dfad

D. The Lawyer and the Client Canon 15 – 15 – Candor,  Candor, Fairness and Loyalty in Dealings with Clients Llunarr v. R icafort , Adm. Case No. 6484, June 16, 2015 Lluna

Facts: In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo Ricafort for the recovery of a parcel of land owned by the Banez family but which was fraudulently registered to a different name. The lot was was the subject of foreclosure proceedings, hence, Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of P95,000.00 (partial redemption fee, as filing fees, and attorneys fees). Three years later, complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case with the RTC of Legazpi City, hence, she demanded the return of P95,000.00. The latter averred that there was a complaint for annulment of title filed against Ard Cervantes, though not him, but by another lawyer. Thus, he was was willing to refund the amount less the P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria. Adelita refused to recognize the case filed by Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire him as counsel; also, the complaint was filed three years late and the property cannot be redeemed from the bank anymore. She also learned that Atty. Ricafort was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law since 2002 in A.C. No. 5054, thus she suspected it was the reason why another lawyer filed the case.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort is guilty of misconduct for practicing law under indefinite suspension?

Ruling:  Yes. The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT. The respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his servi ces. Canon 15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall observe candor , fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.” The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s cas e despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.

Vi ll lla ahe hermosa, rmosa, S r. v . C aracol, A.C. No. 7325 (Resolution), January 21, 2015 FACTS: OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation

of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs -Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the decision. Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela.” Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized  Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because because Efren had already been been dead for more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as “additional counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor. In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. ISSUE: Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court? RULING:  YES. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s la wyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.  Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition.  As an honest, prudent and conscientious conscientious lawyer, lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented au thority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest successors -in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.

Conflict of Interest

R os aci cia a v. B ul ulal ala acao, Adm. Case No. 3745, October 2, 1995 Facts Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of the IBP found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law . "On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc. "After almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf." Issue: WON respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship Held Yes. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. The Court reiterates that the loyalty an attorney owes to his client subsists even after the termination of attorney-client relationship. It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people.

 A baqueta v. F lori lorido, do, Adm.Case No. 5948. January 22, 2003 FACTS: Complainant Abaqueta filed this administration complaint against respondent Atty. Florido for conflict of interest. Abaqueta engaged the prof essional services of Atty. Florido in a special proceeding entitled  In the  Matter of the Intestate Estate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta Abaqueta Susana Uy Trazo (1st Case). Atty. Florido was able to file Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting, registering complainants objection.

Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against complainant Abaqueta in a case entitled, Milagros entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Casiano Gerona (2nd Case ). Respondent Atty. Florido signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap-Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain parcels of land. However, the parcel of land referred to as conjugal party of the complainant and Milagro Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcel of land in the 1 st Case.  Case.

In short, respondent lawyer made allegations in the 2 nd Case, which were contrary to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in the 1st case. Complainant also avered that respondent Atty. Florido admitted that he was never authorized to appear as counsel for Milagro Yap-Abaqueta in the 2 nd case, and that Atty. Florido failed to indicate n the Co mplaint the true and correct address o f herein complainant, which Atty. Florido knew as far back as August 2, 1990. ISSUE: WON Atty Florido violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Respons ibility by representing Milagros Yap? HELD:

YES. The reasons explained by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear representation of conflicting the fact that the subject matter of the two cases are the  same properties could not have escaped the attention of respondent. There is a conf lict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be oppose d by him when he argues for the other client. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of prof essional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client. The reason for the p rohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera, The relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery, should be avoided

P orment ormento, o, Sr. S r. v. P ont ontevedra evedra,, Adm. Case No. 5128, March 31, 2005 Facts: Respondent was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family’s relationship with the respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations. The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant’s counterclaim in a civil case filed with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento was forced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the subject property. In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental. Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondent’s advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for c omplainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainant’s nephew nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant’s nephew Issue: W/N there was conflicting interest in the case at bar? Held/Ruling: Yes. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of P rofessional Responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”

Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.  Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.

P aca acana na vs . Pas cual cual-Lopez  -Lopez , Adm.Case No. 8243. July 24, 2009 Facts:

Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an ad ministrative complaint against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent) charging the latter with flagrant violation of the  provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleges that respondent commited acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of o f all the money and properties p roperties received by her from complainant. Complainant worked for Multitel and earned the ire of investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,00 0,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Complainant sought the advice of respondent and a lawyer-client relationship was established between the parties although no formal document was executed. Complainant learned of the respondent’s clients in Multitel after receiving a demand letter from the latter. Respondent continued to help complainant through the latter paying an amount and even transferring property to the former on different occasions to be used in dealing with the latter’s liabilities. Complainant then went to the US to avoid to avoid being arrested while respondent handles his liabilities. When complainant returned to the Philippines, Ph ilippines, respondent informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. Respondent continued that she was willing to return an amount to complainant after all the accumulated legal fees the former had earned from settling the liabilities of both complainant and the clients from Multitel. Complainant accepted the offer of receiving amou nt but respondent failed to fulfill the  promise. Soon, complainant noticed that respondent began to avoid communicating with him. Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and an d properties given to the latter but respondent failed to  provide a clear audited financial report of all the properties turned over by the complainant to the respondent. Complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent. Issue: Did the respondent violate Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility, representing conflicting interests?

Holding: Yes. Respondent Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby D ISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and d eceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Clearly, respondent established a lawyer-client relationship with the complainant while aware that respondent also represents clients of Multitel, who are opp osed to the liabilities of the complainant. Moreover, respondent took advantage of the complainant’s situation by giving him advice, and later on, soliciting money and properties from him which were used to satisfy clients of Multitel.

 S antos V entur entura a Ho Hocor cor ma F ound oundat atii on, Inc I nc.. v. Funk  F unk , Adm.Case No. 9094. August 15, 2012 Hocorma Foundation filed filed a complaint for disbarment against against respondent. It alleged that respondent used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985. He also served as its counsel counsel in several criminal and civil cases. FACTS:

Complainant alleged that respondent filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma on behalf of Mabalacat institute using information he acquired while with the foundation. As a defense, Atty. Funk contended that he was hired by Mabalacat Institute by Don Teodoro Santos in 1982 to serve as director and legal counsel. He emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-client attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos’ personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation. Santos left for America to get medical treatment. The former and Atty. Funk agreed that the latter would be paid for his legal services out of the properties that Santos donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation. Atty. Funk also claimed that he was authorized to advise Hocorma and follow up with it Santos’ sale o r donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute. Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of funds that Santos provided. provided. It was Santos’ Santos’ intention intention since 1950 1950 to give the the land to Mabalacat Institute free of rent and expenses. The foundation later refused to pay Atty. Funk’s fees, thus he severed his ties with Hocorma. Four years later, he filed a suit against Hocorma. The trial court, CA and SC decided in favor of the respondent. After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his his former client, the Hocorma Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended Atty. Funk’s suspension from the practice of law for one year. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: 

Whether or not not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client without the foundation’s foundation’s written consent. HELD:

An attorney owes his client undivided undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client’s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. Respondent collected collected attorney’s attorney’s fees from the foundation. foundation. Thus, he had an obligation obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation.

 A ng lo v. V al alenc encii a, Adm. Case No. 10567, February 25, 2015 Facts: Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the respondents for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent the complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon the agreement of both parties. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against the complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law which handled the complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved. Comp lainant filed disbarment case against the respondents, alleging that they violated the rule on conflict of interest.

IBP Commissioner found the respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that the respondents be reprimanded. Issue: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR? Held: Yes. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The Supreme Court found the respondents guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 are therefore Reprimanded for said violations, with a Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.

 As the records bear out, respondents’ respondents’ law firm was engaged engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm ’s unethical

acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest.  As an organization organization of individual individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client lawyer- client relationship’s relationship’ s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence

 Mabini C olleg olleges es , Inc . v. P ajari ajarillo llo, Adm. Case No. 10687, July 22, 2015 FACTS:

Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, the other faction is called the Lukban Group. It appointed the Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo as its corporate secretary.  Adeva Group issued a Board Resolution Resolution which authorized authorized the Executive Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and the Vice President for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of Mabini Colleges, Inc. Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the  Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that Mabini Colleges, Inc. was having financial difficulties.  Atty. Pajarillo Pajarillo sent a letter to RBP to assure the the latter of of Mabini College's College's financial financial capacity to pay the loan. RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel,  Atty. Pajarillo. Pajarillo. Mabini Colleges Colleges alleged that it was was only upon receipt of such such letter that it became aware that Atty. Pajarillo is also the legal counsel of RBP. Mabini Colleges filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pajarillo for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Pajarillo is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by Mabini Colleges, Inc. against RBP.

RULING: Yes, he represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.  Atty. Pajarillo represented represented conflicting conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the Mabini College against RBP.

G imeno v. Zaide Zaide, Adm. Case No. 10303, April 22, 2015 PNB charged Atty. Cedo, former AVP of the Asset Mgt Group of PNB with violation of CPR by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with the latter, in which Cedo during his employment with the said bank has intervened. Gimeno alleged that she was a former client of Atty. Zaide. She engaged the services of his law firm ZMZ Law Offices in an annulment case involving her husband and her parents-in-law. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship,  Atty Zaide appeared appeared against her before the Ombudsman. Ombudsman. Thus, Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients’ interests. Atty Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire her as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno was Atty Zaragosa, one of ZMZ’s partners. Issue: Whether there was a conflicting interests when Zaide appeared as counsel against Gimeno before the Ombudsman? Ruling: NO. we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when  Atty. Zaide left left ZMZ. Moreover, Moreover, the case where Gimeno Gimeno engaged engaged ZMZ's services services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman. The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title. The case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the

Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. Privileged Communication Revised Penal Code, Art.209 Canon 16 – 16 – Shall  Shall Hold in Trust Moneys and Properties of Client Civil Code, Art. 1491 Li cuana cuanan n v. Mel Melo, o, Adm. Case No. 2361, February 9, 1989 In 1979, Licuanan won a case against her tenant Aida Pineda whereby Pineda was ordered to pay the rents due to Licuanan. Pineda complied and she started paying the rents to Licuanan’s lawyer, Atty. Manuel Melo. So for 12 months, M elo received the rental payments but he did not turn over the said payments to Licuanan. Licuanan did inquire about said payment but Melo withheld information about the fact that Pineda was actually paying. As a consequence, Licuanan filed a case against Pineda. Pineda in turn filed a damage suit against Licuanan as she claims that the case filed by Licuanan against her is groundless – as she was in fact paying her rents. Eventually, Licuanan find out that Melo failed to deliver to her the rents. Licuanan then filed an affidavit complaint against Melo. Melo in his defense said that he withheld information about the rent payments for a year because he merely wanted to surprise Licuanan about the success of the collections. The Solicitor General subsequently recommended the suspension of Melo for not less than one year. ISSUE: Whether or not Melo should be

suspended.

HELD: No.

As ruled by the Supreme Court, he should be disbarred. Melo’s retaining of Licuanan’s money for more than a year breached his oath and transgressed the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such action did not merely deprive Licuanan of the use of her money but also caused her to file a groundless suit against Pineda and on top of that, Licuanan had to defend herself in a damage suit filed against her in turn by Pineda. In all, Melo’s actuations make him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment of disbarment.

Dumadagg v. Lumaya Dumada Lumaya,, Adm. Case No. 2614. May 21, 1991 Facts:

 According to complainant, complainant, he asked his then counsel, herein respondent, respondent, to prepare and file the appropriate motion for execution; however, the latter failed to do so. It was through the assistance of the court stenographer, Mr. Eleuterio Catubig, that complainant himself signed and filed the motion and later obtained the writ of execution. When the writ of execution was issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon, according to the complainant, instead of serving the same on the Avellanosas, connived with respondent attorney by selling a one (1) hectare portion of the land subject of Civil Case No. 148 to one Eleonora Astudillo to satisfy complainant's claim out of the proceeds of the sale, without however Dumadag's knowledge and consent. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Lumaya is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the CPR? Ruling: Yes. “[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility.

Dhaliwa Dhal iwall v. D uma umagg uing , Adm. Case No. 9390. August 1, 2012 Emilia Dhaliwal was having some legal issues in purchasing a parcel of land from Fil-Estate Development, Inc. Their case reached the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). She then engaged the services of Atty. Abelardo Dumaguing in the year 2000. Atty. Dumaguing was given P342,000.00 for him to consign with the HLURB. With the consignment, he filed a petition with the HLURB to compel Fil-Estate to deliver the title to Dhaliwal. However, a week later, Atty. Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB the amount of P311,819.94. In 2003, Dhaliwal terminated the services of Atty. Dumaguing. In the same year, Dhaliwal lost in the HLURB case. She then demanded Atty. Dumaguing to return her the P311,819.94 he earlier withdrew. Atty. Dumaguing refused to return said amount. Dhaliwal filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Dumaguing. In his defense, Atty. Dumaguing said that the reason why he deemed it not proper to return the said amount to Dhaliwal is that he filed a motion for reconsideration with the HLURB but the latter had not yet acted on it. Atty. Dumaguing attached a copy of the said motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing should be

disciplined.

HELD: Yes.

It was established that the attached motion for reconsideration was a mere fabrication because it did not contain proof that the same was filed with the HLURB nor was there proof that the other party was notified. Atty. Dumaguing is in violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states, among others, that: “A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” A lawyer’s

failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Atty. Dumaguing was suspended for 6 months.

 S ps C onc oncepci epci on v. Dela D ela R os a, Adm. Case No. 10681, February 3, 2015 Facts:

This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint filed by complainants Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer  A. dela Rosa (respondent), (respondent), charging charging him with gross misconduct misconduct for violating, violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow money. The checks were personally encashed by respondent. Demanded the return of payment but failed to do so. Respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose. In fine, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest. Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR. Held: YES. Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected: Rule 16.04  –   –  A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s client’ s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. ”

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any

natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligati on. A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Champertous contracts B autis ta v. G onza onzale less , Adm. Matter No. 1625. February 12, 1990 Facts:  Atty. Gonzales Gonzales is the lawyer lawyer of the Fortunados Fortunados in a civil case wherein wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation. Issue:

Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is valid Held: No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados. However, the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce t he client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

Lien for Attorney’s Fees Tanhueco Tanhue co v. De D umo umo,, Adm. Case No. 1437, April 25, 1989 Facts: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for his refusal to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as a counsel in certain collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may be able to collect from

debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not turn over the P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s fee. Issue: Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive. Held: De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50 % is more than half of the total amount due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because he took advantage of his client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to be unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of the court has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Thus, De Dumo is suspended from the practice of law for six months and the attorney’s fee is reduced to 15% of the total amount collected by him. He is also ordered to return the P 10, 200.00 net amount of the P 12, 000.00 he collected and entitled of 15% attorney’s fee in case he made any other collection from Tanhueco’s debtors

Canon 17 – 17 – Fidelity to Client’s Cause  Manalang  Manal ang , et al al.. v. A ng eles eles,, Adm. Case No. 1558, March 10, 2003 FACTS: Manalang and Cirilo (petitioners) filed a case against their employer, Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, for their overtime and separation pay before the NLRC and Francisco Angeles (respondent) was their counsel.

They obtained a favorable judgment and their employer was asked to pay Php 6,500. However, Atty. Angeles compromised and was only able to collect Php 5,500 and it was allegedly obtained without the consulting his clients. OSG conducted several hearings but respondent only appeared 3 times. It was then transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Neither party appeared despite prior due notice. The Committee issued a resolution recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his cl ients’ fund? RULING: YES. A lawyer must possess standards for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.  Also, the respondent exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his

clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights (violating Canon 17). Moreover, he consistently failed to appear at the hearings and more importantly, failed to deliver upon the demand of Php 4,550 (minus fees) intended for his clients. This demonstrated lack of integrity and propriety

 S olat olatan an v. Inoc I nocentes entes , Adm. Case No. 6504, August 9, 2005 FACTS:  Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG.

They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito  Apartments.  Apartments. Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. Apartments. She left  the apartment to Solatan and other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded at torney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees. Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with  Atty. Camano enforced enforced the writ of execution execution and levied the properties properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment.  Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant complainant presented presented an affidavit affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and  Atty.Inocentes.  Atty.Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors Governors resolved resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 yearand to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Camano violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? HELD:

 All lawyers lawyers must observe observe loyalty in in all transactions transactions and and dealings dealings with their clients.

 An attorney has no right right to act as counsel counsel or legal legal representative representative for a person person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case. The advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.

Vi ll llafue afuerte rte v. C ortez , Adm. Case No. 3455, April 14, 1998 Facts: Complainant Arsenio Villafuerte seeks for the disbarment of Atty. Dante H. Cortez because he perceived that the respondent, Atty. Dante H. Cortez neglected the handling of his cases despite receiving P 1,750.00 acceptance and retainers fee. Complainant went to the office of respondent lawyer to discuss his case for "reconveyance". During their initial meeting, complainant reconstructed the incidents of the case merely from memory so the respondent lawyer asked him to return another day with the records. Complainant requested respondent to accept the case, paying the sum of P1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee. Respondent averred that he accepted the money reluctance and only upon the condition that complainant would get the records of the case as well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of Atty. Jose Dizon, the former counsel of complainant.  Allegedly,  Allegedly, Complainant Complainant never showed up thereafter thereafter until he went to the office of respondent but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in the civil case, a case for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never priorly mentioned to him by complainant. Respondent said he had never entered his appearance in the case. IBP-CBD concluded that the facts established would just the same indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of duty on the part of respondent. The IBP-CBD recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three months with a warning Issue: Whether or not Respondent Lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law? Held: YES. The Court is convinced that a lawyer-client relationship has already arisen between respondent and complainant. His acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. It would not matter really whether the money has been

intended to pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or to include Civil Case No. 062160-CV, there being no showing, in any event, that respondent lawyer has attended to either of said cases. It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find out what might have happened to his client's cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility has stated that a "lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence” decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."

Canon 18 – 18 – Competence  Competence and Diligence R eont eontoy oy v. I ba badl dlit  it , Adm. Case CBD No. 190, January 28, 1998 FACTS:  An adverse adverse decision decision was rendered by the trial court against the client of Atty. Ibadlit. He did not appeal the decision because of his opinion that to appeal would be futile. An administrative complaint was later filed by Atty. Ibadlit’s client against him for failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. ISSUE:  Whether a lawyer may refuse to file an appeal on behalf of his client when in his opinion to make an appeal would be futile. HELD: No. It was highly improper for him to have adopted such opinion since a lawyer is without authority to waive his client’s right to appeal a nd his failure to appeal within the prescribed period constituted constitu ted negligence and malpractice. Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 0f the CPR “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” liab le.”

 Moton v. C adiao, Adm. Case No. 5169. November 24, 1999 FACTS: On August 14, 1990, when the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, the complainants counsel, Atty. Raymundo D. Cadiao, failed to appear, hence, the court dismissed the case. On August 15, 1990, Atty. Cadiao filed with the trial court an entry of appearance for the complainant and a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case.

 Acting on the motion, motion, the court court set aside aside the August 14, 14, 1990 order order of dismissal dismissal and reset the pre-trial conference on May 5, 1991. On August 2, 1991, Atty. Cadiao filed a motion to reset the hearing from August 13, 1991 to August 26, 27, 28 or 29, 1991, for the reason that he had to attend a scheduled hearing in Antique.

 At the hearing hearing of the motion on August 9, 1991, respondent respondent was was absent because because he had left for Antique. Therefore, the court denied the motion to reset hearing. A subsequent motion for reconsideration with prayer to set case for reception of evidence was similarly denied. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Cadiao violated Canon 18 of the CPR? RULING:

YES. Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility  provides that a lawyer lawye r shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render rend er him h im liable. In this case, by reason of Atty. Cadiaos negligence, actual loss has been caused to his client Elmo S. Moton. He should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is why a practising lawyer may accept only so many cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyers oath. In light of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, declaring respondent liable for negligence in the handling h andling of complainants case. Hernandez Her nandez v. P adill adilla a, Adm.Case No. 9387. June 20, 2012 Facts: This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Pa dilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

In a Decision dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay pa y the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney’s fees and mor al al damages. Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. The y chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution dated 16 December 2003.  No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing dismissing the appeal was filed  by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with “deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law.” Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed  them of the adverse decision. de cision. Complainant further claims that she asked

respondent “several times” about the status of the appeal, but “despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. Issue: Whether or not Rules 18.02 and 18.04 were violated? Ruling:  YES. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was n ot complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he h e had agreed to handle. h andle. If he felt he did not n ot have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the  proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to “beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.”

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining h is side by filing a comment, as ordered  by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the th e husband since the filing of the latter’s Memorandum of Appeal. This explanation does not excuse excuse respondent’s actions. R espondent, espondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads: Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s client’s request for information.

E dquiba dquiball v. Ferrer , Adm. Case No. 5687, February 3, 2005 FACTS: Edquibal charged Atty. Ferrer with professional misconduct and neglect of duty. Edquibal engaged the services of Ferrer to assist his mother Ursula in cases she filed against his sister Delia involving a certain property. In one of the cases, the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother.

 Atty. Ferrer then advised complainant complainant to appeal to the CA and that the cost involved is P4,000. When complainant Edquibal informed respondent Atty. Ferrer that he does not have enough money, Atty. ferrer said P2,000 is sufficient. Edquibal followed up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure to file the required appellant’s brief. appellant’s  brief. Respondent Atty. Ferrer denied that tha t he filed an appeal. He claimed claim ed that he never agreed to t o handle the appeal. ISSUE:W/n Atty. Ferrer is guilty of professional misconduct, thus violating Canon 18 of the CPR?

HELD: YES. Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for Edquibal. The resolution of the CA clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel for defendants-appelants requiring him to file appellants brief wihtin 45 days from receipt thereof, was received by him...".

However, respondent failed to file the appellants' brief despite receipt of such notice. Sec 2 rule44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the counsel of the parties in the court of origin shall be considered their counsel in the CA. If it were true that Atty. Ferrer did not agree to represent Edquibals, why did he not file with the CA a motion to withdraw as their counsel? The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence. All that is required is ordinary diligence expected of a bonus pater familias.

B arbuco v. B el eltra tran, n, Adm. Case No. 5092, August 11, 2004 Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent Beltran for malpractice of law. Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of  Appeals from the decision of the Regional Regional Trial Court of Cavite, which adverese to the complainants interest. On the same day, complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees. However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant's brief. The brief was only filed by respondent 43 days after the deadline of submission of the same. When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade liability by alleging that he met a vehicular accident, which incapacitated him for several days, thus he cannot finish the appellants brief. Moreover, he sustained injuries in the head, which as a result respondent lost track of schedules of hearings and deadlines for submitting briefs. Issue: Whether or not respondent's failure to file appellant's brief warrants sanctions. Held: Yes. the SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered

physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. lawyer. As such, respondent could could have asked any of his partners in the law law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.  A lawyer’s fidelity fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within within the bounds of the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

 S uarez v. C our ourtt of A ppeals ppeals,, G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993 Romina M. Suarez was charged twice in a crime for a violation of B.P. 22 or the  Anti-Bouncing  Anti-Bouncing Check Law. Suarez pleaded “not guilty” to all informations again st her and posted bail in all the cases and was granted a provisional liberty. She did not appear in court despite of the notices sent to her. Her counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San Luis appeared in her behalf from the time of the prosecution’s presentation presentati on of its evidence at the time of the defense’ presentation of evidence. Hearing was postponed because of the absence of the private prosecutor and the continuation of the hearing was reset. Copies were sent to Suarez and her counsel. Suarez was represented by Atty. Zamar at the reading of the sentence. Suarez was arrested and detained. Suarez represented by a new counsel de parte filed 3 motions which RTC denied. Suarez appealed to the Court of Appeals only to affirm RTC’s decision. Suarez filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Prosecutor is liable under the CPR? HELD: Yes, Atty. San Luis, counsel de parte of Suarez failed to discharge his duties as counsel. Suarez’ counsel was negligent in abandoning the conduct of the case without formally withdrawing or at least informing her that he would be permanently staying in the USA so that Suarez could appoint another counsel. Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

 Atty. San Luis was unquestionably unquestionably negligent in the performanc pe rformance e of his duties to his client Suarez. His negligence consisted in failure to attend the hearings of the case, failure to advise his client that he was going to stay abroad and failure to withdraw properly as counsel for Suarez.

 As a general rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case during trial, but as an exception, a new trial may be granted where the incompetency of counsel is so great that the accused is prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his defense.

P erea v. A lm lma adro, Adm. Case No. 5246, March 20, 2003 Facts: Complaint for disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea against Atty. Ruben Almadro for gross neglect of his duties as lawyer of herein complainant.

Respondent was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 99) where he (complainant Perea) is being charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. On February 26, 1996, the said RTC issued an order granting Atty. Almadros motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence within ten (10) days from said date. All the while, complainant thought that respondent filed said demurrer and the case against him dismissed. Complainant suffered financially and emotionally due to respondents neglect of his duties. Respondent has not attended any of his hearings which led complainant to plead with respondent to withdraw formally as his counsel so he could hire another lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadros neglect, complainant is now facing the loss of his freedom and livelihood. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Almadro is liable of violating Canon 18 of the CPR? RULING:

YES. It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer failed to submit a demurrer to evidence for which he had earlier asked permission from the trial court and which his client, herein complainant was relying on. More than that, he failed to contact his client and to apprise the latter about the developments of the case leaving complainant completely surprised and without any protection when years later, he received summons from the trial court asking him to present evidence in his defense and, not long after, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.  An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.

B lanza v. A rcang el, Adm. Case No. 492, September 5, 1967 FACTS

 Atty. Agustin Arcangel, Arcangel, respondent, volunteered volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza and Maria Passion, complainants, in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and refused to surrender the papers when asked by the complainants six years later. ISSUE:

WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance. RULING:

No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against respondent. But the Court cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of the law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.

Nonato Nonat o v. Fudolin, J r ., ., Adm. Case No. 10138, June 16, 2015 Facts: The father of the complainant, the late Restituto Nonato, was the owner of real property at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The property became a subject of ejectment proceedings before the MTC of Hinigaran. Restituto was represented by Atty. Garcia but was replaced by Atty. Fudolin during the pre-trial stage. The complainant alleged that Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees but no formal retainer agreement was executed and did not issue any receipts for the acceptance fees paid. The respondent alleged that he received the minimal acceptance fee of P20,000 and appearance fee of P1,000, and that he engaged his services to Restituto because they were relatives. During the pendency of the case he failed to inform Restituto of the status and developments in the case, Restituto could not contact him, and he failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. MTC dismissed Restituto’s complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent could be held liable for negligence in the performance of duty.

Held: The Supreme Court adopted the findings of IBP except for the recommended penalty. The respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as Restituto's counsel and his alibis were unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Respondent is then suspended for 2 years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18, and Canon 17 of the Code. He is also warned that the commission of similar acts will be dealt more severely and is directed to formally Manifest to the Court the date of receipt which shall be the starting point of his suspension

Canon 19 – 19 – Represent  Represent With Zeal Within Bounds of Law Ongg v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002 On FACTS:

This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. They, however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have leverage in his actions against the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Unto’s acts constitute malpractice. HELD: Yes. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate, or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding

Canon 20 – 20 – Charge  Charge Only Fair and Reasonable Fees Nature of attorney’s fees

 Metropolita  Metropoli tan n B ank & Tru T russ t C o. v. C our ourtt of A ppeals , G.R. Nos. 86100-03, Facts:

Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari  after   after the Court of  Appeals ruled that petitioner petitioner should pay the certain amountbased amountbased on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorn ey’s fees, based on quantum meruit , which precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent, Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES: Whether or not: (1) respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney’s fees;

RATIO: No. Charging lien, to be enforcea ble as security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client The persons who are entitled to or w ho must pay attorney’s fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their propriety pr opriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

Right to compensation  A lbano v. C oloma, Adm. Case No. 528, October 11, 1967 FACTS:

 A proceeding proceeding for disbarment disbarment was filed by complainant complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In his letter complaint, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation he and his mother retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in a civil case. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney’s  attorney’s   fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document

showing that they as well as their co/plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her a contingent fee of whatever could be recovered in damages. ISSUE:

Whether or not a lawyer may be removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity? RULING:

No, a lawyer cannot be removed without just cause. The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case, it is complainant and his co/plaintiffs who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter’s  latter’s   contingent attorney’s  attorney’s   fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already alre ady won for them said case ca se in the trial court and the Court of  Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity authenticity and genuineness genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney’s  attorney’s   fees. Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy wort hy of his hire, hi re, is entitled to be fully recompensed recompe nsed for his services.

C orpuz v. C ourt of of Appea A ppeals ls , G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980  A qui quino no v. C as asaba abar  r , G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015 FACTS: - June 27, 2002, Atty. Domingo (now deceased) verbally contracted petitioner to represent him in an agrarian case on a contingency fee basis - The case was for the determination of just compensation for the expropriation and taking of Atty. Domingo’s ricelands consisting of 60.5348 hectares in Guimba, Nueva Ecija by the DAR pursuant to PD 27 - Meanwhile, on September 30, 2007, Atty. Domingo died - Petitioner filed a Manifestation dated December 11, 2007 of the fact of Atty. Domingo's death and the substitution of the latter by his legal heirs, Ma. Ala F. Domingo and Margarita Irene F. Domingo (private respondents) - He then requested her to inform the Land Bank of the segregation of petitioner's thirty percent (30%) contingent attorney's fees out of the increase of the just compensation for the subject property, or thirty percent (30%) of the total increase - Petitioner executed an Affidavit dated August 10, 2009, attesting to the circumstances surrounding the legal services he has rendered for the deceased Atty. Domingo and the successful prosecution of the Agrarian case ISSUE WON atty lien can be demanded?

RULING Yes. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. The award that the court may grant to a successful succ essful party by way of attorney’s fee attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his cause in court. In the instant case, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner is the compensation for professional services rendered, and not an indemnity for damages. Petitioner is claiming payment from private respondents for the successful outcome of the agrarian case which he represented. There is no valid reason why public respondent cannot pass upon a proper petition to determine attorney's fees considering that it is already familiar with the nature and the extent of petitioner's legal services.

Power of Court to fix attorney’s fees

 Mendoza-P ark arker er v. C our ourtt of A ppeals , G.R. No. 109219, March 11, 1994 FACTS On December 18, 1989, private respondents Tan Ng and Teresita S. Riosa, represented by Atty. Efren Barangan, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Quezon City, an action for collection of a sum of money with foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Demetrio G. Alcaras and Julieta Alcaras (Civil Case No. Q-894287). On July 29, 1990, while the case was still at the pretrial stage, Atty. Barangan withdrew his appearance and petitioner took over the case as substitute counsel. On January 19, 1991, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted and judgment was rendered on May 23, 1991 in favor of private respondents. The trial court also awarded private respondents the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fee

ISSUE: W/N the Court can fix the attorney’s fees?

RULING:

YES. A lawyer, being an officer of the court, is placed under judicial control with regard to the reasonableness of the amount of the attorney's fees demanded by him from his client

The determination of the attorney's fees depends on various factors like: the amount and character of the services rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property involved in the controversy; the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; the professional standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the payment of the fees is contingent or absolute

Retainer’s fee

R esea esearch rch and S ervices R ea eallty, Inc. v. C ourt of A ppe ppea als , G.R. No. 124074, January 27, 1997 Attorney’s fees as contract and as award for damages Trader’s Royal Bank Employees Union -Indepe -Independent ndent v. NL R C , G.R. No. 120592, March 14, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz entered into a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). A complaint was filed by petitioner. NLRC favored the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the SC. The SC deleted the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. After private respondent received the decision decision of the SC he notified the petitioner union, the TRB and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of holiday pay differential, he filed a motion before LA for the determination of his attorney’s fees, praying that 10% of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney’s fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him. Petitioner opposed opposed said motion. LA favored private private respondent. Petitioner appealed to NLRC but NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. Hence the petition at bar. 

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ISSUE: Is the private respondent entitled to Atty.’s fees aside from his retainer fee? 

RULING: Yes. There are 2 commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so -called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. Private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the LA and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in their retainer’s agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the services. 

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WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees to private

Attorney’s Lien, When & where claimed Rules of Court, Rule 138, sec.37 Canon 21 – 21 – Client  Client Confidence and Secrets R eg ala la,, et al. al. v. S andig anba nbayan yan , G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996 [read also dissenting opinion] FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the  ACCRA lawyers t he same conditions availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their clients. ISSUE Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and disclosure of such is unethical. RULING The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions: 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. 2) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under the first and third exception. The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of privileged communication.

P al alm m v. Ileda Iledan, n, J r., Adm. Case No. 8242. October 2, 2009 FACTS:  Rebecca J. Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests. The basis of the claim of breach of the lawyer-client relationship occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.

ISSUE:  Whether or not (a) respondent violated the Confidentiality of LawyerClient Relationship; and (b) respondent is guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client RULING:  No. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respo ndent during the stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 22 – 22 – Withdrawal  Withdrawal of Services for Good Cause and Upon Notice Laput v. R amot motig ig ue, Adm. Case No. 219, September 29, 1962 FACTS : Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG  with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer.

In May 1952, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty. Laput to handle her case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings. Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barrera’s counsel . ISSUE : Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases. HELD : No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow.

Besides, the petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. The SC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance

G onza onzagg a v. V ill illa anue nueva va,, J r., Adm. Case No. 1954, July 23, 2004 Venterez, et al al.. v. C os me me,, Adm. Case No. 7421. October 10, 2007 Facts:

A complaint filed by complainants against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty. Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981. They alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. Complainant Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. However said motion was denied. On Zenaida C. de Vera, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted. Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.wFeeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint against him.c Issue:

Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary action. Ruling:

Yes, respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary action. Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record. All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.

Doming Dom ing o v. A quino quino,, G.R. No. L-28078. April 29, 1971 On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special

administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from the available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."

Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court of Appeals, insofar as it was adverse to them, and on January on  January 20, 1967, the appellate court found for respondent as appellant, and affirmed the lower court's judgment with modifications in favor of respondent. According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate  proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court. Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March on  March 9, 1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," and that Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said  judgment on her counsel instead of on o n Atty. Unson as the former special administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for re hearing or reconsideration;" and  praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former  joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the appellate court's decision. Upon due opposition of respondent on the ground of finality of the judgment, the appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration per its resolution of   April 27, 1967 .  No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later when on September 23, 1967 , after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in his favor by the appellate court, it filed the present petition. Upon the representations  —   contrary to the records  —  that   that the appellate court had granted "new or further relief" in favor of respondent by awarding compound interest on the sum due respondent and that Atty. Unson has ceased to be the estate's lawyer since May 21, 1963 with the removal of the former administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr. as such, the Court issued on October 3, 1967, the corresponding summons and required respondents to answer the petition. The court finds no merit in the petition.  Notice and copy of the appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, were therefore duly served b y registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of record at 307 Trinity Building, San Luis, Ermita, Manila, in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court. 3 And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal on  May 21, 1963, when she became the sole administrator (which she previously shared with Luis from December 21, 1961), or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court. Her very motion for substitution filed on  March 9, 1967 with the appellate court after its decision of  January 20, 1967 recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its adverse decision and merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate.

One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has obviously failed to appreciate, wittingly or otherwise, is that the party in the subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as administrator, did not make him the  personal counsel of Luis. Thus, T hus, notwit hstanding Luis' removal as administrator, admini strator, Atty. Unson continued t o represent the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did. It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that the appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or without jurisdiction or that this Court send for the records from the appellate court "for purposes of review and thereafter render its own decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]" notwithstanding its long having become final and executory, is utterly untenable and without legal justification.

Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition in Pajares in Pajares vs. Abad Santos, 6 and other cases cited therein, to wit, that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.'" WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs.

Obando Oba ndo v. Fi g uera uerass , G.R. No. 134854. January 18, 2000