Criminal Procedure CaseDigest.docx

RULE 113- ARREST G.R. No. 186471 People Vs. De Leon FACTS: The Prosecutions Version of Facts On November 9, 2003, at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station AntiIllegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches Police Station in Quezon City and reported the illegal activities of a person named Rodante De Leon. Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.)Nilo Wong formed a team for a buy-bust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer. A pre-operation report was prepared. P/SInsp. Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-bust money and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials NM. At around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, the team proceeded Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo to appellant as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo then asked appellant if he had shabu and the latter answered in the affirmative and asked him how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo handed the money and, in return, appellant handed him one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He then scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated, and thereafter arrested appellant. He recovered the buy-bust money from appellant as PO2 Collado approached them and handcuffed appellant. Upon frisking appellant, PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the person of appellant. Afterwards, appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. PO2 Collado then placed his initials on the sachet and the evidence was subsequently turned over to the police investigator, who prepared a request for its laboratory examination. PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then brought the transparent plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. A Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results. Version of the Defense On the other hand, appellant testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a police officer in Cubao, Quezon City for 10 years. On November 9, 2003, at around 3 oclock in the afternoon, he went to Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City to look for a kumpadre from whom he intended to borrow money when policemen accosted him and poked their guns at him. The people around him ran, and as he was the only one left on the scene, the policemen asked him to sit down. He told SPO3 Concepcion, whom he knew, that he was a police officer but he was told to shut up and to explain his side at the police station instead. Upon arrival at the police station in Novaliches, Quezon City, his wallet, with his I.D. and police badge, were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo told him that he had a fake police I.D. When appellant tried to explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo allegedly kicked him saying, Hindi nausoangpulis, sundalonaangnakaupongayon. The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he was charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied all the charges against him claiming that the alleged shabu marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 came from the arresting police officers. He did not file a case against them,

because he had no money and because he knew that he was not guilty. On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a follow-up operative at the Station Investigation Division of Police Station 7. He admitted that he was separated from the service because he was absent without official leave due to a business problem he had to attend to. He likewise said that he did not know his arresting officers, whom he saw then for the first time, and that he was not familiar with RA 9165. After trial, the RTC convicted appellant. On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. ISSUES: Is Buy Bust Operation Valid Arrest? RULING: Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of irregularities, rendering it illegal. He notes that the PreOperation Report was full of discrepancies. The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of the presence in this case of the elements of violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art.II of RA 9165. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[22] In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[23] In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buybust operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police officers. Even appellant himself declared that it was the first time he met the police officers during his crossexamination. There was, therefore, no motive for the police officers to frame up appellant. Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive identification prevails over appellants defenses of denial and alibi. These defenses have been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[24] Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.[25] We, therefore, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 128587 People Vs. Laguio

March 16, 2007

FACTS: On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the DILG arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a

certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, RedentorTeck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretends to order another supply of shabu. At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Teck and Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Teck and Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. The two did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. They said they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Teck and Junio. Police Inspector Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: • • • •

32 transparent plastic bags of shabu; cash in the amount ofP650,000.00; one electronic and one mechanical scales; and an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.

Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. Three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin. • Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act • Illegal Possession of Firearms • Violation of Comelec Gun Ban During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed. Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.\ On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence. On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.

ISSUES: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. HOLDING: Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest. The 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car were not in plain view. The shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver’s seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein. Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. Prosecution posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accused’s possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW car’s trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs. Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a

suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.[9]

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Teck and Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search. G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007 Valdez Vs. People FACTS: Around 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Laya, the forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves. The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination.[13] Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercados house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him to be guilty. ISSUES: W/N the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful. W/N the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law and the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.

RULING: At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well. Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captains house. Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands out just the same. It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of the circumstances in Sec. 5, Rule 113 was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest. For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him. Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners behavior.

However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, [27] must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest. Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability. ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner. On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being

hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. ISSUE: Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go. HOLDING: The general rule on arrest states that the same is valid if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest maybe considered lawful. Despite that, The warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Go does not fall with in the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on The crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who escaped from the penal institution. With the stated facts, The allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of article 125 of the revised penal code before A preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is a probable cause that the crime has been committed and that the petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused substantial therefore he should not be deprived of such. RULE 114 - BAIL P/SR SUPT. Perello

ORLANDO

MABUTAS

Vs.

Judge

Norma

FACTS: Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two complaints against respondent Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City. FIRST COMPLAINT P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas complained of certain irregularities committed by respondent Judge in the grant of bail to accused AizaChonaOmadan in Criminal Case No. 03-265. Omadan was charged in an Information, dated April 21, 2003, with Violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the possession, custody and control of 57.78 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended. Respondent Judges Order dated May 9, 2003, granting Omadans petition for bail stating that the evidence of guilt is not very strong. SECOND COMPLAINT In Criminal Case No. 03-065, entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Rosemarie Pascual y Mozo @ Rosema, for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Pascual was charged with selling, trading, delivering and giving away to another 0.20 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended.[2] Pascual filed, on February 5, 2003, a motion for bail on the grounds that the quantity of shabu involved is minimal and the imposable penalty is likewise minimal in degree; and that she is nine months pregnant and due to give birth anytime.[3] On the day of arraignment, February 7, 2003, respondent Judge issued an order granting Pascuals motion for bail without hearing. ISSUE: The issue in these administrative cases is whether respondent Judge may be administratively held liable for the grant of bail in the particular criminal cases subject of the complaints. As earlier stated, the criminal cases subject of the present administrative complaints all involve violations of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

HOLDING: Under the foregoing provision, possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense. As such, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court states: No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. Such discretion must be sound and exercised within reasonable bounds. Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory. Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought. In case an application for bail is filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the following duties: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.[16] Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.[17] In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing duties. A hearing was held on the petition; the prosecution was given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of its stance. Respondent Judge based her findings on the prosecutions evidence, namely and since it was her conclusion that the evidence of accused Omadans guilt is not strong, the petition for bail was granted. The Court recognizes that the manner in which the strength of an accused guilt is proven still primarily rests on the prosecution. The prosecutor has the right to control the quantum of evidence and the order of presentation of the witnesses, in support of the denial of bail. After all, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.[20] It was the prosecutions judgment to limit the presentation of evidence to two witnesses, as it felt that the testimonies of the other witnesses would be merely corroborative. It is beyond respondent Judges authority to compel the public prosecutor to exercise its discretion in a way respondent Judge deems fit, so long as such exercise of discretion will not defeat the purpose for which the hearing was held, i.e., to determine whether strong evidence of guilt exists such that the accused may not be entitled to bail. Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, however, portrays an entirely different picture.

In this case, respondent Judge granted bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 without the requisite hearing. In so doing, it was respondent Judges defense that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years, and as such, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required. Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165, as she asserted, to determine the nature of methamphetamine hydrochloride. A plain reading of the law would immediately show that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and not a controlled precursor. The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and indefatigably stressed by the Court. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the complaint against respondent Judge; and, (2) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross ignorance of law, and she is hereby SUSPENDED for Six (6) Months, with warning that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12] Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. ISSUE In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? RULING: Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court , an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted.

scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied) In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5, RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS INTERPRETATION

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal. Laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bailnegating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, complainant, vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, respondent. FACTS: On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M. Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying and undocumented alien and that Peaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands indicted in the United States for health care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S. Federal Government. On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied the P40,000.00 bail recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable offense. However, later on that same day, the BOI received information that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida. In his Comment, dated March 22, 2002, respondent explained: On November 20, 2001, Peaflorida filed an urgent motion to fix bail. When the prosecution and the defense jointly manifested that it would be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of the accused Peaflorida at P250,000.00, he granted the motion to fix bail on November 21, 2001; and, at the time he issued the Order fixing the bail bond of the accused at P250,000.00, he was not aware that a deportation order had already been issued by the BOI against the latter.[2] ISSUE: WON the grant of bail was correct. HOLDING: Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.[7] A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. [8] After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.[9] Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judges evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.[10]

The herein respondent granted bail to the accused Peaflorida without conducting a hearing despite his earlier pronouncement in the Order dated November 19, 2001 denying bail as he considered the crime the accused Peaflorida was charged with to be a non-bailable offense. The manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present any witness to prove that the prosecutions evidence against the accused is strong, is never a basis for the outright grant of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter.[11] A hearing is required even when the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail.[12] The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the defense that it would be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of the accused at P250,000.00 does not justify the granting of bail without a hearing in a case involving a non-bailable offense. A hearing is necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines in fixing the amount of bail set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the judge and the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed upon the will or whim of the prosecution or the defense. Respondent should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of bail recommended. To do away with the requisite bail hearing is to dispense with this timetested safeguard against arbitrariness.[14] It must always be remembered that imperative justice requires the proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.[15] Respondents explanations that he ordered the cancellation of the bail bend posted by the accused Peaflorida and issued a warrant for the latters arrest on April 26, 2002 upon learning that an order of deportation was issued against the latter;24 that accused Peaflorida voluntarily surrendered himself on October 24, 2002 and that he is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro,25 cannot serve to exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him. WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46) is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court. SO ORDERED. TRINIDAD TORMIS,

O.

LACHICA

vs.

JUDGE

ROSABELLA

M.

FACTS: In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003,[1] Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-R. Complainant alleged that since the filing of the information, accused Domugho has remained at large. Thus, the cases were ordered archived but an alias warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge on January 14, 2000. During the investigation, it was established that the accused was arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and was brought directly to the Waterfront Police Station where she was booked at 9:00 p.m. At about 10:00 p.m. the accused was set free without a release order.[11] It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the

provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in his office. ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused? HOLDING: Yes. The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a character flaw which speaks ill of her person. Making false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, the Court held that: The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides: SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of the bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge. WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents. FACTS: Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others. The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.For his part, petitioners coaccused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioners) petition for bail. The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced. However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner filed with the information a motion to quash the amended information on the grounds that as against him, the amended information does not allege a combination of series of over or criminal acts constitutive of plunder. According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the amended information was antithetical to his petition for bail. Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus. ISSUES: (a) W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted. (b) W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail. (c) W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is mandatory (d) W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus. HOLDING: (a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the issue of whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in the petitioner’s case moot. Nonetheless, the court held that arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, this pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of liberty even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The case of Lavides must be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash. Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he had to choose between filing a motion to quash and thus delay his petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and therefore be released on bail. Such would undermine the constitutional right of the accused. When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned.

Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail. (b) Court sees no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for the release of the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These tow relied have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic. (c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearing might be converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that joint hearings will save the court form having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the state, including the prosecution but also that of the petitioner and the witnesses. In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is early to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further such evidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the case at bar, the case against former President Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail, the proceeding assumes completely different dimension. The proceeding will no longer be summary since the proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioner’s bail will be prejudicial to the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn again committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail with the trial of the case against former president. (d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is charged with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under Section 8 of rule 114, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing must be conducted where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid. However, there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in the case at bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie

where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the same applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest. Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH LOS BAÑOS v. PEDRO FACTS: Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the Comelec a day before the May 2001 elections accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) in Boac, Marinduque. A Complaint was filed against him. After Inquest, the Information was filed in court. When his motion for Preliminary Investigation was granted, it did not materialize. Hence he filed Motion to Quash arguing that the Information “contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.” He attached a Comelec Certification that he was “exempted” from the gun ban. The RTC granted the quashal. Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños, representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s Comelec Certification was a “falsification,” and the prosecution was “deprived of due process” when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. The RTC reopened the case, as Pedro did not object to Los Baños’ motion. Pedro filed an MR for the RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The RTC denied Pedro’s MR. The CA initially denied Pedro’s petition. In his MR, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque provincial prosecutor’s receipt of the quashal order to be “2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001,” and argued that based on this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became “permanent” on December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed itself ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision. ISSUE: Is the CA correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule 117 in this case? RULING: NO. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The modifier “provisional” directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character, and not the dismissals that are permanent. Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional. A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a

motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely- defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 – i.e., one with the express consent of the accused – is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8. This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash – the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense – unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply. The Court notes also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals: First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117. Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal. Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information. Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present. Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration. To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations

that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to anintrinsicor extrinsic deficiency ofthe complaint orinformation, asshown onitsface, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal. The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the offense was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial. Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan FACTS: In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank. A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990. 5 In April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. (Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the project. A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions attesting to the demolished concrete structures. The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s further verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction. On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005. 18 On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:

Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused FelicisimoLazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit. ISSUES: 1. W/N the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime charged Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the accused. NO 2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. YES HOLDING: The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court. This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be considered. Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction. The instant petition is DISMISSED. PEOPLE VS. LACSON FACTS: The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution by the SC remanding the instant case to the RTC of Quezon City for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of several criminal cases filed against the respondent and his co-accused. In the said criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons bandied as members of the

KuratongBaleleng Gang. The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the said criminal cases because the essential requirements, respondent’s express consent to the dismissal and due notice to the private complainants, for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution. ISSUE: WON Sec.8, Rule 117 of the RRCP is applicable to the criminal cases herein disputed HOLDING: NO. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 8.Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sinequanon to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the criminal cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motionfor the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree,

impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The Court also agrees with the petitioners’ contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, even if the respondent’s motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. It should also be noted that when the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The issue which arose from such event was whether the time-bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 thereof should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State, to which the Court ruled that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the timebar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay. MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set aside. RULE 118 – PRE TRIAL People v Sunga FACTS: On June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, RamilLansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and LitoOctac as principals, and Locil Cui alias GinalynCuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter. On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal

requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn statement which detailed how her coaccused carried out the crime. Her version of the facts is as follows: "At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park. At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by RamilLansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be pumping." After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands. Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled against her malefactors. After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind. When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone." Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi. Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. Through a sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansang's promise to give him P500.00. DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal

in the crime of Rape. While the others are acquitted and Locil is discharged as state witness. ISSUES: (1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in accordance with law; and (2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt? (3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence? HOLDING: (1) NO. Requisites: 1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness; - YES 2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; - YES (Based on Locil's sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable.) 3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony; YES 4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; - NO a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil's testimony. The declarations of other witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locil's account for they relate --- not to the crime itself but to events THEREAFTER. An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on review. b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre. 5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES 6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. - -YES But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade beingtraced by her mother and aunt? (2) NO, see items 1 and 2. In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi, the prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants' presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.

(3) NO. From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora (Sunga'scounse during custodial investigation) did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible. The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. RATIO: (1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused. (2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a selfconfessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecution's other evidence? - NO b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil's trustworthiness becomes manifest? - NO In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [This was not present in this case] NOTES: (1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dolores L. Espaol The OCAs investigation showed that upon her compulsory retirement on January 9, 2004, Judge Espaol left a total of 69 cases that had not been acted upon. In particular, these included six criminal and sixteen civil cases already submitted for decision, five criminal and eighteen civil cases on appeal, and sixteen cases with pending incidents for resolution. This Court is aware of the predicament that plagues respondent, as well as most other trial judges in the country. The problem of case inputs grossly exceeding case outputs may be traced to several factors, the most prevalent of which

are the large number of cases filed, indiscriminate grant of continuances to litigants, inefficient case flow management by judges, and unrealistic management of the calendar of cases. To solve these problems, this Court has, in several instances, advised judges to follow certain guidelines to facilitate speedy case disposition. Among these measures is the discouragement of continuances, except for exceptional reasons. To enforce due diligence in the dispatch of judicial business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing cases to trial when counsels are unprepared, judges should endeavor to hold them to a proper appreciation of their duties to the public, as well as to their own clients and to the adverse party. [10] In criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory because, at the outset, litigation is abbreviated by the identification of contentious issues. In civil cases, judges are also required to take advantage of the pretrial conference to arrive at settlements and compromises between the parties, to ask the latter to explore the possibility of submitting their cases to any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution, and at least to reduce and limit the issues for trial. Judges are further directed to implement and observe strictly the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 119, providing for a continuous dayto-day trial as far as practicable until termination.[11] The work of magistrates is multifarious. They do not only hear cases and write decisions in the seclusion of their chambers; equally important, they act also as administrators. Their administrative efficiency may well define the justice they dispense. They should be rational and realistic in calendaring cases. Only a sufficient number should be calendared in order to permit them to hear all the cases scheduled. Hence, unless the docket of the court requires otherwise, not more than four cases daily should be scheduled for trial. A continuous and physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis is also recommended, so that they would be aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of the clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared, indicating the steps to be taken to keep cases moving. While decision-writing is a matter of personal style, judges are well-advised to prepare concise but complete as well as correct and clear decisions, orders or resolutions. With a table or calendar indicating the cases submitted for decision, they should note the exact day, month and year when the 90-day period is to expire. Prompt disposition of the courts business is attained through proper and efficient court management. Judges would be remiss in their duty and responsibility as court managers if they fail to adopt an efficient system of record management. At times, circumstances beyond their control result in the accumulation of ripe cases to a daunting number, making it humanly impossible for them to comply with the constitutionally mandated 90-day period. In such instances, all that they should do is write a request for extension from the Supreme Court, stating therein their reasons for the delay. Such administrative requirement finds basis in the 1987 Constitution. This Court has further directed members of the bench to call the attention of the OCA when the situation requires remedies beyond the control or capability of the judges. 10.3 The reduction of case loads would be an efficacious design to strengthen public confidence in the Courts. All efforts should be exerted so that case disposals should exceed case inputs. Whenever obstacles present themselves which delay case disposition, the Presiding Judge should immediately call the attention of the Supreme Court through the Court Administrator when the situation requires

remedies beyond the control or capability of the judges At the very least, Judge Espaol should have requested for an extension of time once she knew that she could not comply with the prescribed ninety (90) day period to render judgment. In doing so, she would have been able to apprise litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any. It would have shown that she minded the deadlines. While Judge Espaol professes her human limitations coupled with the disposition of the election cases which allegedly demand priority, the same cannot exculpate her for noncompliance with the mandates of the law and the rules. WHEREFORE, the factual findings of the Office of Court Administrator are ADOPTED. Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is fined in the amount of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000), to be deducted from the retirement benefits due her. RULE 119 – TRIAL Jeffrey Dayap V Sendiong FACTS: Petitioner Jeffrey ResoDayap was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. He recklessly drove a 10 wheeler cargo truck hitting an automobile causing death to one of the passengers and less serious physical injuries to other passengers. On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment dated 25 April 2005. MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. ISSUE: Whether the grant of demurrer to evidence was valid RULING: Yes. As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction

beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey ResoDayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Salazar V People FACTS: On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused NenaJaucianTimario.Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by NenaTimario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, NenaJaucianTimario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The prosecution filed demurrer to evidence.

its

opposition

to

the

petitioners

The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused NenaJaucianTimario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met NenaJaucianTimario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent. RULING: Yes. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof: SEC. 2.Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.[10] The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads: Sec. 23.Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the

case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt. If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt. The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment. In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.: Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.[12] This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on

the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Sec. 11.Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order: (a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability. (b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case. (c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. (d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda. (e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused. The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process. The Petition is GRANTED.

CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, - versus RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, FACTS: Respondents were charged with EstafaThrough Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City. The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case. Earlier, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment. Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that the Civil Case, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied. This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case remains pending before the appellate court to date.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age. After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence. ISSUE: WON Concepcion's deposition can be taken in the RTC of Makati RULING: No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.

that is, through question and answer. At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise: Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only before the court where the case is pending. Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides: Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.

Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The contention does not persuade. The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision.

On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses. In an Omnibus Order dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix.

Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial,

FACTS: Petitioner RimbertoSalvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane. The above-named accused have conspired, confederated and mutually helped each other. As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. Respondent LucitaParane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.

The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed that it was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioner’s application for bail because the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of the two accused. The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera. In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion for

Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also denied in a Resolution dated May 11, 2000. Hence, this appeal.

must be given their proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in discharging the accused to become state witnesses and in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

RULING: We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely: (1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense; (2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case; (3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge; (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and (5) The trial court is satisfied that: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, versus PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG Appellant

We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects." It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest." As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime. Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner. The grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies

FACTS: MaritessAng (Maritess) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City with kidnapping for ransom confederating with to persons. The Information was subsequently amended to implead the other appellant, Pablo Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. Still later, the Information was further amended to additionally implead one HildoSumipo (Sumipo) who was, however, subsequently discharged as state witness. ISSUE: WON the court erred in discharging Sumipo as a state witness. RULING: Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie. The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she said, Diretsongdukotnarinkay Charlie. He tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the attempts to extract ransom from the victims family. Sumipos testimony was corroborated on material points. The victims mother testified regarding the demands for ransom. Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the barrestaurant on the day and at the time in question. Henry Hong, the victims cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victims brother during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions. [35] And the victims skeletal remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacios information and direction. And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony. Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritesscompany, brought the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacios hands were bloodied. Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess friend who visited her in prison, testified that Maritess admitted having killed Chua. And the prosecution presented letters from Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants MaritessAng and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. And in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS FACTS: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaintsaffidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of Abalos without the latter’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by Abalos, Adasa failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. Adasa filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the 2 checks. Then she alleged in a Supplemental affidavit claiming that it was instead Bebie Correa who received the 2 checks, but that Correa had already left the country. A resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City finding probable cause against Adasa and ordering the filing of 2 separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual. Consequently, 2 separate criminal cases were filed docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782. This instant petition concerns only one of these criminal cases (Criminal Case No. 8782). On 8 June 2001, upon motion of Adasa, the trial court issued an order directing the OCP of Iligan City to conduct a reinvestigation. After conducting the reinvestigation, OCP issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause. Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of the OCP, Adasa later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the OCP and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa. Abalos thereafter filed a MR arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted Adasa’s “Motion to Withdraw Information” and dismissed Criminal Case No. 8782. Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA regarding the DOJ resolution. CA granted the petition and reversed the resolution of the DOJ. CA emphasized that Section 7 of DOJ Circular used the phrase “shall not”. Sec 7. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned While the permissive word "may" in Section 121 would seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned. This provision should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7. ISSUE: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned? NO. RATIO: CA is correct. When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for

1

review due course and must dismiss the same. Arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12, must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal. To give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.

PEOPLE OF DOCUMENTO

THE

PHILIPPINES

vs.

OSCAR

M.

FACTS: Oscar Documento was charged before the RTC with 2 counts of Rape, as defined and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was accused of raping his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age. One information was for the alleged rape committed on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, and another information was for the alleged rape committed on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City. Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such, the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellant’s plea of guilt to the charges. Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established that Documento started sexually molesting his daughter when she was 10 years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and gave birth in 1993. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses both located in Butuan City. AAA’s mother, who was working in Manila, searched for Documento and AAA. Upon learning that Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she went to the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in securing custody of AAA. As soon as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the police that Documento raped her. Dr. Hugo testified that AAA was in fact raped. Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Salise convinced him to do so. Documento contended that he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual, sexual relationship. He further alleged that the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on crossexamination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their forgiveness. The RTC convicted Documento of both counts of Rape. CA affirmed. ISSUES: 1. WON the prosecution failed to establish that the 2 counts of rape were perpetrated in Butuan City – NO! 2. WON the Court gravely erred in failing to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntainess and full comprehension by accused of the consequences of his plea – YES! RATIO: 1. Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed to establish that 2 counts of Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed to specific parts of the records which show that, although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan City" in her testimony, the incidents in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City. The 2 informations also clearly state that the crimes were perpetrated in Butuan City. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice by the trial court. 2. It is true that the appellate court noted the trial court’s failure to conduct the prescribed "searching inquiry"

into the matter of whether or not Documento’s plea of guilt was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant proper. Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases after appellant’s re-arraignment and guilty plea. The questions propounded to appellant during the direct and cross-examination likewise fall short of these requirements. The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might have attended the commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. With the trial court’s failure to comply with the guidelines, appellant’s guilty plea is deemed improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious. This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This course of action is appropriate only when the appellant’s guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction. As held in People v. Mira: Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant’s guilty plea, we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.

VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Cesar Virata is one of the defendants in the case of Republic vs Romualdez which was filed by the PCGG. The case involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth allegedly amassed by the defendants in that case during the marcos years. The complaint was amended 3 times. The last amended complaint filed with the sandiganbayan states the following relevant allegations against virata: [summarized version] Par.14: “defendants...engaged in devises, schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves by... (b) giving meralco undue advantage (increasing power rates while reducing electric franchise tax); (g) justify meralco’s anomalous acquisition of electric cooperatives; (m) manipulated the formation of Erecton Holdings for the purpose of assuming the obligation of Erecton Inc with Philguarantee (Virata is an official of philguarantee) so that Erecton Inc can borrow more capital its obligation with philguarantee amounting to more than P2B.” Par.17: “acting as dummies, nominees...to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.” Par.18: “Acts of defendant... constitute gross abuse of official position... to the grave and irreparable damage of the Filipino people.” Virata filed a bill of particulars asserting that these allegations are vague and not averred with sufficient definiteness to enable him to effectively prepare his responsive pleadings. Sandiganbayan partially granted the motion. Only with regard to par.17 and 18 was the republic required to file a bill of particulars. As to the others, Sandiganbayan declared them to be clear and specific enough to allow Virata to file an intelligent responsive pleading. OSG submitted the bill of particulars relating to par17 and 18. Virata filed a motion to strike out this bill of particular and to defer the filing of his answer. It is alleged that the bill of particulars aver for the first time new actionable wrongs allegedly committed by him in various official capacities and

that the allegations do not indicate that he was a dummy, nominee or agent (which was the allegation in the complaint) but rather a government officer acting in his own name. Meanwhile, Virata filed a petition for certiorari with the SC with regard to the denial of his bill of particulars with regard to par.14 and sections b,g and m. SC granted the petition. OSG filed a manifestation that since PCGG is the investigating body with the complete records of the case, it is in a better position to supply the bill of particulars. Thus, PCGG submitted a bill of particulars (no.2) in relation to par.14 and subparagraphs b,g and m. Virata filed a comment with a motion to dismiss. According to him, bill of particulars no.2 is merely a rehash of the assertions made in the last amended complaint hence, it is not the bill of particulars required by the court. As to the 1 st bill of particulars, it allegedly shows that new imputations are being made which are different from the charge in the complaint. Sandiganbayan found the bill of particulars to be sufficient, hence, this recourse to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the bill of particulars should be admitted or not? NO! HELD: The rule is that a complaint must contain the ultimate facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action. A cause of action has the following elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violating the plaintiff’s right. As long as the complaint contains these three elements, a cause of action exists. Even though the allegations are vague, dismissal is not the proper remedy. Thus, the rules of court provide that a party may move for more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. An order directing the submission of such statement or bill is proper where it enables the party asking for it to intelligently prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial. It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the opposite party and the court of the precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific proposition for which the pleader contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of the pleading which it supplements. It has been held that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature of the pleader's cause of action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled. It should be definite and specific and not contain general allegations and conclusions. It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will allow. Bill of particular for Par14 (b): Complaint alleges virata’s alleged active collaboration in reducing taxes. Yet, there is nothing in the bill of particular about this active collaboration. It is silent as to what acts of Virat that establish that he collaborated in reducing the taxes. Par14(g): BOP (bill of particular) on this also failed to set forth particularly or specifically the charges against virata. It is full of generalizations and indefinite statements. So many questions about the alleged acts which were not answered (ie. What were these electric coops? Why were their acquisition anomalous? Etc) Par14(m): BOP is merely a restatement of the charge in the complaint. Clearly, republic failed to amplify the charges against Virata. The important question as to what particular acts of Virata that constituted support and assistance in the formation of Erectors Holdings is left unanswered.

With regard to the 1st bill of particular, basically SC had the same findings. That is, BOP failed to supply Virata with material matters which he needs in order to file a responsive pleading. Further, the 1 st BOP contains new matters which are not covered by the charges in the complaint. The complaint alleges that he was acting as a dummy but the BOP state that he acted in his official capacity. Therefore, under the BOP he acted as agent of the government whereas in the complaint he allegedly acted as agent of his co-defendants. The two bills of particulars filed by the Republic failed to properly amplify the charges leveled against Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain vague,

immaterial and generalized assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural rules. As a result, SC orders the dismissal of the complaint in so far as the charges against Virata are concerned. This is justified under the rules of court (failure to prosecute – plaintiff... fails to comply with these rules or any order of the court) Side issues: Whether PCGG can file the BOP in behalf of the republic (contention is that only OSG can act in behalf of republic)? YES. Admin code gives power to the OSG to deputize legal officers and to call on any dep’t...etc., as may be necessary to fulfil its functions. Here, OSG called PCGG for assistance and authorized it to file the BOP.