Criminal Law Digest
Criminal Law 2 Case Digest...
Laurel vs Misa Facts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that 1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequen tly, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens therto was then suspended; and 2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the procla mation of the Philippine republic. Issues: Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspended and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands. Held: No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the occupier. Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as well as against the sovereignty of t he Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt from commonwealth to republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth, bec it is an offense against the same govt and the same sovereign people. People vs. Perez FACTS: Accused Perez was charged with treason and rape. The accused kidnapped several women in order to present them to a Japanese Commander to satisfy the latter’s carnal pleasure against the will of the women. In some instances, the accused himself raped several women. HELD: The accused was acquitted in relation to the crime of treason; but, he was found guilty in relation to the crime of rape. The acts of the accused in relation with the Japanese didn’t directly and materially tend to improve the war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States. Moreover, intent of disloyalty – which is essential in the crime of treason – is lacking. Nevertheless, the accused can be held liable for the several counts of rape he committed. People vs. Adriano: Facts: Apolinar Adriano, a Filipino citizen was convicted in the People’s Court for treason, for being a member of the Makapili Army (remember the guys with the bayongs over their heads and pointed fingers?) during the Japanese Occupation. The only evidence the prosecution substantiated was his joining of the Makapili Army. The People’s Court found out that he participated in various acts of participation as a Member of the M. Army (joining in raids and confiscating property, etc.) But these acts were not established by 2 witnesses. What the Court did establish though was that 2 witnesses saw Adriano in Makapili uniform and drilling under a Jap instructor; that he performed sentry duties in a Jap garrison and he retreated with the Japs in the mountains when the Americans liberated Nueva Ecija (where the Jap garrison was located). No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts. But the witnesses all agree that they saw the accused wearing the Makapili uniform. Issue: Whether or not a person can be convicted of treason even though the conviction was not based on the 2-witness rule as required in Art. 114 of the RPC. Held: In satisfying the 3rd element of the crime of treason, Adriano’s joining of the Makapili Army was an evidence of both his adherence to the enemy and of giving them aid and comfort. It was an evidence of adherence because joining that Army means agreeing to the adverse intentions and purposes of its creation (which was to fight the Japs’ enemy = America which at that time still exercised sovereignty over the Philippines. It constituted an overt act because he placed himself a t the enemy’s disposal to fight by their side. The enemy was strengthened by the psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which it was with war with. The practical effect was no different from enlisting in the enemy’s army. But, the crime of treason is an Anglo-American origin. All the materials and cases from that jurisprudence states that. Every act, movement, deed and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony 1
of 2 witnesses. It is necessary to produce 2 direct witnesses to one whole overt act. If it is possible to piece bits and pieces together of the overt act each bit must be supported by two oaths. People vs. Tulin Facts: Accused-appellants were convicted for Qualified Piracy, for seizing M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products together with the complement and crew members, and by employing violence against or intimidation if persons or force upon things. Accused-appellants elevated the case for lack of criminal jurisdiction of the state since the acts were done outside the Philippine waters and territory. Issue: Should the said accused-appellants be acquitted? Held: No. According to Presidential Decree No. 532, the criminal jurisdiction was widened to embrace any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters. Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. People vs. Siyoh Facts: Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder. On July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him (Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea. They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. Who also helped them from selling their goods to different Islands near Pilas. Before the incident happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw that Kiram was talking with another two persons that he can only recognize in their faces somewhere near the house where they were selling the goods. On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas Island from BalukBaluk Island through riding a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them. There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back. But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province. On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram Issue: Whether or not the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt? CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANTS 1. Since it was contested by appellants that there guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the prosecution did not present evidence that the accused were also the one who killed Anastacio de Guzman because his remains are never recovered. 2. The Credibility of the Witness—since only 1 witness was presented 3. Appellants claim (Siyoh and Kiram) that they were not the assailants but also the victim Held: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated homicide RATIONALE 1. Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special complex crime punishable by death—but the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD 532 considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the guilt of respondent were proven beyond reasonable doubt. 2. There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and fabricate story as to apprehend the accused. 3. Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the two persons they have identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is baseless as view in the proven conspiracy among the accused. The Conspiracy was established through the testimony of the lone witness and survivor. 2
People vs. Ang Cho Kio Facts: Ang Kio Cho: charged with murder of Eduardo Diago and murder of Pedro Perlas. Dec 30 1952: Ang Cho is a passenger in PAL flight PI-C-38 from Laoag to Aparri. Ang Cho shoots purser Diago. Ang Cho coerces pilot Perlas into changing course for Amoy, in China. When Perlas refuses, Ang Cho shoots him. Ang Cho pleads guilty to both cases. 12 years prision mayor to 20 years reclusion temporal, plus indemnification of Diago’s heirs for the first case. Reclusion perpetua for the second case. Attorney General contends that the lower court committed errors in each of the two cases: Aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation should be offset by plea of guilty; proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Crime charged should be the complex crime of grave coercion with murder; proper penalty should be death. Supreme Court recognizes the error of the lower court in the first case, but rules that the claim on the second case is baseless, as the coercion committed was not essential to the act of murder. Issue: Whether or not the appeal made by the Attorney General concerning the first case has merit. Held: No. Placing upon the accused the risk of being given a higher penalty that what is imposed by the lower court, even if the lower court erroneously gives the wrong penalty, counts as double jeopardy. "No error, however, flagrant, committed by the court against the state, can be reserved by it for decision by the supreme court when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge was the result of the error committed.” Astroga vs. People Facts: Appellant Arnulfo Astorga appealed the court’s decision on Criminal Case No. 8243 wherein appellant was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code or the kidnap and detention of a minor. Astorga insisted that the inconsistencies and the contradictions of the prosecution’s witnesses should be deemed incredible and that the delay in the filing of the accusation weakened the case. Furthermore, Astorga claimed that he had no motive to kidnap the 8-year-old Yvonne Traya which should’ve been apparent and proven upon conviction. Ultimately, Astorga claimed that the court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he had not detained nor locked Yvonne up which is an important element in kidnapping. Issues: 1.) Whether or not the prosecution’s witnesses were credible. 2.) Whether or not the lack of motive by the appellant is significant in the court’s decision. 3.) Whether or not it was kidnapping or coercion. Held: 1.) The delay in the making of the criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of the witnesses especially if it had been satisfactorily explained. In the case, one week was reasonable since the victim was a resident in Binaungan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao. 2.) The court found it irrelevant to identify the motive since motive is not an element of the crime. Motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the appellant himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School. 3.) The court agreed with the appellant’s contention. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lock up”. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Rather, the felony committed was grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. People vs. Flores Facts: Accused, at knife point, forced his 13 year old daughter to undress and then raped her. All the time and while the accused-appellant was on top of her the knife was poked at her. Victim also testified her father had raped her 4 times when she was in grade 4. Accused denied the charges as fabricated. Appellant cites the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and further contends that the medical findings reveal that the healed lacerations in the victim’s hymen were already existing prior to the alleged date of rape, in which case there is no evidence to prove that appellant raped Ma. Cristina on November 8, 1994. Sentenced to death. Held: Guilty but reclusion perpetua only. It is unthinkable for a daughter to falsely impute the crime of rape against her own father if it was not real. The supposed inconsistencies in the victim’s testimonies refer only to minor details and collateral matters which do not really affect either the substance of her declaration, and its veracity. 3
But, the information only alleged the minority of Ma. Cristina that she was thirteen years old but did not allege the relationship of the accused to the victim. The seven (7) modes of committing rape introduced under RA 7659 which warrant automatic imposition of death penalty partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape only on which he was arraigned, and be convicted of qualified rape punishable by death. Thus, accused-appellant should only suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. People vs. Molina Facts: Accused were charged and found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for having in their possession 946.9 grams of marijuana and were sentenced to death. Held: No. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit, or have committed a crime. There was no probable cause in arresting the accused thus making the arrest illegal. Because the arrest was illegal, so was the search made by the police officers. This being the case, the evidence is inadmissible and the accused are found not guilty of the alleged offense. Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Facts: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.” Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. Decision: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of Ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. Primicias vs. Fugoso Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression Facts: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of theCoalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel thelatter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remainsbitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.” Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, andpenalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb thepeace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; ordisturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Freeuse of Public Place. Issue: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom of assembly. Held: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefullyassemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of thepeople recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society.The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila isvested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawfulassembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets orpublic places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize therisk of disorder. The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing theMayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimitedpower may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of nationalemergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for theassembly itself.The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious injurycannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free menfrom the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonableground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable groundto believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe thatthe evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. PETITION IS GRANTED. 5
People vs. Hernandez Facts: It was the height of the Government action against communists and the Hukbalahap guerillas. President Elpidio Quirino, through his Defense Secretary (and later, President) Ramon Magsaysay intensified the campaign against them, and the crackdown was on against communist organizations. Due to such government action, several communist leaders like Luis Taruc and the Lava brothers were soon in government custody. On January 20, 1951, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) headquarters was raided. Writer (and future National Artist for Literature) Amado V. Hernandez, himself a labor leader, was arrested on January 26 for various rebellious activities with the CLO. Upon his arrest, he was charged in the criminal information of “Rebellion with Murder, Arson and Robbery”. Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the court where his case was pending, but was denied on the basis of the nature of the offense (if the crime was complexed, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a petition to the Supreme Court. The government, headed by Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, argued that the gravity of the crime committed required the denial of the bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by the government against Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other arrested communist leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Held: The Supreme Court, through then Associate Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime and that there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited several cases convicting the defendants of simple rebellion although they killed several persons. Thus, the petition for bail was granted. On May 30, 1964, the Supreme Court acquitted Hernandez. People vs. Geronimo Facts: On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor. Issue: Can rebellion be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping? Held: No. Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion. According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead to undesirable results. It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical whole. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs. People vs. Feliciano Facts: Feliciano was charged with highway robbery and robbery with homicide. He was beaten at the police station and was forced to sign a statement that he was responsible for several hold-ups in the area including the one where the victim was killed. He was examined without counsel by police and even when counsel was given to him, the lawyer did not advise him of the implications of his testimony. Held: Acquitted for lack of evidence. His testimonies were inadmissible. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused. He was questioned before his counsel de officio arrived and even when his counsel was present, his lawyer did not explain to accused-appellant the consequences of his 6
action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail. We also find that Atty. Chavez’s independence as counsel is suspect — he is regularly engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services. Enrile vs. Salazar Facts: In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. Issue: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling? Held: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to grab power. People vs Abarca Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencingthe accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder withdouble frustrated murder.The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With theapproval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting allexisting death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant toinform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliancetherewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case byway of an appeal.On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intentto kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensedfirearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous deathand as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado andArnold Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of said spouses. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with doublefrustrated murder? Held: The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committingmurder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liablefor frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose uponthe accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in itsmaximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro).The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced tofour months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermoreordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs. People vs. Ramos Facts: The appellant was convicted of raping his own 10-year old daughter and relies solely on the defense of denial of the said accusation against him.
Held: A rape victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father. Earlier and long-standing decisions of this Court have likewise held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed. This is true when made against any man committing the crime; it is more so when the accusing words are said against a close relative. Lopez vs. People Facts: Prior to the incident, David, Candalo & Lopez were seen by Seriño (poultry caretaker) having a drinking spree at around 6pm. They stopped by 7pm. Seriño and Helsim left when David and Candalo were asleep leaving Lopez who was still awake. Checked out barking dog around 11 pm. They went to David et al quarters where they saw Edgar Lopez carrying a black bag and wearing bloodied white pants running towards the direction of the gate. They saw him climb over it. When they went to his sleeping quarters, they saw Bonifacio David dead, with an injury at the neck. On their way to captain’s house, they saw Lopez arrested by captain and NBI agents. Issue: Whether or not the appellant guilt of murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt, due to the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation? Held: Yes. Convicted Homicide (Prision mayor minimum 8 years and one day – reclusion temporal max 14 yrs an 8 months 1 day) + P9K funeral fees + 50K indemnity. Direct evidence not needed if all circumstantial evidence support or are consistent with accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence (People v. de Guia). This can surpass direct evidence. The requisites to warrant conviction based on circumstantial evidence are: There is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Treachery (attacked has no chance to defend himself or retaliate deliberate adoption of means) and evident premeditiation (time when decided and clinging to determination and lapse between determination and execution) should be proven by prosecution. Thus, due to lack of aggravating circumstances, death is lowered. Maniego vs. People Facts: Feliciano Maniego was employed as a laborer to work as the person in charge of delivering summons and subpoenas in the Municipal Court of Manila. Nevertheless, Maniego was permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the court for action, without passing through the regular clerk. Sometime in 1947, a certain Felix Rabia was subpoenaed in connection with a traffic violation. The said crime has prescribed without Rabia being prosecuted but then Maniego informed Rabia that he is penalized with a P15 fine; that Maniego can fix this if Rabia can pay him P10. Maniego pocketed the P10.00 and for this he was later charged for violating Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code which provides in part: Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than the value to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed. Maniego assails the charge. He avers, among others, that he is not a public officer as he was merely hired as an ordinary government employee. ISSUE: Whether or not Maniego is correct in assailing the charge by claiming that he is not a public officer as he was merely hired as an ordinary government employee? HELD: No. Maniego is considered a public officer under Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code which includes all persons “who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class.” That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public officers between “officer” and “employee”. Further, even assuming that Article 203 can’t be applied, although Maniego was originally engaged as a laborer, he was temporarily performing public functions when he was permitted to draft motions. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he certainly guilty as charged. The receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent officials.
Magno v. COMELEC Facts: A case was filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections based on Sec 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. On May 10, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC in its resolution dated May 12, 2001. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. A. Whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude? B. Whether or not Omnibus Election Code or the LGC that should apply in this situation? Held: A.) Yes. According to Black, Moral Turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The Elements of Bribery: 1. the offender is a public officer; 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and 4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. B.) No. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year disqualification period provided in Sec 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in Sec 40 of the LGC. It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985 while the LGC (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the LGC states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the LGC. Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections. People vs. Quasha Facts: William H. Quasha, a member of the Philippine bar, committed a crime of falsification of a public and commercial document for causing it to appear that Arsenio Baylon, a Filipino citizen, had subscribed to and was the owner of 60.005 % of the subscribed capital stock of Pacific Airways Corp. (Pacific) when in reality the money paid belongs to an American citizen whose name did not appear in the article of incorporation, to circumvent the constitutional mandate that no corp. shall be authorize to operate as a public utility in the Philippines unless 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos. Found guilty after trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a fine. Quasha appealed to this Court. Primary purpose: to carry on the business of a common carrier by air, land or water. Baylon did not have the controlling vote because of the difference in voting power between the preferred shares and the common shares. ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual 9
who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document. ISSUE: Whether or not Quasha should be criminally liable? HELD: NO. Falsification consists in not disclosing in the articles of incorporation that Baylon was a mere trustee ( or dummy as the prosecution chooses to call him) of his American co-incorporators, thus giving the impression that Baylon was the owner of the shares subscribed to by him. For the mere formation of the corporation such revelation was not essential, and the Corporation Law does not require it. The moment for determining whether a corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is when it applies for a franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for that purpose. that can be done after the corporation has already come into being and not while it is still being formed. so far as American citizens are concerned, the said act has ceased to be an offense within the meaning of the law, so that defendant can no longer be held criminally liable therefore. Lim vs. People FACTS On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300,000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the same amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank and gave the check to Seguan. The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to “cash” dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks, but she never did. On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23, two informations against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22. After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision. Issue: Whether or not Lim violated B.P. No. 22? Held: The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: “(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.” The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued, and the terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks, are irrelevant in determining culpability. Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage. It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita –”it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial…” This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption and she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written. However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)], it was held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.
People vs. Genosa Facts: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15 November 1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995. The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep. Issue: Whether or not Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense? And whether or not she can be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery? Held: No. Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. No. There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor. People vs. Deduyo Facts: The accused feloniously kidnap and detain therebyrestraining the liberty of a minor with threats to kill him for the purpose of extortingransom from his parents.The appellant contends that there was no kidnapping because the victim voluntarily wentwith him. It was ruled that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused didnot remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went with theaccused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so. - thevictim, a boy 16 years of age, would not have voluntarily left with the appellant if not for the false assurance that his mother had supposedly permitted him to accompany theappellant to the airport “to get the baggage” and bring it back to the victim’s house.Moreover in kidnapping, the victim need not be taken by the accused forcibly or againsthis will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carryingaway of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either bemade forcibly or fraudulently.Given all these circumstances, the court finds that the victim was effectively restrained of his liberty - the primary element of the offense of kidnapping and serious illegaldetention. Issue: Whether or not there was a restrain on the liberty of the victim? Held: The appellant, Rolando Deduyo alias Batman, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim, or the deprivation of his liberty. It is notnecessary for the victim to be locked up or placed in an enclosure; it is 11
sufficient for himto be detained or deprived of his liberty in any manner. In the present case, the testimonyand sworn statement of the victim showed that he was effectively restrained of his liberty. People vs. Lahoylahoy Facts: The information in a prosecution for robbery with quadruple homicide charged that the accused criminally and by force appropriated certain articles of value, the property of one Roman Estriba, and on occasion thereof killed the said Roman Estriba and three others. However, the proof showed that the money which was the subject of the robbery was taken from one Juana Seran who was robbed and killed separately from the other three victims. Issue: Whether or not the conviction for robbery with quadruplehomicide can be sustained? Held: No. Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58declares that a complaint or information shall show, among others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property, the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the owner's name is essential. But of course if his name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown. From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be alleged as unknown it should NOT be inferred that the naming of such person, when known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as matter of essential description of the crime charged, the complaint must invest such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is unknown. It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential to the proper description of the offense. To constitute robbery, the property obtained must bethat of another, and indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to identify the offense. A complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide mustnecessarily charge each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where acomplex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses the defendant can be convicted of theother. The mere circumstance that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects the principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject tothe criticism that the defendant is thereby placed ina position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today of the robbery which is alleged tohave been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail. In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with homicide. HOWEVER, the accused were sentenced bythe Supreme Court for four separate homicides. People vs. Regalo Facts: On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the former’s house. Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen and went to the room of the victims and poked at 8inch gun on them, one after the other, and hogtied both of them. Armando raped Nerissa in bed while her grandmother was hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmother’s aparador being opened where two rings, two wrist watches, and money were taken from the aparador. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and was raped again by the accused. He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant appealed his criminal case at the Regional Trial Court in Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita Ulanday, a health officer of Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining witness “either” voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.
Issue: Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered as an aggravating circumstance? Held: On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo, separately testified that they saw the face of Regala, despite of no electricity at the commission of the crime, because he used a flashlight and took off the mask he was wearing, and thus, they remembered him wearing an earring of his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station. The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot detract from the fact, that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified the accused-appellant. As correctly pointed out by the appellee, the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accusedappellant, who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulanday’s testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily submitted to sexual advances of Regala. The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: (1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. The judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, where the victim is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. People vs. Zapata & Bondoc Facts: A complaint for adultery (inclusive dates: 1946- March 1947) was filed by Andres Bondoc against his wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio Bondoc. Guadalupe pleaded guilty and was sentenced to arresto mayor. In the same court, he filed again another complaint for adulterous acts (for the period March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948), but this was dismissed due to double jeopardy by the RTC. It was held that the adulterous acts in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, since the defendants and the complainants were the same parties as before. Issues: Whether or not adultery is a continuous offense, and therefore the defendant may not be charged of the same offense twice? Held: The court held that it is not a continuous offense , and that each sexual intercourse is considered as one count of adultery. Therefore, the husband may still file for additional complaints. Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, meaning it is completed at the moment of the carnal union. As long as the status remains unchanged, each commission of the act constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional provision which bars the filing of as many complaints of adultery. Reasons why it is not considered as a continuing offense: 1. The male defendant cannot anymore use the defense of not knowing his paramour is married. If it is considered as a continuing offense, but he still continued the illicit relation, it is unjust for him to go unpunished because of double jeopardy. 2. Even if the husband pardoned the adulterous wife, she is still not exempt from criminal liability because the pardon extinguished the previous acts, not the subsequent acts.