criminal law case digest

G.R. No. 131131. June 21, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABELARDO SALONGA, accused-appellant. Facts: This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR NO. 18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua. Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information alleging that on or before 23 October 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company (Metrobank), with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document.

Issues: Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft? Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper? Decsion: The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused-appellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that the check was issued without any transaction. Mariano also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in the cashiers

check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00. The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and 1 year of each additional PHP 10,000.00 in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the RPC. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. Falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor in its minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001 JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and POWER CO., respondents. FACTS: Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan Cariaga of qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were

involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym “Canuto Duran”. ‘Duran’ became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his ‘boss’ needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. ‘Duran’ was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). ‘Duran’s undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis ‘apprehended’ him on February 1989. ‘Duran’ then ‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and confessed to their participation as “fence” for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latter’s alleged illegal dismissal. Issues: Whether or not Ricardo’s sworn statement is admissible as evidence; Siton is a credible witness; guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven DECISION: the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION (1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a witness “unable to testify” in court. In Tan v. CA , the Court has held that “unable to testify” does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case. (2) Credible. (3) Guilty.

G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000 CONCHITA QUINAO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep. by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE,respondents.

Facts: Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant Francisco Del Monte are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accusedappellant presented a tax declaration and alleged that the land being claimed by the complainant is different from the land litigated in Civil Cases No. 3561. Trial Court finds accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land in question could be held liable of usurpation of her own property? Decision: Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal Code.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.

In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.

G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000 RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned and operated by the family of private complainant Rosa Cabuso. While she normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the checks would be funded on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp "Account Closed."

Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code? Held: The appeal is impressed with merit. Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element – false pretenses or fraudulent acts – the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a). Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist.Notice of dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder. In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that

petitioner received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. This leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioner’s defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check. In fine, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.

G.R. No. 149354 January 18, 2008 OLAND V. VELOSO, Petitioner, v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City, is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager. Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an occasional guest at the restaurant. Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at the said restaurant having dinner, had a conversation with Ramon. This led to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet. On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo (Eva), the restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner. However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4) additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramons account. The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. When the Sales Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a guest of Ramon. Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should send the bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was always present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office. Hence, the bill was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but still, he refused to pay. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail. Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 31, Quezon City. ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of estafa DECISION: The court DENIED the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA finding petitioner Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Appellant insists that he is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt. We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only one table. We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 153198

July 11, 2006

CRISANTA B. BONIFACIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: Private complainant Ofelia Santos was a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of jewelry. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio was introduced to her. She expressed interest to see the pieces of jewelry Santos was selling. On March 21, 1996, petitioner received several pieces of jewelry from Santos. She signed a document acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreeing to sell these items on commission basis. She also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold items to Santos within 15 days. Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale within the given period. She, however, returned some of the unsold items at a later date. The value of the pieces unaccounted for amounted to P154,000. On March 28, 1996, petitioner asked Santos for new sets of jewelry to sell under the same terms and conditions. Again, on due date, petitioner failed to account. This time, the value of the unpaid and unreturned items amounted to P91,500. On April 3, 1996, petitioner once more accepted several pieces of jewelry and signed an acknowledgment receipt under the same terms and conditions. On due date, petitioner again failed to pay. The pieces of jewelry left unpaid and unreturned amounted to P38,500. In a letter dated July 25, 1996, Santos demanded from petitioner the payment of the total amount of P244,500. Petitioner gave her two checks amounting to P30,000 as partial payment. The checks, however, bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds and being drawn against a closed account, respectively. ISSUE: Whether the CA’s decision of rendering judgement of petitioner being guilty of Estafa is correct DECISION: The petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b), RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent's duty to return the jewelry on demand of the owner. The demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Here, petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of jewelry on commission. She likewise admitted that she failed to return the items or their value on Santos' demand. On the other hand, the testimony of her lone witness, Lilia Pascual, failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence that she misappropriated the items or their corresponding value. She also never appeared in the trial court to refute the charge against her. Hence, the trial and appellate courts' conclusion of guilt by misappropriation was a logical consequence of the established facts.

G.R. No. 133036. January 22, 2003 JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Facts: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional? Decision: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that “any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment. B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee bank’s representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation ‘drawn against insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.

G.R. No. 150910

February 6, 2006

BIENVENIDO GONZALUDO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the Bacolod City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita Manlangit in Bacolod City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulysses’s mother at the latter’s house at Bacolod City. Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.

After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to Bacolod City. And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for P1,500.00 a small house located near that of his mother at Purok 5, Mansungay, Bacolod City. Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and brought her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the house and the house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. After Ulysses’s demise in January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since the house was being sold for a cheap price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the 2-storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of Rosemarie’s rights and interest on the subject house.

Later, upon complaint of Ulysses’s widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated May 31, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. The trial court acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the crime charged. The appellate affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Issue: Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime of Estafa is not present?

Decision: The petition is partly impressed with merit. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false pretense was made prior to or

simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; and private complainant Anita Manlangit’s right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases. It is petitioner’s thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the third element contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any money or property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioner’s submission. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the present case.

While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason must this be for herein petitioner. The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document.

It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally feasible. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house

in this case. Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Document.

G.R. No. 150439. July 29, 2005 AMELITA DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: That on or about and during the period comprised from the month ofDecember 1994 to January 1995, inclusive, or thereabouts in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Great Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village, Inc., and Hock Wan Restaurant Corporation, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused being then the payroll clerk of said Corporations, existing domestic corporations primarily engaged in the restaurant business, with principal places of business at 798 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and 489 Nueva St., Binondo, Manila, respectively, and by virtue of her position as such, received from said

corporations in trust, during the said period a total sum of P471,166.11 representing the excess amount paid to the employees of said corporations as salaries under the obligation of accounting and turning over the said excess to said corporations, but she did not do so in violation of the trust relationship existing between her and said corporations, which amount, once in her possession, far from complying with her obligation aforesaid, went into hiding and failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to return the same whereby misappropriating, misapplying and converting the said amount to her personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said corporation represented by their common personnel manager Manuel M. Matammu in the total amount of P471,166.11 Philippine Currency. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST PETITIONER IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION; WHETHER OR NOT FORMAL DEMAND IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE IN THE CRIME OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION Decision: The court premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2001 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The questioned decision is hereby REVERSED. Accused-petitioner Amelita dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa defined under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code on the ground of reasonable doubt. The cash bond for the accused-petitioners provisional liberty is ordered returned to her, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Ominously, such bait, though hearsay evidence, was acknowledged hook, line and sinker by the court a quo, and worse, affirmed by the appellate court. Not even one iota of documentary or object evidence was presented that would give a semblance of correctness to the actions of the said courts. In sum, from the totality of evidence presented before the Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral certainty. Only the checks and acknowledged payroll slips were presented to show the culpability of the accused-petitioner, and, sadly, said documentary evidence were the only basis for the theory that there was an overcomputation of the payrolls. What the trial court used to convict the accused-petitioner are documents that had no direct relation to her. It would have been different had the accused-petitioners computations been used as the basis for comparing the

acknowledged payroll slips. That way, it would be clearly shown that she had overcomputed the salaries due the employees to enable her to misappropriate said excess. In other words, the trial court failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-petitioner over-computed the payroll and pocketed the excess money. The Court finds the testimonies and documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on accused-petitioner. The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined to hold that the evidence is conclusive that she is not guilty, neither is it convinced that she is so, based on the circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus, under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner. Undeniably, the convergence of the circumstances vis-vis the evidence established by the prosecution, especially the tenuous testimonies of the witnesses, must ineluctably result in a favorable verdict for the defense.

G.R. No. 134120. January 17, 2005 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LEA SAGAN JULIANO, appellant. FACTS: The accused purchased 190 sacks of milled rice from JCT Agro-Development Corporation and in payment she issued a check for a value of P89,000, knowing at the time of issue that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check. When presented for encashment, it was dishonored by the bank for reason of insufficiency of funds. On the following month the accused issued another check that was again dishonored by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT Agro-Development Corporation. The trial court found her guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) and Estafa. Appellant appealed her conviction for estafa to the Court of Appeals, but still found her

guilty, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, committed the offenses. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt to convict the appellant for estafa? Decision: The Court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and acquitted Lea Sagan Juliano for the crime of estafa. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act. Nevertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of P89,000, which is the value of the sack of rice she purchased.

G.R. Nos. 146641-43. November 18, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICA G. CUYUGAN, accused-appellant. FACT: That on or about the 18 th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, Rica G. Cuyugan, defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that said accused with intent to defraud and well knowing that her account with the bank was already closed, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, make out and issue to private Complainant the several checks. in the total amount of P396,000.00 simultaneous with the receipt by the accused of cash money from private Complainant also in the total amount of P396,000.00 but which checks when presented to the drawee bank on their maturity dates were promptly dishonored for reasons of Account Closed and notwithstanding demands made on her,

accused failed and refused and still fails to redeem or make good the said checks face value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P396,000.00. That on or about the 12th day of May 1994, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded and deceived private Complainant Norma Abagat in the following manner to wit: that the accused with intent to defraud and well-knowing that her account with the bank has no sufficient funds, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue to the private Complainant Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 03A058532P postdated June 10, 1994 in the amount of P150,000.00 simultaneous with, for and in consideration of cash money from private Complainant in the total amount of P150,000.00 but which check when presented to the drawee bank on maturity date was promptly dishonored for reason of Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) and notwithstanding demands on her, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good the said check or its value, to the damage and prejudice of the private Complainant in the total aforesaid amount of P150,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime of estafa DECISION: The judgment dated December 20, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, finding appellant RICA G. CUYUGAN, liable for three counts of estafa is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt.However, she is ordered to pay private complainants the balance of her obligation The transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment. We find appellants allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered into a joint venture agreement with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is self-serving. But we also note that the trial court convicted appellant on a general allegation that all the elements of estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code had been proved by the prosecution without making any reference to or giving any proof of the actual fraud that appellant allegedly committed to make her liable for estafa. It is elementary that where an allegation in the information is an essential element of the crime, the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. In this case, the prosecution did not establish

specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offenses charged.

G.R. Nos. 124443-46. June 6, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NIMFA REMULLO, accused-appellant. FACTS: That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for job/placement abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment job placement abroad to the complainants, ROSARIO CADACIO, JENELYN QUINSAAT and HONORINA MEJIA, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, thus committing illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of [Article 38(2) in relation to Article 39 (b) of

the Labor Code]. That in or about and during the months from March to May 1993 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representation made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, with intent to defraud the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT to the effect that she would send her abroad for the purpose of employment and would need certain amount for the expenses in the processing of papers thereof, which representations the accused well knew was (sic) false and fraudulent and was only made by her to induce said complainant to give and pay, as in fact the latter gave and paid to her the amount of P15,000.00 which the accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant JENELYN QUINSAAT in the aforementioned amount of P15,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty for large scale illegal recruitment DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 132, is hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 95-653, for illegal recruitment in large scale, appellant NIMFA REMULLO is found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000; and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654, 95655 and 95-656 for estafa, she is declared guilty sentenced in each case to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) one day of prision mayor, and to pay by way of restitution P15,000 to each of the private complainants, Jenelyn Quinsaat, Rosario Cadacio and Honorina Mejia, together with the costs. Anent appellants conviction for estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-654 to 95-656, we find no error committed by the trial court. Their conviction and sentence are fully supported by the evidence on record. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. In this case, appellant clearly defrauded private complainants by deceiving them into believing that she had the power and authority to send them on jobs abroad. By virtue of appellants false representations, private complainants each parted with their hard-earned money. Each complainant paid P15,000 as recruitment fee to appellant, who then appropriated the money for her own use and benefit, but failed utterly to provide overseas job placements to the complainants. In a classic rigmarole, complainants were provided defective visas, brought to the airport with their passports and tickets, only to be offloaded that day, but with promises to be booked in a plane flight on another day. The recruits wait in vain for weeks, months, even years, only to realize they were gypped, as no jobs await them abroad. No clearer cases of estafa could be imagined than those for which appellant should be held criminally responsible.

G.R. No. 162822

August 25, 2005

JAIME GUINHAWA, Petitioner v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and display room for cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager. On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van and from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went

out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the canal parallel to the highway. The van was damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced. Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint from the DTI. On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City. ISSUE: Whether or not under the Information, the petitioner was charged of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code DECISION: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding circumstances of the case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the private complainant that the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she relied on her belief that the van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioners fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment. The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain business is confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry with it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized.

G.R. No. 182061

March 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v FERDINAND T. BALUNTONG, Appellant. FAC TS: Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the saidhouse and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on JoshuaSavarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The Trial Court found accused guilty be yond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The Court

of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder? Decision: The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE , and a NEW one is rendered findingappellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion p er p etua with no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified. The assailed CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered as follows: Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Appellant is ORDERED to pay the damages and other expenses. How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon. Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

G.R. No. 182460

March 9, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee. v JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, Accused-Appellant. FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of

water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head. He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in the back. Appellant denied setting the house on fire. On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated homicide, ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson and frustrated homicide DECISION: The appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio. This Court does not discount the fact that there was a fight between appellant and Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot be presumed that Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against appellant. His testimony, having withstood cross-examination, has passed the scrutiny of the lower courts and was held to be credible. The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.

G. R. No. 170470

September 26, 2006

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES , Appellee, v EDN A M ALNG AN y M AYO, Appellant. FACTS: From the personal account of Rem igio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on Januar y 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., wit h her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare. Thirt y minutes

later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire. W hen Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the wom an who was later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified the wom an as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accusedappellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angr y residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salar y for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a complex crime of arson and homicide Decision: The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:(a) if

the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson , and the resulting homicide is absorbed;(b) if, on the other hand, the m ain objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/ murder and arson.

G.R. No. 122110. September 26, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERIGEL OLIVA, accused-appellant.

FACTS: August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino Manguba (hereinafter referred to as "Avelino") and his family were sleeping in their house in San Jose, Claveria, Cagayan. Avelino went out of the house to urinate. He saw Ferigel set the roof of their house on fire with a lighted match. Awakened by the loud barking of dogs, Avelino's wife sensed danger and peeped through a hole in their wall. She also saw Ferigel burn the roof of their house. She shouted, "Perry is burning our house!" and called out to the neighbors for help. While the fire razed Avelino's house, Ferigel and three others, Dominador Oliva, Marcos Paderan and Arnel Domingo watched at a distance of about five (5) meters. One of the neighbors, Benjamin Estrellon (hereinafter referred to as "Benjamin") went to the nearby river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by Ferigel at close range. Benjamin tried to run, but he slumped and fell to the ground. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Avelino, his wife, and Benjamin's son, Noel, witnessed

the shooting since they were only about five (5) to six (6) meters away from Ferigel when the incident occurred. The place was brightly lit by the burning roof and visibility was not a problem. On August 24, 1993, a post-mortem report was made on Benjamin's cadaver, revealing the following: "II POSTMORTEM FINDINGS: "Cadaver is in a state of rigor mortis and with postmortem lividity at back."Gunshot wound of entrance 0.9 cm. at left lateral mid-scapular area going medially and anterosuperiorily, 10 cms. deep without exit.""III. CAUSE OF DEATH "Internal Hemorrhage due to gunshot wound at back." ISSUE: Whether or not that the testimonies should be taken into consideration, same with alibi and defense DECISION: We find no reversible error and affirm the conviction. Whether or not Benjamin was shot while he was on the street or when he was in the act of pouring water on the burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. We agree with the Solicitor General that Benjamin could have been on the street while pouring water on the burning roof. The two testimonies were not inconsistent. Also whether or not Benjamin immediately fell or tried to run away after he was shot is not important. The fact is that he was shot; any act of his after he was shot would not change the shooting, which at that point was fait accompli. Equally insignificant is whether the gun used was a long firearm or a short firearm. Identification of the weapon only becomes critical when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. In this case, the trial court did not doubt the identity, and neither would we. There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is intentional burning; (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecution for felonies and offense. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime. It refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies of the witnesses. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 126351

February 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAUL ACOSTA Y LAYGO, accused-appellant. FACTS: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private

complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his livein partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant. At about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino’s query, she returned immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant’s house, which was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellant’s wife who arrived at the place. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson. DECISION: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record: First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother. Second, appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant’s) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife.

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on

ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage. DECISION: The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.

G.R. No. 96715 November 19, 1991 RUBY VERA-NERI, petitioner, vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo in the City of Baguio. On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About fortyfive minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium. Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto. Decision: The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking 171 | P a g e Background image of page 171 to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings.

G.R. No. 157718

April 26, 2005

ALVIN AMPLOYO y EBALADA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Respondent.

Facts: Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and playing the breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent. Amployo contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident happened at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is still very much underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved. Issues: Whether or not lewd design was established; Amployo violated RA 7610. DECISION: *Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.The first element is lewd design. The term ‘lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in the past. *The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioner’s act of purposely touching Kristine Joy’s breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct. The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.

G.R. No. 130709. March 6, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANITO MONTERON y PANTORAS, accused-appellant.

FACTS: On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking home from Wangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a secluded portion of the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see where the stone came from, she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious.[2] When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of her, also naked. She struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her.[3] He placed his penis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away from her. This caused accused-appellant to stand up in pain. Mary Ann ran towards the road while putting on her clothes. Mary Anns cousin, Arnel Arat, witnessed the whole incident as he was then walking to Wangan Agricultural School. He met Mary Ann while the latter was running away and brought her home. When they got home, Mary Ann told her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn, told her mother. That afternoon, upon complaint of Mary Ann, the Calinan Police Precinct arrested accusedappellant. The following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the City Health Office of Davao City where she was examined by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma. The latter found that Mary Anns hymen was intact and had no laceration, but her labia minora was coaptated and her labia majora was gaping.[4] On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was formally charged with rape. At his arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[5] After trial, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape. DECISION: The decision is is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Marianito Monteron y Pantoras is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages. Accusedappellant also contends that it was unlikely for him to strip naked and commit rape in broad daylight. In this connection, suffice it to say that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is known to happen in the most unlikely places such as parks, along roadsides, within school premises or even occupied rooms. Rape has also been committed on a passageway and at noontime. While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attempted stage. Mary Ann clearly testified that accused-appellant only placed his penis on top of her vagina. In fact, she was able to grab it and push it away from her, causing accused-appellant to stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by accused-

appellants attempts to insert his organ into hers. However, the fact remains, based on Mary Anns own narrative, that accused-appellants penis was merely on top of her vagina and has not actually entered the same.Accused-appellant has commenced the commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing himself and the victim and lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which prevented the insertion of accused-appellants penis in her vagina.

G.R. No. 113265. March 5, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PEREZ y MAGPANTAY, accused-appellant.

FACTS: At about 6:00 A.M. on May 31, 1990, Manuel Perez woke up Jennifer who lying asleep on the cemented floor of the house. The door and the windows of the house were closed. Manuel Perez ordered Jennifer to remain lying down on the cemented floor and began undressing Jennifer. Manuel then kissed the cheeks of Jennifer. He proceeded to kiss and touch the breasts of Jennifer as well as the upper part of Jennifers body. Manuel, who was dressed in short pants, did not remove the same but he unzipped the zipper of his short pants. He pulled the legs of Jennifer apart and placed himself on top of the body of Jennifer. He then inserted his private part inside the private part of Jennifer. All this time Jennifer protested and complained of pain but was unable to resist because Manuel threatened to kill her. After satisfying his lust, Manuel again threatened Jennifer not to tell anybody about what happened to her. Jennifer left the house after the incident and proceeded to the nearby house of her aunt, Othelia Marco, who was then out of the house. Jennifer glanced at the clock in Othelias house and found out that it was 6:00 A.M. in the morning of May 31, 1990. Jennifer remained outside the house until Manuel called her later on to clean the bleedings. It was not until June 3, 1990 that Jennifer disclosed her harrowing experience to a certain Malou (Marilou Castellano), a kumadre of her mother, who was then staying with them. Malou promised to help her. She brought her to the Navotas Police Station in order to report the rape incident. The Navotas police, however, told them to report the matter to the Malabon Police Station. Malou and Jennifer then proceeded there, but they were advised that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Kalookan City police force. Malou and the victim, however, did not proceed to the Kalookan City police force as it was already late in the evening. The next day, Jennifer reported the incident to her aunts, Othelia Marco and Myrna Casapao. They then accompanied Jennifer and Malou to the Kalookan City police station, where Jennifer filed a complaint for rape against appellant. After the police investigation, Jennifer was advised to go to the then-Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a physical examination. However, it was only on June 13, 1990, that Jennifer submitted herself to a physical examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape DECISION: The decision is finding appellant Manuel Perez y Magpantay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Jennifer Dimaano y Casapao. Having examined the entire record, we find that the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond doubt all the elements of rape. Private complainant testified as to how appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The carnal knowledge took place under circumstances of violence

and intimidation. Her testimony is supported by the results of the medico-legal examination conducted upon her at the police crime laboratory. Moreover, she positively pointed to appellant in open court as the person responsible for her defilement. Against said positive identification, appellants puerile defense of denial will not hold water, for he does not even deny that he was with the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast ill motive on private complainant or her family for fabricating the charge of rape against him have no evidentiary weight. It would be most unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story of rape by her mothers common-law spouse; allow a medical examination of her genitalia; and subject herself to a public trial and possible ridicule, all because her maternal relatives want her mother to separate from her common-law spouse. Perforce, appellants conviction must stand.

G.R. Nos. 135667-70

March 1, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO, accused-appellant. FACTS: TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in the privacy of her home is despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence unashamedly in front of her younger brother is to descend to the deepest recesses of depravity. Thus the incorrigible lothario transgressed all norms of decency, morality and rectitude when he molested his nine (9)-year old victim in the presence of her six (6)year old brother and severed all strands of gratefulness to her parents who gave him food, shelter and livelihood for four (4) years. Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of his wife Julie, and their three (3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie Ventura Collado, son of Jose Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While waiting for an opportunity to become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as the family

driver. Aside from driving Julie, Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle operated by the Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost always at sea and having no househelp, their children were oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But, instead of taking care of them as their surrogate father, he took advantage of Messeah by sexually molesting her at home, and worse, even in the presence of her younger brother. There were four unfortunate occasions that constituted the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape DECISION: The court finding accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO guilty of Statutory Rape and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in is MODIFIED. Messeahs failure to reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her credibility. Her silence was impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her. It is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life. Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim. In fact, the burden of keeping such a secret took its toll on her health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for a vacation in August 1993, he noticed that his children looked blank and pale, especially Messeah who looked thin, complained of dizziness and headaches and sometimes threw up. He and his wife had brought Messeah to several doctors, before one finally diagnosed Messeah as suffering from nervous breakdown and psychological trauma. The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Jessie's alibi that he was driving the family car on the disputed occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime by both Messeah and Metheor. Neither can we believe Jessie's allegation that Julie only wanted him out of their house because she favored her own relative over him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that a rape victim and her family would publicly disclose the incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in the community unless the charge is true. In fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house, then why would the Dumaoal family file the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994, when it is clear that he had already left the household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither does this explain why the Dumaoal spouses felt compelled to change residences in such a short period of time. As Jose Noli testified, they made the move even before All Saints Day, which shows that they left their familiar surroundings and uprooted their family all within ten (10) days just so they could ensure Messeahs safety.

Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal spouses agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges against him was because they were "torn between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her and the familys reputation. There was also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood kin a new chance at life knowing the gravity of the penalty that would be meted out to him. To interpret their actuation any other way would be most unfair to parents who are equally suffering with what befell their only daughter.

G.R. No. 123164. February 18, 2000 NICANOR DULLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her

uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her. The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to confront him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation and ran away. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined the child on February 3, 1993, showed that hymen of the victim is still intact. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from Lumaban and his men on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether Andrea is a competent witness. RULING: The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Under Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. In People v. Mendoza, the Court held: It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are the following:(a) Capacity of observation,(b) Capacity of recollection(c) Capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination. In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified. Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She answered "yes" and "no" to questions and, when unable to articulate what was done to her by petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation, she showed an understanding of what was being asked. She was

consistent in her answers to the questions asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.

G.R. No. 126096. July 26, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER, accused-appellant.

Facts:Julia Ratunil Javier, a 16-year old girl, was raped three times by her father, Amado Sandrias Javier, one on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994 and December, 1994, which resulted to Julia’s pregnancy.

Three complaints were filed. The trial court found Amado guilty of the crime of incestuous rape in the first complaint and sentenced to death. Upon failure of the prosecution to prove the use of force by Amado in the second and third complaints, he was just convicted of qualified seduction.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction for qualified seduction is proper in the complaint for the crime of rape? Decision: No. Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accused, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).

G.R. Nos. 110974-81. June 17, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANTE MANANSALA Y MANALANSANG, accused-appellant.

Facts: Jennifer Manansala, a 14-year old girl, was raped eight times by her father, a 44-year old “taho” vendor, Rodante Manansala, on November of 1991. On direct examination, Jennifer testified that she was raped eight times in the “taho” factory in Tondo, the workplace of her father. On cross examination, however, Jennifer changed her statement that the first rape incident was committed in the “taho” factory in Tondo but the rest of the seven rape incidents were committed in Tarlac. She also mentioned that her father gave her money every time they had sexual intercourse. The trial court found Rodante Manansala guilty of having raped his daughter in Manila but dismissed those committed in Tarlac on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly, the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the victim’s statement? Decision: No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified seduction. The inconsistencies on victim’s testimony for evidence cannot be dismissed as trivial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As SC has said: Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. The prosecution’s evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination

conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is especially true because she said she had been given money by her father everytime they had an intercourse. The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainant’s testimony is that although accused-appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accusedappellant was not living with them, having separated from complainant’s mother in 1986. Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was committed “by means of force, violence and intimidation,” accused-appellant cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include rape.