Del Castillo Case_digest Part 1

Republic of the Philippines Vs. Yang Chi Hao, G.R. No. 165332. October 2, 2009 a nd this was opposed FACTS: A petition for naturalization was filed by respondents and by the OSG. The RTC ruled against the respondents but later on reversed itself in an MR and granted the petition. Instead of filing an appeal, OSG filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that it was grave abuse of discretion when RTC reversed itself when there was no submission of any additional evidence. OSG also contended that there was no need to appeal because ROC applies only suppletory to naturalization law. ISSUE:

was resort to rule 65 proper?

to petitioner’s contention, appeal is mandatory in naturalization laws as mandated under Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Re vised Naturalization Law. Also, a decision granting a petition for naturalization becomes executory only two years after its promulgation. As such, petitioner is not without a remedy to a ssail the grant of citizenship. In addition, it may also move to have the naturalization certificate cancelled in the proper proceedings, if it can be shown that the certificate was obtained fraudulently.

RULING: No. Contrary

It must be noted that Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy and may only be availed of if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate a dequate remedy.

G.R. No. 175319. January 15, 2010 People of the Philippines Vs. Joselito Noque y Gomez, 2nd Division FACTS: In a buy-bust operation, law enforcers was able

to recover dangerous drugs from accused. He was charged with violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425 that define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. However the allegations in the Information refer to sale and possession of shabu while the drug proven on trial was ephedrine. This prompted accused to file a dismissal of the case. WoN appellant’s conviction for the sale and possession of shabu, despite the fact that what was established and proven was the sale and possession of ephedrine, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and a nd cause of the accusations against him since the charges in the Informations are for se lling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride.

ISSUE:

RULING: No. It must be noted that

the offenses designated in the Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and possession of shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the qualifying phrase which is a regulated drug. Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale sa le and illegal

possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.

G.R. No. 179792. March 5, 2010 LNS International Manpower Services Vs. Armando Padua, Jr., 2nd Division FACTS: Respondent Armando C. Padua, Jr.

filed a Sworn Statement before the Adjudication Office of the POEA against LNS and Sharikat Al Saedi International Manpower (Sharikat) for violation of Section 2(b), (d), and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and E mployment of Land-based Overseas Workers. Respondent Padua alleged that he a pplied as auto electrician with petitioner LNS and assured of a job in Saudi Arabia. Respondent paid to LNS the processing fees, medical expenses, and trade test. Respondent Padua further alleged that it was another agency, Sharikat, which processed his papers and eventually deployed him to Saudi Arabia. However, he returned to the Philippines because he was not allegedly paid his salaries and also because of violations in the terms and conditions of his employment contract. In its answer, LNS admitted that Padua applied for employment abroad but he withdrew all the documents he submitted to LNS. As proof, LNS attached the withdrawal letter duly signed by Padua. Thus, LNS claimed that it could not be held liable for non-issuance of receipt or misrepresentation. The POEA issued its order finding LNS liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation. As to Sharikat, the POEA found no sufficient evidence to hold it liable for the violations charged. On appeal to the Secretary of DOLE, it dismissed the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the POEA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed. ISSUE: Is petitioner liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation? RULING: No. As a general rule,

factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies specializing in their respective fields, especially when affirmed by the CA, must be accorded high respect, if not finality. However, the Court find out that the factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record or are not supported by substantial evidence, as in the instant case. The self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations of respondent cannot defeat the concrete evidence submitted by petitioner. In fine, for failure to adduce any shred of evidence of payment made to petitioner, or that petitioner referred or endorsed respondent for employment abroad to another agency, the charges of non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation against petitioner could not possibly prosper. By the voluntary withdrawal of respondent’s application from petitioner, the latter could not have been involved in the recruitment and placement of respondent and consequently could not be held liable for any violation.

G.R. No. 165300. April 23, 2010 Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer Vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz, et al., 2nd Division FACTS: The Diazes, represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him a

loan of P1,118,228.00 secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner post-dated checks to secure payment of said loan. Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above mentioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at the back of the TCT. The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante. At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s daughter Comandante. However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Is a waiver of

hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid?

RULING: Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of

the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened. (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor. The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 13 47 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 167567. September 22, 2010 San Miguel Corporation Vs. Bartolome Puzon, Jr, First Division FACTS: Puzon purchased SMC products on credit. To ensure payment and as

business practice, SMC required him to issued postdate checks equivalent to the value of the products purchase on credit before the same were released to him. Said checks were returned to puzon when the transaction covered by these checks were paid or settled in full. Puzon issued 2 checks for such transaction. On January 23, 2001 Puzon, together with his accountant visited SMC Sales Office to allegedly set tle his account and requested to see the two checks he issued. However, when he got hold of the checks, he immediately left the office bringing the checks with him. SMC sent a letter demanding the return of the checks but was ignored by Puzon, hence a case for theft was filed against him. ISSUE: WoN the postdated checks issued by Puzon transferred ownership to

petitioner making him liable for theft? RULING: No, the check still belongs to

Puzon, hence not liable of theft. Negotiable Instruments Law provides: Sec. 12. Antedated and postdated- The instrument is not

invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or postdated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery. (Underscoring supplied.)Note however that delivery as the term is used in the aforementioned provision means that the party delivering did so for the purpose of giving effect thereto. Otherwise, it cannot be said that there has been delivery of the negotiable instrument. Once there is delivery, the person to whom the instrument is delivered gets the title to the instrument completely and irrevocably. If the subject check was given by Puzon to SMC in payment of the obligation, the purpose of giving effect to the instrument is evident thus title to or ownership of the check was transferred upon delivery. However, if the check was not given as payment, but being mere security for debt, there being no intent to give effect to the instrument, then ownership of the check was not transferred to SMC. The evidence of SMC failed to establish that the check was given n payment of the obligation of Puzon. There was no provisional receipt of official receipt issued for the amount of the check.

People v. Duran, GR 175834, June 8, 2011 – First Division FACTS: AAA was allegedly raped by her step father during the 1 st ,

2nd and 3rd week of March 2001. However upon cross-examination on the victim, she gave different dates and other facts not consistent with her direct testimony with regard to rape incidents on the first and second week of March 2001. This prompted the accused to file a dismissal based on such inconsistencies. Plaintiff’s argued that such matters are not material and inconsequential to their case. ISSUE: WoN such inconsistencies are enough to cast

reasonable doubt and hence

acquit the accused for the first and second week? RULING: Yes. The records show that such inconsistencies, during the cross

examination and the re-direct examination of the plaintiff, were apparent and should have been given scant consideration. The witnesses’ testimony is totally different from what she said during the cross-examination and was a lso different from what she said during the re-direct. The Court was not convinced.

Jose R. Catacutan Vs. People of the Philippines, GR 175991, Aug. 31, 2011 – First Division FACTS: Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held

guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement the promotion and appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment,

contending that he was denied due process when he was not allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative case against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019,

was well founded despite the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as evidence. HELD: The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued

by CHED was attended by ill motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was affirmed by the sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence presented before it. The non-admittance of the dismissal of the administrative case did not violate petitioner’s right to due process where such dismissal was not relevant to the adjudication of the criminal case. After all, administrative proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to criminal proceedings, the judgment in one is not dependent on the other. Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: 1.that the accused was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury was caused to another party because of such act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADRIANO CABRILLAS, BENNY CABTALAN, G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012, DIVISION FACTS: Accused Adriano and Benny killed and

stabbed to death the victim. In the presentation of witness for the prosecution, witness Wilfredo testified that both men took turns in stabbing the victim while witness Jonalyn testified that both men stabbed the victim in unison. Accused Benny also asserts that Wilfredo is not credible since he only surfaced 3 years after the incident to testify against accused. ISSUE: WoN minor inconsistencies pertaining to trivial matters affect the credibility

of witnesses as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime? RULING: No. Anent the first issue, the

inconsistency merely pertains to the manner the fatal stab wounds was inflicted on the victim. It is perfectly natural for different witness to testify on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details since it all depends on the observing position of the witness. Anent the second issue, a deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. Absence of other circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere concoction and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to discredit his testimony.

Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel vs. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 174893 July 11, 2012, Division FACTS: Petitioner is occupying a managerial position in the company. Due to some

communication mishap with her superiors in which altercation ensued, she was ordered dismissed on the basis of lack of confidence. Petitioner now assails the validity of her dismissal saying that there is no substantial evidence to establish valid ground for her dismissal since various emails from her superiors illustrating her accomplishments and commendations, as well as her “good” overall performance rating negate loss of trust and confidence. She also insists that she was not afforded due process since no investigation and hearing was conducted as required by company policy. ISSUE: WoN the company validly terminated petitioner? RULING: Yes. Anent the first issue,

an employer has a distinct prerogative and wider latitude of discretion in dismissing managerial personnel who performs functions which by their nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. As distinguished from rank and file personnel, mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has breached the trust of the employer justifies dismissal. “Loss of confidence” as a ground for dismissal does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt as the law requires only that there be at least some basis to justify it. When petitioner delivered dismal performance and displayed poor work attitude as attested to by his co-workers, such constitute sufficient reasons for an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Anent the second issue, petitioner’s contention is without merit. Jurisprudence has held that due process requirement is met when there is simply an opportunity to be heard and to explain one’s side even if no hearing is conducted.