Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (2000) Petitioners: Isagani Cruz Respondents: Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Topic: Territory, People, and Government - Territory SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) or RA 8371 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). However, due to a tie vote (7-7) after due deliberation and re-deliberation, the petition was dismissed. (Thus, the separate opinions are more important in this case). FACTS: See issues. ISSUE/S: 

Most important issue: WoN Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 57, and 58 of RA 8371/IPRA and its IRR are unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals, and other natural resources therein, violating the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution o Justice Kapunan: NO.  Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title (definition: lands held in private ownership since time immemorial) do not diminish the State’s ownership of lands within the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño v. Insular Government.  Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.  Section 57 only grants “priority rights” to ICCs/IPs in the utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the SmallScale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the grant of said rights exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency. o Justice Puno: NO.  Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The classification of lands in the public domain under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains.

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The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. Both modes presume or recognize the land as private and not public.  The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Section 7(a) involves “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains”, not “waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources” enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the State.  Small-scale utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.  Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of RA 8371/IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution since only “priority rights” (which does not necessarily mean ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs.  However, by including “natural resources”, Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond Section 7(a) and therefore unconstitutional. Justice Panganiban: YES.  Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain encompasses natural resources found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands as those possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial] contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which declares that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals, and natural resources – none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In addition, mere possession or utilization of land, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.  IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral lands and domains.  IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the State’s power under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution of full control of natural resources in ancestral lands and ancestral domains in favor of ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these rights without any time limit. In addition, they are also given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources under Section 7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to the State. Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony

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WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands, violate the due process clause of the Constitution o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. o Justice Puno: Not discussed. o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by these provisions. o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that customary laws shall govern and end it there. No discussion on the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP. WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination, infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC. o Justice Puno: Not discussed. o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by these provisions. o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.

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Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petitions o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. o Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing

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with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven Justices voted to grant the petition o Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. o Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justice Vitug also mentioned that the petitioners have standing to raise the issue, as it is of transcendental importance. o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.