Dagpin Case Digest

dagpin

[G.R. No. 154898. February 16, 2005] CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, v s .  PASTOR B. TINAYA, r e s p o n d e n t . 1.

FACTS: The Respondent Pastor B. Tinaya, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal FACTS: assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste. The CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment on December 1, 1993 but only as temporary effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. Respondent’s temporary appointment was made due to respondent’s non -submission of his service record with respect to his three (3) years work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor as required in the CSC qualified standards. Respondent’s appointment was approved on the same day and took his oath and assumed the duties of his office. On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste. On November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994 the incumbent Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence. Then Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban acted as Mayor of the Municipality. n June 4, 1999, respondent requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service record. The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor Bienvenido Balderian. This prompted respondent to report the matter to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII with a request to co nduct an “on-the-spot “on-the-spot physical audit” of the municipal employees’ 201 files. In response, the CSC scheduled an audit on August 3, 1999. As scheduled, the CSC’s Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among others, that the matter matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the recall order but the same was denied. On appeal, CSC Central Office rendered its resolution affirming the CSC Regional Office No. VIII Order dated November 9, 1999. This prompted the Respondent to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. On March 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside the Resolutions of CSC Regional Office and CSC Central Office respectively. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in their decision on March 21, 2002 for Setting Aside the assailed resolutions of Civil Service Commission. RULING: Petitioner CSC contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent’s original appointment as municipal assessor on November 16, 1993 is permanent granting him security of tenure; and in declaring that his subsequent appointment on December 1, 1994 does not violate the rule on nepotism. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner CSC and held that under Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.” With respect to petitioner’s recall of respondent’s new permanent appointment dated December 1, 1994 by reason of nepotism, the Court finds the new appointment is in violation of Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law. The Petition for review on certiorari of the CSC through the Solicitor General is GRANTED. The challenged decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED REVERSED.. The Resolutions of CSC are AFFIRMED AFFIRMED..

G.R. NO. 81467, OCTOBER 27, 1989NARCISO Y. SANTIAGO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LEONARDA A. JOSE, RESPONDENTS.

2.

The vacant position of Commissioner Wigberto Tanada to FACTS:

Customs

Collector

III

prompted

then

the

Customs

extend a permanent promotional appointment to herein

 petitioner Santiago. The said appointment was approved by the CSC prior to his  promotional appointment Santiago held the position of Customs Collector I, herein respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II filed a protest before the Merit Systems Promotion Boardagainst Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board referred the  protest to Commissioner Tanada for appropriate action. Commissioner Tanada upheld Santiago's promotional appointment. Respondent Jose then appealed to the Board, which, decided to revoke the petitioner Santiago's appointment and directed that respondent Jose  be appointed in his stead. Hence Petitioner Santiago filed a petition for review on certiorari before the court. ISSUE: Whether or not Santiago's promotional appointment should be upheld RULING: The Court finds the petition to have merit. That petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs Collector III should be upheld. Foregoing decisions states that there is “no mandator y nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that  persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment.”  The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide-latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

RAMON L. LABO, JR. PETITIONER V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND ROBE RTO ORTEGA, RESPONDENTS. 3.

Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched hiscandidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Petitioner Ortega,on other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office.Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec,on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Comelec decided in favor of Ortega. Facts:

Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified to run for Mayor; 2) Whether Ortega having the next highest number of votes is entitled to be  proclaimed Mayor upon Labo’s disqualification. ISSUES:

One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari file by petitioner Labo is DISMISSED   for the following reasons. (1) Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an al ien. His ele ction does no t auto matically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable req ui rem ent fo r holding public office. (2) The dis qu ali fic ati on of pe tit ion er Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to pro clam atio n as the Mayo r. Whil e Orte ga ma y ha ve ga rn er ed th e se co nd highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was n ot th e cho ice o f the s ove reign will. Soun d pol icy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and nom e a s u r e c a n b e d e c l a r e d c a r r i e d u n l e s s h e o r i t r e c e i v e s a m a j o r i t y o r plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. RULING:

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner v. COMMISSION ON ELECT IONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, Respondents. 4.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the p o s i t i o n o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e F i r s t D i s t r i c t o f L e y t e . M o n t e j o , t h e incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancella tion and Disqualification “alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. He contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made b y her in Voter Registration Record 94  No.3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. Mrs. Marcos fil ed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing th e en tr y "se ve n" months to "since childhood", however, the ProvincialElection Supervisor of Leyte informed her that the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on Ma rch 20 , 199 5. C OMELEC s ustaine d Montejo. FACTS:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the elections ISSUES:

Residence means domicile in election laws. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a giv en place for various purposes. The abs ence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile. The Resolution of the COMELEC in this petition is REVERSED and RULING:

SET ASIDE.

MARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. G.R. No. 95398,August 16, 1991 5.

Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of Phase I of the home Technology Building of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang, Leyte, for the price of P488, 000. Pablo Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost. Narido, however, failed to sign as a Witness to the contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 968. FACTS:

While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter dated  November 8, 1983 addressed to Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000 equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the cost of labor and construction materials. The petitioner then sent a letter asking for the approval of the Regional Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved. The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion of the construction which the petitioner granted. However, the contractor later gave up the project mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things, increased cost of construction

materials and labor. The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount  paid for the construction of a public school building on the ground that the infrastructure contract is null and void for want of one signature. ISSUE:

The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond Construction is enforceable and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to  personally pay for the building already constructed. In the case before the court, the chief accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds but failed to sign the contract as witness. But since Section 86 states that the certificate shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his signature to the contract was somehow made up by his own certification which is the  basic and more important validating document. The Court agreed with the petitioner's view that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. RULING:

HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, Respondent. 6.

FACTS: On

June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner The lma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioner’s term of of fice would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.”Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit Enbanc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be  properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion.

ISSUE: The

basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civi l Serv ice Comm issio n, und er an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. ACCORDINGLY , The Court REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto  officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000. RULING:

JOSE C. LAUREL V, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BATANGAS, Petitioner, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LORENZO SANGALANG, Respondent. 7.

FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868. ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation? RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service. Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to

fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. The before the Court petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the challenged Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED.

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, represented by its Chairman EDGARDO J. ANGARA vs.THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO A. AQUINO 8.

FACTS: The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction. RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections." In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not. The assailed COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. 9.

FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision whether the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people. ISSUES:

This petition does not comply with the provision of the Constitution  particularly onwith Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people. Sec. 2, Art. XVII is the RULING:

governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American  jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a  petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the  people through initiative upon petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition  by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. Fi rst, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a  petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before –   not after –  signing.

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent. 10.

FACTS: The petitioners raised in Court that E.O. No. 1, which created the Truth Commission, should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its functions. The petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. They also asserted the fact that the role of the president, as stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office, which was inexistent before, the "Truth Commission".  According to them, the said Executive Order violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.

The respondents, on the other hand, contested that E.O. No. 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create a public office because the President's executive power and power of control necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed. More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers as alleged by the petitioners. They strongly argue that the said Executive Order, is valid and constitutional. ISSUES: Does E.O. No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office? RULING: No. E.O. No 1 does not transgress on the power of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office. In the said E.O., there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations existing funds already appropriated. Thus, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. According to the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission," and thus, will be subject to auditing rules and regulations. However, the Court stressed that, "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing its goals is simply irreconcilable with the constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be

allowed. The Court cannot just run a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Hence, the petitions were GRANTED.

Posted by rsb at 3:35 AM No comments: Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to Facebook Links to this post SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2012

hernandez CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 135805, APRIL 29, 1999 FACTS: On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. On January 28, 1997,the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism. RULING: 

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered in the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.

[ G.R. NO. 96298, MAY 14, 1991 ] RENATO M. LAPINID, PETITIONER, VS.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND JUANITO JUNSAY, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment. In the comparative evaluation sheets, the parties were evaluated according to the following criteria, namely: eligibility; education; work experience; productivity/performance/attendance; integrity; initiative/leadership; and physical characteristics/personality traits. It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78). Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the authority to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter  RULING: 

 Appointment is an essentially discretionar y power and must be performed by the of ficer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents. FACTS: Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The  Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. RULING: The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the  jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter !!, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:  A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: X X X... (b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided hat they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. The court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive

to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for “and offense committed in relation” to his office. Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated.

G.R. No. 161098 September 13, 2007 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent. FACTS: On July 27, 2000, the City of Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay 183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00. This was received by Barangay Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein. On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B. Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and  Alfredo M. Escaño, Sr., all barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical malversation, violation of the  Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, gr ave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0828. In a Decision dated May 22, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissed him from the service. ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring government officials or employees. RULING: Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. In interpreting a statute, care should be given that every part thereof be given effect. Hence, the use of the word "recommend" must be read in conjunction with the words "ensure compliance therewith" in order not to run counter to the intention of the framers of the Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and complete disciplinary authority, with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Considering that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, it follows that the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory.

[ G.R. NO. 193677, SEPTEMBER 06, 2011 ]

LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWISASUNCION AND MARLON M. LACSON, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT. FACTS: On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. The ordinance was deemed approved on August 23, 2002. Section 2 thereof provides:

SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified by the City Treasurer. …xxx… On November 9, 2006, former councilors Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion (Dawis-Asuncion), Luciano M. Veloso (Veloso), Abraham C. Cabochan (Cabochan), Marlon M. Lacson (Lacson), Julio E. Logarta, Jr., and Monina U. Silva, City Accountant Gloria C. Quilantang, City Budget Officer Alicia Moscaya and then Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer Danilo B. Lacuna filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance. In its Decision No. 2007-171 dated November 29, 2007, the LAO-Local decided in favor of the movants. ISSUES: (1) Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds; and (2) Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P9,923,257.00 covering the EPSA of former three-term councilors of the City of Manila authorized by Ordinance No. 8040. RULING: Under the 1987 Constitution, the COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds. Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Section 458 of RA 7160 defines the power, duties, functions and compensation of theSangguniang Panlungsod, to wit: SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (viii) Determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government.

The ordinance authorized the conferment of the EPSA to the former threeterm councilors and, as part of the award, the qualified city officials were to be given "retirement and gratuity pay remuneration." We believe that the award is a "gratuity" which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or demand, or without consideration. However, in line with existing jurisprudence, we need not require the refund of the disallowed amount because all the parties acted in good faith.

[ G.R. NO. 125129, MARCH 29, 1999 ]

JOSEPH H. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT. FACTS: Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees, filed this petition with the Supreme Court on June 17, 1996, as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA). By Resolution No. 89-003, the TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the primary purpose of which was to augment the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. The Provident Fund also provided additional benefits to its members, in accordance with the policies and guidelines approved by the Board of Trustees. The Fund's sources of capital were from contributions of each member consisting of 2% of his gross monthly salary and TLRC's or the government's counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the member's gross monthly salary, earnings of funds and others. On June 3, 1993, Corporate Auditor Adelaida S. Flores suspended the transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991, amounting to P11,065,715.84. Auditor Flores held that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, Rules and

Regulations issued under R.A. 6758, fringe benefits were allowed provided that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. ISSUE: . Whether or not the members of the Provident Fund acquired vested rights over the government contributions. RULING: 

The petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution. However, setting aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treating the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, we find that the Commission on Audit did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. Since the purpose was not attained due to the question on the validity of the Fund, then the employees are not entitled to claim the government share disbursed as its counterpart contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use of public funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated. There is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund acquired a vested right over the government contributions. "A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency," What is more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutor y basis. Thus, contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.

[ G.R. NO. 81467, OCTOBER 27, 1989 ]

NARCISO Y. SANTIAGO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LEONARDO A. JOSE, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: On 18 November 1986, then Customs Commissioner Wigberto E. Tanada extended a permanent promotional appointment, as Customs Collector III, to petitioner SANTIAGO, Jr. That appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), National Capital Region Office. On 26 November 1986, respondent JOSE, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board (the Board, for short) against SANTIAGO's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Narciso Y Santiago as Customs Collector III may be revoked by the Civil Service Commission on the ground that he is not the person next-in-rank. RULING: One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential considerat ion for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants avested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. As provided for in Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 83-343. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents. FACTS: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursem ent voucher in order to def ray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed.  As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante. The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated February 28, 2 005, dismissed the case against Amante for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case involving a sangguniang panlungsod member where the crime charged is one committed in relation to office, but not for violation of ra 3019, ra 1379 or any of the felonies mentioned in chapter ii, section 2, title vii of the revised penal code. RULING: The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:  A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x….. (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

[ G.R. NO. 111471, SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 ]

CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO AND VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, PETITIONERS, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT. FACTS: Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T. Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of General Service of the City Government of San Carlos. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position. The CSC, in its Resolution No. 93-1427 dated 13 April 1993, recalled the approval issued by Director Escobia and disapproved the promotion of petitioner upon the ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission on 21 July 1993. In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Mayor and petitioner Victoria contend that the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in withdrawing and disapproving petitioner Victoria’s promotional appointment.

ISSUES: 1. Whether a promotional appointment is covered by the legal prohibition against nepotism, or whether that prohibition applies only to original appointments to the Civil Service; and 2. Whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria after the Commission, through Director Escobia, had earlier approved that same appointment, without giving an opportunity to petitioner Victoria to explain her side on the matter. RULING: One of the contentions of petitioner in the case at bar is that the ratio of the prohibition against nepotism is not applicable here because petitioner Victoria was already in the government service at the time petitioners were married in 1964. It is not disputed that the original 1961 appointment of petitioner Victoria as an Assistant License Clerk was not a nepotic appointment. Indeed, Section 59 itself states, in the 4th paragraph thereof, that the prohibition against nepotism is not “applicable to the case of a member of any family who,  after his or her appointment to any position in any office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.”(Underscoring supplied) The subsequent marriage of one to the other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the original appointment of petitioner Victoria into a prohibited nepotic one. It is the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner Victoria in 1 October 1982 that is at stake.  A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such appointment. The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.

[ G.R. NO. 71562, OCTOBER 28, 1991 ]

JOSE C. LAUREL V, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BATANGAS, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LORENZO SANGALANG, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, upon assuming office on 3 March 1980, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. On 31 December 1980, the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas became vacant due to the resignation of Mr. Felimon C. Salcedo III. Petitioner designated his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Acting Provincial Administrator effective 2 January 1981 and to continue until the appointment of a regular Provincial  Administrator, unless the designati on is earlier revoked. On 28 April 1981, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868. ISSUES: 1. Whether the questioned position is confidential in nature. 2. Whether or not the rule on nepotism may be applied to designation. RULING  As correctly maintained by the public respondent and the Solicitor General, the position of Provincial Administrator is embraced within the Career Service under Section 5 of P.D. No. 807 as evidenced by the qualifications prescribed for it in the Manual of Position Descriptions. Not being primarily confidential, appointment thereto must, inter alia, be subject to the rule onnepotism.

The rule admits of no distinction between appointment and designation. Designation is also defined as "an appointment or assignment to a particular office"; and "to designate" means "to indicate, select, appoint or set apart for a purpose or duty." In Binamira vs. Garrucho, this Court, per Mr. Justice Isagani M. Cruz, stated: "Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named." WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the challenged Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED.