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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium of Cases
1 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.........................3 INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN...........................................3 Marilyn Geduspan v. People............................................3
Rule 110, Sec. 1..............................................4 SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM,...................4
Rule 110, Sec. 4..............................................4 Leviste v Alameda...........................................................4
RULE 110, Section 5........................................5
Sps. Chua v. Ang...........................................................16
Rule 112, Sec. 3............................................16 People v. Emiliano Anonas.............................................16 Ladlad vs. Velasco.........................................................17
Rule 112, Sec. 4............................................18 DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZ...............18 Adasa v Abalos..............................................................19 Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo.................................20
JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO............................5
Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation...................................................................20
Rule 110, Sec. 6..............................................5
Summerville v. Eugenio.................................................20
Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines.....................5
Rule 112, Sec. 5............................................21
Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9........................................6
JUDGE ESPAÑOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS..................21
Michael Malto vs. People.................................................6
Rule 112, Sec. 6............................................22
Rule 110, Sec. 11............................................6
Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades;...............................22
People v. Zaldy Ibanez....................................................6
Rule 113, Sec. 3............................................22
Rule 110, Sec. 13............................................6
People vs. Nunez...........................................................22
Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines....................6
Rule 113, Sec. 5............................................23
Rule 110, Sec. 14............................................8
Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz.................................................23
Dino v. Olivarez...............................................................8
Rule 126, Sec. 2............................................23
Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan..............................8
Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola.......................23
Rule 110, Sec. 15............................................9
Rule 126, Sec. 4............................................23
Hector Trenas v. People...................................................9
Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol..................24
Rule 111, Sec. 1..............................................9
Andy Quelnan vs. PP.....................................................24
Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals. 9
COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ.................................................24
Rule 111, Sec. 4............................................10
Rule 126, Sec. 13..........................................25
Asilo vs. People of the Philippines.................................10
People vs. Mariacos.......................................................25
Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7..................................10
Rule 126, Sec. 14..........................................25
Magestrado vs. People and Librojo................................10
MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES.....25
SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ...........................................11
Rule 114, Sec. 1............................................27
Dreamworks v. Janiola...................................................11
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia................................27
De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa..........................................12
Rule 114, Sec. 3............................................28
Rule 112, Sec. 1............................................13
P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang...........................................28
De Chavez vs. OMB.......................................................13
Ambil vs. SB..................................................................28
Ricaforte vs. Jurado.......................................................13
Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5......................................28
Rule 112, Sec. 2............................................14
Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda............................29
Turingan vs. Garfin........................................................14
Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok.........................................29
Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar........................................14
People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada..................................30
Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan..15
OCA v. Judge Lorenzo....................................................31
SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA................15
People v. Plaza..............................................................32
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Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana Leviste v. CA.................................................................33
Tan v. People.................................................................63
Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara........................................34
Rule 117, Sec. 8............................................64
Rule 114, Sec. 7............................................34
People v. Panfilo Lacson................................................64
Laarni Valerio v. CA.......................................................34
Rule 117, Sec. 9............................................65
Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante...........................................35
People v. Lamberto Rafon.............................................65
Rule 114, Sec. 15..........................................36 Rasmia Tabao v. Judge Barataman................................36
Rule 114, Sec. 16..........................................36 Judge Simbulan v. Judge Bartolome...............................36
Rule 114, Sec. 17..........................................37 Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint..................................37 Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao...........................................38
Rule 114, Sec. 17 and 19...............................39 Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines.........................................39
Rule 114, Sec. 8, 15, 18.................................39 Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad..........................................39
Rule 114, Sec. 21..........................................40 Mendoza v. Alarma........................................................40 WILFREDO TALAG v. JUDGE REYES................................41
Rule 114, Sec. 22 and 24...............................42 Bongcac v. SB...............................................................42 People v. Cawaling........................................................42
Rule 114, Sec. 26..........................................43 Borlongan v. Pena.........................................................43
Rule 116, Sec. 1[g]........................................55 People v. Alfredo Pangilinan..........................................55 Olbes v. Judge Buemio..................................................56
Rule 116, Sec. 3............................................56 People v. Rogelio Gumimba...........................................56
Rule 116, Sec. 9............................................57 Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon......................................57
Rule 116, Sec. 11..........................................58 Spouses Trinidad v. Ang................................................58
Rule 117, Sec. 3............................................58 MELBAROSE SASOT v. PEOPLE......................................58 Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo.................................59
Rule 117, Sec. 4, 5........................................60 Rafael Gonzalez v. Judge Salvador................................60
Rule 117, Sec. 7............................................63 People v. Nazareno........................................................63
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Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: City Councilor Ricardo Inding was charged before the SB for violations of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, he faked buy-bust operations against alleged drug pushers and users to enable him to collect from the coffers of the local government as reimbursement for the actual expenses incurred, thereby causing undue injury to the government.
Inding filed a motion for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the SB has jurisdiction to try cases only to those officers who have a Salary Grade 27 or higher; and not to him who as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is having only a SG 25. Hence, the crime must be tried in the RTC.
Issue: WON the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner Inding? Held: - Positive. RA 7975 as amended by RA 8249; expanded the jurisdiction of the SB. Sec. 4 (a); Par. 1 (b) of the said act “specifically includes” ; “city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads”, fall within the jurisdiction of the SB; without classification and regardless of their salary grades. -
-
In addition, when the legislature approved the acts mentioned, it was fully aware that not all positions specifically mentioned in Section 4 were classified as SG 27; and yet were specifically included therein. Therefore, petitioner fell under the jurisdiction of the SB by express provision of a law.
Marilyn Geduspan v. People G.R. No. 158187 February 11, 2005 Facts: On July 11, 2002, an information, for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr.
Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director/Manager of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26. Geduspan cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including; xxx xxx xxx (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? YES. Held: Petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction: Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
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1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense; (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘Grade 27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx (f) xxx xxx xxx (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." (Underscoring supplied). It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the above–quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her. The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 110, Sec. 1 SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM, Facts: Sanrio filed a complaint against Edgar Lim for violation of the Intellectual Property Code. Lim asserted that he did not violate the provisions of the IPC since he was only a retailer and that he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of Sanrio products.
After the case was elevated to the CA, the appellate court dismissed it on the ground of prescription since no complaint was filed in court within 2 years after the commission of the alleged violation. Sanrio now contends that the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Issue: W/N the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Held: Yes. Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such an offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against the accused. In the case at bar, Sanrio filed his complaint with the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) on April 4, 2002 or 1 year, 10 mos., and 4 days after the NBI searched Lim’s premises and seized the Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed in court, Lim’s alleged violation had not yet prescribed. Rule 110, Sec. 4 Leviste v Alameda This case involves Former Governor of Batangas Antonio Leviste who shot dead his employee in 2007. The pertinent facts to our subject are as follows: Leviste was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of De las Alas. This was filed in the court presided by Judge Alameda. The heirs of de las Alas filed a motion for reinvestigation. This was granted and the Information was amended. The felony of homicide was replaced with murder. Leviste contended that the heirs did not have the right to cause the reinvestigation when the criminal information had already been filed with the lower court. Under the rules, ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the ACCUSED is given another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, the heirs of de las Alas or the private complainant is the party which asked for reinvestigation and was subsequently granted.
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The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether de las Alas or A private complainant could invoke a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation. Issue: Whether or not the information was validly amended Ruling: YES. The heirs of de las Alas can move for reinvestigation provided that it shall be done with the conformity of the public prosecutor.
(In case the conformity of the public prosecutor will be asked.) ***There shall be another preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, what was conducted was a reinvestigation. The court ruled that There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder. RULE 110, Section 5 JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO Facts: Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were business associates. Looyuko is the registered owner of a sole proprietorship of the businesses which are collectively known as the Noah’s Ark Group of Companies. Go was the business manager or chief operating officer of the group of companies. Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out that spawned numerous civil lawsuits. Among these actions are Civil Case No. 67921 and Criminal Case No. 98-1643 from which arose several incidents which eventually became subject of these consolidated petitions. On May 21, 1998, petitioner filed People of the Philippines v. Alberto T. Looyuko, an Affidavit Complaint18 before the Makati City RTC, Branch 56, charging Looyuko with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-1643. Go alleged that respondent misappropriated and converted in his name petitioner’s 41,376 China Banking Corporation (CBC) shares of stock. Petitioner
averred that he entrusted the stock certificates to respondent for the latter to sell. Petitioner Go filed another petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62296. It sought to reverse the orders of the trial court declaring petitioner to have waived his right to formally offer his documentary evidence and allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evidence. The CA explained that the petition was initiated solely by petitioner and was dismissible for it did not implead nor have the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General. And, on the merits, the appellate court ruled that the voluntary inhibition prayed by petitioner had no legal and factual basis. The appellate court found that three (3) alleged grounds of partiality raised by petitioner were not badges of partiality. Issue: W/ N there is violation of Sec. 5, Rule 110 on the part of petitioner Go. Held: Petitioner Go filed the two petitions before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58639 and CA-G.R. SP No. 62296 involving incidents arising from the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 98-1643. It can be observed from the two petitions that they do not reflect the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned to said criminal case. This is in breach of Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted "under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." Although in rare occasions, the offended party as a "person aggrieved" was allowed to file a petition under Rule 65 before the CA without the intervention of the Solicitor General,55 the instant petitions before the CA, as a general rule, should be filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State and not solely by the offended party.56 For non-compliance with the rules, the twin petitions could have been rejected outright. However, in view of the death of respondent Looyuko, these procedural matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.
Rule 110, Sec. 6 Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines Facts: Eugene Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI in Caraga Regional Office. He was issued with a firearm and a mission order to gather and report to the NBU such information as may be relevant to the investigations undertaken by it.
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Firaza also served as a manager for RF Communications in connection on which he dealt with Christopher Rivas (Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur), for the establishment of Public Calling Office in the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. On August 11, 2000, while in Firaza and Rivas had their meeting at the latter’s restaurant, a heated argument commenced between them which opted Rivas to point his gun at Rivas. Firazo was accosted by P/Insp. Mullanida and PO2 Ronquillo by which they discovered that Firaza’s permit to carry firearm outside residence had expired more a month earlier or on July 5, 2000. A criminal complaint was filed against Firaza for “Unauthorized Carrying of License Firearm Outside Residence.” He was then convicted that offense. Firaza now argued that the complaint charged against him should be “Illegal Possession of Firearms” and not “Carrying Firearms Outside of Residence” as the phrase in the complaint reads “with expired license or permit to carry outside residence…” being “merely descriptive of the alleged unlicensed nature of the firearm. Issue: WON the complaint was sufficient. Held: Yes. The allegations in a complaint on information determine what the offense is charge. The allege acts or omissions complained of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the statute determining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce its judgment. Firaza cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. For the transcript of Stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court shows that he, through his counsel, was duly informed of the nature of the cause against him. The mission order issued to Firaza authorized him to carry firearms “in connection with confidential cases assigned to him.” Admittedly, Firaza was at Riva’s restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the mission order did not authorize him to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence. Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9 Michael Malto vs. People FACTS:
Information was filed against Michael for violation of RA 7610, Section 5(a), par. 3, Article III (Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution). However, it did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with prostitution. What it charged was that he had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA, which is Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Despite such, the RTC in its dispositive portion convicted Michael for violation of Section 5(a) of RA 7610 which was affirmed by CA. ISSUE: Is the information fatally defective? HELD: The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the Designation The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information. The facts stated in the amended information against Michael correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial. Rule 110, Sec. 11 People v. Zaldy Ibanez Facts: Zaldy Ibanes w as charged with three counts of rape of his own daughter. Lower courts convicted him of the Rape. Zaldy filed an appeal raising as issue that the lower courts erred in not considering the informations as insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise dates of the commission of the alleged rapes, it being an essential element of the crime. He avers that the formations are not explicit and certain as to the dates of the rapes. He
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argues that such uncertainties run afoul to his Constitutional Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Issue: Whether the dates of the alleged offense are essential ingredient of the crime of rape and thus must be indispensable in the information filed by the prosecution. Held: NO.
An information is as valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In the prosecution of rape, the material fact to be considered is the occurrence of rape not the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowlwdge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no essential bearing on its commission. Therefore it is not essential to be alleged in the information. Rule 110, Sec. 13
Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines Facts: A letter was transmitted to the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno by the Office of Special Investigation of the BSP. The letter was attached with five affidavits that would serve as the bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689, and for violation of Section 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD 1795 against Hilario Soriano. It alleged that spouses Enrico and Amalia Castro appeared to have an outstanding loan of 8Million Pesos with the Rural Bank of San Miguel, but they had never applied for nor received such loan and that it was Soriano, the president of RBSM who ordered, facilitated, and received such loan without the authorization of RBSM Board of Directors. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against Soriano. Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses’ affidavits and supporting documents attached, and required petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit. In due course, the investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Soriano moved to quash the information. One of the grounds for such motion was that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. he argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription. Moreover, Soriano argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "lettercomplaint," were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to Soriano, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653). The RTC denied Soriano’s Motion to Quash for lack of Merit. He also filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, however, this was denied. Issue: WON the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA NO. 7653. Held: On March 5, 2007, the Court noted petitioner's Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the Petition36 dated February 7, 2007. In the said motion, petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a Decision entitled Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, which also involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the DOJ. According to petitioner, the said Decision allegedly ruled squarely on the nature of the BSP letters and the validity of the sworn affidavits attached thereto. We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the
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witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by "any competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender. Furthermore the case of Santos-concio vs. DOJ it held that: The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document denominated as "complaint-affidavit." It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of one’s personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private offended party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held: A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to be the complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public. Since the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with. Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by "any competent person." The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of "any competent person" who may institute
the complaint for a public crime. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied) A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court. Following the foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we hold that the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653. Rule 110, Sec. 14 Dino v. Olivarez Facts: Bienvenido Dino and Renato Comparado charged Pablito Olivarez of vote buying. Two informations were filed against Olivarez for violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Art. 22 of the Omnibus Election Code. Before arraignment, Olivarez moved to quash the two criminal informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. The assistant prosecutor opposed such motion and likewise moved for the amendment of the information, this time only charging Olivarez with violation of paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b of Section 261, Article 22 of the Omnibus Election Code. Olivarez opposed the motion for the amendment of the information alleging that there was no resolution to explain the changes therein, particularly the deletion of paragraph k. He likewise posits that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations since COMELEC had already directed it to transmit all the records of the case. When Olivarez failed to show up for his arraignment the judge denied his petition to quash the informations and likewise admitted the amended complaint. Subsequently, the COMELEC, upon Olivarez motion, revoked the deputation of the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute election offense cases.
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Issue/s: WON the City the Amended Informations should be admitted. Ruling: The Supreme Court finds that the prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC. The resolution which effectively revoked the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor was issued on April 4, 2005, after the Amended informations were filed on October 28, 2004. Furthermore, the letter of the director of the Law Department of COMELEC did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor. It merely directed the latter to forward the records of the case to COMELEC. The filing of the amended informations was not made in defiance to the order of the Director, rather, it was an act necessitated by the developments of the case. Moreover, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules Criminal Procedure provides: Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x. (Emphasis provided.) Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged, the public prosecutor filed the Amended Informations. The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the joint resolution, not to have the public prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not filing the Amended Informations, thus leaving the COMELEC in a quandary should it later dismiss the appeal before it. by filing the Amended Informations, the public prosecutor had avoided such undesirable situation, which would have forced the COMELEC to re-file the case, waste government resources, and delay the administration of justice. Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan Facts:
An Information was filed charging both of Mayor Saludaga and SPO2 Geni of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government. A Motion to Quash filed by Saludaga was granted for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused to the government. A new Information was filed charging Saludaga and Genio for violation of Sec. 3(e), by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. Saludaga contends that
the change from undue injury to the government to giving unwarranted benefit would constitute as a substitution or a substantial amendment. Issue: Whether or not the changes made in the new Information filed is a substitution or a substantial amendment. Ruling: There is no substitution because only the mode of the commission of the crime was changed. The nature of the offense charged is still the same. Causing undue injury and giving unwarranted benefit are modes of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The SC also ruled that there was no substantial amendment when there was a shift from giving undue injury to giving unwarranted benefit. The Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information. Rule 110, Sec. 15 Hector Trenas v. People Facts: A complaint for estafa was file agains Trenas with the RTC of Makati City. Trenas contends that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Trenas asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the money that was given to and received by him took place in Makati; the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by him was signed and notarized in Iloilo City; the only time Makati was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by him was dishonored by Equitable PCI Bank in Makati.; and that the prosecution failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa occurred in Makati. Issue: W/N the RTC of Makati failed to acquire jurisdiction over his case. Held: Yes. It is a fundamental principle that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
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committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence and during trial which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. Rule 111, Sec. 1
Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals Facts: While everyone was asleep, the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos were attacked by a number of assailants killing Sarah herself and her uncle Erasmo Palma while her another uncle Victor Palma and friend Beningno Oquendo survived the attack. Based on the theory of the police, the cause for such attack is attributed to the land transaction that gone sour between Sarah’s live-in partner, David So and Johnny Co. Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresnencio Aman and Romeo Martin and both executed confession allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They also admitted the participation of Artemio Bergonia, Danilo Sy, and Co who allegedly to be the mastermind. However, these three remained at large. The RTC acquitted Aman and Martin. Ten years after, Co surrendered to the NBI. He was then charged with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing, the RTC granted the bail on the ground that the evidence presented against Co was not strong. The heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied such, hence the heirs of Sarah filed a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed it for the reason that it was filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor General, which is in violation of the jurisprudence and
the Law (Sec. 35 Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code) Issue: WON the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Special Civil Action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without Office of the Solicitor General. Held: Yes. The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant, is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him. But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability. The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
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Rule 111, Sec. 4 Asilo vs. People of the Philippines Facts: This case involves the acts of the late Mayor Comendador who authorized the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order. The said demolition was supervised by Asilo and Angeles. The acts of the three mentioned – Asilo, Mayor Comendador and Angeles prompted the Spouses Bombasi to file a civil action for damages before the RTC and a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3e of R.A. 3019. Upon arraignment the three accused all pleaded not guilty. (Note: After the arraignment the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of the civil with the criminal case. ) However during the pendency of the case, Mayor Comendador died. Notwithstanding the Manifestation of Mayor Comendador’s counsel informing the court of the Mayor’s death, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Comendador and Asilo guilty for violating Section 3e of R.A. 3019 and also held them civilly liable to Spouses Bombasi (No liability si Angeles as he died ahead of Mayor Comendador, the difference is when nag file ng motion to drop ang counsel ni Angeles, there was no objection on the part of the public prosecutor). The counsel for the late Mayor filed a Motion for reconsideration alleging that the death of Mayor Comendador extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion as to the extinction of the criminal liability but upheld Mayor Comendador’s civil liability. Issue: WON the death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case also extinguished his civil liability. No. Ruling: The death of Mayor Comendador did not extinguish his civil liability because his civil liability is not predicated upon the violation of R.A. 3019 but upon his violation as provided under Art. 32(6) of the Civil Code. The Mayor, by authorizing the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order is tantamount to depriving the Spouses Bombasi of their property without due process. Hence, his civil liability stands Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7 Magestrado vs. People and Librojo FACTS Elena Librojo filed 2 cases against Magestrado:
1. Criminal action for perjury in the MeTC 2. Civil action for collection of sum of money in the RTC On the other hand, Magestrado filed a civil action against Librojo for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of title and Damages in the RTC. Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He alleged that the civil cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City must be resolved first before the criminal case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. ISSUE WON there exists a prejudicial question. HELD No. there is no prejudicial question. Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal case. The civil cases are principally for the
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determination of whether a loan was obtained by and whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage involving a property. On the other hand, Criminal Case involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT. The civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss. SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ [G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008] FACTS: Spouses Suarez had availed of Carolina Jose’s offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which the latter increased to 5% and Spouses Suarez were forced to accept due to their financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day fixing claiming that the same were contrary to morals and done under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the Spouses Jose herein filed cases of violation of BP22 against Sps. Suarez where the latter filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question. Herein Sps. Suarez claimed that if the 5%interest rates are nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks which are objects of BP22 cases are not only fully paid but in fact over paid. Accordingly, the trial court as well as the appellate court concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the outcome of the determination of the validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of Purita in the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial questions exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal case. NO HELD: Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil actions involve an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of
the guilt of the respondents in the criminal case. The cause or reason for issuance of a check is immaterial in determining criminal culpability under BP22. The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check and not the purpose it was issued for. The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. Blg. 22. In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued. Dreamworks v. Janiola Facts: On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the
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grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. Issue: W/N there is a prejudicial question in this case.
SC: The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action Ruling: It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us. NB: Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa
This is regarding Bella Torres’s estate. When she died, a compromise agreement was entered into by Rosemary Torres (Bella’s daughter) and Krizia Torres-de Zuzuarregui(Bella’s granddaughter and Rosemary’s niece) regarding the letters of administration of Bella’s estate. In said compromise agreement, they both alleged that they are the only leaving heirs of Bella, and that they have reached an amicable settlement regarding Bella’s estate. The same was approved by the RTC. However, subsequently after the RTC decision, three others claimed to be living heirs of Bella (Peter, Catherine, and Fannie). These three filed a petition to annul the said compromise agreement as they are also legal and living heirs of Bella. While the case in the CA is still pending, Fannie filed a criminal complaint against Rosemary and Krizia for perjury and falsification in the MeTC. She alleges that these two committed these crimes when they falsified a sworn statement claiming to be the only living heirs of Bella in the compromise agreement, when in truth and fact, three others are also living heirs. Rosemary and Krizia motioned to suspend proceedings in the MeTC. They invoke prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether or not there is prejudicial question in the case at bar. Ruling: Yes, there is aprejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal case against Rosemary and Krizia. Requisites of Prejudicial question: 1.) The facts and issues raised in the previously instituted civil action are intimately related with the issues in the criminal case; 2.) The resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case. It is evident, in the case at bar, that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case for perjury and falsification. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in the estate, then there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against Rosemary and Krizia, who could not have committed perjury and falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC, for the truth of her statements regarding Peter, Catherine, and Fannie having been judicially settled
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perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. Rule 112, Sec. 1 De Chavez vs. OMB Facts: On 7 November 2001, private respondent Nora L. Magnaye (Magnaye), Professor IV of the Batangas State University (BSU), filed with the public respondent an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service, Falsification of Official Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as "CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES" against petitioners. Subsequently, on 13 November 2001, based on the above imputed acts plus an additional one,7 private respondent also filed with the public respondent another Complaint imputing criminal liability to the BSU officials above-named for Violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT," Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, Falsification of Official Documents and Estafa. After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing14 and upon submission of both parties of their respective position papers, the public respondent, through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. CasihanDumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez concurring, issued its Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-011083-K recommending the indictment of petitioners De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. It, however, proposed the dismissal of the complaints against petitioners Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., and other officials of BSU namely, Lualhati, Zaraspe, and Montalbo for lack of probable cause. Upon review by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, he issued a Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 "partially approving" with modifications the Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005. Among other findings, he found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Mendoza liable for violation of Section 3(e) and (h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for violation of Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. He also found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, and, thus, imposed on them the penalty of Dismissal from the Service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and
Issue: WON the OMB committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in "convincting" De Chavez et. al. Held: NO. Petitioners make mountain on the use of the words "liable for violation x x x" employed by the Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, the laws and jurisprudential pronouncements is in order. Both the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770) empower the public respondent to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.22 By virtue of this power,23 it may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty thereof.25 In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so.FOOTNOTE: simply put, the OMB merely found probable cause against De Chavez, et.al. finding them to be LIABLE for committing the said offenses and be subjected to the appropriate penalties. No Conviction was EVER MADE by the OMB. Ricaforte vs. Jurado Facts: Leon Jurado filed a complaint before the prosecutor's office charging Alicia Ricaforte of violation of BP 22 and estafa. Ricaforte alleged that Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed her checks to pay off Aguilar’s obligations with Leon Jurado under the condition that Aguilar will replace these checks with her own once Metrobank issued her a new checkbook. Ricaforte likewise claime that when Aguilar issued the replacement checks, the former asked Jurado to return her checks but Jurado
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refused and that's when Ricaforte asked her bank to issue a stop payment order and that's why the checks where dishonored.
arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.
The Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa and BP 22 for insufficiency of evidence.Jurado's motion for reconsideration was denied and so he appealed before the Secretary of Justice. The Justice Secretary modified the decision of the prosecutor's office and ordered the filing of an information for violation of BP 22 against Ricaforte.
Herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
The motion for reconsideration was denied and the CA upheld the decision of the Justice Secretary. It ruled that trial on the merits must ensue since it is on said occasion that petitioner is granted opportunity for a full and exhaustive presentation of her evidence and not during the preliminary investigation phase where the investigating officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief; that in the preliminary investigation phase, it is not yet clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the offense charged and sought to be punished, although petitioner is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; that the crux of the matter rests upon the reasons for the drawing of the postdated checks by petitioner; i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value" as required under B.P. Blg. 22 which will only be determined during trial.Hence, this petition. Issue: WON trial on the merits must ensue ensue for violation of BP 22. Ruling: Yes. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of
Rule 112, Sec. 2 Turingan vs. Garfin G.R. No. 153284 Facts: An Information was filed against Apolinar charging him for violation of relating sections in R.A. 8282 (Social Security Act) for non-remittance of social security and employees’ compensation. The Information was signed by state prosecutor Tolentino accompanied by a certification also signed by Tolentino. Apolinar contends that the state prosecutor Tolentino lacked authority to sign the Information. Respondent Judge Garfin (Branch 19 RTC, Naga) dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the state prosecutor had the authority to file the Information without a written authority or approval of the provincial state prosecutor. Ruling: Toletino lacked authority to file the Information because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the Information by the city prosecutor. An information field by an officer without authority to do so is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Note: The special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information. Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar Facts: Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino are the Legal
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Division Chief and Attorney II, respectively, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Quezon City. Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation conducted upon petitioner’s complaint. After inquest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, an information for direct bribery against respondents. The case was remanded to the DOJ for preliminary investigation. The DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents for direct bribery. Aggrieved, respondents filed in the DOJ a petition for review of the said Resolution. The DOJ, however, endorsed the petition to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman treated the petition for review as a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid DOJ Resolution. It denied the petition for review for lack of merit. Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The appellate court found no probable cause against respondent Saldevar, but upheld the finding of probable cause against respondent Macalino. Issue: WON the CA can substitute the findings of the Ombudsman with regard to finding probable cause. Ruling: No. The determination of probable cause is an executive function lodged with the prosecutorial arm of the government (Ombudsman), not with the judiciary. In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. In the determination of probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion prevails over judicial discretion. Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan Facts: In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College (CCSPC). In December 1998, the “Concerned Faculty Members” of the CCSPC filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019.
The complaint accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing funds allocated for the construction of CCSPC Agriculture Building. The Deputy-Ombudsman Mindanao also endorsed the anonymous complaint to the NBI, Region XII for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation. On 26 April 2002, the Deputy-Ombudsman Mindanao received the NBI report charging Tilendo with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC. Tilendo now contends that the cases against him dragged for more than 3 yrs. in preliminary investigation phase without his fault. The inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates his right to speedy disposition of cases.
Issue: W/N there was delay in the preliminary investigation phase. Held: No. There was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo. Contrary to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary investigation did not automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman. In Raro v. Sandiganbayan, by referring the complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to the NBI. What was delegated was only the factfinding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.
Further, the NBI is not among those authorized under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to conduct preliminary investigations for complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman, to wit: 1) Ombudsman Investigators; 2) Special Prosecuting Officers; 3) Deputized Prosecutors; 4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or
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5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.
SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA
Special Prosecutor under Section 11of RA 6770. The latter is merely a component of the former. And may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman and also limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the SB. Sps. Chua v. Ang
FACTS: On May 31, 2000, Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC Guimaras with Malversaton of Public Funds. She pleaded NOT GUILTY. On August 31, 2001, Castro filed a motion to quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. She argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade, a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy vs. SB (August 9, 1999), she was a public employee with salary grade of 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor and not by the OMB whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the SB. RTC denied motion to quash stating that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. Moreover, the Uy case which was cited was set aside on March 20,2001 expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the OMB in cases cognizable by the RTC. ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority to file and prosecute the case HELD: YES. The Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the SB but also those cognizable by the regular courts. The power to investigate and prosecute granted b law is PLEANRY and UNQUALIFIED. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction. Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the SB. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman “to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. This grant does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Facts: Spouses Leonardo and Milagro Chua and FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI) executed a Contract to Sell a condominium unit FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium The Chuas filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor accusing the officers and directors of FEPI of violating P.D. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree) Assistant City Prosecutor Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Ang issued and approved a resolution dismissing the complaint for being premature *the resolution said that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices APPEAL The Chuas argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. 957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigation of criminal complaints The officers and directors of FEPI counter that the petition should be dismissed outright because the petitioners failed to avail of other remedies provided by law Issue: Whether or not Pastrana and Ang abdicated their authority to conduct a preliminary investigation when they dismissed the criminal complaint for being premature. *abdicate – fail to fulfill or undertake J Held: YES! They committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaints. Nothing in P.D. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose Section 39 – criminal penalties Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (in this case, no provision applies), the
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determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of Criminal Procedure as embodied in Section 2 Rule 112 The Chuas have expressly chosen to pursue the criminal prosecution but the prosecutor dismissed their complaint. The dismissal for prematurity was apparently on the view that an administrative finding of violation must first be obtained before recourse can be made to criminal prosecution. But where the law is silent on this matter(like in this case), administrative cases are independent from criminal actions subject only to the rules on forum shopping. *(SC) The prosecutors should have made a determination of probable cause in the complaint instead of simply dismissing it for prematurity. Their failure to do so and the dismissal they ordered effectively constituted an evasion of a positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Petition granted – complaint returned to Office of the City Prosecutor for determination of probable cause.
Rule 112, Sec. 3 People v. Emiliano Anonas Facts: SPO4 Anonas was charged with illegal possession of shabu and also illegal possession of firearms. The accused moved for reinvestigation on the grounds that he was arrested without a warrant and no preliminary investigation was conducted. The motion for reinvestigation was granted. However, the prosecutor assigned to reinvestigate the complaint was appointed as RTC judge and did not inform the prosecutor who took his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in detention. 4years after the motion for reinvestigation was granted, SPO4 Anonas moved for the dismissal of the informations against him contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process. The trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that the prosecutor who took over the case, was not aware of the pending reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation within thirty (30) days.The prosecutor manifested before the trial court that the reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the Informations against respondent.
On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the Informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. When the case was elevated before the CA, the CA ruled in favor of SPO4 Anonas. The appellate court found that accused's right to due process and speedy trial have been violated because of the delay in the reinvestigation. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the delay in the reinvestigation for almost 5 years constituted a violation of the right to due process of accused SPO4 Anonas. Ruling: Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This is reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires that "the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998) was enacted on February 4, 1998. To implement its provisions, the Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98 dated September 15, 1998 setting a time limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to due process. The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation. There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on
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preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, respondent’s right to due process had been violated. Ladlad vs. Velasco Facts: This is a consolidation of 2 petitions wherein the accused are members of the House of representatives representing various party-list groups. They are all charged with rebellion. By virtue of a PD 1017, declaring a state of emergency, issued by then President GMA, Crispin Beltran was arrested without a warrant. Beltran was subject to 2 inquests for initiating sedition based on a speech he gave during a rally which commemorated the 20th anniversary of the EDSA revolution. The 2nd inquest was based on the letters of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue who were officers of the CIDG. Based also on these letters, Vicente Ladlad et.al and Liza Maza et. Al were sent subpoenas by the DOJ requiring them to appear before said department and to get coppies of the complaint and its attachments. During the PI, the DOJ panel of prosecutors presented a masked man, who later was known as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eye witness against Ladlad and Maza. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before prosecutor VCelasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to members of the media present during the proceedings. The prosecutors gave Ladlad and Maza 10 days to file their counter-affidavits. However, the prosecution gave to Ladlad and Maza a copy of the documents supporting the CIDG’s letters only after 4 days since the PI started. Ladlad and Maza moved for the inhibition of the prosecutors for lack of impartiality and independence considering the manner in which they conducted the PI—that said PI was attended with irregularities. Issue: Whether or not the PI of Ladlad and Maza was conducted in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ruling: No. The manner in which the PI was conducted violated the rule mandated by Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,"38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or,
in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112. Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters.1a\^/phi1.net These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’ statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Rule 112, Sec. 4 DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZ G.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007 Wilfredo Cruz, (R), is a nephew by affinity of Dr. Amanda Cruz (P). On June 5, 1996, respondent filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City a complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. 96-10640. Respondent alleged that petitioner issued to him an undated check in the sum of P100,000.00. On December 29,
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1995, he placed this date on the check and deposited the same, but it was dishonored by the drawee bank due to "account closed." On January 5, 1996, he sent the notice of dishonor to petitioner. Without his knowledge, petitioner, on January 16, 1996, deposited P100,000.00 in his savings account. In her Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner declared that in 1986, she issued to respondent BPI Check No. 349866 as a guarantee for the loan of spouses Arturo and Malou Ventura obtained from him. Later, they informed her that they had paid the loan. However, she forgot to ask for the return of the check. In 1987, she closed her account and opened a new one with the drawee bank. For ten (10) years, she forgot having issued the check. She claimed that respondent filed the complaint against her because her husband, Atty. Francisco Galman Cruz, instituted criminal and civil complaints against Carlos Cruz. Jr., respondent’s brother, involving a parcel of land. On January 16, 1996, or only after eleven (11) days from January 5, 1996 when she learned that her check was dishonored, she deposited P100,000.00 in the account of respondent at the Westmont Bank, Sta. Mesa Branch. On August 7, 1996, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended the dismissal of respondent’s complaint and was then approved by the City Prosecutor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but in its Resolution dated June 28, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, this recourse. Issue: WON the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint in the office of the prosecutor is proper. Yes. First, there is no dispute that when respondent filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his complaint against petitioner, a preliminary investigation was conducted. Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines preliminary investigation as "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."
recommendation. They all found that when respondent filed his complaint with the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, he knew that petitioner had paid the amount of the check. In fact, in his pleading, he admitted such payment. Thus, the prosecutors were one in concluding that petitioner did not commit the offense charged. The preliminary investigation seeks to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy, and stress of a formal trial after the reasonable probability of his guilt or innocence has been passed upon by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose. As mentioned, the prosecutors and also the Secretary of Justice found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner of an information for violation of B.P. 22. There is no indication that their finding of lack of probable cause was reached without any basis in fact and in law.
Under Section 4 of the same Rule, the investigating prosecutor is vested with the duty of (a) preparing a resolution holding the respondent for trial and filing the corresponding information, or (b) dismissing the case should he find that no probable cause exists against respondent. The investigating Assistant City Prosecutor found no probable cause to charge petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, she recommended the dismissal of the case. The City Prosecutor, the Chief State Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice sustained the
Abalos then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution of DOJ – argued that DOJ should have dismissed Adasa’s petition outright. Stated in Section 7 of DOJ Circular 70 is that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. In Section 12, arraignment is one of the grounds for dismissing the petition outright.
Adasa v Abalos Facts: Abalos filed two complaints-affidavits against Adasa for Estafa. She filed this on January 18, 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan CIty On April 25, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause against Adasa and ordered the filing of two separate informations – Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual Two separate criminal cases were filed, 8781 and 8782. This petition pertains only to 8782. Upon Adasa’s motion, a reinvestigation was conducted. - The Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause against Adala Adasa was arraigned on October 1, 2001 – she entered an unconditional plea of not guilty Adasa then filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on October 15, 2001 - DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and directed the said office to withdraw the information for Estafa against Adasa
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DOJ denied this Motion for Reconsideration, said that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language “may” utilized in section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned
The trial court issued an order granting Adasa’s Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissed Criminal Complaint 8782. Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals - CA granted Abalos’ petition and reversed the resolutions of the DOJ - CA relied heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 – “if an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned”. Should be read in relation to Section 12. - CA ruled that since Abalos had been already arraigned before filing her petition for review, DOJ should have dismissed such petition - CA added – when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that surrounds it Issue: Whether or not the DOJ can give due course to an Appeal or Petition for Review despite its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned. NO! Held: The all-too familiar rule in Statutory Construction is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to. Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright and appeal or petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary. Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. Section 7 pertains to the action which the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal. Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused
prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the ground for its dismissal. ***DOJ Circular No. 70 Section 7, Paragraph 2, First Sentence If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned Section 12 The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds: xxx (e) That the accused had arraigned when the appeal was taken
already
been
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo G.R. No. 150606 June 7, 2007 FACTS In 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Information charging (private respondent) Tecklo, the owner of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Republic Act No. 8282 for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System despite demand. The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino, stating that, “THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR”. Teklo filed a motion to quash on the sole ground that Tolentino, not being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial Prosecutor, has no legal personality nor is he legally clothed with the authority to file the Information. Tolentino opposed the motion and contended that he is authorized to investigate, file the necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases since he was designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by Regional State Prosecutor Turingan by virtue of a Regional Order; that the Regional State Prosecutor, as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice, is vested with authority to designate Special Prosecutors; and that the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter said that the information to be filed in court by prosecutorsdesignate do not need the approval of the Regional State Prosecutor or the Provincial or City Prosecutor. RTC Judge Paqueo ordered to quash the information and dismissed the case.
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ISSUE WON petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor. HELD NO. Sec. 4, Rule 112, third paragraph of the RRCP, provides that, “No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.” Since the provision is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory. Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Facts: A complaint was filed against Gonzales for violation of PD 115(Trust Receipts Law) in relation to Art. 315(1)(b) of RPC before the City Prosecutor of Makati. In its Resolution the City prosecutor found probable cause to hold Gonzales liable for 2 counts of Violation of PD 115. Gonzales appealed to the DOJ but was denied. He went to the CA via a Petition for review but was denied for lack of merit. Issue: WON the City Prosecutor and the DOJ erred in finding probable cause? Held: No. In conducting preliminary investigation the investigating prosecutor is given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against the supposed offender, courts can only review WON the executive determination of PC was done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the determination of PC by the City Prosecutor was not done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, there is no showing that the DOJ, in the exercise of its power to review on appeal the findings of the City Prosecutor acted in an arbitrary or despotic manner that amounted to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Summerville v. Eugenio (August 07, 2007) Facts: A complaint for unfair competition was filed by Summerville against Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho, for disposing to the public facial cream products using labeling and distribution which give and depict the general appearance of the Chin Chun Su facial cream products and likely influence the purchasers to believe that the same are those of the said Summerville. The City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila came out with its May 31, 2000 Resolution recommending the prosecution of the Khos and dismissing their counterclaim against Summerville thus, an Information for unfair competition was filed against Khos before the Manila RTC, Branch 24. On June 22 of the same year, Khos filed a petition for review with the DOJ, assailing the May 31, 2000 Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. The RTC issued the first assailed Order, dated October 24, 2001 granting on the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the trial prosecutor dated October 22, 2001. August 21, 2002, the trial court issued an Order holding that there is no necessity to order the dismissal of the case. The re-filing of the Information would constitute double jeopardy. On April 2, 2003, the trial court issued its last assailed Order holding that the “revival of the case is now barred by the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.” On July 17, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Datumanong finally disposed of the petition for review by denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondents Khos. In its May 26, 2004 Decision, the CA held that double jeopardy had set in and that Judge Eugenio cannot be faulted for dismissing the case. Issue: Did Judge Eugenio of Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the Information against the Khos without making an independent assessment of the evidence? Held: Yes, failure of Judge Eugenio to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused violates the complainant’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The October 24, 2001 Order of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal
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of the Information, that the trial court glaringly failed to conduct its own determination of a prima facie case, and simply adopted the September 28, 2001 Resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice. Where the prosecution is, as in this case, disappointingly unsure, irresolute, and uncertain on whether it should prosecute the accused, the court should have been most circumspect and judicious in the resolution of the Motion to Withdraw Information, and should have conducted its own determination whether or not there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The courts should not blindly follow the resolutions issued by the DOJ. On the contrary, it should determine on its own whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. (Santos v. Orda, Jr.)
Rule 112, Sec. 5 JUDGE ESPAÑOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS Facts: The OCA found that respondent failed to forward to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Cavite the records of at least 370 cases which she dismissed after preliminary investigation. Respondent justified such omission on the pretext that her clerk of court and othr court personnel secured photocopies of the cases for their own file in order to help litigants who made queries regarding their cases. She even claimed that the expenses for the photocopying were defrayed by the court personnel. Issue: W/N Toledo- Mupas committed grave ignorance of the law Held: Section 5, Rule 1123 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states that within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, an investigating judge shall transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action her resolution of the case together with the records thereof. Hence, an investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation, shall perform her ministerial duty which is to transmit within ten days after the conclusion thereof, the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the Provincial Prosecutor, regardless
of her belief or opinion that the crime committed, after conducting the preliminary investigation, falls within the original jurisdiction of her court. Most of the cases which respondent failed to transmit to the OPP were found to be within the jurisdiction of the RTC and were decided as early as January 2000. It is difficult to believe that respondent was not aware of these facts. Worse, some of these cases are drugrelated and were dismissed as early as July 2000. Respondent should have been prompted by the gravity of these offenses to forward the records of the cases within the required period to the OPP for appropriate action. Undoubtedly, the parties adversely affected by the dismissal of the complaints after preliminary investigation were denied the statutory right of review that should have been conducted by the provincial prosecutor. Respondent judge claims that the failure to promptly transmit the resolution and records of the cases which she dismissed after preliminary investigation is not her fault but that of her clerk of court. However, it remains the duty of a judge to devise an efficient recording and filing system in their courts to enable them to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.4 If respondent was diligent in the performance of her obligations and responsibilities, the records of cases which were not forwarded to the OPP would not have reached an alarming number. She should have taken corrective measures to promptly address this problem. Her unjustifiable failure to forward to the OPP the cases which she dismissed after preliminary investigation shows that there is more than meets the eye than what she portrays as simple unawareness. Her supposed omission or oversight which remained uncorrected for a period which spanned as long as seven years smacks of malice and bad faith rather than pure and plain ignorance. Hence, she is liable for gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Rule 112, Sec. 6 Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades; Facts: An administrative case was filed by Adriano and Austral against Judge Bercades for abuse of authority. In their complaint, they alleged that Bercades issued a warrant of arrest against them for violation RA 8048 wherein Adriano and Austral were cutting trees without permits. They alleged that there was no showing of necessity by Bercades to order an arrest so as “not to frustrate the ends of justice”.
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Bercades claims that his warrant was issued in accordance with Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, claiming also that he had nothing to do with it since it was “strictly a police matter” Issue: W/N the issuance of Judge Bercades’ warrant of arrest was violative of Sec.6(b), Rule 112 of the RoC? Held: Yes, warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must: (1) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probably cause exists; and (3) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the case at bar, Bercades ordered the issuance of the warrant solely on his finding of probably cause and failed to consider that there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody “in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.” His hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Even if it is truly “strictly a police matter”, warrants of arrest are implemented by arresting officers. Judges are not arresting officers, and therefore, they are not concerned with its implementation.
Rule 113, Sec. 3 People vs. Nunez *I believe this is a typo in Maam Suarez’ outline; I think this case should be under Section 3 of Rule 126(not 113) because it has very little(or nothing) to do with Section 3 of Rule 113 (Duty of Arresting Officer), and the case expressly talks about Section 3 of Rule 126 (Personal Property to be Seized) Facts: Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Banos Police Station and IDD Mobile Force(with the Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod) conducted a search in the house of Raul Nunez. They were armed with a search warrant. They found 31 packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containg P4,610 inside Nunez’ dresser. *The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu.
RTC found Nunez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Republic Act 6425(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) as amended CA affirmed Nunez’ conviction Issues: 1. Whether or not the police officers complied with their duties as arresting officers (Sec. 3, Rule 113) 2. Whether or not the seizure of the personal property of Nunez was valid (Sec.3, Rule 126) Held: 1. Yes. The police officers followed their duties as prescribed by law. 2. No. Rule 126, Section 3: Section 3. Personal Property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: a) subject of the offense b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or c) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In this case, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a stature describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such interference. There were irregularities in the search conducted. The lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in Nunez’ residence they believed were “proceeds of the crime” or “means of committing the offense”. The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to Nunez.
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Rule 113, Sec. 5 Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz Facts: Carlos was arrested during a buy-bust operation which was organized to arrest Boy-Bicol at the latter’s nipa hut hideout. He was charged for illegal possession of firearms and drugs. He was convicted only for possession of dangerous drugs. He claimed he cannot be convicted because he was illegally arrested. Issue: WON his arrest was illegal? Held: Yes. His warrantless arrest was effected under section 5(a) of Rule 113, arrest of a suspect in Flagrante Delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, 2 requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Carlos was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, thus his subsequent arrest was invalid. The said drugs were on top of a table inside the room which he was apprehended. The target of the buy-bust operation was Boy-Bicol. Carlos was merely a guest. Rule 126, Sec. 2 Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola Facts: Special Investigators of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search Spouses Marimla’s house located on Angeles City and the Premises on Porac, Pampanga both for Violation of R.A. 6425 – (Shabu, Marijuana and other paraphernalia were allegedly hidden and being kept in the said house/premises.) Judge Guariña III issued a search warrant. On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI searched petitioners’ house and seized several items (Marijuana) and an Information was subsequently filed before the RTC of Angeles City for Violation of R.A. 6425. The RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57 is presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola. Sps. Marimla filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence illegally seized on the ground that the search warrant issued is void as the application and the issuance of such was made with and by a court which has no territorial jurisdiction
over the judicial region where the alleged crime was committed and consequently, the evidence seized by virtue of such void warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence. Judge Omar T. Viola denied the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows: The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guariña III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in order considering that AM 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the search warrant issued is in violation of Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. No. Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, in the light of the guidelines provided in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC which are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02- Chapter V Section 12, it was explicitly provided there that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. As stated in the facts of the case A.M. No. 99-10-09SCallows or authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI. Hence, the decision of the RTC is affirmed. Petition dismissed. Rule 126, Sec. 4
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Compendium of Cases 26 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol FACTS: Judge Espan issued two(2) SW for the search and seizure of vcd’s @ Solid Laguna Corp. premises. The said corporation was engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of videograms without license and authority from VRB and in violation of petitioner’s intellectual property rights. The said warrants were quashed because the SLD was actually licensed and due to lack of probable cause.
Reason: The SW was properly enforced because nowhere in Sec. 4 of Rule 126s states that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premise. The failure to name the actual occupant of the said building is not a fatal defect to the SW. Even though Quelnan may not be the person subject of the search, the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto so his arrest was valid. COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ Facts:
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On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code.
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Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses (security guards) who saw empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases. MTC Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01 to seize the Coke bottles. The local police seized the particular items including some Pepsi shells. In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included them in their return to make up for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles. The presence of the bottles in their yard was neither intentional nor deliberate; that there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal nature, must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in their favor. Also, Pepsi filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search warrant. Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that Pepsi violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and other similar containers.
ISSUE: w/n the sw was issued based on probable casue. HELD: No. Applicant agent Lavin and his 2 witnesses alleged in their application that they were able to enter the premises of SLD and there they saw stock of infringing, pirated and unauthorized CD’s. However, when queried during the application hearing how they knew that audio and video compact discs were pirated, relied for the most part on what alleged unnamed sources told them and/or on certifications or lists made by persons who were never presented as witnesses. In net defect, they testified under oath as to the truth of facts they had no personal knowledge of.
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It cannot be overemphasized that not one of them testified seeing the pirated discs being manufactured at SLC’s premises. what they stated instead was that they were given copies of “Kenny Rogers Videoke”, Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke” and “Andrew E. Wholesome CD” by two anonymous sources, while yet another informant told them that the discs were manufactured at said premises. Andy Quelnan vs. PP Facts: A team of policemen was formed to implement a search warrant issued by RTC of Manila. The team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in Makati and the proceeded to Units 615 which is controlled by Bernard Kim. During the implementation of the said SW the police found 3 pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing shabu. Then the arrest report and joint affidavit of apprehension were executed by the police operatives leading to the arrest of Andy Quelnan who was also present during the search. The RTC found Quelnan, guilty. Quelnan seeks for the reversal of the said judgment since according to him the SW was invalid for the fact that the SW was not named to him. Issue: W/N the SW was properly enforced. Held: Yes!
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Issue: Whether the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty Coke bottles from Pepsi's yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code? Held: - Negative. A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in
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connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and his or her witnesses. Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath or affirmation the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of "searching questions and answers" in writing and under oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. (Sec. 4&5, Rule 126) The court conclude that the "hoarding" - as defined and charged by Coke - does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner. In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law R.A. No. 623 - covers, to wit:
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SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, with their names or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or are used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
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SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be
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punished by a fine or not more than one hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both. Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the parties did not consider at all in the search warrant application. The petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its search warrant application since the "one specific offense" that the law allows and which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation of the present case is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support the disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent. Rule 126, Sec. 13 People vs. Mariacos
FACTS A Police Station of La Union conducted a checkpoint to intercept a suspected transporation of marijuana and when it did not yield any suspect, PO2 Pallayoc proceeded to the barangay where a secret agent told him that a baggage of marijuana has been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave and that the back pack bag was with an “OK” marking. The police boarded the jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the bag with an OK marking. Inside were several bricks of marijuana. When he alighted from the jeepney, the bags were taken by two women. He caught up with them, introduced himself as a police officer. He told them that they were under arrest but one got away. He brought Belen Mariacos and the bags to the police station. Appellant contend that her right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated when the police searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without asearch warrant and with no permission from her and that there was no probable cause for the arrest. ISSUE
WON the search and arrest was valid?
HELD Yes, the search and arrest were valid. The search was conducted on a moving vehicle so that the search was justified. In addition, it is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Sec 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the prevailing jurisprudence. Generally warrant of arrest is necessary for a valid arrest, but the Rules of Court provides exception under Sec 5 (a) where in his presence, the person to
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be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit and offense. A search, substantially contemporaneous (happening at the same time) with an arrest can precede the arrest if the officer has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Probable cause here is the information given by the special agent. Here, actual conveyance is enough to support a finding that the act of transporting a dangerous drug was being committed. Rule 126, Sec. 14 MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES Facts: (NBI) applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, based on the information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were in possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc. (MANLY). Judge Estrella T. Estrada of RTC-Quezon City, Branch 83, issued on March 17, 2003 Search Warrant No. 4044(03). Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that the same is invalid since the requisites for its issuance have not been complied with. They insisted that the sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not among the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293. We deny the petition. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function.11 As such, the power to quash the same also rests solely with them. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists. Our ruling in Solid Triangle Sales Corp. v. Sheriff, RTC, Q.C., Br. 9312 is instructive, thus: Inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter. The ruling has since been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]
In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entertained the motion to quash considering that no criminal action has yet been instituted when it was filed. The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it earlier issued after finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists to justify its issuance in the first place. As ruled by the trial court, the copyrighted products do not appear to be original creations of MANLY and are not among the classes of work enumerated under Section 172 of RA 8293. When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating officer not to file an information for the court’s ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the executive function.
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Compendium of Cases 29 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Rule 114, Sec. 1 Government of Hongkong v. Olalia GR 153675, 19 April 2007 En Banc: Sandoval Gutierrez, J Facts: The RP and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.” Juan Muñoz was charged in HK for “accepting an advantage as agent,” and conspiracy to defraud. Sep 1999, DOJ received from HK, a request for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. DOJ forwarded the request to NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC, an application for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. RTC issued an Order of Arrest against Muñoz. NBI agents arrested and detained him. Nov 1999, HK filed with the RTC Manila a petition for the extradition of Muñoz. Muñoz filed, in the same case, a petition for bail, was opposed by HK. Oct 2001, bail for Muñoz was granted by Judge Olalia and set at P75T. Issue: Does a person facing extradition have the right to bail? Held: Yes. In Government of USA v. Purganan, we held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, only to criminal proceedings. While Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order. First, the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. RP jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. SC has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the RP under international conventions to uphold human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. Both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Sec. 2(a) of PD 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the RP with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: 1. it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite, 2. the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law” This is shown by Sec. 6 of PD 1069 which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” Sec. 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;” and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.” Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Muñoz was arrested on Sep 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until Dec 20, 2001, when the RTC ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over 2 years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
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serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the “temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. The prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In Purganan, Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. Here, there is no showing that Muñoz presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the RTC to determine whether Muñoz may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.” Rule 114, Sec. 3 P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang AM P-09-2685; Sep 3, 2009 En Banc: Per Curiam Facts: On Feb 14, 2008, the operatives of the PDEAARMM arrested Indag and Manabilang for alleged violation of RA 9165, and were thus committed to the provincial jail. On Feb 15, 2008, the accused were released from the custody of the Jail Warden on the basis of the Custody Receipt signed by Marcos Digandang, Process Server of the RTC-14, Cotabato City. In his complaint, Police Superintendent Orbe, RD of PDEA-ARMM, alleges that the release was illegal because the accused were charged with a nonbailable offense. Digandang admits in his Comment that the accused were his relatives and that he interceded for their release because they allegedly needed medical attention. After their medical check up, they were
immediately brought back to their detention cell. He also claims that he did not file a motion for temporary release, since he could not secure the services of a lawyer, it being a Friday and it was already past 3pm. Jail Warden, likewise admitted that he temporarily relinquished custody over the accused to Digandang for humanitarian reasons. Issue:
Did Digandang have the authority to cause the release of the accused? Held: No. It is undisputed that accused were charged with a non-bailable offense; that they were released from detention on the basis merely of the Custody Receipt signed by the Digandang, which was a clear violation of Sec. 3, Rule 114 which explicitly provides that “no person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.” As a court employee, Digandang is cognizant of this requirement as in fact he admitted in his Comment that a motion for temporary release should have been filed in court. We cannot lend credence to Digandang’s allegation that he was unable to file the motion because he could not immediately avail of the services of a lawyer as it was a Friday and already past 3pm. Assuming that he could not immediately hire the services of a private lawyer, he could always go to the PAO for legal assistance. At 3pm, it is inconceivable that no PAO lawyer would be available. The contention that Digandang interceded for the release of his accused-relatives for humanitarian reasons is self-serving and deserves no consideration. Moreover, the fact that the accused were returned to their detention cell soon after the medical check up does not justify Digandang’s culpability or mitigate his liability. Neither could it be considered a badge of good faith. An infraction had been committed and the accused’s return to incarceration does not extinguish the violation. Ambil vs. SB Facts: The controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David Lorte to the office of the Ombudsman praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim (who was accused for murder) from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of then Governor Ambil Jr. It appears that Ambil ordered provincial jail warden Apelado to fetch Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, Apelado transported Adalim to the house of Ambil.
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As a result, an information was filed charging Ambil for violation of RA 3019.
considered withdrawn did not relieve the Judge Maceda of any liability.
Issue:
Issue: Was San Miguel deprived of his right to bail?
Whether or not the transfer of Adalim from the provincial jail to the house of Ambil was valid. Ruling: Np. Although under the Administrative Code, the provincial governor is considered as the jail keeper, it does not empower him to tale personal custody of prisoners or order for their transfer. Under Section 3, Rule 114, a person under detention may be transfered only upon order of the court. The power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5 Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda AM RTJ-03-1749, 4 Apr 2007 3rd Division: Austria-Martinez Facts: Eduardo San Miguel was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery of .50 grams of shabu, punishable by PC. He jumped bail. On May 10, 2001, then Judge Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond in the amount of P60,000 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000. Chronology of Events [2001]: 1. Sep 8 – San Miguel was arrested 2. Sep 12 – prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail on the ground of reasonable belief to the probability of flight 3. Sep 17 – San Miguel filed an Opposition to the Motion; Judge Maceda issued an Order granting the Motion. 4. Sep 19 – Judge Maceda opted to consider San Miguel’s Opposition as a MR and merely ordered the prosecutor to file a reply thereto 5. Nov 21 – Judge Maceda issued an Order clarifying his Order of Sep 17 San Miguel argues that the offense charged is neither a capital offense nor punishable by reclusion perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order. Clearly, the intendment of the Sep 17 Order was to deny him of his constitutional right to bail. The issuance of the Nov 21 Order that only the bail recommended by the prosecutor was
Held: Yes. San Miguel was charged with violation an offense punishable by PC. Therefore, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The prosecutor's Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail was very precise in its prayer, i.e., that the allowance for bail granted to the accused to secure his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest dated May 10 be canceled as there is reasonable ground to believe and all indications point to the probability that accused is seriously considering flight from the prosecution of the case. Two days before the scheduled date of hearing of the prosecutor’s Motion, Judge Maceda issued the Order granting the motion of the prosecution to cancel bail. However, Judge Maceda continued with the hearing on Sep 19. He considered the Opposition to the Motion as a MR of the assailed Order granting the withdrawal by the prosecution of the recommended bail. This may have rectified the mistake committed by Judge Maceda as the latter took into consideration that the accused has a right to due process as much as the State; but then, no evidence was adduced to prove that San Miguel was seriously considering flight from prosecution, which was very critical to the granting or denial of the motion of the prosecution to cancel bail. Judge Maceda clarified that the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected by the withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended bail; only the bail recommended by the prosecutor in the amount of P60,000 was considered withdrawn in the Order of Sep 17. The bail in the amount of P60,000 was already forfeited as a consequence of San Miguel's jumping bail. How then can Judge Maceda claim that he merely canceled the recommended bail of P60,000 when the same had already been forfeited? The only recommended bail that remains subject of the Motion of the prosecutor is the increased bail in the amount of P120,000. Thus, there remains no other conclusion except that Judge Maceda canceled the recommended bail in the increased amount of P120,000 The Order of Sep 17 effectively deprived San Miguel of his constitutional right to bail when it was issued two days before the scheduled hearing on Sep 19. And even granting for the sake of argument that San Miguel was also charged with the crime of murder on Sep 14, or 3 days before the Order of cancellation was issued, Judge Maceda failed to consider that what
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was being prayed for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the recommended bail for violation of RA 6425 and not for murder. Judge Maceda's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due hearing was justified considering that San Miguel was already detained for the non-bailable offense of murder 3 days before the cancellation was ordered, is misplaced. Where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required. Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok GR 140842, April 12, 2007 1st Division: Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: Rufina Chua filed a complaint for estafa against Chiok. After PI an information for estafa with the RTC. During arraignment, Chiok pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. After the prosecution and the defense had presented their respective evidence, the RTC set the promulgation of judgment on Jan 26, 1999. However, Chiok and his counsel failed to appear on said date despite notice. The RTC reset the promulgation of judgment on Feb 1, 1999, with notice to Chiok. Again, Chiok failed to appear. The RTC then promulgated its Decision convicting Chiok of estafa and sentencing him to suffer 12 years of PM, as minimum, to 20 years of RT, as maximum. On the same day, Feb 1, 1999, the prosecution filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that Chiok might flee or commit another crime. On Feb 15, 1999, the motion for cancellation of bail was set for hearing. The prosecution presented a Record Check Routing Form issued by the BI showing that Chiok has an ACR and ICR. During that hearing, Chiok admitted using the names "Mark Tan" and Tong Wai Fat" as aliases. Consequently, on May 28, 1999, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order: 1. denying Chiok’s MR of the conviction; 2. canceling his bail Chiok filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with application for a TRO assailing the RTC’s Order canceling his bail.
Meanwhile, RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Chiok for his failure to appear despite the lapse of the 5-day period provided in the May 28, 1999 Order. The warrant was returned unserved because he could not be found at his given address. Later, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of Chiok, holding that Chiok should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural. Issue: Was the RTC correct in canceling the bail of Chiok? Held: Yes. Chiok has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the RTC’s judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment of 12 years of PM, as minimum, to 20 years of RT, as maximum which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to Sec. 5[3] (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114. Therefore, bail is discretionary on the part of the court. Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on Jan 26, 1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, but also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail. People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada G.R. No. 158754; August 10, 2007 EN BANC: Garcia J Facts: In Nov 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against President Erap, five [5] criminal complaints against Erap and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the … Office of the Ombudsman. On Apr 4, 2001, the … Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the SB of several criminal Informations against Erap, et al. One of the Informations was for plunder under RA 7080 and among the respondents was Jinggoy, then mayor of San Juan. On Apr 25, 2001, SB issued a warrant of arrest for Jinggoy and his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy, et al were placed in custody of the law. Jinggoy filed a “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion” alleging that he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. He prayed that he be allowed to post bail.
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Eventually, the SB granted the omnibus application for bail fixed at P500T. The people argue that Jinggoy should not have been granted bail. The people argue that since the central figure in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e., Erap, is charged with a capital offense, all those within the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense. The people cite People v. Castelo [GR L-10774, May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 193] which also involves multiple levels of conspiracies where the prime suspect was a former Judge who later rose to hold, in a concurrent capacity, the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National Defense. In Castelo, charges and countercharges were initially hurled by and between Castelo and Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star witness against Castelo in a scandal case. Castelo left the Philippines for Korea. While away, someone shot Monroy dead. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy led by a certain “Ben Ulo” (who appears to be the mastermind) and a group of confidential agents of the DND, one of whom was the triggerman. Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the SolGen tagged Ben Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for desiring Monroy’s demise. The conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be overlapping with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of whom was the triggerman. In People v. Ty Sui Wong [GR L-32529, May 12, 1978, 83 SCRA 125] featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the heart of Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano was found with multiple stab wounds in a dark alley in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among “Sampaloc hoodlums” who had no direct link with Victor. However, one of the neighbors of the “Sampaloc hoodlums” was a classmate of Victor. In the end, on the basis of interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor and his classmate together with all the “Sampaloc hoodlums” guilty of murder. Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, the people presently argue: “It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Erap conspiring with Chavit Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng protection money); and of Singson involving Jinggoy in yet another level of conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e., the regular collection of jueteng protection money for Erap; and, Jinggoy, aware of the details of the conspiracy between Erap and Singson, agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of
bribes to Erap as its ultimate beneficiary. Thus, Jinggoy reached an agreement with Singson, executed the plan and participated in furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and collection of jueteng protection money; remitting P2M thereof to Singson for delivery to Erap and retaining P1M thereof for himself. Similarly, therefore, Jinggoy should have been denied bail since he is as guilty and liable as Erap for the non-bailable offense of Plunder. Issue: Did the SB commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted bail to Jinggoy? Held: No. The rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release on bail. The people erroneously equate the provisional grant of bail to Jinggoy to his virtual acquittal in Criminal Case 26558. The People is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, SB is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of the main case. The SB is not making any judgment as to the final outcome of this case either with respect to Jinggoy or with respect to Erap. The SB is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence of Jinggoy's guilt is strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail. Revoking the bail thus granted to Jinggoy, which necessarily implies that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting SB’s ongoing determination of the facts and merits of the main case. The SB did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility that, in case of conviction, Jinggoy’s criminal liability would probably not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.
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Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, Jinggoy does not, as determined by SB seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the SB wrote in this regard: “It is not open to serious doubt that Jinggoy has, in general, been consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not nil. The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice. OCA v. Judge Lorenzo AM RTJ-05-1911; Dec 23, 2008 En Banc: Velasco, J Facts: Judge Lorenzo is charged for releasing on bail of 3 Filipinos caught while in the act of sniffing shabu and 5 Chinese nationals arrested while manufacturing shabu. The apprehension was effected during a raid in an illegal drugs laboratory in Pasig City. The complaint was filed by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño. According to Zuno, Judge Lorenzo: 1. arbitrarily granted the petition for bail of 3 Filipinos, who were arrested while in the act of sniffing shabu in a pot session; 2. granted bail without conducting a hearing or giving the prosecution reasonable time and chance to oppose the petition for bail—an act constituting gross and deliberate error, if not bad faith. As to those Chinese nationals who were caught in the act of manufacturing shabu including various manufacturing paraphernalia, Zuno contended they were granted bail despite vigorous objection from the prosecution which was still in the process of
presenting evidence on the petition for bail, and despite strong evidence of guilt. Judge Lorenzo stated that the charge against the 3 Filipinos, i.e., use and possession of 1.03 grams of shabu, was, as a matter of right, a bailable offense. Judge Lorenzo also pointed out that, during the hearings on the petition for bail, the prosecutors made no written or oral objection to said petition which he granted in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 114. Issue:
Did Judge Lorenzo err in granting the petition for bail of the 3 Filipinos caught in possession of 1.03 grams of shabu? Held: No. The offense they were charged with was bailable as a matter of right. Issue: Did Judge Lorenzo err in granting the petition for bail of the 5 Chinese nationals caught manufacturing shabu? Held: Yes. When he ordered the release on bail of the accused Chinese nationals, committed several serious lapses in disregard of legal and procedural rules. To start off, he allowed the accused to post bail supposedly because of the prosecution’s inability to prove their guilt with strong evidence. But Judge Lorezo’s decision “would have been correct, if only [he] paid enough attention to the factors why the prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of guilt is strong,” referring to the non-appearance during bail hearings of two key prosecution witnesses. Said witnesses’ testimony would have proved not only the amount of shabu seized, but more importantly that the substance examined was shabu. The records tend to show that 5 kilos of shabu were confiscated. Judge Lorenzo committed the following inculpatory acts: 1. ordering a clerk to serve the subpoena; 2. ordering a prosecutor to serve the orders of arrest/bench warrant; 3. failing to check if the subpoenas were personally received by the police officers indicated therein; 4. preterminating the hearings for the petition for bail for the reason that counsel for the accused submitted the same for resolution; and 5. denying the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence necessary for its opposition to the petition for bail, despite two more hearings set for that purpose.
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People v. Plaza GR 176933; Oct 2, 2009 Carpio-Morales, J Facts: Plaza was charged with murder. After the prosecution rested its case, Plaza filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser: “The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in this case.” Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge B’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. Prosecution contended that: 1. the case being Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is RP to D; 2. it is the prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged with; 3. Plaza should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; 4. Plaza had already waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, State Prosecutor Bagabuyo questioned Judge B’s impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to Judge Tan. Judge Tan granted Palza’s Motion reasoning that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by RT and, therefore, bailable, Plaza could no longer be denied bail. Plaza was subsequently released after he posted bail. Roberto, the victim’s brother faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been filed by Plaza and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the prosecution’s evidence is strong. Issue: Was the RTC correct in granting bail to Plaza? Held:
Yes. The exercise by RTC of its discretionary power to grant bail to accused charged with a capital offense depends on whether evidence of guilt is strong. . .
[W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as “such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.” Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge B of the prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and Judge B’s statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict Plaza of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether Plaza was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution. The People’s recourse to Sec. 5, Rule 114 to support its contention that Plaza should be denied bail is unavailing, for Sec. 5 clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the RTC. Leviste v. CA GR 189122; Mar 17, 2010 3rd Division: Corona, J Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the RTC Makati for homicide and sentenced to suffer a penalty of 6 years and 1 to 12 years and 1 day. He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. CA denied Leviste’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” CA ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. Leviste now questions the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 was present. Leviste’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the RTC is more than 6 years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the Sec. 5[3] are absent, bail must be granted to appellant pending appeal.
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Issue: Is Leviste correct? Held: No. Sec. 5[3] Rule 114 applies to 2 scenarios where the penalty imposed on appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years. 1. The 1st scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated not present 2. The 2nd scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. In the 1st situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 is present, the CA has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the CA’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. In the 2nd situation, the CA exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the CA grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. Given these 2 distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: 1. the determination of discretion stage, where the CA must determine whether any of the circumstances in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the CA will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal, and 2. the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the 1st scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the CA may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the 2nd scenario, the CA’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of
any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the CA to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. Leviste disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the 2 different situations that are governed by Sec. 5[3], Rule 114. Instead, Leviste insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal. Leviste interprets Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the RTC is imprisonment exceeding 6 years. For Leviste, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the 5 bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal. Leviste’s theory therefore reduces the CA into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the 5 circumstances exists. This unduly constricts its “discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the RTC is imprisonment exceeding 6 years. In short, Leviste’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the CA by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue — whether any of the 5 bailnegating circumstances is present. However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Thus, by severely clipping the CA’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere factfinding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by RTC is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, Leviste’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by RTC of an offense not punishable by death, RP, or LI, admission to bail is discretionary.” Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the 5 situations mentioned in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bailnegating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, Leviste applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the 5 situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to “the following or other similar circumstances.” Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 may be considered in the
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allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting Leviste’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the RTC is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than 6 years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than 6 years’ imprisonment must be made only if any of the 5 bailnegating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara AM RTJ-09-2190; Apr 23, 2010 3rd Division: Peralta, J Facts: In 2001, a criminal case for murder was filed against Ishak Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan before the RTC Marawi City. In 2007, Judge Mangotara found both accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced them to imprisonment of RP. Judge M, likewise, increased the accused’s bail bond from P75,000 to P200,000. Issue:
Did Judge M act correctly in increasing the bail
bond? Held: No. Rule 114 is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and possessed sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by RP or D, the accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the accused had been sentenced to RP, the bail should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did. Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT. Rule 114, Sec. 7 Laarni Valerio v. CA GR 164911-12, 10 Oct 2007 2nd Division: Quisumbing Facts: On March 18, 2000, Jun Valerio, Chief of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, was shot and killed in front of his house at Diliman. An information for murder was filed against Antonio Cabador, Martin Jimenez, Samuel Baran, and Geronimo Quintana; while an Information for parricide was filed against the victim’s wife, Milagros Valerio. Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was not strong. The prosecution, on the other hand, moved to discharge accused Samuel Baran and to have him as state witness. Meanwhile, Antonio Cabador was arrested. In his sworn statement, he stated that it was Milagros who planned the murder of Jun Valerio. Further, Antonio pleaded guilty to the charge of murder. The RTC granted Milagros’ application for bail, but denied the motion to convert Samuel as state witness. On Mar 5, 2002, Milagros posted a bailbond and was ordered released. Laarni Valerio, sister of the victim, and the People, elevated the case to the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC judge for granting Milagros bail. Laarni, et al contend that Milagros is not entitled to bail as the evidence of guilt against her is strong. They bank on the testimony of Modesto Cabador that he heard Milagros impatiently ask Antonio about their plot to kill Jun Valerio. They maintain that Milagros’ unrestrained behavior in front of Modesto was not unusual considering Milagros’ desperation and the fact that Modesto is Antonio’s cousin. Laarni, et al point out that Milagros’ high level of education, social orientation, or breeding does not prevent her from committing parricide. They also assert that Antonio’s plea of guilty to the charge of conspiring with Milagros in the murder of Jun Valerio
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indicated strong evidence of guilt against Milagros. Issue: W/N Milagros is entitled to bail. Held: No. The RTC disregarded the glaring fact that the killer himself has confessed to the crime and has implicated Milagros as the mastermind. When taken in conjunction with the other evidence on record, these facts show very strongly that Milagros may have participated as principal by inducement in the murder of Jun Valerio. It was thus a grave error or a grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC to grant her application for bail. Milagros, however, counters that she is entitled to bail as a matter of right because the evidence of guilt against her is not strong. Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante Facts: On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of KiambaMaitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arre sted. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infante’s Branch. On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody. Atty. Gacal filed a Motion for Reconsideration on such orders on the ground that no trial regarding the bail was ever made and that the Judge did not conduct an independent investigation as to the veracity of the recommendation made the public prosecutor. The Motion was denied. Atty. Gacal subsequently filed an administrative case against the Judge. The OCA found Judge Infante guilty. Issue: WON the granting of Ancheta’s petition for bail, despite the offense charged was a capital offense, was valid despite the absence of a bail hearing. Held: NO. Judge Infante specifically cited judicial experience as sanctioning his adoption and approval of the public prosecutor’s recommendation on the
fixing of bail. Yet, it was not concealed from him that the public prosecutor’s recommendation had been mainly based on the documentary evidence adduced, and on the public prosecutor’s misguided position that the evidence of guilt was weak because only circumstantial evidence had been presented. As such, Judge Infante’s unquestioning echoing of the public prosecutor’s conclusion about the evidence of guilt not being sufficient to deny bail did not justify his dispensing with the bail hearing. Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action. Rule 114, Sec. 15 Rasmia Tabao v. Judge Barataman [AM MTJ-01-1384. April 11, 2002] 1st Division: PUNO, J.: Facts: Rasmia Tabao charged MTC Judge Acmad Barataman, with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. Tabao is the private complainant in Criminal Case 9106 entitled "People v. Samsodin Tabao" for abandonment of minor. It appears that Judge B issued an Order granting the motion for bail on recognizance filed by the father of the accused pursuant to RA 6036. Judge Barataman alleges that: 1. the crime of abandonment of a minor is covered by the Summary Rules and hence bail on recognizance is not required as the court can immediately arraign and try the accused, pursuant to Sec. 13 of Rule 114; 2. if he were the acting judge when the criminal case was filed, he would not issue a warrant of arrest but order the immediate arraignment and trial of
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the case and there would be no need to discuss the matter of bail; and, 3. the court can appoint as custodian of the accused his father, a former City Councilor of Marawi City, who qualifies as a responsible person under Sec. 15, Rule 114 OCA Velasco found Judge B guilty of gross ignorance of the law for releasing accused on recognizance before it could acquire jurisdiction over his person. Accused was at large when motion for bail was filed. Issue: Is the OCA correct? Held: Yes. Judge B is liable in granting the motion for bail on recognizance in clear violation of RA 6036, because: First. Sec. 1 of RA 6036 provides that "… bail shall not be required of a person charged with violation of a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than 6 months imprisonment…" Instead of bail, Sec. 2 states that the person charged "shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks..." In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn statement supporting the motion for bail filed before Judge Barataman was signed, not by the accused but by his father. The failure of the accused to sign the sworn statement is in clear contravention of the express mandate of the law that the person charged shall sign a sworn statement binding himself to report to the Clerk of Court. This is a personal obligation imposed by RA 6036 on the accused and cannot be assumed by the custodian or responsible citizen who may be appointed by the court. It is different from Sec. 15, Rule 114 which allows the release of the accused on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. RA 6036 applies to criminal cases where the prescribed penalty is not higher than 6 months imprisonment. In the case at bar, accused stands charged with abandonment of a minor which carries with it the imposable penalty of arresto mayor. Hence, it was erroneous for Judge B to have granted the motion for bail on the basis of the affidavit of the father of the accused. Moreover, RA 6036 allows the release of the accused on his own recognizance only where it has been established that he is unable to post the
required cash or bail bond. The accused in this case is a CPA who is engaged in the transport business. We reject the contention of Judge B that the law does not distinguish whether the accused is rich or poor. The distinction is all to clear for the law explicitly provides that the accused can be released on his own recognizance only if he is able to clearly establish that he is unable to post cash or bail bond. Second. Judge B does not deny that the accused was at large when the motion for bail on recognizance was filed and subsequently granted. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Sec. 15, Rule 114 provides that the court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. It is a basic principle that bail is intended to obtain provisional liberty and cannot be granted before custody of an accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender. It is self-evident that a court cannot grant provisional liberty to one who is actually in the enjoyment of his liberty for it would be incongruous to give freedom to one who is free. Thus, we have held that it is premature to file a motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to be curtailed. In the case at bar, Judge B was fully cognizant that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused who was still at large and yet, he entertained and granted his motion for bail. In doing so, Judge B violated a tenet in criminal procedure which is too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the law. When the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. Rule 114, Sec. 16 Judge Simbulan v. Judge Bartolome AM MTJ-05-1588; Jun 5, 2009 3rd Division: Peralta, J Facts: Criminal Case 13360 was originally raffled to the RTC-41, San Fernando, Pampanga, where Judge Simbulan presides. On Sep 18, 2003, said RTC-41 received an Indorsement from Warrant Officer PO3 Villacentino of the Sasmuan Police Station stating that the accused Mercado voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail bond through Summit Guaranty which was duly approved by Judge Bartolome on Aug 21, 2003. Issue:
Did Judge Bartolome act accordingly when he approved the bail bond of accused Bartolome? Held:
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No. There were indeed grave errors and discrepancies committed by Judge B in processing the surety bond for the accused in Criminal Case 13360. Rule 114, Sec. 14 and 16, apply before an accused can be released on bail. Accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. The proper procedure, would have been to file her bail bond with the RTC-41, San Fernando, Pampanga where her case was pending. Had Judge S been absent or was unavailable at that time, the accused could file for bail with another branch of the RTC in Pampanga or in San Fernando City. However, the accused filed her surety bond with the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where it was approved by Judge B. Not only did Judge B erroneously order the release of the accused, but he also failed to require submission of the supporting documents needed in the application for a bond: 1. There was no Certificate of Detention or Warrant of Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by the MTC to the Judge S. 2. The other supporting documents were belatedly filed. Judge B approved the bail bond on Aug 21, 2003, but: a. the Undertaking was dated Nov 22, 2003, b. the Certification from the OCA was dated Oct 29, 2003, and c. the Certification from Summit Guaranty was dated Nov 22, 2003. Judge B violated Sec. 14 and 16 of Rule 114. Rule 114, Sec. 17 Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint AM 04-1558; Apr 27, 2010 En Banc: Per Curiam Facts: An anonymous letter sent to CJ Davide, dated Oct 22, 2003 requesting the investigation of Judge Marilou Tamang, Presiding Judge of MTC Pateros and Acting Presiding Judge of MTC San Juan. The letter complained that Judge T, through the connivance of the arresting officer and court employees of MTC San Juan, had been indiscriminately approving fake bonds for a fee of P1,000.00 “per count ng kaso.” Investigation revealed that Judge T had approved bail bonds issued by Covenant Assurance, despite Covenant having been blacklisted since Dec 20, 2002. It also appears that the RTC-153 Pasig City on Oct 22, 2003 revoked the “unethical Orders of Release” issued by Judge T in various criminal cases assigned to that branch. The order stated that Judge T had
approved the bail bonds issued by a blacklisted company without any showing of the unavailability of all the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering that the accused persons posting the bail bonds were charged in criminal cases pending before the RTC in Pasig and were detained in the Pasig City Jail. There are also 3 cases where the bail bonds were secured in San Juan and approved by Judge T, despite the presence and availability of RTC Judges in Mandaluyong before whose courts the cases are pending. Such approval was made in contravention of the provisions of Sec. 17(a), Rule 114. There were rare cases when Judge T approved bail bonds secured from legitimate surety companies. However, even in such cases, approval was made without compliance with the provisions of Rule 114 because the accused were all detained in Pasig where their cases were pending. Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the bail bonds issued by Covenant, a blacklisted bonding company, but also the bail bonds in some instances for accused charged in cases pending outside her territorial jurisdiction. Issue:
Did Judge Tamang commit neglect of duty?
Held: Yes. Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by Covenant although they manifestly lacked clearance from the SC indicating that Covenant was qualified to transact business with the courts. Covenant was a blacklisted company at the time of issuance of the bail bonds. She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty, for, the judge is still bound to review the supporting documents before approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and that all requisites for approval have been complied with. The SC expressly enjoins a judge to carefully pore over all documents before signing the documents and giving them official imprimatur. The judge’s signing of orders must not be taken lightly, or be regarded as the usual paper work that passes through the judge’s hands for signature. Judge Tamang’s excuse of simply relying on the representation of the court personnel who unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and kindness betrayed a deficiency in that requisite degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. She cannot now thereby exculpate herself, or take refuge behind that excuse, for, in fact, such reliance was actually her admission of being neglectful and of
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lacking the diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters brought to her for signature. Sec. 17 (a), Rule 114 governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction. Under Sec. 17[a], the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no RTC Judge is available, with any MTC of the place of arrest. The list of approved bail bonds shows 34 involved accused detained in Pasig City, 7 in Taguig City, 6 in San Juan, and 1 in Pateros. The remaining 3 cases involved accused who voluntarily surrendered to Judge T in the San Juan MTC. However, all of the criminal cases were pending in the Pasig RTC. Issue: Judge Tamang contends that under Sec. 17(a), Rule 114, the accused who were detained and who voluntarily surrendered in San Juan could file their applications for bail in San Juan; that the accused detained in Pateros could do the same; and that the bail applications of those detained in Taguig City were legally approved, because she was then the Pairing Judge of the MTC in Taguig City. Is Judge T correct? Held: As a judge then on detail in San Juan, Judge T was correct in approving the applications for bail of the accused who had voluntarily surrendered and been detained in San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig City, because Sec. 7(a), Rule 114, granted her the authority to approve applications for bail of accused detained within her territorial jurisdiction, in the event of the unavailability of any RTC Judge in the area. It is worth noting that at the time of the subject bail applications, there was still no RTC Judge stationed in San Juan and Pateros. However, Judge T did not substantiate her explanation that she had approved the bail applications of the accused detained in Pasig City and had issued the corresponding release orders after office hours on Fridays. Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao [AM MTJ-04-1556. Mar 31, 2005] 1st Division: Ynares-Santiago Facts: In June 5, 2003, Purita Lim charged Judge Cesar Dumlao of the MTC of San Mateo, Isabela, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority. Lim averred that she filed two [2] criminal cases for carnapping and theft with the RTC of Santiago
City, Isabela, Branch 35, against Herman Medina. On May 8, 2003, Medina was apprehended and detained at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Santiago City Jail, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by then Presiding Judge Fe Albano Madrid of Branch 35. On May 9, 2003, Judge Dumlao issued 3 separate orders for the release of Medina on the ground that he had posted bail with his court. Issue: Was Judge Dumlao correct in ordering the release of Medina? Held: No. The criminal cases filed by Lim against Herman Medina were pending before the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order of release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact, Lim avers that on the day Judge Dumlao ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at their respective posts. It is elementary that a MTC judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Sec. 17(a), Rule 114 must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. Judge Dumlao undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve Medina’s bail and issue an order for his release. Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of accused whose cases were not only pending in other courts but who were, likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. It must be emphasized that the rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions. WHEREFORE, Judge Dumlao of the MTC, San Mateo, Isabela, is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6) months
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without salary and other benefits with a WARNING that a repetition of the same shall merit a more serious penalty. Rule 114, Sec. 17 and 19 Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines AM MTJ-07-167, 3Apr 19, 2007 2nd Division: Tinga J Facts: A verified Letter-Complaint was filed by Virginia Savella charging Iluminada MTC-Sinait Judge Ines with Serious Misconduct. The Complaint stemmed from a criminal complaint for Falsification filed by Savella against Isabel Ibañez, before MTC-Vigan. A warrant of arrest was not immediately served on Ibañez because she was residing in the U.S.A. at that time. On 18 April 2006, NBI operatives tried to serve an alias warrant of arrest on Ibañez, who reportedly returned to the RP to visit her hometown in Sinait, Ilocos Sur. Ibañez, however, was not found at her residence. Instead, her daughter produced a copy of the Order issued by Judge Ines directing the provisional release of Ibañez upon posting of a P12,000 bail bond. Savella claims that the Clerk of Court of MTCSinait did not forward the bail bond papers to the court where the case was pending. This failure, according to Savella, is tantamount to serious misconduct. She further alleges that the order of Judge Ines was highly irregular for it gave undue favor and illegal accommodation to Ibañez who is known to be a close friend of Judge Ines. Judge Ines countered that on Holy Tuesday, 13 Apr 2006, Ibañez, together with her daughters, dropped by her house, voluntarily surrendered to her, and posted bail. Judge Ines called her clerk to prepare the corresponding receipt for the cash bond. However, on account of the Holy Week celebration and the heavy workload in her court, so Judge Ines claims, she forgot to transmit the bail bond papers to MTC-Vigan until she was reminded by her Clerk of Court when the latter was “ordered” by Judge Ante of MTC-Vigan to immediately forward the bail bond papers of Ibañez. The OCA found Judge Ines guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended a fine of P5,000 with warning that a repetition of a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Held: As correctly pointed out by the OCA, Judge Ines failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail bond application. Sec. 17, Rule 114 explicitly provides that “(b)ail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any RTC, MTC judge of the province or city or municipality.” The instant falsification case against Ibañez was filed before the MTC-Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. There was no showing of the unavailability of Judge Ante at that time. Judge Ines clearly erred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the falsification case before the MTC of Vigan. Assuming arguendo that Judge Ines rightfully granted bail to Ibañez, her failure to transmit the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes another violation of the rules, particularly Sec. 19 of Rule 114. Judge Ines should have forwarded the records pertaining to the bail bond immediately after she received the same. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. They should strive for excellence exceeded only by their passion for truth, to the end that they be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law. This blatant violation of the rules exhibited by Judge Ines is tantamount to gross ignorance of law or procedure classified as a serious charge. Rule 114, Sec. 8, 15, 18 Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad AM RTJ 06-1976; Apr 29, 2009 En Banc: Carpio-Morales, J Facts: The Provincial Prosecutor, on July 1, 2002, received a copy of a “Motion to Grant Accused Provisional Liberty” filed by the accused. On July 11, 2002, the prosecution then interposed its Opposition thereto, not knowing that, on July 2, 2002, Judge N had already issued an order granting the accused provisional liberty and approving the bonds filed by the accused. Complainant claims that the accused had been charged with murder which is a non-bailable offense. Judge N granted bail without conducting a hearing and without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove the strength of its evidence. Judge N denies that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to prove the strength of its evidence and that the petition for bail was granted without a hearing.
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Judge N claims that an oral petition for bail had been presented in open court which was duly heard and partially argued. In fact, the prosecution had allegedly energetically argued and suggested that the defense reduce its petition into writing so the matter can be brought up to the Provincial Prosecutor. Issue: Did Judge N violate Rule 114? Held: Yes. Anent the charge that he granted the accused bail without a hearing, the record shows that, in reality, no hearing had been conducted by Judge N before he issued the order granting accused provisional liberty and approving the bonds filed. Judge N’s claim that there had been an oral petition for bail which was extensively heard and argued during the pre-trial of the cases on June 20, 2002 is not supported by the record. While Judge N maintains that the stenographer failed to take down the discussion on the oral petition for bail, this is unsubstantiated and totally selfserving. The record speaks for itself and the transcript of the stenographic notes is wholly bereft of any reference to the oral petition for bail... The motion filed by the accused for the grant of provisional liberty was dated June 27, 2002 and was received by the prosecution on July 1, 2002. On July 2, 2002 Judge N had issued an order granting said motion. Judge N contends that the motion filed by the accused was in compliance with an order by the court for the accused to file a formal petition for bail. However, no such order requiring the accused to file a formal petition for bail can be found in the record. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by D, RP, or LI, whether bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail, in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
After the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and, based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. However, the July 2, 2002 order of Judge N judge does not contain such summary and conclusion. Since Judge N did not conduct the requisite hearing before he granted bail, he violated of Sec. 8 and 18, Rule 114. Judge Navidad should also be sanctioned for placing the accused who were charged with heinous crimes under the custody of Atty. Fiel, pending reinvestigation of the cases. The grant of bail based on recognizance in these cases are not among the instance the accused may be released on recognizance under Sec. 15, Rule 114. The accused may be released on recognizance under RA 6036, PD 603, and PD 968, as amended. Also, Sec. 16 of Rule 114, explicitly provides, “A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.” Rule 114, Sec. 21 Mendoza v. Alarma GR 151970; May 7, 2008 1st Division: Carpio, J Facts: Spouses Alarma are the owners of a parcel of land located in Iba, Zambales. The land, was posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty of Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal possession of firearms. When Mayo failed to appear in court, the RTC ordered his arrest and the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government. RTC also directed the bondsmen to produce within a period of 30 days the person of the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bail bond. However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the RTC issued a writ of execution against the land. The land was eventually sold at public auction and Winston Mendoza emerged as the highest bidders. Thus, the land was awarded to Mendoza and they immediately took possession of the same. Sometime thereafter, Alarma filed a complaint for recovery of property against Mendoza with the RTC grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the property bond.
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Issue: Was the RTC correct in issuing the order of execution against the land of Alarma? Held: No. Rule 114, Sec. 21 clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. Here are the 2 occasions upon which the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court: 1. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. 2. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this 30-day period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the RTC, that the RTC may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the RTC and that the RTC declared his bail forfeited. The RTC gave the bondsmen, a 30-day period to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their nonproduction. However, 2 years had passed from the time the RTC ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and awarded to Mendoza, the highest bidders. These turn of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued, not on a judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture. An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond. An order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant “to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond.” Such order is different from a judgment on
the bond which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. The judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final, execution may issue at once. However, in this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated Alarma’ right to procedural due process. As a result, the basis for which title to the land had been issued has no more leg to stand on. The appellate court, therefore, was correct in ordering the annulment of the title to the land as a matter of course. There being no valid title nor any right to possess the land, reconveyance to the Alarma is only proper under the circumstances. WILFREDO TALAG v. JUDGE REYES AM RTJ-04-1852. June 3, 2004 1st Division: Ynares-Santiago Facts: Romeo Lacap filed a complaint against Wilfredo Talag, for violation of BP 22 and Estafa. Wilfredo Talag submitted his counter-affidavits denying any participation in the transaction to defraud Lacap. Later, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa against Talag. The Information was filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, presided by Judge Amor Reyes. Talag filed a MR before the Office of the City Prosecutor, praying for the dismissal of the complaint against him for utter lack of merit. On even date, he filed an Omnibus Motion before RTC: 1. to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or to recall the same if already issued; and 2. to remand case to the Prosecutor pending review of the MR. According to Talag, on June 11, 2002, he requested his counsel to determine whether the hearing for the pending motions had already been set. To his consternation, he was told by his counsel that Judge Reyes ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest without first resolving the said motions. Talag immediately filed a petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing the said warrant. After the expiration of the TRO issued by the CA, Judge Reyes issued another warrant of arrest against Talag. Talag filed a motion for Judge Reyes’s inhibition. Meanwhile, Talag through counsel filed a Notice of Change of Address.
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Judge Reyes denied the motion for inhibition and set the case for arraignment on Dec 11, 2002. Talag claims that said order never reached him or his counsel since it was sent by registered mail to his previous address inspite of the Notice of Change Address which was filed as early as Aug 28, 2002. Since Talag failed to attend his arraignment allegedly due to lack of notice, Judge Reyes reset the same to Jan 22, 2003. However, the second notice was again sent to the wrong address at Makati City, again resulting in Talag’s failure to attend his arraignment. As a consequence, Judge Reyes issued a bench warrant of arrest and confiscated the bond of Talag. Issue: Did Judge Reyes act accordingly when she confiscated the bond of Talag? Held: Yes. The issuance of a warrant of arrest and confiscation of the bond of Talag on Jan 22, 2003 was in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 in view of Talag’s failure to appear despite notice to him and his bondsman. The notice of change of address filed by Talag pertains to the change of address of his counsel and not to himself, hence, court processes were sent to his “alleged” old address. Moreover, Produce Orders of the Dec 11, 2002 and Jan 22, 2003 settings were sent to Talag’s bondsman, but this notwithstanding, Talag’s bondsman failed to produce him in court and it even filed a motion of extension of time to do so. Talag blames the Judge Reyes for his failure to appear at his arraignment because the notice was sent to the wrong address despite a prior notice for change of address. A cursory reading of the notice of change of address will show that it pertains to the counsel’s residence, not to Talag’s. In view of this, it becomes reasonable for the court to assume that court processes could be sent to Talag’s “old” and “unchanged” residence. As correctly pointed out by Judge Reyes, the Produce Order of the Dec 11, 2002 and Jan 22, 2003 settings were sent to Talag’s bondsman. Hence, in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114, his bondsman must produce him before the court on the given date and failing to do so; the bond was forfeited as it was. Rule 114, Sec. 22 and 24 Bongcac v. SB GR 156687-88 , May 21, 2009 1st Division: Carpio, J Facts:
Panfilo Bongcac was the secretary of the mayor of Tagbilaran City. He was charged with Estafa defined and penalized under Art. 315, 1(b) of the RPC before the SB. Upon arraignment, Bongcac pleaded not guilty. SB rendered judgment finding Bongcac guilty. Bongcac filed a MR which was denied by the SB. Bongcac filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC which sought the reversal of the Decision of the SB. SC issued a resolution denying the petition. No MR was filed. Consequently, the Resolution of the SC became final and executory. SB issued a notice to Bongcac and counsel directing them to be present for the execution of judgment in the criminal case. However, Bongcac filed a Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the SC which sought to “reverse and set aside the decision of the SB” and to “declare that Bongcac is acquitted of the offense charged.” Meanwhile, Bongcac filed with the SB, a Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in abeyance to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief he filed with the SC SB denied Bongcac’s Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings. SB further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against Bongcac to serve the sentence imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by Bongcac for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Bongcac was given 5 days to voluntarily surrender. Later, the SC denied the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief for lack of merit. Issue: Did the SB act correctly when it cancelled Bongcac’s cash bailbond? Held: No. The cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction as provided by Sec. 22 of Rule 114. From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The SB did not err in cancelling Bongcac’s cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction became final and executory and its execution became ministerial. People v. Cawaling GR 157147; Apr 17, 2009 3rd Division: Nachura, J
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Facts: Cawaling was charged with murder. The case against him was dismissed [in] Feb 1991 because the complainant, the wife of the victim, executed an affidavit of waiver. After the dismissal of the case, accused went to Papua, New Guinea and upon his return in 1992 he ran and was elected as barangay captain of Busay, San Jose, Romblon. In 1995 he ran for mayor but lost the election. He then filed an election protest in this Court. On the scheduled hearing of his protest, he was arrested and upon inquiry with the arresting officer he was told that the dismissed case was refiled, by the same prosecutor who dismissed the original case. On Dec 15, 1999, RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the offense of homicide. RTC stated that accused, in case of appeal of the Decision, may apply for bail pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 114. ßCawaling took exception to the portion of the RTC decision that convicted him as accomplice to homicide, and appealed to the CA. But the CA reversed the RTC decision, convicted Cawaling of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Held: Lastly, we dispose of a corollary incident – the Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property bond and post cash bond in lieu thereof – filed by bondsperson Margarita Cruz. In this connection, Sec. 22 of Rule 114 is explicit. With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to execute the judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight, the motion must be denied. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is presented. We are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a relative, obtain provisional liberty. However, under Sec. 1 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the accused before any court as required under specified conditions. It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed temporary liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee and evade punishment. As it stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the property bond cannot be released.
Rule 114, Sec. 26 Borlongan v. Pena GR 143591; May 5, 2010 2nd Division: Perez, J Facts: Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, accused immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the accused’s refusal to enter a plea, the MTC entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for them. Issue:
Does the posting of bail constitute a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest? Held: No. The issues raised by accused have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were already arraigned. The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Sec. 26, Rule 114. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. Sec. 26, Rule 114 is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Issue: Did the accused waive his right to question the finding of probable cause after posting a bail bond? Held: No. Considering the conduct of the accused after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of
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probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the accused had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the 0existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x. Accused filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, accused refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the MTC entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the CA or SC. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. Rule 114 BAIL
Sec. 1. Bail Defined Bail 1 Definition: The security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman 2 Who furnishes the bail: 1 The person in custody whose release is sought, or 2 A bondsman 3 Purpose: To guarantee said person’s appearance before any court 4 Forms of bail: 1 Corporate surety, 2 Property bond, 3 Cash deposit, or 4 Recognizance Constitutional provision on the right to bail
Art. III. Sec 13 – All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by RP when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.” Comendador v. De Villa GR 95020, Aug 20, 1991 Issue: Does the right to bail apply to military personnel under Court Martial? Held: The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 order were sustained, on “provisional” bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice. Issue: Does this violate the equal protection clause? Held: No. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or a thing similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated
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against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. Purpose and Nature of Bail The right to bail springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after the trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. [Go v. Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan, Jul 26, 1999]
Person Applying for Bail must be in the Custody of the Court By its definition, bail requires that a person must first be arrested or deprived of liberty before it can be availed of. Thus, although the posting thereof is tantamount to submission to the jurisdiction of the court, it presupposes that the accused is under detention or in the custody of law. Indeed, it would be absurd and incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Hilario v. Ocampo, Dec 03, 2001 Theory of constructive custody This is an exception to the General Rule that an accused has to be arrested or has to voluntarily surrender before he can admitted to bail Paderanga v. CA 247 SCRA 741 (1995) X, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the RTC during the hearing for bail that he could personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The undeniable fact is that X was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the RTC and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person by: 1. 1st – filing the application for bail with the trial court; 2. 2nd – furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; 3. 3rd – unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, X never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts
from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission of his application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. *See also Santiago v. Vasquez 217 SCRA 633, Jan 27, 1993 Types of Bail Corporate Surety Refers to the type of bail, similar to an insurance contract whereby a bonding company will issue a bond in the amount fixed by the court which will be forfeited if the bonding company fails in its obligation to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail. Property Bond Refers to a situation where property is put up by the accused or somebody else to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail. If such conditions are violated, the said property will be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof, up to the amount of bail fixed by the court will be forfeited in favor of the government. Cash Bond Refers to the type of bail whereby the accused or somebody else will actually deposit the amount fixed by the court as bail to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail. If these conditions are violated, the money can be forfeited. Recognizance Refers to the type of bail where a person is released in his own custody or to the custody of a responsible person. This type of bail is allowable only in the cases when specific provisions of the law or the rules allow it. Victory Liner v. Bellosillo AM MTJ-00-1321, Mar 10, 2004 Requiring bail to be posted in cash and in the amounts of P50T and P350T in cases of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide amounts to a denial of the constitutional right to bail. The decision to post a surety bond or cash as bail belongs to the accused and the court cannot require him to post cash Waiver of right to bail 1. Express waiver 2. Implied waiver – failure to raise the issue at the earliest opportune time, accused is deemed to have waived the right to bail [People v. Manes, 303 SCRA 231, Feb 17, 1999]
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Bail in Extradition 1. US Government v. Puruganan – No 2. HK Government v. Olalia – Yes Sec. 2. Conditions Requirements
of
the
Bail;
Conditions of the Bail 1 Effectivity: 1 The undertaking shall be effective upon approval 2 It shall remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the RTC irrespective of whether the case was: 1 Originally filed in the RTC, or 2 Appealed to the RTC 3 It shall lose its effectivity if cancelled, whether or not judgment has been rendered by the RTC 2 Obligation of accused out on bail He shall appear before the court whenever required by the court or these Rules 3 Effect of failure of accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice: 1 It shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat, and 2 The trial may proceed in absentia. 4 When the bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court: For execution of the final judgment Contents 1 The original papers shall state: 1 the full name and address of the accused, 2 the amount of the undertaking, and 3 the conditions required by Sec. 2 2 What must be attached to the bail – photographs of the accused: 1 passport size, 2 taken within the last 6 months, 3 showing his face, left and right profiles The Court has the right to restrict the travel of the Accused 1. Manotoc v. CA, May 30, 1986 2. Silverio v. CA, 195 SCRA 760 (1991) 3. Marcos v. SB, 247 SCRA 127 (1995) When Presence of Accused Required
In certain stages of the proceedings, an accused on bail or tried in absentia may be required to appear, to wit: 1. during arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, 2. during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and 3. at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. [Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb 1, 2000] Note: Arraignment is not a precondition for the granting of bail. [Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb 1, 2000] Sec. 3. No Release or Transfer Except on Court Order or Bail A person under Detention by Legal Process shall NOT be Released or Transferred Except: 1 Upon order of the court, or 2 When he is admitted to bail
Sec. 4.
Bail, a Matter of Right; Exception
When Bail is a Matter of Right 1 BEFORE conviction by the MTC; 2 AFTER conviction by the MTC pending appeal; 3 BEFORE conviction by the RTC and the imposable penalty for the offense is NOT: 1 death, 2 reclusion perpetua, or 3 life imprisonment; 4 BEFORE conviction by the RTC: 1 for an offense punishable by: 1 death, 2 Reclusion perpetua, or 3 life imprisonment 2 But the evidence of guilt is NOT strong Case: 1. San Miguel v. Judge Maceda [Apr 04, 2007] Sec. 5.
Bail, When Discretionary
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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When Bail is Discretionary 1 Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense NOT punishable by: 1 death, 2 reclusion perpetua, or 3 life imprisonment, 2 Provided it is shown that: 1 The accused: 1 is NOT a recidivist, 2 is NOT a quasi-recidivist, 3 is NOT a habitual delinquent, or 4 has NOT committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; 2 The accused has NOT: 1 escaped from legal confinement, 2 evaded sentence, or 3 violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; 3 The accused did NOT commit the offense while under: 1 Probation, 2 parole, or 3 conditional pardon; 4 The circumstances of the accused’s case does NOT indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5 There is NO undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. Effect when Bail is Discretionary and the Accused files a Notice of Appeal 1 The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the RTC: If the original record has not yet been transmitted to the appellate court 2 The application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court: If the decision of the RTC convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable 3 If the proper court grants the application for bail: 1 The accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail, 2 However, this must be with the consent of the bondsman 4 When it is the RTC which resolves the application for bail: 1 The appellate court may review the resolution of the RTC:
1 motu propio, or 2 on motion of any party, and 2 Notice must be given to the adverse party Note: The conviction of the accused rebuts the presumption of innocence. This shows that evidence of guilt is strong. Franciso Yap, Jr. v. CA GR 141529, Jun 06, 2001 The importance attached to conviction is due to underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tired and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. Case: 1. Chua v. CA and Chiok [Apr 12, 2007] Sec. 6.
Capital Offense Defined
Definition of Capital Offense An offense which may be punished with Death: 1 At the time of its commission, and 2 At the time of the application for admission to bail Note: 1. Effect of mitigating circumstances – The criterion to determine whether the offense charged is capital is the penalty provided by the law regardless of the attendant circumstances. The rationale of the provision lies in the difficulty and impracticability of determining the nature of the offense on the basis of the penalty actually imposable. Otherwise, the test will require consideration not only of evidence showing commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [People v. IAC, Jan 10, 1987] 2. Evidence of minority [if established without objection] – Where it has been established
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without objection that accused is a minor, it follows that, if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law," which effectively rules out the death penalty. [Bravo v. Borja, Jr., Feb 18, 1985]
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an punishable by RP or LI, not bailable
offense
When bail shall be denied 1 BEFORE conviction by the RTC: 1 of an offense punishable by: 1 death, 2 reclusion perpetua, or 3 life imprisonment, and 2 The evidence of guilt is strong; 2 AFTER conviction by the RTC, pending appeal, of a offense punishable by: 1 death, 2 reclusion perpetua, or 3 life imprisonment; 3 AFTER conviction by the RTC of an offense with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of more than 6 years but not exceeding 20 years, and it is shown that: 1 The accused: 1 is a recidivist, 2 is a quasi-recidivist, 3 is a habitual delinquent, or 4 has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; 2 The accused has: 1 escaped from legal confinement, 2 evaded sentence, or 3 violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; 3 The accused committed the offense while under: 1 probation, 2 parole, or 3 conditional pardon; 4 The circumstances of the accused’s case indicates the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5 There is undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. Case: 1. Laarni Valerio v. CA [Oct 10, 2007] Sec. 8.
Burden of proof in bail application
Procedure and Requirements in the Application for Bail: 1 An application for bail is filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, RP, or LI; 2 There must be a hearing to determine as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; 3 The burden is on the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong; 4 The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but 5 The court may recall any witness for additional examination: 1 upon motion of either party, 2 unless the witness to be called is: 1 dead, 2 outside the Philippines, or 3 otherwise unable to testify Note: 1. A hearing to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is mandatory. Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.” – EVEN IF THE PETITION FOR BAIL HAS THE PROSECUTOR’S CONFORMITY [Narciso v. Cruz, Mar 17, 2000] 2. What is discretionary on the part of the court in a hearing under Section 8 is only the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 3. Where the imposable penalty is death, RP or LI and the accused files an application for bail, the court’s discretion is limited to determining whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 4. If the evidence of guilt is strong the court MUST DENY bail. On the other hand if the evidence of guilt is not strong the court MUST GRANT bail. Steps to be taken by the judge when there is an application for bail [Basco v. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation 2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the evidence of the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
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of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.” Duties of the Judge when Application for Bail is Filed [Zuno v. Cabebe, Nov 26, 2004] 1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation [Sec. 18, Rule 114]; 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion [Sec. 7 and 8, Rule 114]; 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond [Sec.19]; otherwise the petition should be denied. Note:
1. Summary bail hearing cannot be joined with the regular trial [Grageda v. Tresvalles, Feb 2, 2004]
2. Counsel for private complainant may appear in court to oppose bail application even without authority fro, the public prosecutor [Goodman v. Dela Victoria, Feb 16, 2000]
3. The order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. [People v. Presiding Judge, Jun 8, 2004]
4
Character and reputation of the accused; 5 Age and health of the accused; 6 Weight of the evidence against the accused; 7 Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; 8 Forfeiture of other bail; 9 The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and 1 Pendency of other cases where the 0 accused is on bail. 2 Excessive bail shall not be required
Sec. 10.
Corporate Surety
Requisites for Providing a Bail Bond in the form of a Corporate Security 1 It must be provided by a domestic or foreign corporation which is: 1 licensed as a surety, and 2 authorized to act as a surety; 2 It must be: 1 Jointly subscribed by: 1 the accused, and 2 an officer of the corporation; and 2 Authorized by its board of directors
Sec. 11.
Property Bond, How Posted
4. The private complainant has the standing to question the granting of bail to the accused on certiorari without the approval of the SolGen [People v. Calo, Jun 18, 1990]
Sec. 9.
Amount of Bail; Guidelines
Guidelines for the Judge in Fixing Amount of Bail 1 The amount should be reasonable considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors: 1 Financial ability of the accused to give bail; 2 Nature and circumstances of the offense; 3 Penalty for the offense charged;
Property Bond 1 Definition: It is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail 2 Procedure – Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond: 1 The accused shall cause the annotation of the lien: 1 On the certificate of title on file: 1 if the land is registered with the Registry of Deeds, or 2 if unregistered – in the Registration Book on the space provided therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and
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2 On the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned. 2 The accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for: 1 The cancellation of the property bond, and 2 His re-arrest and detention
Sec. 12. Qualifications Property Bond
of
Sureties
Sureties of Property Bond 1 Qualification: Must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines 2 Value of the property of surety: 1 If there is only one [1] surety – his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the undertaking 2 If there are 2 or more sureties – each may justify in an amount less than that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded 3 Every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all: 1 just debts, 2 obligations, and 3 properties exempt from execution
Sec. 13.
Justification of sureties
Other Requirements: 1 Obligations of a surety: 1 He must justify by affidavit taken before the judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in Sec. 12 2 He must describe the property given as security, stating: 1 the nature of his title, 2 its encumbrances 3 the number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still undischarged, and 4 his other liabilities.
2 The court may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. 3 No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified.
Sec. 14.
in
Deposit of Cash as Bail
Cash Bond as Bail 1 Who may deposit the cash bond: 1 The accused, or 2 Any person acting in his behalf 2 Where the cash bond may be deposited: 1 The nearest collector of internal revenue, or 2 Provincial, city, or municipal treasurer 3 How much shall be deposited: 1 The amount of bail fixed by the court, or 2 The amount recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case 4 When accused shall be discharged from custody – Upon submission of: 1 a proper certificate of deposit, and 2 a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of Sec. 2 5 What happens to the money deposited: 1 It shall be considered as bail, 2 It shall be applied to the payment of fine and costs, 3 The excess, if any, shall be returned: 1 to the accused [whether convicted or acquitted], or 2 to whoever made the deposit Note: 1. It is NOT the discretion of trial judges the question of whether a bail should be posted in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or personal recognizance [Victory Liner v. Bellosillo, March 10, 2004] 2. The judge cannot personally accept the cash bond of the accused [Lachica v. Tormis, Sep 20, 2005] Sec. 15.
Recognizance
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Compendium of Cases 54 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Recognizance 1 Definition: An obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial 2 When may a person in custody be released on recognizance : 1 Whenever allowed by law, or 2 Whenever allowed by these rules 3 In whose recognizance may a person be released: 1 on his own, or 2 on that of a responsible person When Recognizance Allowed [Espiritu v. Jovellanos, Oct 16, 1997] 1. when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense, the imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under the circumstances provided in RA 6036; 2. where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may allow his release on his own recognizance; 3. where the accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one; and 4. in case of a youthful offender held for physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in PD 603, as amended (Art. 191). RA 7610, Sec. 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict Any child who has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights: 1. Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units; 2. Immediate free legal assistance; 3. Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and 4. Release of the child on recognizance within 24 hours to the custody of the DSWD or any responsible member of the community as determined by the court.”
PD 603, Art. 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial A youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the DSWD or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, that in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the DSWD or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required. SC Circular 20-79, RA 6036 1. Sec. 1 – Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person charged with: a. violation of a municipal or city ordinance, b. a light felony c. a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than 6 months imprisonment and/or a fine of P2,000, or both, where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond, except, xxx 2. Sec. 2 – Instead of bail, the person charged with an offense contemplated by Sec. 1 hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of 2 witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. Xxx Where a person is charged with any offense contemplated by RA 6036, the Judge order the release of the accused on recognizance instead of requiring bail.
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Case: 1. Tabao v. Judge Barataman [Apr 11, 2002]
required; 3 Rule 112, Sec. 9 [b] – If the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest
Sec. 16. Bail, When not Required; Reduced Bail or Recognizance Sec. 17. When Bail Not Required 1 When provided by the law, or 2 When provided by these Rules Sec. 16 – Effects: Situation
Effect
The accused has been in custody equal to the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged [without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal]
1
He shall be release immediately
If accused is in custody and the maximum penalty to which he may be sentenced is destierro
2
He shall be released after 30 days of preventive imprisonmen t
If he has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged [without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance]
3
He shall be released on reduced bail or on his own recognizance , at the discretion of the court
When the Accused is Exempt From Putting Up Bail 1 RA 6036 – When the offense has an imposable penalty of 6 months or less under the conditions mentioned therein; 2 Rule 114, Sec. 16 – When a case is filed under the Summary Rules, a mere notice is sufficient, a warrant of arrest is not
Bail, Where Filed
Where Petition for Bail is Filed 1 General Rule With the court where the case is pending 2 Exceptions – the petition may be filed: 1 With any RTC or MTC judge in the province, city or municipality – when the judge where the case is pending is absent or unavailable 2 With the RTC of the place where the accused is arrested – if arrested in a place other than where the case is pending 3 With the MTC of the place where the accused is arrested – if RTC judge of the place where is arrested is not available 3 When Bail can ONLY be Granted in the court where the case is pending [whether on trial or appeal]: 1 When the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, and 2 When the accused seeks to be released on recognizance 4 When the person in custody is NOT yet charged in court: The petition may be filed with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held [This applies to Inquest]
Exception to the Exception: Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending
When accused is arrested – Where he can File Bail [Espanol v. Mupas, Nov 11, 2004] 1. If the accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is pending – where his case is pending or, in the absence or
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unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city 2. If the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other than where his case is pending: a. in the court where his case is pending or, b. with any RTC in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. c. When no RTC judge is available, he may file bail with any MTC judge therein. Note: A judge who approves applications for bail of accused whose cases were not only pending in other courts but who were, likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Cases: 1. Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao [Mar 31, 2005] 2. Savella v. Judge Ines [Apr 19, 2007] Sec. 18. Notice of Application to Prosecutor What the Court must do when it Receives an Application for Bail under Sec. 8 1 It must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor, or 2 It must require the prosecutor to submit his recommendation
Note when Bail is a Matter of Right 1. Even if bail is a matter of right, the prosecutor must still be notified of the application 2. A hearing must still be conducted to determine the amount of bail [Ruiz v. Beldia, Feb 16, 2005] Sec. 19.
Release on Bail
Procedure for Release on Bail 1 The accused can only be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom the petition was filed 2 When the motion for bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending: 1 The judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, to the court where the case is pending, 2 He must include the order of release and other supporting papers, and
3 The court where the case is pending may, for good reason, require a different bail to be filed. Case: 1. Savella v. Judge Ines [Apr 19, 2007] Sec. 20.
Increase or Reduction of Bail
Increase or Reduction of Bail 1 After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount; 2 When increased the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period; 3 An accused held to answer a criminal charge who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may: 1 at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, 2 be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody
Sec. 21.
Forfeiture of Bail
Forfeiture of Bail 1 When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules: His bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. 2 If the accused fails to appear in person as required: 1 His bail shall be declared forfeited, and 2 The bondsmen are given 30 days within which: 1 to produce their principal, and 2 to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. 3 Within the 30 day period, the bondsmen must: 1 Produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and 2 Explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
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4 Effect of failure of bondsman to comply with the above requisites: 1 A judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail, and 2 The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused: 1 has been surrendered, or 2 is acquitted. 1. Judgment against bondsman Reliance Surety v. Amante 462 SCRA 399 June 30, 2005 Second Division: Tinga, J. Two [2] occasions upon which the may rule adversely against the bondsman in cases when the accused fails to appear in court: 1. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. 2. Second, the bondsman, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. Note: 1. It is only after this 30-day period, during which the bondsman is afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsman. 2. Judgment against the bondsman cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsman to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. [Reliance Surety v. Amante, Jun 30, 2005] 3. The judge CANNOT order the forfeiture of bail and the detention of accused for the failure of his counsel to appear during trial. The presence of counsel is not a condition of the bail [Andres v. Beltran, Aug 20, 2001] Case: 1. Talag v. Judge Reyes [Jun 03, 2004] Sec. 22.
Cancellation of Bail
Cancellation of Bail 1 Requisites:
1 An application for cancellation must be filed by the bondsmen, 2 Due notice must be given to the prosecutor, and 3 The bail may be cancelled upon: 1 surrender of the accused, or 2 proof of his death 2 When bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled: 1 upon acquittal of the accused, 2 upon dismissal of the case, or 3 upon execution of the judgment of conviction. 3 Effect of cancellation: It shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail Take Note: 1. Esteban v. Alhambra, Sep 7, 2004 2. People v. Caparas, Mar 9, 1988 Other Instances where Bail may be Cancelled: Aside from the instances enumerated in Sec. 22 of Rule 114, the surety, upon application filed with the court, may also be relieved from the non-appearance of the bond where its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee [Government] or the act of the law. The exoneration under the second category is predicated upon the principle that the Government, as the obligee in the bond, cannot by its own acts prevent the fulfillment of the conditions of the bond by the sureties and at the same time demand its forfeiture. [Philippine Phoenix v. SB, Apr 29, 1987] Sec. 23.
Arrest of Accused Out on Bail
Arrest of Accused Out on Bail 1 Who may execute the arrest for the purpose of surrendering the accused: 1 The bondsmen, or 2 Upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, the bondsmen may cause him to be arrested by 1 a police officer, or 2 any other person of suitable age and discretion. 2 When accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant:
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if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. Note: 1. SB may prohibit a person out on bail from leaving the country [Santiago v. Vasquez. Jan 27, 1993] 2. MTC has no authority to issue a hold departure order. Circular No. 39-97 specifically provides that “hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC [Mondejar v. Buban, Jul 12, 2001] Sec. 24. Exception
No
Bail
After
Final
Judgment;
Bail After Final Judgment of Conviction: 1 After Final Judgment of Conviction: 1 General Rule – Bail is NOT allowed 2 Exceptions – If before such finality, the accused applies for probation: 1 He may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, or 2 The court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community: 1 when no bail was filed, or 2 when the accused is incapable of filing one, 2 After the accused has commenced to serve sentence: Bail is NOT allowed Note: Vicente v. Majudcon [June 23, 2005] Sec. 25.
Court Supervision of Detainees
Court Supervision of Detainees: 1 The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention; 2 The executive judges of the RTC’s shall: 1 conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions, 2 ascertain the number of detainees, 3 inquire on their proper accommodations and health,
4 examine the condition of the jail facilities, 5 order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, 6 ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and 7 strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees; 3 In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the MTC judges shall: 1 conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in their respective municipalities, and 2 submit a report to the executive judge of the RTC having jurisdiction therein; 2 A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court Administrator which shall state: 1 the total number of detainees, 2 the names of those held for more than 30 days, 3 the duration of detention, 4 the crime charged, 5 the status of the case, 6 the cause for detention, and 7 other pertinent information.
Sec. 26. Bail not a Bar to Objections on Illegal Arrest, Lack of or Irregular PI Effect on illegal arrest 1 Effect of application or admission to bail – It shall not bar the accused from: 1 Challenging: 1 the validity of his arrest, or 2 the legality of the warrant issued therefor; or 2 Assailing the regularity of or questioning the absence of a PI of the charge against him [provided that he raises them before entering his plea] 2 Requisite for accused to be entitled to the above: He must raise them before entering his plea 3 When the court shall resolve the matter on whether or not to grant bail: As early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case
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Note: This abandons the ruling in the case of People v. Timon 281 SCRA 597 (1997) and similar cases that “an application for bail constitutes a waiver of right of the accused to question whatever irregularities and defects attended the arrest” This principle was reiterated as lately as the case of People v. Carmen Lacson GR 126174, Aug 29, 2000. Note: 1. Arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. [Serapio v. SB, Jan 28, 2003] 2. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a PI, provided that he raises them before entering his plea [Yusop v. SB, Feb 22, 2001] Rule 116, Sec. 1[g] People v. Alfredo Pangilinan GR 171020, 14 March 2007 EN BANC: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: Two informations were filed charging Pangilinan with raping AAA, his daughter. 1. 5 May 1997 – P, who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed a petition for bail. 2. 23 April 1998 – RTC, finding that the evidence against P is strong, denied P’s petition for bail. 3. Defense presented its evidence with P as the sole witness. 4. 9 June 1999 – RTC, having discovered that P had not yet been arraigned, scheduled his arraignment. 5. 17 June 1999, P, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. 6. 9 Sep 1999 – RTC convicted Pangilinan of two counts of rape. P assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the Pangilinan and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person on Pangilinan? Held: Yes. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Pangilinan when he was arrested on 19 Mar 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the RTC jurisdiction over his person. Issue: Were Pangilinan’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision? Held: No. P’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when Pangilinan was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the RTC. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to 2 death sentences, that P cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of accused was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Olbes v. Judge Buemio (Note: This has nothing to do with Sec.1, Rule 117. It is more applicable in Rule 119) Facts: June 28, 2002: Federico Miguel Olbes (Olbes) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the MeTC of Manila. October 28, 2002: Olbes posted bail and was released.
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February 12, 2003: Olbes pleaded not guilty to the charge during his arraignment. This was after his motion to defer or suspend arraignment was denied. Pre-trial was set to May 28, 2003, however, because it was declared a non-working holiday due to the occurrence of typhoon, the pre-trial was reset to October 23, 2003 At the scheduled date for pre-trial, Olbes failed to appear prompting the trial court to issue a warrant of arrest, however, such order was recalled because of the fact that Olbes nor his counsel was notified for the said rescheduled date, hence, a pre-trial was again reset on January 21, 2004 November 23, 2003: Olbes filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and the Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98. Judge Danilo Buemio denied his motion holding that Olbes played a big part in the delay of the case and technical rules procedure were meant to secure, not override, substantial justice. Olbes filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by Judge Buemio. Olbes draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the first pre-trial to May 28, 2003 and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days – a clear contravention of the 80 day limit from arraignment to trial. Issue: Whether there is violation of Olbes right to speedy trial. Held: No. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, the Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation.To the Court, the reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner
under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting. A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay,29 the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail. Rule 116, Sec. 3 People v. Rogelio Gumimba GR 174056, 27 Feb 2007 En Banc: TINGA, J.: Facts: Gumimba was charged before the RTC, with rape with homicide of an 8-year old child. G entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. Later, G manifested though counsel that he would like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. RTC ordered Gumimba’s re-arraignment and G entered a plea of guilty. RTC conducted an inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of G’s plea and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof. Prosecution was charged to establish the guilt and degree of culpability of G. On the basis of G’s plea of guilty, RTC found him guilty. Issue: Was the RTC correct in allowing G to change his plea to guilty? Held: No. RTC failed in its duty to conduct the prescribed “searching inquiry” into the voluntariness of G’s plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof. G’s guilty plea was made improvidently and it is rendered inefficacious. The Information, to which G pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death at that time.
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Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play Sec. 3, Rule 116. When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, 3 conditions must be observed by the RTC to obviate an improvident guilty: 1. it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; 2. it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. Here, when G entered a plea of guilty, the RTC did not strictly observe Sec. 3, Rule 116. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a “searching inquiry,” viz: 1. Ascertain from G himself: a. how he was brought into the custody of the law; b. whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and PI; and c. under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes. 2. Ask G’s counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to G the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. 3. Elicit information about the personality profile of G, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. 4. Inform G of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. 5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. 6. All questions posed to G should be in a language known and understood by him 7. RTC judge must satisfy himself that G, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. G must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. Rule 116, Sec. 9 Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon GR 121234 August 23, 1995 2nd Division: Puno, J Facts: On June 19, 1994, NBI filed with the DOJ a lettercomplaint charging Hubert Webb with Rape with Homicide. DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct PI of those charged with the rape & killing on Jun 30, 1991 of Carmela Vizconde, et al. During PI, NBI presented the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Jessica Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime. Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Webb filed with the DOJ a Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce: 1. Certification issued by FBI on admission and stay of Hubert Webb in the U.S. from Mar 9, 1991 to Oct 22, 1992. 2. Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by NBI and other police agencies; The motion was granted by DOJ and NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. Webb failed to obtain from the NBI the copy of the FBI Report despite his request. Later, DOJ found probable cause to hold Webb for trial" and filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb with RTC. Webb charges NBI with violating his right to discovery during PI by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and FBI Report. Issue: Is Webb entitled to discovery proceedings during PI?
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Held: Yes. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under PI it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the PI stage. But Sec. 10 and 11 of Rule 117 [now Rule 116, Sec. 9] do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution. But these provisions apply after the filing of the Information in court. This failure to provide discovery procedure during PI does not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. PI is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As discussed, the object of a PI is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. Here, the risk to the liberty of Webb cannot be understated for he is charged with rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when evidence of guilt is strong. The right to have a PI conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. A PI should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of Webb to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their PI considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. Rule 116, Sec. 11 Spouses Trinidad v. Ang -- September 2007: Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for violation of BP 22 against spouses Trinidad --October 10, 2007: Sps Trinidad filed a petition for review with the DOJ --March 2009: Information was filed. --Spouses filed a motion to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition before the DOJ
--This was granted. Instead of the set arraignment date on Aug 10, 2009, this was moved to Sept 10, 2009 Issue (pertinent to Sec 11 Rule 116): Whether the setting of the arraignment after the lapse of 1 year and 10 months due to the pending review of DOJ is valid Held: No. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60day limit provided for by the Rules. In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners – Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment. Rule 117, Sec. 3 MELBAROSE SASOT v. PEOPLE [GR 143193. June 29, 2005] 2nd Division: Austria-Martinez, J.: Facts: The NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by NBA Properties against Sasot for possible violation of Art.189 of the RPC on unfair competition. NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the U.S.A. and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as “CHICAGO BULLS, “LOS ANGELES LAKERS,” etc. These names are used on hosiery, footwear, tshirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Trademarks NBI discovered that Sasot was engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit “NBA” garment products. Hence, it recommended Sasot’s prosecution for unfair competition.
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In an SPA, NBA Properties President then constituted the law firm of Ortega as NBA’s attorneyin-fact, and to act for and on its behalf, in the filing of the proper complaints. The SPA was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of NY. Consul Rebong of the Consulate General of the RP, New York, authenticated the certification. Welts also executed a ComplaintAffidavit, before Notary Public Nicole Brown of New York State. Prosecutor Gutierrez filed an Information against Sasot for unfair competition with the RTC. Before arraignment, Sasot filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over his person. Sasot argue that the fiscal should have dismissed NBA’s complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal. The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it. He also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged is a public crime. Held: While Sasot raise in the motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused, Sasot’s arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, NBA’s capacity to sue and Sasot’ exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair competition. Nowhere in Rule 117 Sec. 3 is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash. For another, under Sec. 3, Rule 112, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez. Even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a
mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits. In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Brown of New York State that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecutor Gutierrez stated that NBA’s representative will present the authenticated notarized original in court, and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand. It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy. Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such determination. Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo G.R. No. 150606: June 7, 2007 1st Division: AZCUNA, J.: Facts: On June 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino filed an Information charging Benedict Tecklo of violation of RA 8282 for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System despite demand. The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino, thus: “I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR. The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by Judge Pablo Paqueo. It was set for arraignment on Aug 7, 2001. On said date, Tecklo moved for the deferment of the arraignment and requested time to file a motion to quash, which request was granted by the court. On Aug 10, 2001, Tecklo filed a Motion to Quash, thus: “Accused, through counsel, most respectfully moves to quash the Information x x x upon the sole ground that State Prosecutor Tolentino, not being the CP nor the PP, has no legal personality nor is he legally clothed with the authority to commence
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prosecution by the filing of the Information and thus prosecute the case. On Aug 16, 2001, Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to Quash on such grounds: 1. He is authorized to investigate, file the necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases since he was designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by RSP Turingan by virtue of RO 97-024A dated July 14, 1997; 2. In a letter dated Oct 24, 2000, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño confirmed such authority and that Informations to be filed in court by prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the RSP or PP or CP; Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the RSP, as alter ego of the SOJ, is vested with authority to designate Special Prosecutors RTC Ruling: The motion is based on the lack of legal personality of State Prosecutor Tolentino, [not being] legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution by the filing of the information and, thus, prosecute the case. One of the grounds provided by the rules to quash an Information is Sec. 3[c] of Rule 117: “that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.” A glance on the face of the information would glaringly show that it was filed by State Prosecutor Tolentino, without the approval of the CP of Naga City, the situs of the crime, a blatant violation of Sec. 4[3] of Rule 112. An information filed by a qualified and authorized officer is required for the jurisdiction of the court over the case. A justification put up by Prosecutor Tolentino is a RO07-024-A subject of which is the Designation of Personnel issued by the RSP which in effect designated him as the special prosecutor to handle the investigation of all SSS cases filed before the Offices of the CP and if evidence warrants to file the necessary information and prosecute the same in the court of [appropriate] jurisdiction. The designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino to investigate, file this information if the evidence warrants, and to prosecute SSS cases in court does not exempt him from complying with the provision of Sec. 4 [3] of Rule 112, that no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the PP, CP or Chief State Prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. The designation given to Prosecutor Tolentino came from the RSP [who] is not one of those mentioned exclusively by the Rules to approve in writing the filing or the dismissal of an information.
Also, as ruled by this court in a similar case which was dismissed, the second attached document supporting the opposition to the motion, is but an opinion of the Chief State prosecutor which has no force and effect to set aside the mandatory requirement of the Rules in the filing of an information in court. RTC granted the motion and dismissed the information. Issue: W/N State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor? Held: No. Judge Paqueo quashed the Information based on Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 in relation to Sec. 4[3], Rule 112. Notably, changes in Sec. 4[3], Rule 112 were introduced in the year 2000. It is noted that the letter dated Oct 24, 2000 of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to support his authority to file the subject Information without the approval of the CP, was issued before the changes in Sec. 4[3], Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules. While the old 1985 Rules stated that “[no] complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal of chief state prosecutor,” the 2000 Revised Rules states that “[n]o complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.” Since the provision is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory. An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of PD 1275 showed that they do not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor. It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since the RSP is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117. Issue:
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Prosecutor Tolentino also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before entering his plea and the trial court is barred from granting further time to the accused to do so; and that there is no evidence in support of the motion to quash. Held: There is substantial compliance by Tecklo with the rule above quoted, as it was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum that his counsel orally moved to quash the Information before the arraignment on Aug 7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date, Judge Paqueo required Tecklo’s counsel to file a motion to quash within five days from the issuance of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed on Aug 10, 2001. Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for quashing the Information, since it was apparent and within judicial notice that Prosecutor Tolentino was not the CP or the PP. As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the Information, the Court finds that Judge Paqueo failed to cite in his Order the correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court where the ground relied upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is important, however, is that he correctly cited the ground for quashing the Information. Rule 117, Sec. 4, 5 Rafael Gonzalez v. Judge Salvador GR 168340: Dec 5, 2006 3rd Division: Carpio-Morales, J.: Facts: Rafael Gonzalez filed before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office a complaint against Glen Dale arising from the publication in the January 7, 1999 issue of Today of his article, entitled “Glad Tidings for Manila Polo Club members” in the “Bizz ‘N’ Fizz” column, under the nom de plume Rene Martel. The Prosecutor’s Office found probable cause to hale Dale into court for Libel. An Information was thus filed before the Makati RTC against Dale. The case was raffled to Branch 63 of the Makati RTC. After posting the necessary cash bond for his provisional liberty, Dale filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review challenging the Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office. The DOJ dismissed Dale’s Petition for Review and denied his MR. Dale elevated the DOJ Resolutions to the CA via Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and TRO
As no preliminary injunction or TRO was issued by the CA, Dale was arraigned before the RTC and pleaded “not guilty” to the offense charged. Dale later filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, there being no allegation in the Information that Gonzalez actually resides in Makati or that the allegedly libelous article was printed or first published in Makati. Dale cited Art. 360 of the RPC as prescribing a specific venue for libel. After the parties ventilated their respective positions, the trial court, by Order of May 29, 2002, granted Dale’s Motion to Quash, holding that the Information was defective for failure to allege that the newspaper article was printed and first published in Makati or that Gonzalez actually resided in Makati at the time of the commission of the act complained of. On June 25, 2002, 26 days after receiving the May 29, 2002 Order, Gonzalez filed a Motion (to Order the Public Prosecutor to Amend the Information and to Admit said Amended Information), invoking Sec 4 and 5 of Rule 117. Dale opposed the motion on the ground that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC to reconsider or recall its May 29, 2002 Order which became final after the lapse of 15 days. Dale added that there was nothing to consider for admission since the supposed amended information was not attached to the motion. Replying, Gonzalez argued that the motion was timely filed since the Rules allow the filing of a new information “within such further time as the court may allow for good cause” and the May 29, 2002 Order failed to provide a period within which the prosecution could file an amended information. Gonzalez further argued that a defective or deficient information cannot be the proper subject of a motion for reconsideration or appeal under the Rules, hence, not subject to the reglementary periods provided therein; and that the Amended Information would be filed once the court directed the amendment of the Information. By Order of Dec 26, 2002, the RTC granted Gonzalez’s Motion and directed the public prosecutor to amend the Information within ten (10) days from notice, and to forthwith file the same before the court. In compliance with the RTC’s order, the public prosecutor filed an Amended Information. Dale filed a MR on the ground that under Sec. 4 of Rule 117 the amendment of a defective information may be made only before a motion to quash is granted and, once quashed, especially in a case where the unqualified quashal had become final, the information can no longer be amended. Dale added that under Sec. 5 of Rule 117, the order to file another information must be contained in the same order sustaining the motion to quash since the accused
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Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
would have been discharged by the time the new information is filed. The RTC granted Dale’s MR and accordingly set aside its Dec 26, 2002 Order. Held: Sec. 4 covers the amendment of an information. Sec. 5 deals with the filing of a new information. The amendment of an information under Sec. 4 of Rule 117 applies if the trial court finds that there is a defect in the information and the defect can be cured by amendment, in which case the court shall order the prosecution to amend the information. Once the court issues an order granting the motion to quash the information and such order becomes final and executory, however, there is nothing more to amend. In cases falling under Sec. 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other than those stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another information within a specified period which is extendible to such further time as the court may allow for good cause. The order to file another information, if determined to be warranted by the circumstances of the case, must be contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. If the order sustaining the motion to quash does not order the filing of another information, and said order becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer direct the filing of another information. It is gathered that Gonzalez never asserted the propriety of amending the Information, he having maintained that the allegations in the Information provided sufficient and adequate bases to confer jurisdiction. When the RTC granted the motion to quash, Gonzalez did not assail the same within the reglementary period. The order quashing the Information thus became final and executory. Issue: Gonzalez posits, however, that the order to file another information may be separately issued at any time after the quashal of the information. He anchors his argument on the clause “within such further time as the court may allow for good cause” contained in Sec. 5 of Rule 117. Held: Gonzalez’s position does not lie. The clause denotes no other construction than a plain extension of time. The allowance of additional time qualifies the period of filing a new information pursuant to an order, and not the period of issuing an order to file a new information. It presupposes that an order has been previously issued, as signified by the prior phrase “if having been made.” As earlier stated, this
order to file another information, if the trial court finds that circumstances warrant its issuance, must be included in the order granting the motion to quash. The time limitation in the rule was intended to prevent the accused from being unnecessarily detained at the whim of the prosecution. Since the order granting the motion to quash had attained finality, it had become immutable. Clutching at straws, Gonzalez implores a relaxation of the application of the Rules to promote substantial justice. Not all defects in an information can be cured by amendment, however. In Agustin v. Pamintuan, this Court held that the absence of any allegation in the information that the therein offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City is a substantial defect, which cannot be amended after the accused enters his plea. Amendments of the information to vest jurisdiction upon a court is not permissible. At all events, the prosecution is not, under the circumstances attendant to the case, precluded from refiling an information against Dale as long as prescription has not set in. Rule 117, Sec, 17 – Double Jeopardy Oscar Z. Benares v. Josephine Lim G.R. No. 173421, 14 Dec 2006 1st Division: Ynares-Santiago, J Facts: Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale executed in 1976 where he sold two parcels of land to Josephine Lim. Records show that after Lim had fully paid the amortizations and after the deed of absolute sale was issued, Benares mortgaged the same parcels of land to the BPI. Thus, when Lim demanded delivery of the properties, Benares failed to comply, thus Lim was compelled to file a case for estafa against Benares. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence. However, the prosecution did not make any formal offer of evidence, hence Benares filed a motion praying that the prosecution’s submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence. Despite receipt of notice of Benares’ motion, Lim and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion set on Dec. 4, 2001. On Jan 28, 2002, the MTC issued an Order giving the prosecution another 15 days within which to
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Compendium of Cases 67 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
formally offer its evidence which Benares opposed. On Feb 27, 2002, the MT dismissed the case, for failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Lim moved to reconsider the order of dismissal and prayed for the admission of Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, claiming that she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked during trial. Benares opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy. Benares argued that the six months’ delay by the prosecution to formally offer its evidence is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; that the private prosecutor’s claim that the documents could not be found is untrue considering that no manifestation was filed in court stating that fact; that the documents were available as early as Jan 2002 but the prosecution never asked for extension, nor explained the delay in filing its formal offer despite two orders to do so. Benares further argued that under Sec.3, Rule 17, failure to comply with a court order without justifiable reason may cause the dismissal of the case, which shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise stated by the court. Lim refuted Benares’s invocation of double jeopardy because the case was dismissed with his express consent. Issue: W/N the order of the MTC dismissing the case for failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave Benares the right to invoke double jeopardy. Held: No. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. there is no question as to the presence of the first four elements. As to the last element, there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that Benares’s guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute. A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. Benares’s claim that the prosecution’s delay in filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right to speedy trial is not well taken.
The prosecution’s delay in the filing of its formal offer of evidence in this case cannot be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. It appears that there was justifiable reason for the prosecution’s failure to formally offer its evidence on time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court were misplaced. The MTC exceeded its authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the MTC reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself. Rule 117, Sec. 7 People v. Nazareno GR 168982; Aug 5, 2009 En Banc: Brion, J Facts: The Sandiganbayan acquitted the Nazareno of the charge of violating Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The People appealed the acquittal to the SC. Nazareno objected to the petition mainly because the review sought violates hisconstitutional right against double jeopardy. He asserts that the petition is essentially an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or a review of alleged errors in judgment that throws the case wide open, placing the respondents in danger of being punished twice for the same offense. He also posits that a judgment of acquittal can only be challenged through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The present petition is a Rule 45 appeal that raises errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. Issue: Did the appeal put Nazareno in double jeopardy? Held:
Yes. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: 1. a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; 2. the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and 3. a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only: 1. after a valid indictment; 2. before a competent court; 3. after arraignment;
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Compendium of Cases 68 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
4. when a valid plea has been entered; and 5. when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. An instance when the State can challenge a judgment of acquittal is pursuant to the exercise of our judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Tan v. People GR 173637; Apr 21, 2009 3rd Division: Chico-Nazario Facts: On 21 Dec 2000 Criminal Cases against Dante Tan were raffled to RTC-153, presided by Judge Ygana. Tan was arraigned on 16 Jan 2001. On 6 Feb 2001, pre-trial was concluded. First date of trial was on 27 Feb 2001. Trial ensued. On 18 Sep 2001, prosecution completed presentation of evidence and was ordered by RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within 30 days. Prosecution was able to file said formal offer for on 25 Nov 2003. On 2 Dec 2003, Tan moved to dismiss due to the People’s alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, Tan faults People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the delay. RTC ordered the dismissal of the case. RTC’s order of dismissal was elevated to CA via a petition for certiorari, with People contending that: Judge Y committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the people violated Tan’s right to speedy trial.
CA granted the petition for certiorari, reinstated the case and ordered RTC to conduct further proceedings immediately. Issue: W/N the petition for certiorari violated Tan’s right against double jeopardy. Held: No. There is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating Tan’s right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case. There is also no merit to Tan’s claim that a reversal of RTC’s Order dismissing the case is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present: 1. The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; 2. The court had jurisdiction; 3. The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and 4. He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The 4th element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: 1. insufficiency of evidence and 2. denial of the right to speedy trial. While indeed Tan was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss, the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived. Tan’s situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the dismissal of the case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
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Compendium of Cases 69 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. As Tan’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused – was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching. It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. Such cases are not applicable here considering that the right of the Tan to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. Rule 117, Sec. 8 People v. Panfilo Lacson Facts:
Panfilo Lacson was charged with multiple murders for the shooting and killing of 11 persons who were members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang after SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the 11 gang members was a “rub-out” or summary execution and not a shootout. On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal cases against Lacson. On June 2001, 11 Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were again filed against Lacson. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Sec. 8, Rule 117 should be applied retroactively. 2. Whether or not Lacson complied with the essential pre-requisites of Section 8. Ruling: 1. Section 8 was approved with the intention that it should be applied prospectively for the reason that applying it retroactively would defeat its purpose; to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. Applying it retroactively in the case at bar, the
State would only be given one year and three months to revive the criminal cases which do not conform to the intendment of Section 8. 2. Lacson through his counsel admitted that he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. He only asked before Judge Agnir, Jr. that warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable cause. The trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable cause but when the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal is absent, Lacson cannot invoke Section 8 to bar a revival of the criminal cases. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Requisites: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (Not present in the present case) 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. Rule 117, Sec. 9 People v. Lamberto Rafon G.R. No. 169059, Sep 5, 2007 EN BANC:TINGA, J.: Facts: Lamberto Rafon was found guilty of raping his minor daughter and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Rafon challenges the two Informations filed against him for being ambiguous as they did not specify the date or at the very least the month as to when the rape incidents allegedly took place. This, so he stresses, is a denial of due process as no less than the Constitution guarantees that the accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The allegations that he committed two counts of rape, one in 1994 and another in 1998, deprived him of the chance to interpose the defense of alibi, he concludes.
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Compendium of Cases 70 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Issue: Were the sufficient?
informations
filed
against
Rafon
Held: Yes. It is unnecessary to state in the information the precise date that the offense was committed, except when it is an essential element of the offense. The date of commission is not an element of the offense of rape. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances provided by law. When the time given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged and x x x the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.” In said case, Rafon was charged with raping his stepdaughter several times before and until 15 October 1994 but was convicted of his dastardly acts committed in 1993. The Court therein held that the victim’s Sworn Statement which categorically stated that she had been raped by the accused in 1993 when she was in grade three substantially cured the vagueness in the information and considered accused to have been sufficiently informed thereby. Thus, a statement of the year of the commission of the offense, as in the instant case, would suffice. Furthermore, it is too late in the day for Rafon to raise this issue. He should have made his objection before he was arraigned. Sec. 9, Rule 117 provides, to wit: “The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in par (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Sec. 3 of this Rule.” Rafon cannot be said to have been deprived of his right to be informed. He did not timely object to the alleged defects in the Informations and he actively participated in the trial, defending himself and confronting the witnesses against him. Hence, there was no denial of due process.
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