; what is it that acts as a differentia between direct dependence and indirect dependence? Dharmakirti, again in his peculiar style, looks for the answer in the time­ interval which, according to him, exists between reality and its appearance in representations in dreams; in the waking state on the other hand there is no temporal break between the two.13 Which means that, while in waking condition the representations and the corresponding reality are contem­ poraneous, the dream-images of others' movements etc., though not existing independently of the causal factors like other minds, are separated from the latter in time. The dream-situation as an illustration of temporal distance is comparable, according to the idealist, to such illusory experiences as those of hell. Such sufferings as one undergoes in hell are merely the experiences of those representations which are the result of a person's previous acts.14 While such acts were committed in the past, the images of hell-experiences, even though caused by these past acts, take place only in the present. Analogously, the dream-representations of the other's mind, can occur only by virtue of their dependence on the latter and other causal factors. Thus no distinction can be allowed between the waking and the dream state so far as inference of other minds on the evidence of the body is concerned.

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Now without entering into the full question of dreams versus waking life - a recurrent theme in Indian philosophy - we can briefly note that Dharmakirti's own admission of a distinction between the two in terms of indirect and direct dependence impinges not only on the asserted functional identification of the two states but also on his approach to the problem of other minds in particular and the external world in general. The concession takes away much of the force of his argument, and no amount of logical sophistry can make his basic standpoint any the more respectable. 7. Now in the course of his attempt to rebut the charge of solipsism levelled

against him, Dharmakirti, while replying to yet another argument of the realist, comes out with a much more radical proposition. The realist confronts him with a communication-situation and asks: If, suppose, X is speaking and Y (the idealist) is listening, then Y has representations containing X's physical acts and speech which according to him entitle him to infer the existence of X's mind. In what way, the realist asks, can Y's representations become real indications of X's mind, since, he says, there can hardly be any direct causal relationship between Y's (i.e. the listener's) representations and the thoughts of the speaker X. That is, while the direct causal linkage between a speaker's verbal acts and his thoughts or his mind is self-evident, the same does not apparently hold between the speaker's thoughts and the representations in which his verbal acts, the real marks of his mind, are given.15 The idealist again finds a simple way out of this quandary by saying that what he main­ tains is only that there is

some causal relation between the two.16 He does

not agree to the proposition that his representations of the other's behaviour are in any way the real marks of the other's mind. What are, then, the real marks of mind? And the idealist seems to take recourse to a desperate ma­ noeuver which only further undermines his position. According to him, only such representations in which appear our own movements and verbal acts can be regarded as the real marks of mind. In regard to the marks of other mind, other consciousness is the regulating (indirect) cause.17 Or, differently, the marks of other mind are so only conventionally and are regarded as such owing to the association in the form of resemblance with our own (representations of our own marks).18 Now if this indeed is the case, and if the listener does not perceive the representations of the speaker and vice versa (since they are given separately to themselves alone as subjects), what becomes of the fate of the agreement on the strength of which both, without

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apprehending each other, are nevertheless simultaneously and equally aware that certain external presentations are caused by the mind? Doesn't it signify the total break-down of communication? If there exist no real marks which can act as a dependable signal of the other's mind, i.e. his thoughts which he is seeking to communicate, how can the certitude come about that what the other is saying is saying as a subject of thoughts and feelings, i.e. as a subject of consciousness? How can then it become possible to apprehend the other's subjecthood?

8.

The end-result of Dharmakirti's reasoning seems to be that in the ultimate

analysis we are unredeemably shut up within our own consciousness. But on the other hand we have also seen that by introducing the notion of 'the general essence of purposive bodily activity' and 'the general essence of consciousness', by making the two appear as neutral entities, he has rid the direct relationship between the representations of external marks (of mind) and mind of all inner conviction felt by each one in respect of one's own self. Isn't this view out of accord with his insistence now that the direct relationship between the two can be properly said to hold only in one's own case� that the representations can be assumed as real marks of mind only if they contain such overt bodily behaviour and speech as flow from one's

own

conscious will, and further, that this direct relationship cannot be

allowed in the context of our apprehension of the

other's mind, because

the external manifestations of the other's mind are for us its marks only conventionally. Furthermore, is not even the 'argument from analogy' pre­ viously accepted by Dharmakirti as a method common to both the realist and himself being given a short shift? The severe strains to which Dharmakirti' s position is subjected and the desperate lengths to which he has to go become apparent in some other ways also. In his attempt to save the communication­ situation in which speech plays a vital role, Dharmakirti cites the instance of two persons under the influence of the same eye-disease who are convinced that

both perceive the same

two moons which are just not there in reality.19

Here, according to him, each one experiences his representation (in which two moons appear) independently of the other; and the conviction on the part of both of them that the other is also perceiving the same object, viz. two moons, is because of the accidental coincidence 20 of their representations. But how to account for the fact that the said conviction, reciprocal in a way, is not only in respect of the same cognized object, but also and more

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pertinently, in regard to the existence of another mind, different from own's own, which has exactly the same representation even if independently? That is, in case they exchange notes and find that the object of cognition is the same for both of them, how does the assurance come about that in the act of cognizing, which gets manifest in the physical movement and speech, there is a volitional act of consciousness at the back in the case of the other? Here again Dharmakirti makes a familiar move. The subjective conviction in regard to the 'real marks of mind' obtained by each one from his experience gets transformed into the general concept of 'mark of mind' and becomes usable in the context of inference of the other mind. Now even assuming that this is possible, it begs explanation, how does this generalization come about unless others are concretely given to us in the first instance. In order for any such generalization to acquire legitimacy, it must have its basis in experience. And if the others are in no way present to us, if they do not become cognizable as minds on the evidence of some external marks by way of analogy, how can the general concept of 'marks of mind' be arrived at? Dharmakirti is guilty of yet another questionable hypostatization. While maintaining that both the speaker and the listener experience their representations separately and independently, he urges that the representations containing the images of physical acts and speech appear in both from the same source, and these representations then get metamorphosed into one general concept named as 'marks of mind'. Thus while granting separate independent status to representations of two different persons, he is not willing to concede two separate consciousnesses as the cause of those two separate sets of representa­ tions. Thus, while representations are accepted in their concrete separateness, a big leap is taken to conclude that their source in the form of consciousness rooted in phenomenal existence is the

same. This we believe is a generalization

not based on sufficient grounds and hence logically suspect.

9.

Given these disparate and diverse moves, the question is: what is it that

Dharmakirti is trying to affirm in his attempt to establish the existence of other minds? What is it that is being inferred on the basis of analogy, if there is nothing to be inferred? The realist in fact protests that if nothing exists apart from one's consciousness, if nothing can be regarded as an object waiting to be cognized, what is it that is being sought to be cognized and hence established? Dharmakirti instead of accepting the logic of the situation distorts the opponent's argument to suit his own point of view. He insists that

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if the existence of the other's mind is to be the object of cognition then its

form also must be cognized. And since this latter in its uniqueness remains inaccessible, what sort of mind does the realist aim at cognizing through inference? That is, since the essence of other mind is unqualifiedly beyond our cognitive reach, its real existence cannot become the object of inferential knowledge. And if it be maintained, as the realist does, that what inference cognizes on the basis of logical connection is only the general concept and not the individual form, that is, in other words, the object of inferential cognition is only mind in general and not any particular one, Dharmakirti points out the fallacy underlying this view. Formulating three possible alternatives on this score, viz., identity (of the general concept of mind with the other's mind), difference, and both identity and difference, he rules as out of order the last two options for they do not admit of cognition, through inference, of other mind.21 As to the first view of identity, he repudiates it on the ground that if identity were indeed possible, the other mind too would then have become known to us in the same form as it really exists. 22 Furthermore, admission of identity in the present case would deal a deathblow to the distinction between sensual cognition and rational cognition which is crucial to Dharmakirti's ontology and epistemology. (Dharmakirti, we may recall, draws a radical distinction between perceptual or sensual cognition (pratyak�a) and inference (anumana) and no overlapping between the two is allowed.23 Perception yields absolutely indeterminate cognition of the essence of a unique particular

(svalak�atJa) which is clearly

outside the reach of inference or rational cognition. The essential form of a particular thing having already been ascertained in perception, what is left for inference is to remove false or foreign ascriptions to the thing sensed, i.e., to differentiate it from all that it is not, to exclude all that is opposed to it. And this exclusion

[apoha] is a mental concept.) Thus even though inference does

not produce direct visual representation of a foreign mind in its unique essential particularity, it yet leads to the cognition of the latter as a mental concept and conseuqently directs our activity leading to the desired aim, 24 viz., talking to this person, greeting him, etc. Thus attainment of the aim invariably presupposes (the existence of) mind. 25 It is in the light of this view of inference that Dharmakirti questions the legitimacy of the realist's claim that the other mind's

individual existence is

apprehended through inference. He protests that the role which is being assigned to inference is impermissible and hence unwarranted, that the realist

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neglects the obvious distinction between perception and inference and thereby renders the own-status of inference as a source of knowledge vulnerable.

1 0.

Now it can be seen that, despite the logical rigour which Dharrnakirti

brings to bear upon the subject, his treatment on the whole leaves something important out of ac.count, leaves back certain ambiguities unexplained, and blurs out certain other distinctions crucial to at least an understanding of the problem if not its final resolution. Foremost of these is of course the difficulty, as indicated above, connected with Dharrnakirti's view of inference which according to him provides us access to the object in its generality or universality. Without claiming competence to pronounce judgement on this highly complicated and controversial issue, I may state that cognition of mind in general (to which inference leads) remains incompatible with the intended activity which is undertaken in respect of some particular person. If I judge someonw as walking, or respond communicatively to someone speaking to me, it is always some particular person (or consciousness) I am having in mind and not consciousness/otherness in general. Again, how can

inferential

knowledge retain truth-value without its being a cognition of the existence of some particular mind which it nevertheless postulates? And if the particular, other's existence, is in no way cognizable, if its existence cannot even become the object of cognition, let alone actual cognition, doesn't it amount to saying that an existence-claim cannot be made about it though a knowledge­ claim can still hold? Further, is not Dharrnakirti's attempt to treat other minds as at par with external objects riddled with some inherent difficulties?; for while the invariable concomitance between an object and its mark is established on the basis of this relationship at first given to us in experience, in the case of the other, the relationship between his physical movements etc. and his conscious will is no way observable. And if Dharmakirti takes refuge in analogy, it can be replied back that his own account suffers from a basic incongruity, for, as we have seen, according to Dharmakirti, while there is direct relationship between one's own physical states and conscious acts, in the other's case what at best can be said is that there is

some relationship

between our representations of the other's bodily acts and the other's mind.26 Why should the operation of analogical reasoning be halted midway? Something also needs to be briefly said about Dharmakirti's view about the cognition of other minds in dreams. Maintaining, and correctly so, that within the dream itself nothing appears baffling or contradictory (despite

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disruption of the waking life's spatio-temporal organization of the world), that everything looks perfectly normal and in order, Dharmakirti argues that other minds are also known in the same way as in waking condition. The attainment of aim and the consequent purposive activity in dreams are in line with the kind of inferential knowledge we have at that point of time. Now all this appears perfectly consistent as it stands. But when in the same breath Dharmakirti introduces a distinction in terms of the time-interval (see above), doesn't he himself thereby admit a basic distinction between the waking and the dream-state?; and further doesn't this distinction go against his own doctrine that seeks ontological equation between the two states? Also, if on Dharmakirti's view, the dream-inference is possible and has its field of operation only in that state (as also the intended activity like communication etc.), it devolves upon him to show why should the logic of the dream-state be restricted to dreams alone, and further, what constitutes the differentia between the two inferential cognitions; in what way, in other words, the dream-logic differs from the waking-life logic? For it is clear that if any difference is to be allowed and any contrast made between dream perceptions and waking perceptions, an appeal to the external world becomes unavoidable.

11.

To conclude the discussion, a few tentative remarks may be made on

the analogical approach taken in its more abstract form and as free from features specific to any particular philosopher's rendering of it. The analogical reasoning as a general hypothesis rests broadly on two basic assumptions:

(1) that

we have direct and immediate access to our own mental realities, an

access which can be called 'privileged';

(2) that

we know that our mental

states get manifested through our visually perceivable bodily states and behaviour; that there exists a special intimate relation between our mental states and the corresponding bodily acts, certitude about which is firstly gained through our observation of the same in our own case 27 (and from this one can proceed to infer to other minds through the mediation of other bodies which look like and behave in a similar way as our own). Now so far as the first assumption is concerned, it makes very sound sense; in fact a better and more true assumption seems inconceivable.28 However, the second assumption, viz., that the correlation between psychic events and their bodily expression is firstly known to us in our own case, need not be regarded as a natural and necessary entailment of the first assumption. (The fact that the second assumption is nevertheless implied in the analogical approach is a

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different matter.) While it is perfectly right to uphold the 'privileged access' view in respect of our mental lives, the same does not always hold in respect of the bodily manifestations of the former. Our observation of our bodies is fairly limited in contrast to our awareness of our mental states. Not only do we not ordinarily observe our bodily movements as expressing (our) corresponding mental events but also we are not always able, even when consciously choosing to do so, to observe some movements of our bodies. In fact in this particular respect our bodies are better observed by others than by ourselves. Again it can quite be the case that the correlations between psychic events and physical behaviour come to be learnt much more from our observation of other people. The similitude therefore sought to be established between my body and an alien body on the strength of my perception of both remains much more obscure than it appears to be. Besides, and more importantly, while the said correlation may provide us significant clue in our 'methodical attempt' to gain knowledge about others in some predicative or descriptive terms, it cannot yield

the existence

of others.

Perception of others as 'bare particulars', as subjects, and not as such-and­ such, is always anterior to, and constitutes the condition of, our subsequent

knowledge

of them through observations of their physical behaviour.

Coming now to a different, though related, feature of the analogical approach, we may note that this approach treats the problem of others essentially on the epistemological level. The existence of other minds is a matter of cognition in much the same way as other objects are. And this cognition finds its via media in the other's body (given as a representation on Dharmakirti's view, as in contrast to the realist position which grants it an independent existence). This body again has its rightful place among the objects - doesn't it share with the latter the properties of tangibility, perceivability, resistance, etc.? The other is therefore out

there

like any other

object separated from us by an external real or 'ideal' space, by a spatial breach so to say, and it is left to cognition to traverse this spatial distance. In other words, to borrow Hegelian terminology, the relation between me and the other is seen as one of 'external negation'. Both the realist and the idealist are of course right in their perception that the other is something who is not-me. But since this not-me is primarily conceived in terms of the body and only then of the mind, they tend to muddle the not-me of the body with the not-me of the objects and place them side by side as "givens". And then a mind is postulated, on the basis of analogy, at the back of the body which is

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to serve as its symbol. The net result of this epistemological approach then is that my knowledge about the existence of other minds can never be more than probable just as my knowledge about the existence of other objects is always at best probable. It therefore remains an open question whether the other even exists as a body, let alone as a mind. The above implication only serves to usher in by the back door the demon of solipsism. Implicit in any repudiation of the solipsist position is the sup­ position that the other, the not-me, too exists, like myself, as a subject, as a "centre" of experience, as one who is not only seen by me but also sees me in turn. This is what, to use Husserlian language, constitutes the radical

otherness of the Other, what sets him qualitatively apart from the rest of the mundane objects, which latter although also existing as not-me lack precisely this radicalness. The recourse to the same cognitive technique in the case of other minds as in the case of objects therefore renders both the realist and the idealist open to the charge of misplaced 'optimism'. In the case of Dharmakirti this charge becomes particularly severe since he totally repudiates the reality of the world including other centres of experience and thereby eliminates whatever possibility is there for the other's subjecthood to be grasped. The analogical reasoning may be inadequate as a means to establish the existence of other minds and here Dharmakirti's failure would be as much as anybody else's. But the disconcerting aspect is that on his view of consciousness, even his professed belief in the existence of others comes under question.

Dept. of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, India

NOTES 1 The article is based on Dharmakirti'sSanttintintara-siddhi with VinHadeva's commentary ({fka} thereon, translated into Russian by Th. Stcherbatsky from Tibetan, and further translated from Russian into English by H. C. Gupta and published in Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky in the Soviet Indology Series No. 2 (Calcutta: Indian Studies, Past and Present, 1969) under the general editorship of Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya. Since in

spite of my efforts I have not been able to lay hands on the Sanskrit rendering of the Tibetan version ( which till today remains the only available version), and since I have no knowledge of the Tibetan language nor for that matter of the Russian, I have had to exclusively rely, for my exposition and critique, on the English translation by H. C.

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Gupta. This situation naturally has its inherent limitations and shortcomings. However, my access to some of Dharmaki rti's other works which are available in Sanskrit helped me in following his essential argument contained in Santtintintara-siddhi. I am not however assuming that it can be a real substitute for one's direct access to the original text. All the references to Santtintintara-siddhi and the Vinitadeva's commentary are to the translation by H.C. Gupta. 2 According to Dharmakirti, consciousness in its various forms - i.e. cognitions - does not involve any reference to the external world. The diversity of cognitions cannot be accounted for in terms of the plurality of external objects, but rather owes its existence to mental dispositions or forces (vtisantis). The subject-object distinction, although also ultimately illusory (avidyal, arises from within consciousness itself under the influence of vtisanti. See Dharmakirti, PramiiT}aVtirttika (hereafter cited as PV) with the com­ mentary (vrtti) of Manorathanandin, critically ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series No. 3 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968), II. 354: "avibhtigo 'pi buddhyaatma­ viparyasitadarsanai�lgrahyagrahakasamvittibhedavtin iva lak�yatell Also see Manorathan­ andin's commentary thereon. Also Ibid., II. 357-363. Thus consciousness of anything (say, of blue) does not refer to anything (blue) existing outside itself. See commentary on PV II. 326: "tasmtid vedyarahita� tasya jfltinasya sa nfltidinlpa titmti anubhava�. sa ca anubhavo na anyasya kasyacid biihyasya."

Further see/bid., II. 327-333, and commentary thereon. Another main reason given by Dharmakirti for denying the reality of the external world is the saholambhaniyama, according to which the object and its cognition being grasped together are really identical. "sakt:t samvedyamanasya niyamena dhiyti saha I vi�ayasya tato 'nyatvam kena iikare'Jll siddhyati II Ibid., II. 388. See further Ibid., II. 335 . Commenting on this Manorathanandin says: "yat ttivad niliidikam biihyam ucyate, tad jfltinena sahopalambhaniyamtit tadabhinnasvabhiivam, dvicandriidivat." For a detailed discussion of the subject see Nagin J. Shah, Akalanka 's Criticism of Dharmakirti's Philosophy A study, L. D. Series 11 (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1967), Chapter IV. 3 Santtintintara-siddhi (hereafter cited as SS), 1. "Realism infers the existence of other mind on the basis of analogy with itself." For detailed elucidation see Vinitadeva's !fkti thereon. 4 SS, 6-8. 5 SS, 9 and f ikti thereon. 6 SS, 2. "The Idealist also accepts that those representations,in which other's actions and speech appear to us,would not have existed,if the special processes of other con­ thereon. sciousness were not there." Alse see tfkti . 7 SS, 9-10 and tfkti thereon. s SS,10-11 and tfkti thereon. 9 SS, 12 and tfka thereon. 10Cf. SS,13.and{fktithereon;also 14-16. 11 SS, 18. 12 SS, 19. 13 SS, 51. 14 Ibid. and{fkri thereon. Vinitadeva here points out other points of identity also between waking and dream states. This view of identification of the two leads up to the conception of the world as a replica and hence absolutely of a piece with dreams/ illusions. And then it is a short step to the conclusion that all our knowledge of the -

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external world has its genesis in and is in perfect accord with universal or transcendental illusion. See further SS, 58 and !fkti thereon. Also see note 1 above. In situations of delusions and dreams, objects are perceived which are just not there in reality. Picking up a few cases of delusions, and taking their cue from what the case is about dreams, the Buddhist idealists established the equation: illusions= dreams = waking life. It seems that for these thinkers it is not only possible but true that our waking life is, to use Russell's words, "a persistent and recurrent nightmare." For the explicit statement of Vijfianavadin Buddhists on the subject, see Madhyanta-Vibhariga, tr. Th. Stcherbatsky (New Delhi: Oriental Reprint, 1978; first published in 1936 as Vol. XXX of Bibliotheca Buddhica Series), Chapters II & IV. 15 SS, 60. 16 SS, 61 and tfkti thereon. 1 7 SS, 63. Co�menting on this, Vinitadeva

clarifies that in using the word 'direct cause,' the author is only employing the realist terminology, for, from his point of view, "the direct cause of the representations is not the volitional acts, but consciousness in general." For details of the view see SS, 65 and .tfka thereon. 18 SS, 64 and !fkti thereon.

19 SS, 65. 20 Tfkti on SS, 65. 21 SS, 71. 22 SS, 72. 23 Admitting only two prarnaf)aS - pratyak�a and anumana-, Dharmakirti sets up two separate objects as their prameyas, and thus roots the distinction between the two in the (ontologically) different nature of the objects of knowledge. The object of pratyak�a is the unique particular (svalak�f)a), while that of anumana is the general concept (stimanyalak�f)a).As Dharmakirti says in PV, ll. 1: "manam dvividham, vi�ayadvaiv­ idhytit, $aktya$aktital:z arthakriytiytim .. ." Manorathanandin comments: "vi�ayasya svalak�f)OSlimlinyalak�f)OriiPatayti dvaividhytit ... vi�ayas ca svasamanyalak�af)tid atirikto na asti.tatas tadvi�ayatve pratyak¥Inumanataiva." This object-wise demarcation of the two prarna')Os leaves little room for overlapping or encroachment. As Manora­ thanandin says (PV, II. 2): "anayos ca anyo 'nyavyavacchedariipatvtid na rtisyantaram," and further (Ibid., II. 1): "na hy ekasya viruddhtiv iva dharme yujyete." This schematiza­ tion is technically called pramti')avyavasthti.On role of inference (anumana), further see SS, 73-75 and tfkti thereon. 24 SS, 76. "Th�ugh inference does not actually reveal the real existence of an object,

it is still the source of cognition of truth, for it leads to the attainment of the desired aim." Also, Ibid., 19. "Having known, through this inference, the existence of other mind, the mind as subject successively produces the effects which lead to the desired aim." See f fkti thereon. Dharmottara commenting on Nytiyabindu 1.1 says: "anumanam tu limgadar§antid niscinvat pravrttivi�yam darsayati." Dharmottara, Nyaya-bindu-(ikti, with Nytiyabindu of Dharmakirti, ed. and trans. Shrinivas Shastri (Meerut: Sahitya Bhand.ar, 1975). 2 5 Tikti on SS, 80. 26 SS, 61-63. 27 That there may be

implicit in this approach a further assumption of mind-body dualism as alleged by some is not really relevant and need not engage us here. We can only note that even monists allow mind-body distinction up to a point. :28 I am well aware that in subscribing to the 'privileged access' theory, I am making a

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commitment of wide implications,and yet I feel this theory is indispensable for any plausible account of subjectivity or consciousness. The theory briefly means that the way we become directly and priviledgedly aware of our own mental states and realities is not available to us in case of our knowledge of the mental states of others. And vice versa. While some and even sound intimation of what goes on in the other's mind - his sadness, anxiety, etc. - can be had through various means,no awareness of the other's experiences is possible in the same way as the other himself has of them in the mere fact of suffering them. In other words, there is an essential interiority to our mental lives which cannot be given away or taken over at will. It is precisely because we are so privileged in respect of our own mental lives and not so privileged in respect of others,' that there is the problem of the Other.