Criminal Law 1 Finals Reviewer

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Law  109  (I-­‐B)   Finals   Reviewer   Criminal  Law  1   Consolidated  Reviewer     Edited  by  Roberto  Miguel  O.  Rañeses   8/27/2011          

 

Consolidated  reviewer  for  Criminal  Law  1  under  Prof.   Dan  Peruelo  Calica.  Digests  were  either  culled  from   various  sources  (contributions  of  blockmates,  etc.)  or   written  by  the  editor  himself.  Notes  and  annotations   were  taken  from  Reyes’s  annotations  of  the  RPC.    

Rañeses  1    

General  Principles  of  Criminal  Law    

A. Definitions       Criminal   law   is   that   branch   or   division   of   law   which  defines  crimes,  treats  of  their  nature,  and   provides  for  their  punishment  [Reyes,  The  RPC,   Book  I,  16th  Revised  Edition]   It   is   that   branch   of   public   substantive   law   which   defines   offenses   and   prescribes   their   penalties.  It  is  substantive  because  it  defines  the   state’s   right   to   inflict   punishment   and   the   liability   of   the   offenders.   It   is   public   law   because   it   deals   with   the   relation   of   the   individual  with  the  state.    

  Crime   is   an   act   committed   or   omitted   in   violation   of   a   public   law   forbidding   or   commanding   it.   [Reyes,   supra,   at   1,   citing   I   Bouvier’s   Law   Dictionary,   Rawle’s   Third   Revision,  729]  

 

 

B. Nullum  crimen  nulla  poena  sine  lege     The   maxim   has   its   roots   in   history.   It   is   in   accordance   with   both   centuries   of   civil   law  

  and   common   law   tradition.   Moreover,   it   is   an     indispensable   corollary   to   a   regime   of   liberty     enshrined   in   our   Constitution.   It   is   of   the     essence  then  that  while  anti-­‐social  acts  should   be   penalized,   there   must   be   a   clear   definition     of  the  punishable  offense  as  well  as  the  penalty     that   may   be   imposed   –   a   penalty,   to   repeat,     that   can   be   fixed   by   the   legislative   body,   and     the  legislative  body  alone.  So  constitutionalism     mandates,  with  its  stress  on  jurisdictio  rather   than   guvernaculum.   The   judiciary   as   the     dispenser   of   justice   through   law   must   be     aware   of   the   limitation   on   its   own   power.     [Concurring   opinion,   Justice   Fernando,     People  v.  Cabural]     Sources  of  Philippine  Criminal  Law   a. The   Revised   Penal   Code   (Act   no.   3815)   and   amendments  thereto   b. Special  criminal  laws   c. Penal  provisions  in  other  laws   d. Local  ordinances  

Reyes:     1. There   are   no   common   law   crimes   in   the   Philippines.   Common-­‐law   crimes,   known   as   the   body   of   principles,   usages   and   rights   of   action,   which   do   not   rest   for   their   authority   upon   any   express   and   positive   declaration  of  the  will  of  the  legislature,  are   not   recognized   in   this   country,   unless   provided  by  law.     2. The   State   has   the   authority,   under   its   police   power,   to   define   and   punish   crimes  and  to  lay  down  rules  of  criminal   procedure.   States,   as   part   of   their   police   power,  have  a  large  measure  of  discretion  to   creating   and   defining   criminal   offenses.   (People  v.  Santiago,  43  Phil.  120,  124)     3. The   Bill   of   Rights   of   the   1987   Constitution   has   certain   limitations   in   the  enactment  of  penal  legislation.     1. No   ex   post   facto   law   or   bill   of   attainder   shall   be   enacted.   (Art.   III,   Sec.  22)   2. Mo   person   shall   be   held   to   answer   for   a   criminal   offense   without   due   process  of  law.  (Art.  III,  Sec.  14[1])     4. An  ex  post  facto  law  is  one  which:   1. Makes   criminal   an   act   done   before   the   passage   of   the   law   and   which   was   innocent   when   done,   and   punishes  such  an  act;   2. Aggravates   a   crime,   or   makes   it   greater   than   it   was,   when   committed;   3. Changes  the  punishment  and  inflicts   a   greater   punishment   than   the   law   annexed   to   the   crime   when   committed;   4. Alters   the   legal   rules   of   evidence,   and   authorizes   conviction   upon   less   or   different   testimony   than   the   law   required   at   the   time   of   the   commission  of  the  offense;     5. Assumes   to   regulate   civil   rights   and   remedies   only,   in   effect   imposes   penalty   or   deprivation   of   a   right   for   something   which   he   has   become   entitled,   such   as   the   protection   of   a  

Rañeses  2    

•

former   conviction   or   acquittal,   or   a   proclamation  of  amnesty.  (In  re:  Kay   Villegas   Kami,   Inc.,   35   SCRA   429,   431)     A   bill   of   attainder   is   a   legislative   act   which   inflicts   punishment   without   trial.   Its  essence  is  the  substitution  of  a  legislative   act   for   a   judicial   determination   of   guilt.   (People  v.  Ferrer,  48  SCRA  382,  395)    

  RPC,  Art.  5:   Duty   of   the   court   in   connection   with   acts   which   should  be  repressed  but  which  are  not  covered  by   the   law,   and   in   cases   of   excessive   penalties.   -­‐   Whenever   a   court   has   knowledge   of   any   act   which  it  may  deem  proper  to  repress  and  which   is   not   punishable   by   law,   it   shall   render   the   proper   decision,   and   shall   report   to   the   Chief   Executive,  through  the  Department  of  Justice,  the   reasons   which   induce   the   court   to   believe   that   said   act   should   be   made   the   subject   of   penal   legislation.   RPC,  Art.  21:     Penalties   that   may   be   imposed.   -­‐   No   felony   shall   be   punishable   by   any   penalty   not   prescribed   by   law  prior  to  its  commission.  

  C. State  authority  to  punish  crimes    

 

 

Sources:       Const.  (1987),  art.  II,  sec.  5   The   maintenance   of   peace   and   order,   the   protection   of   life,   liberty,   and   property,   and   promotion  of  the  general  welfare  are  essential  for   the  enjoyment  by  all  the  people  of  the  blessings  of   democracy.  

 

 

Const.  (1987),  art.  VI,  sec.  1   The   legislative   power   shall   be   vested   in   the   Congress  of  the  Philippines  which  shall  consist  of   a   Senate   and   a   House   of   Representatives,   except   to   the   extent   reserved   to   the   people   by   the   provision  on  initiative  and  referendum.  

 

 

  Const.  (1987),  art.  II,  sec.  1   The   Philippines   is   a   democratic   and   republican   State.   Sovereignty   resides   in   the   people   and   all   government  authority  emanates  from  them.  

    People  v.  Santiago,  43  Phil.  120  (1922)   Facts:   The   accused   was   driving   an   automobile   at   the   rate   of   30   miles   an   hour   on   a   highway   6   meter   wide,   notwithstanding   the   fact   that   he   had   to   pass   a   narrow   space   between   a   wagon   standing   on   one   side   of   the   road   and   a   heap   of   stones   on   the   other   side  where  the  were  two  young  boys,  the  appellant   did   not   take   the   precaution   required   by   the   circumstances   by   slowing   his   machine,   and   did   not   proceed   with   the   vigilant   care   that   under   the   circumstances   an   ordinary   prudent   man   would   take   in   order   to   avoid   possible   accidents   that   might   occur,  as  unfortunately  did  occur,  as  his  automobile   ran   over   the   boy   Porfirio   Parondo   who   was   instantly  killed  as  the  result  of  the  accident.     Issue:   WON   Act   No.   2886   (SEC.   2.   All   prosecutions   for   public   offenses   shall   be   in   the   name   of   the   People  of  the  Philippine  Islands  against  the  persons   charged   with   the   offense)   under   which   the   complaint  in  the  present  case  was  filed,  is  valid  and   constitutional.     Held:   Yes.   Since   the   provisions   of   this   General   Order  (No.  58)  have  the  character  of  statutory  law,   the   power   of   the   Legislature   to   amend   it   is   self-­‐ evident,   even   if   the   question   is   considered   only   on   principle.   Our   present   Legislature,   which   has   enacted   Act   No.   2886,   the   subject   of   our   inquiry,   is   the  legal  successor  to  the  Military  Government  as  a   legislative  body.       United  States  v.  Pablo,  35  Phil.  94  (1916)     Facts:   Andres   Pablo,   a   policeman,   reported   that   he   saw   Rodrigo   and   Malicsi   in   the   jueteng   arena   and   then   testified   on   the   contrary   during   the   trial.   He   was  charged  with  perjury  and  convicted  under  Act.   1697   which   was   said   to   have   repealed   articles   318   and  324  of  the  penal  code.    

Rañeses  3     Issue:  WON  defendant  can  be  punished  for  perjury     Held:   Yes.   Notwithstanding   that   the   said   Act   No.   1697   (which,   as   interpreted   by   this   court   in   its   decisions,   was   deemed   to   have   repealed   the   aforementioned   article   of   the   Penal   Code   relating   to   false   testimony,   comprised   within   the   term   of   perjury)   did   not   expressly   repeal   the   said   articles   of   the   Penal   Code;   and   as   the   said   final   article   of   the   Administrative   Code,   in   totally   repealing   Act   No.   1697,   does   not   explicitly   provide   that   the   mentioned   articles   of   the   Penal   Code   are   also   repealed.      

Limitations:      

No   ex   post   facto   law   or   bill   of   attainder   shall   be   enacted.    

Sec.  14  

*See  definition  of  ex  post  facto  law  on  page  1  and  bill   of  attainder  on  page  2.    

No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  criminal   offense  without  due  process  of  law.   In   all   criminal   prosecutions,   the   accused   shall   be   presumed   innocent   until   the   contrary   is   proved,  and  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  be  heard  by   himself   and   counsel,   to   be   informed   of   the   nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation  against  him,   to   have   a   speedy,   impartial,   and   public   trial,   to   meet   the   witnesses   face   to   face,   and   to   have   compulsory   process   to   secure   the   attendance   of   witnesses   and  the  production   of   evidence  in  his   behalf.   However,   after   arraignment,   trial   may   proceed   notwithstanding   the   absence   of   the   accused:   Provided,   that   he   has   been   duly   notified   and   his   failure   to   appear   is   unjustifiable.  

    Reyes:  A  right  which  may  be  waived  is  the  right  of   the   accused   to   confrontation   and   cross-­‐ examination.   A   right   which   may   not   be   waived   is   the  right  of  the  accused  to  be  informed  of  the  nature   and  cause  of  the  accusation  against  him.       The   reason   or   principle   underlying   the   difference   between  rights  which  may  be  waived  are  personal,   while  those  rights  which  may  not  be  waived  involve   public   interest   which   may   be   affected.   (2   Moran,   Rules  of  Court,  1952  Edition,  748)     *Refer  to  Revised  Rules  on  Criminal  Procedure,  Rule   115,   Sec.   1   for   the   relevant   statutory   rights   of   the   accused  on  page  4  

Sec.  18    

2.

2.

Excessive  fines  shall  not  be  imposed,  nor  cruel,   degrading   or   inhuman   punishment   inflicted.   Neither  shall  death  penalty  be  imposed,  unless,   for   compelling   reasons   involving   heinous   crimes,   the   Congress   hereafter   provides   for   it.   Any   death   penalty   already   imposed   shall   be   reduced  to  reclusion  perpetua.   The   employment   of   physical,   psychological,   or   degrading   punishment   against   any   prisoner   or   detainee   or   the   use   of   substandard   or   inadequate   penal   facilities   under   subhuman   conditions  shall  be  dealt  with  by  law.  

Sec.  22  

No   person   shall   be   deprived   of   life,   liberty,   or   property   without   due   process   of   law,   nor   shall   any   person  be  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  

1.

1.

No   person   shall   be   imprisoned   for   debt   or   non-­‐ payment  of  a  poll  tax.  

Sec.  1  

2.

Sec.  19  

Sec.  20  

Const.  (1987),  art.  III  

1.

Const.  (1987).  art,  III  

No  person  shall  be  detained  solely  by  reason  of   his  political  beliefs  and  aspirations.   No   involuntary   servitude   in   any   form   shall   exist   except   as   a   punishment   for   a   crime   whereof   the   party  shall  have  been  duly  convicted.  

 

Rañeses  4     Revised  Rules  on  Criminal  Procedure,  Rule  115   Section   1.   Rights   of   accused   at   trial.   –   In   all   criminal   prosecutions,   the   accused   shall   be   entitled   to   the   following  rights:   (a)   To   be   presumed   innocent   until   the   contrary   is   proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt.   (b)   To   be   informed   of   the   nature   and   cause   of   the   accusation  against  him.   (c)   To   be   present   and   defend   in   person   and   by   counsel   at   every   stage   of   the   proceedings,   from   arraignment  to  promulgation  of  the  judgment.  x  x  x       (d)   To   testify   as   a   witness   in   his   own   behalf   but   subject  to  cross-­‐examination  on  matters  covered  by   direct   examination.   His   silence   shall   not   in   any   manner  prejudice  him.   (e)   To   be   exempt   from   being   compelled   to   be   a   witness  against  himself.   (f)   To   confront   and   cross-­‐examine   the   witnesses   against  him  at  the  trial.    x  x  x   (g)   To   have   compulsory   process   issued   to   secure   the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  production  of  other   evidence  in  his  behalf.   (h)  To  have  speedy,  impartial  and  public  trial.   (i)   To  appeal  in  all  cases   allowed   and   in   the   manner   prescribed  by  law.  

 

  Civil  Code,  Art.  2   Laws   shall   take   effect   after   fifteen   days   following   the   completion   of   their   publication   in   the   Official   Gazette,  unless  it  is  otherwise  provided.    This  Code   shall  take  effect  one  year  after  such  publication.  (1a)  

    Pesigan  v.  Angeles,  129  SCRA  174  (1984)     Facts:  Anselmo  and  Marcelo  Pesigan  transported  in   the   evening   of   April   2,   1982   twenty-­‐six   carabaos   and   a   calf   from   Camarines   Sur   with   Batangas   as   their   destination.   They   were   provided   with   three   certificates:   1)   a   health   certificate   from   the   provincial   veterinarian,   2)   permit   to   transfer/transport  from  the  provincial  commander;  

and   3)   three   certificates   of   inspections.   In   spite   of   the   papers,   the   carabaos   were   confiscated   by   the   provincial   veterinarian   and   the   town’s   police   station   commander   while   passing   through   Camarines  Norte.  Confiscation  was  based  on  EO  No.   626-­‐A   which   prohibits   transportation   of   carabaos   &   carabeef  from  one  province  to  another.     Issue:   WON   EO   No.   626-­‐A,   providing   for   the   confiscation   and   forfeiture   by   the   government   of   carabaos  transported  from  one  province  to  another,   dated   October   25,   1980   is   enforceable   before   publication  in  the  Official  Gazette  on  June  14,  1982     Held:   No.   The   said   order   isn’t   enforceable   against   the   Pesigans   on   April   2,   1982   because   it’s   a   penal   regulation   published   more   than   2   mos.   later   in   the   OG.   It   became   effective   only   fifteen   days   thereafter   as   provided   in   A2   of   the   CC   &   §11   of   the   Revised   Administrative   Code.   The   word   “laws”   in   article   2   includes   circulars   &   regulations   which   prescribe   penalties.   Publication   is   necessary   to   apprise   the   public   of   the   contents   of   the   regulations   &   make   the   said   penalties   binding   on   the   persons   affected   thereby.   Commonwealth   Act   No.   638   requires   that   all   Presidential   EOs   having   general   applicability   should   be   published   in   the   OG.   It   provides   that   “every   order   or   document   which   shall   prescribe   a   penalty   shall   be   deemed   to   have   general   applicability   and   legal   effect.   This   applies   to   a   violation   of   EO   No.   626-­‐A   because   its   confiscation   &   forfeiture   provision   or   sanction   makes   it   a   penal   statute.  It  results  that  they  have  cause  of  action  for   the   recovery   of   the   carabaos.   The   summary   confiscation   wasn’t   in   order.   The   recipients   of   the   carabaos   should   return   them   to   the   Pesigans.   However,   they   cannot   transport   the   carabaos   to   Batangas   because   they   are   now   bound   by   the   said   executive  order.  Neither  can  they  recover  damages.   Doctor   Miranda   &   Zenerosa   acted   in   good   faith   in   ordering   the   forfeiture   and   dispersal   of   the   carabaos.     Doctrine:   Publication   is   necessary   to   apprise   the   public   of   the   contents   of   the   regulations   &   make   the   said   penalties   binding   on   the   persons   affected   hereby.   Justice   &   fairness   dictate   that   the   public  

Rañeses  5     must  be  informed  of  that  provision  by  means  of  the   publication  on  the  Gazette.     Tañada  v.  Tuvera,  136  SCRA  27  (1985)     Facts:  Invoking  the  people’s  right  to  be  informed  on   matters   of   public   concern,   a   right   recognized   in   Section   6,   Article   IV   of   the   1973   constitution,   petitioners   seek   a   writ   of   mandamus   to   compel   respondent  public  officials  to  publish,  and/or  cause   the   publication   in   the   Official   Gazette,   of   various   presidential  decrees,  letters  of  instructions,  general   orders,   proclamations,   executive   orders,   letter   of   implementation   and   administrative   orders.   The   respondents  would  have  this  case  dismissed  on  the   ground  that  petitioners  have  no  legal  personality  to   bring   this   petition.   Petitioners   maintain   that   since   the   subject   of   the   petition   concerns   a   public   right   and   its   object   is   to   compel   public   duty,   they   need   not  show  any  specific  interest.  Respondents  further   contend  that  publication  in  the  OG  is  not  a  sine  qua   non   requirement   for   the   effectivity   of   laws   where   the   laws   themselves   provide   for   their   own   effectivity  dates.     Issue:  WON  publication  in  the  Official  Gazatte  is  an   indispensable  requirement  for  the  effectivity  of  the   PDs,   LOIs,   general   orders,   EOs,   etc.   where   laws   themselves  provide  for  their  own  effectivity  dates.       Held:  Yes.  It  is  the  people’s  right  to  be  informed  on   matters   of   public   concern   &   corollary   access   to   official   records,   &   to   documents   &   papers   pertaining   to   official   acts,   transactions,   or   decisions,   shall   be   afforded   the   citizens   subject   to   such   limitation  as  may  be  provided  by  law  (§6  AIV,  1973   Constitution).  Laws,  to  be  valid  &  enforceable,  must   be   published   in   the   OG   or   otherwise   effectively   promulgated.   The   fact   that   a   PD   or   LOI   states   its   date   of   effectivity   does   not   preclude   their   publication   in   the   OG   as   they   constitute   important   legislative   acts.   The   publication   of   presidential   issuances   “of   public   nature”   or   “of   general   applicability”   is   a   requirement   of   due   process.   Before  a  person  may  be  bound  by  law,  he  must  first   be  officially  informed  of  its  contents.  

Ex-­‐post  facto  law  

*Refer   to   page   3   for   the   relevant   constitutional   provision   (Art.   III,   Sec.   22)   and   page   1   for   the   definition  of  an  ex-­‐post  facto  law.       In   re:   Kay   Villegas   Kami,   Inc.,   35   SCRA   429   (1970)     Facts:   Kay   Villegas   Kami   Inc.   claiming   to   be   a   recognized   non-­‐stock,   non-­‐profit   corporation   contests   validity   of   RA   6132   Sec.   8   saying   it   violates   due   process   rights   of   association,   freedom   of   expression  and  is  an  ex  post  facto  law     Issues:   1. WON  it  violates  three  rights?   2. WON  it  is  an  ex  post  facto  law?     Held:     1. No.   It’s   set   up   to   prevent   prostitution   of   electoral   process   and   equal   protection   of   laws.   2. No.  Ex  post  facto  law  defined:   a. Makes   criminal   an   act   done   before   law   was   passed   and   punishes   act   innocent   when  done.   b. Aggravates   a   crime,   makes   it   greater   than  it  was   c. Inflicts   greater   punishment   than   the   law   prescribed  when  committed   d. Alters   legal   rules   of   evidence   and   authorizes   conviction   upon   less   or   different  tests   e. Assuming   to   regulate   civil   rights   and   remedies  only  in  effect  imposes  penalty   or  deprivation  of  right  which  when  done   was  lawful   f. Deprives   a   person   accused   of   a   crime   some   lawful   protection   to   which   he   has   become   entitled,   such   as   the   protection   of   a   former   conviction   of   acquittal   or   a   proclamation  of  amnesty.   Constitutional   inhibition   refers   only   to   criminal   laws.   Penalty   in   law   imposed   to   acts  committed  after  approval  of  law     People  v.  Villaraza,  81  SCRA  95  (1978)   Facts:   On   December   3,   1975   an   assistant   fiscal   charged   Caesar   Puerto   with   estafa   in   the   city   court  

Rañeses  6     of   CDO   for   having   issues   two   bouncing   checks.   Judge   Villaraza,   upon   confirming   that   the   accused   had   waived   his   right   to   the   second   stage   of   preliminary   investigation,   directed   the   case   be   elevated   to   the   CFI.   The   CFI   of   Misamis   Oriental,   returned  the  case  to  the  city  court.  Disagreeing  with   the  CFI’s  decision,  Judge  Villaraza  once  again  raised   it   to   the   CFIwith   the   belief   that   estafa   committed   by   the  accused  is  punishable  by    prision  mayor  medium   under  P.D.  No.  818,  which  took  effect  on  October  22,   1975  and  which  amended  Art.  315  of  the  RPC.       Issue:   WON   Puerto   is   punishable   with   prision   mayor  medium  under  P.D.  818  which  amended  Art.   315  of  the  RPC.       Held:   No.   The   penalty   of   prision   mayor   medium   imposed   by   P.D.   818   applies   only   to   swindling   committed   on   or   after   October   22,   1975.   The   increased   penalty   does   not   apply   to   Puerto   to   the   estafa   committed   on   October   16,   1974.   To   do   so   would  make  it  an  ex-­‐post  facto  law,  which  is  clearly   repugnant  to  Art.  21  and  22  of  the  RPC  and  Sec.  12,   Art.  IV  of  the  Constitution.       U.S.  v.  Diaz-­‐Conde,  42  Phil.  766  (1922)     Facts:   On   December   30,   1915,   Bartolome   Oliveros   and  Engracia  Lianco  accomplished  and  delivered  to   the  defendants  a  contract  (named  ‘Exhibit  B’)  which   stated   that   the   Oliveros   and   Lianco   had   borrowed   from   the   latter   a   sum   of   three   hundred   pesos   (Php   300),   and   by   virtue   of   the   terms   of   said   contract,   Oliveros  and  Lianco  obligated  themselves  to  pay  to   the   defendants   interest   at   the   rate   of   five   percent   (5%)  per  month,  payable  within  the  first  ten  days  of   each  and  every  month,  the  first  payment  to  be  made   on  the  January  10,  1916.      On   May   1,   1916,   Act   no.   2655   or   the   Usury   Law   came  into  effect.    The  law  stated  that  that  the  legal   rate   of   interest   for   the   loan   or   forbearance   of   any   money,   goods   or   credits,   […]   shall   be   12%   per   annum.   Any   amount   of   interest   paid   or   to   be   paid   in   excess   of   that   fixed   by   law   is   considered   usurious,   therefore  unlawful.    

 A  complaint  was  filed  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance   of   the   city   of   Manila   on   May   6,   1921,   charging   the   defendants   with   a   violation   of   the   Usury   Law   (Act   No.  2655).  Upon  said  complaint  they  were  arrested,   charged,   and   pleaded   not   guilty.   On   September   1,   1921,   the   case   was   finally   brought   on   for   trial.   At   the   end   of   the   trial,   with   consideration   to   the   evidences   cited   in   court,   Hon.   M.   V.   del   Rosario,   judge,   found   that   the   defendants   were   guilty   of   the   crime  charged  in  the  complaint  and  sentenced  each   of   them   to   pay   a   fine   of   P120   and,   if   they   cannot   meet   their   debt   obligations,   the   defendants   would   suffer   subsidiary   imprisonment   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   law.   From   that   sentence   each   of  the  defendants  made  an  appeal.     Issue:   WON   the   Usury   law   would   apply   to   the   appellants   considering   that   they   executed   the   contract  before  the  passage  of  said  law.       Held:   No.   The   court   held   that   the   acts   complained   of   by   the   defendants   did   not   constitute   a   crime   at   the   time   they   were   committed.     A   law   imposing   a   new   penalty,   liability   or   disability,   or   giving   a   new   right   of   action,   must   not   be   construed   as   having   a   retroactive   effect.     It   is   an   elementary   rule   of   contract   that   the   laws   in   force   at   the   time   of   the   contract   were   made   must   govern   its   interpretation   and   application.     Laws   must   be   construed   prospectively  and  not  retrospectively.    If  a  contract   is  legal  at  its  commencement,  it  cannot  be  rendered   illegal   by   any   subsequent   legislation.     To   make   it   applicable  in  the  present  case  would  make  it  an  ex-­‐ post  facto  law.      

Bill  of  attainder     *Refer   to   page   3   for   the   relevant   constitutional   provision   (Art.   III,   Sec.   22)   and   page   2   for   the   definition  of  a  bill  of  attainder.       People  v.  Ferrer  48  SCRA  382  (1972)     Facts:   Hon.   Judge   Simeon   Ferrer   is   the   Tarlac   trial   court   judge   that   declared   RA1700   or   the   Anti-­‐ Subversive   Act   of   1957   as   a   bill   of   attainder.   Thus,   dismissing   the   information   of   subversion   against   the   following:   1.)   Feliciano   Co   for   being   an   officer/leader   of   the   Communist   Party   of   the  

Rañeses  7     Philippines   (CPP)   aggravated   by   circumstances   of   contempt   and   insult   to   public   officers,   subversion   by   a   band   and   aid   of   armed   men   to   afford   impunity.   2.)   Nilo   Tayag   and   5   others,   for   being   members/leaders   of   the   NPA,   inciting,   instigating   people   to   unite   and   overthrow   the   Philippine   Government.   Attended   by   Aggravating   Circumstances   of   Aid   or   Armed   Men,   Craft,   and   Fraud.   The   trial   court   is   of   opinion   that   1.)   The   Congress   usurped   the   powers   of   the   judge   2.)   Assumed   judicial   magistracy   by   pronouncing   the   guilt  of  the  CPP  without  any  forms  of  safeguard  of  a   judicial   trial.   3.)   It   created   a   presumption   of   organizational   guilt   by   being   members   of   the   CPP   regardless  of  voluntariness.     The   Anti-­‐Subversive   Act   of   1957   was   approved   on   June   20   1957.   It   is   an   act   to   outlaw   the   CPP   and   similar  associations  penalizing  membership  therein,   and   for   other   purposes.   It   defined   the   Communist   Party   being   although   a   political   party   is   in   fact   an   organized   conspiracy   to   overthrow   the   Government,  not  only  by  force  and  violence  but  also   by   deceit,   subversion   and   other   illegal   means.   It   declares  that  the  CPP  is  a  clear  and  present  danger   to  the  security  of  the  Philippines.  Section  4  provided   that  affiliation  with  full  knowledge  of  the  illegal  acts   of   the   CPP   is   punishable.   Section   5   states   that   due   investigation   by   a   designated   prosecutor   by   the   Secretary   of   Justice   be   made   prior   to   filing   of   information  in  court.  Section  6  provides  for  penalty   for  furnishing  false  evidence.  Section  7  provides  for   2   witnesses   in   open   court   for   acts   penalized   by   prision   mayor   to   death.   Section   8   allows   the   renunciation   of   membership   to   the   CPP   through   writing   under   oath.   Section   9   declares   the   constitutionality   of   the   statute   and   its   valid   exercise   under  freedom  if  thought,  assembly  and  association.     Issues:   1. WON   or   not   RA   1700   is   a   bill   of   attainder/   ex  post  facto  law.   2. WON   RA   1700   violates   freedom   of   expression.     Held:  

1. No.   In   the   case   at   bar,   the   statute   simply   declares  the  CPP  as  an  organized  conspiracy   for   the   overthrow   of   the   Government   for   purposes  of  example  of  Sec.  4  of  the  Act.  The   Act   applies   not   only   to   the   CPP   but   also   to   other   organizations   having   the   same   purpose   and   their   successors.   The   Act’s   focus  is  on  the  conduct  not  person.     The   statute   is   PROSPECTIVE   in   nature.   Sec.   44   prohibits   acts   committed   after   approval   of   the   act.   The   members   of   the   subversive   organizations   before   the   passing   of   this   Act   are   given   an   opportunity   to   escape   liability   by   renouncing   membership   in   accordance   with  Sec.  8.     2. Yes,   but   it   is   justified.   The   declaration   of   that   the   CPP   is   an   organized   conspiracy   to   overthrow   the   Philippine   Government   should   not   be   the   basis   of   guilt.   This   declaration  is  only  a  basis  of  Section  4  of  the   Act.   The   existence   of   substantive   evil   justifies   the   limitation   to   the   exercise   of   “Freedom  of  Expression  and  Association”  in   this  matter.      

D. Characteristics  of  Criminal  Law       General:     Const.  (1987),  Art.  VI,  sec.  1   The   legislative   power   shall   be   vested   in   the   Congress  of  the  Philippines  which  shall  consist  of  a   Senate   and   a   House   of   Representatives,   except   to   the   extent   reserved   to   the   people   by   the   provision   on  initiative  and  referendum.  

 

 

Civil  Code,  Art.  14   Penal  laws  and  those  of  public  security  and  safety   shall  be  obligatory  upon  all  who  live  or  sojourn  in   the  Philippine  territory,  subject  to  the  principles  of   public  international  law  and  to  treaty  stipulations.   (8a)  

 

 

Rañeses  8     Agreement  between  the  Government  of  the  Republic   of  the  Philippines  and  the  Government  of  the  United   States   of   America   Regarding   the   Treatment   of   United   States   Armed   Forces   Visiting   the   Philippines,   10   February  1998  (Visiting  Forces  Agreement)     Article  V   Criminal  Jurisdiction       1.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  article:       (a)   Philippine   authorities   shall   have   jurisdiction   over   United   States   personnel   with   respect   to   offenses   committed   within   the   Philippines   and   punishable   under   the  law  of  the  Philippines.       (b)  United  States  military  authorities  shall  have  the  right   to   exercise   within   the   Philippines   all   criminal   and   disciplinary   jurisdiction   conferred   on   them   by   the   military   law   of   the   United   States   over   United   States   personnel  in  the  Philippines.       2.   (a)   Philippine   authorities   exercise   exclusive   jurisdiction  over  United  States  personnel  with  respect  to   offenses,   including   offenses   relating   to   the   security   of   the   Philippines,  punishable  under  the  laws  of  the  Philippines,   but  not  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States.       (b)   United   States   authorities   exercise   exclusive   jurisdiction  over  United  States  personnel  with  respect  to   offenses,   including   offenses   relating   to   the   security   of   the   United   States,   punishable   under   the   laws   of   the   United   States,  but  not  under  the  laws  of  the  Philippines.       (c)   For   the   purposes   of   this   paragraph   and   paragraph   3   of  this  article,  an  offense  relating  to  security  means:       (1)  treason;       (2)  sabotage,  espionage  or  violation  of  any  law  relating  to   national  defense.       3.   In   cases   where   the   right   to   exercise   jurisdiction   is   concurrent,  the  following  rules  shall  apply:       (a)  Philippine  authorities  shall  have  the  primary  right  to   exercise   jurisdiction   over   all   offenses   committed   by   United   States   personnel,   except   in   cases   provided   for   in   paragraphs  l  (b),  2  (b),  and  3  (b)  of  this  Article.       (b)   United   States   military   authorities   shall   have   the   primary   right   to   exercise   jurisdiction   over   United   States  

personnel   subject   to   the   military   law   of   the   United   States   in  relation  to:       (1)   offenses   solely   against   the   property   or   security   of   the   United   States   or   offenses   solely   against   the   property   or   person  of  United  States  personnel;  and       (2)   offenses   arising   out   of   any   act   or   omission   done   in   performance  of  official  duty.       (c)  The  authorities  of  either  government  may  request  the   authorities   of   the   other   government   to   waive   their   primary  right  to  exercise  jurisdiction  in  a  particular  case.       (d)   Recognizing   the   responsibility   of   the   United   States   military   authorities   to   maintain   good   order   and   discipline  among  their  forces,  Philippine  authorities  will,   upon   request   by   the   United   States,   waive   their   primary   right  to  exercise  jurisdiction  except  in  cases  of  particular   importance   to   the   Philippines.   If   the   Government   of   the   Philippines   determines   that   the   case   is   of   particular   importance,   it   shall   communicate   such   determination   to   the   United   States   authorities   within   twenty   (20)   days   after  the  Philippine  authorities  receive  the  United  States   request.       (e)   When   the   United   States   military   commander   determines  that  an  offense  charged  by  authorities  of  the   Philippines  against  United  States  personnel  arises  out  of   an   act   or   omission   done   in   the   performance   of   official   duty,  the  commander  will  issue  a  certificate  setting  forth   such   determination.   This   certificate   will   be   transmitted   to  the  appropriate  authorities  of  the  Philippines  and  will   constitute  sufficient  proof  of  performance  of  official  duty   for   the   purposes   of   paragraph   3(b)(2)   of   this   article.   In   those   cases   where   the   Government   of   the   Philippines   believes   the   circumstances   of   the   case   require   a   review   of   the   duty   certificate,   United   States   military   authorities   and   Philippine   authorities   shall   consult   immediately.   Philippine   authorities   at   the   highest   levels   may   also   present   any   information   bearing   on   its   validity.   United   States   military   authorities   shall   take   full   account   of   the   Philippine   position.   Where   appropriate,   United   States   military  authorities  will  take  disciplinary  or  other  action   against   offenders   in   official   duty   cases,   and   notify   the   Government  of  the  Philippines  of  the  actions  taken.       (f)   If   the   government   having   the   primary   right   does   not   exercise  jurisdiction,  it  shall  notify  the  authorities  of  the   other  government  as  soon  as  possible.      

Rañeses  9     (g)   The   authorities   of   the   Philippines   and   the   United   States   shall   notify   each   other   of   the   disposition   of   all   cases  in  which  both  the  authorities  of  the  Philippines  and   the  United  States  have  the  right  to  exercise  jurisdiction.       4.   Within   the   scope   of   their   legal   competence,   the   authorities  of  the  Philippines  and  the  United  States  shall   assist  each  other  in  the  arrest  of  United  States  personnel   in   the   Philippines   and   in   handing   them   over   to   authorities  who  are  to  exercise  jurisdiction  in  accordance   with  the  provisions  of  this  article.       5.  United  States  military  authorities  shall  promptly  notify   Philippine  authorities  of  the  arrest  or  detention  of  United   States   personnel   who   are   subject   to   Philippine   primary   or   exclusive   jurisdiction.   Philippine   authorities   shall   promptly   notify   United   States   military   authorities   of   the   arrest  or  detention  of  any  United  States  personnel.       6.  The  custody  of  any  United  States  personnel  over  whom   the   Philippines   is   to   exercise   jurisdiction   shall   immediately   reside   with   United   States   military   authorities,   if   they   so   request,   from   the   commission   of   the   offense   until   completion   of   all   judicial   proceedings.   United   States   military   authorities   shall,   upon   formal   notification   by   the   Philippine   authorities   and   without   delay,  make  such  personnel  available  to  those  authorities   in   time   for   any   investigative   or   judicial   proceedings   relating   to   the   offense   with   which   the   person   has   been   charged.   In   extraordinary   cases,   the   Philippine   Government   shall   present   its   position   to   the   United   States   Government   regarding   custody,   which   the   United   States   Government   shall   take   into   full   account.   In   the   event   Philippine   judicial   proceedings   are   not   completed   within  one  year,  the  United  States  shall  be  relieved  of  any   obligations   under   this   paragraph.   The   one   year   period   will   not   include   the   time   necessary   to   appeal.   Also,   the   one   year   period   will   not   include   any   time   during   which   scheduled   trial   procedures   are   delayed   because   United   States   authorities,   after   timely   notification   by   Philippine   authorities   to   arrange   for   the   presence   of   the   accused,   fail  to  do  so.       7.  Within  the  scope  of  their  legal  authority,  United  States   and   Philippine   authorities   shall   assist   each   other   in   the   carrying  out  of  all  necessary  investigations  into  offenses   and   shall   cooperate   in   providing   for   the   attendance   of   witnesses   and   in   the   collection   and   production   of   evidence,   including   seizure   and,   in   proper   cases,   the   delivery  of  objects  connected  with  an  offense.      

8.   When   United   States   personnel   have   been   tried   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   this   article   and   have   been   acquitted   or   have   been   convicted   and   are   serving,   or  have  served  their  sentence,  or  have  had  their  sentence   remitted  or  suspended,  or  have  been  pardoned,  they  may   not  be  tried  again  for  the  same  offense  in  the  Philippines.   Nothing   in   this   paragraph,   however,   shall   prevent   United   States   military   authorities   from   trying   United   States   personnel   for   any   violation   of   rules   of   discipline   arising   from  the  act  or  omission  which  constituted  an  offense  for   which  they  were  tried  by  Philippine  authorities.       9.   When   United   States   personnel   are   detained,   taken   into   custody,   or   prosecuted   by   Philippine   authorities,   they   shall   be   accorded   all   procedural   safeguards   established   by   the   law   of   the   Philippines.   At   the   minimum,   United   States  personnel  shall  be  entitled:       (a)  To  a  prompt  and  speedy  trial;       (b)   To   be   informed   in   advance   of   trial   of   the   specific   charge   or   charges   made   against   them   and   to   have   reasonable  time  to  prepare  a  defense;       (c)  To  be  confronted  with  witnesses  against  them  and  to   cross  examine  such  witnesses;       (d)   To   present   evidence   in   their   defense   and   to   have   compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses;       (e)  To  have  free  and  assisted  legal  representation  of  their   own   choice   on   the   same   basis   as   nationals   of   the   Philippines;       (f)  To  have  the  services  of  a  competent  interpreter;       (g)   To   communicate   promptly   with   and   to   be   visited   regularly   by   United   States   authorities,   and   to   have   such   authorities   present   at   all   judicial   proceedings.   These   proceedings   shall   be   public   unless   the   court,   in   accordance   with   Philippine   law,   excludes   persons   who   have  no  role  in  the  proceedings.       10.   The   confinement   or   detention   by   Philippine   authorities   of   United   States   personnel   shall   be   carried   out  in  facilities  agreed  on  by  appropriate  Philippine  and   United   States   authorities.   United   States   personnel   serving   sentences   in   the   Philippines   shall   have   the   right   to  visits  and  material  assistance.       11.  United  States  personnel  shall  be  subject  to  trial  only   in  Philippine  courts  of  ordinary  jurisdiction,  and  shall  not  

Rañeses  10     be   subject   to   the   jurisdiction   of   Philippine   military   or   religious  courts.     Republic  Act  no.  75     An   act   to   penalize   acts   which   would   impair   the   proper  observance  by  the  republic  and  inhabitants  of   the   Philippines   of   the   immunities,   right,   and   privileges   of   duly   accredited   foreign   diplomatic   and   consular  agents  in  the  Philippines     Section  1.  Any  person  who  shall  falsely  assume  and  take   upon   himself   to   act   as   a   diplomatic,   consular,   or   any   other  official  of  a  foreign  government  duly  accredited  as   such   to   the   Government   of   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   with   intent   to   defraud   such   foreign   government  or  the  Government  of  the  Philippines,  or  any   person,   or   in   such   pretended   character   shall   demand   or   obtain,   or   attempt   to   obtain   from   person   or   from   said   foreign   government   or   the   Government   of   the   Philippines,   or   from   any   officer   thereof,   any   money,   paper,   document,   or   other   thing,   of   value,   shall   be   fined   not   more   than   five   thousand   pesos,   or   shall   be   imprisoned   for   not   more   than   five   years,   or   both,   in   addition  to  the  penalties  that  may  be  imposed  under  the   Revised  Penal  Code.     Section   2.   Any   person,   other   than   a   diplomatic   or   consular  officer  or  attaché,  who  shall  act  in  the  Republic   of   the   Philippines   as   an   agent   of   a   foreign   government   without   prior   notification   to,   and   registration   with,   the   Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  shall  be  fined  not  more  than   five   thousand   pesos,   or   imprisoned   not   more   than   five   years,   or   both,   aside   from   other   penalties   that   may   be   imposed  by  law.     Section   3.   Any   person,   who   with   intent   to   deceive   or   mislead,   within   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Republic,   wear   any   naval,   military,   police,   or   other   official   uniform,   decoration,   or   regalia   of   any   foreign   State,   nation   or   government  with  which  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  is   at  peace,  or  any  uniform,  decoration  or  regalia  so  nearly   resembling   the   same   as   to   be   calculated   to   deceive,   unless  such  wearing  thereof  be  authorized  by  such  State,   nation,   or   government,   shall   upon   conviction,   be   punished   by   a   fine   not   exceeding   two   hundred   pesos   or   imprisonment  not  exceeding  six  months,  or  by  both  such   fine  and  imprisonment.1awphil-­‐itc-­‐alf     Section  4.  Any  writ  or  process  sued  out  or  prosecuted  by   any   person   in   any   court   of   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines,   or   by   any   judge   or   justice,   whereby   the  

person   of   any   ambassador   or   public   minister   of   any   foreign   State,   authorized   and   received   as   such   by   the   President,   or   any   domestic   or   domestic   servant   of   any   such   ambassador   or   minister   is   arrested   or   imprisoned,   or   his   goods   or   chattels   are   distrained,   seized,   or   attached,   shall   be   deemed   void,   and   every   person   by   whom   the   same   is   obtained   or   prosecuted,   whether   as   party   or   as   attorney,   and   every   officer   concerned   in   executing   it,   shall   upon   conviction,   be   punished   by   imprisonment  for  not  more  than  three  years  and  a  fine  of   not   exceeding   two   hundred   pesos   in   the   discretion   of   the   court.     Section  5.  The  provisions  of  section  four  hereof  shall  not   apply   to   any   case   where   the   person   against   whom   the   process  is  issued  is  a  citizen  or  inhabitant  of  the  Republic   of   the   Philippines,   in   the   service   of   an   ambassador   or   a   public   minister,   and   the   process   is   founded   upon   a   debt   contracted   before   he   entered   upon   such   service;   nor   shall   the   said   section   apply   to   any   case   where   the   person   against   whom   the   process   is   issued   is   a   domestic   servant   of   an   ambassador   or   a   public   minister,   unless   the   name   of   the   servant   has,   before   the   issuing   thereof,   been   registered   in   the   Department   of   Foreign   Affairs,   and   transmitted   by   the   Secretary   of   Foreign   Affairs   to   the   Chief   of   Police   of   the   City   of   Manila,   who   shall   upon   receipt  thereof  post  the  same  in  some  public  place  in  his   office.  All  persons  shall  have  resort  to  the  list  of  names  so   posted   in   the   office   of   the   Chief   of   Police,   and   take   copies   without  fee.     Section   6.   Any   person   who   assaults,   strikes,   wounds,   imprisons   or   in   any   other   manner   offers   violence   to   the   person   of   an   ambassador   or   a   public   minister,   in   violation   of   the   law   of   nations,   shall   be   imprisoned   not   more   than   three   years,   and   fined   not   exceeding   two   hundred  pesos,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  in  addition   to  the  penalties  that  may  be  imposed  under  the  Revised   Penal  Code.     Section   7.   The   provisions   of   this   Act   shall   be   applicable   only   in   case   where   the   country   of   the   diplomatic   or   consular   representative   adversely   affected   has   provided   for   similar   protection   to   duly   accredited   diplomatic   or   consular   representatives   of   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   by   prescribing   like   or   similar   penalties   for   like  or  similar  offenses  herein  contained.itc-­‐alf     Section  8.  This  Act  shall  take  effect  upon  its  approval.     Approved:  October  21,  1946    

Rañeses  11     Republic  Act  no.  7055       An   act   strengthening   civilian   supremacy   over   the   military   by   returning   to   the   civil   courts   the   jurisdiction   over   certain   offenses   involving   members   of  the  armed  forces  of  the  Philippines,  other  persons   subject   to   military   law,   and   the   members   of   the   Philippine   national   office,   repealing   for   the   purpose   certain  presidential  decrees       Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives   of  the  Philippines  in  Congress  assembled:              Section   1.   Members   of   the   Armed   forces   of   the   Philippines   and   other   persons   subject   to   military   law,   including   members   of   the   Citizens   Armed   Forces   Geographical   Units,   who   commit   crimes   or   offenses   penalized   under   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   other   special   penal   laws,   or   local   government   ordinances,   regardless,   of   whether   or   not   civilians   are   co-­‐accused,   victims,   or   offended   parties   which   may   be   natural   or   juridical   persons,   shall   be   tried   by   the   proper   civil   court,   except   when   the   offense,   as   determined   before   arraignment   by   the   civil   court,   is   service-­‐connected,   in   which   case   the   offense  shall  be  tried  by  court-­‐martial:  Provided,  That  the   President   of   the   Philippines   may,   in   the   interest   of   justice,   order   or   direct   at   any   time   before   arraignment   that   any   such   crimes   or   offenses   be   tried   by   the   proper   civil  courts.     As   used   in   this   Section,   service-­‐connected   crimes   or   offenses  shall  be  limited  to  those  defined  in  Articles  54  to   70,   Articles   70   to   92,   and   Articles   95   to   97   of   Commonwealth  Act  No,  408,  as  amended.     In   imposing   the   penalty   for   such   crimes   or   offenses,   the   court-­‐martial   may   take   into   consideration   the   penalty   prescribed   therefor   in   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   other   special  penal  laws,  or  local  government  ordinances.     Sec.   2.   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   Section   1   hereof,   all   cases   filed   or   pending   for   filing   with   court-­‐martial   or   other  similar  bodies,  except  those  where  the  accused  had   already   been   arraigned,   shall,   within   thirty   (30)   days   following  the  effectivity  of  this  Act,  be  transferred  to  the   proper  civil  courts:  Provided,  That  the  Chief  of  the  Armed   Forces   of   the   Philippines   shall,   upon   petition   before   commencement   of   trial   and   with   written   consent   of   the   accused,   order   the   transfer   of   such   excepted   case   or   cases  to  the  proper  civil  courts  for  trial  and  resolution.    

Sec.  3.  Presidential  Decree  Nos.  1822,  1822-­‐A,  1850  and   1952,   and   all   acts,   general   orders,   executive   orders,   and   other   presidential   issuances,   rules   and   regulations   inconsistent   with   this   Act   are   hereby   repealed   or   amended  accordingly.     Sec.   4.   This   Act   shall   take   effect   fifteen   (15)   days   following   its   publication   in   the   Official   Gazette   orin   at   least  two  (2)  newspapers  of  general  circulation.     Presidential  Decree  no.  1850     Presidential  decree  no.  1850  -­‐  providing  for  the  trial   by   courts-­‐martial   of   members   of   the   integrated   national   police   and   further   defining   the   jurisdiction   of   courts-­‐martial   over   members   of   the   armed   forces   of  the  Philippines       WHEREAS,   under   Section   12,   Article   XV   of   the   Constitution,   the   State   shall   establish   and   maintain   an   integrated   national   police   force   whose   organization,   administration,  and  operation  shall  be  provided  by  law;       WHEREAS,   under   and   pursuant   to   existing   laws,   the   various   municipal/city   police   and   fire   departments   and   jails   have   been   integrated   into   law-­‐enforcement   units   under  the  operational  control  and  organization  set-­‐up  of   the  Philippine  Constabulary;     WHEREAS,  in  the  interest  of  discipline  and  public  service,   it   is   desirable   that   members   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   be   subject   to   trial   by   courts-­‐martial   under   Commonwealth   Act   No.   408,   as   amended,   otherwise   known   as   the   "Article   of   War   for   the   Armed   Forces   of   the   Philippines,"   for   all   crimes   of   offenses   which   are   heretofore  cognizable  by  the  civil  courts;     WHEREAS,  as  a  complementary  measure,  there  is  a  need   to   clarify   existing   provisions   of   law   relating   to   jurisdiction   of   courts-­‐martial   and   the   Tanodbayan/Sandiganbayan   and   the   regular   civil   courts   over   crimes   and   offenses   committed   by   members   of   the   Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines.     NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  FERDINAND  E,  MARCOS,  President   of   the   Philippines,   by   virtue   of   the   powers   vested   in   me   by  the  Constitution,  do  hereby  order  and  decree:         Section   1.   Court-­‐Martial   Jurisdiction   over   Integrated   National   Police   and   Members   of   the   Armed   Forces.   —   Any  provision  of  law  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding  —   (a)   uniformed   members   of   the   Integrated   National   Police  

Rañeses  12     who  commit  any  crime  of  offense  cognizable  by  the  civil   courts   shall   henceforth   be   exclusively   tried   by   courts-­‐ martial   pursuant   to   and   in   accordance   with   Commonwealth   Act   No.   408,   as   amended,   otherwise   known   as   the   Articles   of   War;   (b)   all   persons   subject   to   military   law   under   Article   2   of   the   aforecited   Articles   of   War   who   commit   any   crime   or   offense   shall   be   exclusively   tried   by   courts-­‐martial   or   their   case   disposed   of  under  the  said  Articles  of  War;  Provided,  that,  in  either   of   the   aforementioned   situations,   the   case   shall   be   disposed   of   or   tried   by   the   proper   civil   or   judicial   authorities   when   court-­‐martial   jurisdiction   over   the   offense   has   prescribed   under   Article   38   of   Commonwealth   Act   Numbered   408,   as   amended,   or   court-­‐martial  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  accused   military   or   Integrated   National   Police   personnel   can   no   longer  be  exercised  by  virtue  of  their  separation  from  the   active   service   without   jurisdiction   having   duly   attached   before  hand  unless  otherwise  provided  by  law.         As   used   herein,   the   term   uniformed   members   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   shall   refer   to   police   officers,   policemen,  firemen  and  jail  guards.     Section   2.   Segregation   of   Criminal   Cases   of   Armed   Forces   and  Integrated  National  Police  from  Civilian  Co-­‐accused.   —  In  cases  where  there  are  two  or  more  accused  one  or   some   of   whom   is   or   are   civilian(s),   the   case   against   the   latter  shall  be  segregated  from  accused  Armed  Forces  or   Integrated   National   Police   member,   and   filed   with   the   appropriate   civil   court   for   trial   in   accordance   with   existing   laws;   Provided,   however,   that   should   such   civilian   accused   waive   in   writing   civil   court   jurisdiction   and   submit   himself   to   court-­‐martial   jurisdiction,   then  the   whole   case   involving   members   of   the   Armed   Forces   or   the   Integrated   National   Police   as   well   as   the   civilian(s)   shall  be  referred  for  trial  to  a  court-­‐martial.       Section   3.   Appointing   Authorities.   —   (a)   Where   uniformed   member(s)   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   are  charged.  —  The  President  of  the  Philippines  and  the   Chief   of   Constabulary/Director   General,   Integrated   National   Police   are   hereby   empowered   to   appoint   general,  special  and  summary  courts-­‐martial  for  the  trial   of  uniformed  members  of  the  Integrated  National  Police.   The   Constabulary   Regional   Commanders/Directors,   Integrated   National   Police   may   appoint   special   and   summary   courts-­‐martial,   and   when   empowered   by   the   President,  they  may  also  appoint  general  courts-­‐martial.   Other   subordinate   field   commanders   of   the   Philippine   Constabulary/Integrated   National   Police   may   appoint  

summary   courts-­‐martial   when   empowered   by   the   President.     (b)   Where   military   personnel   and   Integrated   National   Police   members   are   commonly   charged.   —   The   court-­‐ martial   shall   be   appointed   by   the   appointing   authorities   specified  in  Articles  8,  9,  10  and  11  of  Commonwealth  Act   No.  408,  as  amended.     Section   4.   Composition   of   Courts-­‐Martial.   —   Membership,   whether   military   personnel   or   Integrated   National   Police   members,   in   a   general   or   special   court-­‐ martial   for   the   trial   of   a   member   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   shall   be   in   a   ratio   as   determined   by   the   appointing   authority;   Provided,   however,   that   the   number  of  Integrated  National  Police  personnel  detailed   shall  not  be  less  than  one-­‐third  of  the  total  membership   of  the  court.       Section  5.  Administrative  Action.  —  Court-­‐martial  action   against   uniformed   personnel   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   as   herein   provided   shall   not   preclude   the   taking   of   administrative   action   against   said   personnel   as   may   be   warranted  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  existing  law.     Section   6.   Transitory   Provisions.   —   All   cases   pending   before   the   civil   courts   against   military   personnel   in   the   active   service   Integrated   National   Forces   of   the   Philippines   or   against   Integrated   National   Police   personnel   where,   on   the   effective   date   of   this   Decree,   the   accused   have   been   arraigned,   shall   continue   to   be   tried   and   decided   by   said   civil   courts.   All   other   cases   against   such   personnel   shall   be   tried   by   courts-­‐martial   or   disposed  of  pursuant  to  this  Decree.         Section   7.   Promulgation   of   Rules.   —   The   Chief   of   Staff,   AFP,   shall   formulate   rules   and   regulations   necessary   to   carry   out   the   provisions   of   this   Decree,   which   shall,   upon   recommendation   of   the   Minister   of   National   Defense,   be   subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President.     Section  8.  Appropriations.  —  The  amount  of  two  million   pesos   (P2,000,000.00)   is   hereby   authorized   to   be   appropriated   out   of   the   funds   in   the   National   Treasury   not   otherwise   appropriated   to   carry   out   the   purpose   of   this   Decree   and,   thereafter,   such   amounts   as   may   be   necessary  for  this  purpose  shall  be  included  in  the  annual   appropriation  of  the  Integrated  National  Police.     Section   9.   Repealing   Clause.   —   All   laws,   rules   and   regulations,  or  portions  thereof,  which  are  contrary  to,  or  

Rañeses  13     inconsistent   with,   the   provisions   of   this   Decree,   are   hereby  repealed  or  modified  accordingly.     Section   10.   Effectivity.   —   This   Decree   shall   take   effect   immediately.     Done   in   the   City   of   Manila,   this   4th   day   of   October,   the   year  of  Our  Lord,  nineteen  hundred  and  eighty-­‐two.  

  U.S.  v.  Sweet,  1  Phil.  18  (1901)     Facts:   Sweet   was   employed   by   the   United   States   military   who   committed   an   offense   against   a   POW.   His   case   is   filed   with   the   CFI,   who   is   given   original   jurisdiction  in  all  criminal  cases  for  which  a  penalty   of   more   than   6   months   is   imposed.   He   is   now   contending   that   the   courts   are   without   jurisdiction   because  he  was  “acting  in  the  line  of  duty.”     Issues:   1. WON   this   case   is   within   the   jurisdiction   of   the  CFI.     2. WON   an   assault   committed   by   a   soldier   or   military  employee  upon  a  prisoner  of  war  is   not  an  offence  under  the  penal  code.   3. Assuming   that   it   is   an   offence   under   the   penal   code,   WON   the   military   character   sustained   by   the   person   charged   with   the   offence   at   the   time   of   its   commission   exempts   him   from   the   ordinary   jurisdiction   of  the  civil  tribunals.       Held:     1. Yes.   By   Act   No.   136   of   the   US-­‐Phil   Commission,   the   CFIs   are   given   original   jurisdiction   in   all   criminal   cases   in   which   a   penalty   more   than   6   months   imprisonment   or  a  fine  greater  than  $100  may  be  imposed.   Furthermore,   CFIs   have   jurisdiction   to   try   offenders   charged   with   violation   of   the   Penal   Code   within   their   territorial   limits,   regardless   of   the   military   character   of   the   accused.   The   defendant   and   his   acts   are   within   the   jurisdiction   of   the   CFI   because   he   failed  to  prove  that  he  was  indeed  acting  in   the  line  of  duty.   2. Yes.   Though   assault   by   military   officer   against   a   POW   isn’t   in   the   RPC,   physical  

assault   charges   may   be   pressed   under   the   RPC.   3. No.  The  application  of  the  general  principle   that   the   jurisdiction   of   the   civil   tribunals   is   unaffected   by   the   military   or   other   special   character  brought  before  them  for  trial  (R.A.   No.   7055).   Appellant   claims   that   the   act   was   service   connected.   If   this   were   true,   it   may   be   used   as   a   defense   but   this   cannot   affect   the   right   of   the   Civil   Court   to   takes   jurisdiction  of  the  case.”     Doctrine:   Jurisdiction   of   the   civil   courts   is   not   affected  by  the  military  character  of  the  accused.       Reyes:     1. Civil   courts   have   concurrent   jurisdiction   with  general  courts-­‐martial  over  soldiers   of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines.     2. The   RPC   or   other   penal   laws   is   not   applicable  when  the  military  court  takes   cognizance   of   the   case.   When   the   military   court  takes  cognizance  of  the  case  involving   a   person   subject   to   military   law,   the   Articles   of  War  apply.     3.  The   prosecution   of   an   accused   before   a   court-­‐martial   is   a   bar   to   another   prosecution   of   the   accused   for   the   same   offense.     4. Offenders   of   war   crimes   are   triable   by   military  courts.     5. There   are   exceptions   to   the   general   application   of   Criminal   Law   in   the   Philippines.     • The  opening  sentence  of  Art.  2  of  the   RPC   says   that   the   provisions   of   this   Code   shall   be   enforced   within   the   Philippine   Archipelago,   “except   as   provided   in   the   treaties   and   laws   or   preferential  application.”  (i.e.  Treaty   –  VFA)   • Art.   14   of   the   new   Civil   Code   provides   that   penal   laws   and   those   of   public   safety   shall   be   obligatory   upon   all   who   live   or   sojourn   in   Philippine   territory,   subject   to   the   principles  of  public  international  law  

Rañeses  14     and   to   treaty   stipulations.   (i.e.   Law   of   preferential   application   –   R.A.   no.   75,   which   favors   diplomatic   representatives   and   their   servants;   Principle   of   public   international   law   –   immunity   for   (1)   sovereigns   and   other   chiefs   of   state,   (2)   ambassadors,   ministers   plenipotentiary,   ministers   resident   and  charges  d’affaires.)       Raquiza  v.  Bradford,  75  Phil.  50  (1945)     Facts:   By   virtue   of   the   proclamation   issued   by   General   of   the   Army   MacArthur,   petitioners   were   arrested   by   the   306   CIC   and   detained   under   security   commitment   order   No   385.   The   petitioners   Raquiza,   Tee   Han   Kee,   and   Infante   were   charged   with   Espionage   activity   with   the   Japanese   &   active   collaboration  with  the  enemy  respectively.  Power  of   Commander  of  the  US  Army  to  proclaim  by  virtue  of   military   necessity   is   not   questioned.   He   based   proclamation   on   reasons   that   apprehended   have   violated   due   allegiance   to   US   and   it   is   a   military   necessity.   Petitioners   move   for   writ   of   Habeas   Corpus.     Issues:   1. WON   the   war   terminated   within   the   meaning   of   that   part   in   the   proclamation?   [Note:   The   power   of   commander   in   chief   of   the   US   Army   to   issue   a   proclamation   providing  for  military  measures  to  be  taken   upon   the   apprehension   of   Filipino   citizens   who   voluntarily   have   given   aid,   comfort   and   sustenance   to   the   enemy,   cannot   be   seriously  questioned.]   2. WON   this   court   has   jurisdiction   or   legal   power   to   afford   relief   to   the   petitioners   in   the  sad  and  sorry  plight  to  which  they  have   been  and  are  being  subjected?     Held:     1. No.   “The   war,   in   the   legal   sense,   continues   until,   and   terminated   at   the   same   time   of,   some   formal   proclamation   of   peace   by   an   authority  competent  to  proclaim  it.  It  is  the   province   of   the   political   dept,   &   not   the  

judicial  dept,  to  determine  if  war  has  ended.   Fact   that   delivery   of   certain   persons   under   custody   of   the   US   Army   has   already   begun   doesn’t   mean   that   the   war   has,   in   the   legal   sense,   already   terminated,   w/c   clearly   it   hasn’t.   Delivery   w/in   power   of   military   authorities   to   make   even   before   was   terminated.   2. No.   Civil   Courts   shouldn’t   interfere.   A   foreign  army  permitted  to  march  through  a   friendly   country   or   to   be   stationed   in   it,   is   exempt   from   civil   &   criminal   jurisdiction   of   the   place.   Grant   of   free   passage   implies   a   waiver  of  all  jurisdiction  over  troops  during   passage   (let   them   exercise   their   own   discipline).   Any   attempt   by   our   civil   Courts   to   exercise   jurisdiction   over   US   troops   would   be   a   violation   of   our   country’s   faith.   On   the   other   hand,   petitioners   may   have   recourse  to  proper  military  authorities.     Liang  v.  People,  323  SCRA  692  (2000)     Facts:  Petitioner  is  an  economist  for  ADB  who  was   charged   by   the   Metropolitan   TC   of   Mandaluyong   City   for   allegedly   uttering   defamatory   words   against  her  fellow  worker  w/  2  counts  of  grave  oral   defamation.     MeTC   judge   then   received   an   office   of   protocol   from   the   Department   of   Foreign   Affairs,   stating  that  petitioner  is  covered  by  immunity  from   legal   process   under   section   45   of   the   agreement   bet   ADB   &   the   gov’t.   MeTC   judge,   w/o   notice,   dismissed   the   two   criminal   cases.     Prosecution   filed   writ   of   mandamus   &   certiorari   and   ordered   the   MeTC   to   enforce  the  warrant  of  arrest.     Issue:   WON   the   petitioner   is   covered   by   immunity   under   the   agreement   and   that   no   preliminary   investigation   was   held   before   the   criminal   cases   were  filed  in  court.       Held:   No.   He   is   not   covered   by   immunity   because   the   commission   of   a   crime   is   part   of   the   performance   of   official   duty.   Courts   cannot   blindly   adhere  and  take  on  its  face  the  communication  from   the   DFA   that   a   certain   person   is   covered   by   immunity.  That  a  person  is  covered  by  immunity  is  

Rañeses  15     preliminary.   Due   process   is   right   of   the   accused   as   much  as  the  prosecution.       Slandering   a   person   is   not   covered   by   the   agreement   because   our   laws   do   not   allow   the   commission   of   a   crime   such   as   defamation   in   the   name   of   official   duty.   Under   Vienna   convention   on   Diplomatic   Relations,   commission   of   a   crime   is   not   part  of  official  duty.     On   the   contention   that   there   was   no   preliminary   investigation   conducted,   suffice   it   to   say   that   preliminary   investigation   isn’t   a   matter   of   right   in   cases  cognizable  by  the  MeTC  such  as  the  one  at  bar.   Being   purely   a   statutory   right,   preliminary   investigation  may  be  invoked  only  when  specifically   granted   by   law.   The   rule   on   criminal   procedure   is   clear   than   no   preliminary   investigation   is   required   in   cases   falling   w/in   the   jurisdiction   of   the   MeTC.   Besides,   the   absence   of   preliminary   investigation   doesn’t   affect   the   court’s   jurisdiction   nor   does   it   impair   the   validity   of   the   information   or   otherwise   render  it  defective.     Various   Categories   of   Diplomatic   Immunity   from  Local  Jurisdiction   • Immunity   from   the   exercise   of   local   jurisdiction   may   be   generally   classified   as   absolute  or  relative.     • Absolute   and   Relative   Immunity:   A   foreign   sovereign   could   not,   without   his   consent,   be   made   a   defendant   in   the   courts   of   another   sovereign.   In   a   newer   and   restrictive   theory   of   sovereign   immunity,   such   exemption   has   been   recognized   only   with   respect   to   sovereign   or   public   acts   of   state  and  not  necessarily  with  respect  to  its   so-­‐called   private   acts.   Regardless   of   whether  an  individual  is  constitutionally  the   actual   head   of   state   or   only   its   nominal   head,   he   or   she   enjoys   complete   immunity   from   suit   in   the   territory   of   another   state.   And   whatever   the   sovereign   may   do   in   the   territory   of   another   state,   he   is   immune   from  all  prosecution,  civil  or  criminal.     • 1961   Vienna   Convention   on   Diplomatic   Relations:   heads   of   diplomatic   missions,  

•

•

•

•

such   as   acting   ambassadors   or   nuncios,   or   internuncios   and   charges   d’affaires   are   exempted   from   the   exercise   of   local   jurisdiction.   The  remedy   of   a  local  state  is  to   consider  him  persona  non  grata.     Immunities   of   consuls:   Consuls   do   not   belong   to   the   class   of   diplomatic   agents.   They   do   not   enjoy   immunity   from   local   jurisdiction   from   private   or   commercial   transactions   not   connected   with   consular   duties.     Honorary   consuls:   Are   appointed   to   perform  limited  curricular  duties.  They  have   no   specific   “definition”   in   the   Vienna   Convention.  Their  immunities  are  limited  to   the   level   necessary   for   their   proper   exercise   of   official   consular   functions.   Consular   employees  at  a  post  headed  by  an  honorary   consul   and   members   of   the   honorary   consul’s   family   are   granted   none   of   the   privileges  provided  in  the  convention.     Immunity   of   Officials   Representing   a   Sovereign   State:   Officers   representing   the   sovereign   state   are   exempted   from   local   jurisdiction.     Immunity   of   Officials   of   International   Organizations:   The   immunities   enjoyed   by   the   UN   includes   immunity   for   UN   assets   from   any   legal   process;   from   search,   requisition,   expropriation,   confiscation,   and   any   sort   of   interference;   of   archives;   freedom   from   all   financial   controls,   moratoriums,   or   other   monetary   regulations;   freedom   to   hold   funds   in   any   desired   currency   or   metal;   freedom   to   transfer  funds;  an  absolute  exemption  of  all   assets   and   revenue   from   all   direct   taxes;   exemption   from   all   customs   duties   as   well   as   from   any   foreign   trade   prohibitions   on   needed   goods;   guarantee   of   most   favored   diplomatic   treatment;   exemption   from   censorship,   etc.   Officers   of   the   UN   enjoy   immunity  from  local  jurisdiction.       Similarly,   representatives   of   the   European   Economic   Community   and   the   EURATOM  

Rañeses  16    

•

•

•

•

•

possess   customary   diplomatic   privileges   and  immunities.       Members   of   special   diplomatic   missions   enjoy  civil  and  criminal  immunities,  and  are   exempted   from   customs   duties   and   inspections.     Immunity   of   Intergovernmental   International   Organizations:   Intergovernmental   international   organizations   are   granted   privileges   and   immunities   to   secure   them   from   legal   and   practical   independence   in   the   performance   of   their   duties.   (Jenks,   International   Immunities,  London  [1961])     Immunity   of   Non-­‐Governmental   Intergovernmental   International   Organizations:   The   principle   of   immunity   from   suit   has   been   extended   to   these   organizations  in  order  to  give  them  freedom   of  performance  of  their  activities.     Doctrine   of   Restrictive   Immunity:   the   privileges   of   diplomatic   officials   are   not   altogether   unlimited.   Restrictive   theory   limits  immunity  to  public  acts  and  excluding   all  commercial  or  private  acts.     Immunity   of   As   Hoc   Diplomats:   members   of   official   missions   and   delegates   traveling   abroad   to   attend   international   conference   are   accorded   diplomatic   immunity   while   in   the  performance  of  their  official  functions.     Proper   procedure   for   Liang   v.   People:   The   court   should   have   inquired   whether   the   crime  committed  was  in  connection  with  his   official   duties   pursuant   to   the   agreement   between   the   Government   of   the   RP   and   the   ADB.  His  immunity  was  not  absolute,  as  the   principle   of   restrictive   immunity   applies   to   him.    

  Schneckenburger  v.  Moran,  63  Phil.  249  (1936)     Facts:   Schneckenburger,   who   is   an   honorary   consul   of   Uruguay   at   Manila   was   subsequently   charged   in   CFI-­‐Manila   with   the   crime   of   falsification   of   a   private   document.   He   objected   to   this   saying   that   under   the   US   and   Philippine   Constitution,   the   CFI   has   no   jurisdiction   to   try   him.   After   his   objection  

was   overruled,   he   filed   a   petition   for   a   writ   of   prohibition   to   prevent   the   CFI   from   taking   cognizance   of   the   criminal   action   filed   against   him.   Aside   from   this,   he   contended   that   original   jurisdiction   over   cases   affecting   ambassadors   and   consuls   is   conferred   exclusively   upon   the   Supreme   Court  of  the  Philippines.     Issues:   1. WON   the   US   SC   has   Original   Jurisdiction   over   cases   affecting   ambassadors,   consuls,   et.   al   &   such   jurisdiction   excludes   courts   of   the  Phils.   2. WON   original   jurisdiction   over   cases   affecting   ambassadors,   consuls,   et.   al.   is   conferred   exclusively   upon   the   Supreme   Court  of  the  Philippines     Held:   1. No.   First   of   all,   a   consul   is   not   entitled   to   the   privilege   of   diplomatic   immunity.   A   consul   is  not  exempt  from  criminal  prosecution  for   violations   of   the   laws   of   the   country   where   he   resides.   The   inauguration   of   the   Philippine  Commonwealth  on  Nov.  15,  1935   caused  the  Philippine  Constitution  to  go  into   full  force  and  effect.  This  Constitution  is  the   supreme   law   of   the   land.   It   also   provides   that   the   original   jurisdiction   of   this   court   “shall   include   all   cases   affecting   ambassadors,  consuls  et.al.”   2. “The  Supreme  Court  shall  have  original  and   appellate   jurisdiction   as   may   be   possessed   and   exercised   by   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   Philippines   at   the   time   of   the   adoption   of   this   Constitution.”   According   to   Sec.   17.   of   Act   No.   136   and   by   virtue   of   it,   jurisdiction   to   issue   writs   of   quo   warranto,   certiorari,   mandamus,   prohibition   and   habeas   corpus   was  also  conferred  on  the  CFI’s.  As  a  result,   the   original   jurisdiction   possessed   and   exercised   by   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   Philippines  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was   adopted   was   not   exclusive   of,   but   concurrent   with,   that   of   the   CFI’s.   The   original   jurisdiction   conferred   to   SC   by   the  

Rañeses  17     Constitution   jurisdiction.  

was  

not  

an  

exclusive  

 

Territorial     RPC,  Art.  2     Article   2.   Application   of   its   provisions.   -­‐   Except   as   provided   in   the   treaties   and   laws   of   preferential   application,   the   provisions   of   this   Code   shall   be   enforced  not  only  within  the  Philippine  Archipelago,   including   its   atmosphere,   its   interior   waters   and   maritime   zone,   but   also   outside   of   its   jurisdiction,   against  those  who:   1.   Should   commit   an   offense   while   on   a   Philippine   ship  or  airship;   2.   Should   forge   or   counterfeit   any   coin   or   currency   note   of   the   Philippine   Islands   or   obligations   and   securities   issued   by   the   Government   of   the   Philippine  Islands;   3.   Should   be   liable   for   acts   connected   with   the   introduction   into   these   islands   of   the   obligations   and  securities  mentioned  in  the  preceding  number;   4.   While   being   public   officers   or   employees,   should   commit   an   offense   in   the   exercise   of   their   functions;   or   5.  Should  commit  any  of  the  crimes  against  national   security  and  the  law  of  nations,  defined  in  Title  One   of  Book  Two  of  this  Code.  

 

 

Const.  (1987),  Art.  I   The   national   territory   comprises   the   Philippine   archipelago,   with   all   the   islands   and   waters   embraced   therein,   and   all   other   territories   over   which   the   Philippines   has   sovereignty   or   jurisdiction,   consisting   of   its   terrestrial,   fluvial   and   aerial   domains,   including   its   territorial   sea,   the   seabed,   the   subsoil,   the   insular   shelves,   and   other   submarine  areas.  The  waters  around,  between,  and   connecting   the   islands   of   the   archipelago,   regardless   of   their   breadth   and   dimensions,   form   part  of  the  internal  waters  of  the  Philippines.  

    Visiting  Forces  Agreement,  Art.  V     *Refer  to  pp.  8-­‐10  for  full  text    

 

U.S.  v.  Bull,  15  Phil.  7  (1910)   Facts:  Bull,  the  master  of  the  steamship  STANDARD,   carried,   transported   and   brought   into   the   port   &   city   of   Manila,   aboard   said   vessel,   677   head   of   cattle   &   carabaos,   w/o   providing   suitable   means   for   securing  said  animals  while  in  transit,  so  as  to  avoid   cruelty  &  unnecessary  suffering  to  the  said  animals.   He   failed   to   provide   stalls   &   suitable   means   for   tying   &   securing   said   animals   in   a   proper   manner.     Bull  even  caused  some  of  the  said  animals  to  be  tied   by   means   of   rings   through   their   noses   and   permitted  others  to  be  transported  loose  in  the  hold   &   on   the   deck   of   said   vessel   w/o   being   tied   or   secured   in   stalls.     Bedding   for   all   the   said   animals   was  not  provided  as  well.  Hence,  the  noses  of  some   of   said   animals   were   cruelly   torn,   many   of   said   animals  were  tossed  upon  the  decks  of  hold  of  said   vessels,   cruelly   wounded,   bruised   &   killed.   All   acts   contrary  to  the  provisions  of  Acts  No.  55  &  No.  275   of  the  Phil.  Commission.     Issues:   1. WON  the  trial  court  was  with  jurisdiction  to   hear  and  determine  the  case.   2. WON  Act  No.  55,  as  amended,  is  in  violation   of  certain  provisions  of  the  Constitutions  of   the  US.   3. WON   Whether   or   not   the   evidence   is   insufficient  to  support  the  conviction.     Held:     1. Yes.    Act  No.  55  confers  jurisdiction  over  the   offense.  When  the  vessel  came  w/in  3  miles   of   a   line   drawn   from   the   headlands   w/c   embraces   the   entrance   to   Manila   Bay,   she   was   w/in   territorial   waters.   The   completed   forbidden  act  was  thus  done  w/in  American   waters,   &   the   court   therefore   had   jurisdiction   over   the   subject–matter   of   the   offense  &  the  person  of  the  offender.     The  treaty  does  not  deprive  the  local  courts   of   jurisdiction   over   offenses   committed   onboard   a   merchant   vessel   by   one   member   of  the  crew  against  another  w/c  amount  to  a   disturbance   of   the   order/tranquility   of   the   country.    A  fair  &  reasonable  construction  of   the   language   requires   us   to   hold   that   any   violation   of   criminal   laws   disturbs   the  

Rañeses  18     order/tranquility   of   the   country.     The   offense   of   Bull,   master   of   the   said   vessel,   was   a   violation   of   the   criminal   law   of   the   country   into   whose   port   he   came.   Hence,   neither   by   reason   of   the   nationality   of   the   vessel,   the   place   of   the   commission   of   the   offense,  or  the  prohibitions  of  any  treaty  or   general   principle   of   public   law,   are   the   courts   of   the   Phil.   Islands   deprived   of   jurisdiction   over   the   offense   charged   in   the   information  in  this  case.   2. No.  The  Constitution  of  the  US  operates  only   upon   the   States   of   the   Union.   It   has   no   application   to   the   Government   of   the   Philippine   Islands.   The   power   to   regulate   foreign   commerce   is   vested   in   Congress,   &   by   virtue   of   its   power   to   govern   the   territory   belonging   to   the   US,   it   may   regulate   foreign   commerce   w/   such   territory.   This   Act   has   remained   in   force   since   its   enactment   w/o   annulment   or   other   action   by   Congress,   and   must   be   presumed   to  have  been  met  w/  the  body’s  approval.   3. No.  The  evidence  is  SUFFICIENT  to  support   the   conviction.   15   of   the   said   cattle   had   broken   legs   &   3   others   have   died,   due   to   their   broken   legs.     The   said   cattle   were   transported   &   carried   on   the   deck   &   in   the   hold  of  said  ship,  w/o  suitable  precaution  &   care  for  their  transportation  to  avoid  danger   &  risk  to  their  lives  &  security.   Doctrine:   Offense   committed   on   board   a   foreign   merchant   vessel   while   on   Philippine   waters   is   triable  before  our  court  (Reyes).     Reyes:   1. There   are   two   rules   as   to   jurisdiction   over   crimes   committed   aboard   foreign   merchant  vessels.     a. French   Rule   –   such   crimes   are   not   triable  in  the  courts  of  that  country,   unless   their   commission   affects   the   peace  and  security  of  the  territory  or   the  safety  of  the  state  is  endangered.     b. English   Rule   –   such   crimes   are   triable   in   that   country,   unless   they   merely   affect   things   within   the  

vessel   or   they   refer   to   the   internal   management  thereof.  This  is  the  rule   followed  in  the  Philippines.     2. Crimes   not   involving   a   breach   of   public   order   committed   on   board   a   foreign   merchant   vessel   in   transit   not   triable   by   our  courts.     3. Philippine   courts   have   no   jurisdiction   over   offenses   committed   on   board   foreign  warships  in  territorial  waters.  In   case   vessels   are   in   the   ports   or   territorial   waters   of   a   foreign   country,   a   distinction   must   be   made   between   merchant   ships   and   warships.   The   former   are,   more   or   less,   subjected   to   territorial   laws.   Warships,   on   the  other  hand,  are  always  reputed  to  be  the   territory   of   the   country   to   which   they   belong   and   cannot   be   subjected   to   the   laws   of  another  state.     People  v.  Look  Chaw,  18  Phil.  573  (1910)   Facts:   Between   11   and   12   o'clock   a.   m.   on   the   present   month   (stated   as   August   19,   1909)s   everal   persons,  Jacks  and  Milliron,  chief  of  the  department   of   the   Port   of   Cebu   and   internal   revenue   agent   of   Cebu,   respectively,   went   aboard   the   steamship   Erroll  to  inspect  and  search  its  cargo,  and  found  two   sacks  containing  opium.  The  defendant  stated  freely   and   voluntarily   that   he   had   bought   these   sacks   of   opium   in   Hongkong   with   the   intention   of   selling   them   as   contraband   in   Mexico   or   Vera   Cruz,   and   that   as   his   hold   had   already   been   searched   several   times  for  opium,  he  ordered  two  other  chinamen  to   keep   the   sack.   All   the   evidence   found   properly   constitutes  corpus  delicti.     It   was   established   that   the   steamship   Erroll   was   of   English   nationality,   that   it   came   from   Hongkong,   and  that  it  was  bound  for  Mexico,  via  the  call  ports   in  Manila  and  Cebu.     Issue:   WON   a   local   court   can   exercise   its   jurisdiction  over  foreign  vessels  stationed  in  its  port     Held:   Yes.   The   mere   possession   of   a   thing   of   prohibited   use   in   these   Islands,   aboard   a   foreign   vessel  in  transit,  in  any  of  their  ports,  does  not,  as  a   general  rule,  constitute  a  crime  triable  by  the  courts  

Rañeses  19     of   this   country,   on   account   of   such   vessel   being   considered   as   an   extension   of   its   own   nationality,   the   same   rule   does   not   apply   when   the   article,   whose   use   is   prohibited   within   the   Philippine   Islands,   in   the   present   case,   a   can   of   opium,   is   landed   from   the   vessel   upon   the   Philippine   soil,   thus  committing  an  open  violation  of  the  penal  law   in   force   at   the   place   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   only  the  court  established  in  the  said  place  itself  has   competent   jurisdiction,   in   the   absence   of   an   agreement  under  an  international  treaty.       U.S.  v.  Ah  Sing,  36  Phil.  978  (1917)   Facts:  The  defendant  is  a  subject  of  China  employed   as   a   fireman   on   a   steamship.   The   steamship   is   a   foreign   steamer   which   arrived   at   the   port   of   Cebu   on   April   25,   1917,   after   a   voyage   direct   from   the   port   of   Saigon.   The   defendant   bought   8   cans   of   opium   in   Saigon,   brought   them   on   board   the   steamship   and   had   them   in   his   possession   during   the   trip   from   Saigon   to   Cebu.   When   the   steamer   anchored   in   the   port   of   Cebu,   the   authorities   on   making   the   search   found   the   cans   of   opium   hidden   in   the   ashes   below   the   boiler   of   the   steamer's   engine.   The   defendant   confessed   that   he   was   the   owner  of  the  opium  and  that  he  had  purchased  it  in   Saigon.   He   did   not   confess,   however,   as   to   his   purpose  in  buying  the  opium.  He  did  not  say  that  it   was  his  intention  to  import  the  prohibited  drug.     Issue:   WON   the   crime   of   illegal   importation   of   opium  into  the  Philippine  Islands  has  been  proven?     Held:  Yes.  It  is  the  onus  of  the  government  to  prove   that   the   vessel   from   which   the   drug   discharged   came  into  Philippine  waters  from  a  foreign  country   with  the  drug  on  board.  In  this  case,  it  is  to  be  noted   that   §4   of   Act   No.   2381   begins,   “Any   person   who   shall   unlawfully   import   or   bring   any   prohibited   drug  into  the  Philippine  Islands…”  Import  and  bring   should   be   construed   as   synonymous   terms.   The   mere  act  of  going  into  a  port,  without  breaking  bulk,   is   prima   facie   evidence   of   importation.   The   importation  is  not  the  making  entry  of  goods  at  the   customhouse,  but  merely  the  bringing  them  into  the   port,   and   the   importation   is   complete   before   the   entry   to   the   customhouse.   Moreover,   possession   for  

personal  use  is  unlikely,  judging  from  the  size  of  the   amount  brought.         People  v.  Lol-­‐lo  and  Saraw,  43  Phil.  19  (1922)   Facts:   On   or   about   June   30,   1920,   two   boats   left   matuta,  a  Dutch  possession,  for  Peta,  another  Dutch   possession.  In  one  of  the  boats  was  one  individual,  a   Dutch   subject,   and   in   the   other   boat   eleven   men,   women,   and   children,   likewise   subjects   of   Holland.   After   a   number   of   days   of   navigation,   at   about   7   o'clock   in   the   evening,   the   second   boat   arrived   between   the   Islands   of   Buang   and   Bukid   in   the   Dutch   East   Indies.   There   the   boat   was   surrounded   by   six   vintas   manned   by   twenty-­‐four   Moros   all   armed.  The  Moros  first  asked  for  food,  but  once  on   the   Dutch   boat,   too   for   themselves   all   of   the   cargo,   attacked  some  of  the  men,  and  brutally  violated  two   of   the   women   by   methods   too   horrible   to   the   described.  All  of  the  persons  on  the  Dutch  boat,  with   the  exception  of  the  two  young  women,  were  again   placed   on   it   and   holes   were   made   in   it,   the   idea   that   it   would   submerge,   although   as   a   matter   of   fact,   these   people,   after   eleven   days   of   hardship   and   privation,  were  succored  violating  them,  the  Moros   finally   arrived   at   Maruro,   a   Dutch   possession.   Two   of   the   Moro   marauder   were   Lol-­‐lo,   who   also   raped   one   of   the   women,   and   Saraw.   At   Maruro   the   two   women  were  able  to  escape.     Lol-­‐lo   and   Saraw   later   returned   to   their   home   in   South   Ubian,   Tawi-­‐Tawi,   Sulu,   Philippine   Islands.   There   they   were   arrested   and   were   charged   in   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Sulu   with   the   crime   of   piracy.   A   demurrer   was   interposed   by   counsel   de   officio  for  the  Moros,  based  on  the  grounds  that  the   offense   charged   was   not   within   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Court   of   First   Instance,   nor   of   any   court   of   the   Philippine   Islands,   and   that   the   facts   did   not   constitute   a   public   offense,   under   the   laws   in   force   in   the   Philippine   Islands.   After   the   demurrer   was   overruled   by   the   trial   judge,   trial   was   had,   and   a   judgment  was  rendered  finding  the  two  defendants   guilty   and   sentencing   each   of   them   to   life   imprisonment  (cadena  perpetua),  to  return  together   with   Kinawalang   and   Maulanis,   defendants   in   another  case,  to  the  offended  parties,  the  thirty-­‐nine   sacks   of   copras   which   had   been   robbed,   or   to  

Rañeses  20     indemnify  them  in  the  amount  of  924  rupees,  and  to   pay  a  one-­‐half  part  of  the  costs.     Issue:     1. WON   the   local   court   has   jurisdiction   over   the  case.     2. Does   Art.   153   of   the   Spanish   penal   code   which  punishes  Piracy  still  apply?       Held:     1. Yes.   Piracy   is   a   crime   not   against   any   particular   State   but   against   all   mankind.   It   may   be   punished   in   the   competent   tribunal   or   any   country   where   the   offender   may   be   found  or  into  which  he  may  be  carried.  The   jurisdiction  of  piracy  unlike  all  other  crimes   had  not  territorial  limits.   2. Yes.   All   laws   previously   in   force   shall   remain  force  until  amended  or  repealed.     Doctrine:   Pirates   are   considered   hostis   humani   generis.  Therefore,  they  can  be  tried  anywhere.     People  v.  Wong  Cheng,  46  Phil.  729  (1922)   Facts:   Wong   Cheng   smoked   opium   while   aboard   merchant   vessel   Changsa,   anchored   in   Manila   Bay   2.5  miles  from  shore.     Issue:   WON   Philippines   has   jurisdiction   over   Merchant  ships  in  its  territory?   Held:   Yes;   smoking   within   territory   allows   substance   to   produce   pernicious   effects,   which   is   against   public   order.   It   is   also   an   act   of   defiance   of   authority.     Miquiabas  v.  Commanding  General,  80  Phil.  262   (1948)   Facts:   Miquiabas   is   a   Filipino   citizen   and   civilian   employee  of  the  US  army  in  the  Philippines  who  had   been  charged  of  disposing  in  the  Port  of  Manila  Area   of   things   belonging   to   the   US   army   in   violation   of   the   94th   article   of   War   of   the   US.   He   was   arrested   and  a  General  Court-­‐Martial  was  appointed.  He  was   found   guilty.   As   a   rule,   the   Philippines   being   a   sovereign   nation   has   jurisdiction   over   all   offenses   committed  within  its  territory  but  it  may,  by  treaty   or  by  agreement,  consent  that  the  US  shall  exercise  

jurisdiction  over  certain  offenses  committed  within   said  portions  of  territory.     Issues:   1. WON   the   offense   has   been   committed   within   a   US   base   thus   giving   the   US   jurisdiction  over  the  case.   2. WON   the   offender   is   a   member   of   the   US   armed  forces     Held:     1. No.   The   Port   of   Manila   Area   where   the   offense   was   committed   is   not   w/in   a   US   base   for   it   is   not   names   in   Annex   A   or   B   of   AXXVI   of   the   Military   Base   Agreement   (MBA)   &   is   merely   part   of   the   temporary   quarters   located   w/in   presented   limits   of   the   city   of   Manila.   Moreover,   extended   installations   &   temporary   quarters   aren’t   considered   to   have   the   same   jurisdictional   capacity   as   permanent   bases   &   are   governed  by  AXIII  pars.  2  &  4.  The  offence  at   bar,   therefore   is   in   the   beyond   the   jurisdiction  of  military  courts.   2. No.   Under   the   MBA,   a   civilian   employee   is   not   considered   as   a   member   of   the   US   armed   forces.   Even   under   the   articles   of   war,  the  mere  fact  that  a  civilian  employee  is   in   the   service   of   the   US   Army   does   not   make   him  a  member  of  the  armed  forces.    

Prospective       RPC     Art.  1   Time   when   Act   takes   effect.   -­‐   This   Code   shall   take   effect  on  the  first  day  of  January,  nineteen  hundred   and  thirty-­‐two.   Art.  21   Penalties   that   may   be   imposed.   -­‐   No   felony   shall   be   punishable   by   any   penalty   not   prescribed   by   law   prior  to  its  commission.  

 

Rañeses  21     RPC  Art.  22   Retroactive   effect   of   penal   laws.   -­‐   Penal   laws   shall   have   a   retroactive   effect   insofar   as   they   favor   the   person   guilty   of   a   felony,   who   is   not   a   habitual   criminal,   as   this   term   is   defined   in   rule   5   of   article   62   of   this   Code,   although   at   the   time   of   the   publication   of   such   laws   a   final   sentence   has   been   pronounced  and  the  convict  is  serving  the  same.  

 

  A  person  shall  be  deemed  to  be  habitual  delinquent,  if   within  a  period  of  ten  (10)  years  from  the  date  of  his   release   or   last   conviction   of   the   crimes   of   serious   or   less   serious   physical   injuries,   robo,   burto,   estafa   or   falsification,  he  is  found  guilty  of  any  of  said  crimes  a   third  time  or  oftener.  [Revised  Penal  Code,  Art.  62(5)   as  amended  by  R.A.  No.  7659,  sec.  23]  

 

 

Civil  Code,  Art.  4   Laws   shall   have   no   retroactive   effect,   unless   the   contrary  is  provided.  (3)  

    Reyes:   1. Prospective,   in   that   a   penal   law   cannot   make   an   act   punishable   in   a   manner   in   which   it   was   not   punishable   when   committed.   As   provided   in   Article   366   of   the   RPC,   crimes   are   punished   under   the   laws   in   force   at   the   time   of   their   commission.     2. Whenever   a   new   statute   dealing   with   crime   establishes   conditions   more   lenient  or  favorable  to  the  accused,  it  can   be  given  a  retroactive  effect.  Unless:   1. Where   the   new   law   is   expressly   made   inapplicable   to   pending   actions   or   existing   causes   of   action.   (Tavera   v.   Valdez,   1   Phil.   463,   470-­‐ 471)   2. Where   the   offender   is   a   habitual   criminal   under   Rule   5,   Article   62,   RPC.  (Art.  22,  RPC)   3. The   Repeal   of   penal   laws   have   different   effects.     1. If   the   repeal   makes   the   penalty   lighter   in   the   new   law,   the   new   law  

shall   be   applied,   except   when   the   offender   is   a   habitual   delinquent   or   when   the   new   law   is   made   not   applicable   to   pending   action   or   existing  causes  of  action.     2. If   the   new   law   imposes   a   heavier   penalty,   the   law   in   force   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   offense   shall  be  applied.     3. If   the   new   law   totally   repeals   the   existing   law   so   that   the   act   which   penalized   under   the   old   law   is   no   longer   punishable,   the   crime   is   obliterated.     4. When   the   repealing   law   fails   to   penalize   the   offense   under   the   old   law,   the   accused   cannot   be   convicted   under   the   new  law.     5. A   person   erroneously   accused   and   convicted   under   a   repealed   statute   may   be  punished  under  the  repealing  statute.     6. A   new   law   which   omits   anything   contained   in   the   old   law   dealing   on   the   same   subject   operates   as   a   repeal   of   anything   not   so   included   in   the   amendatory  act.       Who  is  a  habitual  delinquent?   Reyes:  A  person  is  a  habitual  delinquent  if  within  a   period   of   10   years   from   the   date   of   his   last   release   or  last  conviction  of  the  crimes  of  (1)  serious  or  less   serious   physical   injuries,   (2)   robo,   (3)   hurto,   (4)   estafa,  or  (5)  falsification,  he  is  found  guilty  of  any  of   said  crimes  a  time  or  oftener.       Requisites:   1. That  the  offender  has  been  convicted  of  any   of   the   crimes   of   serious   or   less   serious   physical   injuries,   robbery,   theft,   estafa,   or   falsification.     2. That   after   the   conviction   or   after   serving   his   sentence,   he   again   committed,   and,   within   10   years   from   his   release   or   first   conviction,   he   was   again   convicted   of   any   of   the   said   crimes  for  the  second  time.     3. That  after  his  conviction  of,  or  after  serving   sentence   for,   the   second   offense,   he   again  

Rañeses  22     committed,   and,   within   10   years   from   his   last   release   or   last   conviction,   he   was   again   convicted   of   any   of   said   offenses,   the   third   time  or  oftener.       Who  is  a  recidivist?   Reyes:   A   recidivist   is   one   who,   at   the   time   of   his   trial   for   one   crime,   shall   have   been   previously   convicted   by   final   judgment   of   another   crime   embraced   in   the   same   title   of   the   RPC   (People   v.   Lagarto,   G.R.   No.   65833,   May   6,   1991,   196   SCRA   611,  619)     Requisites     1. That  the  offender  is  on  trial  for  an  offense.     2. That   he   was   previously   convicted   by   final   judgment  of  another  crime.     3. That   both   the   first   and   second   offenses   are   embraced  in  the  same  title  of  the  Code;     4. That   the   offender   is   convicted   of   the   new   offense.       *There   is   recidivism   even   if   the   lapse   of   time   between  two  felonies  is  more  than  10  years.     **Pardon   does   not   obliterate   the   fact   that   the   accused   was   a   recidivist;   but   amnesty   extinguishes   the  penalty  and  its  effects.       Who  is  a  quasi-­‐recidivist?     Reyes:  Any  person  who  shall  commit  a  felony  after   having   been   convicted   by   final   judgment,   before   beginning   to   serve   such   sentence,   or   while   serving   the  same,  shall  be  punished  by  the  maximum  period   of   the   penalty  prescribed  by  law  for  the  new  felony.   (Art.  160)       Gumabon   v.   Director   of   Prisons,   37   SCRA   420   (1971)   Facts:   Gumabon,   after   pleading   guilty,   was   sentenced  on  May  5,  1953  to  reclusion  perpetua  for   the   complex   crime   of   rebellion   with   multiple   murder,  robbery,  arson  and  kidnapping  (along  with   Agapito,  Palmares  and  Padua).  The  decision  for  the   first   two   petitioners   was   rendered   on   March   8,   1954   and   the   third   on   Dec.   5,   1955.   The   last   petitioner  Bagolbagol  was  penalized  with  reclusion   perpetua   on   Jan.   12,   1954.   Each   of   the   petitioners  

have   been   imprisoned   for   more   than   13   years   by   virtue  of  their  convictions.     They   now   invoke   the   doctrine   laid   down   in   People   v.  Hernandez  which  negated  such  complex  crime,  a   ruling  which  was  not  handed  down  until  after  their   convictions   have   become   final.   In   People   v.   Hernandez,   the   SC   ruled   that   the   information   against   the   accused   for   complex   rebellion   with   murder,   arson   and   robbery   was   not   warranted   under   Art.   134   of   the   RPC,   there   being   no   such   complex  offense.  This  ruling  was  not  handed  down   until  after  their  convictions  have  become  final.  Since   Hernandez  served  more  than  the  maximum  penalty   that   could   have   been   served   against   him,   he   is   entitled   to   freedom,   and   thus,   his   continued   detention  is  illegal.     Issue:  WON  Art.  22  of  the  RPC  which  gives  a  penal   judgment   a   retroactive   effect   is   applicable   in   this   case   (WON   judicial   decisions   favorable   to   the   accused/convicted   for   the   same   crime   can   be   applied  retroactively)     Held:   Yes.   Judicial   decisions   favorable   to   the   accused   must   be   applied   retroactively.   Petitioners   relied  on  Art.  22  of  the  RPC,  which  states  the  penal   laws   shall   have   a   retroactive   effect   insofar   as   they   favour   the   accused   who   is   not   a   habitual   criminal.     CC  also  provides  that  judicial  decisions  applying  or   interpreting   the   Constitution   forms   part   of   our   legal   system.   Petitioners   even   raised   their   constitutional   right   to   equal   protection,   given   that   Hernandez   et   al.,  has  been  convicted  for  the  same  offense  as  they   have,   though   their   sentences   were   lighter.   Habeas   corpus   is   the   only   means   of   benefiting   the   accused   by  the  retroactive  character  of  a  favorable  decision.     In  Re:  Kay  Villegas  Kami,  Inc.,  supra   *Refer  to  page  5  for  the  digest  of  this  case.       People  v.  Narvaez,  121  SCRA  389,  (1983)   Facts:   Mamerto   Narvaez   has   been   convicted   of   murder   (qualified   by   treachery)   of   David   Fleischer   and   Flaviano   Rubia.   On   August   22,   1968,   Narvaez   shot   Fleischer   and   Rubia   during   the   time   the   two   were   constructing   a   fence   that   would   prevent  

Rañeses  23     Narvaez   from   getting   into   his   house   and   rice   mill.   The   defendant   was   taking   a   nap   when   he   heard   sounds  of  construction  and  found  fence  being  made.   He   addressed   the   group   and   asked   them   to   stop   destroying   his   house   and   asking   if   they   could   talk   things  over.  Fleischer  responded  with   "No,   gadamit,   proceed,   go   ahead."   Defendant   lost   his   "equilibrium,"   and   shot   Fleisher   with   his   shotgun.   He   also   shot   Rubia   who   was   running   towards   the   jeep  where  the  deceased's  gun  was  placed.  Prior  to   the   shooting,   Fleischer   and   Co.   (the   company   of   Fleischer's   family)   was   involved   in   a   legal   battle   with   the   defendant   and   other   land   settlers   of   Cotabato   over   certain   pieces   of   property.   At   the   time  of  the  shooting,  the  civil  case  was  still  pending   for  annulment  (settlers  wanted  granting  of  property   to   Fleisher   and   Co.   to   be   annulled).   At   time   of   the   shooting,   defendant   had   leased   his   property   from   Fleisher   (though   case   pending   and   ownership   uncertain)   to   avoid   trouble.   On   June   25,   defendant   received   letter   terminating   contract   because   he   allegedly  didn't  pay  rent.  He  was  given  6  months  to   remove   his   house   from   the   land.   Shooting   was   barely   2   months   after   letter.   Defendant   claims   he   killed   in   defense   of   his   person   and   property.   CFI   ruled   that   Narvaez   was   guilty.   Aggravating   circumstances   of   evident   premeditation   offset   by   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   voluntary   surrender.   For   both   murders,   CFI   sentenced   him   to   reclusion   perpetua,   to   indemnify   the   heirs,   and   to   pay   for   moral  damages.     Issues:   1. WON   CFI   erred   in   convicting   defendant-­‐ appellant   despite   the   fact   that   he   acted   in   defense  of  his  person.   2. WON   the   court   erred   in   convicting   defendant-­‐appellant   although   he   acted   in   defense  of  his  rights.   3. WON   he   should   be   liable   for   subsidiary   imprisonment   since   he   is   unable   to   pay   the   civil  indemnity  due  to  the  offended  party.     Held:   1. No.   The   courts   concurred   that   the   fencing   and   chiselling   of   the   walls   of   the   house   of   the   defendant   was   indeed   a   form   of  

aggression   on   the   part   of   the   victim.   However,   this   aggression   was   not   done   on   the   person   of   the   victim   but   rather   on   his   rights   to   property.   On   the   first   issue,   the   courts   did   not   err.   However,   in   consideration   of   the   violation   of   property   rights,   the   courts   referred   to   Art.   30   of   the   civil  code  recognizing  the  right  of  owners  to   close  and  fence  their  land.  Although  is  not  in   dispute,  the  victim  was  not  in  the  position  to   subscribe   to   the   article   because   his   ownership   of   the   land   being   awarded   by   the   government   was   still   pending,   therefore   putting   ownership   into   question.   It’s   accepted   that   victim   was   the   original   aggressor.   2. Yes.   However,   the   argument   of   the   justifying   circumstance  of  self-­‐defense  is  applicable  only  if   the   3   requirements   are   fulfilled.   Art.   11(1)   RPC   enumerates  these  requisites:   1. Unlawful   aggression.   In   the   case   at   bar,   there   was   unlawful   aggression   towards   appellant's  property  rights.  Fleisher  had   given   Narvaez   6   months   and   he   should   have   left   him   in   peace   before   time   was   up,  instead  of  chiseling  Narvaez's  house   and   putting   up   fence.   A536   of   the   CC   also   provides   that   possession   may   not   be   acquired   through   force   or   intimidation;   while   Art.   539   provides   that  every  possessor  has  the  right  to  be   respected  in  his  possession   2. Reasonable   necessity   of   means   employed   to   prevent   or   repel   attack.   In   case,   killing   was   disproportionate   to   attack.   3. Lack  of  sufficient  provocation  on  part  of   person   defending   himself.   Here,   there   was   no   provocation   at   all   since   he   was   asleep   Since   not   all   requisites   present,   defendant   is   credited   w/   the   special   mitigating   circumstance   of   incomplete   defense,   pursuant   to   A13(6)   RPC.   These   mitigating   circumstances   are:   voluntary   surrender   &   passion   &   obfuscation   (read   p.   405   explanation)  

Rañeses  24       Crime   is   homicide   (2   counts)   not   murder   because   treachery   is   not   applicable   on   account   of   provocation   by   the   deceased.   Also,   assault   wasn’t   deliberately   chosen   with   view   to   kill   since   slayer   acted   instantaneously.   There   was   also   no   direct   evidence  of  planning  or  preparation  to  kill.     Art.  249  RPC:  Penalty  for  homicide  is   reclusion  temporal.  However,  due  to   mitigating   circumstances   and   incomplete   defense,   it   can   be   lowered   3   degrees   (Art.   64)   to   arresto  mayor.   3. No.   He   isn’t   liable   for   subsidiary   imprisonment   for   non-­‐payment   of   civil   indemnity.  RA  5465  made  the  provisions  of   A39   applicable   to   fines   only   &   not   to   reparation   of   damage   caused,   indemnification  of  consequential  damages  &   costs   of   proceedings.   Although   it   was   enacted   only   after   its   commission,   considering   that   RA   5465   is   favorable   to   the   accused  who  is  not  a  habitual  delinquent,  it   may   be   given   retroactive   effect   pursuant   to   RPC  Art.  22.     People  v.  Ringor,  320  SCRA  342  (1999)   Facts:  The  accused  (Ringor)  on  the  night  of  June  23,   1994   was   seen   entering   People’s   Restaurant.   A   witness   Fely   Batanes   saw   the   accused   approach   a   table  where  the  victim  was  sitting,  pulled  his  hair,  &   poked  a  knife  at  the  latter’s  throat.  After,  leaving  the   restaurant,   the   accused   returned   with   a   gun,   entered   the   kitchen   of   the   restaurant,   stealthily   approached   the   victim   from   behind   &   shot   him   6   times   successively.   The   defendant   was   later   apprehended   and   caught   in   his   possession   was   an   unlicensed   weapon.   Upon   verification   in   Camp   Crame,  it  was  found  out  that  Ringor  is  not  a  licensed   firearm   holder   &   that   the   gun   was   not   licensed.   Ringor   put   up   self-­‐defense   but   he   failed   to   prove   Florida’s   unlawful   aggression.   He   was   found   guilty   of  murder  qualified  by  treachery  and  was  sentenced   to  death.  He  was  found  guilty  of  a  separate  charge  of  

possession  of  an  unlicensed  firearm  with  a  sentence   of  17  to  20  yrs.     Issues:   1. WON   the   amendatory   law   RA   8294   (which   took  effect  in  1997:  crime  occurred  in  1994)   is  applicable   2. WON   RTC   erred   in   convicting   appellant   for   simple   illegal   possession   of   firearms   and   sentenced   him   to   suffer   an   indeterminate   sentence  of  17  to  20  years.   3. WON  trial  court  erred  in  convicting  accused   of  murder   4. WON   RTC   erred   in   sentencing   the   accused   to   death   for   muder   which   wasn’t   proven   &   that   the   alleged   murder   committed   by   the   appellant,   the   appropriate   penalty   for   the   offense   is   reclusion   perpetua   due   to   to   the   absence  of  an  aggravating  circumstance.       Held:     1. No.   At   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   crime   the   use   of   an   unlicensed   firearm   was   still   not   an   aggravating   circumstance   in   murder   to   homicide.   To   apply   it   to   Ringor   would   increase   his   penalty   from   reclusion   perpetua   to   death.   Hence,   RA   8294   cannot   retroact   as   it   is   unfavorable   to   the   accused,   lest  it  becomes  an  ex  post  facto  law.   2. Yes.   In   cases   where   murder   or   homicide   is   committed   with   the   use   of   an   unlicensed   firearm,   there   can   be   no   separate   conviction   for   the   crime   of   illegal   possession   of   firearms   under   PD   1866.   It   is   simply   considered   as   an   aggravating   circumstance,   no   longer   as   a   separate   offence.   According   to   the   Art.   22   of   the   RPC,   retroactivity   of   the   law   must   be   applied   if   it   is   favorable   to   the   accused.   Thus,   insofar   as   it   spares   accused-­‐ appellant   a   separate   conviction   for   illegal   possession   of   firearms,   RA   8294   has   to   be   given  retroactive  application.   3. No.   For   self-­‐defense   to   prosper,   unlawful   aggression,   proportionality   of   methods   to   fend   said   aggression,   and   lack   of   sufficient   provocation  from  defender  must  be  proven.   In   this   case,   defendant   failed   to   prove  

Rañeses  25     unlawful  aggression.  The  statement  that  the   victim   approached   him   with   a   bolo   was   inconsistent   to   the   witness’   statement   of   the   victim   being   in   a   prone   position   in   the   table.   This   does   not   constitute   the   requisite   quantum   of   proof   for   unlawful   aggression.   With   the   first   requirement   missing,   the   last   two  requisites  have  no  basis.     4. Yes.   In   the   absence   of   mitigating   or   aggravating   circumstances   to   a   crime   of   murder   as   described   by   A248   RPC,   a   lesser   penalty   of   reclusion   perpetua   has   to   be   imposed   in   according   to   Art.   63(2)   of   the   RPC.     People  v.  Pimentel,  288  SCRA  542  (1998)   Facts:  1983.  Tujan  charged  with  subversions  under   RA   1700   with   warrant   of   arrest   issued.   On   June   5,   1990,   Tujan   was   arrested   and   caught   with   .38   caliber  revolver.  On  June  14,  1990,  he  was  charged   with  illegal  possession  of  firearms  and  ammunition   in   furtherance   of   subversion   (PD   1866)   Tujan   filed   motion  to  quash  invoking  protection  versus  double   jeopardy   (Art.   III,   Constitution;   Misolas   v.   Panga;   &   Enrile   v.   Salazar:   alleged   possession   absorbed   in   subversion.  It  was  granted  by  the  TC  &  the  CA.     Issue:   WON   charge   under   PD   1866   be   quashed   on   ground   of   double   jeopardy   in   view   of   the   previous   charge  under  RA  1700.     Held:  No.   1. Art.   III   of   the   Constitution   &   RoC   117   state   that  for  double  jeopardy  to  occur,  acquittal,   conviction   or   dismissal   in   previous   cases   must   have   occurred.   In   this   case,   first   case   was  not  even  arraigned  yet.   2. They   are   different   offenses.   RA   1700   punishes   subversion   while   PD   1866   punishes  illegal  possession  of  firearms.     However,   since   RA   7636   totally   repealed   subversion   or   RA   1700,   &   since   this   is   favorable   to   the   accused,   we   can   no   longer   charge   accused   with   RA   1700   even   if   they   didn’t   raise   this   issue.   PD   1866   should   be  

amended   to   mere   illegal   possession   of   firearms  without  furtherance  of  subversion     People  v.  Lacson,  382  SCRA  365  (2002)   Facts:   Soon   after   the   announcement   on   May   18,   1995   that   the   Kuratong   Baleleng   gang   had   been   slain   in   a   shootout   w/   the   police,   2   witnesses   surfaced   providing   the   testimony   that   the   said   slaying   was   a   rub-­‐out.   On   June   1,   1995,   Chief   Superintendent   Job   A.   Mayo,   PNP   Director   for   Investigation,   filed   murder   charges   with   the   Office   of   the   Ombudsman   against   97   officers   &   personnel   of   ABRITFG.   The   next-­‐of-­‐kin   of   the   slain   KBG   members   also   filed   murder   charges   against   the   same  officers  and  personnel.     On   Nov.   2,   1995,   after   2   resolutions,   the   Ombudsman   filed   before   the   SB   11   information[s]   of  murder  against  the  defendant  &  25  policemen  as   principals.   Upon   motion   of   the   respondent,   the   criminal   cases   were   remanded   to   the   Ombudsman   &   in   a   re-­‐investigation,   the   information[s]   were   amended   downgrading   the   principal   into   an   accessory.   With   the   downgrading   of   charges,   the   case   was   later   transferred   from   the   SB   to   the   RTC   not  due  to  jurisdictional  questions  over  the  suspects   but   due   to   the   failure   to   indicate   that   the   offenses   charged  therein  were  committed  in  relation  to,  or  in   discharge   of,   the   official   functions   of   the   respondent,   as   required   by   RA   8249.   Before   the   arraignment,   the   witnesses   of   the   prosecution   recanted   their   statements   while   the   7   private   complainants   submitted   their   affidavits   of   desistance.   All   26   suspects   filed   individual   motions   to  (1)  make  a  judicial  determination  of  the  existence   of   probable   cause   for   the   issuance   of   warrants   of   arrest;   (2)   hold   in   abeyance   the   issuance   of   the   warrants,  &  (3)  dismiss  the  cases  should  the  TC  find   lack  of  probable  cause.  The  cases  were  dismissed.     It   was   on   March   27,   2001   when   PNP   director   Mendoza  indorsed  to  the  DOJ  new  affidavits  of  new   witnesses   w/c   it   began   to   investigate   &   to   file   w/   the   RTC.   The   respondent,   invoking   among   others,   their   right   against   double   jeopardy,   then   filed   w/   the   CA   a   petition   stating   that   §8,   Rule   117   of   the  

Rañeses  26     2000   Rules   on   Crim.   Pro.   bans   the   revival   of   the   murder  cases  against  him;  a  petition  the  CA  denied.       On   June   6,   2001,   11   Information[s]   for   murder   involving   the   killing   of   the   same   members   of   the   Kuratong   Baleleng   gang   were   filed   before   the   RTC   QC.   The   new   Information[s]   charged   as   principals   34   people,   including   respondent   Lacson   &   his   25   other   co-­‐accused   in   Crim.   Cases   Nos.   Q-­‐99-­‐81679   to   Q-­‐99-­‐81689.   The   defendant   filed   for   determination   of   probable   cause   &   an   outright   dismissal   in   the   RTC.   The   CA   considered   the   original   cases   to   be   provisionally   dismissed   &   the   new   cases   as   mere   revivals.   Under   §8   2000   RCP   117,   the   cases   were   dismissed.     Issue:   WON   §8,   Rule   117   bars   the   filing   of   the   11   information[s]   against   the   respondent   Lacson   involving   the   killing   of   some   members   of   the   Kuratong  Baleleng  gang.     Held:   Remanded   to   the   RTC   to   determine   if   they   complied   with   rule   and   case   should   be   dismissed.   There  is  no  question  that  the  new  rule  can  be  given   retroactive   effect   given   RPC   Art.   22.   There   can   be   no   ruling,   however,   due   to   the   lack   of   sufficient   factual  bases  to  support  such  a  ruling.  There  is  need   of  proof  to  show  the  ff.  facts:   1. provisional   dismissal   of   the   case   had   the   express  consent  of  the  accused   2. whether   it   was   ordered   by   the   court   after   giving  notice  to  the  offended  party   3. whether  the  2  year  period  to  revive  the  case   has  already  elapsed   4. whether  there  is  justification  for  filing  of  the   cases  beyond  the  2  yr  period.   The  respondent  expressed  consent,  but  the  records   don’t   reveal   whether   the   notices   to   the   offended   parties   were   given   before   the   cases   were   provisionally   dismissed.   Only   the   right   to   double   Jeopardy   by   the   defendant   was   tackled   by   the   litigants.   The   records   are   also   inconclusive   w/   regards   to   the   2-­‐year   bar,   if   w/in   or   without.   Because  of  this,  both  prosecution  &  defendant  must   be   given   ample   time   to   adduce   evidence   on   the   presence  or  absence  of  the  adduced  evidence.    

People  v.  Lacson,  400  SCRA  267  (2003)   Facts:   Before   the   court   is   the   petitioner’s   MFR   of   the   resolution   dated   May   23,   2002,   for   the   determination   of   several   factual   issues   relative   to   the   application   of   §8   RCP   117   on   the   dismissal   of   the   cases   Q-­‐99-­‐81679   &   Q-­‐99-­‐81689   against   the   respondent.   The   respondent   was   charged   with   the   shooting   &   killing   of   11   male   persons.   The   court   confirmed  the  express  consent  of  the  respondent  in   the   provisional   dismissal   of   the   aforementioned   cases   when   he   filed   for   judicial   determination.   The   court  also  ruled  the  need  to  determine  whether  the   other  facts  for  its  application  are  attendant.   Issues:       1. WON   the   requisites   for   the   applicability   of   §8,  2000  RCP  117  were  complied  w/  in  the   Kuratong  Baleleng  cases   • Was   express   consent   given   by   the   respondent?   • Was   notice   for   the   motion,   the   hearing   and   the   subsequent   dismissal   given   to   the  heirs  of  the  victims?   2. WON   time-­‐bar   in   §8   RCP   117   should   be   applied  prospectively  or  retroactively.     Held:   1. No.  Sec.  8,  Rule  117  is  not  applicable  to  the   case   since   the   conditions   for   its   applicability,   namely:   1)   prosecution   with   the   express   consent   of   the   accused   or   both   of   them   move   for   provisional   dismissal,   2)   offended   party   notified,   3)   court   grants   motion  and  dismisses  cases  provisionally,  4)   public   prosecutor   served   with   copy   of   orders  of  provisional  dismissal,  which  is  the   defendant’s   burden   to   prove,   w/c   in   this   case  hasn’t  been  done.   • The   defendant   never   filed   and   denied   unequivocally  in  his  statements,  through   counsel   at   the   Court   of   Appeals,   that   he   filed   for   dismissal   nor   did   he   agree   to   a   provisional  dismissal  thereof.   • No   notice   of   motion   for   provisional   dismissal,   hearing   and   subsequent   dismissal   was   given   to   the   heirs   of   the   victims.  

Rañeses  27     2. No.   Time-­‐bar   should   not   be   applied   retroactively.   Though   procedural   rules   may   be   applied   retroactively,   it   should   not   be   if   to   do   so   would   work   injustice   or   would   involve   intricate   problems   of   due   process.     Statutes   should   be   construed   in   light   of   the   purposes   to   be   achieved   &   the   evils   to   be   remedied.   This   is   because   to   do   so   would   be   prejudicial  to  the  State  since,  given  that  the   Judge   dismissed   the   case   on   March   29,1999,   &  the  New  rule  took  effect  on  Dec  1,2000,  it   would   only   in   effect   give   them   1   yr   &   3   months   to   work   instead   of   2   yrs.   At   that   time,  they  had  no  knowledge  of  the  said  rule   and   therefore   they   should   not   be   penalized   for   that.   “Indeed   for   justice   to   prevail,   the   scales   must   balance;   justice   is   not   to   be   dispensed  for  the  accused  alone.”     The   2-­‐yr   period   fixed   in   the   new   rule   is   for   the   benefit   of   both   the   State   &   the   accused.   It  shouldn’t  be  emasculated  &  reduced  by  an   inordinate   retroactive   application   of   the   time-­‐bar  therein  provided  merely  to  benefit   the   accused.   To   do   so   would   cause   an   injustice   of   hardship   to   the   state   &   adversely   affect   the   administration   of   justice.     People  v.  Lacson,  413  SCRA  20  (2003)   Facts:   Petitioner   asserts   that   retroactive   application   of   penal   laws   should   also   cover   procedures,   and   that   these   should   be   applied   only   to  the  sole  benefit  of  the  accused.    Petitioner  asserts   that   Sec   8   was   meant   to   reach   back   in   time   to   provide   relief   to   the   accused   in   line   with   the   constitutional  guarantee  to  the  right  to  speedy  trial.     Issues:   1. WON   the   5   Associate   Justices   can   inhibit   themselves   from   deciding   in   the   MFR   given   they  were  only  appointed  in  the  SC  after  his   Feb.  19,  2002  oral  arguments.   2. WON   the   application   of   the   time-­‐bar   under   §8   RCP   117   be   given   a   retroactive   application   w/o   reservations,   only   &   solely  

on   the   basis   of   its   being   favorable   to   the   accused.     Held:     1. The   rule   should   be   applied   prospectively.   The  court  upheld  the  petitioners’  contention   that   while   §8   secures   the   rights   of   the   accused,  it  doesn’t  &  shouldn’t  preclude  the   equally  important  right  of  the  State  to  public   justice.    If  a  procedural  rule  impairs  a  vested   right,  or  would  work  injustice,  the  said  rule   may  not  be  given  a  retroactive  application   2. No.  The  Court  isn’t  mandated  to  apply  rules   retroactively   just   because   it’s   favorable   to   the   accused.     The   time-­‐bar   under   the   new   rule   is   intended   to   benefit   both   the   State   &   the  accused.  When  the  rule  was  approved  by   the   court,   it   intended   that   the   rule   be   applied   prospectively   and   not   retroactively,   for   to   do   so   would   be   tantamount   to   the   denial  of  the  State’s  right  to  due  process.    A   retroactive   application   would   result   in   absurd,   unjust   &   oppressive   consequences   to   the   State   &   to   the   victims   of   crimes   &   their  heirs.    

Construction/Interpretation  of  Penal  Laws     Reyes:  Penal  laws  are  strictly  construed  against   the   Government   and   liberally   in   favor   of   the   accused.   (U.S.   v.   Abad   Santos,   36   Phil.   243;   People   v.  Yu  Hai,  99  Phil.  728)  The  rule  that  penal  statutes   should   be   strictly   construed   against   the   State   may   be   invoked   only   where   the   law   is   ambiguous   and   there   is   doubt   as   to   its   interpretation.   Where   the   law  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  there  is  no  room  for   the   application   of   the   rule.   (People   v.   Gatchalian,   104  Phil.  664)      

Rañeses  28                                        

Const.  (1987),  Art.  III,  Sec.  14(2)   In   all   criminal   prosecutions,   the   accused   shall   be   presumed  innocent  until  the  contrary  is  proved,  and   shall   enjoy   the   right   to   be   heard   by   himself   and   counsel,   to   be   informed   of   the   nature   and   cause   of   the   accusation   against   him,   to   have   a   speedy,   impartial,   and   public   trial,   to   meet   the   witnesses   face   to   face,   and   to   have   compulsory   process   to   secure   the   attendance   of   witnesses   and   the   production   of   evidence   in   his   behalf.   However,   after   arraignment,  trial  may  proceed  notwithstanding  the   absence   of   the   accused:   Provided,   that   he   has   been   duly   notified   and   his   failure   to   appear   is   unjustifiable.  

 

 

Spanish   text   of   the   RPC   prevails   over   its   English  translation.      

Retroactive   application   if   favorable   to   the   accused.  (RPC,  Art.  22)   *Refer  to  page  21  for  the  full  text  for  Art.  22    

Prescribed,  but  undeserved,  penalties     RPC,  Art.  5,  2nd  par.    

In   the   same   way   the   court   shall   submit   to   the   Chief   Executive,   through   the   Department   of   Justice,   such   statement   as   may   be   deemed   proper,   without   suspending   the   execution   of   the  sentence,  when  a  strict  enforcement  of  the   provisions   of   this   Code   would   result   in   the   imposition   of   a   clearly   excessive   penalty,   taking   into   consideration   the   degree   of   malice   and  the  injury  caused  by  the  offense.                        

 

                                       

Rañeses  29    

Felonies  and  Criminal  Liability  

5. “Omission”   should   be   construed   as   inaction,   the   failure   to   perform   a   positive   duty   which   one   is   bound   to   do.   There   must   be   a   law   requiring   the   doing   or   performance  of  an  act.  If  there  is  no  law  that   requires   a   person   to   perform   a   certain   act,   failure   to   do   such   act   would   not   result   in   a   felony   and   would   therefore   not   be   punishable  by  the  RPC.      

  A. Felonies       RPC,  Art.  3   Definition.   -­‐   Acts   and   omissions   punishable   by   law   are  felonies  (delitos).   Felonies  are  committed  not  only  by  means  of  deceit   (d+olo)  but  also  by  means  of  fault  (culpa).   There   is   deceit   when   the   act   is   performed   with   deliberate   intent;   and   there   is   fault   when   the   wrongful   act   results   from   imprudence,   negligence,   lack  of  foresight,  or  lack  of  skill.  

 

Act  

 

Reyes:     1. Felonies   are   acts   and   omissions   punishable  by  the  RPC.     2. Felonies  have  certain  elements.   1. That   there   must   be   an   act   or   omission.   2. That   the   act   or   omission   must   be   punishable   by   the   Revised   Penal   Code.   3. That   the   act   is   performed   or   the   omission   incurred   by   means   of   dolo   or   culpa.   (People   v.   Gonzales,   G.R.   No.   80762,   March   19,   1990,   183   SCRA  309,  324)   3. “Act”   must   be   understood   as   any   bodily   movement   tending   to   produce   some   effect   in   the   external   world,   it   being   unnecessary   that   the   same   be   actually   produced,   as   the   possibility   of   its   production   is   sufficient.   (People   v.   Gonzales,   supra)   But   the   act   must   be   one   which   is   defined   by   the   RPC   as   constituting   a   felony;   or,   at   least,   an   overt   act   of   that   felony,   that   is,   an   external   act   which   has   direct   connection   with   the   felony   intended   to  be  committed.  (Art.  6)     4. The   act   must   be   external,   because   internal   acts   are   beyond   the   spere   of   penal  law.    

People  v.  Gonzales,  183  SCRA  309  (1990)     Facts:   Appeal   of   Custodio   Gonzales,   Sr.   that   the   CA   erred   in   convicting   him   of   murder   qualified   with   treachery   and   evident   premeditation   from   a   previous   case   on   the   sole   basis   of   Huntoria’s   (eye   witness)  account.     Previous   case:     That   appellant   with   his   3   robust   sons   along   with   brother   and   sister   Fausta   and   Rogelio   conspired   to   kill   Augusto   and   Fausta’s   landlord,   Peñacerrada.     The   victim   sustained   16   stab,   puncture,   and   lacerated   wounds,   5   of   which   were  fatal.    The  lone  eyewitness  was  Huntoria  who   claimed   that   he   saw   all   6   accused   ganging   up   on   the   victim,   but   he   failed   to   state   who   actually   did   the   stabbing  or  hacking.     All   the   accused   petitioned   for   parole   except   for   appellant     Issues:   WON   the   appellant   had   committed   the   felony   of   murder   with   treachery   and   evident   premeditation.     Held:   No.   The   Court   held   that   the   prosecution   was   unable   to   prove   the   appellant’s   guilt   beyond   reasonable  doubt  because:  (a)  Huntoria  was  a  poor   eyewitness   (took   8   months   to   come   forward   and   wanted   to   get   in   the   good   graces   of   his   landlord’s   family)   and   was   unable   to   supply   any   information   as  to  what  the  appellant  actually  did  (the  act)  in  his   alleged   participation   in   the   murder;   (b)   it   was   illogical   that   the   appellant’s   3   robust   sons   together   with   Augusto   and   Fausta   would   bring   their   aging   65-­‐year   old   father   to   the   victim’s   house   just   to   participate   in   the   killing   considering   the   appellant  

Rañeses  30     lived   a   good   kilometer   away   from   the   scene   of   the   crime;  (c)  the  prior  investigations  were  sloppy  and   provided   no   decent   evidence   to   support   the   appellant’s  participation  in  the  murder.     Doctrine:   Felony   must   involve   an   act   (any   bodily   movement   tending   to   produce   some   effect   in   the   external   world)   or   omission.     The   act   of   hacking   or   stabbing  the  victim  was  never  proven  to  have  been   done   by   the   appellant.   Therefore,   the   accused   had   not  committed  a  felony.      

2.   Being   entrusted   with   the   collection   of   taxes,   licenses,   fees   and   other   imposts,   shall   be   guilty   or   any  of  the  following  acts  or  omissions:   (b)  Failing  voluntarily  to  issue  a  receipt,  as  provided   by   law,   for   any   sum   of   money   collected   by   him   officially.   Art.  223   Conniving   with   or   consenting   to   evasion.   —   Any   public   officer   who   shall   consent   to   the   escape   of   a   prisoner  in  his  custody  or  charge,  shall  be  punished:  

RPC,  Art.  116   Misprision   of   treason.   -­‐   Every   person   owing   allegiance  to  (the  United  States)  the  Government  of   the   Philippine   Islands,   without   being   a   foreigner,   and   having   knowledge   of   any   conspiracy   against   them,   who   conceals   or   does   not   disclose   and   make   known   the   same,   as   soon   as   possible   to   the   governor   or   fiscal   of   the   province,   or   the   mayor   or   fiscal  of  the  city  in  which  he  resides,  as  the  case  may   be,  shall  be  punished  as  an  accessory  to  the  crime  of   treason.  

1.   By   prision   correccional   in   its   medium   and   maximum   periods   and   temporary   special   disqualification  in  its  maximum  period  to  perpetual   special   disqualification,   if   the   fugitive   shall   have   been  sentenced  by  final  judgment  to  any  penalty.   2.   By   prision   correccional   in   its   minimum   period   and   temporary   special   disqualification,   in   case   the   fugitive   shall   not   have   been   finally   convicted   but   only   held   as   a   detention   prisoner   for   any   crime   or   violation  of  law  or  municipal  ordinance.  

Art.  137   Disloyalty   of   public   officers   or   employees.   -­‐   The   penalty   of   prision   correccional   in   its   minimum   period   shall   be   imposed   upon   public   officers   or   employees   who   have   failed   to   resist   a   rebellion   by   all   the   means   in   their   power,   or   shall   continue   to   discharge   the   duties   of   their   offices   under   the   control  of  the  rebels  or  shall  accept  appointment  to   office  under  them.  (Restored  by  E.O.  No.  187)  

Art.  234   Refusal   to   discharge   elective   office.   —   The   penalty   of   arresto   mayor   or   a   fine   not   exceeding   1,000   pesos,   or   both,   shall   be   imposed   upon   any   person   who,   having  been  elected  by  popular  election  to  a  public   office,   shall   refuse   without   legal   motive   to   be   sworn   in  or  to  discharge  the  duties  of  said  office.  

Art.  208  

Art.  275  (1)    

Prosecution  of  offenses;  negligence  and  tolerance.  —   The   penalty   of   prision   correccional   in   its   minimum   period   and   suspension   shall   be   imposed   upon   any   public   officer,   or   officer   of   the   law,   who,   in   dereliction   of   the   duties   of   his   office,   shall   maliciously  refrain  from  instituting  prosecution  for   the   punishment   of   violators   of   the   law,   or   shall   tolerate  the  commission  of  offenses.  

Abandonment   of   person   in   danger   and   abandonment  of  one's  own  victim.  —  The  penalty  of   arresto  mayor  shall  be  imposed  upon:   1.  Anyone  who  shall  fail  to  render  assistance  to  any   person   whom   he   shall   find   in   an   uninhabited   place   wounded   or   in   danger   of   dying,   when   he   can   render   such   assistance   without   detriment   to   himself,   unless   such   omission   shall   constitute   a   more   serious  offense.  

Art.  213  (2)  (b)   Frauds  against  the  public  treasury  and  offenses.  —   The  penalty  of  prision  correccional  in  its  medium  

period   to   prision   mayor   in   its   minimum   period,   or   a   fine  ranging  from  200  to  10,000  pesos,  or  both,  shall   be  imposed  upon  any  public  officer  who:  

 

 

 

Rañeses  31     Presidential  Decree  no.  953     Requiring  the  planting  of  trees  in  certain  places  and   penalizing   unauthorized   cutting,   destruction,   damaging   and   injuring   of   certain   trees,   plants   and   vegetation     WHEREAS,   the   planting   of   trees   on   lands   adjoining   the   edge   of   rivers   and   creeks   in   both   a   measure   of   beautification  and  reforestation;  and     WHEREAS,   the   planting   of   trees   along   roads   and   areas   intended   for   the   common   use   of   owners   of   lots   in   subdivisions   will   provide   shade   and   healthful   environment  therein;     NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  FERDINAND  E.  MARCOS,  President   of   the   Philippines,   by   virtue   of   the   powers   vested   in   me   by  the  Constitution,  do  hereby  order  and  decree:     Section  1.  The  following  shall  plant  trees:     1.   Every   person   who   owns   land   adjoining   a   river   or   creek,  shall  plant  trees  extending  at  least  five  meters  on   his   land   adjoining   the   edge   of   the   bank   of   the   river   or   creek,   except   when   such   land,   due   to   its   permanent   improvement,  cannot  be  planted  with  trees;     2.   Every   owner   of   an   existing   subdivision   shall   plant   trees  in  the  open  spaces  required  to  be  reserved  for  the   common   use   and   enjoyment   of   the   owners   of   the   lots   therein   as   well   as   along   all   roads   and   service   streets.   The   subdivision   owner   shall   consult   the   Bureau   of   Forest   Development  as  to  the  appropriate  species  of  trees  to  be   planted  and  the  manner  of  planting  them;  and     3.   Every   holder   of   a   license   agreement,   lease,   license   or   permit   from   the   Government,   involving   occupation   and   utilization  of  forest  or  grazing  land  with  a  river  or  creek   therein,   shall   plant   trees   extending   at   least   twenty   (20)   meters  from  each  edge  of  the  bank  of  the  river  or  creek.     The   persons   hereinabove   required   to   plant   trees   shall   take   good   care   of   them,   and,   from   time   to   time,   remove   any  tree  planted  by  them  in  their  respective  areas  which   has   grown   very   old,   is   diseased,   or   is   defective,   and   replant   with   trees   their   respective   areas   whenever   necessary.     Section   2.   Every   owner   of   land   subdivided   into   residential/commercial/industrial   lots   after   the   effectivity   of   this   Decree   shall   reserve,   develop   and  

maintain   not   less   than   thirty   percent   (30%)   of   the   total   area  of  the  subdivision,  exclusive  of  roads,  service  streets   and   alleys,   as   open   space   for   parks   and   recreational   areas.     No  plan  for  a  subdivision  shall  be  approved  by  the  Land   Registration   Commission   or   any   office   or   agency   of   the   government   unless   at   least   thirty   percent   (30%)   of   the   total   area   of   the   subdivision,   exclusive   of   roads,   service   streets   and   alleys,   is   reserved   as   open   space   for   parks   and  recreational  areas  and  the  owner  thereof  undertakes   to  develop  such  open  space,  within  three  (3)  years  from   the  approval  of  the  subdivision  plan,  in  accordance  with   the  development  plan  approved  by  the  Bureau  of  Forest   Development   and   to   maintain   such   parks   and   recreational  areas.     Section   3.   Any   person   who   cuts,   destroys,   damages   or   injures,   naturally   growing   or   planted   trees   of   any   kind,   flowering   or   ornamental   plants   and   shrubs,   or   plants   of   scenic,   aesthetic   and   ecological   values,   along   public   roads,   in   plazas,   parks   other   than   national   parks,   school   premises   or   in   any   other   public   ground   or   place,   or   on   banks   of   rivers   or   creeks,   or   along   roads   in   land   subdivisions  or  areas  therein  for  the  common  use  of  the   owners   of   lots   therein,   or   any   species   of   vegetation   or   forest   cover   found   therein   shall,   be   punished   with   imprisonment  for  not  less  than  six  months  and  not  more   than   two   years,   or   a   fine   of   not   less   than   five   hundred   pesos   and   not   more   than   five   thousand   pesos,   or   with   both  such  imprisonment  and  fine  at  the  discretion  of  the   court,   except   when   the   cutting,   destroying,   damaging   or   injuring   is   necessary   for   public   safety   or   the   pruning   thereof   is   necessary   to   enhance   beauty,   and   only   upon   the   approval   of   the   duly   authorized   representative   of   the   head   of   agency   or   political   subdivision   having   jurisdiction   therein,   or   of   the   Director   of   Forest   Development  in  the  case  of  trees  on  banks  of  rivers  and   creeks,  or  of  the  owner  of  the  land  subdivision  in  the  case   of   trees   along   roads   and   in   other   areas   therein   for   the   common  use  of  owners  of  lots  therein.  If  the  offender  is  a   corporation,  partnership  or  association,  the  penalty  shall   be   imposed   upon   the   officer   or   officers   thereof   responsible  for  the  offense,  and  if  such  officer  or  officers   are   aliens,   in   addition   to   the   penalty   herein   prescribed,   he   or   they   shall   be   deported   without   further   proceedings   before  the  Commission  on  Immigration  and  Deportation.   Nothing  in  this  Decree  shall  prevent  the  cancellation  of  a   license   agreement,   lease,   license   or   permit   from   the   Government,  if  such  cancellation  is  prescribed  therein  or   in  Government  regulations  for  such  offense.    

Rañeses  32     Section  4.  Any  person  who  shall  violate  any  provision  of   Section   one   hereof,   or   any   regulation   promulgated   thereunder,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  not   less   than   six   months   but   not   more   than   two   years,   or   with   a   fine   of   not   less   than   five   hundred   pesos   but   not   more   than   five   thousand   pesos,   or   with   both   such   imprisonment   than   fine   at   the   discretion   of   the   court.   If   the   offender   is   a   public   officer   or   employee,   he   shall,   in   addition,   be   dismissed   from   the   public   service   and   disqualified  perpetually  to  hold  public  office.     Section   5.   Any   person   who   shall   violate   the   provision   of   Section   2   hereof,   or   any   regulation   promulgated   thereunder,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  not   less  than  two  (2)  years  but  not  more  than  five  (5)  years,   or   with   a   fine   equivalent   to   the   value,   at   current   valuation,   of   the   area   representing   thirty   percent   (30%)   of  the  total  area  of  the  subdivision,  or  both  such  fine  and   imprisonment  at  the  discretion  of  the  Court.     Section  6.  The  Director  of  Forest  Development  shall  issue   such  rules  and  regulations  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry   out  the  purposes  of  this  Decree.     Section   7.   All   laws,   rules   and   regulations,   or   parts   thereof,  inconsistent  herewith  are  hereby  repealed.     Section   8.   This   Decree   shall   take   effect   upon   its   promulgation.     Done   in   the   City   of   Manila,   this   6th   day   of   July   in   the   year   of  Our  Lord,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventy-­‐six.     Presidential  Decree  no.  1153     Requiring   the   planting   of   one   tree   every   month   for   five   consecutive   years   by   every   citizen   of   the   Philippines     WHEREAS,   more   abundant   natural   resources,   particularly   forest   resources,   will   prevent   floods,   droughts,   erosion   and   sedimentation,   and   will   increase   our   water   supply   needed   to   generate   more   power,   expand   farm   productivity,   and   meet   the   ever   increasing   demand   for   domestic   consumption   of   our   exploding   population;  and     WHEREAS,   to   achieve   a   holistic   ecosystem   approach   to   forest   resource   management,   to   prevent   irreversible   consequences   of   human   activities   on   the   environment,   and  to  promote  a  healthier  ecosystem  for  our  people,  it  is  

time   to   make   an   urgent   call   upon   our   citizenry   to   plant   trees:     NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  FERDINAND  E.  MARCOS,  President   of   the   Philippines,   by   virtue   of   the   powers   vested   in   me   by   the   Constitution,   do   hereby   order   and   decree   the   following:     Section   1.   It   is   the   policy   of   the   State   to   call   upon   every   citizen  of  the  Philippines  to  help,  as  a  duty  and  obligation,   to  conserve  and  develop  the  resources  of  the  country.     Section   2.   In   furtherance   of   said   policy,   every   citizen   of   the   Philippines   at   least   ten   (10)   years   of   age,   actually   residing  therein,  unless  physically  disabled  to  do  so,  shall   plant  one  tree  every  month  for  five  (5)  consecutive  years.     Section  3.  The  planting  of  such  trees  shall  be  done  in  any   of  the  following  places:     (a)  In  lands  or  lots  owned  by  his  family;     (b)  In  lands  or  lots  leased  by  his  family  with  the  consent   of  the  owner  thereof;     (c)   In   lands   which   are   parts   of   public   grounds   or   places   such  as  plazas,  schools,  markets,  roadside  and  parks,  and     (d)   In   lands   of   the   public   domain   designated   by   the   Presidential   Council   for   Forest   Ecosystem   Management,   hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Council,  such  as  appropriate   forest   lands,   grazing   or   pasture   lands,   mineral   lands,   resettlement  lands,  civil  and  military  reservations.     Section   4.   The   trees   to   be   planted   shall   be   fruit-­‐bearing,   shade,  ornamental  or  forest  trees,  and  the  same  shall  be   taken   care   of   for   at   least   two   years   after   each   planting   and   replaced   if   the   same   die,   are   diseased   or   are   defective.     Section   5.   The   Council,   in   consultation   with   the   appropriate   government   agencies,   shall   issue   such   rules   and  regulations  which  may  be  necessary  to  carry  out  the   purposes   of   this   Decree   and   Letter   of   Instruction   No.   423   whenever  applicable.     Section  6.  Any  person  who  violates  any  provision  of  this   Decree  or  any  rule  or  regulation  promulgated  thereunder   shall   be   punished   with   a   fine   of   not   more   than   one   thousand   pesos   or,   in   appropriate   cases,   with   disqualification  to  acquire  or  enjoy  any  privilege  granted   exclusively   to   citizens   of   the   Philippines,   such   as   the  

Rañeses  33     acquisition   either   through   sale,   free   patent,   homestead,   or  lease  of  public  lands,  enjoyment  of  a  franchise  to  own   or   operate   a   public   utility   or   the   grant   of   lease,   license   or   a   privilege   involving   natural   resources;   and   for   a   period   of   five   years   be   disqualified   to   hold   public   office,   to   graduate  from  any  educational  institution  at  all  levels,  to   take   any   bar,   board   or   civil   service   examination,   and   to   practice   any   profession   licensed   and   regulated   by   the   Supreme   Court   or   the   Professional   Regulation   Commission.     Section   7.   This   Decree   shall   take   effect   upon   its   promulgation.     Done  in  the  City  of  Manila,  this  6th  day  of  June  in  the  year   of  Our  Lord,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventy-­‐seven.    

Omission   People   v.   Sylvestre   and   Atienza,   56   Phil.   353   (1931)   Facts:     Martin   Atienza   was   convicted   as   principal   by   direct   participation   and   Romana   Silvestre   as   accomplice  of  the  crime  of  arson  by  the  CFI.       On   the   night   of   November   25,   1950,   while   the   defendants  and  Nicolas  De  la  Cruz  and  his  wife  were   gathered  after  dinner,  Martin  Atienza  ordered  them   to   take   their   furniture   out   of   the   house   as   he   was   going  to  set  it  on  fire  to  get  revenge  on  the  people  of   Masocol,   who   instigated   the   charge   of   adultery   against   him   and   Silvestre   and   drove   them   out   of   town.   As   Atienza   had   a   gun   in   hand,   nobody   said   anything.   The   de   la   Cruz   couple   left   to   alert   the   barrio   lieutenant,   but   before   they   got   there   they   heard   the   cries   of   “Fire!   Fire!”   and   looked   back   to   see  their  home  on  fire.  The  fire  destroyed  about  48   houses.  Romana  was  accused  for  listening  to  her  co-­‐ defendants   threat   without   raising   a   protest,   and   not   giving   the   alarm   when   the   latter   set   fire   to   the   house.     Issue:   WON   Silvestre’s   failure   is   an   omission   that   belongs  properly  to  the  meaning  in  Art.3  and  hence,   punishable.     Held:   No.   Mere   passive   presence   at   the   scene   of   another’s   crime,   mere   silence   and   failure   to   give   the   alarm,  without  evidence  of  agreement  or  conspiracy,   is   not   punishable.     An   accomplice   is   one   who   does  

not   take   a   direct   part   in   the   commission   of   the   act,   who   does   not   induce   other   to   commit   it,   nor   cooperates  in  the  commission  of  the  act  by  another   act   without   which   it   would   not   have   been   accomplished,  yet  cooperates  in  the  execution  of  the   act  by  previous  or  simultaneous  actions.         There   is   no   evidence   of   conspiracy   or   cooperation.   Mere  passive  presence  at  the  scene  of  another’s  crime   does   not   constitute   the   cooperation   required   in   Article  14  of  the  Penal  code.    

Punishable  by  the  Revised  Penal  Code     Nullum  crimen,  nulla  poena  sine  lege   *Refer  to  page  1  for  the  definition,  as  elucidated  by   Justice  Fernando     RPC,  Art.  3   *Refer  to  page  29  for  the  full  text  of  the  provision   Art.  5   Duty   of   the   court   in   connection   with   acts   which   should   be   repressed   but   which   are   not   covered   by   the   law,   and   in   cases   of   excessive   penalties.   -­‐   Whenever   a   court  has  knowledge  of  any  act  which  it  may  deem   proper   to   repress   and   which   is   not   punishable   by   law,   it   shall   render   the   proper   decision,   and   shall   report   to   the   Chief   Executive,   through   the   Department  of  Justice,  the  reasons  which  induce  the   court   to   believe   that   said   act   should   be   made   the   subject  of  penal  legislation.   Art.  21   Penalties   that   may   be   imposed.   -­‐   No   felony   shall   be   punishable   by   any   penalty   not   prescribed   by   law   prior  to  its  commission.  

 

 

How  committed     RPC,  Art.  3   *Refer  to  page  29  for  the  full  text  of  the  provision   Act.  365   Imprudence  and  negligence.  —  Any  person  who,  

 

Rañeses  34     of   Art.   3,   the   act   is   performed   with   deliberate   intent   (with   malice).   The   offender,   in   performing   the   act   or   in   incurring   the   omission,   has   the   intention   to   cause   an   injury   to   another.   In   culpable   felonies,  the  act  or  omission  of  the  offender   is   not   malicious.   The   injury   caused   by   the   offender   to   another   person   is   “unintentional,   it   being   simply   the   incident   of   another   act   performed   without   malice.”   (People  v.  Sara,  55  Phil.  939)     3. In   felonies   committed   by   means   of   dolo   or   with   malice   and   in   felonies   committed   by   means   of   fault   or   culpa,   the   acts   or   omissions  must  be  voluntary.     4. A   person   causing   damage   or   injury   to   another,   without   malice   or   fault,   is   not   criminally  liable  under  the  RPC.    

(Cont.)   by   reckless   imprudence,   shall   commit   any   act  which,  had  it  been  intentional,  would  constitute   a   grave   felony,   shall   suffer   the   penalty   of   arresto   mayor   in   its   maximum   period   to   prision   correccional   in   its   medium   period;   if   it   would   have   constituted   a   less   grave   felony,   the   penalty   of   arresto  mayor  in  its  minimum  and  medium  periods   shall  be  imposed;  if  it  would  have  constituted  a  light   felony,  the  penalty  of  arresto  menor  in  its  maximum   period  shall  be  imposed.   Any   person   who,   by   simple   imprudence   or   negligence,   shall   commit   an   act   which   would   otherwise  constitute  a  grave  felony,  shall  suffer  the   penalty   of   arresto   mayor   in   its   medium   and   maximum   periods;   if   it   would   have   constituted   a   less   serious   felony,   the   penalty   of   arresto   mayor   in   its  minimum  period  shall  be  imposed.   When   the   execution   of   the   act   covered   by   this   article   shall   have   only   resulted   in   damage   to   the   property  of  another,  the  offender  shall  be  punished   by   a   fine   ranging   from   an   amount   equal   to   the   value   of   said   damages   to   three   times   such   value,   but   which   shall   in   no   case   be   less   than   twenty-­‐five   pesos.  

 

Dolo  

A   fine   not   exceeding   two   hundred   pesos   and   censure  shall  be  imposed  upon  any  person  who,  by   simple  imprudence  or  negligence,  shall  cause  some   wrong   which,   if   done   maliciously,   would   have   constituted  a  light  felony.   In  the  imposition  of  these  penalties,  the  court  shall   exercise   their   sound   discretion,   without   regard   to   the  rules  prescribed  in  Article  sixty-­‐four.  

   

 

Reyes:     The  provisions  contained  in  this  article  shall  not  be   1. Art.   3   classifies   felonies,   according   to   to   applicable:   the  means  by  which  they  are  committed,     into   (1)   intentional   felonies,   and   (2)   culpable   felonies.   Thus,   the   second          1.   When   the   penalty   provided   for   the   offense   is   paragraph   of   the   aforementioned   article   equal   to   or   lower   than   those   provided   in   the   first   states   that   are   committed   not   only   two   paragraphs   of  felonies   this   article,   in   which   case   the   by   means   of   deceit   (dolo)   but   also   by   mean   court  shall  impose  the  penalty  next  lower  in  degree   of  fault   (culpa).   than   that   which   should     be   imposed   in   the   period   which   they  may   deem   proper  to   pply.   2. There   is,   obviously,   a  adistinct   difference   between   intentional   and   culpable     felonies.   In   the   former,   the   act   or   omission   of  the  offender  is  malicious.  In  the  language          2.   When,   by   imprudence   or   negligence   and   with   violation   of   the   Automobile   Law,   to   death   of   a   person  shall  be  caused,  in  which  case  the  defendant  

  Reyes:   1. The   word   “deceit”   in   the   second   paragraph   of   Art.   3   is   not   the   proper   translation   of   the   word   “dolo.”   Dolus   is   equivalent   to   malice,   which   is   the   intent   to   do   an   injury   to   another.   (I   Wharton’s   Criminal  Law  180)     When   the   offender,   in   performing   an   act   or   in   incurring   an   omission,   has   the   intention   to  do  an  injury  to  person,  property  or  right  of   another,   such   offender   acts   with   malice.   If   the  act  or  omission  is  punished  by  the  RPC,   he  is  liable  for  intentional  felony.     2. There   are   certain   requisites   for   dolo   or   malice.   In   order   that   an   act   or   omission   may   be   considered   as   having   been   performed   or   incurred   with   deliberate   intent,  the  following  requisites  must  concur:   1. He  must  have  FREEDOM  while  doing   an  act  or  omitting  to  do  an  act;   2. He   must   have   INTELLIGENCE   while   doing   the   act   or   omitting   to   do   the   act;   3. He   must   have   INTENT   while   doing   the  act  or  omitting  to  do  the  act.    

Rañeses  35     3. When   a   person   acts   without   freedom,   he   is   no   longer   a   human   being   but   a   tool.     Therefore,   a   person   who   acts   under   the   compulsion  of  an  irresistible  force  is  exempt   from   criminal   liability.   (Art.   12,   par.   5)   So   also,  a  person  who  acts  under  the  impulse  of   an  uncontrollable  fear  of  an  equal  or  greater   injury  is  exempt  from  criminal  liability.  (Art.   12,  par.  6)   4. Without   intelligence,   necessary   to   determine  the  morality  of  human  acts,  no   crime   can   exist.   Thus,   the   imbecile   or   insane,   and   the   infant   under   nine   years   of   age,  as  well  as  the  minor  over  nine  but  less   than   fifteen   years   ol   and   act   without   discernment,   have   no   criminal   liability,   because   they   act   without   intelligence.   (Art.   12,  pars.  1,  2  and  3)   5. Intent   to   commit   the   act   with   malice,   being   purely   a   meantal   process,   is   presumed   and   the   presumption   arises   from   the   proof   of   the   commission   of   an   unlawful  act.     6. All   three   requisites   of   voluntariness   in   intentional   felony   must   be   present,   because   “a   voluntary   act   is   free,   intelligent,  and  intelligent  act.”  (U.S.  v.  Ah   Chong,  15  Phil.  488,  495)      

Presumption  of  Intent   U.S.  v.  Apostol,  14  Phil.  92  (1909)   Facts:   Five   individuals,   among   them   being   the   accused   herein,   went   to   the   house   where   Pedro   Tabilisima,   Celestino   Vergara,   and   Tranquilino   Manipul  were  living,  and  there  inquired  after  some   carabaos   that   had   disappeared,   and   because   these   above-­‐mentioned  inmates  answered  that  they  knew   nothing  about  the  matter,  ordered  them  to  leave  the   house,  but  as  the  three  men  named  above  refused  to   do   so   the   accused   Catalino   Apostol,   set   fire   to   the   hut  and  the  same  was  burnt  down.     Issue:     1. WON  proof  of  criminal  intent  is  needed.     2. WON  due  to  the  burnt  hut  being  situated  in   an   uninhabited   place,   it   is   not   proper   to  

apply   article   549,   but   article   554   of   the   Penal  Code.     Held:   1. No.   Criminal   intent   as   well   as   the   will   to   commit   a   crime   are   always   presumed   to   exist  on  the  part  of  the  person  who  executes   an   act   which   the   law   punishes,   unless   the   contrary  shall  appear.  (Art.  1,  Penal  Code.)   2. No.   The   argument   which   the   defense   advances,   based   on   article   554,   which   in   connection   with   553   punishes   the   setting   fire  to  a  building  intended  for  habitation,  in   an   uninhabited   place,   does   not   apply,   because   the   article   question   refers   to   an   edifice  intended  for  human  habitation  in  an   uninhabited   place   at   a   time   when   the   same   is   unoccupied.   It   is   article   549,   which   punishes   with   the   very   severe   penalties   of   cadena  temporal  to  cadena  perpetua  "those   who  shall  set  fire  to  any  edifice,  farmhouse,   hut,  shed,  or  vessel  in  port,  with  knowledge   that   one   or   more   persons   were   within   the   same,"  that  must  be  applied.     Doctrine:   As   intent   is   largely   a   mental   process,   there  is  always  a  presumption  of  intent  aising  from   overt  acts.       U.S.  v.  Catolico,  18  Phil.  504  (1911)   Facts:  On  2  October  1900  justice  of  the  peace  Rafael   B.   Catolico   had   16   cases   against   16   distinct   individuals   each   one   for   violating   a   contract   with   one  Juan  Canillas.  All  cases  were  decided  in  favor  of   Canillas;   and   all   16   cases   appealed,   depositing   P16   as   required   by   law   and   filing   a   bond   of   P50.   On   12   October   1900   Canillas   proved   to   Catolico   that   each   of   the   bonds   were   insolvent.   As   a   result,   Catolico   ordered   the   cancellation   of   the   bonds   filed   and   ordered   the   16   to   file   another   bond.   Canillas   then   asked   for   the   court   to   declare   final   judgment   for   each   of   the   16   cases   and   at   the   same   time   asking   that   the   sums   deposited   by   the   defendants   be   delivered   to   him.   Catolico   agreed.   Attorney   for   the   defendants   in   the   16   cases   then   filed   a   complaint   against   Catolico   for   malversation   of   public   funds.   Catolico  was  convicted  and  now  appeals.    

Rañeses  36       Issue:   WON   Catolico   committed   a   crime   when   he   believed  he  was  performing  an  innocent  act     Held:  No,  he  did  not  commit  a  crime.   1. Essential   elements   for   malversation   of   public  funds  were  not  present   o accused   did   not   convert   the   money   to   his   own   use   or   to   the   use   of   any   other  person   o he   did   not   permit   anybody   else   to   convert  it     To  constitute  a  crime,  the  act  must,  except  in  certain   crimes   made   such   by   statute,   be   accomplished   by   a   criminal  intent  or  by  such  negligence  or  indifference   to  duty  or  to  consequences  as  in  law  is  equivalent  to   criminal  intent     The  maxim  is  actus  non  facit  reum  nisi  mens  rea  “a   crime   is   not   committed   if   the   mind   of   the   person   performing  the  act  complained  it  to  be  innocent”     Doctrine:  The  presumption  of  criminal  intent  does   not  arise  from  the  proof  of  the  commission  of  an  act   which  is  not  unlawful.      

General  and  Specific  Intent   People  v.  Puno,  219  SCRA  85  (1993)   Facts:   The   primal   issue   for   resolution   in   this   case   is   whether   accused-­‐appellants   committed   the   felony   of   kidnapping   for   ransom   under   Article   267   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   as   charged   in   the   information;   or  a  violation  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  532  (Anti-­‐ Piracy  and  Anti-­‐Highway  Robbery  Law  of  1974),  as   contended  by  the  Solicitor  General  and  found  by  the   trial   court;   or   the   offense   of   simple   robbery   punished  by  Paragraph  5,  Article  294  of  the  Revised   Penal  Code,  as  claimed  by  the  defense.     On   January   13,   1988   in   Quezon   City,   the   said   accused   Isabelo   Puno   and   Enrique   Amurao,   being   then   private   individuals,   feloniously   kidnapped   Maria   del   Socorro   Sarmiento   for   the   purpose   of   extorting   ransom,   to   the   damage   and   prejudice   of   the   said   offended   party   in   such   amount   as   may   be  

awarded   to   her   under   the   provisions   of   the   Civil   Code.     On   a   plea   of   not   guilty   when   arraigned,   appellants   went   to   trial   which   ultimately   resulted   in   a   judgment   promulgated   on   September   26,   1990   finding   them   guilty   of   robbery   with   extortion   committed   on   a   highway,   punishable   under   Presidential  Decree  No.  532.     On  their  appeal,  appellants  contended  that  the  court   a   quo   erred   (1)   in   convicting   them   under   Presidential   Decree   No.   532   since   they   were   not   expressly   charged   with   a   crime   therein;   (2)   in   applying  Sections  4  and  5,  Rule  120  of  the  Rules  of   Court   since   the   charge   under   said   presidential   decree  is  not  the  offense  proved  and  cannot  rightly   be   used   as   the   offense   proved   which   is   necessarily   included  in  the  offense  charged.     Issue:  WON  the  accused  were  guilty  of  kidnapping.       Held;  No.  it  is  worth  recalling  an  accepted  tenet  in   criminal  law  that  in  the  determination  of  the  crime   for   which   the   accused   should   be   held   liable   in   those   instances   where   his   acts   partake   of   the   nature   of   variant   offenses,   and   the   same   holds   true   with   regard   to   the   modifying   or   qualifying  circumstances   thereof,  his  motive  and  specific  intent  in  perpetrating   the  acts  complained  of  are  invaluable  aids  in  arriving   at   a   correct   appreciation   and   accurate   conclusion   thereon.     With   respect   to   the   specific   intent   of   appellants   vis-­‐a-­‐ vis  the  charge  that  they  had  kidnapped  the  victim,  we   can   rely   on   the   proverbial   rule   of   ancient   respectability   that   for   this   crime   to   exist,   there   must   be   indubitable   proof   that   the   actual   intent   of   the   malefactors  was  to  deprive  the  offended  party  of  her   liberty,   and   not   where   such   restraint   of   her   freedom   of  action  was  merely  an  incident  in  the  commission  of   another   offense   primarily   intended   by   the   offenders.   Hence,   as   early   as   United   States   vs.   Ancheta,   and   consistently   reiterated   thereafter,   it   has   been   held   that   the   detention   and/or   forcible   taking   away   of   the  victims  by  the  accused,  even  for  an  appreciable   period   of   time   but   for   the   primary   and   ultimate  

Rañeses  37     purpose   of   killing   them,   holds   the   offenders   liable   for   taking   their   lives   or   such   other   offenses   they   committed   in   relation   thereto,   but   the   incidental   deprivation   of   the   victims'   liberty   does   not   constitute  kidnapping  or  serious  illegal  detention.     *Highway   robbery   does   not   apply   here   either.   Accused  are  only  guilty  of  simple  robbery.       Doctrine:   In   some   felonies,   proof   of   particular   specific   intent   is   required.   (i.e.   kidnapping,   homicide).       People  v.  Delim,  396  SCRA  386  (2003)   Facts:   Marlon,   Leon   &   Ronald   Delim   were   convicted   for  murder  of  Modesto  Delim,  resident  of  Bila,  Sison,   Pangasinan.   Modesto   is   the   adopted   child   of   Marlon’s   Dad.   Marlon,   Manuel   &   Robert   are   brothers   &   Leon   &   Ronald   are   their   nephews.   Around   6:30   pm,   January   23,   1999,   Modesto   and   family   were   preparing   to   eat   dinner   when   Marlon,   Robert   and   Ronald   arrived.   Marlon   poked   gun,   other   two   grabbed,   hog   tied   and   gagged   Modesto.   They   herded   him   out   of   the   hose   and   went   to   the   direction   of   Paldit.   Leon   and   Manual   guarded   Rita   &   Randy   until   7   am   and   told   them   to   stay   put.   They   searched   for   him   for   3   days   and   reported   to   police   three   days   after   the   incident.   Randy   with   relatives   found   Modesto   in   the   housing   project   in   Paldit   under  bushes.  He  was  dead  due  to  gun  shot  wound   on  head.     Issues:   1. WON  case  is  murder  or  kidnapping?   2. WON  prosecution  had  sufficient  evidence?   3. WON  there  was  conspiracy?   4. WON  witness  testimonies  were  valid?   5. WON  alibi  warranted?   6. WON   there   was   treachery   and   other   aggravting  circumstances?     Held:     1. Murder:   when   primary   purpose   is   to   kill,   deprivation   is   incidental   and   doesn’t   constitute   kidnapping   (US   v.   Ancheta).   Specific   intent:   active   desire   to   do   certain   criminal   acts   or   particular   purpose  

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

(example,  murder  and  kidnapping—kill  and   deprive   victim   of   liberty)   motive:   reason   which   prompts   accused   to   engage   in   particular   criminal   activity   (ex.   Kidnap   for   ransom)   essential   for   kidnapping.   Information:   described   murder   and   kidnapping  not  specified.   Yes.   Prosecution   proved   intent   to   kill   with   their   knives   and   handguns,   5   gun   shot   wounds   and   4   stab   wounds   (defensive).   Furthermore,   the   pieces   of   circumstancial   evidence   were   convincing:   Rita   and   Randy   testified   events.   Rita   claimed   she   heard   3   gunshots   and   accordingly,   decomposing   body   was   found   with   gunshot   wounds   and   stabs.   Yes.   Conspiracy   is   when   two   or   more   persons   agree   and   decide   to   commit   a   felony.   This   is   proven   by   acts   of   criminal.   Before   during   and   after   crime   committed   and   that   accused   had   same   purpose   and   united   in   execution;   act   of   one   act   of   all.   Wharton  criminal  law—actual  presence  not   necessary   if   there’s   direct   connection   bet   actor  and  crime   Yes.   Inconsistencies   mean   and   even   strengthen.  It  was  not  rehearsed   No.  Positive  identification  over  alibi.  Unable   to  prove  that  they  were  in  another  place  and   impossible  to  go  to  crime  scene   No.   Treachery   and   taking   advantage   of   superior   strength   was   not   proven   as   there   was  no  witness  or  evidence.  The  unlicensed   firearm   and   dwelling   was   further   not   included  in  information.  

  Important  snippets  from  the  case:   • Specific   intent   is   not   synonymous   with   motive.     Motive   generally   is   referred   to   as   the   reason   which   prompts   the   accused   to   engage   in   a   particular   criminal   activity.     Motive  is  not  an  essential  element  of  a  crime   and  hence  the  prosecution  need  not  prove  the   same.    As  a  general  rule,  proof  of  motive  for   the  commission  of  the  offense  charged  does   not  show  guilt  and  absence  of  proof  of  such   motive   does   not   establish   the   innocence   of  

Rañeses  38    

•

accused   for   the   crime   charged   such   as   murder.     Specific  intent  is  used  to  describe  a  state   of   mind   which   exists   where   circumstances   indicate   that   an   offender   actively   desired   certain   criminal   consequences   or   objectively   desired   a   specific  result  to  follow  his  act  or  failure   to  act.  

  Intent  and  Motive     Reyes:     1. Intent   is   different   from   motive.   Motive   is   the   moving   power   which   impels   one   to   action   for   a   definite   result.   Intent   is   the   purpose   to   use   a   particular   means   to   effect   such   result.   Motive   is   not   an   essential   element   of   a   crime,   and,   hence,   need   not   be   proved   for   purposes   of   conviction.   (People   v.   Aposaga,   No.   L-­‐32477,   Oct.   30,   1981,   108   SCRA   574,   595)    

  An   extreme   moral   perversion   may   lead   a   man   to   commit   a   crime   without   a   real   motive  but  just  for  the  sake  of  committing  it.   Or,   the   apparent   lack   of   a   motive   for   committing   a   criminal   act   does   not   necessarily  mean  that  there  is  none,  but  that   simply   it   is   not   known   to   us,   for   we   cannot   probe  the  depths  of  one’s  conscience  where   it   may   be   found,   hidden   away   and   inaccessible   to   our   observation.   (People   v.   Taneo,  58  Phil.  255,  256)     One   may   be   convicted   of   a   crime   whether   his   motive   appears   to   be   good   or   bad   or   even   though   no   motive   is   proven.   A   good   motive   does   not   prevent   an   act   from   being   a   crime  (i.e.  Mercy  killing).     2. Motive   need   not   always   be   established,   although   there   are   cases   where   the   determination   of   motive   aids   in   the   evaluation  of  a  felony.     1. Where   the   identity   of   a   person   accused   of   having   committed   a   crime   is   in   dispute,   the   motive   that  

may  have  impelled  its  commission  is   very  relevant.     2. Generally,   proof   of   motive   is   not   necessary   to   pin   a   crime   on   the   accused   if   the   commission   of   the   crime   has   been   proven   and   the   evidence   of   identification   is   convincing.     3. Motive   is   essential   only   when   there   is   doubt   as   to   the   identity   of   the   assailant.   It   is   immaterial   when   the   accused   has   been   positively   identified.     4. Where   the   defendant   admits   the   killing,  it  is  no  longer  necessary     5. Motive   is   important   in   ascertaining   the   truth   between   two   antagonistic   theories  or  versions  of  the  killing.     6. Where   the   identification   of   the   accused  proceeds  from  an  unreliable   source   and   the   testimony   is   inconclusive   and   not   free   from   doubt,   evidence   of   motive   is   necessary.     7. Where  there  are  no  eyewitnesses  to   the   crime,   and   where   suspicion   is   likely   to   fall   upon   a   number   of   persons,   motive   is   relevant   and   significant.     8. If   the   evidence   is   merely   circumstantial,   proof   of   motive   is   essential.     9. Proof  of  motive  is  not  indispensable   where   the   guilt   is   otherwise   established  by  sufficient  evidence.     10. While   the   question   of   motive   is   important   to   the   person   who   committed   the   criminal   act,   yet   when   there   is   no   longer   any   doubt   that   the   defendant   was   the   culprit,   it   becomes   unimportant   to   know   the   exact   reason   or   purpose   for   the   commission  of  the  crime.     3. Generally,   the   motive   is   established   by   the  testimony  of  witnesses  on  the  acts  or   statements   of   the   accused   before   or   immediately  after  the  commission  of  the  

Rañeses  39     offense.   Such   words   or   deeds   may   indicate   the   motive.   (Barrioquinto   v.   Fernandez,   82   Phil.  642,  649)   4. Disclosure   of   the   motive   aids   in   the   the   completion   of   the   proof   of   the   commission  of  the  crime.     5. Proof   of   motive   alone   is   not   sufficient   to   support   a   conviction.   Existence   of   a   motive,   though   perhaps   an   important   consideration,   is   not   sufficient   proof   of   guilt.   Mere  proof  of  motive,  no  matter  how  strong,   is   not   sufficient   to   support   a   conviction   if   there   is   no   reliable   evidence   from   which   it   may   be   reasonably   deduced   that   the   accused  is  the  malefactor.     6. Lack   of   motive   may   aid   in   showing   the   innocence  of  the  accused.    

  People  v.  Temblor,  161  SCRA  623  (1988)   Facts:   On   30   December   1980,   7:30   PM,   Vicente   Temblor  alias  “Ronald”  (accused-­‐appellant)  went  to   Julius   Cagampang’s   house   in   Agusan   del   Norte,   to   buy  cigarettes.  Cagampang,  while  opening  a  pack  of   cigarettes,   was   shot!   The   accused   (and   another   person,   Anecito   Ellevera)   demanded   Victorina   Cagampang   (Julius’   wife)   that   she   brings   out   her   husband’s   firearms.   The   accused   fired   two   more   shots   at   the   fallen   victim.   Victorina   gave   a   suitcase   to   Temblor,   who   then   took   the   .38   caliber   which   was  inside,  and  fled.     In   August   1981,   Temblor,   an   NPA,   surrendered   (it   was   actually   a   mass   surrender   of   NPA’s)   after   hiding   in   the   mountains.   In   26   November   1981,   he   was   arrested   by   Buenavista   police   at   the   public   market   and   then   detained   at   municipal   jail.   Regarding   the   murder   of   Cagampang,   Temblor’s   alibi   was   that   day   until   the   next,   he   was   with   his   father  for  drinking  and  pulutan.  On  8  June  1982,  the   accused   was   convicted   and   sentenced   to   suffer   reclusion   perpertua,   and   to   indemnify   the   heirs   of   the  victim  P12,000.  He  appealed.     ***   In   this   appeal,   the   appellant   alleges   that   the   court   a   quo   erred:   (1)   in   finding   that   he   was   positively   identified   by   the   prosecution   witness   as   the  killer,  and  (2)  in  rejecting  his  defense  of  alibi.    

  Issue:  WON  the  accused  is  guilty  of  murder.     Held:  Yes,  the  accused  is  guilty  of  murder.  Judgment   appealed   from   is   AFFIRMED   in   all   respects   and   civil   indemnity  increased  to  P30K.  It  was  proven  that  he   had  motive  in  killing  Cagampang:  he  had  knowledge   that   Cagampang   possessed   a   firearm;   this   was   motive   enough   to   kill   him,   as   part   of   NPA’s   “agaw   armas”   campaign   or   killings   perpetrated   by   NPA   for   the   purpose   of   acquiring   more   firearms.   Moreover,   proof   of   motive   is   not   essential   when   the   culprit   has   been  positively  identified.  Also,  his  flight  implies  guilt.     The   prosecution   witness,   Victorina   Cagampang,   may   have   minor   inconsistencies   in   her   testimony   but   this   does   not   diminish   her   credibility   –   that   is   part   of   being   human.   What   is   important   is   that   she   had   positively   identified   the   accused   as   the   assailant  and  that  her  testimony  is  corroborated  by   other  witnesses.     Furthermore,   the   accused’s   alibi   was   unacceptable   because   it   was   self-­‐serving   and   uncorroborated.   It   cannot   overrule   positive   identification,   it   was   merely   15-­‐20   minutes   away   from   crime   scene   and   Perol  was  at  work.     People  v.  Hassan,  157  SCRA  261  (1988)   Facts:  Usman  Hassan,  15  yrs.  Old  of  Samal  Tribe  in   Zambo   City   was   convicted   of   murder   of   Pichel.   Pichel  was  stabbed  to  death  at  fruit  paradise  while   sitting   at   his   red   Honda   motorcycle,   waiting   for   friend  Jose  Samson  who  was  buying  fruits.     Issue:  WON  conviction  is  valid   Held:   No.   Conviction   reversed.   Acquitted.   The   Medico  Legal  found  two  stab  wounds  from  front  but   the   Samson   claimed   that   Pichel   was   stabbed   once   from   behind.   Procedure   followed   was   also   improper.   The   accused   was   presented   to   the   witness   alone   and   in   confrontation,   not   police   line   up.   He   was   also   denied   right   to   counsel,   particularly   when   identification   took   place—this   qualifies   for   uncounselled   confession.   The   witness   was   also   questioned   2   days   after   incident   and   sworn   4   days   after.   The   fruit   vendor   as   well   as   the   companion   of  

Rañeses  40     the   accused   was   not   investigated.   In   fact,   they   did   not   pursue   other   suspect.   Also,   the   knife   was   not   tested.  Further  notable  are  the  facts  that  the  age  of   the   accused   was   observed   without   medical   basis,   that   the   accused   did   not   run   away   and   that   he   had   no   motive,   which,   in   People   vs.   Verzo   was   considered   important   when   there   is   doubt   in   the   identity   of   culprit   and   reiterated   in   People   vs.   Pervelo   which   stated   that   identification   is   tenuous.   Furthermore,  no  motive  was  established.       People  v.  Delim,  supra   *Refer  to  pp.  36  –  37  for  the  digest  of  this  case.  See   ‘important   snippets   from   the   case’   for   notes   pertaining  to  intent  and  motive.      

Mistake  of  Fact   Reyes:   1. While   ignorance   of   the   law   excuses   no   one   from   compliance   therewith   (ignorantia   legis   non   excusat),   ignorance   or   mistake   of   fact   relieves   the   accused   from   criminal   liability   (ignorantia   facti   excusat).   Mistake   of   fact   is   a   misapprehension   of   fact   on   the   part   of   the   person   who   caused   injury   to   another.   He   is   not,   however,   criminally   liable,   because   he   did   not   act   with   criminal   intent.   An   honest   mistake  of  fact  destroys  the  presumption  of   criminal   intent   which   arises   upon   the   commission   of   a   felonious   act.   (People   v.   Coching,   et.   Al.,   C.A.,   52   O.G.   293,   citing   People  v.  Oanis,  74  Phil.  257)   2. Mistake   of   fact   has   certain   requisites   to   be  a  valid  defense.     1. That   the   act   done   would   have   been   lawful   had   the   facts   been   as   the   accused  believed  them  to  be.     2. That   the   intention   of   the   accused   in   performing  the  act  should  be  lawful.     3. That   the   mistake   must   be   without   fault   or   carelessness   on   the   part   of   the  accused   3. Lack  of  intent  to  commit  a  crime  may  be   inferred  from  the  facts  of  the  case.     4. In   mistake   of   fact,   the   act   done   would   have   been   lawful,   had   the   facts   been   as  

the  accused  believed  them  to  be.  In  other   words,   the   act   done   would   not   constitute   a   felony   had   the   facts   been   as   the   accused   believed   them   to   be.   Furthermore,   the   act   done  by  the  accused  would  have  constituted   (1)   a   justifying   circumstance   under   Art.   11,   (2)   an   absolutory   cause,   such   as   that   contemplated   in   Art.   247,   par.   2,   or   (3)   an   involuntary  act.     5. There  exists  no  crime  of  resistance  when   there  is  a  mistake  of  fact.     6. When   the   accused   is   negligent,   mistake   of  fact  is  not  a  defense..       U.S.  v.  Ah  Chong,  15  Phil.  488  (1910)   Facts:   Ah   Chong   was   a   cook   in   Ft.   McKinley.   He   was   afraid  of  bad  elements.  One  evening,  before  going  to   bed,  he  locked  himself  in  his  room  by  placing  a  chair   against   the   door.   After   having   gone   to   bed,   he   was   awakened   by   someone   trying   to   open   the   door.   He   called   out   twice,   “Who   is   there,”   but   received   no   answer.   Fearing   that   the   intruder   was   a   robber,   he   leaped   from   his   bed   &   called   out   again,   “If   you   enter   the  room  I  will  kill  you.”  But  at  that  precise  moment,   he   was   struck   by   the   chair   that   had   been   placed   against   the   door,   &   believing   that   he   was   being   attacked   he   seized   a   kitchen   knife   &   struck   &   fatally   wounded   the   intruder   who   turned   out   to   be   his   roommate.     Issue:   WON   Ah   Chong   must   be   acquitted   because   of   mistake  of  fact.     Held.  Yes.  Had  the  facts  been  as  Ah  Chong  believed   them   to   be,   he   would   have   been   justified   in   killing   the   intruder   under   A11,   par.   1,   of   the   RPC,   which   requires,  to  justify  the  act,  that  there  be:   1. unlawful   aggression   on   the   part   of   the   person  killed,   2. reasonable   necessity   of   the   means   employed  to  prevent  or  repel  it,  &   3. lack  of  sufficient  provocation  on  the  part  of   the  person  defending  himself   If   the   intruder   was   really   a   robber,   forcing   his   way   into   the   room   of   Ah   Chong,   there   would   have   been   unlawful   aggression   on   the   part   of   the   intruder.   There  would  have  been  a  necessity  on  the  part  of  Ah  

Rañeses  41     Chong  to  defend  himself  and/or  his  home.  The  knife   would  have  been  a  reasonable  means  to  prevent  or   repel   such   aggression.   And   Ah   Chong   gave   no   provocation   at   all.   Under   Art.   11   of   the   RPC,   there   is   nothing   unlawful   in   the   intention   as   well   as   in   the   act  of  the  person  making  the  defense.     Doctrine:  Mistake  of  fact  is  a  valid  defense  as  long   as   the   requisites   are   met.   (Refer   to   item   no.   2   of   Reyes’s  annotations  under  mistake  of  fact.)       People  v.  Oanis,  74  Phil.  257  (1943)     Facts:   Chief   of   Police   Oanis   and   his   co-­‐accused   Corporal   Galanta   were   under   instructions   to   arrest   one   Balagtas,   a   notorious   criminal   and   escaped   convict,  and  if  overpowered,  to  get  hi  dead  or  alive.   Proceeding  to  the  suspected  house,  they  went  into  a   room   and   on   seeing   a   man   sleeping   with   his   back   toward   the   door,   simultaneously   fired   at   him   with   their  revolvers,  without  first  making  any  reasonable   inquiry   as   to   his   identity.   The   victim   turned   out   to   be   an   innocent   man,   Tecson,   and   not   the   wanted   criminal.     Issue:  WON  the  accused  can  use  mistake  of  fact  as  a   valid  defense.       Held:  No.    Both  accused  are  guilty  of  murder.    Even   if   it   were   true   that   the   victim   was   the   notorious   criminal,   the   accused   would   not   be   justified   in   killing   him   while   the   latter   was   sleeping.   In   apprehending  even  the  most  notorious  criminal,  the   law  does  not  permit  the  captor  to  kill  him.  It  is  only   when  the  fugitive  from  justice  is  determined  to  fight   the   officers   of   law   who   are   trying   to   capture   him   that  killing  him  would  be  justified.     Doctrine:  Careless  on  the  part  of  the  accused  does   not  allow  for  the  usage  of  mistake  of  fact  as  a  valid   defense.      

failing   to   do   an   act   must   also   be   voluntary,   there   must   be   freedom   and   intelligence   on   the  part  of  the  offender,  but  the  requisite  of   criminal  intent,  which  is  required  in  felonies   by   dolo,   is   replaced   by   the   requisite   of   imprudence,  negligence,  lack  of  foresight,  or   lack  of  skill.       Such  negligence  or  indifference  to  duty  or  to   consequence   is,   in   law,   equivalent   to   criminal   intent.   (U.S.   v.   Catolico,   18   Phil.   507)     But   in   felonies   committed   by   means   of   culpa,   the   mind   of   the   accused   is   not   criminal.   However,   his   act   is   wrongful,   because  the  injury  or  damage  caused  to  the   injured   party   results   from   the   imprudence,   negligence,   lack   of   foresight   or   lack   of   skill   of  the  accused.     2. Felonies   committed   by   means   of   culpa   has  certain  requisites  as  well.     1. He  must  have  FREEDOM  while  doing   an  act  or  omitting  to  do  an  act;   2. He  must  have    INTELLIGENCE  while   doing   the   act   or   omitting   to   do   the   act;   3. He   is   IMPRUDENT,   NEGLIGENT   or   LACKS   FORESIGHT   or   SKILL   while   doing   the   act   or   omitting   to   do   the   act.     3. In  culpable  felonies,  the  injury  caused  to   another   should   be   unintentional,   it   being   simply   the   incident   of   another   act   performed  without  malice.     4. Mistake   in   the   identity   of   the   intended   victim   is   not   reckless   imprudence.   A   deliberate   intent   to   do   an   unlawful   act   is   essentially   inconsistent   with   the   idea   of   reckless   imprudence.   Where   such   an   unlawful   act   is   willfully   done,   a   mistake   in   the  identity  of  the  intended  victim  cannot  be   considered  as  reckless  imprudence.    

Culpa   Reyes:   1. Criminal  intent  is  replaced  by  negligence   and   imprudence   in   felonies   committed   by   means   of   culpa.   In   felonies   committed   by   means   of   culpa,   since   the   doing   of   or  

 

Elements   People  v.  Carmen,  355  SCRA  267  (2001)    

Rañeses  42     Facts:   The   trial   court   rendered   a   decision   and   the   accused-­‐appellants   were   all   found   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of   the   crime   of   Murder   after   having   performed   a   cultic   healing   pray-­‐over   which   resulted   to   the   death   of   Randy   Luntayao.   They   were   sentenced   to   suffer   the   penalty   of   RECLUSION   PERPETUA.     Issue:   WON   accused-­‐appellants   can   be   held   liable   for   reckless   imprudence   resulting   in   homicide,   considering  that  the  information  charges  them  with   murder.     Held:   Yes.   Conviction   modified   to   reckless   imprudence   resulting   in   homicide.   Killing   a   person   w/  treachery  is  murder  even  if  there  is  no  intent  to   kill.   When   death   occurs,   it’s   presumed   to   be   the   natural  consequence  of  physical  injuries  inflicted.  In   murder   qualified   by   treachery,   it’s   required   only   that   there   is   treachery   in   the   attack,   &   this   is   true   even  if  the  offender  has  no  intent  to  kill  the  person   assaulted     One   who   commits   an   intentional   felony   is   responsible   for   all   the   consequences   which   may   naturally   and   logically   result   therefrom,   whether   foreseen  or  intended  or  not.     Intent   is   presumed   from   the   commission   of   an   unlawful   act.   The   presumption   of   criminal   intent   may  arise  from  the  proof  of  the  criminal  act.  Hence,   they   are   liable   for   all   the   direct   and   natural   consequences   of   their   unlawful   act,   even   if   the   ultimate  result  had  not  been  intended.     The   strange   procedure   resulted   in   the   death   of   the   boy.   Thus,   accused-­‐appellants   had   no   criminal   intent  to  kill  the  boy.  Their  liability  arises  from  their   reckless   imprudence   because   they   ought   that   to   know  their  actions  would  not  bring  about  the  cure.   They   are,   therefore,   guilty   of   reckless   imprudence   resulting  in  homicide  and  not  of  murder.     Art.  365,  of  the  RPC,  as  amended,  states  that  reckless   imprudence   consists   in   voluntarily,   but   w/o   malice,   doing   or   failing   to   do   an   act   from   which   material   damage   results   by   reason   of   inexcusable   lack   of  

precaution   on   the   part   of   the   person   performing   such   act.   Compared   to   intentional   felonies,   such   as   homicide   or   murder,   what   takes   the   place   of   the   element   of   malice   or   intention   to   commit   a   wrong   or   evil   is   the   failure   of   the   offender   to   take   precautions   due   to   lack   of   skill   taking   into   account   his   employment,   or   occupation,   degree   of   intelligence,   physical   condition,   &   other   circumstances  regarding  persons,  time,  &  place.     The  elements  of  reckless  imprudence  are  apparent  in   the   acts   done   by   accused-­‐appellants   which,   because   of  their  lack  of  medical  skill  in  treating  the  victim  of   his  alleged  ailment,  resulted  in  the  latter's  death.  The   accused   had   no   intention   to   cause   an   evil   but   rather   to  remedy  the  victim's  ailment.     TC's   reliance   on   the   rule   that   criminal   intent   is   presumed   from   the   commission   of   an   unlawful   act   is   untenable   because   such   presumption   only   holds   in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary.     Consequently,   treachery   cannot   be   appreciated   for   in  the  absence  of  intent  to  kill,  there’s  no  treachery   or   the   deliberate   employment   of   means,   methods,   &   manner   of   execution   to   ensure   the   safety   of   the   accused   from   the   defensive   or   retaliatory   attacks   coming  from  the  victim.     Important   snippet   from   the   case:   Compared   to   intentional   felonies,   such   as   homicide   or   murder,   what   takes   the   place   of   the   element   of   malice   or   intention   to   commit   a   wrong   or   evil   is   the   failure   of   the   offender   to   take   precautions   due   to   lack   of   skill   taking   into   account   his   employment,   or   occupation,   degree   of   intelligence,   physical   condition,   and   other   circumstances  regarding  persons,  time,  and  place.    

Distinguished  from  dolo   People  v.  Pugay,  167  SCRA  439  (1988)   Facts:   The   accused   are   pronounced   by   the   RTC   of   Cavite  guilty  beyond  reasonable  doubt  for  the  crime   of   murder   of   Bayani   Miranda   and   sentencing   them   to   a   prison   term   ranging   from   12   years   (prison   mayor)   as   minimum   to   20   years   (prison   temporal)   as   maximum   and   for   Samson   to   be   sentenced   to   reclusion  perpetua.  

Rañeses  43       Miranda   and   the   accused   Pugay   are   friends.   Miranda   used   to   run   errands   for   Pugay   and   they   used   to   sleep   together.   On   the   evening   of   May   19,   1982   a   town   fiesta   was   held   in   the   public   plaza   of   Rosario   Cavite.   Sometime   after   midnight   accused   Pugay  and  Samson  with  several  companions  arrived   (they   were   drunk),   and   they   started   making   fun   of   Bayani   Miranda.   Pugay   after   making   fun   of   the   Bayani,   took   a   can   of   gasoline   and   poured   its   contents   on   the   latter,   Gabion   (principal   witness)   told   Pugay   not   to   do   the   deed.   Then   Samson   set   Miranda   on   fire   making   a   human   torch   out   of   him.   They  were  arrested  the  same  night  and  barely  a  few   hours   after   the   incident   gave   their   written   statements.     Issue:   WON   conspiracy   is   present,   thus   affirming   the   charge   of   murder.   If   not,   what   are   the   criminal   responsibilities  of  the  accused?       Held:   1. No.   Conspiracy   is   determined   when   two   or   more  persons  agree  to  commit  a  felony  and   decide   to   commit   it.   Conspiracy   must   be   proven  with  the  same  quantum  of  evidence   as   the   felony   itself,   more   specifically   by   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   It   is   not   essential   that   there   be   proof   as   to   the   existence   of   a   previous   agreement   to   commit   a   crime.   It   is   sufficient   if,   at   the   time   of   commission   of   the   crime,   the   accused   had   the   same   purpose   and   were   united   in   its   executed.     Since   there   was   no   animosity   between   Miranda   and   the   accused,   and   add   to   the   that   that   the   meeting   at   the   scene   of   the   incident   was   purely   coincidental,   and   the   main  intent  of  the  accused  is  to  make  fun  of   miranda.     Since   there   is   no   conspiracy   that   was   proven,   the   respective   criminal   responsibility   of   Pugay   and   Samson   arising   from   different   acts   directed   against   Miranda   is  individual  and  NOT  collective  and  each  of  

them   is   liable   only   for   the   act   that   was   committed  by  him.   2. Having   failed   to   exercise   diligence   necessary   to   avoid   every   undesirable   consequence   arising   from   any   act   committed   by   his   companions   who   at   the   same   time   were   making   fun   of   the   deceased,   Pugay   is   guilty     of  reckless  imprudence  resulting  to  homicide     On   the   other   hand,   since   the   evidence   is   insufficient   to   establish   qualifying   circumstances   of   treachery   and   conspiracy,   and   given   the   mitigating   circumstance   that   he   never   intended   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong,  Samson  is  guilty  of  homicide.      

B. Crimes   defined   and   penalized   by   special   laws   Reyes:   1. There   are   three   classes   of   crimes.   The   RPC   defines   and   penalizes   the   first   two   classes   of   crimes,   (1)   the   intentional   felonies,   and   (2)   the   culpable   felonies.   The   third   class   of   crimes   are   defined   and   penalized   by   special   laws   which   include   crimes   punished   by   municipal   or   city   ordinances.     2. When   the  crime  is  punished  by  a  special   law,   as   a   rule,   intent   to   commit   the   crime   is   not   necessary.   It   is   sufficient   that   the   offender  has  the  intent  to  perpetrate  the   act  prohibited  by  the  special  law.     3. Intent   to   commit   the   crime   and   intent   to   perpetrate  the  act  must  be  distinguished.   A   person   may   not   have   consciously   intended   to   commit   a   crime;   but   he   did   intend   to   commit   an   act,   and   that   act   is,   by   the   very   nature   of   things,   the   crime   itself.   (U.S.  v.  Go  Chico,  14  Phil.  128)       In   the   first,   there   must   be   criminal   intent;   in   the   second,   it   is   enough   that   the   prohibited   act  is  done  freely  and  consciously.     4. In  those  crimes  punished  by  special  laws,   the  act  alone,  irrespective  of  its  motives,   constitutes  the  offense.    

Rañeses  44     5. Good  faith  and  absence  of  criminal  intent   not  valid  defenses  in  crimes  punished  by   special   laws.   (For   specific   exemptions,   refer   to   pp.   56-­‐58  of  Reyes’s   annotations  of   the  RPC,  17th  edition.)    

  Crimes  Mala  in  se  and  Mala  prohibita   Reyes:   1. There   is   a   distinction   between   crimes   which   are   mala   in   se,   or   wrongful   from   their   nature,   such   as   theft,   rape,   homicide,   etc.,   and   those   that   are   mala   prohibita,   or   wrong   merely   because   prohibited   by   statute,   such   as   illegal   possession   of   firearms.   Crimes   mala   in   se   are   those   so   serious   in   their   effects   on   society   as   to   call   for   almost   unanimous   condemnation  of  its  members;  while  crimes   mala   prohibita   are   violations   of   mere   rules   of   convenience   designed   to   secure   a   more   orderly   regulation   of   the   affairs   of   society.   (Bouvier’s   Law   Dictionary,   Rawle’s   3rd   Revision)   2. In   acts   mala   in   se,   the   intent   governs;   but   in  those  mala  prohibita,  the  only  inquiry   is,  has  the  law  been  violated?     3. The   term   mala   in   se   refers   generally   to   felonies   defined   and   penalized   by   the   RPC.   When   the   acts   are   inherently   immoral,   they   are   mala   in   se,   even   if   punished   by   special   laws.   On   the   other   hand,   there   are   crimes   in   the   RPC   which   were  originally  defined  and  penalized  by   special   laws,   like   use   of   opium,   malversation,  brigandage  and  libel.     4. The  term  mala  prohibita  refers  generally   to  acts  made  criminal  by  special  laws.       Lozano  v.  Martinez,  146  SCRA  323  (1986)   Facts:   Petitioners,   charged   with   Batas   Pambansa   Bilang   22   (BP   22   for   short),   popularly   known   as   the   Bouncing   Check   Law,   assail   the   law's   constitutionality.     BP  22  punishes  a  person  "who  makes  or  draws  and   issues   any   check   on   account   or   for   value,   knowing   at  the  time  of  issue  that  he  does  not  have  sufficient  

funds   in   or   credit   with   the   drawee   bank   for   the   payment   of   said   check   in   full   upon   presentment,   which   check   is   subsequently   dishonored   by   the   drawee   bank   for   insufficiency   of   funds   or   credit   or   would   have   been   dishonored   for   the   same   reason   had   not   the   drawer,   without   any   valid   reason,   ordered   the   bank   to   stop   payment."   The   penalty   prescribed   for   the   offense   is   imprisonment   of   not   less  than  30  days  nor  more  than  one  year  or  a  fine   or   not   less   than   the   amount   of   the   check   nor   more   than   double   said   amount,   but   in   no   case   to   exceed   P200,000.00,  or  both  such  fine  and  imprisonment  at   the  discretion  of  the  court.     The   statute   likewise   imposes   the   same   penalty   on   "any   person   who,   having   sufficient   funds   in   or   credit   with   the   drawee   bank   when   he   makes   or   draws  and  issues  a  check,  shall  fail  to  keep  sufficient   funds   or   to   maintain   a   credit   to   cover   the   full   amount  of  the  check  if  presented  within  a  period  of   ninety   (90)   days   from   the   date   appearing   thereon,   for   which   reason   it   is   dishonored   by   the   drawee   bank.     An   essential   element   of   the   offense   is   "knowledge"   on   the   part   of   the   maker   or   drawer   of   the   check   of   the   insufficiency   of   his   funds   in   or   credit   with   the   bank  to  cover  the  check  upon  its  presentment.  Since   this   involves   a   state   of   mind   difficult   to   establish,   the  statute  itself  creates  a  prima  facie  presumption   of   such   knowledge   where   payment   of   the   check   "is   refused  by  the  drawee  because  of  insufficient  funds   in  or  credit  with  such  bank  when  presented  within   ninety   (90)   days   from   the   date   of   the   check.   To   mitigate  the  harshness  of  the  law  in  its  application,   the   statute   provides   that   such   presumption   shall   not   arise   if   within   five   (5)   banking   days   from   receipt   of   the   notice   of   dishonor,   the   maker   or   drawer   makes   arrangements   for   payment   of   the   check  by  the  bank  or  pays  the  holder  the  amount  of   the  check.     Another  provision  of  the  statute,  also  in  the  nature   of  a  rule  of  evidence,  provides  that  the  introduction   in   evidence   of   the   unpaid   and   dishonored   check   with   the   drawee   bank's   refusal   to   pay   "stamped   or   written   thereon   or   attached   thereto,   giving   the  

Rañeses  45     reason   therefor,   "shall   constitute   prima   facie   proof   of   "the   making   or   issuance   of   said   check,   and   the   due   presentment   to   the   drawee   for   payment   and   the   dishonor   thereof   ...   for   the   reason   written,   stamped   or   attached   by   the   drawee   on   such   dishonored  check."     The   presumptions   being   merely   prima   facie,   it   is   open   to   the   accused   of   course   to   present   proof   to   the  contrary  to  overcome  the  said  presumptions.     Issues:   1. WON   BP   22   violates   the   constitutional   provision  forbidding  imprisonment  for  debt.     2. WON  BP  22  impairs  the  freedom  to  contract.   3. WON  it  violates  the  equal  protection  clause.     Held:   1. No.   The   gravamen   of   the   offense   punished   by   BP   22   is   the   act   of   making   and   issuing   a   worthless   check   or   a   check   that   is   dishonored   upon   its   presentation   for   payment.   It   is   not   the   non-­‐payment   of   an   obligation   which   the   law   punishes.   The   law   is   not   intended   or   designed   to   coerce   a   debtor   to   pay   his   debt.   The   thrust   of   the   law   is   to   prohibit,   under   pain   of   penal   sanctions,   the  making  of  worthless  checks  and  putting   them   in   circulation.   Because   of   its   deleterious  effects  on  the  public  interest,  the   practice   is   proscribed   by   the   law.   The   law   punishes   the   act   not   as   an   offense   against   property,   but   an   offense   against   public   order.     The   effects   of   the   issuance   of   a   worthless   check  transcends  the  private  interests  of  the   parties   directly   involved   in   the   transaction   and  touches  the  interests  of  the  community   at  large.  The  mischief  it  creates  is  not  only  a   wrong   to   the   payee   or   holder,   but   also   an   injury  to  the  public.  The  harmful  practice  of   putting   valueless   commercial   papers   in   circulation,   multiplied   a   thousand   fold,   can   very   wen   pollute   the   channels   of   trade   and   commerce,   injure   the   banking   system   and  

eventually   hurt   the   welfare   of   society   and   the  public  interest.     The   enactment   of   BP   22   is   a   declaration   by   the   legislature   that,   as   a   matter   of   public   policy,   the   making   and   issuance   of   a   worthless   check   is   deemed   public   nuisance   to   be   abated   by   the   imposition   of   penal   sanctions.   2. No.   The   freedom   of   contract   which   is   constitutionally   protected   is   freedom   to   enter   into   "lawful"   contracts.   Contracts   which   contravene   public   policy   are   not   lawful.   Besides,   we   must   bear   in   mind   that   checks   can   not   be   categorized   as   mere   contracts.   It   is   a   commercial   instrument   which,   in   this   modem   day   and   age,   has   become   a   convenient   substitute   for   money;   it   forms   part   of   the   banking   system   and   therefore   not   entirely   free   from   the   regulatory  power  of  the  state.   3. No.   Petitioners   contend   that   the   payee   is   just   as   responsible   for   the   crime   as   the   drawer   of   the   check,   since   without   the   indispensable   participation   of   the   payee   by   his   acceptance   of   the   check   there   would   be   no   crime.   This   argument   is   tantamount   to   saying   that,   to   give   equal   protection,   the   law   should   punish   both   the   swindler   and   the   swindled.   Moreover,   the   clause   does   not   preclude   classification   of   individuals,   who   may   be   accorded   different   treatment   under   the   law   as   long   as   the   classification   is   no   unreasonable  or  arbitrary.     Magno  v.  C.A.,  210  SCRA  475  (1992)   Facts:   Petitioner   Magno   was   in   the   process   of   putting   up   a   car   repair   shop   sometime   in   April   1983,  but  he  did  not  have  complete  equipment  that   could   make   his   venture   workable.   He   also   had   another   problem,   and   that   while   he   was   going   into   this   entrepreneurship,   he   lacked   funds   with   which   to  purchase  the  necessary  equipment  to  make  such   business  operational.  Thus,  petitioner,  representing   Ultra   Sources   International   Corporation,   approached   Corazon   Teng,   (private   complainant)   Vice   President   of   Mancor   Industries   (hereinafter  

Rañeses  46     referred   to   as   Mancor)   for   his   needed   car   repair   service   equipment   of   which   Mancor   was   a   distributor.     Having   been   approached   by   petitioner   on   his   predicament,   who   fully   bared   that   he   had   no   sufficient   funds   to   buy   the   equipment   needed,   the   former   (Corazon   Teng)   referred   Magno   to   LS   Finance   and   Management   Corporation   (LS   Finance   for   brevity)   advising   its   Vice-­‐President,   Joey   Gomez,   that   Mancor   was   willing   and   able   to   supply   the   pieces   of   equipment   needed   if   LS   Finance   could   accommodate   petitioner   and   provide   him   credit   facilities.     The   arrangement   went   through   on   condition   that   petitioner   has   to   put   up   a   warranty   deposit   equivalent   to   thirty   per   centum   (30%)   of   the   total   value   of   the   pieces   of   equipment   to   be   purchased,   amounting  to  P29,790.00.  Since  petitioner  could  not   come   up   with   such   amount,   he   requested   Joey   Gomez   on   personal   level   to   look   for   a   third   party   who   could   lend   him   the   equivalent   amount   of   the   warranty  deposit.  However,  unknown  to  petitioner,   it   was   Corazon   Teng   who   advanced   the   deposit   in   question,  on  condition  that  the  same  would  be  paid   as  a  short  term  loan  at  3%  interest.     As   part   of   the   arrangement,   petitioner   and   LS   Finance   entered   into   a   leasing   agreement   whereby   LS  Finance  would  lease  the  garage  equipments  and   petitioner   would   pay   the   corresponding   rent   with   the   option   to   buy   the   same.   After   the   documentation  was  completed,  the  equipment  were   delivered   to   petitioner   who   in   turn   issued   a   postdated   check   and   gave   it   to   Joey   Gomez   who,   unknown   to   the   petitioner,   delivered   the   same   to   Corazon   Teng.   When   the   check   matured,   petitioner   requested   through   Joey   Gomez   not   to   deposit   the   check   as   he   (Magno)   was   no   longer   banking   with   Pacific  Bank.     To   replace   the   first   check   issued,   petitioner   issued   another   set   of   six   (6)   postdated   checks.   Two   (2)   checks   dated   July   29,   1983   were   deposited   and   cleared   while   the   four   (4)   others,   which   were   the   subject  of  the  four  counts  of  the  aforestated  charges  

subject   of   the   petition,   were   held   momentarily   by   Corazon   Teng,   on   the   request   of   Magno   as   they   were  not  covered  with  sufficient  funds.       Subsequently,   petitioner   could   not   pay   LS   Finance   the   monthly   rentals,   thus   it   pulled   out   the   garage   equipment.   It   was   then   on   this   occasion   that   petitioner  became  aware  that  Corazon  Teng  was  the   one  who  advanced  the  warranty  deposit.  Petitioner   with   his   wife   went   to   see   Corazon   Teng   and   promised   to   pay   the   latter   but   the   payment   never   came  and  when  the  four  (4)  checks  were  deposited   they  were  returned  for  the  reason  "account  closed."     For   having   issued   the   four   (4)   checks   that   later   bounced,   petitioner   was   charged   with   four   (4)   counts  of  violation  of  B.P  Blg.  22.  After  trial,  he  was   found  guilty  and  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  one   year   in   each   criminal   case   and   to   pay   complainant   the   respective   amounts   reflected   in   the   subject   checks.     Issue:   WON   petitioner   should   be   punished   for   the   issuance  of  the  checks  in  questions.     Held:   No.   By   the   nature   of   the   "warranty   deposit"   amounting   to   P29,790.00   corresponding   to   30%   of   the   "purchase/lease"   value   of   the   equipment   subject   of   the   transaction,   it   is   obvious   that   the   "cash   out"   made   by   Mrs.   Teng   was   not   used   by   petitioner   who   was   just   paying   rentals   for   the   equipment.   It   would   have   been   different   if   petitioner   opted   to   purchase   the   pieces   of   equipment  on  or  about  the  termination  of  the  lease-­‐ purchase  agreement  in  which  case  he  had  to  pay  the   additional   amount   of   the   warranty   deposit   which   should   have   formed   part   of   the   purchase   price.   As   the   transaction   did   not   ripen   into   a   purchase,   but   remained   a   lease   with   rentals   being   paid   for   the   loaned   equipment,   which   were   pulled   out   by   the   Lessor   (Mancor)   when   the   petitioner   failed   to   continue   paying   possibly   due   to   economic   constraints  or  business  failure,  then  it  is  lawful  and   just   that   the   warranty   deposit   should   not   be   charged  against  the  petitioner.    

Rañeses  47     To   charge   the   petitioner   for   the   refund   of   a   "warranty  deposit"  which  he  did  not  withdraw  as  it   was   not   his   own   account,   it   having   remained   with   LS   Finance,   is   to   even   make   him   pay   an   unjust   "debt",   to   say   the   least,   since   petitioner   did   not   receive   the   amount   in   question.   All   the   while,   said   amount   was   in   the   safekeeping   of   the   financing   company,   which   is   managed,   supervised   and   operated  by  the  corporation  officials  and  employees   of  LS  Finance.     It  is  intriguing  to  realize  that  Mrs.  Teng  did  not  want   the   petitioner   to   know   that   it   was   she   who   "accommodated"   petitioner's   request   for   Joey   Gomez,   to   source   out   the   needed   funds   for   the   "warranty   deposit".   Thus   it   unfolds   the   kind   of   transaction   that   is   shrouded   with   mystery,   gimmickry   and   doubtful   legality.   It   is   in   simple   language,   a   scheme   whereby   Mrs.   Teng   as   the   supplier   of   the   equipment   in   the   name   of   her   corporation,  Mancor,  would  be  able  to  "sell  or  lease"   its   goods   as   in   this   case,   and   at   the   same   time,   privately   financing   those   who   desperately   need   petty   accommodations   as   this   one.   This   modus   operandi   has   in   so   many   instances   victimized   unsuspecting   businessmen,   who   likewise   need   protection   from   the   law,   by   availing   of   the   deceptively   called   "warranty   deposit"   not   realizing   that   they   also   fall   prey   to   leasing   equipment   under   the  guise  of  a  lease-­‐purchase  agreement  when  it  is  a   scheme  designed  to  skim  off  business  clients.     This  maneuvering  has  serious  implications  especially   with   respect   to   the   threat   of   the   penal   sanction   of   the   law  in  issue,  as  in  this  case.  And,  with  a  willing  court   system   to   apply   the   full   harshness   of   the   special   law   (B.P   Blg.   22)   in   question,   using   the   "mala   prohibita"   doctrine,  the  noble  objective  of  the  law  is  tainted  with   materialism  and  opportunism  in  the  highest  degree.     A   Theory   of   Crime   and   Punishment   by   David   G.   Nitafan   1. Magno   v.   Court   of   Appeals:   For   all   intents   and   purposes,   the   law   was   devised   to   safeguard  the  interest  of  the  banking  system   and   the   legitimate   public   checking   account   user.  It  did  not  intend  to  shelter  or  favor  nor  

2.

3.

4.

5.

encourage   users   of   the   system   to   enrich   themselves   through   manipulations   and   circumvention   of   the   noble   purpose   and   objective  of  the  law.  (Quoting  Paras,  J.)     …   still   in   mala   prohibita,   while   there   is   no   need   of   criminal   intent,   there   must   be   knowledge   that   the   same   existed.   Without   the   knowledge   of   voluntariness   there   is   no   crime.  (Quoting  Paras,  J.)     The   much   abused   theory   of   malum   prohibitum—that   the   only   point   of   inquiry   in   this   kind   of   offense   is,   whether   the   law   has   been   violated—was   already   clearly   relegated   to   the   background   in   favor   of   the   teleological  idea  of  fairness  and  justice.     The  Lozano  doctrine,  which  uses  the  theory   of   malum   prohibitum   as   justification,   was   a   haphazard   ruling   and   its   effect   is   a   perversion   of   the   criminal   process,   because   payees   of   dishonored   are   using   the   threat   of   criminal   sanction   to   enforce   collections   of   their  credits.     Three  classes  of  crimes  are  recognized  in   the   second   and   third   paragraphs,   Art.   3   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   (Refer   to   page   29  for  the  full  text  of  the  provision).   1. Crimes  mala  in  se  are  unlawful  facts   accompanied   by   evil   intent.   The   Code   calls   these   crimes   dolo   offenses.   This   class   of   crimes   is   based   on   the   general   condition   of   penal   liability   under   the   legal   maxim,   actus   non   facit   reum,   nisi   mens   sit   rea,   or   the   mens   rea   doctrine,   under   which   the   unlawful   act   alone   does   not   amount   to   guilt   unless   it   is   accompanied   by   a   guilty   mind.       Offenses  mala  in  se  require  malice  or   malicious   intention.   The   term   dolus,   as   an   element   of   the   mode   of   commission  of  this  class  of  offenses,   involves   a   complex   idea,   which   consists   of   several   elements;   freedom,   intelligence,   and   intent.   The   violation   must   be   a   voluntary  

Rañeses  48    

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act,  otherwise  it  will  not  amount  to  a   crime,   or   stating   it   in   another   way,   no  criminal  liability  is  incurred.       2. There   are   crimes   which,   by   the   act   alone,   irrespective   of   its   motives,   constitute   the   offenses   punished   by   the   statute.   These   are   the   crimes   mala   prohibita,   where   in   determining   the   existence   of   the   crime,   the   only   inquiry   is,   has   the   law  been  violated?       Traditional   concept:   the   act   is   evil   because   it   is   prohibited.   An   offense   malum   prohibitum   is   an   act   made   wrong   by   legislation—a   forbidden   evil.     With   the   latest   rulings   applying   the   theory   of   malum   prohibitum,   the   traditional   concept   of   the   theory   has   been   “exploded.”   Knowledge   of   the   prohibition   is   now   a   requirement,  so  that  in  charging    an  offense   the   information   must   now   state   not   mere   “unlawfulness”   of   the   act   but   that   it   was   done   “knowingly”   or     “willfully,”   otherwise   the   information   is   insufficient   to   charge   an   offense.    

  U.S.  v.  Go  Chico,  14  Phil.  128  (1909)     Facts:   Accused   Go   Chico   was   charged   with   a   violation  of  Sec.  1  of  Act  No.  1696  of  the  Philippine   Commission,   which   punishes   any   person   who   shall   expose   to   public   view   any   flag,   banner,   emblem   or   device   used   during   the   late   insurrection   in   the   Philippines.   Even   if   the   accused   acted   without   criminal   intent   without   criminal   intent,   the   lower   court  convicted  him.       Issue:  WON  the  conviction  of  the  accused  is  proper.       Held:   Yes.   The   display   of   a   flag   or   emblem   used,   particularly   within   a   recent   period,   by   the   enemies   of   the   Government   tends   to   incite   resistance   of   governmental   functions   and   insurrection   against   governmental  authority  just  as  effectively  if  made  in   the   best   of   good   faith   as   if   made   with   the   most  

corrupt   intent.   The   display   itself,   without   the   intervention  of  any  other  fact,  is  the  evil.  It  is  quite   different  from  that  large  class  of  crimes,  made  such   by   the   common   law   or   by   statute,   in   which   the   injurious   effect   upon   the   public   depends   upon   the   the   corrupt   intention   of   the   person   perpetrating   the   act.   […]   In   the   case   at   bar,   however,   the   evil   to   society   and   to   the   Government   does   not   depend   upon  the  state  of  mind  of  the  one  who  displays  the   banner,   but   upon   the   effect   which   that   display   has   upon   the   public   mind.   In   the   one   case   the   public   is   affected  by  the  intention  of  the  actor;  in  the  other  by   the  act  itself.      

Relation  of  RPC  to  special  laws   RPC,  Art.  10   Offenses  not  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Code.  —   Offenses   which   are   or   in   the   future   may   be   punishable  under  special  laws  are  not  subject  to  the   provisions   of   this   Code.   This   Code   shall   be   supplementary   to   such   laws,   unless   the   latter   should  specially  provide  the  contrary.  

 

  Reyes:   1. Art.  10  is  composed  of  two  clauses.  In  the   first,   it   is   provided   that   offenses   under   special   laws   are   not   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the   Code.   The   second   makes   the  Code  supplementary  to  such  laws.       The   first   clause   should   be   taken   to   mean   only   that   the   Penal   Code   is   not   intended   to   supersede  special  penal  laws.  The  latter  are   controlling   with   regard   to   offenses   therein   specially  punished.  Said  clause  only  restates   the  elemental  rule  of  statutory  construction   that   special   legal   provisions   prevail   over   general  ones.       The   second   clause   contains   the   soul   of   the   article.   The   main   idea   and   purpose   of   the   article  is  embodied  in  the  provision  that  the   “Code   shall   be   supplementary”   to   special   laws,   unless   the   latter   should   specially   provide   the   contrary.   (Dissent   of   Justice   Perfecto,  People  v.  Gonzales,  82  Phil.  307)  

Rañeses  49     2. IMPORTANT  WORDS  AND  PHRASES   1. “Special   laws”-­‐   defined   in   U.S.   v.   Serapio,  23  Phil.  584,  as  a  penal  law   which  punishes  acts  not  defined  and   penalized   by   the   Penal   Code.   It   is   a   statute   enacted   by   the   legislative   branch,   penal   in   character,   which   is   not   an   amendment   to   the   RPC.   Special  laws  usually  follow  the  form   of  American  penal  law.     2. “Supplementary”   –   the   word   means   supplying   what   is   lacking;   additional.   Some   provisions   of   the   Penal   Code   are   perfectly   applicable   to  special  laws.     3. “Unless  the  latter  should  provide  the   contrary.”  -­‐     3. The   provisions   of   the   RPC   on   penalties   cannot  be  applied  to  offenses  punishable   under  special  laws.   4. Offenses   under   special   laws   are   not   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the   RPC   relating   to   attempted   and   frustrated   crimes.     5. The   special   law   has   to   fix   penalties   for   attempted   and   frustrated   crime.   The   penalty   for   the   consummated   crime   cannot   be   imposed   when   the   stage   of   the   acts   of   execution   is   either   attempted   or   frustrated,   because  the  penalties  for  the  attempted  and   frustrated   crime   is   two   degrees   or   one   degree   lower,   respectively.   The   special   law   does   not   provide   for   penalty   one   or   two   degrees   lower   than   that   provided   for   the   consummated   stage.   The   special   law   has   to   fix   a   penalty   for   the   attempt   and   a   penalty   for   the   frustration     of   the   crime   defined   by   it,   in   order   that   the   crime   may   be   punished   in   case   its   commission   reached   only   the   attempted  or  frustrated  stage  of  execution.     6. When   a   special   law   covers   the   mere   attempt   to   commit   the   crime   defined   by   it,   the   attempted   stage   is   punishable   by   the  same  penalty  provided  by  the  law.     7. Art.   10,   RPC,   is   not   applicable   to   punish   an  accomplice  under  the  special  law.    

8. Plea   of   guilty   as   a   mitigating   circumstance   is   not   available   to   offenses   punishable  under  special  laws.     9. No   accessory   penalty,   unless   the   law   provides  therefor.   10. Special   laws   amending   the   RPC   are   subject  to  its  provisions.    

   

C. Criminal  Liability     How  incurred     RPC,  Art.  4   Criminal   liability.   —   Criminal   liability   shall   be   incurred:   1.   By   any   person   committing   a   felony   (delito)   although   the   wrongful   act   done   be   different   from   that  which  he  intended.   2.  By  any  person  performing  an  act  which  would  be   an  offense  against  persons  or  property,  were  it  not   for   the   inherent   impossibility   of   its   accomplishment   or   an   account   of   the   employment   of   inadequate   or   ineffectual  means.  

 

 

Reyes:     1. Criminal   liability   is   incurred   by   any   person   in   the   cases   mentioned   in   the   two   paragraphs   of   Art.   4.   The   article   has   no   reference  to  the  manner  criminal  liability  is   incurred.   The   manner   of   incurring   criminal   liability   is   stated   in   Art.   3,   that   is,   performing   or   failing   to   do   an   act,   when   either   is   punished   by   law,   by   means   of   deceit   (with   malice)   or   fault   (through   negligence  or  imprudence).     2. One  who  commits  an  intentional  felony  is   responsible   for   all   the   consequences   which   may   naturally   and   logically   result   therefrom,  whether  foreseen  or  intended   or  not.  Ordinarily,  when  a  person  commits  a   felony   with   malice,   he   intends   the   consequences  of  his  felonious  act.  But  there   are   cases   where   the   consequences   of   the   felonious   acts   of   the   offender   are   not  

Rañeses  50     intended   by   him.   In   those   cases,   “the   wrongful   act   done”   is   “different   from   that   which  he  intended.”       In   view   of   par.   1   of   Art.   4,   a   person   committing   a   felony   is   criminally   liable   although   the   consequences   of   his   felonious   act  are  not  intended  by  him.       One   is   not   relieved   from   criminal   liability   for  the  natural  consequences  of  one’s  illegal   acts,  merely  because  one  does  not  intend  to   produce   such   consequences.   (U.S.   v.   Brobst,   14  Phil.  310)     3. IMPORTANT   WORDS   AND   PHRASES   IN   PAR.  1  OF  ART.  4.     1. “Committing   a   felony.”   –   Not   mere   performance   of   an   act.   A   felony   is   an   act  punishable  by  the  RPC.  If  it  is  not   punishable   by   the   code,   it   is   not   a   felony.   The   felony   committed   should   be  one  committed  by  means  of  dolo,   that  is,  with  malice,  because  par.  1  of   Art.   4   speaks   of   wrongful   act   done   “different   from   that   which   he   intended.”       If   the   wrongful   act   results   from   imprudence,   negligence,   lack   of   foresight   or   lack   of   skill   of   the   offender,   his   liability   should   be   determined   under   Art.   365,   which   defines   and   penalizes   criminal   negligence.       The   act   or   omission   should   not   be   punished   by   a   special   law,   because   the   offender   violating   a   special   law   may   have   the   intent   to   do   an   injury   to   another.   In   such   case,   the   wrongful   act   done   could   not   be   different   as   the   offender   did   not   intend  to  do  any  other  injury.     § When   a   person   has   not   committed   a   felony,   he   is   not   criminally   liable   for   the   result  which  is  not  intended.    

4.

5.

6.

7.

2. “Although   the   wrongful   act   done   be   different   from   that   which   he   intended.”   –   The   causes   which   may   produce   a   result   different   from   that   which  the  offender  intended  are:  (1)   mistake   in   the   identity   of   the   victim;   (2)  mistake  in  the  blow,  that  is  when   the   offender   intending   to   do   an   injury   to   another   person   actually   inflicts  it  on  another;  and  (3)  the  act   exceeds   the   intent,   that   is,   the   injurious   result   is   greater   than   that   intended.     Under  par.  1,  Art.  4,  a  person  committing   a  felony  is  still  criminally  liable  even  if-­‐   1. There   is   a   mistake   in   the   identity   of   the  victim  –  error  in  personae.     2. There   is   a   mistake   in   the   blow   –   aberratio  ictus.     3. The   injurious   result   is   greater   than   that  intended  –  praeter  intentionem.     The   first   paragraph   of   Art.   4   has   certain   requisites.     1. That   an   intentional   felony   has   been   committed;  and   2. That   the   wrong   done   to   the   aggrieved   party   be   the   direct,   natural   and   logical   consequence   of   the   felony   committed   by   the   offender.     Any   person   who   creates   in   another’s   mind   an   immediate   sense   of   danger,   which   causes   the   latter   to   do   something   resulting   in   the   latter’s   injuries,   is   liable   for  the  resulting  injuries.     The   felony   committed   must   be   the   proximate   cause   of   the   resulting   injury.   Proximate   cause   is   “that   cause,   which,   in   natural  and  continuous  sequence,  unbroken   by  any  efficient  intervening  cause,  produces   the   injury,   and   without   which   the   result   would   not   have   occurred.”   (Bataclan   v.   Medina,   102   Phil.   181,   186,   quoting   38   Am.   Jur.  695)  

  Moreover,   a   person   committing   a   felony   is   criminally   liable   for   all   natural   and   logical  

Rañeses  51     consequences   resulting   therefrom   although   the   wrongful   act   done   be   different   from   that   which   he   intended.   “Natural”   refers   to   an   occurrence  in  the  ordinary  course  of  human   life   or   events,   while   “logical”   means   that   there   is   a   rational   connection   between   the   act  of  the  accused  and  the  resulting  injury  or   damage.   The   felony   committed   must   be   the   proximate   cause   of   the   resulting   injury.   Proximate   cause   is   that   cause   which,   in   natural  and  continuous  sequence,  unbroken   by  any  efficient  intervening  cause,  produces   the   injury,   and   without   which   the   result   would   not   have   occurred.   The   proximate   legal   cause   is   that   acting   first   and   producing   the  injury,  either  immediately,  or  by  setting   other   events   in   motion,   all   constituting   a   natural  and  continuous  chain  of  event,  each   having   a   close   causal   connection   with   its   immediate  predecessor.       The   felony   committed   is   not   the   proximate   cause  of  the  resulting  injury  when:   1. There   is   an   active   force   that   intervened   between   the   felony   committed   and   the   resulting   injury,   and   the   active   force   is   a   distinct   act   or   fact   absolutely   foreign   from   the   felonious  act  of  the  accused;  or   2. The   resulting   injury   is   due   to   the   intentional  act  of  the  victim.       *Refer  to  pp.  78-­‐79  of  Reyes’s  annotation  of   the   RPC,   17th   edition,   for   the   examples   of   causes   which   are   not   considered   efficient   intervening  causes.   8. There  are  certain  requisites  before  death   is   presumed   to   be   the   natural   consequence   of   physical   injuries   inflicted.     1. That   the   victim   at   the   time   the   physical   injuries   were   inflicted   was   in  normal  health.     2. That   death   may   be   expected   from   the  physical  injuries  inflicted.    

3. That  death  ensued  within  a   reasonable  time.  (People  v.  Datu   Baginda,  (C.A.,  44  O.G.  2287)     9. A   supervening   event   may   be   the   subject   of  amendment  of  original  information  or   of  a  new  charge  without  double  jeopardy.            

Rañeses  52      

RPC,  Art.  14  (1)  

RPC,  Art.  14  (3)  

Aggravating   circumstances.   -­‐   The   following   are   aggravating  circumstances:   1.

Aggravating   circumstances.   -­‐   The   following   are   aggravating  circumstances:  

That  advantage  be  taken  by  the  offender  of   his  public  position.  

3.

RPC,  Art.  13(3)   Mitigating   circumstances.   -­‐   The   following   are   mitigating  circumstances:   3.

That   the   offender   had   no   intention   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong   as   that   committed.  

RPC,  Art.  48   Penalty   for   complex   crimes.   -­‐   When   a   single   act   constitutes  two  or  more  grave  or  less  grave  felonies,   or   when   an   offense   is   a   necessary   means   for   committing   the   other,   the   penalty   for   the   most   serious   crime   shall   be   imposed,   the   same   to   be   applied   in   its   maximum   period.   (As   amended   by   Act   No.  4000.)  

RPC,  Art.  49   Penalty  to  be  imposed  upon  the  principals  when  the   crime   committed   is   different   from   that   intended.   -­‐   In   cases   in   which   the   felony   committed   is   different   from   that   which   the   offender   intended   to   commit,   the  following  rules  shall  be  observed:   1.  If  the  penalty  prescribed  for  the  felony  committed   be   higher   than   that   corresponding   to   the   offense   which  the  accused  intended  to  commit,  the  penalty   corresponding   to   the   latter   shall   be   imposed   in   its   maximum  period.   2.  If  the  penalty  prescribed  for  the  felony  committed   be  lower  than  that  corresponding  to  the  one  which   the  accused  intended  to  commit,  the  penalty  for  the   former  shall  be  imposed  in  its  maximum  period.   3.   The   rule   established   by   the   next   preceding   paragraph   shall   not   be   applicable   if   the   acts   committed   by   the   guilty   person   shall   also   constitute   an   attempt   or   frustration   of   another   crime,   if   the   law   prescribes   a   higher   penalty   for   either   of   the   latter   offenses,   in   which   case   the   penalty   provided   for   the   attempted   or   the   frustrated   crime   shall   be   imposed  in  its  maximum  period.  (Arts.  61,  62,  65)    

 

That  the  act  be  committed  with  insult  or  in   disregard  of  the  respect  due  to  the  offended   party  on  account  of  his  rank,  age,  or  sex,  or   that   it   be   committed   in   the   dwelling   of   the   offended   party,   if   the   latter   has   not   given   provocation.  

    Reyes:   1. (Art.   14   [1])   Failure   in   official   duties   is   tantamount  to  abuse  of  office.     2. Same.   It   is   not   aggravating   when   it   is   an   integral   element   of,   or   inherent   in,   the   offense.     3. (Art.   13[3])   This   mitigating   circumstance   can  only  be  applied  when  the  facts  show   that   there   is   a   notable   and   evident   disproportion   between   the   means   employed  to  execute  the  criminal  act  and   its   consequences.   (US   v.   Reyes,   36   Phil.   904,  907)   4. Same.   Intention,   being   an   internal   state,   must  be  judged  by  external  acts.     5. Same.   It   is   not   applicable   when   the   offender  employed  brute  force.     6. Same.   It   is   applicable   only   in   offenses   resulting  in  physical  injuries  or  harm.     7. (Art.   48)   This   provision   requires   the   commission   of   at   least   two   crimes.   But   the   two   or   more   grave   or   less   grave   felonies   nmust   be   the   result   of   a   single   act,   or   an   offense   must   be   a   necessary   means   for   committing  the  other.     8. Same.   A   complex   crime   is   only   one   crime,   even   if   two   or   more   crimes   are   actually   committed.   The   offender   has   only   one   criminal  intent.     9. Same.  Two  kinds  complex  crimes:   1. When  a  single  act  constitutes  two  or   more  grave  or  less  grave  felonies.   2. When   an   offense   is   a   necessary   means  for  committing  the  other.    

Rañeses  53     10. Same.  “When  a  single  act  constitutes  two   or   more   grave   or   less   grave   felonies.”   –   (1)   That   only   a   single   act   is   performed   by   the   offender   and   (2)   that   the   single   act   produces   (a)   two   or   more   less   grave   felonies,   or   (b)   one   or   more   grave   and   one   or   more   less   grave   felonies   or   (c)   two   or   more  less  grave  felonies.     11. Same.  “Two  or  more  less  grave  felonies.”   –   In   the   case   of   a   compound   crime,   the   offenses   involved   should   be   either   both   grave   or   both   less   grave,   or   one   of   them   a   grave  felony  and  the  other  less  grave.     12. Same.  Light  felonies  are  produced  by  the   same   act   should   be   treated   and   punished   as  separate  offenses  or  may  be  absorbed   by  the  grave  felony.     1. Several   light   felonies   resulting   from   one  single  act  –  not  complex.     2. When   the   crime   is   committed   by   force   or   violence,   slight   physical   injuries  are  absorbed.   13. Same.   “When   an   offense   is   a   necessary   means   for   committing   the   other.”   –   (1)   That   at   least   two   offenses   are   committed,   (2)   that   one   or   some   of   the   offenses   must   be   necessary  to  commit  the  other,  and  (3)  That   both   or   all   the   offenses   must   be   punished   under  the  same  statute.     14. Same.   “Necessary   means”   does   not   mean   “indispensable  means.”     15. Same.   In   complex   crime,   when   the   offender   executes   various   acts,   he   must   have  a  single  purpose.     16. Same.   There   is   no   complex   crime   when   one   offense   is   committed   to   conceal   the   other.     17. Same.  No  complex  crime  when  one  of  the   offenses  is  penalized  by  a  special  law.     18. Same.   When   two   or   more   crimes   are   committed  but  (1)  not  by  a  single  act,  or   (2)   one   is   not   a   necessary   means   for   omitting   the   other,   there   is   no   complex   crime.     19. Same.   Thgere   is   no   complex   crime   of   rebellion   with   murder,   arson,   robbery,   or  other  common  crimes.    

20. Same.   When   two   crimes   produced   by   a   single   act   are   respectively   within   the   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   two   courts   of   different  jurisdiction,  the  court  of  higher   jurisdiction  shall  try  the  complex  crime.     21. Same.   Art.   48   is   intended   to   favor   the   culprit.   In   directing   the   penalty   for   the   graver   offense   shall   be   imposed   in   its   maximum  period,  Art.  48  could  have  had  no   other   purpose   than   to   prescribe   a   penalty   lower  than  the  aggregate  of  the  penalties  for   each   offense,   if   imposed   separately.   When   two  or  more  crimes  are  the  result  of  a  single   act,   the   offender   is   deemed   less   perverse   than   when   he   commits   said   crimes   through   separate   but   distinct   acts.   (People   v.   Hernandez,  99  Phil.  515,  542-­‐543)   22. Same.   The   penalty   for   complex   crime   is   the   penalty   for   the   most   serious   crime,   the   same   to   be   applied   in   its   maximum   period.     23. Same.   When   two   felonies   constituting   a   complex   cime   are   punishable   by   imprisonment   and   fine,   respectively,   only  the  penalty  of  imprisonment  should   be  imposed.     24. Same.   This   provision   only   applies   when   the   Code   does   not   provide   a   definite   specific  penalty  for  a  complex  crime.     25. One   information   should   be   filed   when   a   complex  crime  is  committed.     26. Same.   When   a   complex   crime   is   charged   and   one   offense   is   not   proven,   the   accused  can  be  convicted  of  the  other.     27. Same.   Art.   48   does   not   apply   when   the   law   provides   on   single   penalty   for   the   special  complex  crime.     28. Same.  Plurality  of  crimes  –  consists  in  the   successive  execution  by  the  same  individual   of  different  criminal  acts  upon  any  of  which   are  no  conviction  has  been  declared.     29. Same.   Kinds   of   plurality   crimes   –   (1)   formal   or   ideal   and   (2)   real   or   material   plurality     30. Same.  A  continued  crime  is  not  a  complex   crime.   A   continued   crime   is   a   continuous,   unlawful  act  or  series  of  acts  set  on  foot  by  a  

Rañeses  54     single  impulse  and  operated  by  a  force  that   is   not   intermittent,   however   long   a   time   it   may  occupy.  (22  C.J.S.,  52)   31. Same.   In   material   plurality,   each   eact   constitutes   a   separate   crime,   while   each   act   in   a   continued   crime   constitute   only   one  crime.     32. (Art.   49)   It   only   applies   when   there   is   a   mistake   in   the   identity   of   the   victim   of   the   crime,   and   the   penalty   for   the   crime   committed   is   different   from   that   for   the   crime  intended  to  be  committed.     33. Same.   It   has   no   application   in   cases   where   a   more   serious   consequence   not   intended   by   the   offender   befalls   the   same  person.     34. Same.   It   is   applicable   only   when   the   intended   crime   actually   committed   is   punished  with  different  penalties.     35. Same.   Art.   49   imposes   the   lesser   penalty   to   be   applied   in   its   maximum   period,   while   Art.   48   applies   the   penalty   for   the   more   or   most   serious   crime   in   its   maximum  period.     36. Same.   Rule   no.   3   in   Art.   49   is   not   necessary,   because   the   cases   contemplated   in   the   said   rule   may   be   covered  by  Art.  48.     37. (Art.   14[3])   The   four   circumstances   enumerated   in   the   provision   can   be   considered   single   or   together.   If   all   are   present,   they   have   the   weight   of   one   single   aggravating  circumstance.     38. Same.   It   is   applicable   only   to   crimes   against  persons  or  honor.     39. Same.   “With   insult   or   in   disregard.”   –   There   must   be   evidence   that   in   the   commission   of   the   crime,   the   accused   deliberately  intended  to  offend  or  insult  the   sex   or   age   of   the   offended   party.   (People   v.   Mangsant,  65  Phil.  548,  550-­‐551)     1. There   must   be   difference   in   the   social   condition   of   the   offender   and   the  offended  party.     2. The   circumstance   of   lack   of   respect   due   to   age   applies   in   cases   where  

the  victim  is  of  tender  age  as  well  as   of  old  age.   3. Sex   in   the   circumstances   enumerated   refer   to   the   female   sex,   not  the  male  sex.     40. Same.  It  is  not  applicable  when:   1. The  offender  acted  with  passion  and   obfuscation   2. There   exists   a   relationship   between   the  offended  party  and  the  offender.   3. The   condition   of   being   a   woman   is   indispensable   in   the   commission   of   the  crime.     41. Same.   Disregard   of   sex   is   absorbed   in   treachery.   42. Same.   That   the   crime   be   committed   in   the  dwelling  of  the  offended  party   1. The   abuse   of   confidence   which   the   offended   party   reposed   in   the   offender  by  opening  the  door  to  him;   or     2. The   violation   of   the   sanctity   of   the   home   by   trespassing   therein   with   violence   or   against   the   will   of   the   owner.     43. Same.   Offended   party   must   not   give   provocation.   As   may   be   seen,   a   condition   sine   qua   non   of   this   circumstance,   is   that   the   offended   party   “has   not   given   provocation”   to   the   offender.   When   it   is   the   offended   party   who   has   provoked   the   incident,   he   loses   his   right   to   the   respect   and   consideration  due  him  in  his  own  house.     44. Same.  Provocation  must  be:   1. Given  by  the  owner  of  the  dwelling   2. Sufficient,  and   3. Immediate   to   the   commission   f   the   crime     45. Same.   There   must   be   close   relation   between   provocation   and   commission   of   the  crime  in  the  dwelling.     46. Same.   Because   the   provocation   is   not   immediate,  dwelling  is  aggravating.       U.S.  v.  Brobst,  14  Phil.  310  (1909)   Facts:  The  defendant,  James  L.  Brobst,  and  another   American  named  Mann,  were  engaged  in  work  on  a  

Rañeses  55     mine  located  in  the  municipality  of  Masbate,  where   they   gave   employment   to   a   number   of   native   laborers.       Mann   discharged   one   of   these   laborers   named   Simeon   Saldivar,   warned   him   not   to   come   back   on   the  premises,  and  told  the  defendant  not  to  employ   him   again,   because   he   was   a   thief   and   a   disturbing   element  with  the  other  laborers.       A  few  days  afterwards,  sometime  after  6  o'clock  on   the   morning   of   the   10th   of   July,   1907,   Saldivar,   in   company   with   three   of   four   others,   went   to   the   mine   to   look   for   work.   The   defendant,   caught   sight   of  Saldivar,  ordered  him  off  the  place,  exclaiming  in   bad   Spanish,   "Sigue,   Vamus!"   (Begone).   Saldivar   made   no   move   to   leave,   and   although   the   order   was   repeated,   merely   smiled   or   grinned   at   the   defendant,   whereupon   the   latter   became   enraged,   took   three   steps   toward   Saldivar,   and   struck   him   a   powerful   blow   with   his   closed   fist   on   the   left   side,   just   over   the   lower   ribs,   at   the   point   where   the   handle   of   Saldivar's   bolo   lay   against   the   belt   from   which  it  was  suspended.     On   being   struck,   Saldivar   threw   up   his   hands,   staggered.   (dio   vueltas   -­‐   spun   around   helplessly)   and   without   saying   a   word,   went   away   in   the   direction   of   his   sister's   house,   which   stood   about   200   yards   away,   and   about   100   feet   up   the   side   of   a   hill.   He   died   as   he   reached   the   door   of   the   house,   and  was  buried  some  two  or  three  days  later.       Issue:   Whether   or   not   Brobst   is   guilty   of   homicide   and  not  homicide  as  a  result  of  reckless  negligence.       Held:     Yes.   The   evidence   of   record   leaves   no   room   for   reasonable   doubt   that   the   defendant   struck   Saldivar   a   powerful   body   blow   with   his   closed   fist;   and   that   was   far   in   excess   of   such   authority,   and   was,   therefore,   unlawful,   and   cannot   be   excused   or   justified   as   an   exercise   of   necessary   force   in   the   exercise  of  a  right     The   deceased   came   to   his   death   as   a   result   of   the   blow   inflicted   by   the   defendant.   Two   or   three   days   prior   to   his   death   he   was   employed   as   a   laborer   in  

defendant's   mine;   his   sister   testified   that   on   the   morning   of   the   day   he   died,   he   left   her   house   in   apparent   good   health   and   went   to   the   mines   to   look   for   work;   a   short   time   afterwards   he   received   a   violent   blow   on   his   lower   left   side,   a   region   of   the   body   where   many   of   the   vital   organs   are   located;   and   immediately   thereafter,   he   stared   up   the   short   trail   leading   to   his   sister's   house,   and   died   as   he   reached  the  door.  In  the  absence  of  evidence  of  any   intervening   cause,   we   think   there   can   be   no   reasonable   doubt   that   his   death   resulted   from   the   blow.       In   the   case   at   bar   the   evidence   conclusively   establishes  the  voluntary,  intentional,  and  unlawful   infliction   by   the   accused   of   a   severe   blow   on   the   person  of  the  deceased;  and  while  it  is  true  that  the   accused   does   not   appear   to   have   intended   to   take   the   life   of   his   victim,   there   can   no   doubt   that   in   thus   striking   the   deceased,   he   intended   to   do   him   some   injury,   at   least   to   the   extent   of   inflicting   some   degree   of   physical   pain   upon   him,   and   he   is   therefore,   criminally   responsible   for   the   natural,   even   if   unexpected   results   of   his   act,   under   the   provisions   of   article   1   of   the   Penal   Code,   which   prescribes  that:       Any   person   voluntarily   committing   a   crime   or   misdemeanor   shall   incur   criminal   liability,   even   though   the   wrongful   act   committed   be   different   from   that  which  he  had  intended  to  commit.       In   such   cases   the   law   in   these   Islands   does   not   excuse   one   from   liability   for   the   natural   consequences   of   hi   illegal   acts   merely   because   he   did   not   intend   to   produce   such   consequences,   but   it   does   take   that   fact   into   consideration   as   an   extenuating   circumstance,   as   did   the   trial   judge   in   this  case.     People  v.  Mananquil,  132  SCRA  196  (1984)   Facts:     Valentina   Mananquil   y   Laredo   was   accused   of  parricide  allegedly  committed  as  follows:     On   March   6,   1965,   at   about   11:00   o'clock   in   the   evening,  appellant  went  to  the  NAWASA  Building  at   Pasay  City  where  her  husband  was  then  working  as  

Rañeses  56     a   security   guard.   She   had   just   purchased   ten   (10)   centavo   worth   of   gasoline   from   the   Esso   Gasoline   Station  at  Taft  Avenue  which  she  placed  in  a  coffee   bottle.   She   was   angry   of   her   husband,   Elias   Day   y   Pablo,   because   the   latter   had   burned   her   clothing,   was  maintaining  a  mistress  and  had  been  taking  all   the   food   from   their   house.   Upon   reaching   the   NAWASA   Building,   she   knocked   at   the   door.   Immediately,   after   the   door   was   opened,   Elias   Day   shouted   at   the   appellant   and   castigated   her   saying,   "puta   buguian   lakaw   galigaon"   The   appellant   tired   of   hearing   the   victim,   then   got   the   bottle   of   gasoline   and   poured   the   contents   thereof   on   the   face   of   the   victim   (t.s.n.,   p.   14,   Id).   Then,   she   got   a   matchbox   and   set   the   polo   shirt   of   the   victim   a   flame.   The   appellant  was  investigated  by  elements  of  the  Pasay   City   Police   to   whom   she   gave   a   written   statement   where  she  admitted  having  burned  the  victim.       Upon   the   other   hand,   the   victim   was   taken   first   to   the   Philippine   General   Hospital   and   then   to   the   Trinity   General   Hospital   at   Sta.   Ana,   Manila,   when   he  died  on  March  10,  1965.  due  to  pneumonia,  lobar   bilateral  Burns  2  secondary.       Issues:   1. WON   or   not   appellant's   extrajudicial   confession  was  voluntarily  given;     2. WON   or   not   the   burns   sustained   by   the   victim   contributed   to   cause   pneumonia   which  was  the  cause  of  the  victim's  death.       Held:   1. Yes.    No  denunciation  of  any  sort  was  made   nor   levelled   by   her   against   the   police   investigators.   Neither   was   there   any   complaint  aired  by  her  to  the  effect  that  she   merely   affixed   her   signatures   thereto   because   of   the   promise   by   the   police   that   she  will  be  released  later.     Furthermore   almost   all   the   recitals   and   narrations   appearing   in   the   said   statement   were   practically   repeated   by   her   on   the   witness   stand   thus   authenticating   the   truth   and   veracity   of   her   declarations   contained   therein  

2. Yes.     The   cause   of   death   as   shown   by   the   necropsy   report   is   pneumonia,   lobar   bilateral.   Burns   2'   secondary.   There   is   no   question   that   the   burns   sustained   by   the   victim   as   shown   by   The   post-­‐mortem   findings  immunity  about  62%  of  the  victim's   entire   body.   The   evidence   shows   that   pneumonia   was   a   mere   complication   of   the   burns   sustained.   While   accepting   pneumonia  as  the  immediate  cause  of  death,   the   court   a   quo   held   on   to   state   that   this   could   not   litem   resulted   had   not   the   victim   suffered   from   second   degree   burns.   It   concluded,   and   rightly   so,   that   with   pneumonia   having   developed,   the   burns   became   as   to   the   cause   of   death,   merely   contributory     Appellant's   case   falls   squarely   under   Art,   4,   Par.   1   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   which   provides:       Art.   4.   Criminal   Liability.     Criminal   liability  shall  be  incurred.       By   any   person   committing   a   felony   (delito)   although   the   wrongful   act   done   be   different   from   that   which   he   intended.       The   essential   requisites   of   which   are:   (a)   that   an   intentional   felony   has   been   committed;   and   (b)   that   the   wrong   done   to   the   aggrieved   party   be   the   direct,   natural   and   logical   consequence   of   the   felony   committed  by  the  offender.     People  v.  Iligan,  191  SCRA  643  (1990)     Facts:   At   around   2   in   the   morning   Esmeraldo   Quinones   and   his   companions   Zaldy   Asis   and   Felix   Lukban   were   walking   home   from   barangay   Sto.   Domingo  after  attending  a  barrio  fiesta.  On  the  way   they   met   the   accused     Fernando   Iligan   and   his   nephew   Edmundo   Asis   and   Juan   Macandog.   Edmundo  Asis  pushed  them  aside  prompting  Zaldy   Asis  to  box  him.  Felix  quickly  said  that  they  had  no   desire   to   fight.   Upon   seeing   his   nephew   fall,  

Rañeses  57     Fernando   Iligan   drew   from   his   back   a   bolo   and   hacked  Zaldy  but  missed.       Terrified   the   trio   ran,   pursued   by   the   three   accused.   They   ran   for   a   good   while   and   even   passed   the   house   of   Quinones,   when   they   noticed   that   they   were   no   longer   being   chased   the   three   decided   to   head  back  to  Quinones  house.  On  the  way  back  the   three   accused   suddenly   emerged   from   the   road   side,   Fernando   Iligan     then   hacked   Quinones   Jr.   on   the   forehead   with   his   bolo   causing   him   to   fall   down.   Felix   and   Zaldy   ran.   Upon   returning   they   saw   that   Quinones  Jr.  was  already  dead  with  his  head  busted.       The  postmortem  examination  report  and  the  death   certificate   indicates   that   the   victim   died   of   “shock   and   massive   cerebral   hemorrhages   due   to   vehicular   accident.”     Issue:   WON   the   accused   are   liable   for   the   victim’s   death   given   that   it   was   due   to   a   vehicular   accident   and  not  the  hacking.     Held:  Yes.  We  are  convinced  beyond  peradventure   that   indeed   after   Quinones,   Jr.   had   fallen   from   the   bolo   hacking   perpetrated   by   Iligan,   he   was   run   over   by  a  vehicle.    This  finding,  however,  does  not  in  any   way   exonerate   Iligan   from   liability   for   the   death   of   Quinones   Jr.   This   being   under   ART   4   of   the   RPC   which  states  that  criminal  liability  shall  be  incurred   by   any   person   committing   a   felony   although   the   wrongful   act   done   be   different   from   that   which   he   intended.       The   essential   requisites   of   Art   4   are:   that   an   intentional   felony   has   been   committed   and   that   the   wrong   done   to   the   aggrieved   party   be   the   direct   natural   and   logical   consequence   of   the   felony   committed  by  the  offender.       It  is  held  that  the  essential  elements  are  present  in   this  case.  The  intentional  felony  committed  was  the   hacking  of  the  head  of  Quinones  the  fact  that  it  was   considered   superficial   by   the   physician   is   immaterial.   The   location   of   the   wound   intended   to   do  away  with  him.    

The   hacking   incident   happened   on   the   national   highway   where   vehicles   pass   any   moment;   the   hacking   blow   received   by   Quinones   weakened   him   and  was  run  over  by  a  vehicle.  The  hacking  by  Iligan   is   thus   deemed   as   the   proximate   cause   of   the   victim’s  death.       Iligan   is   held   liable   for   homicide   absent   any   qualifying  circumstances     People  v.  Sabalones,  294  SCRA  751  (1998)   Facts:   Beronga,   Sabalones,   cabanero   and   Alegarbe   were  convicted  of  2  counts  of  murder  and  3  counts   of  frustrated  murder  of  Glenn  tiempo,  Alfred  nardo,   rey   bolo,   reogelio   presores   and   nelson   tiempo.   A   shooting  incident  on  June  1,  1985  in  Manuela  Comp,   Talisay  Cebu  led  to  these  deaths.     Issues:   1. WON   prosecution   witnesses   and   evidence   are  credible.   2. WON  alibi’s  acceptable.   3. WON  correct  penalty  imposed.     Held:     1. Yes.   RTC   findings   were   binding   to   court   with   appreciated   testimonies   of   two   witnesses.  There  was  positive  identification   by   survivors   who   saw   them   when   they   peered  during  lulls  in  gunfire.  The  place  was   well-­‐lit,   whether   from   post   of   car’s   headlights.   The   extrajudicial   confession   has   no   bearing   because   the   conviction   was   based   on   positive   identification.   It   is   binding,   though,   to   the   co-­‐accused   because   it   is   used   as   circumstantial   evidence   corroborated   by   one   witness.   The   inconsistencies   are   minor   and   inconsequential   which   strengthen   credibility   of   testimony.   Furthermore,   in   aberratio   ictus   (mistake   in   blow),   mistake   does   not   diminish   culpability;   same   gravity   applies,   more   proper   to   use   error   in   personae.      

Rañeses  58     2. No.   It   was   still   quite   near   the   crime   scene.   It   is   overruled   by   positive   identification.   Furthermore,  flight  indicates  guilt     3. No.  Under  RPC  A248,  the  imposable  penalty   is   reclusion   temporal,   in   its   maximum   period   to   death.   There   being   no   aggravating/mitigating   circumstance,   aside   from   the   qualifying   circumstance   of   treachery,   the   appellate   court   correctly   imposed  reclusion  perpetua  for  murder.  The   CA  however  erred  in  computing  the  penalty   for   each   of   the   three   counts   of   frustrated   murder.   Under   RPC   A50,   the   penalty   for   a   frustrated   felony   is   the   next   lower   in   degree   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   consummated   felony   xxx.”   Because   there   are   no   aggravating   or   mitigating   circumstance   as   the   CA   itself   held,   the   penalty   prescribed   by   law   should   be   imposed  in  its  medium  period.     People  v.  Guillen,  85  Phil.  307  (1950)   Facts:   Guillen   was   charged   with   the   crime   of   murder   of   Simeon   Varela   (Barrela)   and   to   multiple   frustrated   murder   of   President   Roxas,   Alfredo   Eva,   Jose   Fabio,   Pedro   Carrillo   and   Emilio   Maglalang   who   were   the   injured   parties,   as   the   information   filed   against   him   provided.   Guillen   pleaded   not   guilty   to   the   crime   charged   against   him,   but   was   later  found  after  duly  admitting  his  intention  to  kill   the   President,   the   lower   court   found   him   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   was   sentenced   with   the   highest   capital   punishment,   for   the   murder   of   Simeon   Varela   (Barrela)   and   to   the   multiple   frustrated  murder  of  President  Roxas  et  al.     Issue:   WON   the   conviction   of   the   accused   was   proper.     Held:   No.   The   case   is   clearly   governed   by   the   first   clause   of   article   481   because   by   a   single   act,   that   a   throwing   highly   explosive   hand   grenade   at                                                                                                                           1

 Art.  48.  Penalty  for  Complex  Crimes.  —  When  a  single  act   constitutes   two   or   more   grave   or   less   grave   felonies,   or   when  an  offense  is  a  necessary  means  for  committing  the   other,   the   penalty   for   the   most   serious   crime   shall   be   imposed,  the  same  to  be  applied  in  its  maximum  period.  

President   Roxas,   the   accused   committed   two   grave   felonies,   namely:   (1)   murder,   of   which   Simeon   Varela   was   the   victim;   and   (2)   multiple   attempted   murder,   of   which   President   Roxas,   Alfredo   Eva,   Jose   Fabio,  Pedro  Carrillo  and  Emilio  Maglalang  were  the   injured  parties.     The   killing   of   Simeon   Varela   was   attended   by   the   qualifying  circumstance  of  treachery.  In  the  case  of   People  vs.  Mabug-­‐at,  supra,  this  court  held  that  the   qualifying   circumstance   of   treachery   may   be   properly   considered,   even   when   the   victim   of   the   attack   was   not   the   one   whom   the   defendant   intended  to  kill,  if  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that   neither  of  the  two  persons  could  in  any  manner  put   up  defense  against  the  attack,  or  become  aware  of  it.   In   the   same   case   it   was   held   that   the   qualifying   circumstance  of  premeditation  may  not  be  properly   taken   into   the   account   when   the   person   whom   the   defendant   proposed   to   kill   was   different   from   the   one  who  became  his  victim.     There   can   be   no   question   that   the   accused   attempted   to   kill   President   Roxas   by   throwing   a   hand  grenade  at  him  with  the  intention  to  kill  him,   thereby   commencing   the   commission   of   a   felony   by   over   acts,   but   he   did   not   succeed   in   assassinating   him   "by   reason   of   some   cause   or   accident   other   than   his   own   spontaneous   desistance."   For   the   same   reason   we   qualify   the   injuries   caused   on   the   four   other   persons   already   named   as   merely   attempted   and   not  frustrated  murder.     *The   accused   committed   a   mistake   in   blow   (aberratio  ictus),  hence  the  application  of  Art.  48.       People  v.  Albuquerque,  59  Phil.  150  (1933)   Facts:  Appellant,  deeply  affected  by  the  knowledge   that   his   daughter   had   been   impregnated   by   the   victim,   made   efforts   to   force   victim   to   legitimize   marry   his   daughter.   Although   the   victim   agreed   to   give   the   child   a   monthly   allowance   by   way   of   support,   he   never   complied   with   his   promise.   Incensed,  the  appellant  went  into  the  victim’s  office.   Upon   hearing   the   victim   refuse   once   again,   appellant   whipped   out   his   penknife   and   stabbed   him   in   the   face.   Due   to   his   lack   of   control   of   the  

Rañeses  59     movement   of   his   arm,   the   weapon   landed   on   the   base  of  the  neck  of  the  victim,  killing  him.       Issue:  WON  conviction  of  the  appellant  was  proper   in  view  of  the  circumstances.       Held:  Yes.  The  appellant  did  not  intend  to  cause  so   grave  an  injury  as  the  death  of  the  deceased.  In  his   testimony   the   appellant   affirmed   that   he   only   wanted   to   inflict   a   wound     that   would   leave   a   permanent  scar  on  the  face  of  the  deceased,  or  one   that   would   compel   him   to   remain   in   the   hospital   for   a  week  or  two.  There  was  no  intention  to  kill  him,  as   that   would   frustrate   his   efforts   to   get   the   deceased   to   marry   his   daughter   or   at   least   provide   some   support.       In   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   mitigating   circumstances  of  lack  of  intention  to  cause  so  grave   an  injury  as  the  death  of  the  deceased  as  well  as  his   voluntary   surrender   to   the   authorities,   and   acted   under   the   influence   of   passion   and   obfuscation   should  be  taken  into  consideration.       Appellant’s   contention   of   self-­‐defense   has   no   merit   as   he   provoked   and   commenced   the   aggression.   Defense  counsel’s  claim  for  application  of  Art.  49  of   the   RPC2   has   no   merit   for   it   is   only   applicable   in                                                                                                                           2

  Article   49.   Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   the   principals   when  the  crime  committed  is  different  from  that  intended.   -­‐  In  cases  in  which  the  felony  committed  is  different  from   that   which   the   offender   intended   to   commit,   the   following  rules  shall  be  observed:     1.   If   the   penalty   prescribed   for   the   felony   committed   be   higher  than  that  corresponding  to  the  offense  which  the   accused   intended   to   commit,   the   penalty   corresponding   to  the  latter  shall  be  imposed  in  its  maximum  period.     2.   If   the   penalty   prescribed   for   the   felony   committed   be   lower   than   that   corresponding   to   the   one   which   the   accused   intended   to   commit,   the   penalty   for   the   former   shall  be  imposed  in  its  maximum  period.     3.  The  rule  established  by  the  next  preceding  paragraph   shall   not   be   applicable   if   the   acts   committed   by   the   guilty   person   shall   also   constitute   an   attempt   or   frustration   of   another  crime,  if  the  law  prescribes  a  higher  penalty  for   either   of   the   latter   offenses,   in   which   case   the   penalty   provided  for  the  attempted  or  the  frustrated  crime  shall  

cases   where   the   crime   committed   befalls   a   different   person  (aberratio  ictus).       Bataclan  v.  Medina,  102  Phil.  181  (1957)   Facts:   The   deceased   Juan   Bataclan   was   among   the   passengers   of   Medina   Transportation,   driven   by   Conrado   Saylon   and   operated   by   Mariano   Medina.   On   its   way   from   Cavite   to   Pasay,   the   front   tires   burst   and   the   vehicle   fell   into   a   canal.   Some   passengers   were   able   to   escape   by   themselves   or   with   some   help,   while   there   were   4,   including   Bataclan,   who   could   not   get   out.   Their   cries   were   heard  in  the  neighborhood.  Then  there  came  about   10   men,   one   of   them   carrying   a   torch.   As   they   approached   the   bus,   it   caught   fire   and   the   passengers   died.   The   fire   was   due   to   gasoline   leak   and  the  torch.  Salud  Villanueva  Vda.  de  Bataclan,  in   her   name   and   on   behalf   of   her   5   minor   children,   sought   to   claim   damages   from   the   bus   company.   The   CFI   favored   the   plaintiff,   and   the   Court   of   Appeals   forwarded   the   case   to   the   Supreme   Court   due  to  the  amount  involved.     Issue:   WON   Medina   Transportation   was   liable   for   the  deaths  and  damages  incurred  by  the  passengers.       Held:   Yes.   The   case   involves   a   breach   of   contract   of   transportation   for   hire,   the   Medina   Transportation   having   undertaken   to   carry   Bataclan   safely   to   his   destination,  Pasay  City.  We  also  agree  with  the  trial   court   that   there   was   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   defendant,   through   his   agent,   the   driver   Saylon.   There   is   evidence   to   show   that   at   the   time   of   the   blow   out,   the   bus   was   speeding,   as   testified   to   by   one  of  the  passengers,  and  as  shown  by  the  fact  that   according   to   the   testimony   of   the   witnesses,   including  that  of  the  defense,  from  the  point  where   one   of   the   front   tires   burst   up   to   the   canal   where   the   bus   overturned   after   zig-­‐zaging,   there   was   a   distance   of   about   150   meters.   The   chauffeur,   after   the  blow-­‐out,  must  have  applied  the  brakes  in  order   to   stop   the   bus,   but   because   of   the   velocity   at   which   the   bus   must   have   been   running,   its   momentum   carried  it  over  a  distance  of  150  meters  before  it  fell   into  the  canal  and  turned  turtle.                                                                                                                                                                                                             be   imposed   in   its   maximum   period.(Read   also   Arts.   61,   62,  and  65)  

Rañeses  60       There   is   no   question   that   under   the   circumstances,   the  defendant  carrier  is  liable.  The  only  question  is   to   what   degree.   A   satisfactory   definition   of   proximate  cause  is  found  in  Volume  38,  pages  695-­‐ 696   of   American   jurisprudence,   cited   by   plaintiffs-­‐ appellants  in  their  brief.  It  is  as  follows:     .   .   .   'that   cause,   which,   in   natural   and   continuous   sequence,   unbroken   by   any   efficient   intervening   cause,   produces   the   injury,   and   without   which   the   result   would   not   have   occurred.'   And   more   comprehensively,   'the   proximate   legal   cause   is   that   acting   first   and   producing   the   injury,   either   immediately  or  by  setting  other  events  in  motion,  all   constituting   a   natural   and   continuous   chain   of   events,  each  having  a  close  causal  connection  with  its   immediate   predecessor,   the   final   event   in   the   chain   immediately   effecting   the   injury   as   a   natural   and   probable   result   of   the   cause   which   first   acted,   under   such   circumstances   that   the   person   responsible   for   the   first   event   should,   as   an   ordinary   prudent   and   intelligent  person,  have  reasonable  ground  to  expect   at  the  moment  of  his  act  or  default  that  an  injury  to   some  person  might  probably  result  therefrom.     In   the   present   case   under   the   circumstances   obtaining  in  the  same,  the  proximate  cause  was  the   overturning   of   the   bus,   this   for   the   reason   that   when   the   vehicle   turned   not   only   on   its   side   but   completely   on   its   back,   the   leaking   of   the   gasoline   from   the   tank   was   not   unnatural   or   unexpected;   that   the   coming   of   the   men   with   a   lighted   torch   was   in   response   to   the   call   for   help,   made   not   only   by   the   passengers,   but   most   probably,   by   the   driver   and   the   conductor   themselves,   and   that   because   it   was  dark  (about  2:30  in  the  morning),  the  rescuers   had   to   carry   a   light   with   them,   and   coming   as   they   did   from   a   rural   area   where   lanterns   and   flashlights   were  not  available;  and  what  was  more  natural  than   that   said   rescuers   should   innocently   approach   the   vehicle   to   extend   the   aid   and   effect   the   rescue   requested   from   them.   In   other   words,   the   coming   of   the  men  with  a  torch  was  to  be  expected  and  was  a   natural  sequence  of  the  overturning  of  the  bus,  the   trapping   of   some   of   its   passengers   and   the   call   for   outside   help.   What   is   more,   the   burning   of   the   bus  

can   also   in   part   be   attributed   to   the   negligence   of   the   carrier,   through   is   driver   and   its   conductor.   According   to   the   witness,   the   driver   and   the   conductor  were  on  the  road  walking  back  and  forth.   They,   or   at   least,   the   driver   should   and   must   have   known  that  in  the  position  in  which  the  overturned   bus  was,  gasoline  could  and  must  have  leaked  from   the  gasoline  tank  and  soaked  the  area  in  and  around   the  bus,  this  aside  from  the  fact  that  gasoline  when   spilled,   specially   over   a   large   area,   can   be   smelt   and   directed   even   from   a   distance,   and   yet   neither   the   driver   nor   the   conductor   would   appear   to   have   cautioned  or  taken  steps  to  warn  the  rescuers  not  to   bring  the  lighted  torch  too  near  the  bus.    

Impossible  Crimes   Reyes:   1. The   commission   of   an   impossible   crime   is   indicative   of   criminal   propensity   or   criminal   tendency   on   the   part   of   the   actor.   Such   person   is   a   potential   criminal.   According   to   positivist   thinking,   the   community   must   be   protected   from   anti-­‐ social   activities,   whether   actual   or   potential,   of   the   morbid   type   of   man   called   “socially   dangerous  person.”     2. To   be   classified   as   an   impossible   crime,   certain  requisites  must  be  met.   1. That  the  act  performed  would  be  an   offense  against  persons  or  property.     2. That   the   act   was   done   with   evil   intent.     3. That   its   accomplishment   is   inherently   impossible,   or   that   the   means   employed   is   either   inadequate  or  ineffectual.   4. That   the   act   performed   should   not   constitute   a   violation   of   another   provision  of  the  RPC.      

Rañeses  61     d. Infanticide  (Art.  255)   e. Abortion   (Arts.   256,   257,   258  and  259)   f. Duel  (Arts.  260  and  261)   g. Physical   injuries   (Arts.   262,   263,  264,  265  and  266)   h. Rape  (Art.  266-­‐A)  

RPC,  Art.  4  (2)   Criminal   liability.   —   Criminal   liability   shall   be   incurred:   2.  By  any  person  performing  an  act  which  would  be   an  offense  against  persons  or  property,  were  it  not   for   the   inherent   impossibility   of   its   accomplishment   or   an   account   of   the   employment   of   inadequate   or   ineffectual  means.  

  Felonies  against  property:   a. Robbery   (Arts.   294,   297,   298,  299,  300,  302  and  303)   b. Brigandage   (Arts.   306   and   307)   c. Theft   (Arts.   308,   310   and   311)   d. Usurpation   (Arts.   312   and   313)   e. Culpable   insolvency   (Art.   314)   f. Swindling   and   other   deceits   (Arts.   315,   316,   317   and   318)   g. Chattel  mortgage  (Art.  319)   h. Arson   and   other   crimes   involving   destruction   (Arts.   320,  321,  322,  323,  324,  325   and  326)   i. Malicious   mischief   (Arts.   327,  328,  329,  330  and  331)  

Art.  59   Penalty  to  be  imposed  in  case  of  failure  to  commit  the   crime   because   the   means   employed   or   the   aims   sought  are  impossible.  -­‐  When  the  person  intending   to   commit   an   offense   has   already   performed   the   acts  for  the  execution  of  the  same  but  nevertheless   the   crime   was   not   produced   by   reason   of   the   fact   that   the   act   intended   was   by   its   nature   one   of   impossible   accomplishment   or   because   the   means   employed  by  such  person  are  essentially  inadequate   to   produce   the   result   desired   by   him,   the   court,   having  in  mind  the  social  danger  and  the  degree  of   criminality   shown   by   the   offender,   shall   impose   upon   him   the   penalty   of   arresto   mayor   or   a   fine   from  200  to  500  pesos.  

 

 

Reyes:     1. IMPORTANT   WORDS   AND   PHRASES   IN   PAR.  2  OF  ART.  4   1. “Performing   an   act   which   would   be   an   offense   against   persons   or   property.”   –   In   committing   an   impossible   crime,   the   offender   intends   to   commit   a   felony   against   persons  or  a  felony  against  property,   and   the   act   performed   would   have   been   an   offense   against   persons   or   property.   But   a   felong   against   persons   or   property   should   not   be   actually   committed,   for,   otherwise,   he   would   be   liable   for   that   felony.   There   would   be   no   impossible   crime   to  speak  of.       Felonies  against  persons:   a. Parricide  (Art.  246)   b. Murder  (Art.  248)   c. Homicide  (Art.  249)  

  If   the   act   performed   would   be   an   offense   other   than   a   felony   against   persons  or  against  property,  there  is   no  impossible  crime.     2. “Were   it   not   for   the   inherent   impossibility   of   its   accomplishment   or  on  account  of  the  employment  of   inadequate   or   ineffectual   means.”   –   In   impossible   crime,   the   act   performed   by   the   offender   cannot   produce   an   offense   against   persons   or   property,   because:   (1)   the   commission   of   the   offense   (against   persons   or   against   property)   is   inherently   impossible   of   accomplishment;   or   (2)   the   means  

Rañeses  62     employed   is   either   (a)   inadequate;   or  (b)  ineffectual.       “Inherent   impossibility   of   its   accomplishment.”   –   This   phrase   means   that   the   act   intended   by   the   offender   is   by   its   nature   one   of   impossible   accomplishment.   (Art.   59)     There   must   be   either   (1)   legal   impossibility,   or   (2)   physical   impossibility   of   accomplishing   the   intended  crime.     2. In   impossible   crime   the   act   performed   should   not   constitute   a   violation   of   another   provision   of   the   Code.     3. The  purpose  of  punishing  impossible   crimes   is   to   suppress   criminal   propensity   or   criminal   tendencies.   Objectively,   the   offender   has   not   committed   a   felony,   but   subjectively,   he   is  a  criminal.       People  v.  Balmores,  85  Phil.  493  (1950)   Facts:   Appellant,   waiving   the   right   to   be   assisted   by   counsel,  pleaded  guilty  to  the  following  information   filed   against   him   in   the   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Manila:     The   accused   did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   commence   the   commission   of   the   crime   of   estafa   through   falsification   of   a   security   directly   by   overt   acts,   to   wit;   by   then   and   there   tearing  off  at  the  bottom  in  a  cross-­‐wise  direction  a   portion   of   a   genuine   1/8   unit   Philippine   Charity   Sweepstakes   ticket   thereby   removing   the   true   and   real   unidentified   number   of   same   and   substituting   and   writing   in   ink   at   the   bottom   on   the   left   side   of   said   ticket   the   figure   or   number   074000   thus   making   the   said   ticket   bear   the   said   number   074000,  which  is  a  prize-­‐winning  number.       He   presented   the   falsified   ticket.   exchanging   the   same   for   the   corresponding   cash   that   said   number   has  won,  fraudulently  pretending  in  said  office  that  

the   said   1/8   unit   of   a   Philippine   Charity   Sweepstakes  ticket  is  genuine  and  that  he  is  entitled   to  the  corresponding  amount  of  P359.55  so  won  by   said  ticket     Said   accused   failed   to   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   would   have   produce   the   crime   of   estafa   through   falsification   of   a   security   as   a   consequence   by   reason   of   some   causes   other   than   this   spontaneous   desistance,   to   wit:   one   Bayani   Miller,   an   employee   to   whom   the   said   accused   presented   said   ticket   in   the   Philippine   Charity   Sweepstakes   Office   discovered   that   the   said   ticket   as   presented   by   the   said   accused   was   falsified   and   immediately   thereafter   he   called   for   a   policeman   who   apprehended   and   arrested   the   said   accused   right  then  and  there.     Issue:   WON   said   act   constitutes   an   impossible   crime     Held:   No.   It   may   be   that   appellant   was   either   reckless  or  foolish  in  believing  that  a  falsification  as   patent   as   that   which   he   admitted   to   have   perpetrated   would   succeed;   but   the   recklessness   and  clumsiness  of  the  falsification  did  not  make  the   crime   impossible   within   the   purview   of   paragraph   2,   article   4,   in   relation   to   article   59,   of   the   Revised   Penal  Code     Judging   from   the   appearance   of   the   falsified   ticket   in   question,   we   are   not   prepared   to   say   that   it   would   have   been   impossible   for   the   appellant   to   consummate  the  crime  of  estafa  thru  falsification  of   said   ticket   if   the   clerk   to   whom   it   was   presented   for   the  payment  had  not  exercised  due  care.     Intod  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  215  SCRA  52  (1992)   Facts:  In  the  morning  of  February  4,  1979,  Sulpicio   Intod,   Jorge   Pangasian,   Santos   Tubio   and   Avelino   Daligdig   went   to   Salvador   Mandaya's   house   in   Katugasan,   Lopez   Jaena,   Misamis   Occidental   and   asked   him   to   go   with   them   to   the   house   of   Bernardina  Palangpangan.  Thereafter,  Mandaya  and   Intod,  Pangasian,  Tubio  and  Daligdig  had  a  meeting   with   Aniceto   Dumalagan.   He   told   Mandaya   that   he   wanted  Palangpangan  to  be  killed  because  of  a  land  

Rañeses  63     dispute   between   them   and   that   Mandaya   should   accompany   the   four   (4)   men,   otherwise,   he   would   also  be  killed.     At   about   10:00   o'clock   in   the   evening   of   the   same   day,   Petitioner,   Mandaya,   Pangasian,   Tubio   and   Daligdig,   all   armed   with   firearms,   arrived   at   Palangpangan's   house   in   Katugasan,   Lopez   Jaena,   Misamis   Occidental.   At   the   instance   of   his   companions,   Mandaya   pointed   the   location   of   Palangpangan's   bedroom.   Thereafter,   Petitioner,   Pangasian,  Tubio  and  Daligdig  fired  at  said  room.  It   turned   out,   however,   that   Palangpangan   was   in   another   City   and   her   home   was   then   occupied   by   her   son-­‐in-­‐law   and   his   family.   No   one   was   in   the   room  when  the  accused  fired  the  shots.  No  one  was   hit  by  the  gun  fire.     Petitioner   and   his   companions   were   positively   identified   by   witnesses.   One   witness   testified   that   before  the  five  men  left  the  premises,  they  shouted:   "We   will   kill   you   (the   witness)   and   especially   Bernardina  Palangpangan  and  we  will  come  back  if   (sic)  you  were  not  injured     Issue:   WON   said   act   constitutes   an   impossible   crime     Held:   Yes.   The   factual   situation   in   the   case   at   bar   present   a   physical   impossibility   which   rendered   the   intended  crime  impossible  of  accomplishment.  And   under   Article   4,   paragraph   2   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   such   is   sufficient   to   make   the   act   an   impossible  crime.     To  be  impossible  under  this  clause,  the  act  intended   by   the   offender   must   be   by   its   nature   one   impossible   of   accomplishment.   There   must   be   either   impossibility   of   accomplishing   the   intended   act    in  order  to  qualify  the  act  an  impossible  crime.   Legal   impossibility   occurs   where   the   intended   acts,   even   if   completed,   would   not   amount   to   a   crime.   Factual   impossibility   occurs   when   extraneous   circumstances   unknown   to   the   actor   or   beyond   his   control   prevent   the   consummation   of   the   intended   crime.  The  case  at  bar  belongs  to  this  category.      

In  our  jurisdiction,  impossible  crimes  are  recognized.   The   impossibility   of   accomplishing   the   criminal   intent  is  not  merely  a  defense,  but  an  act  penalized  by   itself.   Furthermore,   the   phrase   "inherent   impossibility"   that   is   found   in   Article   4(2)   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   makes   no   distinction   between   factual   or   physical   impossibility   and   legal   impossibility     To   uphold   the   contention   of   respondent   that   the   offense  was  Attempted  Murder  because  the  absence   of   Palangpangan   was   a   supervening   cause   independent   of   the   actor's   will,   will   render   useless   the   provision   in   Article   4,   which   makes   a   person   criminally   liable   for   an   act   "which   would   be   an   offense  against  persons  or  property,  were  it  not  for   the   inherent   impossibility   of   its   accomplishment   .   .   ."   In   that   case   all   circumstances   which   prevented   the   consummation   of   the   offense   will   be   treated   as   an  accident  independent  of  the  actor's  will  which  is   an  element  of  attempted  and  frustrated  felonies.    

Stages  of  Commission     Definitions     RPC,  Art.  6   Consummated,   frustrated,   and   attempted   felonies.   -­‐   Consummated   felonies   as   well   as   those   which   are   frustrated  and  attempted,  are  punishable.   A   felony   is   consummated   when   all   the   elements   necessary   for   its   execution   and   accomplishment   are   present;   and   it   is   frustrated   when   the   offender   performs   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   would   produce   the   felony   as   a   consequence   but   which,   nevertheless,  do  not  produce  it  by  reason  of  causes   independent  of  the  will  of  the  perpetrator.   There  is  an  attempt  when  the  offender  commences   the   commission   of   a   felony   directly   by   overt   acts,   and  does  not  perform  all  the  acts  of  execution  which   should  produce  the  felony  by  reason  of  some  cause   or   accident   other   than   his   own   spontaneous   desistance.  

    Reyes:  

 

Rañeses  64     1. Consummated   -­‐   A   felony   is   consummated   when   all   the   elements   necessary   for   its   execution  and  accomplishment  are  present.     2. Frustrated   -­‐   It   is   frustrated   when   the   offender   performs   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   would   produce   the   felony   as   a   consequence   but   which,   nevertheless,   do   not   produce   it   by   reason   of   causes   independent  of  the  will  of  the  perpetrator.     3. Attempted   -­‐   There   is   an   attempt   when   the   offender   commences   the   commission   of   a   felony   directly   by   overt   acts,   and   does   not   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   should   produce   the   felony   by   reason   of   some   cause   or   accident   other   than   his   own   spontaneous  desistance.     4. Development   of   crime.   From   the   moment   the  culprit  conceives  the  idea  of  committing   a  crime  up  to  the  realization  of  the  same,  his   act  passes  through  certain  stages.     1. Internal   acts,   such   as   mere   ideas   in   the   mind   of   a   person,   are   not   punishable   even   if,   had   they   been   carried   out,   would   constitute   a   crime.       Intention   and   effect   must   concur.   Mere   intention   producing   no   effect   is   no   more   a   crime   than   a   mere   effect   without   the   intention   is   a   crime.     2. External   acts   cover   (a)   preparatory   acts;  and  (b)  acts  of  execution.   a. Preparatory  acts  –  ordinarily  not   punishable.   Hence,   proposal   to   commit   a   felony,   which   are   preparatory   acts,   are   not   punishable,  except  when  the  law   provides   for   their   punishment   in   certain  felonies.  (Art.  8)     b. Acts   of   execution   –   they   are   punishable   under   the   RPC.   The   stages   of   acts   of   execution   –   attempted,   frustrated   and   consummated  –  are  punishable.     5. Attempted   felony   –   there   is   an   attempt   when  the  offender  begins  the  commission  of  

a   felony   directly   by   overt   acts.   He   has   not   performed   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   should  produce  the  felony.       Elements  of  attempted  felony:   1. The   offender   commences   the   commission  of  the  felony  directly    by   overt  acts;   2. He   does   not   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution  which  should  produce  the   felony.     3. The  offender’s  act  is  not  stopped  by   his  own  voluntary  desistance;   4. The   non-­‐performance   of   all   acts   of   execution   was   due   to   cause   or   accident   other   than   his   own   spontaneous  desistance.     6. IMPORTANT   WORDS   AND   PHRASES   IN   ART.  6  (Attempted  felony)   o “Commences   the   commission   of   a   felony   directly   by   overt   acts.”   A   felony   is   deemed   to   have   been   commenced   through   overt   acts   when   (1)   there   are   external   acts   and   (2)   such   external   acts   have   direct   connection   with   the   crime   intended   to  be  committed.     § Overt   act   –   some   physical   activity   or   deed   indicating   the   intention   to   commit   a   particular   crime,   more   than   a   mere   planning   or   preparation,  which  if  carried   to   its   complete   termination   following   its   natural   course,   without   being   frustrated   by   external   obstacles   nor   by   the   voluntary   desistance   of   the   perpetrator,   will   logically   and   necessarily   ripen   into   a   concrete  offense.     7. Indeterminate   offense   –   it   is   one   where   the   purpose   of   the   offender   in   performing   an   act   is   not   certain.   Its   nature   in   relation   to   its  object  is  ambiguous.     8. The   intention   of   the   accused   must   be   viewed   from   the   nature   of   the   acts  

Rañeses  65     executed   by   him,   and   not   from   his   admission.   The   intention   of   the   accused   must   be   ascertained   from   the   facts   and,   therefore,   it   is   necessary   that   the   mind   be   able   to   directly   infer   from   them   the   intention   of   the   perpetrator   to   cause   a   particular  injury.       Acts   susceptible   of   double   interpretation…   must   not   and   cannot   furnish   grounds   by   themselves   for   attempted   crime   (People   v.   Lamahang,  61  Phil.  707)     In   offenses   not   consummated,   as   the   material   damage   is   wanting,   the   nature   of   the   action   intended   cannot   exactly   be   ascertained,   but   the   same   must   be   inferred   from   the   nature   of   the   acts   executed.   (I   Groizard,  p.  99)  The  overt  acts  leading  to  the   commission   of   the   offense   are   not   punishable   except   when   they   are   aimed   directly  at  its  execution,  and  therefore  must   have  an  immediate  and  necessary  relation  to   the  offense.  (I  Viada,  p.  47)     1. “Directly   by   overt   acts.”   –   the   law   requires   that   the   “offender   commences   the   commission   of   the   felony   directly   by   overt   acts.”   Only   offenders   who   personally   execute   the   commission   of   a   crime   can   be   guilty   of   attempted   felony.   The   word   “directly”   suggests   that   the   offender   must   commence   the   commission   of   the   felony   by   taking   direct   part   in   the  execution  of  the  act.     2. “Does   not   perform   all   acts   of   execution.”   –   If   the   offender   has   performed   all   acts   of   execution   – nothing  more  is  left  to  be  done  –  the   stage   of   execution   is   that   of   a   frustrated   felony,   if   the   felony   is   nt   produced;   or   consummated,   if   the   felony  is  produced.     3. “By   reason   of   some   cause   or   accident.”  –  In  attempted  felony,  the   offender  fails  to  perform  all  the  acts   of   execution   which   should   produce  

the  felony  because  of  some  cause  or   accident.     4. “Other   than   his   own   spontaneous   desistance.”   –   If   the   actor   does   not   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution   by   reason   of   his   own   spontaneous   desistance,   there   is   no   attempted   felony.  The  law  does  not  punish  him.       The   desistance   may   be   through   fear   or  remorse.  (People  v.  Pambaya,  See   60   Phil.   1022)   It   is   not   necessary   that  it  be  actuated  by  a  good  motive.   The   Code   requires   only   that   the   discontinuance   of   the   crime   comes   from   the   person   who   has   begun   it,   and   that   he   stops   of   his   own   free   will.  (Albert)   9. The  desistance  should  be  made  before  all   the  acts  of  execution  are  performed.     10. The   desistance   which   exempts   from   criminal   liability   has   reference   to   the   crime  intended  to  be  committed,  and  has   no   reference   to   the   crime   actually   committed   by   the   offender   before   his   desistance.     11. In   attempted   felony,   the   offender   never   passes   the   subjective   phase   of   the   offense.     1. Subjective   phase     -­‐   that   portion   of   the   acts   constituting   the   crime,   starting   from   the   point   where   the   offender   begins   the   commission   of   the   crime   in   that   point   where   he   still   has   control   over   his   acts,   including   their  (acts’)  natural  course.       F   between   these   two   points   the   offender   is   stopped   by   any   cause   outside   of   his   own   voluntary   desistance,   the   subjective   phase   has   not  been  passed  and  it  is  an  attempt.   If  he  is  not  so  stopped  but  continues   until   he   performs   the   last   act,   it   is   frustrated,  provided  that  the  crime  is   not   produced.   The   acts   then   of   the  

Rañeses  66     offender  reached  the  objective  phase   of  the  crime.     12. Frustrated  Felony   Elements:   1. The   offender   performs   all   the   acts   of   execution;   2. All   the   acts   performed   would   produce   the   felony   as   a   consequence;   3. But  the  felony  is  not  produced;   4. By   reason   of   causes   independent   of   the  will  of  the  perpetrator.     13. IMPORTANT   WORDS   AND   PHRASES   IN   ART.  6  (Frustrated  Felony)   1. “Performs   all   the   acts   of   execution.”   –   In   frustrated   felony,   the   offender   must   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution.  Nothing  more  is  left  to  be   done  by  the  offender,  because  he  has   performed   the   last   act   necessary   to   produce   the   crime.   This   element   distinguishes   frustrated   felony   from   attempted   felon.   In   attempted   felony,   the   offender   does   not   perform  all  the  acts  of  execution.  He   does   not   perform   the   last   act   necessary   to   produce   the   crime.   He   merely   commences   the   commission   of  a  felony  directly  by  overt  acts.     2. “Would   produce   the   felony   as   a   consequence.”   –   All   the   acts   of   execution  performed  by  the  offender   could  have  produced  the  felony  as  a   consequence.     3. “Do   not   produce   it.”   –   In   frustrated   felony,   the   acts   performed   by   the   offender   do   not   produce   the   felony,   because   if   the   felony   is   produced   it   would  be  consummated.     4. “Independent   of   the   will   of   the   perpetrator.”  –  Even  if  all  the  acts  of   execution   have   been   performed,   the   crime   may   not   be   consummated,   because   certain   causes   may   prevent   its   consummation.   These   certain   causes   may   be   the   intervention   of   third   persons   who   prevented   the  

consummation   of   the   offense   or   may   be  due  to  the  perpetrator’s  own  will.       If  the  crime  is  not  produced  because   of   the   timely   intervention   of   a   third   person,  it  is  frustrated.       If  the  crime  is  not  produced  because   the   offender   himself   presented   its   consummation,   there   is   no   frustrated  felony,  for  the  4th  element   is  present.       Note   that   the   4th   element   says   that   the   felony   is   not   produced   “by   reason  of  causes  independent  of  the   will  of  the  perpetrator.”  Hence,  if  the   cause   which   presented   the   consummation  of  the  offese  was  the   perpetrator’s   own   and   exclusive   will,  the  4th  element  does  not  exist.     14. Frustrated   felony   distinguished   from   attempted  felony.   1. In   both,   the   offender   has   not   accomplished  his  criminal  purpose.     2. While   in   frustrated   felony,   the   offender   has   performed   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   would   produce   the   felony   as   a   consequence,   in   attempted   felony,   the   offender   merely   commences   the   commission   of   a   felony   directly   by   overt   acts   and   does   not   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution.       In   other   words,   in   frustrated   felony,   the   offender   has   reached   the   objective  phase;  in  attempted  felony,   the   offender   has   not   passed   the   subjective  phase.     15. Attempted   or   frustrated   felony   distinguished  from  impossible  crime.     1. In   attempted   or   frustrated   felony   and  impossible  crime,  the  evil  intent   of  the  offender  is  not  accomplished.     2. But   while   in   impossible   crime,   the   evil  intent  of  the  offender  cannot  be  

Rañeses  67     accomplished,   in   attempted   or   frustrated   felony   the   evil   intent   of   the   offender   is   possible   accomplishment.     3. In   impossible   crime,   the   evil   intent   of   the   offender   cannot   be   accomplished   because   it   is   inherently   impossible   of   accomplishment   or   because   the   means   employed   by   the   offender   is   inadequate   or   ineffectual;   in   attempted   or   frustrated   felony,   what   prevented  its  accomplishment  is  the   intervention   of   certain   cause   or   accident   in   which   the   offender   had   no  part.     16. Consummated   felony   –   a   felony   is   consummated   when   all   the   elements   necessary  for  its  execution  are  present.     17. IMPORTANT   WORDS   AND   PHRASES   IN   ART.  6  (Consummated  felony)     o “All   the   elements:   necessary   for   its   execution   and   accomplishment   “are   present.”       In   consummated   felony,   all   the   elements  necessary  for  its  execution   and   accomplishment   must   be   present.   Every   crime   has   its   own   elements   which   must   all   be   present   to  constitute  a  culpable  violation  of  a   precept  of  law.     18. When   not   all   the   elements   of   a   felony   are   proved-­‐   when   a   felony   has   two   or   more   elements   and   one   of   them   is   not   proved   by   the   prosecution   during   the   trial,   either   (1)   the   felony   is   not   shown   to   have   been   consummated,   or   (2)   the   felony   is   not   shown   to   have   been   committed,   or   (3)   another   felony   is   shown   to   have   been   committed.       Hence,   all   the   elements   of   the   felony   for   which   the   accused   is   prosecuted   must   be   present  in  order  to  hold  him  liable  therefor   in  its  consummated  stage.     19. Manner  of  committing  the  crime.  

1. Formal   crimes   –   consummated   in   one   instant,   no   attempt.   (i.e.   slander,   false  testimony)   2. Crimes   consummated   by   mere   attempt   or   proposal   or   by   overt   act.   (i.e.   flight   to   enemy’s   country   [Art.121])   3. Felony   by   omission.   –   there   can   be   no   attempted   stage   when   the   felony   is   by   omission,   because   in   this   kind   of   felony  the  offender  does  not  execute   acts.   He   omits   to   perform   an   act   which  the  law  requires  him  to  do.     4. Crimes   requiring   the   intervention   of   two   persons   to   commit   them   are   consummated   by   mere   agreement.   (i.e.  betting  in  sport  contests)   5. Material   crimes   –   There   are   three   stages   of   execution   –   attempted,   frustrated,   consummated,   (i.e.   rape,   homicide).     20. There   is   no   attempted   or   frustrated   impossible  crime.       RPC,  Art.  7   When   light   felonies   are   punishable.   -­‐   Light   felonies   are   punishable   only   when   they   have   been   consummated,   with   the   exception   of   those   committed   against  person  or  property.  

    Reyes:   1. Light  felonies  are  those  infractions  of  law   for   the   commission   of   which   the   penalty   of   arresto   menor   or   a   fine   not   exceeding   200   pesos,   or   both,   is   provided.   (Art.   9,   par.  3)   2. Light  felonies  punished  by  the  RPC:   1. Slight  physical  injuries.  (Art.  266)   2. Theft.  (Art.  309,  pars.  7  and  8)   3. Alteration   of   boundary   arks.   (Art.   313)   4. Malicious  mischief.  (Art.  328,  par.  3;   Art.  329,  par.  3)   5. Intriguing  against  honor.  (Art.  364)   3. IMPORTANT  WORDS  AND  PHRASES  

Rañeses  68     1. “With   the   exception   of   those   committed   against   persons   or   property.”       General   rule:   Light   felonies   are   punishable   only   when   they   have   been   consummated,   UNLESS   they   are   committed   against   persons   or   property.   If   that’s   the   case,   they   are   punishable,   even   if   they   are   attempted  or  frustrated  only.       U.S.  v.  Eduave.  36  Phil.  209  (1917)   Facts:     The   accused   rushed   upon   the   girl   suddenly   and  struck  her  from  behind,  in  part  at  least,  with  a   sharp   bolo,   producing   a   frightful   gash   in   the   lumbar   region   and   slightly   to   the   side   eight   and   one-­‐half   inches  long  and  two  inches  deep,  severing  all  of  the   muscles  and  tissues  of  that  part.  Fortunately  the  girl   was  able  to  survive     The   motive   of   the   crime   was   that   the   accused   was   incensed   at   the   girl   for   the   reason   that   she   had   theretofore  charged  him  criminally  before  the  local   officials   with   having   raped   her   and   with   being   the   cause   of   her   pregnancy.   He   was   her   mother's   querido  and  was  living  with  her  as  such  at  the  time   the  crime  here  charged  was  committed     The  accused  is  charged  with  frustrated  murder.  We   are   satisfied   that   there   was   an   intent   to   kill   in   this   case.   A   deadly   weapon   was   used.   The   blow   was   directed   toward   a   vital   part   of   the   body.   The   aggressor  stated  his  purpose  to  kill,  thought  he  had   killed,  and  threw  the  body  into  the  bushes.  When  he   gave   himself   up   he   declared   that   he   had   killed   the   complainant.       Issue:   WON   the   accused   is   to   be   charged   with   frustrated  murder.     Held:  Yes.  The  crime  cannot  be  attempted  murder.   This   is   clear   from   the   fact   that   the   defendant   performed   all   of   the   acts   which   should   have   resulted  in  the  consummated  crime  and  voluntarily   desisted  from  further  acts.  

A   felony   is   frustrated   when   the   offender   performs   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   should   produce   the   felony   as   a   consequence,   but   which,   nevertheless,   do   not   produce   it   by   reason   of   causes   independent   of   the   will   of   the   perpetrator.   To   put   it   in   another   way,  in  case  of  an  attempt  the  offender  never  passes   the  subjective  phase  of  the  offense.     On   the   other   hand,   attempted   murder   is   defined   as   when  the  offender  commences  the  commission  of  the   felony   directly   by   overt   acts,   and   does   not   perform   all   the   acts   of   execution   which   constitute   the   felony   by   reason  of  some  cause  or  accident  other  than  his  own   voluntarily  desistance.  Hence    the  subjective  phase  is   completely   passed.   Subjectively   the   crime   is   complete.       The   subjective   phase   is   that   portion   of   the   acts   constituting   the   crime   included   between   the   act   which   begins   the   commission   of   the   crime   and   the   last   act   performed   by   the   offender   which,   with   the   prior   acts,   should   result   in   the   consummated   crime.   From   that   time   forward   the   phase   is   objective.   It   may   also   be   said   to   be   that   period   occupied   by   the   acts   of   the   offender   over   which   he   has   control   that   period   between   the   point   where   he   begins   and   the   points   where   he   voluntarily   desists.   If   between   these  two  points  the  offender  is  stopped  by  reason   of   any   cause   outside   of   his   own   voluntary   desistance,   the   subjective   phase   has   not   been   passed   and   it   is   an   attempt.   If   he   is   not   so   stopped   but   continues   until   he   performs   the   last   act,   it   is   frustrated.     People  v.  Enriquez,  281  SCRA  103  (1997)   Facts:   Accused   Enriquez   and   Rosales   were   supposed  to  sell  6  kg  of  marijuana  in  violation  of  the   Dangerous  Drugs  Act  of  1972,  but  were  caught  red-­‐ handed   in   a   buy-­‐bust   operation:   Rosales   had   just   delivered   the   drug,   while   Enriquez   peddled   sale   to   agents.   Sale   and   delivery   of   marijuana   is   punishable   under  the  aforementioned  statute.         Issue:   WON   ‘attempted   delivery’   of   the   prohibited   drug  is  applicable  in  the  case  at  bar.      

Rañeses  69     Held:   No.   Offense   penalized   by   a   special   law   and   not   the   RPC,   hence   no   such   thing   as   attempted   delivery.   Incomplete   delivery,   granting   it   is   true,   is   inconsequential.   Mere   act   of   conveying   drugs   punishable,   immaterial   whether   or   not   place   of   destination  is  reached.       Doctrine:   If   the   act   is   punishable   under   a   special   law,  the  stages  of  execution  cannot  be  applied.       People  v  Listerio,  335  SCRA  40  (2000)     Facts:     Araque   brothers   went   to   Muntinlupa   to   collect   money   from   a   certain   Tino.   Being   unable   to   collect,   they   started   on   their   way   home.   However,   before  they  could  do  so,  Listerio  et  al,  accosted  and   attacked   them   with   bladed   weapons   and   lead   pipes,   killing   Jeonito   Araque   and   wounding   his   brother   Marlon  Araque.         Issue:     WON   the   conviction   of   attempted   homicide   at  least  in  terms  of  Marlon  Araque  was  correct.       Held:   No.   It   should   have   been   frustrated   homicide.   Accused   only   left   when   victims   became   unconscious.   Gravity   of   wunds   should   not   be   the   determinative   factor   but   whether   or   not   the   subjective   phase   in   the   commission   of   a   crime   has   been  passed.       *Refer   to   item   11,   sub-­‐item   1   on   page   65   for   the   definition  of  the  subjective  phase.      

Specific  Felonies   Rape   RPC,  Art.  335   When   and   how   rape   is   committed.   —   Rape   is   committed  by  having  carnal  knowledge  of  a  woman   under  any  of  the  following  circumstances:   1. 2. 3.

by  using  force  or  intimidation;   When   the   woman   is   deprived   of   reason   or   otherwise  unconscious;  and   When   the   woman   is   under   twelve   years   of   age  

The   crime   of   rape   shall   be   punished   by   reclusion   perpetua.  

 

 

(Cont.)   Whenever   the   crime   of   rape   is   committed   with   the   use  of  a  deadly  weapon  or  by  two  or  more  persons,   the  penalty  shall  be  reclusion  perpetua  to  death.     When   the   victim   has   become   insane,   the   penalty   shall  be  death.     When   rape   is   attempted   or   frustrated   and   a   homicide  is  committed  by  reason  or  on  the  occasion   thereof,  the  penalty  shall  be  likewise  death.  

    People  v.  Erinia,  50  Phil.  998  (1927)   Facts:   The   accused   endeavored   to   have   carnal   knowledge   with   victim   (3   years   old   +   11months).   The   attempt   foiled   from   further   violating   the   child   by   the   appearance   of   victim’s   parents   and   sister.   Physician   found   inflammation   of   the   exterior   parts   of   the   organ,   but   no   signs   of   penetration.   Mother   saw   that   genitals   was   covered   with   sticky   substance,   however,   no   proof   was   shown   to   corroborate  such  an  allegation.       Issue:   WON   this   was   considered   consummated   rape.       Held:   No,   this   was   merely   frustrated   rape.   It   was   suggested   penetration   was   impossible   due   to   the   age   of   the   child,   but   for   rape   to   be   consummated   only   partial   penetration   was   required,   up   to   the   labia.   However,   as   no   such   proof   of   penetration   was   evident,   benefit   of   the   doubt   was   accorded   to   the   accused,  hence  only  frustrated  rape     *Later   rape   cases   have   dismissed   Erinia   as   a   stray   decision,  and  is  therefore  not  controlling.       People  v.  Hernandez,  49  Phil.  980  (1925)   Facts:   Domingo   Hernandez,   70   yrs   old   charged   of   raping   his   9   yr   old   step   granddaughter,   Conrada   Jocson  with  threat  to  kill  if  she/doesn’t  give  in  to  his   wish.   Aggravating:   (1)   related,   (2)   grave   abuse   of   confidence  since  they  lived  in  same  house.     Issue:  WON  act  is  consummated  rape   Held:   Yes,   plus   there   is   an   aggravating   circumstance.  

Rañeses  70     1. People   v.   Rivers:   rupture   of   hymen   not   necessary   as   long   as   there   is   proof   that   there’s   some   degree   of   entrance   of   male   organ  within  labia  of  the  victim.     2. Physical   exam   findings:   hymen   intact,   labia   and  vaginal  opening  inflamed,  abundance  of   semen,  she  felt  intense  pain.       People  v.  Orita,  184  SCRA  105  (1990)   Facts:     At   around   1:30   am,   after   attending   a   party,   Abayan   came   home   to   her   boarding   house.   As   she   knocked   at   the   door,   Orita   suddenly   held   her   and   poked  a  knife  at  her  neck.  She  pleaded  for  him  to  let   her   go   but   instead   of   doing   so,   Orita   dragged   her   upstairs   with   him   while   he   had   his   left   arm   wrapped   around   her   neck   and   his   right   hand   holding  and  poking  the  balisong  at  the  victim.  At  the   second  floor,  he  commanded  Christina  to  look  for  a   room.   Upon   finding   a   room,   Orita   held   her   against   the   wall   while   he   undressed   himself.   He   then   ordered   her   to   undress.   As   she   took   off   her   shirt,   he   pulled  off  her  bra,  pants  and  panty,  and  ordered  her   to   lie   on   the   floor.   He   then   mounted   her   and,   pointing   the   balisong   at   her   neck,   ordered   he   to   hold   his   penis   and   insert   it   in   her   vagina.   In   this   position,  only  a  portion  of  his  penis  entered  her,  so   he   ordered   Abayan   to   go   on   top   of   him.   With   him   lying  on  his  back  and  Abayan  mounting  him,  still,  he   did  not  achieve  full  penetration  and  only  part  of  his   penis   was   inserted   in   the   vagina.   At   this   instance,   Abayan   got   the   opportunity   to   escape   Orita   because   he  had  both  his  hands  and  the  knife  on  the  floor.     Abayan,  still  naked,  was  chased  from  room  to  room   with   Orita   climbing   over   the   partitions.   Abayan,   frantic   and   scared,   jumped   out   of   a   window   and   darted   for   the   municipal   building   and   was   finally   found  by  Pat.  Donceras  and  other  policemen.  Due  to   darkness  though,  the  failed  to  apprehend  Orita.     In   the   medico   legal,   Dr.   Ma.   Luisa   Abude   had   the   following  findings:  circumscribed  hematoma  at  Ant.   neck,   linear   abrasions   below   left   breas,   multiple   pinpoint   marks   at   the   back,   abrasions   on   both   kness,   erythemetous   areas   noted   surrounding   vaginal   orifice,   tender;   hymen   intact;   no   laceration   fresh   and   old   noted;   examining   finger   can   barely  

enter   and   with   difficulty;   vaginal   cavity   tight,   no   discharges  noted     Issue:  WON  rape  is  consummated     Held:   Rape   was   consummated.   Perfect   penetration   is  not  essential.  For  the  consummation  of  rape,  any   penetration   of   the   female   organ   by   the   male   organ   is  sufficient  to  qualify  as  having  carnal  knowledge.   In  the  crime  of  rape,  from  the  moment  the  offender   has   carnal   knowledge   of   the   victim,   he   actually   attains   his   purpose   and   from   that   moment,   the   essential   elements   of   the   offense   have   been   accomplished.     *According   to   Orita,   there   is   no   more   frustrated   rape.       People  v.  Campuhan,  329  SCRA  270  (2000)   Facts:  Primo  Campuhan  was  accused  of  raping  four   year  old  Crysthel  Pamintuan.  Campuhan  was  caught   by  child’s  mother  on  April  25,  1996  at  around  4pm   in   their   house.   Campuhan,   helper   of   Corazon’s   brother  was  allegedly  kneeling  in  front  of  the  child   with   both   their   pants   downa   dn   child   was   crying   “ayoko,   ayoko”   while   Primo   forced   his   penis   into   child’s  vagina     Issue:  WON  crime  is  consummated  rape     Held:  No.  Modified  to  attempted  rape   1. Consummated  rape:  perfect  penetration  not   essential.  Slight  penetration  is  equivalent  to   rape.   Mere   touching   of   external   genitalia   considered   when   its   an   essential   part   of   penetration   not   just   touching   in   ordinary   sense   (People   v.   Orita).   Labia   majora   must   be   entered   for   rape   to   be   consummated   (People  v.  Escober)   2. Attempted   –   no   penetration   or   didn’t   reach   labia/mere  grazing  of  surface   3. Failed   to   prove   that   penetration   occurred.   Mother’s   testimony   questionable   with   regards   to   her   position   relative   to   Primo   and   child.   They   failed   to   establish   how   she   could   have   seen   actual   contact   in   her   position  

Rañeses  71     4. Man’s  instinct  is  to  run  when  caught.  Primo   could   not   have   stayed   or   to   satisfy   his   lust   even  if  ..  seeing  Corazon   5. Child  denied  penetration  occurred   6. People   v.   Villamor:   consummation   even   when   penetration   doubted:   pain’s   felt,   discoloration   of   inner   lips   of   vagina   or   red   labia   minora   or   hymenal   tags   not   visible.   Now   seen   in   case,   Medico   legal   officer,   though   penetration   not   needed   to   prove   contact,   no   medical   basis   to   hold   that   there   was  sexual  contact.  Hymen  intact.   Interesting   metaphors:   “shelling   of   the   castle   of   orgasmic  potency,”  “strafing  the  citadel  of  passion,”   “bombardment  of  the  drawbridge.”      

Theft   RPC,  Art.  308.    Who   are   liable   for   theft.   —   Theft   is   committed   by   any   person   who,   with   intent   to   gain   but   without   violence   against   or   intimidation   of   persons   nor   force   upon   things,   shall   take   personal   property   of   another  without  the  latter's  consent.   Theft  is  likewise  committed  by:   1.

2.

3.

Any   person   who,   having   found   lost   property,   shall   fail   to   deliver   the   same   to   the  local  authorities  or  to  its  owner;   Any   person   who,   after   having   maliciously   damaged   the   property   of   another,   shall   remove   or   make   use   of   the   fruits   or   object   of  the  damage  caused  by  him;  and   Any   person   who   shall   enter   an   inclosed   estate  or  a  field  where  trespass  is  forbidden   or   which   belongs   to   another   and   without   the   consent   of   its   owner,   shall   hunt   or   fish   upon   the   same   or   shall   gather   cereals,   or   other  forest  or  farm  products.  

    U.S.  v.  Adiao,  38  Phil.  752  (1918)   Facts:   Tomas   Adiao,   customs   inspector,   got   a   leather   bag   costing   P0.80   from   baggage   of   T.   Murakami   and   kept   it   in   his   desk   where   it   was   found  by  other  employees     Issue:  WON  act  is  consummated  theft.      

Held:   Yes.   Aggravating   Circumstance,   public   possession   1. He   performed   all   acts   of   execution   as   required   by   RPC   Art.   3.   He   didn’t   need   to   take  it  out  of  the  building   2. Spanish   Supreme   Court:   taking   first   caught   by   police   still   consummated   no   proof   of   contrary;   pickpocket   got   money   but   returned  it  later  on,  still  consummated;  took   money   even   if   its   on   top   of   safe,   still   consummated.     People  v.  Dino,  45  O.G.,  3445   Facts:   Accused   Dino   found   guilty   as   accomplice   in   the  crime  of  qualified  theft  and  sentenced  to  penalty   from  3  months  11  days  of  arresto  mayor,  to  1  year  8   months   21   days   of   prision   correccional.   Appellant   was   driver   of   US   Army,   and   after   dropping   off   articles   in   the   port   in   South   Harbor   in   Manila,   he   was   found   with   3   boxes   of   10   caliber   .30   army   rifles   (carbines).         Issue:     1. WON  crime  is  consummated  theft.   2. WON  conviction  as  accomplice  was  proper.     Held:     1. No.  The  court  held  in  this  case  the  crime  of   theft   cannot   be   said   to   be   consummated,   since   the   fact   determinative   of   consummation   is   the   ability   of   the   thief   to   dispose  freely  of  the  articles  stolen,  even  if  it   were   more   or   less   momentary,   and   in   the   case  at  bar,  this  fact  can  only  be  seen  to  have   occurred   if   the   carbines   passed   the   MP   checkpoint.   Therefore,   the   appellant   should   be  convicted  of  frustrated  theft.   2. No.   Since   the   passing   of   the   truck   through   the   MP   checkpoint   was   an   essential   part   to   the   consummation   of   the   crime,   the   appellant   should   be   considered   a   principal   instead   of   an   accomplice,   since   he   directly   participated  in  the  commission  of  the  crime.       Aristotel   Valenzuela   v.   People,   G.R.   No.   160188,   21  June  2007  

Rañeses  72     Facts:  Aristotel  Valenzuela  and  Jovy  Calderon  tried   to   steal   boxes   of   Tide   from   SM   Super   Sale   Club   in   North  Edsa.  Security  guard  Lorenzo  Lago  witnessed   this   and   stopped   the   taxi   that   the   2   were   riding   in   trying   to   escape   with   the   goods.   The   accused   ran   and   Lago   fired   a   warning   shot   to   alert   the   other   guards,   causing   the   apprehension   of   the   accused.   RTC   of   QC   convicted   both   of   the   crime   of   consummated  theft.     Petitioners   appealed,   but   only   Valenzuela   was   considered   to   have   filed   the   appeal   since   Calderon   was  considered  to  have  abandoned  the  appeal.       Issue:  WON  crime  is  consummated  theft.       Held:   Yes.   The   Court   said   that   the   Dino   ruling   has   not   been   held   as   precedent   by   the   court.   It   also   discussed   that   a   felony   has   a   “subjective   phase”   or   that   portion   of   the   acts   constituting   the   crime   included   between   the   act   which   begins   the   commission  of  the  crime  and  ends  with  the  last  act   performed   by   the   offender,   which   would   produce   the  felony.   • Elements  of  Theft:   1. That   there   be   taking   of   personal   property   2. That   the   said   property   belongs   to   another   3. That   the   taking   be   done   with   intent   to   gain   4. That   the   taking   be   done   without   the   consent  of  the  owner   5. That   the   taking   be   accomplished   without   the   use   of   violence   against   or   intimidation   of   persons   or   force   upon   things   • For  the  theft  to  have  been  frustrated,  certain   factors  are  to  be  considered:     1. That  the  felony  is  not  produced   2. That   such   failure   is   due   to   causes   independent   of   the   will   of   the   perpetrator   It  is  Congress,  and  not  the  courts,   which  is  to  define   and   punish   crime,   and   it   has   defined   theft   as   to   having   the   5   elements   mentioned   above—the   elements   not   including   “ability   of   the   thief   to  

dispose   freely   of   the   articles   stolen.   Unlawful   taking   is  deemed  complete  from  the  moment  the  offender   gains   possession   of   the   thing,   even   if   he   has   no   opportunity   to   dispose   of   the   same.   Theft   cannot   have   a   frustrated   stage,   since   unlawful   taking   produces  the  felony  in  its  consummated  stage.    

Robbery   RPC,  Art.  293.   Who  are  guilty  of  robbery.  —  Any  person  who,  with   intent   to   gain,   shall   take   any   personal   property   belonging   to   another,   by   means   of   violence   or   intimidation   of   any   person,   or   using   force   upon   anything  shall  be  guilty  of  robbery.  

 

 

People  v.  Lamahang,  61  Phil.  703  (1935)   Facts:   Aurelio   Lamahang   was   caught   opening   with   an   iron   bar   a   wall   of   a   store   of   cheap   goods   in   Fuentes   St.   Iloilo.   He   broke   one   board   and   was   unfastening  another  when  a  patrolling  police  caught   him.  Owners  of  the  store  were  sleeping  inside  store   as   it   was   early   dawn.   Convicted   of   attempt   of   robbery     Issue:  WON  crime  is  attempted  robbery?     Held:   No.   Attempted   trespass   to   dwelling.   Attempt   should   have   logical   relation   to   a   particular   and   concrete   offense   which   would   lead   directly   to   consummation.   Necessary   to   establish   unavoidable   connection   &   logical   &   natural   relation   of   cause   and   effect.   Important   to   show   clear   intent   to   commit   crime.   In   case   at   bar,   we   can   only   infer   that   his   intent   was   to   enter   by   force,   other   inferences   are   not   justified   by   facts.   Groizard:   infer   only   from   nature   of   acts   executed.   Acts   susceptible   of   double   interpretation   can’t   furnish   ground   for   themselves.   Mind   should   not   directly   infer   intent.   Spain   SC:   necessary   that   objectives   established   or   acts   themselves  obviously  disclose  criminal  objective.     People  v.  Salvilla,  184  SCRA  671  (1990)   Facts:   April   12,   1986,   at   about   noon   time   –   Petitioner,   together   with   Reynaldo,   Ronaldo   and   Simplicio   (all   surnamed   Canasares),   staged   a   robbery   at   the   New   Iloilo   Lumber   Yard.   They   were  

Rañeses  73     armed   with   homemade   guns   and   a   hand   grenade.   On   their   way   inside   the   establishment,   they   met   Rodita  Habiero,  an  employee  there  who  was  on  her   way  out  for  her  meal  break,  and  informed  her  that  it   was   a   hold-­‐up.   They   went   inside   the   office   and   the   petitioner   pointed   his   gun   at   Severino   Choco,   the   owner,   and   his   two   daughters,   Mary   and   Mimmie.     They   informed   Severino   that   all   they   needed   was   money.   Severino   asked   Mary   to   get   a   paper   bag   wherein   he   placed   P20,000   cash   (P5000   acc   to   the   defense)   and   handed   it   to   the   petitioner.   Simplicio   Canasares   took   the   wallet   and   wristwatch   of   Severino  after  which  the  latter,  his  2  daughters  and   Rodita  were  kept  inside  the  office.  According  to  the   appellant,   he   stopped   Severino   from   getting   the   wallet  and  watches.  At  about  2:00  of  the  same  day,   the  appellant  told  Severino  to  produce  P100,000  so   he  and  the  other  hostages  can  be  released.    Severino   told   him   it   would   be   hard   to   do   that   since   banks   are   closed   because   it   was   a   Saturday.   The   police   and   military   authorities   had   surrounded   the   lumber   yard.   Major   Melquiades   Sequio,   Station   Commander   of   the   INP   of   Iloilo   City,   negotiated   with   the   accused   and   appealed   to   them   to   surrender.     The   accused   refused   to   surrender   and   release   the   hostages.   Rosa   Caram,   OIC   Mayor   of   Iloilo   City,   joined   the   negotiations.     Appellant   demanded   P100,000,   a   coaster,   and   some   raincoats.     Caram   offered   P50,000   instead.     Later,   the   accused   agreed   to   receive   the   same   and   to   release   Rodita   to   be   accompanied  by  Mary  in  going  out  of  the  office.    One   of  the  accused  gave  a  key  to  Mayor  Caram  and  with   the   key,   Mayor   Caram   unlocked   the   door   and   handed  to  Rodita  P50,000,  which  Rodita  gave  to  one   of   the   accused.     Rodita   was   later   set   free   but   Mary   was  herded  back  to  the  office.   The   police   and   military   authorities   decided   to   assault   the   place   when   the   accused   still   wouldn’t   budge   after   more   ultimatums.    This  resulted  to  injuries  to  the  girls,  as   well   as   to   the   accused   Ronaldo   and   Reynaldo   Canasares.     Mary’s   right   leg   had   to   be   amputated   due   to   her   injuries.   The   appellant   maintained   that   the   money,   wallet   and   watches   were   all   left   on   the   counter   and   were   never   touched   by   them.     He   also   claimed   that   they   never   fired   on   the   military   because  they  intended  to  surrender.    

Issues:   1. WON   the   crime   of   robbery   was   consummated   2. WON  there  was  a  mitigating  circumstance  of   voluntary  surrender       Held:   1. Yes.   The   robbery   shall   be   deemed   consummated   if   the   unlawful   “taking”   is   complete.     Unlawful   taking   of   personal   property   of   another   is   an   essential   part   of   the   crime   of   robbery.    The  respondent  claimed  that  none   of   the   items   (money,   watches   and   wallet)   were  recovered  from  them.    However,  based   on   the   evidence,   the   money   demanded,   the   wallet   and   the   wristwatch   were   within   the   dominion   and   control   of   the   appellant   and   his   co-­‐accused   and   thus   the   taking   was   completed.     it   is   not   necessary   that   the   property   be   taken  into  the  hands  of  the  robber  or  that  he   should   have   actually   carried   the   property   away,   out   of   the   physical   presence   of   the   lawful   possessor,   or   that   he   should   have   made  his  escape  with  it.     2. No.     The   “surrender”   of   the   appellant   and   his  co-­‐accused  cannot  be  considered  in  their   favor  to  mitigate  their  liability.     To   be   mitigating,   surrender   must   have   the   following   requisites:   (1)   that   the   offender   had   not   been   actually   arrested,   (2)   that   the   offender  surrendered  himself  to  a  person  in   authority   or   to   his   agent,   and   that   the   surrender   was   voluntary.     The   “surrender”   by   the   appellant   and   his   co-­‐accused   hardly   meets   these   requirements.     There   is   no   voluntary  surrender  to  speak  of.      

Rañeses  74    

Murder RPC,  Art.  248   Murder.   —   Any   person   who,   not   falling   within   the   provisions  of  Article  246  shall  kill  another,  shall  be   guilty  of  murder  and  shall  be  punished  by  reclusion   temporal   in   its   maximum   period   to   death,   if   committed   with   any   of   the   following   attendant   circumstances:   1.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

 

With   treachery,   taking   advantage   of   superior   strength,   with   the   aid   of   armed   men,   or   employing   means   to   weaken   the   defense  or  of  means  or  persons  to  insure  or   afford  impunity.    In   consideration   of   a   price,   reward,   or   promise.   By   means   of   inundation,   fire,   poison,   explosion,  shipwreck,  stranding  of  a  vessel,   derailment   or   assault   upon   a   street   car   or   locomotive,   fall   of   an   airship,   by   means   of   motor  vehicles,  or  with  the  use  of  any  other   means  involving  great  waste  and  ruin.   On   occasion   of   any   of   the   calamities   enumerated  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  or   of   an   earthquake,   eruption   of   a   volcano,   destructive   cyclone,   epidemic   or   other   public  calamity.   With  evident  premeditation.   With   cruelty,   by   deliberately   and   inhumanly   augmenting   the   suffering   of   the   victim,   or   outraging   or   scoffing   at   his   person  or  corpse.  

 

People  v.  Borinaga.  55  Phil.  433  (1930)   Facts:  On  March  4,  1929,  an  American  named  Harry   H.   Mooney,   contracted   with   Juan   Lawaan   for   the   construction   of   a   fish   corral.   Basilio   Borinaga   was   associated   with   Lawaan.   On   the   morning   of   same   date,   Lawaan   and   his   men   went   to   Mooney’s   shop   and   tried   to   collect   the   whole   amount   fixed   by   the   contract   notwithstanding   that   only   2/3   of   the   fish   corral   was   finished.   Mooney   refused   to   pay   and   Lawaan   threatened   him   that   if   he   did   not   pay,   something  would  happen  to  him.     On  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  Mooney  was  in  the   store   of   a   neighbor   Perpetua   Najarro   and   was   seated  with  his  back  being  to  the  window.  Perpetua  

saw   Borinaga   from   the   window   strike   with   a   knife   at  Mooney,  but  fortunately,  knife  lodged  in  the  back   of   the   chair   on   which   Mooney   was   seated.   Mooney   fell  from  the  chair  uninjured  while  Borinaga  fled  to   the  market  place.  Borinaga  was  persistent  and  after   nearly   ten   minutes,   returned   with   knife   in   hand   to   renew   attack   but   was   unable   to   do   so   because   Perpetua   turned   a   flashlight   on   Borinaga,   frightening  him.     Above   instances   gave   rise   to   CFI   of   Leyte   convicting   Borinaga  and  sentencing  him  to  14  years,  8  months   and   a   day   of   reclusion   temporal,   with   accessory   penalty   and   costs.   Court   held   that   1)   homicidal   intent   of   the   accused   was   plainly   evidenced;   2)   murder   was   in   the   heart   and   mind   of   the   accused;   3)   aggressor   stated   his   purpose   and   even   apologized  to  his  friends  for  not  accomplishing  that   purpose;  4)  blow  was  directed  towards  vital  organs;   and   5)   means   used   were   suitable   for   accomplishment   therefore,   crime   qualifies   as   murder.     Issue:   WON   the   crime   committed   is   attempted   murder.     Held:   No.   The   crime   committed   is   frustrated   murder.   The   essential   condition   of   a   frustrated   crime,   that   the   author   performs   all   the   acts   of   execution,   attended   the   attack.   Nothing   remained   to   be   done   to   accomplish   the   work   of   the   assailant   completely.  The  cause  resulting  in  the  failure  of  the   attack  arose  by  reason  of  forces  independent  of  the   will   of   the   perpetrator.   No   superfine   distinctions   need   be   drawn   in   favor   of   the   accused   to   establish   a   lesser  crime  than  that  of  frustrated  murder,  for  the   facts   disclose   a   wanton   disregard   of   the   sanctity   of   human  life  fully  meriting  the  penalty  imposed  in  the   trial  court.     People  v.  Sy  Pio,  94  Phil.  885  (1954)   Facts:  Sy  Pio  shot  three  people  early  in  the  morning   of   September   3,   1949.   Tan   Siong   Kiap,   Ong   Pian   and   Jose  Sy.  Sy  Pio  entered  the  store  at  511  Misericordia   Sta  Cruz  Manila  and  started  firing  with  a  .45  caliber   pistol.   First   to   be   shot   was   Jose   Sy.   Upon   seeing   Sy   Pio   fire   at   Jose   Sy,   Tan   asked   “what   is   the   idea?”  

Rañeses  75     thereupon,  Sy  Pio  turned  around  and  fired  at  him  as   well.   Tan   was   shot   at   his   right   shoulder   and   it   passed   through   his   back.   He   ran   to   a   room   behind   the  store  to  hide.  He  was  still  able  to  hear  gunshots   from   Sy   Pio’s   pistol,   but   afterwards,   Sy   Pio   ran   away.      Issue:  WON  accused  is  guilty  of  frustrated  murder.     Held:  No.  Accused  is  guilty  of  attempted  murder.     1. Sy   Pio   had   to   turn   around   to   shoot   Tan   Siong  Kiap.   2. There   is   sufficient   proof.   (Uncontradicted   testimony   of   the   victim,   admissions   made   to   Lomotan,  testimony  of  physician,  etc.)   3. Assignment   of   error   must   be   dismissed.   Offended   party   spent   P300   for   the   hospital   fees.   4. The   fact   that   he   was   able   to   escape   which   appellant   must   have   seen,   must   have   produced   in   the   mind   of   the   defendant-­‐ appellant   that   he   was   not   able   to   hit   his   victim   at   a   vital   part   of   the   body.   The   defendant   appellant   knew   that   he   had   not   actually   performed   all   acts   of   execution   necessary   to   kill   his   victim.   Under   these   circumstances,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   subjective  phase  of  the  acts  of  execution  had   been  completed.     People  v.  Trinidad,  169  SCRA  51  (1989)   Facts:   Trinidad   accused   of   2   counts   of   murder   &   1   count  frustrated  murder.  Accused  in  member  of  INP   in  Nasipit.  Crime  occurred  in  Butuan  between  El  Rio   &   Agfa   while   they   were   in   a   Ford   Fiera   bound   for   Davao.  Trinidad  shot  &  killed  Soriano  &  Laron  while   he  shot  and  injured  Tan     Issue:  WON  conviction  is  proper?     Held:   Affirmed.   Murder   and   attempted   murder.   Trinidad   alibi   is   weak   and   overridden   by   Tan   and   Commendador’s   positive   identification.   Though   some   discrepancies   in   testimonies   are   found,   these   are  trivial.  Distance  between  Trinidad  &  2  deceased   immaterial.  Important  is  that  he  shot  them.  Tan  has   no   seen   ill   motive   to   falsifiably   testify   against  

Trinidad.  It  is  attempted  and  not  frustrated  murder   because   he   failed   to   execute   all   acts   due   to   moving   vehicle  and  this  shielded  Tan’s  body  and  his  wound   was   not   fatal   thus   not   sufficient   to   cause   death   (People  v.  Pilones)     People  v.  Ravelo,  202  SCRA  655  (1991)   Facts:   The   accused-­‐appellants   are   members   of   the   Civilian  Home  Defense  Force  (CHDF)  stationed  at  a   checkpoint   near   the   airport   of   Tandag.   At   approximately   6:30   PM   of   May   21,   1984,   accused-­‐ appellants   allegedly   kidnapped   by   means   of   force   one  Reynaldo  Gaurano.  They  then  detained  Gaurano   at   the   house   of   Pedro   Ravelo,   one   of   the   accused.   Thereafter,   they   assaulted,   attacked,   and   burned   Gaurano,   with   the   intent   of   killing   the   latter.   Reynaldo  Gaurano  died  on  May  22.     At   about   1AM   of   May   22,   the   accused-­‐appellants   also   kidnapped   by   means   of   force   Joey   Lugatiman.   The   latter   was   also   brought   to   Ravelo's   house   where   he   was   tortured.   At   5AM,   Lugatiman   was   transferred   to   the   house   of   accused-­‐appellant   Padilla.   There   he   was   tied   to   the   wall   with   a   nylon   line  and  was  told  he  would  be  killed  at  9AM.  Shortly   after,  accused-­‐appellants  had  to  attend  to  Gaurano;   Lugatiman   was   thus   left   alone.   He   was   able   to   escape.     He  reported  what  happened  to  him  and  to  Gaurano   to   the   police   authorities.   RTC   convicted   the   accused-­‐appellants   of   murder   of   Gaurano   and   frustrated  murder  of  Lugatiman.     In  this  appeal,  counsel  for  the  accused  aver  that  the   lower  court  erred  in  finding  that  accused-­‐appellants   are   guilty   of   frustrated   murder.   Counsel   further   contends   that   there   can   be   no   frustrated   murder   absent   any   proof   of   intent   to   kill,   which   is   an   essential   element   of   the   offense   of   frustrated   murder.   The   trial   court   merely   relied   on   the   statement   of   the   accused-­‐appellants   stating   they   would  kill  Lugatiman  to  establish  intent  to  kill.     Issue:   WON   the   statement   by   the   accused   stating   that   Lugatiman   would   be   killed   is   sufficient   proof   of   intent  to  convict  a  person  of  frustrated  murder  

Rañeses  76     Held:   No.   In   a   crime   of   murder   or   an   attempt   of   frustration   thereof,   the   offender   must   have   the   intent   or   the   actual   design   to   kill   which   must   be   manifested   by   external   acts.   A   verbal   expression   is   not  sufficient  to  show  an  actual  design  to  perpetrate   the   act.   Intent   must   be   shown   not   only   by   a   statement   of   the   aggressor,   but   also   by   the   execution   of   all   acts   and   the   use   of   means   necessary   to   deliver   a   fatal   blow   while   the   victim   is   not   placed   in  a  position  to  defend  himself.    

Homicide   RPC,  Art.  249   Homicide.  —  Any  person  who,  not  falling  within  the   provisions  of  Article  246,  shall  kill  another  without   the   attendance   of   any   of   the   circumstances   enumerated   in   the   next   preceding   article,   shall   be   deemed   guilty   of   homicide   and   be   punished   by   reclusion  temporal.  

 

 

People  v.  Kalalo,  59  Phil.  715  (1934)   Facts:  Appellant  Marcelo  Kalalo  and  Isabel  Holgado   had  a  litigation  over  a  parcel  of  land  situated  in  the   barrio   of   Calumpang,   Batangas.   Marcelo   Kalalo   cultivated   the   land   in   questions   during   the   agricultural  years  1931-­‐1932  but  when  the  harvest   time  came,  Isabela  Holgado  reaped  all  that  had  been   planted   thereon.   Marcelo   filed   complaints   against   Isabel,  however  these  were  dismissed  by  the  CFI  of   Batangas  twice.     On   October   1,   1932,   Isabela   Holgado   and   her   brother   Arcadio   Hodalgo   decided   to   have   the   said   land   plowed   and   employed   several   workers   for   that   purpose.   Arcadio   Hodalgo   together   with   the   hired   workers  went  to  plow  the  land  early  that  day.     Marcelo   Kalalo   who   had   been   informed   thereof,   proceeded   to   the   land   together   with   his   brothers   Felipe   Kalalo   and   Juan   Kalalo,   brother   in   law   Gregorio  Ramos,  and  Aejandro  Garcia.  Five  of  them   are  all  armed  with  bolos.  Fausta  Abrenica  and  Alipia   Abrenica,   mother   and   aunt,   respectively   of   the   Kalalo   brothers,   followed   them   thereafter.   Upon   their   arrival,   they   ordered   those   workers   of   Isabel   and  Arcadio  Hodalgo  to  stop.  

Shortly  after,  Isabela  Holgado,  Maria  Guttierez,  and   Hilarion  Holgado  arrived  at  the  place  with  food  for   the   laborers.   Marcelino   Panaligan,   the   cousin   of   Isabelo   and   Arcadio,   also   arrived   and   ordered   Arcadio  and  the  workers  to  resume  their  work.   With   this,   they   all   simultaneously   struck   with   their   bolos.   Marcelo   Kalalo   slashed   Arcadio   while   Felipe   Kalalo,   Juan   Kalalo   and   Gregorio   Ramos   slashed   Marcelino   Panaligan.   Both   Arcadio   and   Marcelino   died  instantly.     Marcelo   Kalalo   then   took   a   revolver   from   the   belt   of   the   lifeless   Marcelino,   and   fired   four   shots   at   Hilarion   Holgado   who   was   then   also   fleeing   from   the  scene.     Issues:   1. WON   the   appellants   Marcelo   Kalalo,   Juan   Kalalo,   Felipe   Kalalo,   and   Gregorio   Ramos   are  guilty  of  murder  or  of  simple  homicide.   2. WON  Marcelo  Kalalo  is  guilty  of  discharge  of   firearms  or  attempted  homicide     Held:   1. The   court   held   that   the   appellants   are   merely   guilty   of   homicide   for   the   crimes   of   killing   Arcadio   and   Marcelino   as   no   mitigating   circumstance   has   been   proved.   The   accused   and   the   deceased   were   both   armed.   Marcelino   has   a   revolver   while   the   accused   have   bolos.   The   risk   was   even   between  the  two  parties.   2. It   was   held   that   he   is   guilty   of   attempted   homicide.   Evidence   shows   that   Marcelo   Kalalo  fired  four  successive  shots  at  Hilarion   Holgado   while   the   latter   was   fleeing   from   the   scene.   This   fact   simply   shows   that   he   was  then  intent  on  killing  Hilarion  Holgado.   he   has   performed   all   acts   necessary   to   commit   the   crime   but   failed   by   reason   of   causes   independent   of   his   will   (poor   aim,   victim  succeeded  in  dodging  his  shots).    

Penalties  to  be  imposed  in  relation  to  stages   of  commission      

Rañeses  77     RPC,  Art.  6  

RPC,  Art.  55  

*Refer  to  page  63  for  the  full  text  of  the  provision  

Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   accessories   of   a   frustrated     crime.   —   The   penalty   lower   by   two   degrees   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   frustrated   felony   shall   be   imposed   upon   the   accessories   to   the   commission   of   a   frustrated   felony.  

RPC,  Art.  7   *Refer  to  page  67  for  the  full  text  of  the  provision   RPC,  Art.  50  

RPC,  Art.  56.    

Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   principals   of   a   frustrated     crime.   —   The   penalty   next   lower   in   degree   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   consummated   felony   shall   be   imposed   upon   the   principal  in  a  frustrated  felony.  

Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   accomplices   in   an   attempted   crime.   —   The   penalty   next   lower   in   degree   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   an   attempt   to   commit   a   felony   shall   be   imposed   upon   the   accomplices  in  an  attempt  to  commit  the  felony.  

RPC,  Art.  51  

RPC,  Art.  57.    

Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   principals   of   attempted   crimes.   —   A   penalty   lower   by   two   degrees   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   consummated   felony   shall   be   imposed   upon   the   principals   in   an   attempt   to   commit  a  felony.  

Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   accessories   of   an   attempted   crime.   —   The   penalty   lower   by   two   degrees   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   attempted   felony   shall   be   imposed   upon   the   accessories  to  the  attempt  to  commit  a  felony.  

RPC,  Art.  52    

      Conspiracy  and  proposal  to  commit  a  felony    

Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   accomplices   in   consummated   crime.   —   The   penalty   next   lower   in   degree   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   consummated   shall   be   imposed   upon   the   accomplices   in   the   commission   of   a   consummated   felony.  

RPC,  Art.  8   Conspiracy   and   proposal   to   commit   felony.   —   Conspiracy   and   proposal   to   commit   felony   are   punishable   only   in   the   cases   in   which   the   law   specially  provides  a  penalty  therefor.  

RPC,  Art.  53     Penalty   to   be   imposed   upon   accessories   to   the   commission   of   a   consummated   felony.   —   The   penalty   lower   by   two   degrees   than   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   consummated   felony   shall   be   imposed  upon  the  accessories  to  the  commission  of   a  consummated  felony.  

RPC,  Art.  115     Conspiracy  and  proposal  to  commit  treason;  Penalty.   —  The  conspiracy  or  proposal  to  commit  the  crime   of  treason  shall  be  punished  respectively,  by  prision   mayor  and  a  fine  not  exceeding  P10,000  pesos,  and   prision   correccional   and   a   fine   not   exceeding   P5,000  pesos.  

RPC,  Art.  54.     Penalty  to  imposed  upon  accomplices  in  a  frustrated     crime.   —   The   penalty   next   lower   in   degree   than   prescribed  by  law  for  the  frustrated  felony  shall  be   imposed  upon  the  accomplices  in  the  commission  of   a  frustrated  felony.  

       

RPC,  Art.  136   Conspiracy   and   proposal   to   commit   coup   d'etat,   rebellion   or   insurrection.   —   The   conspiracy   and   proposal  to  commit  coup  d'etat  shall  be  punished  by   prision  mayor  in  minimum  period  and  a  fine  which   shall  not  exceed  eight  thousand  pesos  (P8,000.00).  

 

 

 

Rañeses  78     RPC,  Art.  141  

(Cont.)   eriods   it   being   sufficient   for   the   imposition   thereof   that   the   initial   steps   have   been   taken   toward   carrying   out   the   purposes   of   the   combination.  

Conspiracy   to   commit   sedition.   —   Persons   conspiring  to  commit  the  crime  of  sedition  shall  be   punished   by   prision   correccional   in   its   medium   period   and   a   fine   not   exceeding   2,000   pesos.  

Any   property   possessed   under   any   contract   or   by   any   combination   mentioned   in   the   preceding   paragraphs,   and   being   the   subject   thereof,   shall   be   forfeited  to  the  Government  of  the  Philippines.  

(Reinstated  by  E.O.  No.  187).  

RPC,  Art.  186   Monopolies  and  combinations  in  restraint  of  trade.  —   The   penalty   of   prision   correccional   in   its   minimum   period   or   a   fine   ranging   from   200   to   6,000   pesos,   or   both,  shall  be  imposed  upon:  

Whenever   any   of   the   offenses   described   above   is   committed   by   a   corporation   or   association,   the   president   and   each   one   of   its   agents   or   representatives   in   the   Philippines   in   case   of   a   foreign   corporation   or   association,   who   shall   have   knowingly   permitted   or   failed   to   prevent   the   commission   of   such   offense,   shall   be   held   liable   as   principals  thereof.  

1.   Any   person   who   shall   enter   into   any   contract   or   agreement   or   shall   take   part   in   any   conspiracy   or   combination   in   the   form   of   a   trust   or   otherwise,   in   restraint   of   trade   or   commerce   or   to   prevent   by   artificial  means  free  competition  in  the  market;   2.   Any   person   who   shall   monopolize   any   merchandise   or   object   of   trade   or   commerce,   or   shall   combine   with   any   other   person   or   persons   to   monopolize   and   merchandise   or   object   in   order   to   alter  the  price  thereof  by  spreading  false  rumors  or   making   use   of   any   other   article   to   restrain   free   competition  in  the  market;  

Who   are   brigands;   Penalty.   —   When   more   than   three   armed   persons   form   a   band   of   robbers   for   the   purpose   of   committing   robbery   in   the   highway,   or   kidnapping  persons  for  the  purpose  of  extortion  or   to   obtain   ransom   or   for   any   other   purpose   to   be   attained   by   means   of   force   and   violence,   they   shall   be  deemed  highway  robbers  or  brigands.  

3.  Any  person  who,  being  a  manufacturer,  producer,   or   processor   of   any   merchandise   or   object   of   commerce   or   an   importer   of   any   merchandise   or   object  of  commerce  from  any  foreign  country,  either   as   principal   or   agent,   wholesaler   or   retailer,   shall   combine,  conspire  or  agree  in  any  manner  with  any   person   likewise   engaged   in   the   manufacture,   production,   processing,   assembling   or   importation   of  such  merchandise  or  object  of  commerce  or  with   any   other   persons   not   so   similarly   engaged   for   the   purpose  of  making  transactions  prejudicial  to  lawful   commerce,  or  of  increasing  the  market  price  in  any   part  of  the  Philippines,  of  any  such  merchandise  or   object   of   commerce   manufactured,   produced,   processed,   assembled   in   or   imported   into   the   Philippines,   or   of   any   article   in   the   manufacture   of   which   such   manufactured,   produced,   or   imported   merchandise  or  object  of  commerce  is  used.  

Persons   found   guilty   of   this   offense   shall   be   punished  by  prision  mayor  in  its  medium  period  to   reclusion  temporal  in  its  minimum  period  if  the  act   or   acts   committed   by   them   are   not   punishable   by   higher   penalties,   in   which   case,   they   shall   suffer   such  high  penalties.  

If   the   offense   mentioned   in   this   article   affects   any   food   substance,   motor   fuel   or   lubricants,   or   other   articles  of  prime  necessity,  the  penalty  shall  be  that   of  prision  mayor  in  its  maximum  and  medium  

 

RPC,  Art.  306  

If  any  of  the  arms  carried  by  any  of  said  persons  be   an   unlicensed   firearms,   it   shall   be   presumed   that   said  persons  are  highway  robbers  or  brigands,  and   in   case   of   convictions   the   penalty   shall   be   imposed   in  the  maximum  period.  

   

 

 

Reyes:   1. (Art.   8)   IMPORTANT   WORDS   AND   PHRASES   1. “Conspiracy  and  proposal  to  commit   felony.”   –   Conspiracy   and   proposal   to   commit   are   two   different   acts   or   felonies:  (1)  conspiracy  to  commit  a   felony,   and   (2)   proposal   to   commit   a   felony.    

Rañeses  79    

2.

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

2. “Only   in   the   cases   in   which   the   law   specifically   provides   a   penalty   therefor.”  –  Unless  there  is  a  specific   provision   in   the   RPC   providing   a   penalty   for   conspiracy   or   proposal   to  commit  a  felony,  mere  conspiracy   or  proposal  to  commit  a  felony  is  not   a  felony.     General  rule:  Conspiracy  and  proposal  to   commit   a   felony   are   not   punishable.   They   are   ppunishable   only   in   the   cases   in   which   the   law   specially   provides   a   penalty   therefor.     When   the   conspiracy   relates   to   a   crime   actually  committed,  it  is  not  a  felony  but   only   a   manner   of   incurring   criminal   liability,   that   is,   when   there   is   conspiracy,  the  act  of  one  is  the  act  of  all.     Requisites  of  conspiracy:   1. That   two   or   more   persons   come   to   an   agreement;.   –   agreement   presupposes  meeting  of  the  minds  of   two  or  more  persons   2. That   the   agreement   concerned   the   commission   of   a   felony.     –   the   agreement   must   refer   to   the   commission  of  a  crime.  It  must  be  an   agreement   to   act,   to   effect.   To   bring   about   what   has   already   been   conceived  and  determined   3. That   the   execution   of   the   felony   be   decided   upon.   –   the   conspirators   have  made  up  their  minds  to  commit   the   crime.   There   must   be   determination   to   commit   the   crime   of  treason,  rebellion  or  sedition   Direct  proof  is  not  necessary  to  establish   conspiracy.     Quantum  of  proof  is  required  to  establish   it.     Requisites  of  proposal:   1. That  a  person  has  decided  to  commit   a  felony;  and   2. That   he   proposes   its   execution   to   some  other  person  or  persons.     There  is  no  criminal  proposal  when:  

1. The   person   who   proposes   is   not   determined  to  commit  the  felony.     2. There   is   no   decided,   concrete   and   formal  proposal.     3. It   is   not   the   execution   of   a   felony   that  is  proposed.     9. The   crimes   in   which   conspiracy   and   proposal   are   punishable   are   against   the   security   of   the   State   or   economic   security.       People  v.  Peralta,  25  SCRA  759  (1968)   Facts:  On  February  16,  1958,  in  the  municipality  of   Muntinglupa,  province  of  Rizal,  two  known  warring   gangs  inside  the  New  Bilibid  Prison  as  “Sigue-­‐Sigue”   and   “OXO”   were   preparing   to   attend   a   mass   at   7   a.m.   However,   a   fight   between   the   two   rival   gangs   caused   a   big   commotion   in   the   plaza   where   the   prisoners   were   currently   assembled.   The   fight   was   quelled   and   those   involved   where   led   away   to   the   investigation   while   the   rest   of   the   prisoners   were   ordered  to  return  to  their  respective  quarters.     In   the   investigation,   it   was   found   out   that   the   accused,   “OXO”   members,   Amadeo   Peralta,   Andres   Factora,   Leonardo   Dosal,   Angel   Paramog,   Gervasio   Larita   and   Florencio   Luna   (six   among   the   twenty-­‐ two   defendants   charged   therein   with   multiple   murder),   are   also   convicts   confined   in   the   said   prisons  by  virtue  of  final  judgments.     They   conspired,   confederated   and   mutually   helped   and   aided   each   other,   with   evident   premeditation   and  treachery,  all  armed  with  deadly  weapons,  did,   then  and  there,  willfully,  unlawfully  and  feloniously   killed   “Sigue-­‐Sigue”   sympathizers   Jose   Carriego,   Eugenio   Barbosa   and   Santos   Cruz,   also   convicts   confined   in   the   same   institution,   by   hitting,   stabbing,  and  striking  them  with  ice  picks,  clubs  and   other   improvised   weapons,   pointed   and/or   sharpened,   thereby   inflicting   upon   the   victims   multiple  serious  injuries  which  directly  caused  their   deaths.     Issues:   1. WON   conspiracy   attended   the   commission   of  the  multiple  murder  

Rañeses  80      

Conspiracy   alone,   without   execution   of   its   purpose,   is   not   a   crime   punishable   by   law,   except   in   special   instances   (Article   8,   Revised   Penal   Code)   which,   do   not   include   robbery.  

2. WON  an  aggravating  circumstance  of  quasi-­‐ recidivism   is   present   in   the   commission   of   the  crime?     Held:     1. Yes.   A   conspiracy   exists   when   two   or   more   persons   come   to   an   agreement   concerning   the   commission   of   a   felony   and   decide   to   commit   it.   Generally,   conspiracy   is   not   a   crime   unless   when   the   law   specifically   provides   a   penalty   thereof   as   in   treason,   rebellion   and   sedition.   However,   when   in   resolute   execution   of   a   common   scheme,   a   felony   is   committed   by   two   or   more   malefactors,   the   existence   of   a   conspiracy   assumes   a   pivotal   importance   in   the   determination   of   the   liability   of   the   perpetrators.   Once   an   express   or   implied   conspiracy   is   proved,   all   of   the   conspirators   are   liable   as   co-­‐principals   regardless   of   the   extent   and   character   of   their   respective   active  participation  in  the  commission  of  the   crime/s   perpetrated   in   furtherance   of   the   conspiracy   because   in   contemplation   of   law   the  act  of  one  is  the  act  of  all.     The   collective   criminal   liability   emanates   from   the   ensnaring   nature   of   conspiracy.   The   concerted   action   of   the   conspirators   in   consummating   their   common   purpose   is   a   patent  display  of  their  evil  partnership,  and   for   the   consequences   of   such   criminal   enterprise   they   must   be   held   solidarity   liable.  However,  in  order  to  hold  an  accused   guilty   as   co-­‐principal   by   reason   of   conspiracy,   it   must   be   established   that   he   performed   an   overt   act   in   furtherance   of   the   conspiracy,   either   by   actively   participating   in  the  actual  commission  of  the  crime,  or  by   lending   moral   assistance   to   his   co-­‐ conspirators   by   being   present   at   the   scene   of   the   crime,   or   by   exerting   moral   ascendancy  over  the  rest  of  the  conspirators   as   to   move   them   to   executing   the   conspiracy.    

  Reverting   now   to   the   case   at   bar,   the   trial   court   correctly   ruled   that   conspiracy   attended  the  commission  of  the  murders.  To   wit,   although   there   is   no   direct   evidence   of   conspiracy,   the   court   can   safely   say   that   there   are   several   circumstances   to   show   that   the   crime   committed   by   the   accused   was   planned.   First,   all   the   deceased   were   Tagalogs   and   members   of   sympathizers   of   “Sigue-­‐Sigue”   gang   (OXO   members   were   from   either   Visayas   or   Mindanao),   singled   out   and   killed   thereby,   showing   that   their   killing   has   been   planned.   Second,   the   accused   were   all   armed   with   improvised   weapons  showing  that  they  really  prepared   for   the   occasion.   Third,   the   accused   accomplished   the   killing   with   team   work   precision   going   from   one   brigade   to   another   and   attacking   the   same   men   whom   they   have   previously   marked   for   liquidation   and   lastly,   almost   the   same   people   took   part   in   the  killing  of  the  Carriego,  Barbosa  and  Cruz.   2. Yes.  In  view  of  the  attendance  of  the  special   aggravating   circumstances   of   quasi-­‐ recidivism,   as   all   of   the   six   accused   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   offenses   were   serving  sentences  in  the  New  Bilibid  Prison   by   virtue   of   convictions   by   final   judgments   that   penalty   for   each   offense   must   be   imposed   in   its   maximum   period,   which   is   the  mandate  of  the  first  paragraph  of  article   160   of   the   RPC.   Hence,   severe   penalty   imposed   on   a   quasi-­‐recidivist   is   justified   because  of  the  perversity  and  incorrigibility   of  the  crime.     US  v.  Bautista,  6  Phil.  581  (1906)   Facts:   In   1903   a   junta   was   organized   and   a   conspiracy  entered  into  by  a  number  of  Filipinos  in   Hong   Kong,   for   the   purpose   of   overthrowing   the   government   of   the   United   States   in   the   Philippine  

Rañeses  81     Islands   by   force   of   arms   and   establishing   a   new   government.       Francisco  Bautista  (1),  a  close  friend  of  the  chief  of   military   forces   (of   the   conspirators)   took   part   of   several   meetings.   Tomas   Puzon   (2)   held   several   conferences   whereat   plans   are   made   for   the   coming   insurrection;  he  was  appointed  Brigadier-­‐General  of   the  Signal  Corps  of  the  revolutionary  forces.  Aniceto   de   Guzman   (3)   accepted   some   bonds   from   one   of   the  conspirators.     The   lower   court   convicted   the   three   men   of   conspiracy.   Bautista   was   sentenced   to   4   years   imprisonment   and   a   P3,000   fine;   Puzon   and   De   Guzman  to  3  years  imprisonment  and  P1,000.       Issue:  WON  the  accused  are  guilty  of  conspiracy.     Held:   Yes,   Bautista   and   Puzon   are   guilty   of   conspiracy.   Bautista   was   fully   aware   of   the   purposes   of   the   meetings   he   participated   in,   and   even   gave   an   assurance   to   the   chief   of   military   forces  that  he  is  making  the  necessary  preparations.   Puzon  voluntarily  accepted  his  appointment  and  in   doing   so   assumed   all   the   obligations   implied   by   such   acceptance.   This   may   be   considered   as   an   evidence   of   the   criminal   connection   of   the   accused   with  the  conspiracy.     However,  de  Guzman  is  not  guilty  of  conspiracy.  He   might   have   been   helping   the   conspirators   by   accepting   bonds   in   the   bundles,   but   he   has   not   been   aware   of   the   contents   nor   does   he   was,   in   any   occasion,   assumed   any   obligation   with   respect   to   those  bonds.       *See   RPC   Art.   136:   Crimes   against   public   order:   conspiracy   and   proposal   to   commit   coup   d’   etat,   rebellion  or  insurrection.    

Classification  of  Felonies   RPC,  Art.  7   *Refer  page  67  for  the  full  text  of  the  provision  and   Reyes’s  explanation.  

 

RPC,  Art.  9   Grave  felonies,  less  grave  felonies  and  light  felonies.  -­‐   Grave   felonies   are   those   to   which   the   law   attaches   the  capital  punishment  or  penalties  which  in  any  of   their   periods   are   afflictive,   in   accordance   with   article  25  of  this  Code.     Less   grave   felonies   are   those   which   the   law   punishes   with   penalties   which   in   their   maximum   period   are   correctional,   in   accordance   with   the   above-­‐mentioned  article.     Light   felonies   are   those   infractions   of   law   for   the   commission   of   which   the   penalty   of   arresto   menor   or   a   fine   not   exceeding   200   pesos   or   both,   is   provided.    

   

 

Reyes:   1. IMPORTANT  WORDS  OR  PHRASES   1. “To   which   the   law   attaches   the   capital   punishment.”   –   Capital   punishment  is  death  penalty.   2. “Or  penalties  in  any  of  their  periods   are   afflictive.”     -­‐   Although   the   word   “any”  is  used  in  the  phrase,  when  the   penalty  prescribed  for  the  offense  is   composed   of   two   or   more   distinct   penalties.   The   higher   or   the   highest   of  the  penalties  must  be  an  afflictive   penalty3.       If   the   penalty   prescribed   is   composed   of   two   or   more   periods   corresponding   to   different   divisible   penalties,   the   higher   or   maximum   period   must   be   that   of   an   afflictive   penalty.       If   the   penalty   is   composed   of   two   periods   of   an   afflictive   penalty   or   of   two   periods   corresponding   to   different   afflictive   penalties,   the   offense  for  which  it  is  prescribed  is  a   grave  felony.     3. “Penalties   which   in   their   maximum   period  are  correctional.”  –  When  the                                                                                                                           3  Reclusion  perpetua,  reclusion  temporal  

Rañeses  82     penalty  prescribed  for  the  offense  is   composed   of   two   or   more   disctint   penalties,   the   higher   or   highest   of   the  penalties  must  be  a  correctional   penalty.       If   the   penalty   prescribed   is   composed   of   two   or   more   periods   corresponding   to   different   divisible   penalties,   the   higher   of   maximum   period   must   be   that   of   correctional   penalty4.       If   the   penalty   is   composed   of   two   periods   of   a   correctional   penalty,   like  destierro  and  arresto  mayor,  the   offense  for  which  it  is  prescribed  is  a   less  grave  felony.     4. “The   penalty   of   arresto   menor   or   a   fine   not   exceeding   200   pesos,   or   both,   is   provided.”   –   When   the   code   provides   a   fine   P200   for   the   commission   of   a   felony,   it   is   a   light   felony.  If  the  amount  provided  for  by   the   Code   is   more   than   P200,   then   it   is   a   less   grave   felony,   because   according   to   art.   26,   a   fine   not   exceeding   P6k   is   a   correctional   penalty.   If   the   amount   provided   for   is   more   than   P6k,   then   it   is   a   grave   felony,   because,   according   to   Art.   26,   a   fine   exceeding   said   amount   is   an   afflictive  penalty.       Althought   Art.   26   provides   that   a   fine   not   less   than   P200   is   a   correctional   penalty,   Art.   9   which   defines  light  felonies  should  prevail,   because   the   latter   classifies   felonies   according   to   their   gravity,   while   the   former   classifies   the   fine   according   to  the  amount  thereof.                                                                                                                                     4

 Prision  correctional,  arresto  mayor,  suspension,  destierro  

                                                                                             

Rañeses  83    

Circumstances   Which   Criminal  Liability    

Affect  

Reyes:     1. Imputability   is   the   quality   by   which   an   act   may   be   ascribed   to   a   person   as   its   author   or   owner.   It   implies   that   the   act   committed   has   been   freely   and   consciously   done  and  may,  therefore,  be  put  down  to  the   doer  as  his  very  own.  (Albert)   2. Responsibility   is   the   obligation   of   suffering   the   consequences   of   crime.   It   is   the   obligation   of   taking   the   penal   and   civil   consequences  of  the  crime.  (Albert)     3. While   imputability   implies   that   a   deed   may   be   imputed   to   a   person,   responsibility   implies   that   the   persom   must   take   the   consequence   of   such   a   deed.     4. Guilt  is  an  element  of  responsibility,  for  a   man  cannot  answer  for  the  consequences   of  a  crime  unless  he  is  guilty.  (Albert)      

A. Justifying  Circumstances  

prescribed   in   the   next   preceding   circumstance   are   present,   and   the   further   requisite,   in   case   the   revocation   was   given   by   the   person   attacked,   that   the  one  making  defense  had  no  part  therein.   3.   Anyone   who   acts   in   defense   of   the   person   or   rights   of   a   stranger,   provided   that   the   first   and   second   requisites   mentioned   in   the   first   circumstance   of   this   Art.   are   present   and   that   the   person   defending   be   not   induced   by   revenge,   resentment,  or  other  evil  motive.   4.   Any   person   who,   in   order   to   avoid   an   evil   or   injury,   does   not   act   which   causes   damage   to   another,   provided   that   the   following   requisites   are   present;          First.   That   the   evil   sought   to   be   avoided   actually   exists;          Second.   That   the   injury   feared   be   greater   than   that  done  to  avoid  it;          Third.   That   there   be   no   other   practical   and   less   harmful  means  of  preventing  it.   5.   Any   person   who   acts   in   the   fulfillment   of   a   duty   or  in  the  lawful  exercise  of  a  right  or  office.   6.   Any   person   who   acts   in   obedience   to   an   order   issued  by  a  superior  for  some  lawful  purpose.  

  RPC,  Art.  11   Justifying   circumstances.   —   The   following   do   not   incur  any  criminal  liability:   1.   Anyone   who   acts   in   defense   of   his   person   or   rights,   provided   that   the   following   circumstances   concur;                  First.  Unlawful  aggression.                  Second.   Reasonable   necessity   of   the   means   employed  to  prevent  or  repel  it.                  Third.  Lack  of  sufficient  provocation  on  the  part   of  the  person  defending  himself.   2.   Any   one   who   acts   in   defense   of   the   person   or   rights   of   his   spouse,   ascendants,   descendants,   or   legitimate,  natural  or  adopted  brothers  or  sisters,  or   his   relatives   by   affinity   in   the   same   degrees   and   those   consanguinity   within   the   fourth   civil   degree,   provided  that  the  first  and  second  requisites    

 

    Reyes:     1. Justifying   circumstances   are   those   where   the   act   of   a   person   is   said   to   be   in   accordance  with  law,  so  that  such  person   is   deemed   not   to   have   transgressed   the   law   and   is   free   from   both   criminal   and   civil   liability.   There   is   no   civil   liability,   except   in   par.   4   of   Art.   11,   where   the   civil   liability   is   borne   by   the   party   benefited   by   the  act.     2. The   law   recognizes   the   non-­‐existence   of   a   crime   by   expressly   stating   in   the   opening  sentence  of  of  Article  11  that  the   persons  therein  mentioned  “do  not  incur   any  criminal  liability.”   3. There   is   no   crime   committed,   the   act   being  justified.     4. The   circumstances   mentioned   in   Art.   11   are  matters  of  defense  and  it  is  incumebt  

Rañeses  84     upon   the   accused,   in   order   to   avoid   criminal   liability,   to   prove   the   justifying   circumstance   claimed   by   him   to   the   satisfaction  of  the  court.    

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Self-­‐Defense   Reyes:   1. When   the   accused   invokes   self-­‐defense,   it   is   incumbent   upon   him   to   prove   by   clear   and   convincing   evidence   that   he   indeed   acted   in   defense   of   himself.   He   must   rely   on   the   strength   of   his   own   evidence   and   not   on   the   weakness   of   the   prosecution.       It   must   be   proved   with   certainty   by   sufficient,   satisfactory,   and   convincing   evidence   that   excludes   any   vestige   of   criminal   aggression   on   the   part   of   the   person   invoking   it   and   it   cannot   be   justifiably   entertained   where   it   is   not   only   uncorroborated   by   any   separate   ompetent   evidence  but,  in  itself,  is  extremely  doubtful.     2. Self-­‐defense   includes   not   only   the   defense   of   the   person   or   the   body   of   the   one   assaulted   but   also   that   of   his   rights,   that   is,   those   rights   the   enjoyment   of   which  is  protected  by  law.     3. Requisites   of   self-­‐defense:   (1)   unlawful   aggression;   (2)   reasonable   necessity   of   the   means  employed  to  prevent  or  repel  it;  and   (3)  lack  of  sufficient  provocation  on  the  part   of  the  person  defending  himself.     • Unlawful   aggression   is   an   indispensable  requisite.  There  can   be   no   self-­‐defense,   complete   or   incomplete,   unless   the   victim   has   committed   an   unlawful   aggression   against   the   person   defending   himself.   If   there   is   no   unlawful   aggression,   there   is   nothing   to   prevent  or  repel.     § Aggression   must   be   unlawful.   Two   kinds   of   aggression:   (1)   lawful   (i.e.   fulfillment  of  a  duty),  and  (2)   unlawful.    

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Unlawful   aggression   is   equivalent   to   assault   or   at   least   threatened   assault   of   an   immediate   and   imminent   kind.   (People   v.   Alconga,  78  Phil.  366)       There   must   be   an   actual   physical   assault   upon   a   person,   or   at   least   a   threat   to   inflict  real  injury.       In   case   of   threat,   the   same   must   be   offensive   and   positively   strong,   showing   the   wrongful   intent   to   cause   an   injury.   (U.S.   vs.   Guysayco,   13  Phil.  292,  295)     When   theire   is   no   peril   to   one’s   life,   limb   or   right,   there   is  no  unlawful  aggression.     Peril  to  one’s  life.     • Actual   –   that   the   danger   must   be   present   that   is,   actually  in  existence.     • Imminent   –   that   the   danger   is   on   the   point  of  happening.  It   is   not   required   that   the   attack   already   begins,   for   it   may   be   too  late.     Peril  to  one’s  limb.  When  a   person   is   attacked,   he   is   in   imminent  danger  of  death  or   bodily  harm.  It  may  be  actual   or   only   imminent.   It   includes   peril   to   the   safet   of   oen’s   person   from   physical   injuries.     There   must   be   actual   physical   force   or   actual   use   of   weapon.   Thus,   insulting  words  addressed  to   the   accused,   no   matter   how  

Rañeses  85    

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objectionable  they  may  have   been,   without   physical   assault,   could   not   constitute   unlawful   aggression.   (U.S.   v.   Carrero,  9  Phil.  544)     Mere   belief   of   an   impending   attack   is   not   sufficient.     A   strong   retaliation   for   an   injury   or   threat   may   amount   to   an   unlawful   aggression.     Retaliation   is   not   self-­‐ defense.   In   retaliation,   the   aggression   that   was   begun   by   the   injured   party   already   ceased   to   exist   when   the   accused   attacked   him.   In   self-­‐defense,   the   aggression   was   still   existing   when   the   aggressor   was   injured   or   disabled   by   the   person   making  a  defense.       The   attack   made   by   the   deceased  and  the  killing  of   the  deceased  by  defendant   should   succeed   each   other   without   appreciable   interval   of   time.   When   the   killing  of  the  deceased  by  the   accused   was   after   the   attack   made   by   the   deceased,   the   accused   must   have   no   time   nor   occasion   for   deliberation   and  cool  thinking.     The   unlawful   aggression   must   come   from   the   person   who   was   attacked   by  the  accused.     Nature,   character,   location,   and   extent   of   wound   of   the   accused   may   belie  claim  of  self-­‐defense.     When   the   aggressor   flees,   unlawful   aggression   no   longer   exists.   HOWEVER,   if   it   is   mere   retreat   to   take   a  

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more  advantageous  position,   the   unlawful   aggression   still   exists.     § The   rule   now   is   “stand   ground   when   in   the   right.”   The   reason   for   the   rule   is   that   if   one   flees   from   an   aggressor,  he  runs  the  risk  of   being  attacked  in  the  back  by   the  aggressor.     § Mere   threatening   attitude   is  not  unlawful  aggression.     § Threat   to   inflict   real   injury   as   unlawful   aggression.   A   mere   threatening   or   intimidating   attitude,   not   preceded   by   outward   and   material   aggression,   is   not   unlawful   aggression,   because   it   is   required   that   the   act   be   offensive   and   positively   strong,   showing   the   wrongful   intent   of   the   aggressor  to  cause  an  injury.     § When   intent   to   attack   is   manifest,   picking   up   a   weapon   is   sufficient   unlawful  aggression.     § Aggression   must   be   real,   not  merely  imaginary.     § An   aggression   that   is   expected   is   still   real,   provided  it  is  imminent.     Reasonable   necessity   of   the   means   employed   to   prevent   or   repel   it.   This   requisite   presupposes   the  existence  of  unlawful  aggression,   which  is  either  imminent  or  actual.       The   second   requisite   of   defense   means   that   (1)   there   be   a   necessity   of   the   course   of   action   taken   by   the   person   making   a   defense,   and   (2)   there   be   a   necessity   of   the   means   used.  Both  must  be  reasonable.    

Rañeses  86     The   reasonableness   of   the   necessity   depends   upon   the  circumstances.     § When   only   minor   physical   injuries   are   inflicted   after   unlawful   aggression   has   ceased   to   exist,   there   is   still   self-­‐defense   if   mortal   wounds   were   inflicted   at   the   time   the   requisites   of   self-­‐defense  were  present.     § The   person   defending   is   not  expected  to  control  his   blow.     § Whether   or   not   the   means   employed   is   reasonable,   will   depend   upon   the   nature   and   quality   of   the   weapon   used   by   the   aggressor,   his   physical   condition,   character,   size   and   other   circumstances,   and   those   of   the   person   defending   himself,   and   also  the  place  and  occasion   of  the  assault.     § First   two   requisites   common   to   three   kinds   of   legitimate  defense.     Lack   of   sufficient   provocation   on   the   part   of   the   person   defending   himself.   The   one   defending   himself   must   not   have   given   cause   for   the   aggression   by   his   unjust   conduct   or   by   inciting   or   provoking   the   assailant.     § It  is  present  when:   1. No  provocation  at  all   was   given   to   the   aggressor   by   the   person   defending   himself  ;  or     2. When,   even   iof   a   provocation   was   given,   it   was   not   sufficient;  or   §

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3. When,   even   if   the   provocation   was   sufficient,   it   was   not   given   by   the   person   defending  himself;  or   4. When,   even   if   a   provocation   was   given   by   the   person   defending   himself,   it   was   not   proximate   and   immediate   to   the   act   of   aggression.   (Decisions   of   the   Supreme   Court   of   Spain   of   March   5,   1902  and  of  April  20,   1906)   § Requisite   of   “lack   of   sufficient   provocation”   refers   exclusively   to   “the   person  defending  himself.”     4. The   Battered   Woman   Syndrome.   Recognized  in  foreign  jurisdictions  as  a  form   of   self-­‐defense   or,   at   least,   incomplete   self-­‐ defense.     • Battered   woman   –   a   woman   “who   is   repeatedly   subjected   to   any   forceful   physical   or   psychological   behavior  by  a  man  in  order  to  coerce   her  to  do  something  he  wants  her  to   do  without  concern  for  her  rights.”     • It  is  characterized  by  the  so-­‐called   “cycle   of   violence,”   which   has   three   phases:   (1)   the   tension-­‐ building   phase;   (2)   the   acute   battering   incident;   and   (3)   the   tranquil,   loving   (or,   at   least,   nonviolent)  phase.     5. Flight  is  incompatible  with  self-­‐defense.       People   v.   Boholst-­‐Caballero,   61   SCRA   180   (1974)   Facts:   Cunigunda   Boholst   Caballero   seeks   reversal   of   the   judgment   of   the   CFI   of   Ormoc   City   finding   her   guilty   of   parricide—she   allegedly   killed   her   husband,   Francisco   Caballero,   using   a   hunting   knife.   The   couple   was   married   in   1956   and   had   a  

Rañeses  87     daughter.   They   had   frequent   quarrels   due   to   the   husband's   gambling   and   drinking   and   there   were   times   when   he   maltreated   and   abused   his   wife.   After   more   than   a   year,   Francisco   abandoned   his   family.   In   1958,   Cunigunda   went   caroling   with   her   friends  and  when  she  was  on  her  way  home  she  met   her   husband   who   suddenly   held   her   by   the   collar   and  accused  her  of  going  out  for  prostitution.  Then   he   said   he   would   kill   her,   held   her   by   the   hair,   slapped   her   until   her   nose   bled   then   pushed   her   towards  the  ground.  She  fell  to  the  ground,  he  knelt   on   her   and   proceeded   to   choke   her.   Cunigunda,   having  earlier  felt  a  knife  tucked  in  Francisco's  belt   line   while   holding   unto   his   waist   so   she   wouldn't   fall   to   the   ground,   grabbed   the   hunting   knife   and   thrust   it   into   her   husband's   left   side,   near   the   belt   line   just   above   the   thigh.   He   died   2   days   after   the   incident  due  to  the  stab  wound.  Then  she  ran  home   and   threw   the   knife   away.   The   next   day,   she   surrendered   herself   to   the   police   along   with   the   torn  dress  that  she  wore  the  night  before.     Issue:   WON   Cunigunda,   in   stabbing   her   husband,   acted  in  legitimate  self-­‐defense     Held:  Yes.   1. Burden  of  proof  of  self-­‐defense  rests  on  the   accused.  In  this  case,  the  location  and  nature   of   the   stab   wound   confirms   that   the   said   victim,  the  husband,  was  the  aggressor.     With   her   husband   kneeling   over   her   and   choking   her,   accused   had   no   other   choice   but   to   pull   the   knife   tucked   in   his   belt   line   and  thrust  it  into  his  side.     The  fact  that  the  blow  landed  in  the  vicinity   where  the  knife  was  drawn  from  is  a  strong   indication   of   the   truth   of   the   testimony   of   the   accused.   Based   on   the   re-­‐enactment   of   the  incident,  it  was  natural  for  her  to  use  her   right  hand  to  lunge  the  knife  into  husband's   left  side.     2. Three   requisites   of   legitimate   self-­‐defense   are  present  

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Unlawful   aggression.   The   husband   resorting   to   pushing   her   to   the   ground   then   choking   her   just   because   she   was   out   caroling   at   night   constitutes   unlawful   aggression,   There   was   imminent  danger  of  injury.   Reasonable  necessity  of  means  employed.   While   being   choked,   Cunigunda   had   no   other   recourse   but   to   take   hold   of   the   knife   and   plunge   it   into   husband's   side   in   order   to   protect   herself.   Reasonable   necessity   does   not   depend   upon   the   harm  done  but  on  the  imminent  danger   of  such  injury.   Lack   of   sufficient   provocation.   Provocation   is   sufficient   when   proportionate   to   the   aggression.   In   this   case,   there   was   no   sufficient   provocation   on   the   part   of   the   accused   (Cunigunda)  to  warrant  the  attack  of  her   husband.   All   that   she   did   to   provoke   an   imaginary  commission  of  a  wrong  in  the   mind   of   her   husband   was   to   be   out   caroling  at  night.  

  People  v.  Alconga,  78  Phil.  366  (1947)   Facts:   The   deceased   was   the   banker   in   a   game   of   black   jack.   The   accused   posted   himself   behind   the   deceased  acting  as  a  spotter  of  the  latter’s  cards  and   communicating   by   signs   to   his   partner.   Upon   discovering   the   trick,   the   deceased   the   accused   almost   came   to   blows.   Subsequently,   while   the   accused   was   seated   on   a   bench   the   deceased   came   and   forthwith   gave   a   blow   with   a   “pingahan,”    but   the   accused   avoided   the   blow   by   crawling   under   the   bench.   The   deceased   continued   with   second   and   third   blows,   and   the   accused   in   a   crawling  position  fired  with  his  revolver.  A  hand  to   hand  fight  ensued,  the  deceased  with  his  dagger  and   the  accused  using  his  bolo.  Having  sustained  several   wounds,   the   deceased   ran   away,   but   was   followed   by  the  accused  and  another  fight  took  place,  during   which  a  mortal  blow  was  delivered  by  the  accused,   slashing  the  cranium  of  the  deceased.       Issue:   WON   Alconga   was   justified   in   killing   the   deceased.    

Rañeses  88       Held:   No.   There   were   two   stages   in   the   fight   between   the   accused   and   the   deceased.   During   the   first   stage   of   the   fight,   the   accused,   in   inflicting   several   wounds   upon   the   deceased,   acted   in   self-­‐ defense,   because   then   the   deceased,   who   had   attacked   the   accused   with   repeated   blows,   was   the   unlawful   aggressor.   But   when   the   deceased   after   receiving   several   wounds,   ran   away,   from   that   moment  there  was  no  longer  any  danger  to  the  life   of  the  accused  who,  being  virtually  unscathed,  could   have   chosen   to   remain   where   he   was   and   when   he   pursued   the   deceased,   fatally   wounding   him   upon   overtaking   him,   Alconga   was   no   longer   acting   in   self-­‐defense,   because   the   aggression   begun   by   the   deceased  ceased  from  the  moment  he  took  flight.       United  States  v.  Mack,  8  Phil.  701  (1907)     Facts:  The  accused  was  sitting  on  a  bench  a  few  feet   back   from   the   street,   in   the   town   of   Tacloban,   in   the   Province  of  Leyte,  in  an  open  space  some  3  or  4  feet,   width,   between   the   tienda   or   content   of   a   woman   named   Olimpia   and   another   building.   The   deceased,   with   another   policemen,   approached   the   place   directed   Olimpia   to   close   her   tienda,   and,   later,   ordered   the   accused   and   another   soldier   who   was   standing  nearby  to  go  to  their  quarters.  The  accused   did  not  obey  this  order,  and  it  is  probable  that  some   words   passed   between   the   soldiers,   the   policemen,   and   the   woman   which   angered   the   deceased,   though   the   weight   of   the   evidence   clearly   maintain   the   contention   of   the   accused   that   he   did   and   said   nothing   to   provoke   or   offend   the   deceased,   except   in  so  far  as  his  failure  to  obey  the  order  to  go  to  his   quarters   may   have   had   that   effect.   The   deceased,   who   was   standing   some   10   or   12   feet   from   the   accused,   cursing   and   abusing   him   for   his   failure   to   obey   the   order,   wrought   himself   into   a   passion   dragged  himself  free  from  his  companion,  who  was   endeavoring  to  restrain  him  and  take  him  away,  and   started   toward   the   accused,   at   the   same   time   drawing  his  bolo  and  brandishing  it  in  a  threatening   manner.   Thereupon   the   accused   got   up,   drew   his   revolver,  and  the  deceased  having  then  approached   within   a   distance   of   from   3   to   6   feet,   the   accused   fired   three   shots,   one   of   which   took   effect   in   the   left  

breast   of   the   deceased,   just   above   the   nipple,   and   another  in  the  back  of  his  head.     Issue:  WON  Mack  can  invoke  self-­‐defense.     Held:   Yes.   It   affirmatively   appears   from   the   evidence   of   record   that   there   was   an   unprovoked,   illegal   aggression   on   the   part   of   the   deceased,   as   held   by   the   trial   court,   after   a   careful   analysis   of   the   testimony;   and   further   that   there   was   reasonable   necessity  for  the  use  of  the  means  employed  by  the   accused   to   defend   himself   from   this   unlawful   aggression.       Mere   physical   superiority   in   no   protection   to   an   unarmed  man,  as  against  an  assailant  armed  with  a   large   bolo,   and   if   it   be   true   that   the   deceased   was   under   the   influence   of   liquor   when   he   made   that   attack,   his   intoxication   probably   rendered   him   the   more   dangerous   unless   he   was   so   drunk   as   to   be   physically   helpless,   which   is   not   suggested   in   the   evidence.     A  murderous  attack  with  a  formidable-­‐looking  bolo   is   a   very   different   from   an   assault   with   a   small   chisel   or   a   piece   of   bamboo,   and   the   fact   that   this   court   has   held   that   the   taking   of   life   was   not   reasonably   necessary   in   defending   oneself   against   assault   in   the   latter   cases   does   not   sustain   a   ruling   that   taking   the   life   of   one's   assailant   in   the   former   case   may   not   become   reasonably   necessary   in   the   defense   of   one's   person,   as   we   think   it   was   in   the   case  at  bar.     People  v.  Sumicad,  56  Phil.  643  (1932)     On   February   23,   1931,   the   accused,   a   resident   of   Buenavoluntad,   in   the   municipality   of   Plaridel,   Occidental  Misamis,  was  engaged  with  others  in  the   gratuitous   labor   of   hauling   logs   for   the   construction   of  a  chapel  in  the  barrio  above-­‐mentioned.  At  about   5.30  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  on  the  day  mentioned,   when   the   laborers   were   resting   from   the   work   of   the   day,   one   Segundo   Cubol   happened   to   pass   the   place   where   the   accused   was   sitting.   Prior   to   this   date   the   accused   had   rendered   five   and   one-­‐half   days   service   to   Cubol,   and   as   the   latter   passed,   the   accused   said   to   him,   "Segundo,   pay   me   for   the   five  

Rañeses  89     and   one-­‐half   days   work   for   which   you   owe   me."   Cubol   replied,   "What   debt!,"   an   exclamation   which   was   followed   by   an   insulting   expression.   At   the   same   time   he   struck   the   accused   with   his   fist.   The   accused   arose   from   the   log   upon   which   he   was   sitting   and   moved   backward,   trying   to   escape,   but   Cubol   pursued   him   and   continued   striking   him   with   his   fists.   As   the   accused   receded   he   found   himself   cornered   by   a   pile   of   logs,   the   wings   of   which   extended   out   on   either   side,   effectually   preventing   any  further  retreat.  As  Cubol  pressed  upon  him,  the   accused   drew   his   bolo   and   delivered   a   blow   on   Cubol's   right   shoulder.   Upon   this   Cubol   lunged   at   the   accused   with   the   evident   intention   of   wresting   the   bolo   from   the   accused.   To   prevent   this,   the   accused   struck   two   other   blows   with   the   bolo,   inflicting   two   deep   cuts   on   Cubol's   forehead   above   the   left   eye.   One   of   these   blows   broke   through   the   cranium.   The   other   made   a   cut   extending   from   the   left  eyebrow  to  the  nose  and  upper  lip.  Upon  finding   a  seat  on  a  log  nearby.  A  witness,  named  Francisco   Villegas,   who   came   up   in   a   moment,   after   learning   something   about   the   matter,   asked   Cubol   whether   he   had   struck   the   accused   blows   with   his   fist.   Cubols   replied   that   he   had.   The   witness   Villegas   then   turned   to   the   accused,   who   was   standing   a   short  distance  away,  and  told  him  to  put  up  his  bolo   and  go  to  the  poblacion.  Acting  upon  this  suggestion   the   accused   immediately   repaired   to   the   office   of   the  justice  of  the  peace  and  surrendered  himself  to   the  authorities.  Cubol  lived  only  an  hour  or  so,  and   died  from  the  effect  of  the  wounds  received.  In  one   of   the   pockets   of   the   deceased   a   knife   was   found,   and   the   accused   testified   that,   when   he   struck   the   deceased   with   his   bolo,   the   latter   was   attempting   to   draw  a  knife  from  his  pocket.     Issue:  WON  accused  can  invoke  self-­‐defense.       Held:  Yes.    The  person  assaulted  must,  in  such  case,   either  resist  with  the  arms  that  nature  gave  him  or   with  other  means  of  defense  at  his  disposal,  short  of   taking  life.  But  that  rule  contemplates  the  situation   where   the   contestants   are   in   the   open   and   the   person  assaulted  can  exercise  the  option  of  running   away.  It  can  have  no  binding  force  in  the  case  where   the   person   assaulted   has   retreated   to   the   wall,   as  

the   saying   is,   and   uses   in   a   defensive   way   the   only   weapon   at   his   disposal.   One   is   not   required,   when   hard   pressed,   to   draw   fine   distinctions   as   to   the   extent  of  the  injury  which  a  reckless  and  infuriated   assailant   might   probably   inflict   upon   him   (Browell   vs.  People,  38  Mich.,  732).  And  it  was  not  incumbent   on  the  accused  in  this  case,  when  assailed  by  a  bully   of   known   violent   disposition,   who   was   larger   and   stronger   than   himself.   On   the   contrary,   under   the   circumstances   stated,   he   had   the   right   to   resist   the   aggression   with   the   bolo,   and   if   he   unfortunately   inflicted  a  fatal  blow,  it  must  be  considered  to  have   been   given   in   justifiable   self-­‐defense.   Upon   this   point   it   may   be   recalled   that   the   deceased,   when   asked   about   the   circumstances   of   the   homicide,   admitted  that  he  himself  was  the  aggressor;  and  it  is   noteworthy   that   he   used   no   word   placing   blame   upon  the  accused.     Reyes:   1. The   defense   of   rights   requires   also   the   first   and   second   requisites   (unlawful   aggression,   reasonable   necessity   of   the   means   employed   to   prevent   or   repel   it)   present   in   the   three   classes   of   defense   mentioned  in  Arts.  1,  2  and  3  of  Art.  11.     1. Attempt   to   rape   a   woman   –   defense   of  right  to  chastity   2. Defense  of  property  –  can  be  invoked   only   when   it   is   coupled   with   an   attack   on   the   person   of   one   entrusted  with  said  property.   3. Defense  of  home    

  Defense  of  honor   People  v.  Luague,  62  Phil.  504  (1935)     Facts:   In   the   morning   of   February   18,   1935,   while   the   accused   Natividad   Luague   was   in   her   house   situated  in  Lupuhan,  barrio  of  Agpañgi,  municipality   of  Calatrava,  Occidental  Negros,  with  only  her  three   children   of   tender   age   for   company,   her   husband   and  co-­‐accused  Wenceslao  Alcansare  having  gone  to   grind   corn   in   Juan   Garing's   house   several   kilometers  away,  Paulino  Disuasido  came  and  began   to   make   love   to   her;   that   as   Natividad   could   not   dissuade   him   from   his   purpose,   she   started   for   the   kitchen   where   Paulino   followed   her,  

Rañeses  90     notwithstanding   her   instance   that   she   could   by   no   means   accede   to   his   wishes,   for   Paulino,   bent   on   satisfying  them  at  all  costs,  drew  and  opened  a  knife   and,   threatening   her   with   death,   began   to   embrace   her  and  to  touch  her  breasts;  that  in  preparing  to  lie   with  her,  Paulino  had  to  leave  the  knife  on  the  floor   and   the   accused,   taking   advantage   of   the   situation,   picked   up   the   weapon   and   stabbed   him   in   the   abdomen;   and   that   Paulino,   feeling   himself   wounded,   ran   away   jumping   through   the   window   and   falling   on   some   stones,   while   the   accused   set   forth   immediately   for   the   poblacion   to   surrender   herself  to  the  authorities  and  report  the  incident.     The   theory   the   prosecution,   which   we   consider   a   trifle   unsubstantial   is   as   follows:   The   accused   Wenceslao   Alcansare,   thinking   that   Paulino   importuned  his  wife  with  unchaste  advances,  out  of   jealousy,   decided   to   get   rid   of   him.   His   chance   to   bring  about  his  plan  can  when,  in  the  morning  of  the   crime,   Paulino   happened   to   pass   in   front   of   the   house   of   the   spouses   with   his   friend   Olimpio   Libosada.  The  accused  wife  invited  Paulino  to  drop   in,  which  the  letter  and  his  friend  did.  The  spouses   met  them  at  the  threshold.  The  accused  wife  asked   Paulino   whether   he   had   a   knife   and   as   the   latter   answered   in   the   affirmative,   she   asked   him   to   lend   it   to   lend   it   to   her   because   she   wanted   to   cut   her   nails,   to   which   Paulino   willingly   acceded,   while   the   accused   wife   was   cutting   her   nails,   she   asked   Paulino   where   he   came   from   and   the   latter   answered,   turning   his   head   around,   that   he   came   from   the   house   of   one   Inting,   whereupon   the   accused   wife   slashed   him   in   the   abdomen.   Paulino   tried   to   return   the   blow   but   the   accused   husband   picked   up   a   stone   and   struck   him   in   the   forehead.   Wounded   in   the   abdomen   and   in   the   forehead,   Paulino  fled  therefrom.     Issue:   WON   the   accused   can   invoke   defense   of   honor/self-­‐defense     Held:   Yes.   Natividad   Luague's   act   in   mortally   wounding   Paulino   Disuasido,   unaided   her   husband   and   co-­‐accused   Wenceslao   Alcansare,   and   in   the   circumstances   above   set   out,   constitutes   the   exempting   circumstance   defined   in   article   11,  

subsection   1,   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   because,   as   stated   by   a   commentator   of   note,   "aside   from   the   right  to  life  on  which  rest  the  legitimate  defense  of   our   person,   we   have   the   right   to   party   acquired   by   us,   and   the   right   to   honor   which   is   not   the   least   prized  of  man's  patrimony."  (1  Viada,  172,  173,  5th   edition.)   "Will   the   attempt   to   rape   a   woman   constitute   an   aggression   sufficient   to   put   her   in   a   state   of   legitimate   defense?"   asks   the   same   commentator.  "We  think  so,"  he  answer,  "inasmuch   as   a   woman's   honor   cannot   but   be   esteemed   as   a   right   as   precious,   if   not   more,   cannot   her   very   existence;   this   offense,   unlike   ordinary   slander   by   word   or   deed   susceptible   of   judicial   redress,   in   an   outrage   which   impresses   an   indelible   blot   on   the   victim,  for,  as  the  Roman  Law  says:  quum  virginitas,   vel   castitas,   corupta   restitui   non   protest   (because   virginity   or   chastity,   once   defiled,   cannot   be   restored).   It   is   evident   that   a   woman   who,   imperiled,   wounds,   nay   kills   the   offender,   should   be   afforded   exemption   from   criminal   liability   provided   by   this   article   and   subsection   since   such   killing   cannot   be   considered   a   crime   from   the   moment   it   became   the   only   means   left   for   her   to   protect   her   honor  from  so  great  an  outrage."  (1  Viada,  301,  5th   edition.)     People  v.  De  la  Cruz,  61  Phil.  344  (1935)   Facts:   The   accused,   a   woman,   was   walking   home   with   a   party   including   the   deceased,   Francisco   Rivera.  It  was  already  dark  and  they  were  passing  a   narrow   path.   When   the   other   people   were   far   ahead,  the  deceased  who  was  following  the  accused   suddenly   threw   his   arms   around   her   from   behind,   caught  hold  of  her  breasts,  kissed  her,  and  touched   her   private   parts.   He   started   to   throw   her   down.   When   the   accused   felt   she   could   not   do   anything   more  against  the  strength  of  her  aggressor,  she  got   a  knife  from  her  pocket  and  stabbed  him.       Issue:  WON  accused  can  invoke  defense  of  honor     Held:   Yes.   She   was   justified   in   making   use   of   the   knife  in  repelling  what  she  believed  to  be  an  attack   upon   her   honor   since   she   had   no   other   means   of   defending  herself.      

Rañeses  91     People  v.  Jaurigue,  76  Phil.  174  (1946)   Facts:   The   deceased   was   courting   the   accused   in   vain.   One   day,   the   deceased   approached   her,   spoke   to   her   of   his   love   which   she   flatly   refused,   and   he   thereupon   suddenly   embraced   her   and   kissed   her   on  account  of  which  the  accused  gave  him  fist  blows   and  kicked  him.  Thereafter,  she  armed  herself  with   a  fan  knife,  whenever  she  went  out.  One  week  after   the   incident,   the   deceased   entered   a   chapel,   went   to   sit   by   the   side   of   the   accused,   and   placed   his   hand   on   the   upper   part   of   her   thigh.   Accused   pulled   out   her  fan  knife  and  with  it  stabbed  the  deceased  at  the   base   of   the   left   side   of   the   beck,   inflicting   a   mortal   wound.       Issue:  WON  accused  can  invoke  defense  of  honor     Held:   No.   The   means   employed   by   the   accused   in   the   defense   of   her   honor   was   evidently   excessive.   The   chapel   was   lighted   with   electric   lights,   and   there   were   already   several   people,   including   her   father   and   the   barrio   lieutenant,   inside   the   chapel.   Under  the  circumstances,  there  was  and  there  could   be  no  possibility  of  her  being  raped.      

Defense  of  property   People  v.  Apolinar,  38  OG  2870   Facts:   The   accused,   armed   with   a   shotgun,   was   looking   over   his   land.   He   noticed   a   man   carrying   a   bundle  on  his  shoulder.  Believing  that  the  man  had   stolen   his   palay,   the   accused   fired   in   the   air   and   then  at  him,  causing  his  death.       Issue:  WON  accused  can  invoke  defense  of  property     Held:   No.   Defense   of   property   is   not   of   such   importance  as  right  to  life,  and  defense  of  property   can   be   invoked   as   a   justifying   circumstance   only   when   it   is   coupled   with   an   attack   on   the   person   of   one  entrusted  with  said  property.       United  States  v.  Bumanglag,  14  Phil.  644  (1909)   Facts:   On   the   night   of   January   2,   1909,   Rafael   Bumanglag   noticed   that   40   bundles   of   palay   which   were   kept   in   his   granary   were   missing.   He   searched   for   the   missing   palay   the   following   morning   and   found  them  in  an  enclosed  field  which  was  planted  

with   sugar   cane,   at   a   distance   of   about   100   meters   from   his   granary.   For   the   purpose   of   ascertaining   who   had   done   it,   he   left   the   palay   there,   and   that   night,   accompanied   by   Gregorio   Bundoc,   Antonio   Ribao,  and  Saturnino  Tumamao,  he  waited  near  the   said  field  for  the  person  who  might  return  to  get  the   palay.   Guillermo   Ribis   appeared   and   attempted   to   carry   the   palay   away   him,   but   at   that   instant   Bumanglag,   Bundoc,   and   Ribao   assaulted   the   presumed  thief  with  sticks  and  cutting  and  stabbing   weapons;   as   a   result   of   the   struggle   which   ensued,   Ribis  fell  down  and  died  instantly.     Issue:  WON  there  is  defense  of  property.     Held:   No.   Defense   of   property   can   be   invoked   as   a   justifying  circumstance  only  when  it  is  coupled  with   an   attack   on   the   person   of   one   entrusted   with   said   property.  (People  v.  Apolinar)     The   bolo   worn   by   the   deceased   was   in   its   sheath   and  hanging  from  his  waist.  It  can  not  be  concluded   that   the   deceased   even   intended   to   assault   his   murderers   with   his   bolo   either   before   he   was   attacked   by   them   or   during   the   fight.   Without   unlawful  aggression  and  the  other  requisites  which   would   exempt   the   accused   from   criminal   responsibility,   the   appellant   and   his   two   companions  assaulted  Ribis  with  sticks  and  cutting   and   stabbing   arms,   inflicting   upon   him   serious   and   mortal   wounds,   and   therefore,   the   said   accused   is   guilty   of   the   crime   of   homicide   as   co-­‐principal   by   direct   participation,   fully   convicted,   together   with   his   codefendants   who   are   already   serving   their   sentence.     People  v.  Narvaez,  supra   Facts:   Mamerto   Narvaez   has   been   convicted   of   murder   (qualified   by   treachery)   of   David   Fleischer   and   Flaviano   Rubia.   On   August   22,   1968,   Narvaez   shot   Fleischer   and   Rubia   during   the   time   the   two   were   constructing   a   fence   that   would   prevent   Narvaez   from   getting   into   his   house   and   rice   mill.   The   defendant   was   taking   a   nap   when   he   heard   sounds  of  construction  and  found  fence  being  made.   He   addressed   the   group   and   asked   them   to   stop   destroying   his   house   and   asking   if   they   could   talk  

Rañeses  92     things  over.  Fleischer  responded  with  "No,  gadamit,   proceed,   go   ahead."   Defendant   lost   his   "equilibrium,"   and   shot   Fleisher   with   his   shotgun.   He   also   shot   Rubia   who   was   running   towards   the   jeep  where  the  deceased's  gun  was  placed.  Prior  to   the   shooting,   Fleischer   and   Co.   (the   company   of   Fleischer's   family)   was   involved   in   a   legal   battle   with   the   defendant   and   other   land   settlers   of   Cotabato   over   certain   pieces   of   property.   At   the   time  of  the  shooting,  the  civil  case  was  still  pending   for  annulment  (settlers  wanted  granting  of  property   to   Fleisher   and   Co.   to   be   annulled).   At   time   of   the   shooting,   defendant   had   leased   his   property   from   Fleisher   (though   case   pending   and   ownership   uncertain)   to   avoid   trouble.   On   June   25,   defendant   received   letter   terminating   contract   because   he   allegedly  didn't  pay  rent.  He  was  given  6  months  to   remove   his   house   from   the   land.   Shooting   was   barely   2   months   after   letter.   Defendant   claims   he   killed   in   defense   of   his   person   and   property.   CFI   ruled   that   Narvaez   was   guilty.   Aggravating   circumstances   of   evident   premeditation   offset   by   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   voluntary   surrender.   For   both   murders,   CFI   sentenced   him   to   reclusion   perpetua,   to   indemnify   the   heirs,   and   to   pay   for   moral  damages.     Issues:   1. WON   CFI   erred   in   convicting   defendant-­‐ appellant   despite   the   fact   that   he   acted   in   defense  of  his  person.   2. WON   the   court   erred   in   convicting   defendant-­‐appellant   although   he   acted   in   defense  of  his  rights.   3. WON   he   should   be   liable   for   subsidiary   imprisonment   since   he   is   unable   to   pay   the   civil  indemnity  due  to  the  offended  party.     Held:   1. No.   The   courts   concurred   that   the   fencing   and  chiseling  of  the  walls  of  the  house  of  the   defendant   was   indeed   a   form   of   aggression   on   the   part   of   the   victim.   However,   this   aggression   was   not   done   on   the   person   of   the   victim   but   rather   on   his   rights   to   property.   On   the   first   issue,   the   courts   did   not   err.   However,   in   consideration   of   the  

violation   of   property   rights,   the   courts   referred   to   Art.   30   of   the   civil   code   recognizing  the  right  of  owners  to  close  and   fence   their   land.   Although   is   not   in   dispute,   the   victim   was   not   in   the   position   to   subscribe   to   the   article   because   his   ownership   of   the   land   being   awarded   by   the   government   was   still   pending,   therefore   putting   ownership   into   question.   It’s   accepted   that   victim   was   the   original   aggressor.   2. Yes.   However,   the   argument   of   the   justifying   circumstance  of  self-­‐defense  is  applicable  only  if   the   3   requirements   are   fulfilled.   Art.   11(1)   RPC   enumerates  these  requisites:   1. Unlawful  aggression.  In  the  case  at  bar,   there   was   unlawful   aggression   towards   appellant's   property   rights.   Fleisher   had   given   Narvaez   6   months   and   he   should   have   left   him   in   peace   before  time  was  up,  instead  of  chiseling   Narvaez's   house   and   putting   up   fence.   A536   of   the   CC   also   provides   that   possession  may  not  be  acquired  through   force   or   intimidation;   while   Art.   539   provides   that   every   possessor   has   the   right  to  be  respected  in  his  possession   2. Reasonable   necessity   of   means   employed   to  prevent  or  repel  attack.  In  case,  killing   was  disproportionate  to  attack.   3. Lack   of   sufficient   provocation   on   part   of   person   defending   himself.   Here,   there   was   no   provocation   at   all   since   he   was   asleep   Since   not   all   requisites   present,   defendant   is   credited   w/   the   special   mitigating   circumstance   of   incomplete   defense,   pursuant   to   A13(6)   RPC.   These   mitigating   circumstances   are:   voluntary   surrender   &   passion   &   obfuscation   (read   p.   405   explanation)     Crime   is   homicide   (2   counts)   not   murder   because   treachery   is   not   applicable   on   account   of   provocation   by   the   deceased.   Also,   assault   wasn’t   deliberately   chosen   with   view   to   kill   since   slayer   acted  

Rañeses  93     instantaneously.   There   was   also   no   direct   evidence  of  planning  or  preparation  to  kill.     Art.  249  RPC:  Penalty  for  homicide  is   reclusion  temporal.  However,  due  to   mitigating   circumstances   and   incomplete   defense,   it   can   be   lowered   3   degrees   (Art.   64)   to   arresto  mayor.   3. No.   He   isn’t   liable   for   subsidiary   imprisonment   for   non-­‐payment   of   civil   indemnity.  RA  5465  made  the  provisions  of   A39   applicable   to   fines   only   &   not   to   reparation   of   damage   caused,   indemnification  of  consequential  damages  &   costs   of   proceedings.   Although   it   was   enacted   only   after   its   commission,   considering   that   RA   5465   is   favorable   to   the   accused  who  is  not  a  habitual  delinquent,  it   may   be   given   retroactive   effect   pursuant   to   RPC  Art.  22.    

Defense  of  relative   Reyes:   1. Relatives  that  can  be  defended.   1. Spouse   2. Ascendants   3. Descendants   4. Legitimate,   natural   or   adopted   brothers   and   sisters,   or   relatives   by   affinity  in  the  same  degrees   5. Relatives   by   consanguinity   within   the  fourth  civil  degree   § Relatives  by  affinity,  because   of   marriage,   are   parents-­‐in-­‐ law,   son   or   daughter-­‐in-­‐law,   and  brother  or  sister-­‐in-­‐law.     2. Basis:   Founded   not   only   upon   a   humanitarian   sentiment,   but   also   upon   the   impulse  of  blood  which  impels  men  to  rush,   on   the   occasion   of   great   perils,   to   the   rescue   of   those   close   to   them   by   ties   of   blood.   (Albert)     3. Requisites  of  defense  of  relatives:   1. Unlawful  aggression;   2. Reasonable   necessity   of   the   means   employed  to  prevent  or  repel  it;  and  

3. In  case  the  provocation  was  given  by   the   person   attacked,   the   making   a   defense  had  no  part  therein.     § The   phrase   “in   case”   means   “in  the  event  that.”     § Reason:   Although   the   provocation   prejudices   the   person   who   gave   it,   its   effects   o   not   reach   the   defender   who   took   no   part   therein,   because   the   latter   was   prompted   by   some   noble  or  generous  sentiment   in   protecting   and   saving   a   relative.       United  States  v.  Esmedia,  17  Phil.  260  (1910)   Facts:   Ciriaco   Abando,   his   wife,   and   their   son,   Santiago,  lived  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  municipality   of  Sibalom,  in  the  barrio  of  Bongboñgan,  Province  of   Antique.   Gregorio   Esmedia,   father   of   these   two   accused,  son-­‐in-­‐law  of  Ciriaco  Abando  and  brother-­‐ in-­‐law  of  Santiago  Abando,  lived  in  the  same  barrio.   These   tow   families   lived   very   near   to   each   other   and  owned  adjoining  rice  lands.  Before  this  trouble   occurred   there   had   been   a   dispute   between   these   two   families   relative   to   the   ownership   of   the   rice   land   then   occupied   by   Ciriaco   Abando.   About   2   o'clock   on   the   afternoon   of   the   24th   of   June,   1909,   Ciriaco  Abando  instructed  his  son,  Santiago,  to  go  to   a  certain  place  in  his  rice  field  to  let  out  the  water  in   order   that   they   could   plant   rice   the   said   field.   In   compliance   with   these   instructions   of   his   father,   Santiago   proceeded   to   the   place   designated,   and   while   at   work   doing   what   he   had   been   ordered   by   his  father  to  do,  Gregorio  Esmedia  appeared  on  the   scene   and   started   a   quarrel   with   Santiago.   Soon   thereafter   Gregorio   drew   a   dagger   and   stabbed   Santiago  in  the  back.  Santiago  fell  to  the  ground,  but   arose   immediately   and   attacked   Gregorio   with   his   bolo,  inflicting  several  wounds  on  the  said  Gregorio   in   consequence   of   which   he   fell   to   the   ground.   Before   this   trouble   finally   terminated   the   two   accused   and   Ciriaco   Abando   appeared   in   that   immediate  vicinity.    

Rañeses  94     These  two  accused  contend  that  they  were  working   in   their   rice   field   nearby,   and   on   seeing   Ciriaco   Abando  and  Santiago  Abando  attacking  their  father,   Gregorio,   they   started   to   the   place   to   render   their   father  assistance,  Ponciano  starting  first;  that  when   Ponciano   got   near   the   place   of   the   trouble   he   was   met  by  Ciriaco  and  Santiago  who  attacked  him  with   bolos   and   clubs   and   that   he,   Ponciano,   in   self-­‐ defense,   knocked   them   both   down,   and   after   they   had   fallen   the   other   accused,   Mena   Esmedia,   arrived.   Ponciano   further   contends   that   he   did   not   use  a  bolo  in  this  fight,  but  used  a  club  only.     Issue:  WON  the  two  accused  can  invoke  defense  of   relative     Held:   YES   to   Santiago,   but   NO   to   Ciriaco.     Under   the   provisions   of   No.   5,   article   8   of   the   Penal   Code,   the   two   accused   are   exempt   from   criminal   responsibility   for   having   caused   the   death   of   Santiago   Abando,   inasmuch   as   it   has   been   shown   that   they   inflicted   these   wounds   upon   him   in   defense  of  their  father  who  was  fatally  wounded  at   the   time.   They   honestly   believed,   and   had   good   grounds   upon   which   to   found   their   belief,   that   Santiago   would   continue   his   attack   upon   their   father.   They   are,   however,   guilty   of   having   caused   the   death   of   the   old   man,   Ciriaco   Abando.   When   they   attacked   and   killed   him   the   other   trouble   had   terminated   and   they   were   not   in   danger   of   bodily   harm  from  him.    

Defense  of  stranger     Reyes:     1. Requisites:     1. Unlawful  aggression;   2. Reasonable   necessity   of   the   means   employed  to  prevent  or  repel  it;  and   3. The   person   defending   be   not   induced   by   revenge,   resentment,   or   other  evil  motive.     § Defense  must  be  actuated  by   a   disinterested   or   generous   motive,   whe   it   puts   down   “revenge,  resentment,  or  evil   motive”   as   illegitimate.   (Albert)    

2. Basis:   What   one   may   do   in   his   defense,   another  may  do  for  him.   3. Any   person   not   included   in   the   enumeration   of   relatives   mentioned   in   par.  2  is  considered  a  stranger.      

Avoidance  of  a  greater  evil  or  injury   Reyes:     1. Although,   as   a   rule   there   is   no   civil   liability   in   justifying   circumstances,   it   is   only   in   Par.   4,   of   Art.   11   where   there   is   civil   liability,   but   the   civil   liability   is   borne  by  the  persons  benefited.     2. Requisites:   1. That   the   evil   sought   to   be   avoided   actually  exists;   2. That   the   injury   feared   be   greater   than  that  done  to  avoid  it;     § If   evil   sought   is   merely   expected   or   anticipated   or   may   happen   in   the   future,   Par.   4   of   Art.   11   is   not   applicable   3. That  there  be  no  other  practical  and   less  harmful  means  of  preventing  it   3. The   greater   evil   should   not   be   brought   about   by   the   negligence   or   imprudence   of   the  actor     People  v.  Norma  Hernandez,  55  OG  8465   Facts:   Maria   Norma   Hernandez   and   her   parents   were   charged   with   serious   slander   by   deed   by   Vivencio   Lascano.   Vivencio   had   courted   Maria   and   after   months   of   courtship,   Maria   finally   accepted   Vivencio.   Vivencio   brought   his   parents   to   Maria’s   home  so  they  could  talk  about  marriage;  when  they   came   with   his   12   aunts,   they   brought   30   chickens   and   3   goats   and   asked   for   Maria’s   hand   in   marriage.   The  parents  of  both  parties  agreed  to  the  marriage.   The   date   was   set,   Vivencio’s   parents   agreed   to   buy   the  wedding  dress  among  other  clothes,  to  advance   P20   for   fetching   the   sponsors   of   the   wedding   and   to   repair  the  roof  of  the  house  of  one  of  Maria’s  uncles.     A   marriage   license   was   already   secured   and   a   wedding   gown   sewn   and   bought.   Vivencio   and   his   parent’s   made   preparations   for   a   wedding   feast   by   cleaning   their   house   and   yard,   setting   up   a  

Rañeses  95     temporary   shed   and   stove   and   slaughtering   goats,   pigs,   chickens.   On   March   18,   The   guests   came   but   Maria   was   nowhere   to   be   found;   Vivencio   and   his   parents   waited   for   her   up   to   12   midnight   but   she   never  came  which  resulted  to  their  great  shame  and   humiliation.   The   CFI   acquitted   her   parents,   but   Maria  was  found  guilty  and  sentenced  her  a  fine  and   imprisonment.   Maria   claims   that   she   did   not   love   Vivencio   and   that   her   parents   had   forced   her   to   agree   to   the   marriage.   On   March   11,   without   her   parent’s   knowledge,   she   left   for   Mindoro   to   avoid   the  marriage.     Issue:   WON   Maria   acts   constituted   serious   slander   by  deed     Held:   No.   Maria’s   act   in   going   to   Mindoro   with   the   deliberate  purpose  of  preventing  the  celebration  of   the  marriage  with  Vivencio  because  she  did  not  love   him,   does   not   constitute   the   crime   of   slander   by   deed.   Malice,   which   is   an   essential   requisite   of   slander,   was   absent   because   in   changing   her   mind,   she  was  merely  exercising  her  right  not  to  give  her   consent   to   a   marriage   after   mature   deliberation.   She  had  the  right  to  avoid  to  herself  the  evil  of  going   through   a   loveless   marriage   pursuant   to   Art.   11,   par.   4   of   the   RPC.   If   a   party   to   an   agreement   to   marry   who   backs   out   should   be   held   liable   for   the   crime   of   slander   by   deed,   then   that   would   be   an   inherent   way   of   compelling   said   party   to   go   into   a   marriage  without  his  or  her  free  consent.     Ty  v.  People,  439  SCRA  220  (2004)   Facts:  Ty’s  mother  was  confined  in  Manila  Doctor's   Hospital   to   which   a   medical   bill   amounting   to   600,000   pesos   was   made   to   be   paid   to   TY,   after   signing   a   contract   of   responsibility   with   the   hospital.   Ty,   issued   7   checks   to   cover   the   said   expenses,   all   of   which   were   dishonored   for   being   drawn   against   a   closed   a   account.   Manila   Doctors   Hospital  then  instituted  criminal  actions  against  Ty   for  violation  of  BP22.     In   her   defense   she   alleged   that   she   issued   the   checks   involuntarily   because   her   mother   threatened   to   commit   suicide   due   to   the   inhumane   treatment   she   allegedly   suffered   while   confined   in  

the   hospital.   She   further   claimed   that   no   consideration   was   obtained   by   her   because   all   the   checks  were  made  as  payment  to  the  medical  bills.     Issue:   WON   avoidance   of   a   greater   evil   can   be   invoked  in  the  case  at  bar     Held:   No.   In   the   instant   case,   the   evil   sought   to   be   avoided   is   merely   expected   or   anticipated.     If   the   evil   sought   to   be   avoided   is   merely   expected   or   anticipated   or   may   happen   in   the   future,   this   defense   is   not   applicable.   Ty   could   have   taken   advantage   of   an   available   option   to   avoid   committing  a  crime.    By  her  own  admission,  she  had   the   choice   to   give   jewelry   or   other   forms   of   security   instead   of   postdated   checks   to   secure   her   obligation.     Moreover,   for   the   defense   of   state   of   necessity   to   be   availing,   the   greater   injury   feared   should   not   have   been   brought   about   by   the   negligence   or   imprudence,   more   so,   the   willful   inaction   of   the   actor.   In   this   case,   the   issuance   of   the   bounced   checks   was   brought   about   by   Ty’s   own   failure   to   pay  her  mother’s  hospital  bills.     The   Court   thinks   it   rather   odd   that   Ty   has   chosen   the   exempting   circumstance   of   uncontrollable   fear   and  the  justifying  circumstance  of  state  of  necessity   to   absolve   her   of   liability.     It   would   not   have   been   half   as   bizarre   had   Ty   been   able   to   prove   that   the   issuance   of   the   bounced   checks   was   done   without   her  full  volition.    Under  the  circumstances,  however,   it  is  quite  clear  that  neither  uncontrollable  fear  nor   avoidance   of   a   greater   evil   or   injury   prompted   the   issuance  of  the  bounced  checks.    

Fulfillment  of  duty   Reyes:   1. Requisites:   1. That   the   accused   acted   in   the   performance   of   a   duty   or   in   the   lawful  exercise  of  a  right  or  office;   2. That  the  injury  caused  or  the  offense   committed   be   the   necessary   consequence   of   the   due  

Rañeses  96     performance   of   duty   or   the   lawful   exercise  of  such  right  or  office.       People  v.  Delima,  46  Phil.  738  (1922)   Facts:   Lorenzo   Napoleon   escaped   from   jail.   Poiiceman  Felipe  Delima  found  him  in  the  house  of   Jorge   Alegria,   armed   with   a   pointed   piece   of   bamboo  in  the  shape  of  a  lance.  Delima  ordered  his   surrender   but   Napoleon   answered   with   a   stroke   of   his   lance.   The   policeman   dodged   it,   fired   his   revolver  but  didn't  hit  Napoleon.  The  criminal  tried   to   ran   away,   not   throwing   his   weapon;   the   policeman   shot   him   dead.   Delima   was   tried   and   convicted  for  homicide;  he  appealed.     Issue:  WON  the  accused  acted  in  fulfillment  of  duty     Held:   The   SC   ruled   that   Delima   must   be   acquitted.   The   court   held   that   the   killing   was   done   in   performance   of   a   duty.   Napoleon   was   under   the   obligation  to  surrender  and  his  disobedience  with  a   weapon   compelled   Delima   to   kill   him.   The   action   was  justified  by  the  circumstances.     People  vs.  Belbes,  334  SCRA  220  (2004)   Facts:   Accused   together   with   Pat.   Jose   Pabon   were   assigned  to  maintain  peace  and  order  at  the  prom  of   Pili   Brgy.   High   School.   At   9:00   pm,   two   students   approached   them   and   their   teacher   saying   someone   was   making   trouble.   Accused   and   Pat.   Pabon   who   were   armed   with   an   armalite   and   .38   caliber   respectively,   responded   forthwith.   Meanwhile,   Fernando  Bataller  and  two  of  his  company.  Bataller   was  drunk  and  was  vomiting  and  holding  on  to  the   bamboo   wall   of   the   school‘s   temporary   building   when   the   bamboo‘s   broke.   At   this   instance,   the   accused   and   Pat.   Pabon   appeared   and   without   warning  Accused  fired  his  gun.  Bataller  fell  and  the   two  patrolmen  fled.     Accused’s  version  of  the  facts:   Upon  responding  and  arriving  at  the  scene:  Bataller   was  a  little  tipsy  but  not  vomiting.  They  introduced   themselves   as   policemen   but   Bataller   didn‘t   mind   them.   Bataller   then   stabbed   Pabon   with   a   knife   which   accused   said   he   knew   because   he   saw   the   glint   of   the   blade   and   he   was   only   1   meter   away  

from   Pat.   Pabon.   The   latter   unfortunately   was   not   hit.  After  two  more  thrusts  were  made  towards  him,   Pabon   retreated   but   accused   was   stabbed   in   his   lower  left  shoulder.  The  accused  firearm  was  slung   over  his  shoulder.  As  Bataller  made  another  thrust,   Accused   gave   a   shot,   which   after   doing   so,   Bataller   suddenly   grabbed   the   firearm.   Bataller‘s   two   other   companions   had   also   ganged   up   on   him.   They   struggled   with   each   other   and   the   gun   went   off.   It   was   semi-­‐automatic,   so   one   squeeze   at   the   trigger   would   fire   a   shot.   After   the   armalite   went   off,   Bataller  fell.  He  took  the  knife  and  that  was  the  time   people   started   to   gather.   They   went   to   the   police   station   and   turned   over   the   knife.   Pat.   Pabon‘s   testimony   corroborated   with   the   accused‘   except   the  part  when  accused  fired  a  warning  shot  and  the   deceased‘   companions   ganging   up   on   accused.   Accused  pleaded  not  guilty  invoking  self-­‐defense  in   the  performance  of  his  official  duty     Issue:   Was   the   trial   court   correct   in   holding   accused-­‐appellant  guilty  of  murder?     Held:   No.   It   was   modified   to   HOMICIDE.   To   prove   self-­‐defense,  the  accused  must  show  with  clear  and   convincing  evidence  that  (1)  he  is  not  the  unlawful   aggressor,   (2)   there   was   lack   of   sufficient   provocation   on   his   part,   and   (3)   he   employed   reasonable   means   to   prevent   or   repel   the   aggression.     It  is  incumbent  upon  an  accused  who  has  admitted   to   inflict   fatal   injuries   to   prove   the   justifying   circumstance   claimed   by   him   with   clear,   satisfactory   and   convincing   evidence   in   order   to   avoid  criminal  liability.  Appellant  offers  no  material   evidence   to   sufficiently   support   his   claim   of   self-­‐ defense  on  the  face  of  mortal  danger  while  on  police   duty.  The  knife  used  by  the  deceased  was  not  even   subjected  to  fingerprinting.  The  accused  wound  was   only  examined  after  21  hours  making  self-­‐infliction   a   possibility.   If   it   was   true   that   accused   and   Bataller   grappled   face   to   face,   then   the   victim   should   not   have  been  hit  sideways.     TIME   FACTOR!   It   took   only   about   6   seconds   from   the  time  the  accused  left  his  seat  until  the  gunshots  

Rañeses  97     were   heard.   There   are   two   requisites   to   invoke   self-­‐ defense  in  the  fulfillment  of  a  duty:   1. that   the   offender   acted   in   the   performance   of  a  duty  or  in  the  lawful  exercise  of  a  duty   or  in  the  lawful  exercise  of  a  right   2. that   the   injury   or   offense   committed   be   the   necessary   consequence   of   the   due   performance  of  such  right  or  office     The  first  requisite  is  present  for  it  was  admittedly  a   performance  of  his  duty.  However  the  second  one  is   lacking   for   the   killing   need   not   be   a   necessary   consequence   on   the   performance   of   his   duty.   He   exceeded   his   duty   which   is   only   to   maintain   peace   and   order   when   he   fired   his   armalite   without   warning.   Thus,   it   would   account   only   as   an   INCOMPLETE  JUSTIFYING  CIRCUMSTANCE.     ON   MURDER:   Treachery   must   be   proved   by   clear   and   convincing   evidence   as   conclusively   as   the   killing  itself.  For  it  to  be  a  qualifying  circumstance,  2   conditions  must  concur:   1. the   employment   of   means,   method   or   manner   of   execution   which   would   ensure   the   safety   of   the   malefactor   from   defensive   or  retaliatory  acts  on  the  part  of  the  victim,   no   opportunity   being   given   the   latter   to   defend  himself  or  to  retaliate   2. the   means,   method   or   manner   of   execution   were  deliberately  or  consciously  adopted  by   the  offender   3. None  of  the  two  conditions  were  committed.   Likewise,   suddenness   of   an   attack   does   not   necessarily   imply   treachery.   Thus,   ruling   out   murder.   Homicide   resulting   from   reckless   imprudence   is   not   recognized   either.    

Lawful  order  of  superior   Reyes:   1. Requisites:   1. That   an   order   has   been   issued   by   a   superior.     2. That   such   order   must   be   for   some   lawful  purpose.    

3. That   the   means   used   by   the   subordinate   to   carry   out   said   order   is  lawful.       People  v.  Beronilla,  96  Phil.  566  (1955)   Facts:   Arsenio   Borjal   was   mayor   of   La   Paz   Abra   at   the   outbreak   of   war   and   continued   to   serve   as   mayor   during   the   Japanese   occupation.   Dec   19,   1944   accused-­‐appellant   Manuel   Beronilla   was   appointed   Military   Mayor   of   La   Paz   by   Lt.   Col   Arnold.   Simultaneously,   he   received   a   memorandum  issued  by  Arnold  authorizing  them  to   appoint  a  jury  of  12  bolomen  to  try  persons  accused   of   treason,   espionage   or   aiding   the   enemy.   He   also   received   a   list   of   all   puppet   government   officials   of   Abra,   with   a   memorandum   instructing   all   Military   Mayors   to   investigate   said   persons   and   gather   against   them   complaints.   Beronilla,   pursuant   to   his   instructions  placed  Borjal  under  custody  and  asked   residents  of  La  Paz  to  file  case  against  him.  He  also   appointed  a  12-­‐man  jury  composed  of  Labuguen  as   chairman   and   others,   plus   Alverne   and   Balmaceda   were  prosecutors;  Paculdo  as  clerk  of  the  jury,  and   Inovermo   as   counsel   for   the   accused,   later   Atty.   Barreras   voluntarily   appeared   as   counsel   for   Borjal.   The   jury   found   Borjal   guilty   on   all   counts   and   imposed   death   penalty.   Mayor  Beronilla  forwarded   the  records  of  the  case  to  Headquarters  of  Infantry   for   review.   Records   were   returned   on   April   18,   1945   with   approval   of   Arnold.   On   the   same   day,   Beronilla   ordered   the   execution   of   Borjal.   Immediately  after  the  execution,  Beronilla  reported   the   execution   to   Arnold,   the   latter   complementing   Beronilla.     Two   years   later,   Mayor   Beronillo   and   others   involved   in   the   Borjal   case   were   indicted   by   CFI   of   Abra   for   murder,   for   allegedly   conspiring   and   confederating  in  the  execution  of  Borjal.  Pres.  Roxas   issued   E.P.   no.   8,   granting   amnesty   to   all   persons   who   committed   acts   penalized,   under   RPC   in   furtherance   of   resistance   to   the   enemy   against   persons   aiding   in   the   war   efforts   of   the   enemy.   All   the   accused   (except   Labuguen   who   filed   and   granted   amnesty   by   the   AFP),   filed   their   application   to   Second   Guerilla   Amnesty   Commission,   which   denied   their   application   on   the   ground   that   they  

Rañeses  98     were   inspired   by   purely   personal   motives,   thus   remanding   case   to   CFI   for   trial   on   merits.   On   July   10,   1950   Beronillo,   Paculdo,   Velasco   and   Adriatico   were   convicted   as   conspirator   and   co-­‐principals   of   crime  murder.  They  appealed.     Issue:   WON   accused   appellants   are   guilty   of   murder;  and  WON  they  should  be  granted  amnesty.     Held:  The  records  are  ample  to  show  that  Beronilla   acted   pursuant   to   the   orders   of   the   Infantry   Headquarters.   Although   it   was   alleged   by   the   state   that   there   was   a   radiogram   from   certain   Col.   Volkmann   to   Lt.   Col.   Arnold,   on   the   illegality   of   Borjal's   execution,   there   are   no   sufficient   evidence   to   show   that   it   was   known   to   Beronilla.   Furthermore,   the   messages   of   Col.   Arnold   approving   the   decisions   of   Beronilla   prove   otherwise.   The   testimony   of   Rafael   Balmaceda,   relative  of  Borjal  was  also  unreliable.     The   state   claims   that   the   appellants   held   grudges   against  late  Borjal,  but  court  said  that  the  conduct  of   the   appellants   does   not   dispose   that   they   were   impelled   by   malice.   In   fact,   prior   to   the   execution,   Beronilla   sent   the   decision   for   review.   The   lower   court   also   found   that   Borjal   was   really   guilty   of   treasonable   acts.   The   court   held   that   the   accused-­‐ appellants   just   acted   upon   the   orders   of   superiors   and  criminal  intent  was  not  established.     Even   assuming   the   accused-­‐appellant   are   guilty   of   murder,   they   should   not   be   denied   of   the   amnesty   on   the   ground   that   the   slaying   took   place   after   actual   liberation   of   the   area   from   enemy   control.   The   court   held   that   any   reasonable   doubt   as   to   whether   a   given   case   falls   within   the   amnesty   proclamation   shall   be   resolved   in   favor   of   the   accused.    

B. Exempting  Circumstances    

RPC,  Art.  12   Circumstances  which  exempt  from  criminal  liability.  -­‐   The  following  are  exempt  from  criminal  liability:   1.   An   imbecile   or   an   insane   person,   unless   the   latter   has  acted  during  a  lucid  interval.   When   the   imbecile   or   an   insane   person   has   committed  an  act  which  the  law  defines  as  a  felony   (delito),   the   court   shall   order   his   confinement   in   one   of   the   hospitals   or   asylums   established   for   persons   thus   afflicted,   which   he   shall   not   be   permitted   to   leave   without   first   obtaining   the   permission  of  the  same  court.   2.  A  person  under  nine  years  of  age.   3.  A  person  over  nine  years  of  age  and  under  fifteen,   unless   he   has   acted   with   discernment,   in   which   case,   such   minor   shall   be   proceeded   against   in   accordance  with  the  provisions  of  article  80  of  this   Code.   When   such   minor   is   adjudged   to   be   criminally   irresponsible,   the   court,   in   conformity   with   the   provisions   of   this   and   the   preceding   paragraph,   shall   commit   him   to   the   care   and   custody   of   his   family   who   shall   be   charged   with   his   surveillance   and  education;  otherwise,  he  shall  be  committed  to   the   care   of   some   institution   or   person   mentioned   in   said  article  80.   4.   Any   person   who,   while   performing   a   lawful   act   with   due   care,   causes   an   injury   by   mere   accident   without  fault  or  intention  of  causing  it.   5.   Any   person   who   acts   under   the   compulsion   of   irresistible  force.   6.   Any   person   who   acts   under   the   impulse   of   an   uncontrollable  fear  of  an  equal  or  greater  injury.   7.  Any  person  who  fails  to  perform  an  act  required   by  law,  when  prevented  by  some  lawful  insuperable   cause.  

    Reyes:   1. Definition:   Excemtping   circumstances   (non-­‐imputability)   are   those   grounds   for   exemption   from   punishment   because   there   is   wanting   in   the   agent   of   the   crime   any   of  

Rañeses  99     the  conditions  which  make  the  act  voluntary   or  negligent.     2. Basis:   Based   on   the   complete   absence   of   intelligence,   freedom   of   action,   or   intent,   or   on   the   absence   of   negligence   on   the   part   of   the  accused.     3. There   is   a   crime   committed   but   no   criminal  liability  arises.     4. In   justifying   circumstances,   there   is   neither   a   crime   nor   a   criminal.   No   civil   liability,   except   in   par.   4   (causing   damage  to  another  in  state  of  necessity).     In   exempting   circumstances,   there   is   a   crime   but   no   criminal   liability.   There   is   civil   liability,   except   in   pars.   4   and   7   (causing   an   injury   be   mere   accident;   failing  to  perform  an  act  required  by  law   when   prevented   by   some   lawful   or   insuperable  cause)  of  Art.  12.      

Insanity   Reyes:   1. While  the  imbecile  is  exempt  in  all  cases   of   criminal   liability,   the   insane   is   not   so   exempt   if   it   can   be   shown   that   he   acted   during  a  lucid  interval.       An   imbecile   is   one   who,   while   advanced   in   age,   has   a   mental   development   comparable   to   that   of   children   between   two   and   seven   years  of  age.     2. To   constitute   insanity,   there   must   be   complete   deprivation   of   intelligence   or   that   there   be   a   total   deprivation   of   the   freedom  of  the  will.     3. The  defense  must  prove  the  accused  was   insane   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   because   the   presumption   is   always   in   favor   of   sanity.   (People   v.   Bascos,  44  Phil.  204,206)   4. When  a  person  was  insane  at  the  time  of   the   commission   of   the   felony,   he   is   exempt   from   criminal   liability.   When   he   was   sane   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the  crime,  but  he  becomes  insane  at  the  time   of  the  trial,  he  is  liable  criminally.    

5. Dementia   praecox   is   covered   by   the   term   insanity.   Schizophrenia   is   its   current   incarnation.     6. Based   on   the   complete   absence   of   intelligence.       People  v.  Bonoan,  64  Phil.  87  (1937)   Facts:   • 12  Dec.  1934  -­‐  Celestino  Bonoan  met  Carlos   Guison   on   Avenida   Rizal   near   a   barbershop   close   to   Tom's   Dixie   Kitchen.   Francisco   Beech,   who   was   at   the   time   in   the   barbershop,   heard   Bonoan   say   in   Tagalog,   "I   will   kill   you."   Beech   turned   around   &   saw   Bonoan   withdrawing   his   right   hand,   w/c   held   a   knife,   from   the   side   of   Guison   who   said,   "I   will   pay   you,"   but   Bonoan   simply   replied  saying  that  he  would  kill  him  &  then   stabbed  Guison  3  times  on  the  left  side.  The   incident   was   witnessed   by   policeman   Damaso   Arnoco.   Bonoan   was   arrested   on   the   day   itself.   Bonoan   admitted   to   stabbing   Guison.   Guison   was   taken   to   PGH   where   he   died  2  days  later.   • 5   January   1935   -­‐   Prosecuting   attorney   of   Manila   filed   an   information   charging   Celestino  Bonoan  with  the  crime  of  murder.   • 16   January   1935   -­‐   Bonoan's   defense   counsel   objected   to   the   arraignment   on   the   ground   that   the   defendant   was   mentally   deranged   and   was   at   the   time   confined   in   the   psychopathic  hospital.  The  court  issued  and   order   requiring   the   Director   of   the   hospital   to   report   on   Bonoan's   mental   condition.   A   report  was  rendered  by  Dr.  Toribio  Joson.   • 23   March   1935   -­‐   the   case   was   called   for   arraignment  again,  the  defense  objected  and   again  the  court  filed  another  order  requiring   the  doctor  who  examined  Bonoan  to  appear   in   court   to   report   on   Bonoan's   mental   condition.   • 26   March   1935   -­‐   Dr.   Toribio   appeared   before   the   court   for   the   inquiry.   The   court   issued   another   order   asking   to   summon   other   doctors   from   the   hospital   and   to   put   Bonoan   under   another   doctor,   Dr.   Jose  

Rañeses  100    

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Fernandez,   for   closer   observation.   Dr.   Fernandez  filed  his  report  on  11  June  1935.   28   June   1935   the   case   was   called   again,   Dr   Fernandez   showed   up   in   court   and   reported   that   Bonoan   was   still   not   in   a   condition   to   defend  himself.   21   January   1936   -­‐   Dr.     Fernandez   reported   to  the  court  that   Bonoan   could   be   discharged   from   the   hospital   and   appear   for   trial   as   he   was   "considered  a  recovered  case."   27   February   1936   -­‐   Bonoan   was   arraigned   and   pleaded   "not   guilty"   and   the   trial   was   held.  To  prove  motive  and  mental  normalcy   of  Bonoan  the  prosecution  called  on  Damaso   Arnoco   who   testified   that   the   reason   for   Bonoan's   attack   was   that   Guison   owed   him   P55   and   would   not   pay   him   back.   Bonoan   had  bought  the  knife  with  which  he  stabbed   Guison   for   50   centavos   and   had   been   waiting   2   days   to   kill   him.   He   acquired   this   information   when   he   arrested   and   questioned   Bonoan.   Bonoan   was   charged   with   the   murder   of   Carlos   Guison,   and   sentenced   him   to   life   imprisonment   and   to   pay  P1K  to  indemnify  the  heirs  of  Guison.   The   defendant   appealed   the   case   and   his   counsel   cited   that   the   lower   court   had   erred   in   finding   that   Bonoan   had   dementia   intermittently  and  not  immediately  prior  to   the   commission   of   the   offense,   in   finding   that   the   accused   did   not   show   any   abnormality   either   in   behavior,   action,   language,  appearance,  or  action  that  he  was   mentally   deranged,   in   finding   that   the   burden   of   proof   lay   in   the   defendant   to   prove  that  he  was  mentally  deranged  at  the   time   of   the   crime,   and   in   not   acquitting   Bonoan.  

  Issue:   WON   Bonoan   was   insane   at   the   time   of   the   commission  of  the  crime.     Held:  Yes.  There  are  3  different  theories  used   1. Insanity   as   a   defense   in   a   confession   and   avoidance   and   as   such   must   be   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   Proof   of   insanity  

at   the   time   of   committing   the   criminal   act   should   be   clear   and   satisfactory   in   order   to   acquit   the   accused   on   the   ground   of   insanity.  (Philippines  uses  this)   2. That   an   affirmative   verdict   of   insanity   is   to   be  governed  by  preponderance  of  evidence,   and   in   this   view,   insanity   is   not   to   be   established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.   3. Prosecution   must   prove   sanity   beyond   a   reasonable  doubt.     When  a  defendant  in  a  criminal  case  interposes  the   defense   of   mental   incapacity,   the   burden   of   establishing   the   fact   rests   upon   the   defendant.   To   prove   insanity   the   evidence   must   be   clear   and   convincing.   The   courts   need   to   distinguish   insanity   in   law   from   passion   or   eccentricity,   mental   weakness   or   mere   depression   resulting   from   physical   ailment.   In   the   separate   reports   given   by   Dr.   Toribio   Joson   and   Dr.   Fernandez   they   both   diagnosed   Bonoan   to   be   unstable,   stating   that   "he   will   always   have   troubles   and   difficulties   with   this   world   of   realities."   Bonoan   was   diagnosed   with   dementia   praecox   which   is   a   mental   disease   that   disqualifies   a   person   from   legal   responsibility   for   his   actions.   In   these   people   homicidal   attacks   are   common   because   of   the   delusions   that   they   are   being   interfered   with   or   that   their   property   is   being   taken.   The   court   was   of   the   opinion   that   Bonoan   was   demented   at   the   time   he   perpetrated   the   serious   offense   charge   with   and   that   consequently   he  is  exempt  from  criminal  liability.     Judgment:   Judgment   of   the   lower   court   REVERSED.   Defendant   appellant   ACQUITTED   but   to   be   kept   in   confinement  in  the  San  Lazaro  Hospital  or  any  other   hospital  for  the  insane.     Imperial,   dissenting:   "The   dissenting   opinions,   in   establishing   the   conclusion   that   the   accused   was   then  in  the  possession  of  his  mental  faculties  or,  at   least,   at   a   lucid   interval,   are   based   on   the   fact   admitted   by   the   parties   and   supported   by   expert   testimony,   that   the   accused   before   the   commission   of   a   crime,   had   been   cured   of   dementia   praecox   and   later  of  manic  depressive  psychosis."  The  inference   of   the   majority   that   the   accused   was   insane   is   not  

Rañeses  101     sufficiently   supported   by   evidence.   No   attention   was   given   to   the   decision   of   the   judge   who   originally   tried   the   case,   which   should   have   been   done   because   he   was   able   to   observe   Bonoan,   the   witnesses,   the   evidence   and   the   testimonies.   This   court  generally  gives  importance  to  the  conclusions   drawn   by   the   judge   who   tried   the   case   in   first   instance  unless  there  is  a  clear  contradiction  in  the   evidence   and   the   decision,   which   is   not   the   case   here.     Diaz,   dissenting:   The   appellant   committed   the   crime   when   he   was   sane   or   at   least   during   a   lucid   interval.   He   had   motive   to   kill   Guison   [55php],   as   clearly   stated   by   the   arresting   police   officer.   The   law  presumes  that  everyone  is  sane,  and  insanity  is   an  exception,  to  be  established  by  clear  proof  and  it   is   not   usually   permanent.   There   is   no   evidence   or   record  that  can  prove  that  Bonoan  was  insane  at  the   time   he   committed   the   crime,   or   that   he   was   continuing   to   suffer   from   insanity   from   the   date   of   the  commission  of  the  crime.  Where  it  is  shown  that   the   defendant   experiences   lucid   intervals,   the   crime   is   assumed   to   have   been   committed   during   one   of   them,  unless  proven  otherwise.     Concepcion,   dissenting:   There   is   no   evidence   or   record  to  prove  that  Bonoan  was  insane  at  the  time   he  committed  the  crime,  and  there  were  no  records   to   show   that   he   had   suffered   a   relapse   of   the   condition   he   had   sought   treatment   for   at   the   San   Lazaro   hospital   years   before   the   crime   was   committed.   Bonoan   had   been   sane   for   9   years   [or   at   least   "socially   adjustable"].   The   attack   of   insomnia   before   the   event   is   not   clear   proof   that   he   was   insane  or  suffering  a  bout  with  insanity  at  the  time   of   the   crime,   it   merely   presents   a   possibility,   and   the   innocence   to   the   accused   cannot   be   based   on   a   mere   possibility.   The   accused   when   questioned   by   the   police   immediately   after   the   crime   did   not   exhibit   insane   behavior.   It   cannot   be   said   that   Bonoan   stabbed   Guison   because   of   a   hallucination   because   Guison   actually   owed   him   money   and   this   was  confirmed  by  the  fact  of  his  saying  "I  am  going   to  pay  you"  before  he  was  stabbed.  This  shows  the   motive  for  aggression  [vengeance]    

People  v.  Ambal,  100  SCRA  325  (1980)   Facts:   Felicula   (Feling),   married   to   Honorato   Ambal,   was   mortally   wounded,   having   7   incised   wounds   in   different   parts   of   her   body.   She   died   40   minutes  later.  Honorato  admitted  to  killing  his  wife.       The   immediate   provocation   for   the   assault   was   a   fight,   because   Feling   had   not   bought   medicine   for   Honorato,  who  then  had  influenza.  She  told  him  that   he   was   better   off   dead,   so   he   attacked   her.   He   was   charged   with   parricide.   He   pleaded   not   guilty.   His   defense  was  insanity.       Dr.   Cresogono   Llacuna   said   that   Ambal   suffered   from  a  minor  psycho-­‐neurosis,  a  disturbance  of  the   functional  nervous  system  which  is  NOT  INSANITY.   He  was  normal  but  nervous,  and  HAD  NO  MENTAL   DISORDER.    Trial  court  concluded  that  his  behavior   immediately   after   the   incident   showed   he   wasn‘t   insane  and  that  he  acted  like  a  normal  human  being.       Issue:     Should   Ambal   be   exempted   from   criminal   liability  by  reason  of  insanity?       Held:     NO.   Courts   should   be   careful   to   distinguish   insanity  in  law  from  passion  or  eccentricity,  mental   weakness   or   mere   depression   resulting   from   physical   ailment.   The   State   should   guard   against   sane   murderers   escaping   punishment   through   a   general  plea  of  insanity.       Imbecile:   person   marked   by   mental   deficiency;   must   be   deprived   completely   of   reason   or   discernment   and   freedom   of   the   will   at   the   time   of   committing  the  crime.         Insanity:   one   who   has   an   unsound   mind   or   suffers   from   a   mental   disorder;   there   must   be   complete   deprivation  of  intelligence  in  the  commission  of  the   act   or   that   the   accused   acted   without   the   lease   discernment.   Mere   abnormality   of   his   mental   faculties  does  not  exclude  imputability.     Passion   and   motives   of   anger,   hatred,   etc,   is   not   insanity   either.   Neither   is   being   weak-­‐minded.   The   court   presumes   that   a   person   is   of   sound   mind  

Rañeses  102     unless   there   is   positive   proof   stating   otherwise.   In   this  case,  no  such  proof  has  been  given.     People  v.  Puno,  105  SCRA  151  (1981)   Facts:   • 8   Sep.   1970   -­‐   around   2pm   Ernesto   Puno   entered  the  bedroom  of  72  y.o.  Francisca  Col   also   known   as   Aling   Kikay,   in   Little   Bagio,   barrio  Tinajeros,  Malabon,  Rizal.  Aling  Kikay   was   on   the   bed,   when   Puno   entered   &   insulted   her   by   saying   "Mangkukulam   ka,   mambabarang,   mayroon   kang   bubuyog."   Then,  he  repeatedly  slapped  her  and  struck   her   on   the   head   several   times   with   a   hammer  until  she  was  dead.  The  assault  was   witnessed   by   Hilaria   dela   Cruz   who   was   present   in   the   room   during   the   attack,   and   by   Lina   Pajes,   a   tenant   in   the   next   room.   After  killing  the  old  lady  Puno  went  into  the   next  room,  where  the  girls  had  taken  refuge   &   made   the   following   confession   &   threat   "Huag   kayong   magkakamaling   tumawag   ng   pulis   at   sabihin   nunyo   na   umalis   kayo   ng   bahay   at   hindi   ninyo   alam   kung   sino   ang   pumatay   sa   matanda."   Or   according   to   Lina   "pinatay   ko   na   ang   iyong   matanda.   Huag   kayong   tumawag   ng   pulis.   Pag   tumawag   kayo   ng   pulis,   kayo   ang   pahihigantihan   ko."   After   Puno   left,   Lina   called   the   police.   Puno   fled  to  his  parents'  house  then  later  on  to  his   second  cousin,  Teotimo’s  house.   • 10   Sep.   1970   -­‐   Puno's   father   surrendered   him   to   the   police.   He   was   brought   to   the   National   Mental   Hospital   in   Mandaluyong,   Rizal.   He   was   charged   with   murder   in   the   municipal  court.   • Puno's   wife,   his   sister   in   law   and   his   2nd   cousin   all   testified   in   court   describing   his   appearance   [bloodshot   eyes]   and   his   behavior  immediately  before   and  after  them   murder,   [boxing   the   dog,   having   an   imaginary   bumble   bee   flying   around   him,   singing,  etc..]   • The   defense   presented   3   doctors   to   prove   insanity  but  the  doctors  instead  proved  that   Puno   had   acted   with   discernment   when   he   killed  Aling  Kikay.  

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Dr.   Araceli   Maravilla   of   Dr.   Jose   Reyes   Memorial   hospital   said   Puno   was   an   outpatient   who   could   very   well   live   with   society   even   if   he   was   afflicted   with   schizophrenic  reaction.   Dr.   Reynaldo   Robles   stated   that   Puno   had   schizophrenic   reaction   but   that   this   condition  was  "not  socially  incapacitating"   Dr.   Carlso   Vicente   of   the   National   Mental   Hospital   testified   that   Puno   acted   w/   discernment   &   could   distinguish   right   from   wrong.   21  October  1970  -­‐  Puno  was  indicted  for  the   murder   in   the   Circuit   Criminal   Court   at   Pasig,   Rizal.   Alleged   in   the   information   as   aggravating   circumstances   were   evident   premeditation,   abuse   of   superiority   and   disregard   for   sex.   Puno   was   sentenced   to   death  and  ordered  to  pay  P22K  to  the  heirs   of  the  victim  

  Issue:   WON   Puno   was   insane   when   he   killed   Aling   Kikay.     Held:   No.   Record   from   Puno's   stay   at   the   National   Mental   Hospital   stated   that   he   had   been   an   out   patient  for  schizophrenia  in  1962,  recovered,  had  a   relapse  in  1964,  improved  and  in  1966  his  sickness   remained   UNIMPROVED.   Treatment   continued   in   San   Lazaro   Compound   up   to   1970   where   he   was   relieved   of   symptoms   and   did   not   come   back   for   medication.   It   cited   that   he   was   quiet   and   as   usual   manageable.  The  report  stated  that  he  "is  presently   free   from   any   social   incapacitating   psychotic   symptoms",   but   persons   suffering   from   schizophrenia   may   retain   some   of   the   residual   symptoms   but   it   wouldn't   affect   their   discernment   of  right  and  wrong.     The   court   says:   "in   the   light   of   the   strict   rule   just   stated  and  the  circumstance  surrounding  the  killing,   we   are   led   to   the   conclusion   that   Puno   was   not   legally  insane  when  he  killed,  the  victim''  The  court   cited  that  had  he  been  a  homicidal  maniac  he  would   have   killed   Lina   and   Hilaria   too.   The   evidence   should  prove  clearly  that  he  was  insane  at  the  time   of  the  commission  of  the  crime.  

Rañeses  103       Insanity  exists  when  there  is  a  complete  deprivation   of   intelligence   in   committing   the   act,   that   is,   the   accused   is   deprived   of   reason,   he   acts   without   the   least   discernment   because   there   is   a   complete   absence   of   the   power   to   discern,   or   total   deprivation  of  freedom  of  wilt.  Mere  abnormality  of   the  mental  faculties  will  not  exclude  imputability.     Two   aggravating   circumstances,   dwelling   and   disregard   of   the   respect   due   to   the   age   of   the   victim   are   off   set   by   the   mitigating   circumstances   of   voluntary   surrender   and   the   offender's   mental   illness   (mild   schizophrenic   reaction)   which   diminished   him   of   his   will   power   but   did   not   deprive  him  of  consciousness  of  his  acts.     Judgment:   Medium   penalty   for   murder   imposed.   Death   penalty   is   set   aside.   Accused   is   sentenced   to   RECLUSION  PERPETUA     Makasiar,  dissenting:  The  appellant  should  not  be   held  liable  for  the  crime  of  murder.  He  was  mentally   ill   when   he   committed   the   alleged   killing   of   Francisca   Col   (Aling   Kikay).   His   medical   records   properly   evaluated   &   confirmed   undeniably   establish   the   fact   that   he   had   been   ailing   with   a   psychotic   disorder   medically   known   as   chronic   schizophrenia   of   the   paranoid   type.   His   record   for   treatment   stated   him   to   be   "unimproved"   upon   discharge   and   his   out   patient   record   merely   stated   him   as   "improved"   not   "recovered"   or   "unimproved".   Appellant   was   treated   18   times   in   the   National   Mental   Hospital   and   Jose   Reyes   Memorial   Hospital   in   a   span   of   8   years,   characteristic   of   the   chronic   nature   of   his   mental   illness.  This  was  confirmed  by  Dr.  Carlos  Vicente.       People  v.  Dungo,  199  SCRA  860  (1991)   Facts:   On   March   16,   1987   between   2:00   and   3:00pm,   the   accused   went   to   Mrs.   Sigua's   office   at   the   Department   of   Agrarian   Reform,   Apalit,   Pampanga.   After   a   brief   talk,   the   accused   drew   a   knife   from   the   envelope   he   was   carrying   and   stabbed   Mrs.   Sigua   several   times.   After   which   he   departed   from   the   office   with   blood   stained   clothes,   carrying   a   bloodied   bladed   weapon.   The   autopsy  

report   revealed   that   the   victim   sustained   14   wounds,  5  of  which  were  fatal.     Rodolfo   Sigua,   husband   of   the   deceased,   testified   that   sometime   in   February   1987,   the   accused   Rosalino   Dungo   inquired   from   him   why   his   wife   was   requiring   so   many   documents   from   him.   Rodolfo  explained  to  him  the  procedure  at  the  DAR.     The   accused,   in   defense   of   himself,   tried   to   show   that  he  was  insane  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of   the  offense:   • Two   weeks   prior   to   March   16,   1987,   Rosalino's   wife   noticed   that   he   appears   to   be  in  deep  thought  always,  maltreating  their   children  when  he  was  not  used  to  it  before.   There   were   also   times   that   her   husband   would   inform   her   that   his   feet   and   head   were  on  fire  when  in  truth  they  were  not.   • On   that   fateful   day,   Rosalino   complained   of   stomachache   but   they   didn't   bother   to   buy   medicine   as   the   pain   went   away   immediately.   Thereafter,   he   went   back   to   the  store.  But  when  Andrea  followed  him  to   the   store,   he   was   no   longer   there.   Worried,   she   looked   for   him.   On   her   way   home,   she   heard   people   saying   that   a   stabbing   occurred.   She   saw   her   husband   in   her   parents-­‐in-­‐law's   house   with   people   milling   around.   She   asked   her   husband   why   he   did   the   act,   to   which   Rosalino   answered,   "That's   the   only   cure   for   my   ailment.   I   have   cancer   of  the  heart.  If  I  don't  kill  the  deceased  in  a   number   of   days,   I   would   die.”   That   same   day,  the  accused  went  to  Manila.     Dr.  Santiago  and  Dr.  Echavez  of  the  National  Center   for   Mental   Health   testified   that   the   accused   was   confined  in  the  mental  hospital,  as  per  order  of  the   trial   court   dated   Aug.   17,   1987.   Based   on   the   reports   of   their   staff,   they   concluded   that   Rosalino   was   psychotic   or   insane   long   before,   during   and   after   the   commission   of   the   alleged   crime   and   classified   his   insanity   as   an   organic   mental   disorder   secondary   to   cerebro-­‐vascular   accident   or   stroke.   But   Dr.   Balatbat   who   treated   the   accused   for   ailments   secondary   to   stroke,   and   Dr.   Lim   who  

Rañeses  104     testified   that   the   accused   suffered   dorm   occlusive   disease,   concluded   that   Rosalino   was   somehow   rehabilitated   after   a   series   of   medical   treatment   in   their  clinic.     Issue:   WON   the   accused   was   insane   during   the   commission  of  the  crime  charged.     Held:   No.   For   insanity   to   relieve   the   person   of   criminal   liability,   it   is   necessary   that   there   be   a   complete   deprivation   of   intelligence   in   committing   the  act,  that  he  acts  w/o  the  least  discernment  and   that   there   be   complete   absence   or   deprivation   of   the  freedom  of  the  will.   Under   Philippine   jurisdiction,   there's   no   definite   test   or   criterion   for   insanity.   However,   the   definition   of   insanity   under   Sec   1039*   of   the   Revised   Administrative   Code   can   be   applied.   In   essence,   it   states   that   insanity   is   evinced   by   a   deranged   and   perverted   condition   of   the   mental   faculties,   which   is   manifested   in   language   or   conduct.   An   insane   person   has   no   full   and   clear   understanding   of   the   nature   and   consequence   of   his   act.     Evidence   of   insanity   must   refer   to   the   mental   condition   at   the   very   time   of   doing   the   act.   However,   it   is   also   permissible   to   receive   evidence   of   his   mental   condition   for   a   reasonable   period   before  and  after  the  time  of  the  act  in  question.  The   vagaries  of  the  mind  can  only  be  known  by  outward   acts.     It   is   not   usual   for   an   insane   person   to   confront   a   specified   person   who   may   have   wronged   him.   But   in   the   case   at   hand,   the   accused   was   able   to   Mrs.   Sigua.  From  this,  it  can  be  inferred  that  the  accused   was  aware  of  his  acts.  This  also  established  that  the   accused  has  lucid  intervals.   Moreover,  Dr.  Echavez  testified  to  the  effect  that  the   appellant   could   have   been   aware   of   the   nature   of   his  act  at  the  time  he  committed  it  when  he  shouted   (during  laboratory  examination)  that  he  killed  Mrs.   Sigua.  This  statement  makes  it  highly  doubtful  that   the  accused  was  insane  when  he  committed  the  act.    

The  fact  that  the  accused  was  carrying  an  envelope   where   he   hid   the   fatal   weapon,   that   he   ran   away   from   the   scene   of   the   incident   after   he   stabbed   the   victim  several  times,  that  he  fled  to  Manila  to  evade   arrest,  indicate  that  he  was  conscious  and  knew  the   consequences   of   his   acts   in   stabbing   the   victim.   (This  was  taken  from  the  TC's  decision).     Judgment:  questioned  decision  AFFIRMED.     People  v.  Yam-­‐id,  308  SCRA  651  (1999)   Facts:   Julius   Cantutay   and   Jerry   Tejamo   passed   by   the   house   of   the   accused   who   greeted   them   “Good   Evening,”   unsheathed   a   long   bolo   and   ran   after   the   two.   Appellant   caught   up   with   Jerry   and   stabbed   him   on   the   left   portion   of   his   back,   then   held   him   by   the  hair  and  hacked  him  on  the  nape.  As  Jerry  fell  to   ground,   the   appellant   further   stabbed   him   on   the   right   side   of   his   back   then   the   appellant   knelt   over   the   prostrate   body   of   Jerry   and   sucked   the   blood   from   his   neck   .   At   the   automatic   review   at   the   Supreme   Court,   the   appellant   admitted   to   killing   Jerry   and   pleaded   insanity   as   his   defense   which   contends  that  he  has  schizophrenia.       Issue:   WON   the   appellant   can   use   the   defense   of   insanity  in  killing  of  Jerry  Tejamo       Held:   No.   Insanity   must   be   proven   beyond   reasonable   doubt   to   exist   before   or   at   the   very   moment   the   crime   was   committed,   by   whoever   invokes   it   as   a   defense.   Defense   failed   to   discharge   its   burden   of   proving   that   accused-­‐appellant   was   insane   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   crime.   Also,   no   evidence   was   presented   that   the   accused   was   insane   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   crime   and   the   fact   that   the   defense   of   insanity   was   not   even   raised   during   the   trial   of   the   case   gives   the   impression  that  is  but  an  afterthought.     People  v.  Belonio,  429  SCRA  579  (2004)   Facts:  RTC  found  Randy  Belonio  y  Landas  guilty  of   the  murder  of  Ramy  Tamayo  and  sentenced  him  to   death.   The   night   of   a   wake,   Ramy   decided   to   buy   cigarettes   from   a   store.   Ramy   was   occupying   that   space   in   front   of   the   opening   to   pay   when   the   accused  Randy  Belonio  arrived.  Randy  tried  to  force  

Rañeses  105     his   way   in   front   of   the   opening   and   as   a   consequence,  he  bumped  on  Ramy.     Jennifer  and  Ramy  sat  and  talked  on  the  bench.  The   accused   came   over   and   sat   on   the   other   end   of   the   bench   and   conversed   with   Ramy.   The   accused   left   but   after   a   few   minutes   he   returned,   delivered   a   stabbing   blow   with   a   dagger   which   was   concealed   in  his  hand.       Randy   Belonio   raised   the   defense   of   insanity   and   relied   on   the   expert   assessment   of   his   witness,   Dr.   Antonio   Gauzon,   who   certified   that   he   is   suffering   from  schizophrenia  triggered  by  abuse  of  shabu  and   marijuana.   RTC   found   appellant   guilty   of   Murder   and  that  he  had  full  control  of  his  mental  faculties.       Issue:   WON   appellant‘s   defense   of   insanity   as   an   exempting  circumstance  is  tenable.       Held:   NO.   Appellant   is   found   GUILTY   of   murder.   The   defense   utterly   failed   to   discharge   its   burden   of   proving   that   appellant   was   insane.   The   evidence   adduced   by   the   defense   is   sorely   insufficient   to   establish  his  claim  that  he  was  insane  at  the  time  he   killed  Tamayo.     Belonio’s   acts   tend   to   establish   that   Belonio   was   well  aware  of  what  he  had  just  committed,  and  was   capable   of   distinguishing   right   from   wrong.   Otherwise,   he   would   not   have   attempted   to   escape   and   go   into   hiding.   Evidence   of   insanity   after   the   fact   of   commission   of   the   offense   may   be   accorded   weight   only   if   there   is   also   proof   of   alleged   abnormal   behavior   immediately   before   or   simultaneous   to   the   commission   of   the   crime.   Dr.   Guazon‘s  report  was  silent  as  regards  the  incidents   occurring   prior   to   or   during   the   circumstance   for   which  Belonio  stands  trial.    

Somnambulism   Reyes:   1. Another  case  of  lack  of  intelligence.     2. Somnambulism   or   sleepwalking,   where   the   acts   of   the   person   afflicted   are   automatic,   is   embraced   in   the   plea   of  

insanity   and   must   be   clearly   proven.   (People  v.  Gimena,  55  Phil.  604)     People  v.  Taneo,  58  Phil.  255  (1933)   Facts:   Potenciano   Taneo   and   his   wife   lived   in   his   parent's   house   in   Dolores,   Ormoc.   On   January   16,   1932,   a   fiesta   was   being   celebrated   in   the   said   barrio   and   guests   were   entertained   in   the   house,   among   them   were   Fred   Tanner   and   Luis   Malinao.   Early   that   afternoon,   Potenciano   went   to   sleep   and   while   sleeping,   he   suddenly   got   up,   left   the   room   bolo   in   hand   and,   upon   meeting   his   wife   who   tried   to   stop   him,   wounded   her   in   the   abdomen.   He   also   attacked  Fred  and  Luis  and  tried  to  attack  his  father,   after   which,   he   wounded   himself.   Potenciano's   wife,   who   was   7   months   pregnant   at   that   time,   died   five   days  later  as  a  result  of  the  wound.     The  trial  court  found  Potenciano  guilty  of  parricide   and  was  sentenced  to  reclusion  perpetua.     It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  day  before  the   commission   of   the   crime,   the   defendant   had   a   quarrel   over   a   glass   of   "tuba"   with   Collantes   and   Abadilla,   who   invited   him   to   come   down   and   fight.   When  he  was  about  to  go  down,  he  was  stopped  by   his   wife   and   his   mother.   On   the   day   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   it   was   noted   that   the   defendant   was   sad   and   weak,   had   a   severe   stomachache  that's  why  he  went  to  bed  in  the  early   afternoon.   The   defendant   stated   that   when   he   fell   asleep,  he  dreamed  that  Collantes  was  trying  to  stab   him   with   a   bolo   while   Abadila   held   his   feet.   That's   why   he   got   up   and   it   seemed   to   him   that   his   enemies  were  inviting  him  to  come  down;  he  armed   himself   with   a   bolo   and   left   the   room.   At   the   door,   he  met  his  wife  who  seemed  to  say  to  him  that  she   was   wounded.   Then,   he   fancied   seeing   his   wife   really   wounded   and   in   desperation   wounded   himself.  As  his  enemies  seemed  to  multiply  around   him,  he  attacked  everybody  that  came  his  way.     Issue:  WON  defendant  acted  while  in  a  dream.     Held:    Yes.  The  defendant  acted  while  in  a  dream  &   his   acts,   therefore,   weren’t   voluntary   in   the   sense   of   entailing  criminal  liability.  

Rañeses  106       The   apparent   lack   of   motive   for   committing   a   criminal   act   does   not   necessarily   mean   that   there   are  none,  but  that  simply  they  are  not  known  to  us.   Although   an   extreme   moral   perversion   may   lead   a   man   to   commit   a   crime   without   a   real   motive   but   just   for   the   sake   of   committing   it.   In   the   case   at   hand,   the   court   found   not   only   lack   of   motives   for   the   defendant   to   voluntarily   commit   the   acts   complained   of   (read:   he   loved   his   wife   dearly,   he   tried   to   attack   his   father   in   whose   house   the   lived   and   the   guests   whom   he   invited),   but   also   motives   for  not  committing  the  acts.     Dr.   Serafica,   an   expert   witness   in   the   case,   stated   that   considering   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   the   defendant   acted   while   in   a   dream,   under   the   influence   of   a   hallucination   and   not   in   his   right   mind.     The   wife's   wound   may   have   been   inflicted   accidentally.   The   defendant   did   not   dream   that   he   was   assaulting   his   wife,   but   that   he   was   defending   himself  from  his  enemies.    

Minority   Reyes:   1. “Under  nine  years”  to  be  construed  “nine   years  or  less.”     2. Age  of  absolute  irresponsibility  raised  to   fifteen   years   of   age.   Republic   Act   No.   9344   otherwise   known   as   “Juvenile   Justice   and   Welfare   Act   of   2006”   raised   the   age   of   absolute   irresponsibility   from   nine   (9)   to   fifteen  (15)  years  of  age.     3. Children   above   fifteen   (15)   but   below   eighteen   (18)   years   of   age   who   acted   without   discernment   exempt   from   criminal   liability.   It   is   incumbent   upon   the   prosecution   to   prove   that   a   minor   who   is   over  15  but  under  18  years  of  age  has  acted   with   discernment,   in   order   for   the   minor   not   to   be   entitled   to   this   exempting   circumstance.     4. Periods  of  criminal  responsibility   a. Absolute   irresponsibility   –   9   years   and  below  (infancy).  

b. Conditional   responsibility   –   between  9  and  15  years.     c. Full   responsibility   –   18   or   over   (adolescence)  to  70  (maturity).     d. Mitigated   responsibility   –   over   9   and   under   15,   offender   acting   with   discernment;   15   or   over   but   less   than  18;  over  70  years  of  age.       Senility   –   although   said   to   be   the   second   childhood,   is   only   a   mitigated  responsibility,     5. Discernment:   mental   capacity   to   understand   the   difference   between   right   and   wrong,   and   such   capacity   may   be   known   and   should   be   determined   by   taking   into   consideration   all   the   facts   and   circumstances   afforded   by   the   records   in   each   case,   the   very   appearance,   the   very   attitude,   the   very   comportment   and   behavior   of   said   minor,   not   only   before   during   the   commission   of   the   act,   but   also   after  and  even  during  the  trial.     a. May  be  shown  by:   i. Manner   of   committing   the   crime.   ii. Conduct  of  offender.     6. The   child   in   conflict   with   the   law   shall   enjoy  the  presumption  of  minority.     7. Age  may  be  determined  through:   a. Birth  certificate   b. Baptismal   certificate   or   any   other   pertinent  documents   c. In   the   absence   of   the   above,   information   from   child   himself/herself   d. Testimonies  of  other  persons   e. Physical  appearance  of  the  child     People  v.  Doquena,  68  Phil.  580  (1939)   Facts:   Between   1-­‐2   pm   of   Nov.   19,   1938,   Juan   Ragojos   and   Epifanio   Rarang   were   playing   volleyball   in   the   yard   of   their   school   in   Sual,   Pangasinan.   Valentin   Doquena,   the   accused,   intercepted   the   ball,   and   threw   it   a   Ragojos,   who   was   hit   in   the   stomach.   Miffed,   Ragojos   chased   Doquena,  and  upon  catching  him,  slapped  Doquena  

Rañeses  107     on   the   nape,   and   punched   him   in   the   face.   After   doing  this,   Ragojos   went  back  to  Rarang   to  resume   playing   volleyball.   Insulted,   Doquena   looked   for   something  to  throw  at  Ragojos,  finding  none,  he  got   his  cousin's  (Romualdo  Cocal)  knife,  and  confronted   Ragojos.   Ragojo's   denied   Doquena's   request   for   a   fight   and   resumed   playing.   Doquena   stabbed   the   unaware   Ragojos   in   the   chest,   thereby   killing   the   latter.   The   court   held   that   in   committing   the   act,   the   accused  acted  with  discernment  and  was  conscious   of   the   nature   and   consequences   of   his   acts,   therefore   his   defense   that   he   was   a   minor   was   untenable  (given  that  the  Doquena  was  a  7th  grade   pupil,   one   of   the   brightest   in   his   class,   and   was   an   officer  in  the  CAT  program),  and  thus  convicted  him   of  the  crime  of  homicide.  The  court  ordered  him  to   be   sent   to   the   Training   School   for   Boys   until   he   reaches  the  age  of  majority.  Thus,  the  appeal  by  the   accused,   stating   that   to   determine   whether   or   not   there   was   discernment   on   the   part   of   the   minor,   the   following  must  be  taken  into  consideration:   a. The  facts  and  circumstances  which  gave  rise   to  the  act  committed.   b. The  state  of  mind  at  the  time  the  crime  was   committed   c. The  time  he  had  at  his  disposal   d. The  degree  of  reasoning  of  the  minor     Issue:  WON  the  accused  acted  with  discernment     Held:  Decision  affirmed.  Yes,  the  accused  acted  with   discernment.  Accused  mistakes  the  discernment  for   premeditation,  or  at  least  for  lack  of  intention,  as  a   mitigating   circumstance.   However,   the   DISCERNMENT  that  constitutes  an  exception  to  the   exemption   from   criminal   liability   of   a   minor   under   15   years   but   over   nine,   who   commits   an   act   prohibited   by   law,   is   his   MENTAL   CAPACITY   to   understand   the   difference   between   right   and   wrong,  and  such  capacity  may  be  known  and  should   be   determined   by   taking   into   consideration   all   the   facts   and   circumstances   afforded   by   the   records   in   each   case,   the   very   appearance,   the   very   attitude,   the   very   comportment   and   behavior   of   said   minor,   not   only   before   and   during   the   commission   of   the   act,  but  also  after  and  even  during  the  trial.    

People  v.  Navarro,  51  OG  4062   Facts:   Luisa   Navarro   13   years   old   who   was   approached   by   agents   of   the   Price   Enforcement   Division  of  PRISCO  asking  frot  he  price  of  one  tin  of   Hershey’s   Cocoa.   She   was   arrested   after   allegedly   selling  cocoa  11  cents  more  that  ceiling  price.  Found   guilty   of   violating   E.O.   447   in   connection   with   Sec   12  of  RA  509-­‐  Anti-­‐  Profiteering  law  and  was  sent  to   the  custody  of  Phil.  Training  School  for  Girls     Issue:  WON  Article  12  par  3  can  be  applied  despite   being  charged  with  violation  of  a  special  law     Held:   Yes.   Nothing   in   the   law   says   that   RPC   is   not   suppletory  to  their  provisions  (Art10)   While   intent   is   immaterial   in   crimes   mala   prohibita,   the   circumstances,   which   exempt   from   criminal   liability,  are  based  on  lack  of  intelligence,  intent  and   spontaneity.  In  the  language  of  art  12  (3),  state  has   the   burden   of   proving   that   the   minor   acted   with   discernment.   Discernmentbeing   more   than   mere   understanding  is  the  mental  capacity  to  understand   the   difference   between   right   and   wrong.     In   the   instant   case,   accused   did   not   fully   grasp   the   importance  of  the  question  and  there  was  no  record   that   she   was   a   merchant.   Such   minor,   over   9   but   less  than  15  is  not  criminally  responsible.     Remiendo   v.   People   of   the   Philippines,   G.R.   No.   184874  (2009)   Facts:   Petitioner   was   a   minor   above   15   but   below   18  years  old  when  he  raped  a  minor  when  the  latter   was   left   alone   in   her   house.   He   threatened   to   kick   the  latter  if  she  would  shout  for  help.  Petitioner  was   convicted   of   rape   but   on   appeal   invoked   suspension   of   sentence   pursuant   to   RA   9344.   By   the   time   he   was  convicted  by  the  trial  court,  he  was  already  22   years  old     Issue:   WON   petitioner   is   exempt   from   criminal   liability   and   entitled   to   suspension   of   sentence   under  sec  38,  40  of  RA  9344       Held:   NO.   Since   he   is   above   15but   below   18,   finding   of   discernment   is   necessary   to   determine   exemption  from  criminal  liability.  His  act  of  waiting   for   victim’s   parents   before   defiling   her   and  

Rañeses  108     threating   to   kick   her   if   she   shouts   prove   that   the   petitioner  can  differentiate  b/w  right  and  wrong.     Sec  38  and  40  can  no  longer  be  availed  since  by  the   time   sentence   was   imposed,   he   was   already   22   years   old.   Sec   40   provides   that     if   the   child   in   conflict  with  law  has  reached  18  years  while  under   suspended   sentence,   the   court   can   determine   whether   to   discharge   the   child   in   accordance   with   the   act   or   to   order   execution   of   sentence   or   to   suspend   the   sentence   for   a   certain   period   until   the   child  reaches  maximum  age  of  21  years.     Sierra   v.   People   of   the   Philippines,   G.R.   No.   182941  (2009)   Facts:    Petitioner  was  15  years  old  when  he  raped  a   minor.   He   was   convicted   of   rape   where   penalty   was   reclusion  perpetua  and  a  fine.  During  the  pendency   of   appeal   to   CA,   RA   9344   took   effect.   CA   affirmed   the   conviction   and   denied   the   defense   of   minority   since   age   was   not   established   by   presenting   birth   certificate   but   only   alleged   testimonies   of   petitioner   and  his  mother.  According  to  them,  burden  of  proof   of  age  is  upon  the  prosecution     Issue:  Who  has  the  burden  of  proof  in  establishing   age   of   accused   and   can   RA   9344   be   given   retroactive  application?     Held:   Minority   is   usually   established   through   birth   certificate   of   the   child,   baptismal   certificate,   testimonies   of   other   persons   and   physical   appearance.  In  case  of  doubt,  minority  should  be  in   favor   of   the   child.   Minority   in   this   case   was   established   by   testimonies   of   he   petitioner   and   his   mother.   This   was   not   objected   to   by   prosecution   and  did  not  even  present  contrary  evidence.       Law   should   be   given   retroactive   effect   since   it   is   favorable  to  the  accused  as  provided  for  by  the  RPC.   Case   is   dismissed   and   petitioner   is   referred   to   appropriate  local  social  welfare.    

Negligence   Reyes:   1. Elements:   1. A  person  is  performing  a  lawful  act;  

2. With  due  care;   3. He   causes   an   injury   to   another   by   mere  accident;   4. Without  fault  or  intention  of  causing   it.     2. Accident:   something   that   happens   outside   the   sway   of   our   will,   and   although   it   comes   about   through   some   act   of   our   will,   lies   beyond   the   bounds   of   humanly   forseeable   consequences.     1. Presupposes   lack   of   intention   to   commit  the  wrong  done.     3. Accident  and  negligence  are  intrinsically   contradictory.     1. Accident:   a   fortuitive   (sic)   circumstance,   event   or   happening;   an   event   happening   without   any   human   agency,   or   if   happening   wholly   or   partly   through   human   agency,   an   event   which   under   the   circumstance   is   unusual   or   unexpected   by   the   person   to   whom   it  happen.     2. Negligence:   failure   to   observe,   for   the   protection   of   the   interest   of   another   person,   that   degree   of   care,   precaution   and   vigilance   which   the   circumstances   justly   demand   without   which   such   other   person   suffers  injury.       People  v.  Bindoy,  56  Phil.  15  (1931)   Facts:  On  May  6,  1930,  Donato  Bindoy  offered  some   tuba   to   Tibay,   Faustino   Pacas'   wife.   She   refused   and   Bindoy   threatened   to   injure   her   if   she   did   not   accept.   Pacas   stepped   in   to   defend   his   wife   and   attempted   to   take   away   from   Bindoy   the   bolo   he   carried.   The   disturbance   attracted   the   attention   of   Emigdio   Omamdam.   In   the   course   of   the   struggle,   Bindoy   succeeded   in   disengaging   himself   from   Pacas,   wrenching   the   bolo   from   the   latter's   hand,   with   such   violence   that   the   point   of   the   bolo   reached   Omamdam's   chest,   who   was   then   behind   Bindoy.   The   trial   court   held   that   Bindoy   was   guilty   of  the  crime  of  homicide.  Bindoy  appealed,  alleging   that   the   death   of   Omamdam   was   caused   accidentally  and  without  malicious  intent.  

Rañeses  109       Issue:   WON   the   crime   of   which   Bindoy   was   found   guilty  of  can  be  mitigated  on  the  ground  of  accident.     Held:  Yes.  Decision  is  reversed.  Bindoy  is  acquitted   according   to   Article   8,   No.   8   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code     1. There   is   no   evidence   to   show   that   Bindoy   deliberately   and   intentionally   killed   Omamdam.   • No  evidence  that  Omamdam  took  part  in   the  fight  between  Bindoy  and  Pacas.   • No   evidence   that   Bindoy   was   aware   of   Omamdam's  presence.   • No   evidence   that   there   was   disagreement   or   ill   feelings   between   Bindoy   &   Omamdam.   On   the   contrary,   they   were   nephew   &   uncle,   &   were   on   good  terms  with  each  other.   2. The   witness   for   the   defense   corroborates   the   defendant   to   the   effect   that   Pacas   and   Bindoy   were   actually   struggling   for   the   possession   of   the   bolo,   and   that   when   the   latter   let   go,   the   former   had   pulled   so   violently   that   it   flew   towards   Omamdam,   who   was   therefore   hit   in   the   chest,   without   Bindoy's   seeing   him,   because   Omamdam   had   passed   behind   him.   The   testimony   of   this   witness   was   not   contradicted   by   any   rebuttal  evidence  adduced  by  the  fiscal.   3. If,   in   the   struggle,   the   defendant   had   attempted   to   wound   his   opponent,   and   instead   of   doing   so,   had   wounded   Omamdam,   he   would   be   liable   for   his   act,   since  whoever  willfully  commits  a  felony  or   a   misdemeanor   incurs   criminal   liability,   although   the   wrongful   act   done   is   different   from  that  which  he  intended.     This  is  not  the  case  here.  Bindoy  did  not  try   to   wound   Pacas.   He   was   only   trying   to   defend   his   possession   of   the   bolo,   which   Pacas  was  trying  to  wrench  away  from  him.   His  conduct  was  perfectly  lawful.     U.S.  v.  Tanedo,  15  Phil.  196  (1910)  

Facts:   On   January   26,   1909,   Cecilio   Tanedo,   a   landowner,  went  with  some  workers  to  work  on  the   dam  on  his  land,  carrying  with  him  his  shotgun  &  a   few   shells.   Upon   reaching   the   dam,   the   accused   went  on  his  way  to  hunt  for  wild  chickens,  meeting   the   victim,   Feliciano   Sanchez,   the   latter's   Mother   &   Uncle.   The   accused   went   into   the   forest   upon   the   recommendation   of   the   deceased   to   continue   his   search   for   the   elusive   wild   chickens.   Upon   seeing   one,  Tanedo  shot  one,  but  simultaneously,  he  heard   a  human  cry  out  in  pain.    After  seeing  that  Sanchez   was  wounded,  Tanedo  ran  back  to  his  workers  and   asked   one,   Bernardino   Tagampa,   to   help   him   hide   the  body,  which  they  did  by  putting  it  amidst  the  tall   cogon   grass,   &   later   burying   in   an   old   well.   Only   1   shot   was   heard   that   morning   &   a   chicken   was   killed   by   a   gunshot   wound.   Chicken   feathers   were   found   at   the   scene   of   the   crime.   There   was   no   enmity   between  the  accused  and  the  deceased.  Prior  to  the   trial,   the   accused   denied   all   knowledge   of   the   crime,   but   later   confessed   during   the   trial.   The   lower   court   found  the  accused  guilty  of  homicide,  having  invited   the   deceased   into   the   forest   &   intentionally   shooting  him  in  the  chest.  Accused  was  sentenced  to   14   yrs,   8   mos   &   1   day   of   reclusion   temporal,   accessories,   indemnifications   &   costs.   The   accused   appealed.     Issue:  WON  the  accused  is  guilty     Held:   No.   The   idea   that   Tanedo   intended   to   kill   Sanchez  is  negated  by  the  fact  that  the  chicken  and   the   man   were   shot   at   the   same   time,   there   having   only  one  shot  fired.  Also,  according  to:   • Article   1   of   the   Penal   Code:   Crimes   or   misdemeanors   are   voluntary   acts   and   omissions  punished  by  law…   • Article   8:   He   who   while   performing   a   legal   act   with   due   care,   causes   some   injury   by   mere   accident   without   liability   or   intention   of  causing  it.   • Section  57  of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure:  A   defendant   in   a   criminal   action   shall   be   presumed   to   be   innocent   until   the   contrary   is  proved,  and  in  case  of  a  reasonable  doubt   that  his  guilt  is  satisfactorily  shown  he  shall   be  entitled  to  an  acquittal.  

Rañeses  110       In   this   case   there   is   no   evidence   of   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   accused,   nor   is   it   disputed   that   the   accused   was   engaged   in   a   legal   act,   nor   is   there   evidence   that   the   accused   intended   to   kill   the   deceased.  The  only  thing  suspicious  is  his  denial  of   the  act  and  his  concealment  of  the  body.     The  court  quoted  State  vs.  Legg:  "Where  accidental   killing  is  relied  upon  as  a  defense,  the  accused  is  not   required   to   prove   such   a   defense   by   a   preponderance   of   the   evidence,   because   there   is   a   denial  of  intentional  killing,  and  the  burden  is  upon   the  state  to  show  that  it  was  intentional,  and  if,  from   a   consideration   of   all   the   evidence,   both   that   for   the   state   and   the   prisoner,   there   is   a   reasonable   doubt   as   to   whether   or   not   the   killing   was   accidental   or   intentional,  the  jury  should  acquit."     Court   held   that   the   evidence   was   insufficient   to   support  the  judgment  of  conviction.     Decision:   Judgment   of   Conviction   is   reversed,   the   accused  acquitted,  and  discharged  from  custody.     Pomoy  v.  People,  439  SCRA  439  (2004)   Facts:   Balboa   was   arrested   for   being   one   of   the   suspects  in  a  robbery.  Sergeant  Pomoy  went  to  the   cell   of   Balboa   and   started   to   escort   him   to   the   investigation   room.   When   they   reached   the   main   building,   2   gunshots   were   heard   and   Pomoy   was   still   holding   the   gun   with   Balboa   lying   in   a   pool   of   blood   dead.   The   lone   witness   said   that   Pomoy   and   Balboa   were   grappling   possession   of   the   gun   with   Pomoy’s  right  hand  on  the  handle  with  Balboas  left   hand   over   the   right   hand   of   Pomoy   and   such   hand   positions   did   not   change   when   the   gun   was   out   of   the  holster.  The  witness  did  not  see  who  pulled  the   trigger.   Pomoy   was   convicted   of   homicide   by   the   trial   court   and   affirmed   by   the   Court   of   Appeals   because  he  was  said  to  have  control  of  the  gun  as  he   held  it  and  2  shots  were  fired.     Issue:  WON  Pomoy  had  control  of  the  gun.     Held:   The   testimony   of   the   witness   showed   that   Pomoy’s   right   hand   was   trying   to   maintain  

possession   of   the   gun   while   the   left   hand   was   warding   off   Balboa.   Under   such   circumstance,   Pomoy   could   not   have   coolly   and   effectively   released  the  safety  lock,  aim  and  fire  at  Balboa.  The   grappling   was   fierce   and   vicious.   The   logical   conclusion   is   the   safety   lock   was   released   through   the   scuffle   and   accidentally   fired   as   the   .45   pistol   immediately   replaces   the   empty   bullet   with   a   new   one  making  it  prone  to  accident/  The  location  of  the   wound  cannot  be  taken  into  account  as  the  nozzle’s   direction   was   continuously   changing   in     the   struggle.   His   defense   of   the   possession   of   his   gun   was   a   lawful   act.   No   intent   or   negligence   was   proven   and   he   even   had   precautionary   measures     keeping   the   gun   in   the   holster.   The   circumstance   was   beyond   the   control   of   Pomoy.   Pomoy   is   AQUITTED.    

Irresistible  force/Uncontrollable  fear   Reyes:   1. Irresistible  force   1. Elements:   1. That   the   compulsion   is   by   means  of  physical  force.     2. That  the  physical  force  must   be  irresistible.     3. That  the  physical  force  must   come  from  a  third  person.     2. Passion   or   obfuscation   cannot   be   irresistible  force.     3. Basis:  complete  absence  of  freedom   2. Uncontrollable  fear   1. Elements:   1. That  the  threat  which  causes   the   fear   is   of   an   evil   greater   than  or  at  least  equal  to,  that   which   he   is   required   to   commit;   2. That   is   promises   an   evil   of   such   gravity   and   imminence   that   the   ordinary   man   would   have  succumbed  to  it.     2. Duress   as   a   valid   defense   should   be   based   on   real,   imminent   or   reasonable   fear   for   one’s   life   or   limb   and   should   not   be  

Rañeses  111    

3.

4. 5.

6.

speculative   fanciful   or   remote   fear.     The   accused   must   not   have   opportunity   for   escape   or   self-­‐ defense.   A   threat   of   future   injury   is   not  enough.  The  compulsion  must  be   of   such   character   as   to   leave   no   opportunity   to   the   accused   for   escape  or  self-­‐defense.     Speculative,   fanciful   and   remote   fear  is  not  uncontrollable  fear.     In   irresistible   force,   the   offender   uses   violence   or   physical   force   to   compel   another   erson   to   commit   a  rime;  in  uncontrollable  fear,  the   offender   employs   intimidation   or   threat   in   compelling   another   to   commit  a  crime.     Basis:  complete  absence  of  freedom.    

  United  States  v.  Caballeros,  4  Phil.  350  (1905)   Facts:  Robert  Baculi  and  Apolonio  Caballeros  were   convicted   as   accessories   to   the   crime   of   assassination   or   murder   of   four   American   school-­‐ teachers,  having  buried  the  corpses  of  the  victims  to   conceal  the  crime.  They  were  allegedly  coerced.     Issue:  WON  the  defense  under  Art12(5)  is  tenable     Held:   Yes.   Not   only   is   Baculi’s   confession   that   he   only   assisted   in   the   burial   of   the   corpses   because   he   was   compelled   by   the   murderers,   but   this   was   corroborated   by   the   only   eyewitness   to   the   crime,   Sabate.   Sabate   said   that   he   was   present   when   the   Americans   were   killed;   that   Baculi   was   not   a   member   of   the   group   of   murderers   but   he   was   in   the  banana  plantation  gathering  some  bananas;  that   when   he   heard   the   shots   he   began   to   run;   that   he   was,   however,   seen   by   Damaso   and   Isidro,   the   leaders  of  the  band;  that  the  latter  called  to  him  and   striking  him  with  the  butts  of  their  guns  forced  him   to  bury  the  corpses.  As  for  Caballeros,  there  was  no   proof   that   he   took   any   part   in   the   execution   of   the   crime;   there   was   conclusive   proof   to   the   contrary.   Sabate   and   Baculi   declared   that   Caballeros   did   not   take  any  part  in  the  burial  of  the  aforesaid  corpses,   nor   was   he   even   in   the   place   of   the   occurrence  

when   the   burial   took   place.   Their   failure   to   report   the   crime   is   not   an   offense   punished   by   the   Penal   Code.       United  States  v.  Exaltacion,  3  Phil.  339  (1904)   Facts:   On   March   26,   1903,   Liberate   Exaltacion   and   Buenaventura   Tanchinco   were   charged   with   rebellion   –   willfully   and   illegally   bound   themselves   to  take  part  in  a  rebellion  against  the  government  of   the  US,  swearing  allegiance  to  the  Katipunan  Society   (whose  purpose  was  to  overthrow  the  government   by   force   of   arms).   Exaltacion   and   Tanchinco   claim   that  they  were  captured  by  armed  bandits  and  were   compelled   to   sign   documents   (containing   oath   taken   in   the   name   of   God   and   a   covenant   to   carry   out   superior   orders   of   the   Katipunan   Society   and   never  disobey  them  until  their  death  in  the  defense   of   the   mother   country)   under   threat   of   death.   Exaltacion   and   Tanchinco   reported   the   incident   to   the   governor,   lieutenant   of   volunteers   and   the   president  of  Meycauayan.  Witnesses  testified  to  this   fact  as  well.     Issue:     1. WON  the  defendants  are  guilty  of  the  crime   of  rebellion     2. WON   defendants   incur   criminal   liability   when  they  signed  the  documents?     Held:  No.  The  evidence  for  the  prosecution  and  the   documents  signed  by  the  accused  is  not  sufficient  to   prove   the   guilt   of   the   latter   or   to   justify   the   imposition  upon  them  of  the  penalty  inflicted  by  the   judgment  of  the  court  below.  The  facts,  established   by   the   evidence,   that   the   defendants   were   kidnapped   by   brigands   who   belonged   to   the   Contreras   Band,   and   that   they   signed   the   said   documents   under   compulsion   and   while   in   captivity,   relieve   them   from   all   criminal   liability   from   the   crime   of   rebellion   of   which   they   are   charged.   The   conduct   of   the   defendants   in   presenting  themselves  to  the  authorities  as  soon  as   they   were   released   is   corroborative   of   their   innocence.   Guilt   of   defendants   was   not   established   beyond  reasonable  doubt.    

Insuperable  cause  

Rañeses  112     Reyes:   1. Elements:   1. That  an  act  is  required  by  law  to  be   done;   2. That   a   person   fails   to   perform   such   act;   3. That   his   failure   to   perform   such   act   was   due   to   some   lawful   or   insuperable  cause.     2. Basis:  Absence  of  intent.       U.S.  v.  Vicentillo,  19  Phil.  118    (1911)   Facts:   Municipal   Pres.   Vicentillo   was   found   guilty   of   illegal   and   arbitrary   detention   after   detaining   Ney   for   three   days   without   bringing   the   latter   to   the   proper  judicial  authority  for  trial.       Issue:     WON   Pres.   acted   arbitrarily   and   without   legal  authority  in  such  detainment     Held:   No.   It   was   conclusively   proven   that   neither   the  local  justice  of  the  peace  nor  his  auxiliary  were   in   the   municipality,   and   to   reach   the   justice   of   the   peace   of   either   of   the   two   adjoining   municipalities,   it  was  necessary  to  take  a  long  journey  by  boat.       People  v.  Bandian,  63  Phil.  530  (1936)   Facts:   Josefina   was   seen   going   to   the   bushes   apparently  to  respond  to  a  call  of  nature.  When  she   emerged   from   the   bushes   her   clothes   were   stained   with  blood  and  she  was  weak  and  dizzy.  Neighbors   helped   her   go   up   to   her   house   and   later   found   a   dead  newborn  in  the  bushes.       Issue:  WON  she  is  guilty  of    infanticide     Held:   No.     Evidence   does   not   show   that   she   willfully,   consciously   or   imprudently   left   her   child   when   she   was   continuously   ill,   dizzy,   and   inexperienced  as  to  childbirth.    

Instigation  and  entrapment   Reyes:   1. Absolutory   causes:   those   where   the   act   committed   is   a   crime   but   for   reasons   of   public   policy   and   sentiment   there   is   no   penalty  imposed.    

2. Other   absolutory   causes.   Aside   from   the   justifying   and   exempting   circumstances,   there  are  also  other  absolutory  causes  (Arts.   6,  20,  124,  247,  280,  332,  344)     3. Instigation  is  an  absolutory  cause.     1. Must   be   made   by   public   officers   or   private  detectives   4. Entrapment  is  not  an  absolutory  cause.     5. There   is   a   wide   difference   between   entrapment   and   instigation,   for   while   in   the   latter   case   the   instigator   practically   induces   the   would-­‐be   accused   into   the   commission   of   the   offense   and   himself   become   a   co-­‐principal,   in   entrapment,   ways   and   means   are   resorted   to   for   the   purpose   of   trapping   and   capturing   the   lawbreaker   in   the   execution   of   his   criminal  plan.     6. There   is   neither   instigation   nor   entrapment  when  the  violation  of  the  law   is  simply  discovered.     7. Assurance   of   immunity   by   a   public   officer   does   not   exempt   a   person   from   criminal  liability.       People  v.  Lua  Chu,  56  Phil.  44  (1931)   Background   of   Case:   On   Nov.   1929,   Uy   Se   Tieng,   was   the   consignee   of   the   Shipments   of   Opium   coming  from  Hongkong,  who  represented  agents  of   the   real   Owners   of   Shipments   of   Opium   containing   3,252   tins.     He   collaborated   w/   Samson   &   Natividad   of   the   Customs   by   paying   them   an   amount   of   P6K   for  the  opium  to  be  released  safely  from  Customs.     On  Dec.  1929,  upon  arrival  of  the  Shipment  of  Opium   in   the   ports   of   Cebu,   Uy   Se   Tieng   informed   Samson   that   the   former   consult   the   real   owners   on   how   to   proceed   the   payment   of   P6K   &   will   come   over   to   Samson   house   on   Dec.   17,   1929   to   inform   the   decision  of  the  owners.     On   the   same   day   Samson   informed   the   Constabulary  represented  by  Captain  Buencosejo  &   the   Provincial   Fiscal   requesting   a   stenographer   to   take   down   the   conversation   between   Samson   &   Uy   Se  Teung.     On   the   night   of   Dec.   17,   1929,   Captain   Buencosejo   and  a  stenographer  named  Jumapao  from  a  law  firm   and  hid  themselves  behind  the  curtains  in  the  house   of   Samson   to   witness   the   conversation   between   Samson,  Uy  Se  Teung  and  Lua  Chu.  

Rañeses  113     Captain   Buencosejo   &   Jumapao   noted   the   ff.   important  facts:   1. Uy  Se  Teung  informed  Samson  that  Lua  Chu  was   one  of  the  owners  of  the  Opium.   2. Lua   Chu   informed   Samson   that   aside   from   him,   there   were   co-­‐owners   named   Tan   and   another   located  in  Amoy.     3. Lua   Chu   promised   to   pay   the   P6,000   upon   delivery  of  the  opium  from  the  warehouse  of  Uy   Se  Tieng.       4. A   Customs   Collector   had   a   conversation   before   when   Samson   was   on   vacation   in   Europe,   with   Lua  Chu  and  agreed  on  the  business  of  shipping   the  Opium.         The   following   morning   Uy   Se   Tieng   and  companion,   Uy   Ay   presented   papers   to   Samson   &   Captain   Buencosejo   showed   up   &   caught   them   in   the   act   &   arrested   the   two   Chinese.     The   Constabulary   then   arrested   Lua   Chu   &   confiscated   P50K   worth   of   Opium  (3,252  tins).   Facts  of  Case:  An  Appeal  was  made  by  Uy  Se  Tieng   &   Lua   Chu   &   made   10   assignments   of   errors   made   by  the  TC  in  its  judgment.     Appelant’s   Held   Point  of   Defense   Juan  Samson   1. A  public  official  shall  be   induced  the   involved  in  the  crime  if:   defendants  to   • He  induces  a  person  to   import  the   commit  a  crime  for   opium.   personal  gain     • Does  not  take  the   necessary  steps  to  seize   the  instrument  of  the   crime  and  to  arrest  the   offenders  before  he   obtained  the  profits  in   mind.   • He  obtained  the  profits  in   mind  even  through   afterwards  does  take  the   necessary  steps  seize  the   instrument  of  the  crime   &  to  arrest  the  offenders.   2. Even  though  Juan  Samson   smoothed  the  way  for  the   introduction  of  the   prohibited  drugs,  the  ff   should  be  noted  that  held   Samson  not  guilty  for  the   crime:   • The  accused  have  already   planned  and  actually  

ordered  the  opium   without  the  consent  or   participation  of  Juan   Samson.   • Did  not  help  the  accused   to  successfully   implement  there  plan   rather,  Samson  assured   the  seizure  of  the   imported  drug  and  the   arrest  of  the  smugglers.     Not  one  of  the  means   prescribed  in  section  342  of   the  Code  of  Civil  Procedures  

Trial  judge   refusal  of   exclusion  of   Juan  Samson  in   the  witness   stand  even   though  he  was   already   dismissed  from   the  Customs   secret  service   In  accepting   1. The  transcript  contains   the  transcript   certain  admissions  made  by   taken  down  by   the  defendants.   Jumapao  as  the   2. Stenographer  attested  that   true  &  correct   it  was  faithfully  taken  down.     conversation   3. Corroborated  by  statement   between  Juan   of  Juan  Statement  in  the   Samson  &  Uy   court.   Se  Tieng     Concluding  Remarks:   Entrapment   1. The   practice   of   entrapping   persons   into   crime   for   the   purpose   of   instituting   criminal   prosecutions   2. It   is   a   scheme   or   technique   ensuring   the   apprehension   of   the   criminals   by   being   in   the   actual  crime  scene.       3. The  law  officers  shall  not  be  guilty  to  the  crime  if   he  have  done  the  following:   a. He   does   not   induce   a   person   to   commit   a   crime   for   personal   gain   or   is   not   involved   in   the  planning  of  the  crime.     b. Does   take   the   necessary   steps   to   seize   the   instrument   of   the   crime   and   to   arrest   the   offenders   before   he   obtained   the   profits   in   mind.     Instigation:   This   is   the   involvement   of   a   law   officer   in  the  crime  itself  in  the  following  manners:   a. He   induces   a   person   to   commit   a   crime   for   personal  gain  

Rañeses  114     b. Doesn’t   take   the   necessary   steps   to   seize   the   instrument  of  the  crime  &  to  arrest  the  offenders   before  he  obtained  the  profits  in  mind.   c. He   obtained   the   profits   in   mind   even   through   afterwards   does   take   the   necessary   steps   seize   the   instrument   of   the   crime   and   to   arrest   the   offenders.     United  States  v.  Phelps,  16  Phil.  440  (1910)   Facts:   BIR   employee   Smith   (under   the   guise   of   Lockwood)   came   to   Phelps’   house   and   asked   if   Phelps   knew   anyone   who   could   assist   Smith   to   smoke   opium.   Smith   acted   like   he   was   having   convulsions   and   he   needed   to   smoke   opium   but   refused   to   be   brought   to   the   hospital,   so   Phelps   helped  him  find  a  Chinaman  who  prepared  opium.         At  the  opium  house,  a  Chinaman  gave  them  a  pipe  of   opium,   which   Smith   took   as   evidence   to   get   a   warrant   of   arrest.   Phelps   was   arrested   40   minutes   later.       The  Chinaman  testified  that  he  prepared  the  opium   after  repeated  demands  by  Smith.       Issue:  WON  Phelps  was  instigated     Held:   Yes.     Smith   not   only   suggested   but   also   stated   that   he   desired   to   commit   the   offense   and   would   pay   the   expense   necessary   for   the   commission   of   the  act.       When   an   employee   of   the   Government   encourages   or   induces   persons   to   commit   a   crime   in   order   to   prosecute   them,   such   conduct   is   most   reprehensible.       Phelps   is   not   guilty.   The   judgment   of   the   lower   court  is  reversed  and  the  appellant  acquitted.    

C. Mitigating  Circumstances   Reyes:   1. Mitigating   circumstances   are   those   which,   if   present   in   the   commission   of   the   crime,   do   not   entirely   free   the   actor   from   criminal   liability,   but   serve   only   to   seduce  the  penalty.     2. Basis:   Mitigating   circumstances   are   based   on   the   diminution   of   either   freedom   of   action,   intelligence,   or   intent,   or   on   the   lesser  perversity  of  the  offender.     3. Classes  of  mitigating  circumstances.  

1. Ordinary   mitigating   –   those   enumerated   in   subsections   1   to   10   of  Art.  13.       Those   mentioned   in   subsection   1   of   Art.   13   are   ordinary   mitigating   circumstances,   if   Art.   69,   for   instance  is  not  applicable.     2. Privileged  mitigating  –     a. Art.  68.  Penalty  to  be  imposed   upon  a  person  under  eighteen   years  of  age.   When  the  offender   is   a   minor   under   eighteen   years   of   age   and   his   case   falls   under   the   provisions   of   the   Juvenile   Justice   and   Welfare   Act,   the   following   rules   shall   be   observed:   (1) A   person   under   fifteen   years   of   age,   and   a   person   over   fifteen   and   under   eighteen   years   of   age   who   acted   without   discernment,   are   exempt   from  criminal  liability;   (2) Upon   a   person   over   fifteen   and   under   eighteen   years   of   age   who   acted   with   discernment,   the   penalty   next   lower   than   that   prescribed   by   law   shall   be   imposed,   but   always   in  the  proper  period.  (As   amended   by   RA   No.   9344)     b. Art.  69.  Penalty  to  be  imposed   when   the   crime   committed   is   not   wholly   excusable.   A   penalty   lower   by   one   or   two   degrees   than   that   prescribed   by   law  shall  be  imposed  if  the  deed   is   not   wholly   excusable   for   reason  of  the  lack  of  some  of  the   conditions  required  to  justify  the   same  or  to  exempt  from  criminal   liability   x   x   x,   provided   that   the   majority   of   such   conditions   be   present.     c. Art.   64.   Rules   for   the   application   of   penalties   which   contain  three  periods.  In  cases   in   which   the   penalties   prescribed   by   law   contain   three  

Rañeses  115     periods,   whether   it   be   a   single   divisible  penalty  or  composed  of   three   different   penalties,   each   one   of   which   forms   a   period   x   x   x,   the   courts   shall   observe   for   the  application  of  the  penalty  the   following   rules,   according   to   whether   there   are   or   are   not   mitigating   or   aggravating   circumstances:       x  x  x.         (5)  When  there  are  two  or  more   mitigating  circumstances  and  no   aggravating   circumstances   are   present,   the   court   shall   impose   the   penalty   next   lower   to   that   prescribed   by   law,   in   the   period   that   it   may   deem   applicable,   according   to   the   number   and   nature  of  such  circumstances.       x  x  x.     4. Privileged   mitigating   circumstances   applicable  only  to  particular  crimes.     1. Voluntary   release   of   the   person   illegally   detained   within   3   days   without   the   offender   attaining   his   purpose  and  before  the  institution  of   criminal   action.   (Art.   268,   par.   3)   The  penalty  is  one  degree  lower.     2. Abandonment   without   justification   of   the   spouse   who   committed   adultery.   (Art.   333,   par.   3)   The   penalty  is  one  degree  lower.     5. Distinctions.     1. Ordinary   mitigating   circumstance   is   susceptible   of   being   offset   by   any   aggravating   circumstance;   while   privileged   mitigating   cannot   be   offset  by  aggravating  circumstance.     2. Ordinary   mitigating,   if   not   offset   by   an   aggravating   circumstance,   produces   only   the   effect   of   applying   the   penalty   provided   by   law   for   the   crime   in   its   minimum   period,   in   case   of   divisible   penalty;   whereas   privileged   mitigating   produces   the   effect  of  imposing  upon  the  offender   the   penalty   lower   by   one   or   two   degrees  that  that  provided  by  law  for   the  crime.    

6. Mitigating  circumstances  only  reduce  the   penalty,   but   do   not   change   the   nature   of   the  crime.     • Where   the   accused   is   charged   with   murder,   as   when   treachery   as   a   qualifying  circumstance  is  alleged  in  the   information,   the   fact   that   there   is   a   generic   or   privileged   mitigating   circumstance  does  not  change  the  felony   or  homicide.     • If   there   is   any   ordinary   or   generic   mitigating   circumstance,   not   offset   by   any   aggravating   circumstance,   the   accused   should   be   found   guilty   of   the   same   crime   of   murder,   but   the   penalty   to   be   imposed   is   reduced   to   the   minimum  of  the  penalty  for  murder.     • If   there   is   a   privileged   mitigating   circumstance,   the   penalty   for   murder   will   be   reduced   by   one   or   two   degrees   lower.     • In   every   case,   the   accused   should   be   held  guilty  for  murder.     • The   judgment   of   the   trial   court   that   the   mitigating  circumstance  of  non-­‐habitual   drunkenness   changes   the   felony   to   homicide   is   erroneous,   because   treachery   is   alleged   in   the   information   and   the   crime   committed   by   the   appellant   is   that   of   murder.   The   mitigating   circumstance   reduces   the   penalty   provided   by   law   but   does   not   change   the   nature   of   the   crime.   (People   v.  Talam,  C.A.,  56  O.G.  3654)       RPC,  Art.  13   Mitigating   circumstances.   -­‐   The   following   are   mitigating  circumstances:   1.  Those  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  when   all   the   requisites   necessary   to   justify   the   act   or   to   exempt   from   criminal   liability   in   the   respective   cases  are  not  attendant.   2.   That   the   offender   is   under   eighteen   years   of   age   or   over   seventy   years.   In   the   case   of   the   minor,   he   shall   be   proceeded   against   in   accordance   with   the   provisions  of  article  80.   3.  That  the  offender  had  no  intention  to  commit  so   grave  a  wrong  as  that  committed.  

 

 

Rañeses  116     4.   That   sufficient   provocation   or   threat   on   the   part   of  the  offended  party  immediately  preceded  the  act.  

2.

5.   That   the   act   was   committed   in   the   immediate   vindication  of  a  grave  offense  to  the  one  committing   the   felony   (delito)   his   spouse,   ascendants,   descendants,   legitimate,   natural   or   adopted   brothers  or  sisters  or  relatives  by  affinity  within  the   same  degrees.   6.  That  of  having  acted  upon  an  impulse  so  powerful   as   naturally   to   have   produced   passion   or   obfuscation.  

3.

7.   That   the   offender   had   voluntarily   surrendered   himself   to   a   person   in   authority   or   his   agents,   or   that   he   had   voluntarily   confessed   his   guilt   before   the   court   prior   to   the   presentation   of   the   evidence   for  the  prosecution.   8.   That   the   offender   is   deaf   and   dumb,   blind   or   otherwise   suffering   some   physical   defect   which   thus   restricts   his   means   of   action,   defense,   or   communication  with  his  fellow  beings.   9.  Such  illness  of  the  offender  as  would  diminish  the   exercise   of   the   will-­‐power   of   the   offender   without   however  depriving  him  of  consciousness  of  his  acts.   10.  And,  finally,  any  other  circumstance  of  a  similar   nature  and  analogous  to  those  above  mentioned.  

    Reyes:     1. Par.   1.   “Those   mentioned   in   the   preceding  chapter.”   1. Refers   to   justifying   and   exempting   circumstances.     § Self-­‐defense  (Art.  11,  par.  1);   § Defense  of  relatives  (Art.  11,   par.  2);   § Defense   of   stranger   (Art.   11,   par.  3);     § State   of   necessity   (Art.   11,   par.  4);   § Performance   of   duty   (Art.   11,  par.  5);   § Obedience   to   order   of   superior  (Art.  11,  par.  6);   § Minority   over   9   and   under   15  years  of  age  (Art.  12,  par.   3);   § Causing   injury   by   mere   accident  (Art.  12,  par.  4);  and    

Uncontrollable  fear.  (Art.  12,     par.  6)     Same.   When   all   the   requisites   necessary  to  justify  the  act  are  not   attendant.     § Incomplete   self-­‐defense,   defense   of   relatives,   and   defense  of  stranger.  Unlawful   aggression   must   be   present,   it   being   an   indispensable   requisite.   What   is   absent   is   either  one  or  both  of  the  last   two  requisites.     Same.   Par.   1   is   applicable   only   when   unlawful   aggression   is   present   but   the   other   two   requisites   are   not   in   any   of   the   cases  referred  to  in  circumstances   Nos.  1,  2  and  3  of  Art.  11.     § Art.   13,   par.   1,   applies   only   when   unlawful   aggression   is   present,   but   the   other   two   requisites   are   not   present.   (Guevara)   § When   two   of   the   three   requisites  mentioned  therein   are   present   (for   example,   unlawful  aggression  and  any   one   of   the   other   two),   the   case  must  not  be  considered   as   one   in   which   an   ordinary   or   generic   mitigating   circumstance   is   present.   Instead,   it   should   be   considered   a   privileged   mitigating   circumstance   referred   to   in   Art.   69   of   this   Code.     § If   there   is   no   unlawful   aggression,   there   could   be   no  self-­‐defense  or  defense  of   a  relative,  whether  complete   or  incomplete.     Same.   Incomplete   justifying   circumstance   of   avoidance   of   greater  evil  or  injury.  If  any  of  the   last   two   requisites   is   absent,   there   is   only  a  mitigating  circumstance.     Same.   Incomplete   justifying   circumstance   of   performance   of   duty.   Since   the   Supreme   Court   considered  one  of  the  two  requisites   as  constituting  the  majority,  it  seems   that   there   is   no   ordinary   mitigating   §

4.

5.

Rañeses  117     circumstance   under   Art.   13,   par.   1,   when   the   justifying   or   exempting   circumstance   has   two   requisites   only.     6. Same.   When   all   the   requisites   necessary   to   exempt   from   criminal   liability   are   not   attendant.     7. Same.   Incomplete   exempting   circumstance   of   minority   over   9   and   under   15   years   of   age.   The   case   of   a   minor   invoking   this   circumstance   is   specifically   covered   by  Art.  68.     8. Same.   Incomplete   exempting   circumstance   of   accident.   If   the   second   requisite   (performance   of   a   lawful   act)   and   the   first   part   of   the   fourth  requisite  are  absent  (without   fault),   the   case   will   fall   under   Art.   365   which   punishes   a   felony   by   negligence  or  imprudence.     § In  effect,  there  is  a  mitigating   circumstance,   because   the   penalty   is   lower   than   that   provided   for   intentional   felony.     If  the  first  requisite  (performance  of   a   lawful   act)   and   the   second   part   of   the   fourth   requisite   (without   intention  of  causing  it)  are  absent,  it   will  be  an  intentional  felony.  The  2nd   and  3rd  requisites  will  not  be  present   either.     • In  this  case,  there  is  not   even   a  mitigating  circumstance.     9. Same.   Incomplete   exempting   circumstance   of   uncontrollable   fear.   If   only   of   the   requisites   of   uncontrollable   fear   as   an   exemting   circumstance   is   present,   there   is   only    mitigating  circumstance.     2. Par.  2.  Impliedly  repealed  by  RA  9344.  An   offender   fifteen   (15)   or   over   but   under   eighteen   (18)   years   of   age   is   exempt   from   criminal   liability   should   he/she   act   without   discernment.     3. Same.   Diversion   and   Diversion   Program   under   RA   9344.   “Diversion”   refers   to   an   alternative,   child-­‐appropriate   process   of   determining   the   responsibility   and   treatment  of  a  child  in  conflict  with  the  law   on   the   basis   of   his/her   social,   cultural,   economic,   pasychological,   or   educational  

background   without   resulting   to   formal   court   proceedings.   (Section   4[j],   Rep.   Act.   No.  9344)     “Diversion   Program”   refers   to   the   program   that   the   child   in   conflict   with   the   law   is   required   to   undergo   after   he/she   is   found   responsible   for   an   offense   without   resorting   to   formal   court   proceedings.   (Section   4[j],   Rep.  Act.  No.  9344)   4. Same.   System   of   Diversion.   Children   in   conflict  with  the  law  shall  undergo  diversion   procceedings   without   undergoing   court   proceedings   subject   to   the   following   conditions:   1. Imposable   penalty   is   not   more   than   six   (6)   years.   Law   enforcement   officer   or   Punong   Barangay   with   the   assistance   of   the   local   DSWD   officer   or   other   members   of   the   Local   Councils   for   the   Protection   of   Children   (LCPC)   established   in   a   all   levels   of   local   government   shall   conduct   mediation,   family   conferencing   and   conciliation  and,  where  appropriate,   adopt   indigenous   modes   of   conflict   resolution   in   accordance   with   the   best   interest   of   the   child   with   a   view   to   accomplishing   the   objectives   of   restorative   justice   and   the   formulation  of  a  diversion  program.     2. In   victimless   crimes   where   the   imposable   penalty   is   not   more   than   six   (6)   years   of   imprisonment.   Local   DSWD   officer   shall   meet   with   child   and   his/her   parents   or   guardians   for   the   development   of   the   appropriate   diversion   and   rehabilitation   program,   in   coordination   with   the   Barangay   Council   for   the   Protection   of  Children  (BCPC).     3. Imposable   penalty   for   the   crime   committed   exceeds   six   (6)   years   imprisonment.  Diversion  measures   may  be  resorted  to  only  by  the  court.   (see   Section   23,   Republic   Act   No.   9344)   5. Same.   Contract   of   Diversion.   If   during   the   conferencing,   mediation   or   conciliation,   the   child   voluntarily   admits   the   commission   of   the   act,   a   diversion   program   shall   be   developed   when   appropriate   and   desirable  

Rañeses  118     as   determined   under   Section   30.   Such   admission  shall  not  be  used  against  the  child   in   any   subsequent   judicial,   quasi-­‐judicial   or   administrative   proceedings.   The   diversion   program   shall   be   effective   and   binding   if   accepted   by   the   parties   concerned.   The   acceptance   shall   be   in   writing   and   signed   by   the   parties   concerned   and   the   appropriate   authorities.   The   local   social   welfare   and   development   officer   shall   supervise   the   implementation   of   the   diversion   program.   The   diversion   proceedings   shall   be   completed   within   forty-­‐five   (45)   days.   The   period  of  prescription  of  the  offense  shall  be   suspended   until   the   completion   of   the   diversion   proceedings   but   not   to   exceed   forty-­‐five  (45)  days.     The   child   shall   present   himself/herself   to   the   competent   authorities   that   imposed   the   diversion   program   at   least   once   a   month   for   reporting   and   evaluation   of   the   effectiveness  of  the  program.     Failure   to   comply   with   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   contract   of   diversion,   as   certified   by   the   local   social   welfare   and   development  officer,  shall  give  the  offended   party   the   option   to   institute   the   appropriate   legal  action.     The   period   of   prescription   of   the   offense   shall   be   suspended   during   the   effectivity   of   the   diversion   program,   but   not   exceeding   a   period   of   two   (2)   years.   (Sec.   26,   Rep.   Act.   No.  9344)   6. Where   diversion   may   be   conducted.   Diversion   may   be   conducted   at   the   Katarungang   Pambarangay,   the   police   investigation   or   the   inquest   or   preliminary   investigation   stage   and   at   all   1evels   and   phases  of  the  proceedings  including  judicial   level.  (Section  24,  Republic  Act  No.  9344)   7. Duty  of  the  Punong  Barangay  or  the  Law   Enforcement   Officer   when   there   is   no   diversion.  If  the  offense  does  not  fall  under   Section   23(a)   and   (b),   or   if   the   child,   his/her   parents   or   guardian   does   not   consent   to   a   diversion,   the   Punong   Barangay   handling   the   case   shall,   within   three   (3)   days   from   determination  of  the  absence  of  jurisdiction   over   the   case   or   termination   of   the   diversion   proceedings,   as   the   case   may   be,   forward  the  records  of  the  case  of  the  child  

to   the   law   enforcement   officer,   prosecutor   or  the  appropriate  court,  as  the  case  may  be.   Upon   the   issuance   of   the   corresponding   document,   certifying   to   the   fact   that   no   agreement  has  been  reached  by  the  parties,   the   case   shall   be   filed   according   to   the   regular   process.   (See   Section   27,   Republic   Act  No.  9344)     If   the   offense   does   not   fall   under   Section   23(a)  and  (b),  or  if  the  child,  his/her  parents   or  guardian  does  not  consent  to  a  diversion,   the  Women  and  Children  Protection  Desk  of   the   PNP,   or   other   law   enforcement   officer   handling  the  case  of  the  child  under  custody,   to  the  prosecutor  or  judge  concerned  for  the   conduct   of   inquest   and/or   preliminary   investigation   to   determine   whether   or   not   the   child   should   remain   under   custody   and   correspondingly   charged   in   court.   The   document   transmitting   said   records   shall   display   the   word   "CHILD"   in   bold   letters.   (Sec.  28,  Rep.  Act  No.  9344)   8. Determination   of   age   of   child   in   conflict   with  the  law.    The  child  in  conflict  with  the   law  shall  enjoy  the  presumption  of  minority.   He/She   shall   enjoy   all   the   rights   of   a   child   in   conflict   with   the   law   until   he/she   is   proven   to   be   eighteen   (18)   years   old   or   older.   The   age   of   a   child   may   be   determined   from   the   child's  birth  certificate,  baptismal  certificate   or   any   other   pertinent   documents.   In   the   absence   of   these   documents,   age   may   be   based   on   information   from   the   child   himself/herself,   testimonies   of   other   persons,   the   physical   appearance   of   the   child  and  other  relevant  evidence.  In  case  of   doubt   as   to   the   age   of   the   child,   it   shall   be   resolved  in  his/her  favor.     Any  person  contesting  the  age  of  the  child  in   conflict  with  the  law  prior  to  the  filing  of  the   information   in   any   appropriate   court   may   file  a  case  in  a  summary  proceeding  for  the   determination   of   age   before   the   Family   Court   which   shall   decide   the   case   within   twenty-­‐four   (24)   hours   from   receipt   of   the   appropriate   pleadings   of   all   interested   parties.     If   a   case   has   been   fiied   against   the   child   in   conflict   with   the   law   and   is   pending   in   the   appropriate   court,   the   person   shall   file   a   motion   to   determine   the   age   of   the   child   in  

Rañeses  119     the   same   court   where   the   case   is   pending.   Pending   hearing   on   the   said   motion,   proceedings   on   the   main   case   shall   be   suspended.     In   all   proceedings,   law   enforcement   officers,   prosecutors,   judges   and   other   government   officials   concerned   shall   exert   all   efforts   at   determining   the   age   of   the   child   in   conflict   with   the   law.   (Section   7,   Republic   Act   No.   9344)   9. That  the  offender  is  over  70  years  of  age   is   only   a   generic   mitigating   circumstance.     10. Basis:   The   mitigating   circumstance   in   paragraph   2   of   Art.   13   are   based   on   the   diminution   of   intelligence,   a   condition   of   voluntariness.      

Lack   of   intention   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong   Reyes:   1. This   circumstance   can   be   taken   into   account  only  when  the  facts  proven  show   tat   there   is   a   notable   and   evident   disproportion   between   the   means   employed  to  execute  the  criminal  act  and   its   consequences.   (U.S.   vs.   Reyes,   36   Phil.   904,  907)   2. Intention,   being   an   internal   state,   must   be   judged   by   external   acts.   Intention,   as   an   internal   act,   is   judged   not   only   by   the   proportion   of   the   means   employed   by   him   to   the   evil   produced   by   his   act,   but   also   by   the  fact  that  the  blow  was  or  was  not  aimed   at  a  vital  part  of  the  body.     3. The   weapon   used,   the   part   of   the   body   injured,   the   injury   inflicted,   and   the   manner   it   is   inflicted   may   show   that   the   accused  intended  the  wrong  committed.     4. Not   applicable   when   the   offender   employed  brute  force.     5. Lack   of   intention   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong   mitigating   in   robbery   with   homicide.     6. Appreciated   In   murder   qualified   by   circumstances   based   on   manner   of   commission,   not   on   state   of   mind   of   accused.     7. Not   appreciated   in   murder   qualified   by   treachery.     8. Lack   of   intent   to   kill   not   mitigating   in   physical  injuries.    

1. It   is   appreciated   when   the   victim   dies.     9. Not  applicable  to  felonies  by  negligence.     10. Applicable   only   to   offenses   resulting   in   physical  injuries  or  material  harm.     11. Basis:  Intent,  an  element  of  voluntariness  in   intentional  felony,  is  diminished.       People  v.  Ural,  56  SCRA  138  (1974)   Facts:   Ural   was   convicted   of   murder   by   the   Zamboanga   CFI   sentencing   him   to   reclusion   perpetua,   and   orderinh   im   to   indemnify   the   heirs   of   Felix   Napola,   in   the   sum   of   P12K   and   to   pay   the   costs.  The  judgment  of  conviction  was  based  on  the   testimony   of   Brigido   Alberto,   former   detention   prisoner   who   witnessed   what   happened.   Ural,   a   policeman,   boxed   the   deceased,   Felix   Napola,   a   detention   prisoner,   inside   the   jail.  As  a  consequence   of   the   fistic   blows,   the   deceased   collapsed   on   the   floor.  The  accused  stepped  on  the  prostate  body  and   left.  After  a  while  he  returned  with  a  bottle  poured   its   contents   on   the   re¬cumbent   body   of   the   deceased,   ignited   it   with   a   match   and   left   the   cell   again.  As  a  consequence,  the  victim  later  on  died  of   the   burns.   The   crime   committed   by   appellant   Ural   was   murder   by   means   of   fire   (incendio)   (Art   248(3),  RPC)     Issue:   WON   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   lack   of   intention   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong   can   be   appreciated  in  thie  case  at  bar.     Held:   Yes.   The   trial   court   correctly   held   that   the   accused   took   advantage   of   his   public   position   (Art   14(1),  RPC)  but  it  failed  to  appreciate  the  mitigating   cir¬cumstance  of  "no  intention  to  commit  so  grave  a   wrong   as   that   committed."   (Art.13(3),   RPC).   The   intention,   as   an   internal   act,   is   judged   not   only   by   the   pro-­‐portion   of   the   means   employed   by   him   to   the  evil  produced  by  his  act,  but  also  by  the  fact  that   the  blow  was  or  was  not  aimed  at  a  vital  part  of  the   body.   Thus,   it   may   be   deduced   from   the   proven   facts   that   the   accused   had   no   intent   to   kill   the   victim,   his   design   being   only   to   maltreat   him,   such   that   when   he   realized   the   fearful   consequences   of   his   felo¬nious   act,   he   allowed   the   victim   to   secure   medical  treatment  at  the  municipal  dispensary.     Lack   of   intent   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong   offsets   the   generic   aggravating,   circumstance   of   abuse   of   his   official   position.   The   trial   court   properly   imposed  the  penalty  of  reclusion  perpetua  which  is   the  medium  period  of  the  penalty  for  murder  (Arts   64(4)  and  248,  RPC)  

Rañeses  120    

Sufficient  provocation   Reyes:     1. Provocation   is   understood   as   any   unjust   or   improper   conduct   or   act   of   the   offended   party,   capable   of   exciting,   inciting,  or  irritating  any  one.     2. Requisites:   1. That   the   provocation   must   be   sufficient.   § Sufficient   –   adequate   to   excite   a   person   to   commit   the   wrong   and   must   accordingly   be   proportionate  to  its  gravity.   § Dependent   on   the   act   constituting  provocation,  the   social  standing  of  the  person   provoked,   the   place   and   the   time   when   the   provocation   is  made.     2. That   it   must   originate   from   the   offended  party.     3. That   the   provocation   must   be   immediate   to   the   act,   i.e.,   to   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   the   person  who  is  provoked.     3. Difference   between   sufficient   provocation   as   requisite   of   incomplete   self-­‐defense   and   as   a   mitigating   circumstance.     As   an   element   of   self-­‐ defense,   it   pertains   to   its   absence   on   the   part   of   the   person   defending   himself,   while   as   a   mitigating   circumstance,   it   pertains   to   its   presence   on   the   part   of   the   offended   party.     4. Provocation   must   be   immediate   to   the   commission  of  the  crime.     5. Basis:  Diminution  of  intelligence  and  intent.       People  v.  Leonor,  305  SCRA  285   Facts:   In   the   morning   of   May   15,   1995,   Dr.   Maria   Teresa   Tarlengco,   a   dentist   by   profession,   was   at   her   clinic   at   the   third   floor   of   the   Hermanos   Building,  Bicutan,  Parañaque,  Metro  Manila,  when  a   man   entered   and   inquired   about   the   cost   of   tooth   extraction.     After   Dr.   Tarlengco   quoted   her   professional   fee,   the   man,   who   was   later   on   identified  as  Christopher  Leonor,  said  that  he  would   come   back   and   then   left   in   a   hurry.     Minutes   later,   Leonor   came   back[,]   and   Dr.   Tarlengco   told   him   to   take   a   seat   and   wait.     Dr.   Tarlengco   was   preparing   her  dental  instruments  when  Leonor  barged  in  and   demanded   money.     Dr.   Tarlengco   told   Leonor   that   her   money   [was]   on   the   table.     On   hearing   this,  

Leonor   stabbed   Dr.   Tarlengco,   grabbed   her   watch   and   ran   away.     Dr.   Tarlengco   struggled   out   of   the   clinic  and  saw  the  man  running  out  of  the  building,   Dr.  Tarlengco  shouted  for  help.     Reynaldo   Baquilod,   building   security   guard,   heard   Dr.   Tarlengco   shouting,   “Tulungan   ninyo   ako,   sinaksak  ako  ng  taong  iyon.”    Baquilod  noticed  that   Dr.  Tarlengco  was  referring  to  the  man  “running  out   of   the   building,   coming   from   upstairs.”     Baquilod   chased   Leonor   up   to   Daang   Hari   Street   where   he   was   joined   by   traffic   policeman   Luis   Galeno   who   was   alerted   by   people   running   after   a   person   with   bloodied   shirt.     When   Galeno   and   Baquilod   caught   up   with   Leonor,   Baquilod   grabbed   Leonor’s   hand   and   took   therefrom   a   Titus   wristwatch   and   P900   cash.    When  queried,  Leonor  readily  answered,  “Sir,   hindi   ko   naman   gusto   po   ito.     Ginawa   ko   lang   ito   dahil   kailangan   ng   pamilya   ko.”     Leonor   was   brought  to  the  Parañaque  Police  Block  Station,  PO3   Interia  who  was  instructed  to  investigate  proceeded   to   Dr.   Tarlengco’s   clinic,   where   they   saw,   among   other[   ]   [things],   a   bloodied   balisong   (fan   knife)   at   the   ground   floor   of   the   Hermano’s   building.     Baquilod  turned  over  the  watch  and  money  he  took   from   Leonor   to   Interia.     Thereafter,   Galeno   and   Interia   returned   to   the   police   station   where   they   were  interrogated.     Issue:   WON   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   sufficient  provocation  can  be  invoked  in  the  case  at   bar.       Held:   No.   CHRISTOPHER   is   thus   claiming   that   a   push   and   “bad   words”   justify   retaliation   with   a   knife.    Such  claim  is  undeserving  of  belief  and  does   not   entitle   CHRISTOPHER   to   the   benefit   of   the   mitigating   circumstance   prior   provocation   by   the   offended  party.    

Immediate  vindication  of  a  grave  offense   Reyes:   1. Requisites:   1. That   there   be   a   grave   offense   done   to   the   one   committing   the   feloy,   his   spouse,   ascendants,   descendants,   legitimate,   natural   or   adopted   brothers   or   sisters,   or   relatives   by   affinity  within  the  same  degrees;   2. That   the   felony   is   committed   in   vindication   of   such   grave   offense.   A   lapse   of   time   is   allowed   between   the   vindication   and   the   doing   of   the   grave  offense.    

Rañeses  121     §

The   word   “immediate”   used   in   the   English   text   is   not   the   correct   translation.   The   Spanish  text  uses  “proxima.”     provocation   from  

2. Distinguish   vindication.     1. In  the  case  of  provocation,  it  is  made   directly   only   to   the   person   committing   the   felony;   in   vindication,   the   grave   offense   may   be   committed   also   against   the   offender’s   relatives   mentioned   by   law.     2. In   vindication,   the   offended   party   must   have   done   a   grave   offense   to   the   offender   or   his   relatives   mentioned   by   the   law;   in   provocation,   the   cause   that   brought   about  the  provocation  need  not  be  a   grave  offense.     3. In   provocation,   it   is   necessary   that   the   provocation   or   threat   immediately   preceded   the   act,   i.e.,   that   there   be   no   interval   of   time   between   the   provocation   and   the   commission   of   the   crime;   while   in   vindication,   the   vindication   of   the   grave   offense   may   be   proximate,   which   admits   of   an   interval   of   time   between   the   grave   offense   done   by   the   offended   party   and   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   the   accused.     3. Same.   Reason   for   difference.   Greater   leniency   in   the   case   of   vindication   is   due   undoubtedly  to  the  fact  that  it  concerns  the   honor  of  a  person,  an  offense  which  is  more   worthy   of   consideration   than   mere   spite   against   the   one   giving   the   provocation   or   threat.     4. Basis  to  determine  the  gravity  of  offense   in   vindication.   Social   standing,   place   and   time  when  the  insult  was  made.     5. Basis:   Diminution   of   the   conditions   of   voluntariness.       United  States  v.  Ampar,  37  Phil.  201  (1917)   Facts:   During   a   fiesta,   an   old   man   70   years   of   age   asked   the   deceased,   Patobo,   for   some   roast   pig.   In   the  presence  of  many  guests,  the  deceased  insulted   the   old   man,   saying:   "There   is   no   more.   Come   here   and  I  will  make  roast  pig  of  you."  A  little  later,  while   the   deceased   was   squatting   down,   the   old   man  

came   up   behind   him   and   struck   him   on   the   head   with  an  ax.     Issue:   WON   immediate   vindication   of   a   grave   offense   is   available   as   a   mitigating   circumstance   in   this  case.       Held:   While   it   may   be   mere   trifle   to   an   average   person,   it   evidently   was   a   serious   matter   to   an   old   man,  to  be  made  the  butt  of  a  joke  in  the  presence  of   so   many   guests.   The   accused   was   given   the   benefit   of   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   vindication   of   a   grave   offense.   In   this   case,   the   age   of   the   accused   and   the   place   were   considered   in   determining   the   gravity  of  the  offense.     People  v.  Pajares,  210  SCRA  237  (1992)     Facts:   Renato   R.   Perez,   a   resident   of   1386-­‐K   Burgos   St.,   Paco,   Manila,   is   the   same   Renato   Perez   who   is   the   victim   in   Criminal   Case   No.   85-­‐40580   for   Frustrated   Homicide.   He   testified   that   at   about   11:30   p.m.   on   October   11,   1985,   he   and   the   deceased   Diosdado   Viojan   were   on   their   way   to   a   store   located   at   Gomez   St.,   Paco,   Manila   to   buy   something.   They   were   walking   abreast   with   each   other,  the  deceased  was  at  his  right  side  and  was  a   bit   ahead   of   him,   when   appellant   Pajares   suddenly   appeared   from   behind   and   hit   Viojan   with   a   baseball   bat   at   the   back   of   his   head.   The   latter   ran   a   short   distance   and   fell   down   near   the   store   of   one   Alex   Blas.   When   Perez   tried   to   help   Viojan.   he,   too,   was   attacked   by   Pajares   with   the   baseball   bat   hitting   him   at   the   back   below   the   left   shoulder.   He   then  grappled  with  the  appellant  for  the  possession   of   the   baseball   bat   but   the   latter's   companions,   namely:   Rudy   Dokling,   Popoy,   Inggo   and   Lauro   Duado   mauled   him   until   he   lost   consciousness.   He   was   brought   to   the   Philippine   General   Hospital   by   Eugene   Panibit   and   Joselito   Perez   where   he   was   treated  for  the  injuries  he  sustained.  He  identified  in   court  the  baseball  bat  used  by  Pajares.       Issue:   WON   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   immediate  vindication  can  be  applied  in  the  case  at   bar.       Held:   Yes.   Having   established   the   guilt   of   herein   appellant.   the   next   question   is   whether   or   not   the   mitigating  circumstance  of  immediate  vindication  of   a   grave   offense   can   be   appreciated   in   his   favor.   While   it   may   be   true   that   appellant's   brother   Roberto   Pajares   was   mauled   by   the   companions   of   the   deceased   at   about   11:30   a.m.   of   October   11,   1985   as   show   in   the   entry   in   the   Police   Blotter  

Rañeses  122     (Exhibits  "A"  to  "A-­‐3",  Original  Records  of  Criminal   Case   No.   85-­‐40579.   pp.   30-­‐33)   and   by   appellant's   brother  himself  (Exhibits  "G",  "Q"  and  "A"  Nos.  7-­‐9,   Ibid.,  p.  219),  it  must  be  emphasized  that  there  is  a   lapse   of   about   ten   (10)   hours   between   said   incident   and   the   killing   of   Diosdado   Viojan.   Such   interval   of   time  was  more  than  sufficient  to  enable  appellant  to   recover   his   serenity   (People   v.   Benito,   G.R.   No.   L-­‐ 32042,  December  17,  1976  [74  SCRA  271]).  Hence,   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   immediate   vindication  of  a  grave  offense  cannot  be  appreciated   in  his  favor.    

Passion  or  obfuscation   Reyes:     1. Requisites:   1. The  accused  acted  upon  impulse.   2. The   impulse   must   be   so   powerful   that  it  naturally  produced  passion  or   obfuscation  in  him.     2. Rules  for  application  of  this  paragraph.     • Passion   or   obfuscation   may   constitute  a  mitigating  circumstance   only   when   the   same   arose   from   lawful  sentiments.     • For   the   above   reason,   there   is   no   mitigating  circumstance  when:   1. The   act   is   committed   in   a   spirit  of  lawlessness;  or   2. The   act   is   committed   in   a   spirit  of  revenge.     3. Exercise   of   a   right   or   fulfillment   of   duty   is   not   a   proper   source   for   passion   or   obfuscation.     4. No  passion  or  obfuscation  after  24  hours,   or  several  hours  or  half  an  hour.     1. The  defense  must  prove  that  the  act   which   produced   passion   or   obfuscation  took  place  at  a  time  not   far   removed   from   the   commission   of   the  crime.     2. The   crime   committed   must   be   the   result  of  a  sudden  impulse  of  natural   and  uncontrollable  fear.     5. Obfuscation   –   when   relationship   is   illegitimate  –  is  not  mitigating.     6. The   cause   producing   passion   or   obfuscation   must   come   from   the   offended  party.     7. Basis:   Passion   or   obfuscation   is   a   mitigating   circumstance   because   the   offender   who   acts   with   passion   or   obfuscation   suffers   a   diminution  of  intelligence  and  intent.    

8. Provocation   and   obfuscation   arising   from   one   and   the   same   cause   should   be   treated   as   only   one   mitigating   circumstance.     9. Vindication   of   grave   offense   cannot   co-­‐ exist  with  passion  and  obfuscation.     10. Exception   –   When   there   are   other   facts,   although   closely   connected.   But   where   there   are   other   facts,   although   closely   connected   with   the   fact   upon   which   one   circumstance   is   premised,   the   other   circumstance   may   be   appreciated   as   based   on   the   other   fact.   (People   vs.   Diokno,   63   Phil.  601)   11. Passion   or   obfuscation   compatible   with   lack   of   intention   to   commit   so   grave   a   wrong.     12. Passion   or   obfuscation   incompatible   with  treachery.     1. Vindication  or  obfuscation  cannot  be   considered   when   the   person   attacked   is   not   the   one   who   gave   cause  therefor.     13. Passion   and   obfuscation   cannot   co-­‐exist   with  evident  premeditation.     14. Passion   or   obfuscation   distinguished   from  provocation.     15. Passion   or   obfuscation   distinguished   from  provocation.     1. Provocation  comes  from  the  injured   party;   passion   or   obfuscation   is   produced   by   an   impulse   which   may   be  caused  by  provocation.     2. Provocation   must   immediately   precede   the   commission   of   the   crime;  in  passion  or  obfuscation,  the   offense   which   engenders   perturbation   of   mind   need   not   be   immediate.   It   is   only   required   that   the   influence   thereof   lasts   until   the   moment  the  crime  is  committed.     3. In   both,   the   effect   is   the   loss   of   reason   and   self-­‐control   on   the   part   of  the  offender.       United  States  v.  Hicks,  14  Phil.  217  (1909)   Facts:   For   about   5   years,   the   accused   and   the   deceased   lived   illicitly   in   the   manner   of   husband   and   wife.   Afterwards,   the   deceased   separated   from   the   accused   and   lived   with   another   man.   The   accused   enraged   by   such   conduct,   killed   the   deceased.    

Rañeses  123     Issue:  WON  the  mitigating  circumstance  of  passion   or  obfuscation  can  be  invoked.       Held:   No.   Even   if   it   is   true   that   the   accused   acted   with   obfuscation   because   of   jealousy,   the   mitigating   circumstance   cannot   be   considered   in   his   favor   because   the   causes   which   mitigate   criminal   responsibility   for   the   loss   of   self-­‐control   are   such   which   originate   from   legitimate   feelings,   and   not   those   which   arise   from   vicious,   unworthy   and   immoral  passions.     United  States  v.  De  la  Cruz,  22  Phil.  429  (1912)   Facts:   The   accused,   in   the   heat   of   passion,   killed   his   common-­‐law   wife   upon   discovering   her   in   flagrante   in   carnal   communication   with   a   common   acquaintance.     Issue:  WON  the  mitigating  circumstance  of  passion   or  obfuscation  can  be  invoked  in  the  case  at  bar.       Held:  Yes.  In  this  a  case,  the  accused  was  entitled  to   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   passion   or   obfuscation.   The   facts   in   this   case   must   be   distinguished   from   the   case   of   U.S.   vs.   Hicks   where   it   was   found   that   the   accused,   deliberately   and   after   due   reflection   resolved   to   kill   the   woman   who   had   left   him   for   another   man.   With   a   clean   and   well-­‐ prepared  weapon,  he  entered  the  house;  disguising   his   intention   and   calming   her   by   his   apparent   repose   and   tranquility,   doubtless   in   order   to   successfully   accomplish   his   criminal   design.   In   this   case,   the   cause   of   the   alleged   passion   and   obfuscation   of   the   accused   was   his   vexation,   disappointment   and   anger   engendered   by   the   refusal   of   the   woman   to   continue   to   live   in   illicit   relations  with  him,  which  she  had  a  perfect  right  to   do.   In   the   present   case,   however,   the   impulse   was   caused   by   the   sudden   revelation   that   she   was   untrue  to  him,  and  his  discovery  of  her  in  flagrante   in  the  arms  of  another.    

Illness  

Reyes:   1. Requisites:     1. That  the  illness  of  the  offender  must   diminish   the   exercise   of   his   will-­‐ power.   2. That  such  illness  should  not  deprive   the   offender   of   consciousness   of   his   acts.     2. When   the   offender   completely   lost   the   exercise   of   will-­‐power,   it   may   be   an   exempting  circumstance.    

3. A   diseased   mind,   not   amounting   to   insanity,  may  give  place  to  mitigation.     4. Basis:  Diminution  of  intelligence  and  intent.       People  v.  Javier,  311  SCRA  576  (1999)     Facts:     1. Dec  1954:  Accused-­‐appellant  Eduardo  Javier   was   married   to   Florentina   Laceste.     They   begot   10   children.   On   June   ’96,   after   41   yrs   of  marriage,  Javier  admitted  killing  his  wife.   2. Testimonies   of   SPO1   Rotelio   Pacho,   a   desk   investigator,    and  Consolacion  Javier  Panit  &   Alma  Javier,  daughters  of  the  sps:   3. Between  2–3am,  Consolacion,  who  lived  10-­‐ 15m.   away,   heard   her   mom   shouting,   “your   father   is   going   to   kill   me!”   (translated   from   local   dialect).     She   ran   outside   &   met   her   sister   Alma   who   was   weeping   &   informed   her   of   their   parents’   quarrel.     Together,   they   went  to  their  brother  Manuel’s  house,  about   70-­‐80m.  away  from  their  parents’  house.   4. Upon   reaching   the   latter,   Manuel,   who   entered   first,   found   the   lifeless   body   of   his   mother   in   their   bedroom   and   his   father,   wounded  in  the  abdomen.   5. Their   father,   Eduardo,   confessed   to   son   Manuel  that  he  killed  his  wife  and  thereafter   stabbed  himself.   6. April   1997:   RTC   held   Javier   guilty   of   the   crime   of   parricide   and   sentenced   him   to   suffer  the  penalty  of  death,  and  to  indemnify   the   heirs   of   the   victim   in   the   amount   of   PhP50K   as   moral   damages   and   PhP21,730   as  actual  expenses.   7. In   his   appeal,   Javier   claims   he   killed   his   wife   because  he  was  suffering  from  insomnia  for   a   month   and   at   the   time   of   the   killing,   his   mind   went   totally   blank   and   he   did   not   know  what  he  was  doing.    He  claims  that  he   was  insane  then.     Issues:     1. WON   accused-­‐appellant   Javier   can   claim   mitigating   circumstances   of   illness   and   of   passion  and  obfuscation   2. WON   he   should   be   sentence   to   suffer   a   lower  penalty     Held:   1. No   to   both.   On   illness,   since   Javier   has   already   admitted   to   the   killing,   it   is   incumbent   upon   him   to   prove   the   claimed   mitigating   circumstance.     OSG   found   no   sufficient   evidence   or   medical   finding   to  

Rañeses  124     support   his   claim.     For   the   mitigating   circumstance  of  illness  of  the  offender  to  be   appreciated,   the   law   requires   the   presence   of  the  following  requisites:   1. Illness  must  diminish  the  exercise  of   the  willpower  of  the  offender,  and   2. Such   illness   should   not   deprive   the   offender  of  consciousness  of  his  acts.     For   the   circumstance   of   passion   and   obfuscation   of   the   offender   to   be   appreciated,   the   law   requires   the   presence   of  the  ff  requisites:   1. There   should   be   an   act   both   unlawful   and   sufficient   to   produce   such  condition  of  mind,  and   2. Such   act   w/c   produced   the   obfuscation   was   not   far   removed   from  the  commission  of  the  crime  by   a  considerable  length  of  time,  during   w/c   the   perpetrator   might   recover   his  moral  equanimity.     The   defense   never   presented   any   medical   record   of   the   accused   nor   was   a   psychiatrist   presented   to   validate   the   defense   of   insanity.   None   of   the   elements-­‐requisites   were   proved   to   be   present   &   in   his   testimony,   Javier   even   stated   that   he   was   not   jealous   of   his   wife.   Equally   important,   the   defense,   during   the   trial,   never   alleged   the  above-­‐claimed  mitigating  circumstances   of   illness   &   passion   &   obfuscation,   thus   weakening   the   case   of   accused-­‐appellant.     The   alleged   mitigating   circumstances   are   mere   afterthought   to   whittle   (to   shape)   down  his  criminal  liability.   2. Yes.     The   crime   of   parricide,   not   being   a   capital   crime   per   se   is   not   punishable   by   mandatory  death  penalty  but  by  the  flexible   penalty   of   reclusion   perpetua   to   death,   two   indivisible  penalties.    The  application  of  the   lesser   of   greater   penalty   depends   on   the   presence   of   mitigating   and   aggravating   circumstances.     Thus,   in   the   absence   of   any   aggravating   or   mitigating   circumstance   for   the   accused,   the   lesser   penalty   of   reclusion   perpetua  should  be  imposed.      

Analogous  circumstances     Reyes:     1. Must   be   of   similar   nature   and   analogous   to  those  mentioned  in  paragraphs  1  to  9   of  Art.  13.    

2. Over   60   years   old   with   failing   eyesight,   similar   to   over   70   years   of   age   mentioned  in  par.  2.     3. Outraged   feeling   of   owner   of   animal   taken   for   ransom   analogous   to   vindication  of  a  grave  offense.     4. Outraged   feeling   of   creditor,   similar   to   passion   and   obfuscation   mentioned   in   par.  6.     5. Impulse   of   jealous   feeling,   similar   to   passion  and  obfuscation.     6. Manifestations   of   Battered   Wife   Syndrome,   analogous   to   an   illness   that   diminishes  the  exercise  of  will  power.     7. Esprit   de   corps,   similar   to   passion   and   obfuscation.     8. Voluntary   restitution   of   stolen   property,   similar   to   voluntary   surrender   mentioned  in  paragraph  7.     9. Extreme   poverty   and   necessity,   similar   to  incomplete  justification  based  on  state   of  necessity.     10. Testifying  for  the  prosecution,  analogous   to  plea  of  guilty.       Canta  v.  People,  353  SCRA  250  (2001)   Facts:   1. Narciso   Gabriel   acquired   a   cow   upon   its   birth  on  March  10,  1984   2. Narciso   left   it   with   his   sister   in   law   Erlinda   Montes,   then   he   left   it   with   Generoso   Cabonce,   then   with   Maria   Tura,   and   then   with  Gardemo  Agapay.   3. Agapay   took   the   cow   up   a   mountain   for   grazing  and  it  was  gone  when  he  came  back   for  it   4. Hoof  prints  led  him  to  Valejos  house  and  he   was  told  that  Canta  had  taken  it.   5. Narciso   instructed   Maria   Tura   to   get   the   cow.  She  met  Canta  who  said  that  he  gave  it   to   his   father,   the   barangay   captain.   They   went  to  father‘s  house  and  Tura  recognized   cow.   Canta   said   he   will   consult   with   his   father   on   what   to   do   and   call   her   about   it   later.   6. Canta   didn‘t   call   so   Narciso   reported   it   to   police   7. In   the   investigation   Canta   admitted   he   took   cow,   but   he   contended   that   it   was   his   cow.   He   lost   it   Dec   3   1985.   He   produced   2   certificates   of   ownership   dated   March   17,   1986  and  Feb  27,  1988.   8. Narciso   presented   certificate   of   ownership   dated   Mar   9   1986   signed   by   municipal  

Rañeses  125     treasurer.   I   contained   a   description   of   the   cow   including   identifying   marks   (cowlicks   on   the   head,   back   and   legs;   coloring).   4   previous   caretakers   certify   that   this   is   the   cow  they  took  care  of.   9. Canta   said   that   he   got   the   baby   cow   as   payment  for  taking  care  of  Pat.  Villanueva‘s   cow.   It   was   born   on   Dec   5,   1984   and   was   lost   Dec   2   1985.   He   reported   loss   to   Padre   Burgos.   10. His   uncle   said   he   saw   the   cow   under   the   care   of   Agapay.   Canta   went   to   the   Agapay‘s   grazing  place  with  the  mommy  cow  to  see  if   the  baby  cow  would  drink  its  milk,  it  did  so   Canta  assumed  the  baby  cow  was  his.   11. He  brought  it  to  his  father  and  Maria  tried  to   get   it   but   Canta‘s   father   refused   and   asked   Narciso   to   come   by   so   they   can   discuss.   Narciso   never   came   by.   Canta   took   cow   to   Padre  Burgos.     Issues/Held/Ratio:     1. Canta‘s  Certificate  of  Ownership   a. It   was   not   filed   by   the   municipal   treasurer,  but  by  Canta‘s  friend  Franklin   Telen  who  was  a  janitor  at  the  municipal   treasurer‘s   office.   Telen   issued   certificate   on   March   24,   1986   but   he   antedated  it  Feb  27,  1985  at  the  request   of   Canta   who   assured   Telen   that   he   owned   the   cow.   No   registration   recorded  in  municipal  records.   b. Trial   Court   said:   Obviously   Canta   took   the   cow   using   strategy   and   stealth   considering   Agapay   was   separated   by   a   hill   and   couldn‘t   see   him.   Canta   tries   to   justify   taking   the   cow   with   a   certificate   of   ownership   but   Telen   said   he   antedated  the  certificate.   c. It   is   clear   Canta   falsified   and   manipulated   the   certificate   of   title.   He   only   got   it   after   the   incident   happened   on  March  14,  1986.  His  claim  has  no  leg   to  stand  on.  CA  agrees.   2. Petitioner   Canta   claims   good   faith   and   honest   belief  in  his  right  to  the  cow   a. Brought   mother   cow   and   calf   suckled   its   milk   b. Compared   marks   on   the   cow   to   the   recorded   marks   on   his   certificate.   Match.   c. He  turned  over  cow  to  barangay  captain,   and   later   to   police   when   the   dispute   began  

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

d. Filed  complaint  against  Nicolas  for  cattle   rustling.   Cattle  Rustling  requisites   a. Large  cattle  is  taken   b. It  belongs  to  another   No  question  cattle  belongs  so  Narciso  Gabriel   a. Taking  without  consent  of  owner   Canta   took   cow   from   Agapay   even   if   he   knew   Agapay  was  holding  it  for  Narciso.   a. Taking   done   by   any   means   method   or   scheme   He  falsified  certificate  of  ownership,  a  scheme   a. Taking  is  with  or  without  intent  to  gain   Canta   concocted   a   ploy   to   obtain   ownership   so   he  had  an  obvious  intent  to  gain   a. Taking  without  violence  or  intimidation   No  violence   a. Fact   that   Canta   went   to   barangay   captain   does   not   prove   good   faith.   He   already   committed   a   crime,   also   the   barangay  captain  was  his  father.   b. Calves   suckle   on   strange   cows.   It   don‘t   have  to  be  the  mom.   Petitioner   says   that   even   if   his   certificate   of   ownership   is   ―not   in   order‖   it   does   not   mean   he  did  not  believe  in  good  faith  that  the  cow  was   his.  Merely  mistake  of  fact.   a. His   certificate   was   FRADULENT.   Negates  good  faith.   b. If  he  had  been  responsible  he  could  have   verified   ownership   of   cow   first.   He   was   negligent   c. He   was   NOT   justified   to   take   cow,   tried   to  take  law  into  own  hands   MITIGATING  circumstances   a. Analogous   with   voluntary   surrender,   which  has  the  ff  elements   b. Offender  not  actually  arrested   In   the   case:   Canta   not   yet   arrested.   There   was   no   complaint   filed   against   him   when   he   surrendered   cow.   The   intent   to   unconditional   submission   was   there.   Also   there   was   intent   to   save   authorities   the   trouble   of   search   and   capture.   He   voluntarily   took   cow   to   municipal   hall   of   Padre   Burgos   and   put   it   in   custody   of   authorities.   Can   be   considered   analogous   to   voluntary   surrender   a. Offender  surrenders  to  authority   b. Surrender  is  voluntary   c. PD  533  Anti-­‐Cattle  Rustling  Law  is  not  a   special   law.   It‘s   penalties   are   discussed   in  RPC.  

Rañeses  126     14. DECISION:   One   mitigating   circumstance   equals   the   case   be   fixed   in   minimum   period.   CA   decisions  lessened.  4  yrs.  2  mos.  (minimum)  10   yrs  1  day  maximum.    

D. Aggravating  Circumstances  

Reyes:   1. Definition.   Aggravating   circumstances   are   those  which,  if  attendant  in  the  commission   of   the   crime,   serve   to   increase   the   penalty   without,   however,   exceeding   the   maximum   of   the   penalty   provided   by   law   for   the   offense.     2. Basis:   Greater   perversity   of   the   offender   manifested   in   the   commission   of   the   felony   as   shown   by:   (1)   the   motivating   power   itself,   (2)   the   place   of   commission,   (3)   the   means  and  ways  employed,  (4)  the  time,  or   (5)   the   personal   circumstances   of   the   offender,  or  of  the  offended  party.     3. Four  kinds  of  aggravating  circumstances.   1. Generic   –   Those   that   can   generally   apply  to  all  crimes.     • Par.  Nos.  1,  2,  3  (dwelling),  4,   5,  6,  9,  10,  14,  18,  19  and  20,   “except   by   means   of   motor   vehicles,”   are   generic   aggravating  circumstances.     2. Specific   –   Those   that   apply   only   to   particular  cimes.     • Par  Nos.  3  (except  dwelling),   15,  16,  17  and  21  are  specific   aggravating  circumstances.     3. Qualifying   –   Those   that   change   the   nature  of  the  crime.   • Art.   248   enumerates   the   qualifying   circumstances   which  qualify  the  killing  of  a   person  to  murder.     4. Inherent   –   Those   that   must   of   necessity   accompany   the   commission   of   the   crime.   (Art.   62,   par.  2)     4. Qualifying   circumstances   distinguished   from  generic  aggravating  circumstance.     1. The   effect   of   a   generic   aggravating   circumstance,   not   offset   by   any   mitigating   circumstance,   is   to   increase   the   penalty   which   should   be  imposed  upon  the  accused  to  the   maximum   period,   but   without   exceeding   the   limit   prescribed   by   law;   while   that   of   a   qualifying   circumstance   is   not   only   to   give   the  

5.

6.

7.

8.

crime  its  proper  and  exclusive  name   but   also   to   place   the   author   thereof   in   such   a   situation   as   to   deserve   no   other   penalty   than   that   specially   prescribed   by   law   for   said   crime.   (People  v.  Bayot,  64  Phil.  269,  273)   2. A  qualifying  circumstance  cannot  be   offset   by   a   mitigating   circumstance;   a   generic   aggravating   circumstance   may   be   compensated   by   a   mitigating   circumstance.     3. A   qualifying   circumstance   to   be   such   must   be   alleged   in   the   information.   If   it   is   not   alleged,   it   is   a   generic   aggravating  circumstance  only.     Aggravating   circumstances   (a)   which   in   themselves   constitute   a   crime   specially   punishable   by   law,   or   (b)   which   are   included   by   the   law   in   defining   a   crime   and   prescribing   the   penalty   therefor   shall   not   be   taken   into   account   for   the   purpose   of   increasing   the   penalty.   (Art.   62,   par.   1)   Same   rule   shall   apply   with   respect   to   any   aggravating   circumstance   inherent  in  the  crime  to  such  a  degree  that  it   must   be   of   necessity   accompany   the   commission  thereof  (Art.  62,  par.  2).     Aggravating   circumstances   which   arise:   (a)   from   the   moral   attributes   of   the   offender,   or   (b)   from   his   private   relations   with   the   offended   party,   or   (c)   from  any  other  personal  cause,  shall  only   serve   to   aggravate   the   liability   of   the   principals,   accomplices,   and   accessories   as   to   whom   such   circumstances   are   attendant.     The   circumstances   which   consist   (1)   in   the   material   execution   of   the   act,   or   (2)   in   the   means   employed   to   accomplish   it,   shall   serve   to   aggravate   the   liability   of   those   persons   only   who   had   knowledge   of   them   at   the   time   of   the   execution   of   the   act   or   their   cooperation   therei.   (Art.   62,  par.  4)     Aggravating   circumstances   not   presumed.    

  RPC,  Art.  14   Aggravating   circumstances.   -­‐   The   following   are   aggravating  circumstances:   1.   That   advantage   be   taken   by   the   offender   of   his   public  position.  

 

Rañeses  127     2.   That   the   crime   be   committed   in   contempt   of   or   with  insult  to  the  public  authorities.  

13.   That   the   act   be   committed   with   evident   premeditation.  

3.   That   the   act   be   committed   with   insult   or   in   disregard   of   the   respect   due   to   the   offended   party   on   account   of   his   rank,   age,   or   sex,   or   that   it   be   committed   in   the   dwelling   of   the   offended   party,   if   the  latter  has  not  given  provocation.  

14.  That  craft,  fraud,  or  disguise  be  employed.   15.  That  advantage  be  taken  of  superior  strength,  or   means  be  employed  to  weaken  the  defense.   16.   That   the   act   be   committed   with   treachery   (alevosia).  

4.   That   the   act   be   committed   with   abuse   of   confidence  or  obvious  ungratefulness.   5.  That  the  crime  be  committed  in  the  palace  of  the   Chief  Executive,  or  in  his  presence,  or  where  public   authorities   are   engaged   in   the   discharge   of   their   duties,  or  in  a  place  dedicated  to  religious  worship.  

There   is   treachery   when   the   offender   commits   any   of  the  crimes  against  the  person,  employing  means,   methods,   or   forms   in   the   execution   thereof   which   tend   directly   and   specially   to   insure   its   execution,   without   risk   to   himself   arising   from   the   defense   which  the  offended  party  might  make.  

6.  That  the  crime  be  committed  in  the  nighttime,  or   in   an   uninhabited   place,   or   by   a   band,   whenever   such   circumstances   may   facilitate   the   commission   of  the  offense.  

17.   That   means   be   employed   or   circumstances   brought   about   which   add   ignominy   to   the   natural   effects  of  the  act.   18.   That   the   crime   be   committed   after   an   unlawful   entry.  

Whenever   more   than   three   armed   malefactors   shall   have   acted   together   in   the   commission   of   an   offense,  it  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  committed   by  a  band.  

There   is   an   unlawful   entry   when   an   entrance   is   effected  by  a  way  not  intended  for  the  purpose.  

7.   That   the   crime   be   committed   on   the   occasion   of   a   conflagration,   shipwreck,   earthquake,   epidemic,   or   other  calamity  or  misfortune.  

19.  That  as  a  means  to  the  commission  of  a  crime  a   wall,  roof,  floor,  door,  or  window  be  broken.   20.   That   the   crime   be   committed   with   the   aid   of   persons   under   fifteen   years   of   age   or   by   means   of   motor   vehicles,   motorized   watercraft,   airships,   or   other   similar   means.   (As   amended   by   Rep.   Act   No.   5438,  approved  Sept.  9,  1968.)  

8.   That   the   crime   be   committed   with   the   aid   of   armed   men   or   persons   who   insure   or   afford   impunity.   9.  That  the  accused  is  a  recidivist.  

21.   That   the   wrong   done   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   be   deliberately   augmented   by   causing   other   wrong  not  necessary  for  its  commission.  

A   recidivist   is   one   who,   at   the   time   of   his   trial   for   one  crime,  shall  have  been  previously  convicted  by   final   judgment   of   another   crime   embraced   in   the   same  title  of  this  Code.  

  Insult  to  public  authorities  

10.  That  the  offender  has  been  previously  punished   for   an   offense   to   which   the   law   attaches   an   equal   or   greater  penalty  or  for  two  or  more  crimes  to  which   it  attaches  a  lighter  penalty.  

Reyes:   1. Basis:   Greater   perversity   of   offender,   as   shown   by   the   lack   of   respect   for   the   public   authorities.   2. Requisites:   1. That  the  public  authority  is  engaged   in  the  exercise  of  his  functions.     2. That   he   who   is   thus   engaged   In   the   exercise   of   said   functions   is   not   the   person   against   whom   the   crime   is   committed.   (U.S.   vs.   Rodriguez,   19  

11.  That  the  crime  be  committed  in  consideration  of   a  price,  reward,  or  promise.   12.   That   the   crime   be   committed   by   means   of   inundation,   fire,   poison,   explosion,   stranding   of   a   vessel  or  intentional  damage  thereto,  derailment  of   a   locomotive,   or   by   the   use   of   any   other   artifice   involving  great  waste  and  ruin.  

 

 

Rañeses  128    

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Phil.   150,   156;   People   vs.   Siojo,   61   Phil.  307,  317)   3. The   offender   knows   him   to   be   a   public  authority.     4. His   presence   has   not   prevented   the   offender   from   committing   the   criminal  act.     Meaning   of   “public   authority.”   A   public   authority,  sometimes  also  called  a  person  in   authority,   is   a   public   officer   who   is   already   vested   with   jurisdiction,   that   is,   a   public   officer   who   has   the   power   to   govern   and   execute   the   las.   The   councilor,   the   mayor,   the   governor,   etc.,   are   persons   in   authority.   The   barangay   captainand   barangay   chairman  ae  also  persons  in  authority.  (Art.   152,   as   amended   by   P.D.   No.   1232,   Nov.   7,   1977)   Not   applicable   when   crime   is   committed   in   the   presence   of   an   agent   only.   An   agent   of  a  person  in  authority  is  “any  person  who,   by   direct   provision   of   law   or   by   election   or   by   appointment   by   competent   authority,   is   charged   with   the   maintenance   of   public   order  and  the  protection  and  security  of  life   and   property,   such   as   barrio   councilman,   barrio   policeman   and   barangay   leader,   and   any  person  who  comes  to  the  aid  of  perons   in   authority.”   (Art.   152,   as   amended   by   BP   Blg.  873)   The   crime   should   not   be   committed   against   the   public   officer.   If   the   crime   is   committed   against   a   public   authority   while   he  is  in  the  performance  of  his  official  duty,   the   offender   commits   direct   assault   (Art.   148.)   without   this   aggravating   circumstance,   because   it   is   not   a   crime   committed  “in  contempt  of  or  with  insult”  to   him,  but  a  crime  directly  committed  against   him.     Knowledge   that   a   public   authority   is   present  is  essential.  Lack  of  knowledge  on   the   part   of   the   offender   that   a   public   authority   is   present   indicates   lack   of   intention  to  insult  the  public  authority.     Presence   of   public   authority   has   not   prevented  offender  from  committing  the   crime.   An   offense   may   said   to   have   been   committed  in  contempt  of  a  public  authority   when   his   presence,   made   known   to   the   offender,   has   not   prevented   the   latter   from   committing  the  criminal  act.    

  People  v.  Rodil,  109  SCRA  308  (1981)  

Facts:   Floro   Rodil   was   found   guilty   of   the   crime   of   murder   by   the   Circuit   Criminal   Court   for   the   death   of  Lt.Masana.     Version  of  the  prosecutor   • April   24,   1971   around   1:00   pm   –   Masana   together   with   Fidel,   Ligsa   and   Mojica   was   having   lunch   inside   a   restaurant   in   front   of   the   Indang   Market.   While   they   were   eating,   their  attention  was  called  by  Rodil  who  was   outside   blowing   his   whistle.     Masana,   in   civilian  clothing,  accompanied  by  Fidel  went   outside   and   asked   Rodil,   after   identifying   himself   as   a   PC   officer,   whether   the   gun   that   was  tucked  under  his  shirt  had  a  license   • Instead   if   answering   Rodil   attempted   to   draw  his  gun  but  Fidel  grabbed  the  gave  and   gave  it  to  Masana.   • The   three   went   inside   the   restaurant   and   Masana   wrote   a   receipt   for   the   gun   and   he   asked   Rodil   to   sign   it   but   the   appellant   refused  to  do  so.    Masana  refused  to  return   the  gun  to  Rodil  and  as  Masana  was  about  to   stand   up   Rodil   pulled   out   his   dagger   and   stabbed   Masana   several   times   on   the   chest   and  stomach  causing  his  death  after  several   hours.   • The  companions  of  Masana  took  the  accused   into  custody.     Version  of  the  defense   • Rodil  is  claiming  self-­‐defense   • Rodil   together   with   his   wife   were   eating   inside   the   restaurant   and   while   they   were   waiting   for   their   food   Masana   approached   and   inquired   whether   he   was   a   member   of   the  Anti-­‐smuggling  Unit.    Rodil  answered  in   the   affirmative   and   Masana   invited   him   to   join  him  in  his  table.   • Rodil   accepted   the   invitation.     During   their   conversation   Masana   asked   for   identification   of   Rodil   and   the   latter   showed   his   ID.     Masana   told   Rodil   that   his   ID   was   fake   and   Rodil   insisted   that   it   was   genuine.     Masana   was   demanding   that   Rodil   surrender   his   ID   to   him   but   Rodil   refused.     When   Rodil   refused   Masana   pulled   out   his   gun   and   hit   the   accused   on   the   head   with   its   handle   for   2   times   and   as   a   result   blood   gushed  out  from  his  head  and  face.   • Rodil   pulled   out   his   dagger   and   stabbed   Masana  and  then  ran  out  of  the  restaurant.   • Rodil  went  to  the  direction  of  the  Municipal   building   where   he   intended   to   surrender.    

Rañeses  129     On   his   was   he   met   the   Chief   of   Police   and   he   was   accompanied   to   the   municipal   building   and  was  given  first  aid  treatment.     Issues:     1. WON  self-­‐defense  can  be  availed  by  Rodil.   2. WON   the   crime   committed   was   murder   or   homicide   merely   or   murder   or   homicide   complexed   (sic)   with   assault   upon   an   agent   of   authority.   3. WON   the   AC   disregard   of   rank   should   be   appreciated       Held:   1. No.   Self-­‐defense   must   be   proven   by   clear,   sufficient,   satisfactory   and   convincing   evidence   • Accused   must   rely   on   the   strength   of   his   own   evidence   and   not   on   the   weakness   of   the  prosecution.   • Having   admitted   the   wounding   or   killing   of   the   victim,   the   accused   must   be   held   liable   for   the   crime   unless   he   establishes   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   court   the   fact   of   legitimate  self-­‐defense.   • Court  cannot  perceive  how  the  refusal  of  the   accused   to   give   his   ID   could   have   provoked   or   enraged   the   deceased     to   the   extent   of   initiating   the   aggression   by   drawing   his   pistol  and  hitting  the  accused  with  its  butt.   • It  is  the  accused  who  had  every  reason  to  be   resentful  of  the  deceased  and  to  be  enraged   after   the   deceased   refused   to   heed   his   plea   that  his  gun  be  returned.     2. Crime   committed   was   homicide   (No   complex   crime   but   there   is   a   general   aggravating  circumstance)   • Murder   –   it   was   established   by   the   prosecution   that   during   the   stabbing   incident,   appellant   suddenly   and   without   giving  the  victim  a  chance  to  defend  himself,   stabbed   the   latter   several   times   with   a   dagger,  inflicting  mortal  wounds.   • No   treachery   –   assailant   &   victim   was   face   to   face.   Attack   wasn’t   treacherous   because   the   victim   was   able   to   ward   off   the   same   w/   his   hand.     Force   of   warding   off   the   attack   was   so   strong   that   the   accused   bump   his   head   on   a   table   nearby,   causing   injuries   to   him.    Failed  to  show  that  the  accused  made   any   preparation   to   kill   his   victim   so   as   to   insure  the  commission  of  the  crime,  making  

it   at   the   same   time   possible   or   hard   for   the   victim  to  defend  himself  or  retaliate.   • Treachery   exists   when   the   offender   commits   any   of   the   crimes   against   the   person  employing  means,  methods,  or  forms   in   the   execution   thereof   which   tend   to   directly  and  specially  to  insure  its  execution,   w/o   risk   to   himself   arising   from   the   defense   which  the  offended  party  might  make.   • Information  does  not  allege  the  fact  that  the   accused   then   knew   that,   before   or   at   the   time  of  the  assault,  the  victim  was  an  agent   of  a  person  in  authority.   • Such   knowledge   must   be   expressly   and   specifically   averred   in   the   information;   otherwise,  in  the  absence  of  such  allegation,   the   required   knowledge   would   only   be   appreciated   as   a   generic   aggravating   circumstance.   • It   is   essential   that   the   accused   must   have   knowledge   that   the   person   attacked   was   a   person   in   authority   or   his   agent   in   the   exercise   of   his   duties,   because   the   accused   must  have  the  intention  to  offend,  injure,  or   assault   the   offended   party   as   a   person   in   authority  or  agent  of  a  person  in  authority.     3. Yes.  Whenever  there  is  a  difference  in  social   condition   between   the   offender   and   the   offended   party,   this   aggravating   circumstance  sometimes  is  present.   • Mesana  identified  himself  as  a  PC  officer  and   the   accused   is   merely   a   member   of   the   Anti-­‐ Smuggling   Unit   and   therefore   inferior   both   in  rank  and  social  status.   • Rank   –   refers   to   a   high   social   position   or   standing   • Cases  wherein  the  aggravating  circumstance   of  disregard  of  rank  was  appreciated   o People   vs.   Benito   –   clerk   murdered   assistant   chief   of   the   personnel   transaction  division   o People   vs.   Torres   –   murder   of   Col.   Salgado   and   injuries   to   Gen.   Castaneda   o People   vs.   Valeriano   –   murder   of   district  judge   • Chief   of   Police   (Panaligan)   was   present   during   the   incident.   Panaligan   was   the   one   who  wrested  the  dagger  from  Rodil  and  the   accused  knew  him  to  be  the  chief  of  police.   • Chief   of   police   is   considered   a   public   authority   or   a   person   in   authority   for   he   is   vested   with   jurisdiction   or   authority   to   maintain  peace  and  order  and  is  specifically  

Rañeses  130     duty   bound   to   prosecute   and   to   apprehend   violators  of  the  law     Dissent:  Melencio-­‐Herrera   • Contempt   of,   or   which   insult   to   public   authorities  to  be  considered  as  aggravating,   it  is  essential  that:   • Crime   is   committed   in   the   presence   of   a   public   authority,   not   a   mere   agent   of   the   authorities   • Public   authority   is   engaged   in   the   exercise   of   his   functions   and   is   not   the   person   against  whom  the  crime  is  committed.   • Masana   is   not   a   public   authority   nor   a   person   in   authority   he   is   a   mere   agent   of   a   person  in  authority     • Disregard  of  the  respect  due  to  rank   • There   must   be   a   difference   in   social   condition   of   the   offender   and   the   offended   party   • Offender  and  offended  are  of  the  same  rank   the   aggravating   circumstance   does   not   apply   • Difference   in   rank   bet   a   lieutenant   and   officer  of  anti-­‐smuggling  unit  is  not  such  of  a   degree   as   to   justify   consideration   of   disrespect  of  rank  due  to  the  offended  party.  

  Note:   The   ruling   in   this   case   directly   contradicts   Reyes’s  statement  with  regard  to  the  Chief  of  Police   being   mere   agent.   In   the   case   at   bar,   the   chief   of   police  is  now  a  person  of  authority  as  well.      

Dwelling   Reyes:   1. Dwelling   must   be   a   building   or   structure,   exclusively   used   for   rest   and   comfort.   A   “combination   house   and   store”   (People   vs.   Magnaye,   89   Phil.   233,   239),   or   a   market   stall  where  the  victim  slept  is  not  a  dwelling.     2. Basis:   Greater   perversity   of   offender,   as   shown  by  the  place  of  the  commission  of  the   offense.     3. What   aggravates   the   commission   of   the   crime  on  one’s  dwelling?     a. The   abuse   of   confidence   which   the   offended   party   reposed   in   the   offender   by  opening  the  door  to  him;  or   b. The   violation   of   the   sanctity   of   the   home   by   trespassing   therein   with   violence   or   against   the   will   of   the   owner.   (Dissenting   opinion   of   Justice   Villareal,   People  vs.  Ambis,  68  Phil.  635,  637)  

c.

“The   home   is   a   sort   of   sacred   place   for   its   owner.   He   who   goes   to   another’s   house   to   slander   him,   hurt   him   or   do   him   wrong,   is   more   guilty   than   he   who   offends   him   elsewhere.”   (Viada,   5th   edition,  Bol.  II,  pp.  323-­‐324)     4. Offended   party   must   not   give   provocation.   If   the   offended   party   provoked   the   incident,   he   loses   his   right   to   respect   and   consideration   due   him   in   his   own  house.  (People  vs.  Ambis,  supra)   5. Meaning   of   provocation   in   the   aggravating  circumstance  of  dwelling.   a. Given  by  the  owner  of  the  dwelling   b. Sufficient,  and   c. Immediate   to   the   commission   of   the   crime.     If   the   above   conditions   are   present,   the   offended   party   is   deemed   to   have   given   provocation,   and   the   fact   that   the   crime   is   committed   in   the   dwelling   of   the   offended   party  is  not  an  aggravating  circumstance.       On  the  other  hand,  if  any  of  those  conditions   is   not   present,   the   offended   party   is   deemed   not   to   have   given   provocation,   and   the   fact   that  the  crime  is  committed  in   the  dwelling   of   the   offended   party   is   an   aggravating   circumstance.     6. There   must   be   close   relation   between   provocation   and   commission   of   the   crime  in  the  dwelling.     7. Because   the   provocation   is   not   immediate,  dwelling  is  aggravating.     8. Owner   of   dwelling   gave   immediate   provocation   à   dwelling   is   not   aggravating.     9. Prosecution   must   prove   that   no   provocation   was   given   by   the   offended   party.     10. The   offender   need   not   enter   the   dwelling   for  the  circumstance  to  apply.     11. If   the   crime   took   place   outside   the   dwelling,   it   is   still   aggravating   if   the   commission   of   the   crime   was   begun   inside.     12. Dwelling  is  not  included  in  treachery.       People  v.  Daniel,  86  SCRA  511  (1978)   Facts:   13-­‐yr   old   Margarita   Paleng   filed   complaint   against   Amado   Daniel   alias   “Amado   Ato”   for   the   crime  of  rape.       • On   Sept   20,   1965,   Margarita,   a   native   of   Mt   Province,  arrived  in  Baguio  City  from  Tublay  

Rañeses  131    

•

in   a   Dangwa   bus.   She   was   then   en   route   to   her   boarding   house   in   Guisad   as   she   was   a   high   school   student   at   the   Baguio   Eastern   High   School.   While   she   was   waiting   inside   the   bus,   the   accused   Daniel   came   and   started  molesting  her  by  inquiring  her  name   and   getting   hold   of   her   bag.     She   did   not   allow   the   latter   and   instead   called   the   attention   of   the   bus   driver   and   the   conductor   but   was   merely   shrugged   by   them.     It   seemed   that   they   were   also   afraid   of  the  accused.    Despite  the  rain,  she  left  the   bus  and  went  to  ride  in  a  jeep  parked  some   100meters  away.    The  accused  followed  her   and   rode   and   sat   beside   her.     When   Margarita  alighted  in  Guisad,  she  was  again   followed   by   the   accused.     Reaching   her   boarding   house,   she   opened   the   door   and   was   about   to   close   it   when   the   accused   dashed   in   and   closed   the   door   behind   him.     He   pulled   a   dagger   8   inches   long   and   threatened  her  saying,  “If  you  will  talk,  I  will   kill  you.”    Because  of  her  fear,  Margarita  fell   silent.     She   was   then   forced   to   lie   down   w/   the   accused   placing   a   handkerchief   in   her   mouth   and   holding   a   dagger   to   her   neck.     Her   attempts   to   flee   was   to   no   avail   as   she   was   only   4   ft   8   inches   tall   &   95   lbs   while   Daniel   was   5   ft   7   inches   tall   and   weighed   126   lbs.     The   accused   was   successful   in   having   carnal   knowledge   of   Margarita.     Thereafter   she   lost   consciousness.     When   she  recovered,  Daniel  had  already  gone.       For   his   defense,   Daniel   asserts   that   he   and   Margarita   have   known   each   other   since   1963   and   this   was   in   fact   the   2nd   time   he   had   carnal   knowledge   of   her.     Also,   he   alleges   that   he   promised   to   marry   Margarita   and  was  actually  surprised  the  she  filed  the   complaint   against   him.   Medico-­‐Legal   report   indicated  that  Margarita  was  a  virgin  before   the  incident  complained  of.  

  Issue:   WON   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   “dwelling”  can  be  appreciated  in  the  case  at  bar.       Held:   Yes.   The   crime   committed   by   Daniel   is   rape   w/   the   use   of   a   deadly   weapon   w/   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   having   been   committed   in   the   dwelling  of  the  offended  party.    Although  Margarita   was   merely   renting   a   bedspace   in   a   boarding   house,   her  room  constituted  for  all  intents  and  purposes  a   “dwelling”  as  the  term  is  used  in  Art  14  (3)  RPC.    It  is   not   necessary,   under   the   law,   that   the   victim   owns  

the   place   where   he   lives   or   dwells.     Be   he   a   lessee,   a   boarder,   or   a   bed-­‐spacer,   the   place   is   his   home   the   sanctity  of  w/c  the  law  seeks  to  protect  and  uphold.    

Nighttime/Disguise   Reyes:   1. Par.6.   (Nighttime).   Basis:   Time   and   place   of   the   commission   of   the   crime   and   the   means  and  ways  employed.     2. Same.  When  aggravating.   a. When   it   facilitated   the   commission   of   the  crime;  or   b. When   especially   sought   for   by   the   offender  to  insure  the  commission  of  the   crime   or   for   the   purpose   of   impunity   (People  vs.  Pardo,  79  Phil.  568,  578);  or   c. When   the   offender   took   advantage   thereof   for   the   purpose   of   impunity.   (U.S.   vs.   Billedo,   32   Phil.   574,   579;   People  vs.  Mathagon,  60  Phil.  887,  893)       Although   nocturnity   (sic)   should   not   be   estimated   as   an   aggravating   circumstance,   since   the   time   for   the   commission   of   the   crime   was   not   deliberately   chosen   by   the   accused;   yet,   if   it   appears   that   the   accused   took   advantage   of   the   darkness   for   the   more   successful  consummation  of  his  plans,  to   prevent   his   being   recognized,   and   that   the   crime   might   be   perpetrated   unmolested,   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   nocturnity   should   be   applied.     3. Same.   Nighttime   may   facilitate   the   commission   of   the   crime,   when   because   of  the  darkness  of  the  night  the  crime  can   be   perpetrated   unmolested,   or   interference   can   be   avoided,   or   there   would   be   greater   certainty   in   attaining   the   ends   of   the   offender.   (People   vs.   Matbagon,  60  Phil.  887,  894)     4. Same.   Nighttime   need   not   be   specifically   sought   for   when   (1)   it   facilitated   the   commission   of   the   offense,   or   (2)   the   offender   took   advantage   of   the   same   to   commit  the  crime.     5. Same.  “Nighttime”  should  be  understood,   according   to   Viada,   as   that   period   of   darkness   beginning   at   end   of   dusk   and   ending   at   dawn.   Nights   are   from   sunset   to  sunrise.  (Art.  13,  Civil  Code)   6. Same.   The   information   must   allege   that   nighttime   was   sought   for   or   taken  

Rañeses  132     advantage   of   by   the   accused   or   that   it   facilitated  the  commission  of  the  crime.     7. Same.   Not   aggravating   when   the   crime   began  at  daytime.     a. The  commission  of  the  crime  must  begin   and  be  accomplished  in  the  nighttime.     b. The  offense  must  be  actually  committed   in  the  darkness  of  the  night.     c. When   the   place   of   the   crime   is   illuminated   by   light,   nighttime   is   not   aggravating.     8. Par.  14.  (Disguise).  Disguise  is  the  use  of   any  device  to  conceal  identity.     9. Same.   The   purpose   of   the   offender   in   using   any   device   must   be   to   conceal   his   identity.       People  v.  Bermas,  309  SCRA  741  (1999)   Facts:     Lower   court   ruling:   Rustom   Bermas   and   Galma   Arcilla   were   found   guilty   of   Multiple   Murder   and   Multiple   Frustrated   Murder,   “with   evident   premeditation,   conspiring,   confederating   and   helping   one   another,   with   treachery,   taking   advantage   of   nighttime,   with   the   use   of   high   powered  firearms,  and  with  intent  to  kill.”   Rustom  Bermas  worked  in  a  mining  firm  and  was  a   councilman   for   Brgy.   Liguan   while   Galma   Arcilla   was  a  member  of  the  PC  Company,  with  the  position   of   Asst.   Detachment   Commander,   and   was   in   possession  of  an  Armalite  M-­‐16.     On  April  20,  1985,  at  around  8:30  in  the  evening,  at   the   sea   of   Albay,   Arturo,   Abion,   Antonio   Abion,   Renato   Abion,   Teodoro   Cas,   Jesus   Lotera,   Catalino   Bellen,   and   Expedito   Bonaobra   (barangay   captain)   were   aboard   a   fishing   boat   named   ―Sagrada   Familia‖,   owned   by   the   Abion   family,   for   the   purpose  of  catching  fish.     The   accused   Rustom   Bermas   and   a   masked   companion,   which   the   courts   held   to   be   Galma   Arcilla,   approached   the   party   through   a   small   paddled  boat.  They  circled  the  fishing  boat  Sagrada   four   times   which   gave   survivors/witnesses   Bonaobra   and   Renato   Abion   opportunity   to   recognize   Bermas   as   the   one   paddling   the   boat.   Bonaobra  asked  Arturo  to  remove  the  shade  of  the   gas   lamp   so   they   could   recognize   Bermas‘   companion  but  they  still  could  not  due  to  the  mask   he   was   wearing.   Bonaobra   asked   Bermas   if   they   were   fishing.   The   accused   said   yes,   and   that   they   were   looking   for   somebody.   He   then   asked   Bonaobra   who   owned   the   fishing   boat   and  

Bonaobra   told   him   it   was   Jose   Abion.   The   two   accused  pretended  to  paddle  away.  When  they  were   about   7   meters   away,   Bermas‘   companion   fired   his   Armalite  m16  rifle  at  Bonaobra  and  his  companions.   They   heard   2   volleys   fired   at   them.   They   lay   down   but   could   not   avoid   the   attack.   After   5   minutes,   Renato,   upon   instruction   from   his   father   Arturo,   crawled   to   turn   off   remaining   pressure   gas   lamp   and   loosen   the   anchor.   He   then   lost   consciousness.   The   boat   was   carried   away   by   the   currents   of   the   sea   and   into   the   shore,   where   they   were   found   by   Jose,   Rudy,   and   Santiago   Abion   the   following   morning.   Arturo   Abion   and   Catalino   Bellen   were   already   dead.   Renato   Abion,   Jesus   Lotera,   and   Bonaobra   were   seriously   wounded,   such   that   had   they   not   received   medical   attention,   they   would   have   died   from   said   wounds.   Antonio   Abion   was   also   injured   though   not   as   grave.   Teodoro   Cas   was   missing,   and   his   body   was   found   3   days   later   in   a   neighboring   town   in   Albay.   Santiago   found   2   slugs   inside   the   fishing   boat,   which   he   surrendered   to   the   police.     Prior   to   the   night   in   question,   the   following   events   happened:     October  13,  1984  –  at  a  public  dance  at  Namanday,   Albay,   Arcilla   was   involved   in   a   fistfight   with   Leopoldo   Abion.   He   boxed   Leopoldo   in   the   chest   leaving   him   writhing   in   pain   on   the   ground.   Thereafter,   the   Abion   brothers   arrived   to   get   even   with   Arcilla   and   Daniel   Abion   was   able   to   hit   appellant  on  the  face  with  a  piece  of  wood.  Rustom   Bermas,   the   usual   confederate   and   companion   of   accused,   arrived   to   seek   revenge   for   Arcilla,   but   Daniel  had  already  left.     October   14,   1985   –   Galma   Arcilla,   with   a   group   of   armed   men   forced   open   a   window   in   Santiago‘s   house   looking   for   the   latter.   Santiago‘s   pregnant   wife  was  so  scared,  she  miscarried.   April  4,  1985  –  Rustom  Bermas  pounded  on  a  table   and   said   to   Santiago,   ―I   will   bring   home   the   Baraka‖.   Baraka   is   the   appellation   (title/label)   of   the   Abion   family.   This   was   considered   a   death   threat  to  the  family.     On   appeal:   Defendants‘   defense   was   alibi,   insisting   that   they   were   at   a   different   place   at   the   time   of   the   crime   in   question.   Arcilla   further   contends   that   lower   court   erred   in   ruling   it   was   he   who   was   the   masked   companion   since   none   of   the   witnesses   identified   him   as   the   masked   man   who   fired   at   the   victims.  There  was  also  that  question  of  the  firearm,  

Rañeses  133     and  that  the  one  used  to  commit  the  felony  was  not   the   same   one   he   was   issued   with,   and   that   the   firearm   he   owned   was   not   in   his   possession   that   night.   Bermas   claims   he   had   no   motive   to   kill   and   that  conspiracy  was  not  proven.     Issues:   1. WON  defendant’s  alibi  can  be  accepted.   2. WON   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   nighttime  may  be  appreciated.   3. WON   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   disguise  may  be  appreciated.       Held:   1. No.   Alibi   is   the   weakest   of   all   defenses   because  it  is  easy  to  contrive  and  difficult  to   disprove.  Defendant‘s  defense  of  alibi  easily   crumbles   in   the   weight   of   evidence   presented  against  them.     Although   the   witnesses   were   unable   to   identify   the   masked   man,   it   is   of   no   moment   because   there   were   enough   circumstantial   evidence  on  which  the  ruling  could  be  based   on.   The   facts   established   are   enough   to   warrant  a  finding  of  guilt  beyond  reasonable   doubt.   Circumstantial   evidence   may   be   sufficient   to   warrant   a   conviction.   Physical   evidence   speaks   more   eloquently   than   all   the  witnesses  put  together.     The  firearm  used  in  the  felony  was  found  to   be   exactly   the   one   issued   to   Galma   Arcilla.   That  he  allegedly  left  his  gun  in  the  custody   of  another  person  was  dubious  because  the   military   requirement   is   to   leave   firearms   at   the   headquarters   where   it   would   be   safer.   He  also  failed  to  satisfactorily  explain  where   and   how   the   missing   ammunitions   were   used.     In   sum,   court   held   that   Arcilla   had   been   lying  in  order  to  exculpate  himself.     With   regard   to   Bermas‘   contention   that   he   had   no   ill   motive   since   the   quarrel   was   between  Arcilla  and  the  Ambions,  court  held   that   proof   of   ill   motive   becomes   irrelevant   in  the  face  of  positive  identification.  Bermas   was   positively   identified   by   Bonaobra   and   Renato  Ambion.     Conspiracy   is   proven   by   the   specific   acts   done   with   such   closeness   and   coordination  

with  the  one  who  executed  the  criminal  act.   In   this   case,   Bermas‘   act   of   paddling   to   and   from   the   boat,   as   well   as   his   silence   while   the  victims  were  being  gunned  down  by  his   companion,   was   enough   to   warrant   a   conspiracy.  He  must  be  equally  liable  as  co-­‐ principal.  It  was  also  a  well-­‐known  fact  that   he  was  a  close  companion  of  his  co-­‐accused   and   they   were   frequently   seen   together,   as   testified  by  other  witnesses.     Treachery   was   appreciated   in   this   case   because   it   satisfied   the   requirements   that   a)   malefactor  employed  means  of  execution  to   ensure  his  safety  from  retaliatory  acts  of  the   victim   b)   said   means   were   deliberate.   Essence   of   treachery   is   in   the   swift   and   unexpected   attack   on   unsuspecting   and   unarmed  victims.     2. No.   Nighttime   was   not   appreciated   as   an   aggravating   circumstance   in   this   case.   The   mere  fact  that  the  offense  happened  at  night   was   not   enough   to   sustain   a   finding   of   nocturnity.   It   only   becomes   an   aggravating   circumstance   when   the   following   requisites   are   present:   1.   It   was   specially   SOUGHT   by   the   offender   2.   It   was   TAKEN   ADVANTAGE   by  him,  or  3.  It  FACILITATES  commission  of   the   crime   by   insuring   immunity   from   capture.     In   this   case,   nothing   suggests   that   it   was   consciously  resorted  to.     3. Yes.   Disguise,   however,   was   appreciated   as   an   aggravating   circumstance   because   of   appellant‘s  use  of  a  mask.    

Evident  premeditation   Reyes:   1. Basis:   Ways   of   committing   the   crime,   because   evident   premeditation   implies   a   deliberate   planning   of   the   act   before   executing  it.     2. Evident   premeditation   may   be   considered  as  to  principal  by  induction.     3. Essence   of   premeditation.   Execution   of   the   criminal   act   must   be   preceded   by   cool   thought   and   reflection   upon   the   resolution   to   carry   out   the   criminal   intent   during   the   space   of   time   sufficient   to   arrive   at   a   calm   judgment.  (People  vs.  Durante,  53  Phil.  363,   369)  

Rañeses  134     4. The   premeditation   must   be   “evident.”   There   must   be   evidence   showing   that   the   accused   meditated   and   reflected   on   his   intention  between  the  time  when  the  crime   was   conceived   by   him   and   the   time   it   was   actually  perpetrated.     5. Requisites:   1. The  time  when  the  offender  determined   to  commit  the  crime;   2. An   act   manifestly   indicating   that   the   culprit   has   clung   to   his   determination;   and   3. A   sufficient   lapse   of   time   between   the   determination   and   execution,   to   allow   him  to  reflect  upon  the  consequences  of   his   act   and   to   allow   his   conscience   to   overcome  the  resolution  of  his  will.     6. The   date   and   time   when   the   offender   determined   to   commit   the   crime   essential.     7. The   premeditation   must   be   based   upon   external   acts   and   not   presumed   from   mere  lapse  of  time.  (U.S.  vs.  Ricafort,  1  Phil.   173,  176)   8. Mere  threats  without  the  second  element   (external   acts)   does   not   show   evident   premeditation.     9. Existence  of  ill-­‐feeling  or  grudge  alone  is   not  proof  of  evident  premeditation.     10. Three  hours  or  less  considered  sufficient   lapse  of  time.     11. Why   sufficient   time   is   required.   The   offender   must   have   an   opportunity   to   coolly   and   serenely   think   and   deliberate   on   the   meaning   and   the   consequences   of   what   he   planned   to   do,   an   interval   long   enough   for   his   conscience   and   better   judgment   to   overcome   his   evil   desires   and   scheme.   (People  vs.  Mendoza,  91  Phil.  58,  64)   12. There   must   be   sufficient   time   between   the   outward   acts   and   the   actual   commission  of  the  crime.     13. Conspiracy   generally   presupposes   premeditation.     14. Evident   premeditation   and   price   or   reward  can  co-­‐exist.     15. When   victim   is   different   from   that   intended,  premeditation  not  aggravating.     16. It  is  not  necessary  that  there  is  a  plan  to   kill  a  particular  person.  For  premeditation   to  exist,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  accused   plan  to  kill  a  particular  person.       United  States  v.  Manalinde,  14  Phil.  77  (1909)  

Facts:   The   accused,   Manalinde,   who   pleaded   guilty   confessed   that   his   wife   died   about   one   hundred   days  before;  that  he  was  directed  by  Datto  Mupuck   to   go   huramentado   and   to   kill   the   two   persons   he   would   meet   in   the   town;   that   if   he   was   successful   in   the  matter,  Mupuck  would  give  him  a  pretty  woman   on   his   return;   that   in   order   to   carry   out   his   intention   to   kill   two   persons   in   the   town   of   Cotobato,  he  provided  himself  with  a  kris,  which  he   concealed   in   banana   leaves;   that   he   traveled   for   a   day  and  a  night  from  his  home;  that  upon  reaching   the   town,   he   attacked   from   behind   a   Spaniard   named   Igual,   and   immediately   after,   he   attacked   a   Chinaman  named  Choa,  who  was  close  by;  and  that   he  had  no  quarrel  with  the  assaulted  persons.  Both   victims  died  as  a  result.     Issue:   WON   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   evident  premeditation  is  established  by  the  facts.     Held:   Yes.   Those   facts   establish   the   aggravating   circumstance  of  evident  premeditation.     The   three   requisites   of   evident   premeditation   are   illustrated  by  the  facts:     First  requisite:   On   a   certain   date,   Manalinde   accepted   the   proposition   that   he   would   turn   hurmentado  and  kill  the  first  two  persons  he  would   meet   in   the   market   place.   On   said   date,   the   offender   is  said  to  have  determined  the  crime.     Second   requisite:   He   undertook   the   journey   to   comply   therewith   and   provided   himself   with   a   weapon.   The   journey   and   the   carrying   of   the   weapon   are   acts   manifestly   indicating   that   the   offender   clung   to   his   determination   to   commit   the   crime.     Third   requisite:   After   the   journey   for   a   day   and   a   night,   he   killed   the   victims.   One   day   and   one   night   constitute  a  sufficient  lapse  of  time  for  the  offender   to  realize  the  consequences  of  his  contemplated  act.    

Treachery   Reyes:   1. Basis:   Reference   to   the   means   and   ways   employed  in  the  commission  of  the  crime.     2. Meaning   of   treachery.   There   is   treachery   when   the   offender   commits   any   of   the   crimes   against   the   person,   employing   means,   methods   or   forms   in   the   execution   thereof  which  tend  directly  and  specially  to   insure  its  execution,  without  risk  to  himself  

Rañeses  135     3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

arising   from   the   defense   which   the   offended   party  might  make.     Rules.   1. Applicable   only   to   crimes   against   the   person.     2. Means,   methods   or   forms   need   not   insure  accomplishment  of  crime.     3. The  mode  of  attack  must  be  consciously   adopted.     Treachery   cannot   be   presumed.   The   suddenness   of   the   attack   does   not,   of   itself,   suffice  to  support  a  finding  of  alevosia,  even   if   the   purpose   was   to   kill,   so   long   as   the   decision   was   made   all   of   a   sudden   and   the   victim’s   helpless   position   was   accidental.   The   qualifying   circumstance   of   treachery   may   not   be   simply   deduced   from   presumption   as   it   is   necessary   that   the   existence   of   this   qualifying   or   aggravating   circumstance   should   be   proven   as   fully   as   the   crime   itself   in   order   to   aggravate   the   liability  or  penalty  incurred  by  the  culprit.     The   mode   of   attack   must   be   consciously   adopted.     1. The   accused   must   make   some   preparation   to   kill   the   deceased   in   such   a   manner   as   to   insure   the   execution   of   the   crime   or   to   make   it   impossible   or   hard   for   the   person   attacked   to   defend   himself  or  retaliate.   2. The   mode   of   attack   must   be   thought   of   by   the   offender,   and   must   not   spring   from  the  unexpected  turn  of  events.     Treachery   cannot   be   appreciated   where   there   is   nothing   in   the   record   to   show   that   the   accused   had   pondered   upon   the   mode   or   method   to   insure   the   killing   of   the   deceased   or   remove   or   diminish   any   risk   to   himself   that   might   arise   from   the   defense  that  the  deceased  might  make.     Requisites:   1. That  at  the  time  of  the  attack,  the  victim   was  not  in  a  position  to  defend  himself;   and   2. That   the   offender   consciously   adopted   the  particular  means,  method  or  form  of   attack  employed  by  him.     Treachery   must   be   proven   by   clear   and   convincing  evidence.     Guiding  principles.     1. When   the   aggression   is   continuous,   treachery   must   be   present   in   the   beginning  of  the  assault.    

2. When   the   assault   was   not   continuous,   in   that   there   was   an   interruption,   it   is   sufficient   that   treachery   was   present   at   the  moment  the  fatal  blow  was  given.     10. Treachery   is   not   to   be   considered   as   to   the   principal   by   induction   when   it   is   not   shown   that   the   principal   by   induction   directed   or   induced   the   killer   of   the   deceased  to  adopt  the  means  or  methods   actually   used   by   the   latter   in   accomplishing  the  crime.     11. Treachery,   abuse   of   superior   strength,   and   means   employed   to   weaken   the   defense,  distinguished.     1. Treachery   –   means,   methods   or   forms   of   attack   are   employed   by   the   offender   to   make   it   impossible   or   hard   for   the   offended   party   to   put   up   any   sort   of   resistance.     2. Abuse   of   superior   strength   –   the   offender   does   not   employ   means,   methods   or   forms   of   attack;   he   only   takes  advantage  of  his  superior  strength.     3. Means   employed   to   weaken   the   defense   –   employs   means   but   the   means   employed   only   materially   weakens   the   resisting   power   of   the   offended  party.     12. When   there   is   conspiracy,   treachery   is   considered  against  all  the  offenders.     13. The  mastermind  should  have  knowledge   of  the  employment  of  treachery  if  he  was   not   present   when   the   crime   as   committed.     14. If   the   intervention   of   other   persons   did   not   directly   and   especially   insure   the   execution  of  the  crime  without  risk  to  the   accused  there  is  no  treachery.     15. Treachery,   evident   premeditation   and   use  of  superior  strength  are  absorbed  in   in  treason  by  killings.   16. Treachery   absorbs   abuse   of   superior   strength,   aid   of   armed   men,   by   a   band   and  means  to  weaken  the  defense.     17. Nighttime  inherent  in  treachery.     18. Craft   is   included   in   and   absorbed   by   treachery.     19. Age  and  sex  are  included  in  treachery.     20. Treachery   cannot   co-­‐exist   with   passion   or  obfuscation.       People  v.  Sangalang,  58  SCRA  737  (1974)   Facts:   June   9,   1968,   6   a.m.:   Ricardo   Cortez   left   his   nipa   hut   in   Silang,   Cavite   to   gather   tuba   from   a  

Rañeses  136     nearby   coconut   tree.   His   wife   Flora   Sarno   was   left   inside  the  hut.  While  on  top  of  the  tree,  Cortez  was   struck   by   a   valley   of   shots.   He   later   on   fell   to   the   ground   at   the   base   of   the   coconut   tree.   Flora   went   outside  &  was  supposed  to  help  his  husband  but  the   five   persons   each   armed   w/a   long   firearm   fired   at   her  too.  She  went  back  to  the  hut  for  cover  but  she   was   able   to   recognize   the   5   as   Conrado   Gonzales,   Irineo   Canuel,   Perino   Canuel,   Eleuterio   Cuyom   &   Laureano  Sangalang.  The  latter  was  known  to  Flora   &  her  bro  Ricardo  since  childhood.  The  five  left  after   about   5mins   &   when   she   returned   to   her   husband,   he  was  already  dead.  L       Ricardo  Sarno,  Flora’s  bro  who  lived  nearby,  heard   the   gunshots   too.   He   went   out   &   saw   Sangalang   shooting   Cortez   w/a   Garand   carbine.   He   was   supposed   to   help   Cortez   but   he   was   fired   upon   by   the  men  too.     Sarno   &   Flora   executed   sworn   statements   &   based   on   these,   a   complaint   against   the   5   offenders   was   filed.   Only   Sangalang   was   arrested.   CFI   convicted   him  of  murder  &  was  sentenced  to  RP.       Defense:  Sangalang  claims  that  during  that  time,  he   was   in   Sampaloc,   Manila   to   borrow   money   from   a   certain   Gatdula   for   the   tuition   fees   of   his   children.   He  likewise  impugns  the  credibility  of  Mrs.  Cortez  &   Ricardo.     Issues:   1. WON  Sangalang’s  alibi  is  admissible   2. WON   the   qualifying   AC   of   treachery   (alevosia)  should  be  appreciated.     Held:     1. No.   Discrepancies   in   the   testimonies   of   Sarno   &   Mrs.   Cortez   are   not   glaring   and   instead   these   strengthen   their   credibility   &   show   that   they   did   not   rehearse   their   testimonies.   • Cortez   &   Sarno   clearly   &   consistently   testified   that   Sangalang   was   among   those   who   shot   Ricardo.   Their   unwavering   identification   negates   Sangalang’s  alibi.     • Although   motive   for   killing   was   not   proven,   it   was   not   shown   either   that   Cortez   &   Sarno   were   impelled   by   malicious   desires   to   falsely   incriminate   Sangalang.     2. Yes.   When   the   crime   happened,   victim   was   on  top  of  a  coconut  tree.  He  was  unarmed  &   defenseless.  The  assault  was  unexpected.  He  

didn’t   give   any   immediate   provocation.   Deliberate   &   surprise   attack   insured   victim’s  killing  w/o  any  risk  to  the  offenders   arising   from   any   defense   w/c   the   victim   could  have  made.  Thus,  offense  is  murder.   • Treachery  absorbs  the  AC  of  band.     • Evident   premeditation,   though   alleged,   was  not  proven.    

  Ignominy   Reyes:   1. Ignominy  is  a  circumstance  pertaining  to   the   moral   order,   which   adds   disgrace   and   obloquy   to   the   material   injury   caused  by  the  crime.     2. Applicable   to   crimes   against   chastity,   less   serious   physical   injuries,   light   or   grave  coercion,  and  murder.       People  v.  Torrefiel,  45  OG  803   Facts:   The   accused   and   his   companion   were   guerillas  of  the  USAFFE.   On  their  way  to  their  headquarters,  they  stopped  at   the   house   of   the   offended   party   and   asked   her   husband  for  khaki  clothes.     The   offended   party   accused   them   of   being   looters.   They   then   decided   to   bring   the   spouses   to   their   headquarters   supposedly   to   investigate   the   accusations.     The   accused   was   initially   assigned   to   accompany   the  husband  and  his  companion  the  wife.  However,   the  accused  was  lost  on  their  way,  which  led  to  the   escape  of  the  husband.     He   eventually   kept   up   with   his   companion,   who,   after   realizing   that   the   husband   escaped,   left   the   wife  with  the  accused  to  look  for  said  husband.     The   wife   then   testified   that   the   accused,   after   winding   cogon   grass   around   his   genital   organ,   raped  her.     Issue:   WON   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   ignominy  can  be  appreciated.       Held:   Yes.   The   court   appreciated   the   aggravating   circumstance   stating   that   the   manner   of   commission   augmented   the   wrong   done   by   increasing  the  pain  and  adding  ignominy  thereto.     People  v.  Alfanta,  320  SCRA  357  (1999)    

Rañeses  137     Facts:   The   offended   party   testified   that,   while   sleeping  in  the  living  room  of  a  friend,  was  suddenly   pulled  and  boxed  by  the  accused,  and  then  covered   her  mouth  with  his  hand.     With  a  bolo,  the  accused  allegedly  ordered  her  to  go   out,  climb  up  the  fence  to  the  next  house.     The   accused   then   ordered   her   to   undress   and   to   separate  her  legs.  She  was  then  raped.     Allegedly,   the   accused   also   inserted   his   genital   organ  in  her  genital  organ.   The   accused   defense   was   that   they   were   sweethearts.     The  court  rejected  this  theory,  it  being  belied  by  the   offended   party   stabbing   him,   after   which   she   reported  the  incident  to  the  police.     The   court   also   appreciated   two   aggravating   circumstances.     Issue:     1. WON   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   nighttime  can  be  appreciated.     2. WON  the  aggravating  circumstance  of       Held:   1. Yes.   Nighttime:   The   accused   took   advantage   of   the   time   in   order   to   facilitate   the   crime   without  being  recognized.   2. Yes.   Ignominy:   While   the   accused   claimed   that   the   manner   in   which   the   rape   was   done   was   normal   for   lovers,   the   court   did   not   think  so.    

E. Alternative  Circumstances   Reyes:   1. Alternative   circumstances   are   those   which   must   be   taken   into   consideration   as  aggravating  or  mitigating  according  to   the   nature   and   effects   of   the   crime   and   the   other   conditions   attending   its   commission.     2. Basis:   nature   and   effects   of   the   crime   and   the   other   conditions   attending   its   commission.     3. The  alternative  circumstances  are:   1. Relationship;   2. Intoxication;  and   3. Degree   of   instruction   and   education   of   the  offender.     4. Same.  Relationship.  

Spouse,   Ascendant,   Descendant,   Legitimate,   natural,   or   adopted   brother   or  sister,  or,   • Relative  by  affinity  in  the  same  degree  of   the  offender.     5. Same.   Same.   When   mitigating   and   when   aggravating.   • As   a   rule,   relationship   is   mitigating   in   crimes   against   property,   by   analogy   to   the  provisions  of  Art.  332.     • It   is   aggravating   in   crimes   against   persons   in   cases   where   the   offended   party   is   a   relative   of   a   higher   degree   than   the   offender   or   when   the   offender   and   the   offended   party   are   relatives   of   the  same  level.     6. Same.  Same.  If  the  crime  against  persons   is  any  of  the  serious  physical  injuries,  the   fact   that   the   offended   party   is   a   descendant   of   the   offender   is   not   mitigating.   But   when   the   offense   committed   is   less   serious   physical   injuries   (Art.   265);   or   slight   physical   injuries   (Art.   266),   relationship   is   a   mitigating   circumstance,   if   the   offended   party   is   a   relative   of   a   lower   degree   of   the   offender;   and   an   aggravating   circumstance,   if   the   offended   party   is   a   relative   of   a   higher   degree  of  the  offender.     7. Same.   Same.   Relationship   is   neither   mitigating   nor   aggravating,   when   relationship  is  an  element  of  the  offense.     8. Same.   Same.   In   crimes   against   chastity,   relationship  is  always  aggravating.     9. Same.  Intoxication.   • Mitigating   –   (1)   if   intoxication   is   not   habitual,   or   (2)   if   intoxication   is   not   subsequent   to   the   plan   to   commit   a   felony.     • Aggravating   –   (1)   if   intoxication   is   habitual;   or   (2)   if   it   is   intentional   (subsequent   to   the   plan   to   commit   a   felony).     10. Same.   Same.   The   accused’s   state   of   intoxication  must  be  proved.     11. Same.   Same.   Drunkenness   must   affect   mental  faculties.     12. Same.   Even   if   intoxication   is   not   habitual,   it  is  aggravating  when  subsequent  to  the   plan  to  commit  the  crime.     13. Same.   Same.   Presumption   is   that   intoxication  is  accidental.     • • • •

Rañeses  138     14. Same.   Same.   Non-­‐habitual   intoxication,   lack   of   instruction   and   obfuscation   are   not  be  taken  separately.     15. Same.   Degree   of   instruction   and   education   of   the   offender.   Low   degree   of   instruction   and   education   or   lack   of   it   is   generally   mitigating..   High   degree   of   instruction   and   education   is   aggravating   when   the   offender   avails   himself   of   his   learning  in  committing  the  crime.     • Lack  of  sufficient  intelligence  is  required   in  illiteracy.     • Lack   of   sufficient   instruction   is   not   mitigating   when   the   offender   is   a   city   resident   who   knows   how   to   sign   his   name.     16. Same.   Same.   Lack   of   instruction   must   be   proved   by   the   defense.   It   must   be   positively   and   directly   proved   and   cannot   be  based  on  mere  deduction  or  inference.     17. Same.   Same.   The   question   of   lack   of   instruction   cannot   be   raised   for   the   first   time  in  appellate  court.     18. Same.   Same.   Ordinarily,   low   degree   or   lack   of   instruction   is   mitigating   in   all   crimes.     19. Same.  Same.  High  degree  of  instruction  as   aggravating.     • Degree   of   instruction   is   aggravating   when   the   offender   availed   himself   or   took   advantage   of   it   in   committing   the   crime.       RPC,  Art.  15   Their  concept.  -­‐  Alternative  circumstances  are  those   which   must   be   taken   into   consideration   as   aggravating   or   mitigating   according   to   the   nature   and   effects   of   the   crime   and   the   other   conditions   attending   its   commission.   They   are   the   relationship,   intoxication   and   the   degree   of   instruction   and   education  of  the  offender.   The   alternative   circumstance   of   relationship   shall   be   taken   into   consideration   when   the   offended   party   is   the   spouse,   ascendant,   descendant,   legitimate,   natural,   or   adopted   brother   or   sister,   or   relative   by   affinity   in   the   same   degrees   of   the   offender.   The   intoxication   of   the   offender   shall   be   taken   into   consideration   as   a   mitigating   circumstance   when   the  offender  has  committed  a  felony  in  a  state  

 

 

of   intoxication,   if   the   same   is   not   habitual   or   subsequent   to   the   plan   to   commit   said   felony;   but   when   the   intoxication   is   habitual   or   intentional,   it   shall  be  considered  as  an  aggravating  circumstance.  

 

 

Intoxication     People  v.  Camano,  115  SCRA  688  (1982)   Facts:     • Feb.   17,   1970   bet.   4   &   5   p.m.   in   Nato,   Sagnay,   Camarines   Sur:   Camano,   after   drinking   liquor,   stabbed   Godofredo   Pascua   w/a  bolo  while  the  latter  was  walking  along   the  barrio  street  almost  in  front  of  the  store   of   one   Socorro   Buates.   Pascua   sustained   2   mortal   wounds   w/c   caused   his   death.   Afterwards,  Camano  went  to  the  seashore  of   the   barrio   where   he   found   Mariano   Buenaflor  leaning  at  the  gate  of  the  fence  of   his   house   in   a   kneeling   position   w/both   arms  on  top  of  the  fence  &  his  head  stooping   down.   Camano   then   hacked   Buenaflor   w/the   same   bolo   sustaining   8   wounds   w/c   caused   latter’s   death.   No   proof   of   any   altercation   between   the   accused   &   victims   prior  to  the  incidents.   • 3   yrs   before   the   incident,   the   victims   had   a   misunderstanding   w/the   accused.   Camano   asked   for   Pascua   to   tow   his   fishing   boat   w/the   motorboat   owned   by   Buenaflor   but   the   two   refused   to   do   so.   Camano   resented   such   refusal.   Even   if   they   were   seen   drinking   together   later   on,   the   friendly   attitude   was   more   artificial   than   real.   Camano   refused   to   associate   w/the   2   &   a   neighbor’s   attempt   to   reconcile   the   3   was   repeatedly   refused.   And   in   instances   when   Camano   was   drunk,   he’d   even   challenge   Buenaflor   to   a   fight   &   announce   his   evil   intention  to  kill  them.     • Prosecution:   Camano   surrendered   upon   demand   of   the   peace   officers.   He   admitted   that  he  owned  the  bolo  used  in  the  killing  &   such   was   hidden   under   the   table   of   his   house.  Patrolman  Baluyot  found  the  bolo  at   the   place   indicated   by   Camano.   The   bolo   was   still   stained   w/human   blood.   He   likewise   admitted   that   killed   Pascua   &   Buenaflor   in   self-­‐defense   but   he   refused   to   sign   his   statement.   He   was   charged   w/murder   attended   by   evident   premeditation  &  treachery.    

Rañeses  139     •

•

•

Defense:   Camano   claims   that   he   went   fishing   early   morning   of   Feb.   17.   Buenaflor,   upon   seeing   that   he   had   a   big   catch,   demanded   a   percentage   for   the   fishery   commission.   Camano   refused   to   pay   &   saw   Buenaflor   called   him   hard   headed.   He   went   home  afterwards.  After  dinner,  he  prepared   to  go  out  to  sea  again.  While  standing  in  the   yard   of   his   house,   he   saw   Buenaflor   &   Pascua   having   a   drinking   session   w/a   group   of   men   at   the   score   of   Socorro   Buates.   He   claims   that   the   Buenaflor’s   group   approached   him   &   w/o   any   provocation,   Pascua   boxed   him.   Buenaflor   punched   him   also.  He  claims  that  when  Pascua  was  about   to   bolo   him,   he   was   able   to   grab   the   bolo   from  Pascua.  Pascua  then  fell  on  the  ground   &  the  rest  of  the  group  ran  away  except  for   Buenaflor   who   approached   him.   Buenaflor   was   also   armed   w/a   bolo   w/c   prompted   Camano   to   bolo   him.   Buenaflor   ran   away   once  he  was  wounded  but  Camano  ran  after   him   claiming   that   former   had   a   gun   at   home   w/c  he  might  use  to  shoot  Camano  later  on.   Thus,   he   hacked   Buenaflor   to   death.   He   denies  killing  Pascua  &  claims  that  the  fight   was   due   to   a   heated   argument   &   their   drunkenness.     CFI   Camrines   Sur:   sentenced   Camano   to   death.   Claims   of   Camano   are   w/o   evidentiary  support  &  are  mere  fictions.  His   cousin   &   lone   witness,   Nemesio   Camano   is   not  credible  either.  His  testimonies  had  a  lot   of   inconsistencies.   Besides,   if   Camano   were   really   innocent,   he   should   have   produced   more   witnesses   considering   that   the   crime   was   committed   in   broad   daylight   w/many   people  witnessing  it.  But  only  Nemesio  was   presented.  Nemesio  &  Camano’s  testimonies   were   changed   many   times   too.   Evidence   show   that   he   is   guilty   of   murder   beyond   reasonable  doubt  w/evident  premeditation,   treachery,   abuse   of   superior   strength   &   intoxication.     Appeal:   Camano’s   counsel   claims   that   the   accused   is   only   guilty   of   homicide   &   not   murder.    

  Issues:     1. WON   evident   premeditation   should   be   appreciated.   2. WON  treachery  should  be  appreciated  

3. WON   the   alternative   circumstance   of   intoxication   should   be   appreciated   as   an   aggravating  circumstance.   4. WON   death   is   a   cruel   &   unusual   penalty   &   not  proper  in  the  case  at  bar.     Held:     1. No.   Evident   Premeditation   is   present   when   the   offender   had   carefully   planned   the   killing.     a. Requisites:   a)   time   when   offender   determined   to   commit  the  crime;  b)   act   manifestly   indicating   that   the   culprit   had   clung   to   his   determination;   c)   sufficient   lapse   of   time   bet   the   determination   &   execution   of   the   crime   to   allow   him   to   reflect   upon   the   consequences   of   his   act   &   to   allow   his   conscience   to   overcome  the  resolution  of  his  will.     b. No   proof   of   the   requisites   in   this   case.   Trial   court   merely   concluded   that  crime  was  premeditated  due  to   the  incident  w/c  occurred  3  yrs  ago.   But   such   did   not   establish   the   time   when   Camano   decided   to   commit   the   crime.   It   can   only   establish   his   motive   for   killing   the   victims.   Previous   incidents   wherein   Camano   challenged   Buenaflor   to   a   fight   did   not   reveal   a   persistence   of   criminal   design  since  there’s  no  proof  that  he   was   making   plans   in   between   those   threats   &   the   consummation   of   the   crime.     2. Yes.  Amado  Payago,  one  of  the  men  drinking   w/Pascua   &   Buenaflor   during   the   incident,   testified   that   Camano   attacked   Pascua   from   behind.  Such  is  a  measure    w/c  ensures  the   accomplishment   of   criminal   act   w/o   any   risk   to   the   perpetrator   arising   from   the   defense   that   his   victim   may   put   up   characterizing   treachery.   Payago’s   testimony   is   further   strengthened   by   the   nature   &   location   of   the   wounds   sustained   by  Pascua  w/c  show  that  the  point  of  entry   of   the   stab   wounds   were   at   the   back   &   point   of  exit  were  in  front.       Buenaflor   was   hacked   while   he   was   in   a   kneeling   position.   The   attack   was   sudden,   unexpected   &   lethal   such   as   to   disable   &  

Rañeses  140     incapacitate   him   from   putting   up   any   defense.  

barbarous,   something   more   that   the   mere  extinguishments  of  life.    

3. No.   IT’S   MITIGATING.   Camano’s   counsel   claims   that   there   was   no   proof   of   accused’s   intoxication   at   the   time   of   the   killing   other   than   Payago’s   testimony   that   he   saw   Camano   drinking   in   his   house   about   30   meters   away.   No   police   report/doctor’s   certification   was   presented   either.   Furthermore,   there’s   no   proof   that   accused   purposefully   got   drunk   to   facilitate   the   commission   of   the   offense.   If   intoxication   should   be   appreciated   it   should   be   used   as   mitigating   circumstance   since   it   diminished   his  capacity  to  know  the  injustice  of  his  acts   &   comprehend   fully   the   consequence   of   his   acts.         • Mitigating   if   accidental,   not   habitual   or   intentional   &   not   subsequent   to   the   plan   to   commit   the   crime.   It   must   be   indubitably  proven.   • Aggravating   if   habitual   or   intentional.   Habitual   drunkard   is   one   given   to   intoxication   by   excessive   use   of   intoxicating   drinks.   Habit   should   be   actual   &   confirmed.   Not   necessarily   a   daily   occurrence   but   it   must   lessen   the   individual’s   resistance  to   evil  thought   &   undermine  will  power  making  its  victim   a  potential  evildoer.     • No   proof   that   Camano   was   a   habitual   drinker   although   he   used   to   get   drunk   every   now   &   then.   Even   Pagayo’s   testimony   does   not   establish   the   habitual   drinking   of   Camano.   The   intoxication   not   being   habitual   &   since   accused  was  in  a  state  of  intoxication  at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   intoxication   should   be   appreciated   as   a   mitigating  circumstance.   4. No.   Camano’s   counsel   claims   that   the   penalty  violates  Art.  IV,  Sec.  21  of  the  Consti   w/c   provides   that   excessive   fines   shall   not   be   imposed   nor   cruel   or   unusual   punishment  inflicted.     • Harden   vs.   Dir   of   Prisons:   DP   is   not   cruel,   unjust   or   excessive.   Punishments   are  cruel  when  they  involve  torture  or  a   lingering   death   but   the   punishment   of   death   is   not   cruel   w/in   the   meaning   of   that   word   as   used   in   the   Consti.   It   implies   something   inhuman   &  

  Aquino   dissenting:   Premeditation   is   aggravating   thus  accused  should  be  sentenced  to  2  RPs.     Makasiar   concurring:   Voluntary   surrender   will   also  mitigate  guilt  of  the  accused.  He  had  a  choice  to   surrender   or   not   when   demanded   by   the   policemen   who  didn’t  place  him  under  arrest  nor  did  they  have   any  arrest  warrant.                                                                                        

 

Rañeses  141    

Persons  Criminally  Liable    

A. In  Grave  and  Less  Grave  Felonies     RPC,  Art.  16.     Who   are   criminally   liable.   -­‐   The   following   are   criminally  liable  for  grave  and  less  grave  felonies:  

4.

1.  Principals.  

5.

2.  Accomplices.  

6.

3.  Accessories.   The  following  are  criminally  liable  for  light  felonies:   1.  Principals   2.  Accomplices.  

 

7.

 

Reyes:   1. Treble   division   of   persons   criminally   liable.   This   division   rests   upon   the   very   nature   of   their   participation   in   the   commission  of  the  crime.       When   a   crime   is   committed   y   many,   without   being   equally   shared   by   all,   a   different   degree   of   responsibility   is   imposed   upon   each   and   every   one   of   them.   In   that   case,   they   are   criminally   liable   either   as   principals,  accomplices  or  accessories.     2. Active   subject   and   passive   subject   of   crime.   In   all   crimes   there   are   always   two   parties,   namely;   the   active   subject   (the   criminal)   and   the   passive   subject   (the   injured   party).   Art.   16   enumerates   the   active  subjects.     3. Only   natural   persons   can   be   active   subjects  of  crime.  Only  natural  persons  can   be   the   active   subject   of   crime   because   of   the   highly   personal   nature   of   the   criminal   responsibility.     1. The   RPC   requires   that   the   culprit   should   have   acted   with   personal   malice  or  negligence.  An  artificial  or   juridical   person   cannot   act   with   malice  or  negligence.     2. A   juridical   person,   like   a   corportation,  cannot  commit  a  crime   in   which   a   willful   purpose   or   a   malicious  intent  is  required.    

3. An   artificial   or   juridical   person   cannot   act   with   malice   or   negligence.     4. Other   penalties   consisting   in   imprisonment  and  other  deprivation   of   liberty,   like   destierro,   can   be   executed   only   against   individuals.   (Albert)     Officers,   not   corporation,   are   criminally  liable.     Juridical   persons   are   criminally   liable  under  certain  special  laws.     Only   the   officers   of   the   corporation   who  participated  either  as  principals   by   direct   participation   or   principals   by  induction  or  by  cooperation,  or  as   accomplices   in   the   commission   of   an   act  punishable  by  law  are  liable.     Passive   subject   of   crime.   The   holder   of   the   injured   rights:   the   man,   the   juristic   person,  the  group  and  the  State.    

 

Principals     RPC,  Art.  17.     Principals.   -­‐   The   following   are   considered   principals:   1.   Those   who   take   a   direct   part   in   the   execution   of   the  act;   2.   Those   who   directly   force   or   induce   others   to   commit  it;   3.   Those   who   cooperate   in   the   commission   of   the   offense   by   another   act   without   which   it   would   not   have  been  accomplished.  

 

 

Reyes:     1. Difference   between   a   principal   under   any   of   the   three   categories   enumerated   in   Art.   17   and   a   co-­‐conspirator.   The   difference   between   an   accused   who   is   a   principal   under   any   of   the   three   categories   enumerated   in   Art.   17   of   the   RPC   and   a   co-­‐ conspirator   who   is   also   a   principal   is   that   while   the   former’s   criminal   liability   is   limited  to  his  own  acts,  as  a  general  rule,  the   latter’s  responsibility  includes  the  acts  of  his   fellow  conspirators.      

Principals  by  direct  participation  

Rañeses  142     Reyes:   1. Two   or   more   persons   may   take   direct   part  in  the  execution  of  the  act,  in  which   case   they   may   be   principals   by   direct   participation.     2. Requisites:   a. That   they   participated   in   the   criminal  resolution;   b. That  they  carried  out  their  plan  and   personally  took  part  in  its  execution   by  acts  which  directly  tended  to  the   same  end.     3. Conspiracy.   A   conspiracy   exists   when   two   or   more   persons   come   to   an   agreement   concerning   the   commission   of   a   felony   and   decide  to  commit  it.  (Art.  8,  par.  2)     a. To   be   a   party   to   a   conspiracy,   one   must   have   the   intention   to   participate  in  the  transaction  with  a   view   to   the   furtherance   of   the   common  design  and  purpose.     4. Silence  does  not  make  one  a  conspirator.     5. Conspiracy  transcends  companionship.     6. Existence   of   conspiracy.   The   existence   of   conspiracy   does   not   require   necessarily   an   agreement  for  an  appreciable  length  prior  to   the  execution  of  the  purpose,  since  from  the   legal   viewpoint,   conspiracy   exists   if,   at   the   time   of   the   commission   of   the   offense,   the   accused   had   the   same   purpose   and   were   united   in   its   execution.   (People   v.   Binasing,   et  al.,  98  Phil.  908)   7. Proof  of  conspiracy.   a. In   the   absence   of   collusion   among   the   declarants,   their   confessions   may   form   a   complete   picture   of   the   whole   situation   and   may   be   considered   collectively   as   corroborative   and/or   confirmatory   of   the   evidence   independent   therefrom.     b. It   is   not   essential   that   there   be   proofs  as  to  the  previous  agreement   and  decision  to  commit  the  crime,  it   being   sufficient   that   the   malefactors   shall  have  acted  in  concert  pursuant   to  the  same  objective.     c. Formal   agreement   or   previous   acquaintance   among   several   persons  not  necessary  in  conspiracy.     d. Conspiracy   must   be   established   by   positive  and  conclusive  evidence.    

8. When  there  is  no  conspiracy,  each  of  the   offenders   is   liable   only   for   the   act   performed  by  him.     9. Conspiracy   is   implied   when   the   accused   had  a  common  purpose  and  were  united   in  its  execution.     10. Unity   of   purpose   ad   intention   in   the   commission  of  the  crime.   a. Spontaneous   agreement   at   the   moment   of   the   commission   of   the   crime   is   sufficient   to   create   just   responsibility.     b. Active   cooperation   by   all   the   offenders   in   the   perpetration   of   the   crime   will   also   create   joint   responsibility.     c. Contributing   by   positive   acts   to   the   realization   of   a   common   criminal   intent   also   creates   joint   responsibility.     d. Presence   during   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   a   band   and   lending   moral   support   thereto,   also   create   joint  responsibility  with  the  material   executors.     e. Where   one   of   the   accused   knew   of   the   plan   of   the   others   to   commit   a   crime   and   accepted   the   role   assigned   to   him   and   he   actually   performed  the  role.     11. There   may   be   conspiracy   even   if   there   is   no   evident   premeditation   on   the  part  of  the  accused.     12. Where   there   is   conspiracy,   the   act   of   one  is  the  act  of  all.     13. A   conspirator   is   not   liable   for   another’s   crime   which   is   not   an   object   to   the   conspiracy   or   which   is   not   a   necessary   and   logical   consequence  thereof.     14. A   person   in   conspiracy   with   others,   who   had   desisted   before   the   crime   was   committed   by   the   others,   is   not   criminally  liable.     15. When   there   is   conspiracy,   it   is   not   necessary  to  ascertain  the  specific  act   of  each  conspirator.     16. When   there   is   conspiracy,   the   fact   that   an   element   of   the   offense   is   not   present   as   regards   one   of   the   conspirators  is  immaterial.     17. There   could   be   no   conspiracy   to   commit   an   offense   through   negligence.    

Rañeses  143     18. In   cases   of   criminal   negligence   or   crimes   punishable   by   special   law,   allowing   or   failing   to   prevent   an   act   to   be   performed   by   another,   makes   one  a  co-­‐principal.     19. The   principals   by   direct   participation   must   be   at   the   scene   of   the   crime,   personally   taking   part   in   the   execution.     20. When   the   second   requisite   is   lacking   (culprits   personally   took   part),   there   is  only  conspiracy.     21. There   is   collective   criminal   responsibility  when  the  offenders  are   criminally   liable   in   the   same   manner   and  to  the  same  extent.  The  penalty  to   be  imposed  must  be  the  same  for  all.     22. In   the   absence   of   previous   conspiracy,  unity  of  criminal  purpose   and   intention   immediately   before   the   commission   of   the   crime,   or   community   of   criminal   design,   the   criminal   responsibility   arising   from   different   acts   directed   against   one   and   the   same   person   is   individual   and   not   collective,   and   each   of   the   participants   is   liable   only   for   the   act   committed  by  him.    

  United  States  v.  Diris,  26  Phil.  133  (1918)   Fact:   Fulgencio   Seal,   who   lived   in   the   pueblo   of   Calauag,   Province   of   Tayabas,   received   from   the   railroad   company,   more   than   P400   in   payment   of   certain  land  expropriated  by  that  company,  and  that   the   defendant   Tomas   Olea,   a   nephew   of   Fugencio   Seal,  was  present  when  the  money  was  counted  and   paid   over   to   his   uncle.   Thereafter,   after   Fulgencio   Seal  left  the  house  leaving  his  wife  in  charge  of  their   tienda,  the  three  defendants  appeared  at  the  tienda   and   Eustaquio   Siaga   engaged   the   woman   in   conversation   while   the   other   two   defendants   went   upstairs,  broke  open  the  trunk,  and  took  the  money,   amounting  to  P353,  and  a  receipt  for  P100.  After  the   discovery   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   The   nephew   when   found   admitted   the   theft   of   the   money   and   promised   that   if   the   uncle   would   not   make   any   trouble   about   it   he   would   try   and   recover   it  from  the  other  defendants.       At   the   trial   the   defendants   denied   that   they   were   the  authors  of  the  crime;  Olea  and  Diris  denied  that   they   were   present   at   the   house   on   the   morning   in   question.   However,   they   were   convicted   for   the   crime   of   robbery.   On   appeal,   defendant   Eustaquio  

Siaga,   who   remained   below   in   the   tienda   and   engaged  the  woman  in  conversation  while  the  other   defendants   went   up   into   the   house,   should   only   be   held   as   a   accomplice   (accessary   before   the   fact)   as   defined  in  the  Penal  Code,  and  not  as  a  principal.     Issue:    WON  defendant  Eustaquio  Siaga  should  only   be  held  liable  as  accomplice?     Held:   No.   The   defendant   Siaga   acted   concurrently   with  the  other  defendants,  and  must  be  held  to  have   been  present  with  them  aiding  and  abetting  them  in   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   remaining   below   and  talking  with  the  woman  in  order  to  distract  her   attention   from   what   was   going   on   upstairs.   In   doing   so  he  was  evidently  serving  as  a  guard  to  warn  his   companions  in  case  there  should  arise  any  necessity   for   giving   an   alarm.   When   the   other   defendants   came   down   out   of   the   house   he   went   away   with   them.       This  court  has  repeatedly  held  that  one  who  shares   the   guilty   purpose   and   aids   and   abets   the   commission   of   a   crime   by   his   presence   at   the   time   of   its   perpetration,   even   though   he   may   not   have   taken   an   active   part   in   its   material   execution,   is   guilty   as   a   principal.   We   have   also   held   that   one   who  stands  as  guard  near  the  place  where  a  crime  is   committed   to   keep   others   away   or   to   warn   his   companions   and   fellow   conspirators   of   danger   of   discovery,   takes   a   direct   part   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   and   is   therefore   guilty   as   a   principal   under  article  13  of  the  Penal  Code.    

Principals  by  inducement   Reyes:   1. The   principal   by   induction   becomes   liable   only   when   the   principal   by   direct   participation  committed     2. Two   ways   of   becoming   principal   by   induction.   a.  by  directly  forcing  another  to  commit   a  crime,  and   • By  using  irresistible  force.   • By   causing   uncontrollable   fear.     b.  by   directly   inducing   another   to   commit  a  crime.     • By   giving   price,   or   offering   reward  or  promise.     • By  using  words  of  command.     3. Requisites  

Rañeses  144     a.  That  the  inducement  be  made  directly   with   the   intention   of   procuring   the   commission  of  the  crime;  and   b.  That   such   inducement   be   the   determining   cause   of   the   commission   of  the  crime  by  the  material  executor.   • It   is   necessary   that   inducement   be   the   determining   cause   of   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   the   principal   by   direct   participation,  that  is,  without   such   inducement   the   crime   would   not   have   been   committed.     • The   indicement   must   precede   the   act   induced   and   must   be   so   influential   in   producing   the   criminal   act   that  without  it,  the  act  would   not  have  been  performed.       To   constitute   inducement,   there   must   exist   on   the   part   of   the   inducer   the   most  positive  resolution  and  the  most   persistent   effort   to   secure   the   commission   of   the   crime,   together   with   the   presentation   to   the   person   induced   by   the   very   strongest   kind   of   temptation  to  commit  the  crime.     4. A   thoughtless   expression   without   intention   to   produce   the   result   is   not   an   inducement  to  commit  a  crime.     5. The   words   of   advice   or   the   influence   must   have   actually   moved   the   hands   of   the  principal  by  direct  participation.     6. In   order   that   a   person   using   words   of   command   may   be   held   liable   as   principal   under   paragraph   no.   2   of   Art.   17,   the   following   five   requisites   must   all   be   present:   a. That   the   one   uttering   the   words   of   command   must   have   the   intention   of   procuring  the  commission  of  the  crime.     b. That   the   one   who   made   the   command   must   have   an   ascendancy   or   influence   over  the  person  who  acted.     c. That   the   words   used   must   be   so   direct,   so  efficacious,  so  powerful  as  to  amount   to  physical  or  moral  coercion.   d. The  words  of  command  must  be  uttered   prior  to  the  commission  of  the  crime.     e. The   material   executor   of   the   crime   has   no  personal  reason  to  commit  the  crime.    

7. Ascendancy  or  influence  as  to  amount  to   moral   coercion   is   not   necessary   when   there  is  conspiracy.     8. One   who   planned   the   crime   committed   by  another  is  a  principal  by  inducement.     9. If   the   crime   committed   is   not   contemplated   in   the   order   given,   the   inducement   is   not   material   and   not   the   determining  cause  thereof.     10. Distinguish   principal   by   inducement   from  the  offender  who  made  proposal  to   commit  a  felony.     a. In   both,   there   is   an   inducement   to   commit  a  crime.     b. In  the  first,  the  principal  by  inducement   becomes   liable   only   when   the   crime   is   committed   by   the   principal   by   direct   participation;   in   the   second   the   mere   proposal   to   commit   a   felony   is   punishable   in   treason   or   rebellion.   The   person   to   whom   the   proposal   is   made   should  not  commit  the  crime;  otherwise,   the   proponent   becomes   a   principal   by   inducement.     c. In   the   first,   the   inducement   involves   any   crime;  in  the  second,  the  proposal  to  be   punishable   must   involve   only   treason   or   rebellion.     11. Effects   of   acquittal   of   principal   by   direct       participation   upon   the   liability   of   principal  by  inducement.   a. Conspiracy   is   negatived   (sic)   by   the   acquittal  of  the  co-­‐defendant.     b. One   cannot   be   held   guilty   of   having   instigated   the   commission   ofa   crime   without  first  being  shown  that  the  crime   has  been  actually  committed  by  another.       People  v.  Ong  Chiat  Lay,  60  Phil.  788  (1934)   Facts:   Appellant   and   two   others,   Ong   Ban   Hua   and   Kua   Sing,   were   jointly   informed   against   by   the   provincial  fiscal  of  Zamboanga,  charging  them  with   having   feloniously   burned   a   building   in   which   was   located   a   store   belonging   to   the   appellant.   Upon   a   plea  of  "not  guilty,"  appellant  and  his  codefendants   were  tried  jointly  upon  said  information;  and,  after   trial,   while   Ong   Ban   Hua   and   Kua   Sing   were   acquitted,  appellant  was  found  guilty  of  the  crime  of   arson     Issue:   WON   the   appellant   is   criminally   liable   as   principal  by  direct  participation.      

Rañeses  145     Held:   No.   In   order   to   convict   a   defendant   as   principal   in   the   commission   of   a   crime,   it   must   be   shown   either   (1)   that   he   took   a   direct   part   in   the   execution   of   the   criminal   act;   (2)   that   he   directly   forced  or  induced  another  or  others  to  commit  it;  or   (3)   that   he   cooperated   in   the   commission   of   the   offense   by   an   act   without   which   it   would   not   have   been   accomplished.   (Revised   Penal   Code,   article   17.)   They   take   direct   part   in   the   execution   of   a   criminal   act   who,   participating   in   the   criminal   design,   proceed   to   carry   out   their   plan   and   personally   take   part   in   its   execution   by   acts   which   directly  tend  to  the  same  end.  (Viada,  Codigo  Penal,   5th   ed.,   vol.   1,   p.   341;   Albert's   Revised   Penal   Code   Ann.,  144.)                     In   the   instant   case,   it   is   not   claimed   that   appellant   had   taken   a   direct   part   in   the   burning   of   the   building.   In   fact,   the   prosecution   lays   stress   on   appellant's  absence  from  the  scene  of  the  fire  as  one   of  the  suspicious  circumstances  indicating  his  guilt.     United  States  v.  Indanan,  24  Phil.  203  (1913)   Facts:   Panglima   Indanan,   accussed   is   the   headman   of  Parang.       • On   Mar.   24,   1912,   Indanan   ordered   the   killing  of  Sariol  to  his  men  Akiran,  Kalyakan   &  Suhuri  in  the  Chinese  Cemetary  asserting   that   Indanan   had   an   order   to   that   effect   from  the  governor.     • The  CFI  found  Indanan  guilty  of   the   crime   of   murder  &  sentencing  him  to  be  hanged.       Issues:   WON   Indanan   is   guilty   of   murder   by   inducement.     Held:  Yes.  A13(2),  of  the  Penal  Code  declares  those   to   be   principals   in   a   crime   "who   directly   force   or   induce  others  to  commit  it."     • Commenting   upon   this   paragraph,   Viada   says:     • They   force   another   to   commit   a   crime   who   physically   by   actual   force   or   grave   fear,   for   example,   with   a   pistol   in   hand   or   by   any   other   threatening   means,   oblige   another   to   commit   the   crime.   In   our   commentary   on   par.  9  of  A8  (page  28),  we  have  already  said   that  he  who  suffers  violence  acts  w/o  will  &   against   his   will,   is   no   more   than   an   instrument,   &   therefore   is   guilty   of   no   wrong.   The   real   culprits   in   such   case,   the   only   guilty   persons,   are   those   who   use   the   violence,   those   who   force   the   other   to   commit  the  crime.    

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One   is   induced   directly   to   commit   a   crime   either   by   command,   or   for   a   consideration,   or   by   any   other   similar   act   w/c   constitutes   the  real  &  moving  cause  of  the  crime  &  w/c   was   done   for   the   purpose   of   inducing   such   criminal   act   &   was   sufficient   for   that   purpose.   We’ve   already   seen   in   our   commentary  on  par.  12  of  A8  that  the  1  who   physically   commits   the   crime   may   escape   criminal   responsibility   by   showing   that   he   acted   w/   due   obedience   to   an   order;   in   such   case  the  criminal  responsibility  falls  entirely   upon   the   1   who   orders,   i.e.,   upon   him   who   by   his   commands   has   directly   induced   the   other   to   commit   the   act.   But   in   case   the   obedience   of   the   inferior   isn’t   due   to   the   superior   &   thus   not   necessary,   &   doesn’t,   thus,   exempt   him   from   criminal   responsibility   as   the   physical   author   of   the   crime,   he   who   thus,   by   his   command,   directly   induced   him   to   the   criminal   act   is   considered   by   the   law   also   as   principal   in   the  crime.     The  pacto  by  virtue  of  w/c  1  purchases  for  a   consideration   the   hand   w/c   commits   the   crime   makes   him   who   gives,   promises,   or   offers  the  consideration  the  principal  in  the   crime   by   direct   inducement,   because   w/o   such  offer  or  promise  the  criminal  act  would   never  have  been  committed.  But  this  doesn’t   mean   that   the   1   who   actually   commits   the   crime   by   reason   of   such   promise,   remuneration   or   reward   is   exempted   from   criminal   responsibility;   on   the   contrary,   such   circumstance   constitutes   an   aggravation  of  his  crime.     We   have   heretofore   said   that   in   addition   to   the   precepto   &   the   pacto   there   are   similar   means   by   w/c   another   may   be   induced   to   commit   a   crime   w/c   also   make   the   1   who   offers   the   inducement   the   principal   in   the   crime  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  A13(2).   But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  acts   of   inducement   do   not   consist   in   simple   advice   or   counsel   given   before   the   act   is   committed,   or   in   simple   words   uttered   at   the  time  the  act  was  committed.  Such  advice   &   such   words   constitute   undoubtedly   an   evil   act,   an   inducement   condemned   by   the   moral   law;   but   in   order   that,   under   the   provisions   of   the   Code,   such   act   can   be   considered   direct   inducement,   it   is   necessary   that   such   advice   or   such   words   have   a   great   dominance   &   great   influence  

Rañeses  146     over   the   person   who   acts;   it   is   necessary   that   they   be   as   direct,   as   efficacious,   as   powerful  as  physical  or  moral  coercion  or  as   violence  itself.     People  v.  Kiicihi  Omine,  61  Phil.  609  (1935)   Facts:  Defendants  appeal  from  a  decision  of  the  CFI   finding   them   guilty   of   frustrated   homicide,   w/   the   AC   that   advantage   was   taken   of   their   superior   strength,   &   sentencing   them   each   to   suffer   an   IS   from   6   yrs   of   prision   correccional   to   12   yrs   of   prision  mayor.     Defendants  Eduardo  Autor,  Luis  Ladion  and  Agapito   Cortesano  were  working  under  co-­‐defendant  Kiichi   Omine,   the   overseer   or   manager   of   the   hemp   plantation   owned   by   Angel   Pulido.     The   4   defendants   lived   together   in   a   house   on   the   plantation.     Kiichi   Omine   asked   Angel   Pulido   permission   to   open   a   new   road   through   the   plantation.     Acdg   to   Omine,   Pulido   did   give   his   permission  that’s  why  he  began  working  on  the  new   road.     But   acdg   to   Pulido,   he   refused   to   grant   this   request   because   there   was   already   an   unfinished   road.     As   Pulido   and   his   son   along   w/   2   others   were   returning   home   from   a   cockpit,   they   noticed   that   a   considerable   number   of   hemp   plants   were   destroyed   by   the   construction   of   the   new   road.     Angered  by  this,  they  went  to  the  defendants’  house   and   there   happened   a   violent   altercation   resulting   to   the   owner   Pulido’s   death   from   a   wound   by   a   bolo   struck  in  his  breast.     Issue:   WON   Kiiche   Omine   is   a   principal   by   induction.       Held:   No.   Although   it   is   alleged   that   Kiichi   Omine   uttered   words   of   inducement   to   Eduardo   Autor,   it   would   be   insufficient   to   make   him   a   principal   by   induction.     Eduardo   Autor   though   working   under   the   direction   of   Omine   was   still   being   paid   by   Pulido.     Moreover,   it   is   necessary   that   inducement   be   made   directly   w/   the   intention   of   procuring   the   commission  of  the  crime  and  that  such  inducement   be   the   determining   cause   of   the   commission   of   the   crime.      It  must  be  precede  the  act  induced  and  must   be   so   influential   in   producing   the   criminal   act   that   w/o   it   the   act   wouldn’t   have   been   performed.     Moreover,   as   words   of   direct   inducement,   it   is   essential   that   such   advice   or   words   have   great   dominance  and  great  influence  over  the  person  who   acts,   that   they   be   as   direct,   as   efficacious,   as  

powerful   as   physical   or   moral   coercion   or   as   violence  itself.     Hence,   the   3   co-­‐defendants   of   Autor   are   not   responsible  for  the  injury  inflicted  by  him  on  Angel   Pulido.    Judging  from  the  nature  of  the  wound,  w/c   was   abt   11   inches   in   length,   it   is   probable   that   it   was   caused   by   the   point   of   the   bolo   on   a   downward   stroke.    It  was  not  a  stab  wound,  and  was  probably   given  during  a  commotion  and  w/o  being  aimed  at   any  particular  part  of  the  body.    Moreover,  as  Autor   struck  the  offended  only  once,  it  is  indicative  that  it   was   not   his   intention   to   take   the   offended   party’s   life.     Wherefore,   Eduardo   Autor   is   guilty   of   lesiones   graves   w/   a   sentence   of   1yr   8   mos   &   21   days   of   prision   correccional,   since   the   offended   party   was   incapacitated   for   the   performance   of   his   usual   work   for   a   period   of   more   than   90   days,   and   not   of   frustrated   homicide.    The   rest   of   the  co-­‐defendants   are  acquitted.    

Principals  by  indispensable  cooperation   Reyes:   1. To  cooperate  means  to  desire  or  wish  in   common  a  thing.  But  that  common  will  or   purpose   does   not   necessarily   mean   previous   understanding,   for   it   can   be   explained   or   inferred   from   the   circumstances   of   each   case.   (People   vs.   Apelgido,  56  Phil.  571,  576)   2. Requisites:   a. Participating   in   the   criminal   resolution,   that   is,   there   is   either   anterior   conspiracy   or   unity   of   criminal   purpose   and   intention   immediately   before   the   commission   of  the  crime  charged;  and   b. Cooperation   in   the   commission   of   the   offense   by   performing   another   act,   without   which   it   would   not   have   been  accomplished.       People  v.  Montealegre,  161  SCRA  700  (1988)   Facts:     • Edmundo   Abadilla   was   eating   in   a   resto   when   he   detected   the   smell   of   marijuana   smoke  coming  from  a  nearby  table.   • Intending   to   call   a   policeman,   he   quietly   went   outside   and   saw   Pfc.   Renato   Camantigue.   Camantigue   joined   Abadilla   in   the   resto   and   they   both   smelled   the  

Rañeses  147    

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marijuana   smoke   from   the   table   of   Vicente   Capalad  and  Napoleon  Montealegre.   Camantigue   collared   the   2   &   said   “Nagmamarijuana   kayo,   ano?”   He   forced   them  up,  holding  1  in  each  hand  but  Capalad   pulled   out   a   knife   &   started   stabbing   Camantigue   at   the   back.   Camantigue   let   go   of   Montealegre   to   get   his   gun   but   Montealegre   restrained   Camantigue’s   hand   to  prevent  the  latter  from  defending  himself.   They   grappled   &   fell   on   the   floor.   Capalac   fled   and   Camantigue   pursued   him   firing   some   shots.   Then   he   stopped   and   asked   to   be  brought  to  a  hospital.  Capalac  was  found   slumped   in   the   street,   with   a   bullet   to   his   chest.  Both  he  and  Camantigue  died  the  next   day.   Montealegre   on   the   other   hand,   escaped  through  the  confusion.  He  was  later   apprehended.  

  Issue:   WON   Montealegre   was   rightly   considered   a   co-­‐principal   for   having   corroborated   with   Capalad   in  the  killing  of  the  police  officer.       Held:   YES.   The   two   acted   in   concert,   with   Capalad   actually   stabbing   Camantigue   7   times   and   Montealegre  holding  on  to  victim’s  hands  to  prevent   him  from  drawing  the  pistol  and  defending  himseld,   as  Abadilla  had  testified.   • While   it   is   true   that   Montealegre     did   not   himself   commit   the   act   of   stabbing,   he   was   nonetheless   equally   guilty   thereof   for   having   prevented   Camantigue   for   resisting   the  attack  against  him.   • Montealegre   was   a   principal   by   indispensable   cooperation   under   A17(3),   RPC.  The  requisites  of  this  provision   • Participating   in   the   criminal   resolution,   i.e.,   there’s  either  anterior  conspiracy  or  unity  of   criminal   purpose   &   intention   immediately   before  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged;   &   • Cooperation   in   the   commission   of   the   offense  by  performing  another  act  w/o  w/c   it  would  not  have  been  accomplished.   • But   although   there   was   no   evidence   of   prior   agreement   between   Capalad   &   Montealegre,   their   subsequent   acts   should   prove   the   presence   of   such   conspiracy.   The   Court   has   consistently   upheld   such   view   in   previous   cases   (People   v.   Laganson,   People   v.   Cercano,   People   v.   Garcia   Cabarse,   Dacanay   v.  People)  

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Montealegre   was   correctly   convicted   of   the   complex   crime   of   murder,   qualified   by   treachery,   w/   assault   upon   a   person   of   authority.  

  People  v.  Simbra,  117  SCRA  242  (1982)   Facts:  Sergio  Tolibas  was  charged  and  found  guilty   of  the  crime  of  rape  of  one  Gresilda  Gonzales,  a  16-­‐ yr  old  girl.       Prosecution’s   version:   One   night,   Gonzales   left   her   house   to   fetch   water   from   the   artesian   well.   In   the   public   market.   About   36   meters   away   from   her   house,   along   an   unlighted   portion   of   the   road,   appellant   Tolibas   and   one   Simbra,   both   smelling   of   ‘tuba’,   accused   her.   Simbra   grabbed   her   by   the   arms   while   Tolibas   quickly   covered   her   mouth   with   a   handkerchief.  Helping  each  other,  they  dragged  the   girl   to   a   serin,   where   the   bad   deed   happened.   During  the  first  commission  of  rape,  Simbra  was  the   one  who  succeeded  having  carnal  knowledge  while   Tolibas  held  the  girl’s  arms  and  covered  her  mouth.   Simbra  succeeded  twice.  Afterwards,  it  was  Tolibas   who  had  carnal  knowledge  of  the  girl  3  times  while   Simbra   was   holding   the   complainant.   After   the   commission  of  the  crime,  the  two  brought  the  girl  to   the  house  of  Tolibas’  sister,  where  she  was  fetched   by  her  aunt.  Police  interrogation  followed.       Defense’s   version:   Gonzales   was   Simbra’s   sweetheart   and   what   happened   in   the   serin   was   done  with  the  consent  of  the  girl.     Issue:   WON   Simbra   was   a   principal   by   indispensable  cooperation.     Held:   Yes.   Appellant’s   version   is   hard   to   believe.   Tolibas  committed  the  crime  of  rape  through  direct   participation   when   he   himself   had   carnal   knowledge   of   the   girl.   And,   when   he   aided   Simbra,   he   committed   another   crime   of   rape   through   indispensable   cooperation.   He   is   hereby   guilty   of   two  crimes  of  consummated  rape.    

Accomplices     RPC,  Art.  18.    

Accomplices.   -­‐   Accomplices   are   those   persons   who,   not   being   included   in   article   17,   cooperate   in   the   execution   of   the   offense   by   previous   or   simultaneous  acts.  

  Reyes:  

 

Rañeses  148     1. Quasi-­‐collective   criminal   responsibility.   Between   collective   criminal   responsibility   and  individual  criminal  responsibility,  there   is   the   so-­‐called   quasi-­‐collective   criminal   responsibility.       In   quasi-­‐collective   criminal   responsibility,   some   of   the   offenders   in   the   crime   are   principals  and  the  others  are  accomplices.     2. The   participation   of   an   accomplice   presupposes   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   the   principal   by   direct   participation.     3. In   case   of   doubt,   the   participation   of   the   offender   will   be   considered   that   of   an   accomplice   rather   than   that   of   a   principal.     4. When   the   participation   of   an   accused   is   not  disclosed,  he  is  only  an  accomplice.     5. An   accomplice   does   not   have   previous   agreement   or   understanding   or   is   not   in   conspiracy   with   the   principal   by   direct   participation.     6. Conspirators   and   accomplices   have   one   thing   in   common:   they   know   and   agree   with   criminal   design.   Conspirators,   however,   know   the   criminal   intention   because   they   themselves   have   decided   upon   such   course   of   action.   Accomplices   come   to   know   about   it   after   the   principals   have   reached  the  decision,  and  only  then  do  they   agree   to   cooperate   in   its   execution.   Conspirators   decide   that   a   crime   should   be   committed;   they   merely   assent   to   the   plan   and   cooperate   in   its   accomplishment.   Conspirators   are   the   authors   of   a   crime;   accomplices   are   merely   instruments   who   perform   acts   not   essential   to   the   perpetration  of  the  offense.     7. Requisites:   a. That   there   be   community   of   design;   that   is,   knowing   the   criminal   design   of   the   principal   by   direct   participation,   he   concurs   with   the   latter  in  his  purpose;   i. Principal   originates   the   original  design.   ii. Accomplice  merely  concurs.     iii. Knowledge  acquired:   1. When   the   principal   informs   or   tells   the   accomplice   of   the   former’s   criminal   purposes.  

2. When   the   accomplice   saw  the  criminal  acts   of  the  principal   b. That   he   cooperates   in   the   execution   of   the   offense   by   previous   or   simultaneous   acts,   with   the   intention   of   supplying   material   or   moral   aid   in   the   execution   of   the   crime  in  an  efficacious  way;  and   i. Moral   aid   may   be   through   advice,   encouragement   or   agreement.     c. That   there   be   a   relation   between   the   acts  done  by  the  principal  and  those   attributed   to   the   person   charged   as   accomplice.     8. The   accomplice   intends   by   his   acts,   to   commit   or   take   part   in   the   execution   of   the   crime.     9. The   community   of   design   need   not   be   to   commit   the   crime   actually   committed.   It   is   sufficient  if  there  was  a  common  purpose  to   commit   a   particular   crime   and   that   the   crime   actually   committed   was   a   natural   or   probable   consequence   of   the   intended   crime.   10. Principal   in   general   and   accomplice,   distinguished.   An   accomplice   is   one   who   does   not   take   a   direct   part   in   the   commission   of   the   act,   who   does   not   force   or   induce   others   to   commit   it,   or   who   does   not   cooperate   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   by   another   act   without   it   would   not   have   been   accomplished,   yet   cooperates   in   the   execution   of   the   act   by   previous  or  simultaneous  actions.     11. Principal   by   cooperation   and   accomplice,   distinguished.  Participation  of  an  accomplice  is   not  indispensable  as  in  the  case  of  a  co-­‐principal   by  cooperation.     12. Principal   by   direct   cooperation   and   accomplice,  distinguished.     a. In   both,   there   is   community   of   criminal  design.     b. No  clear-­‐cut  distinction  between  the   acts   of   the   accomplice   and   those   of   the  principal  by  direct  participation.   In  case  of  doubt,  it  shall  be  resolved   in  favor  of  lesser  responsibility.       c. Between   or   among   principals,   there   must  be  conspiracy;  but  between  the   principals   and   the   accomplices,   there  is  no  conspiracy.       People  v.  Nierra,  96  Phiil.  1  (1980)  

Rañeses  149     Facts:  Juliana  Gadugdug-­‐Nierra  and  Pagano  Nierra,   her   brother-­‐inlaw,   were   competitors   in   the   businesses  of  launch  transportation  and  the  sale  of   soft  drinks  in  Barrio  Tinago,  General  Santos  City.     In   order   to   monopolize   those   businesses   in   the   locality,   Paciano   Nierra   conceived   the   Idea   of   liquidating  his  competitor,  Juliana.  For  that  purpose,   Felicisimo   Doblen,   a   cousin-­‐in-­‐law   of   Paciano,   accompanied   to   Paciano's   house   Gaspar   Misa,   a   convicted   murderer   who   had   escaped   from   the   Davao  Penal  Colony     Thereafter,   Doblen,   in   behalf   of   Pagano   Nierra,   delivered  to  Misa  at  the  beach  a  package  containing   a  caliber  .38  pistol  with  five  bullets.  Misa  contacted   his   friend,   Vicente   Rojas,   and   apprised   him   that   he   (Misa)   had   been   hired   to   kill   Juliana.   Misa   asked   Rojas   to   act   as   lookout   when   the   killing   would   be   perpetrated.       Thereafter,   the   unwary   Juliana   went   to   the   beach   where   she   was   accustomed   to   void   and   when   she   squatted,   Misa   unexpectedly   appeared   behind   her,   held  her  hair,  thus  tilting  her  face,  and  while  in  that   posture,   he   inserted   into   her   mouth   the   muzzle   of   the   pistol   and   fired   it.   Paciano   and   Gaudencia,   who   were  near  the  beach,  witnessed  the  actual  killing.       On   August   7,   1969,   Misa   was   interrogated   by   Patrolman   A.B.   Vencer   Jr.   of   the   city   police   department.   He   signed   a   confession   admitting   the   killing   of   Juliana   Nierra   and   implicating   the   other   accused   therein.   ,   Misa   testified   at   the   preliminary   in-­‐vestigation.   In   his   testimony,   he   admitted   again   the  killing  and  confirmed  his  confession  implicating   Paciano   Nierra,   his   wife   Gaudencia,   Doblen   and   Rojas     Thereafter,   Misa,   Doblen,   Rojas   and   the   Nierra   spouses,   as   co-­‐conspirators,   were   charged   with   murder   aggravated   by   reward,   treachery,   evident   premeditation,   nocturnity,   ignominy   and   abuse   of   superiority  and,  as  to  Misa,  recidivism,  since  he  had   been   sentenced   to   reclusion   perpetua   for   the   murder  of  Antonio  Abad  Tormis  in  Cebu  City.       Issue:   WON   Dublin   and   Rojas   are   criminally   liable   as  accomplice.         Held:   Yes.   After   a   conscientious   reflection   on   the   complicity   of   Doblen   and   Rojas,   we   have   reached   the   conclusion   that   they   should   be   held   guilty   as  

accomplices.   It  is  true,  strictly  speaking,  that  as  co-­‐ conspirators   they   should   be   punished   as   co-­‐ principals.   However,   since   their   participation   was   not   absolutely   indispensable   to   the   consummation   of   the   murder,   the   rule   that   the   court   should   favor   the  milder  form  of  liability  may  be  applied  to  them   (People  vs.  Tamayo,  44  Phil.  38  and  other  cases).     In   some   exceptional   situations,   having   community   of   design   with   the   principal   does   not   prevent   a   malefactor  from  being  regarded  as  an  accomplice  if   his   role   in   the   perpetration   of   the   homicide   or   murder   was,   relatively   speaking,   of   a   minor   character   (See   People   vs.   Ubiña,   97   Phil.   515;   U.S.   vs.  Doming  1st,  37  Phil.  446;  People  vs.  Daligdig,  89   Phil.  598;  People  vs.  Largo,  99  Phil.  1061).     People  v.  Doble,  114  SCRA  131  (1982)   Facts:     Late   in   the   night   of   June   13,   1966,   10   men,   almost   all   heavily   armed   w/   pistols,   carbines   and   thompsons,   left   the   shores   of   Manila   in   a   motor   banca   &   proceeded   to   Navotas,Rizal   to   rob   the   beach-­‐bank  Prudential  Bank  &  Trust  Co.    Said  bank   wad   an   unusual   banking   hours,   open   from   midnight   till   8AM.     Once   docked   in   Navotas   and   taking   advantage   of   the   darkness   of   the   night,   8   men   disembarked  from  the  banca  and  proceeded  to  their   mission.     Once   inside,   they   started   firing   at   the   bank’s  ceiling,  walls  &  door  of  the  vault.    The  8  men   then  returned  to  the  waiting  motor  banca  w/  about   P10.5K   &   sped   away.     As   a   result   of   the   shooting,   many  people  got  killed  &  injured.    Among  those  who   got  killed  were  agents  of  the  law.       Only  5  of  the  10  men  were  brought  to  trial,  the  rest   still   remain   at   large.     2   of   the   5   accused   were   acquitted.    It  is  only  Cresencio  Doble,  Simeon  Doble   and   Antonio   Romaquin   appealing   in   the   charge   of   bank   robbery   committed   in   band,   w/   multiple   homicide,   multiple   frustrated   homicide   and   assault   upon  agents  of  persons  in  authority.     Issue:  WON  defendant  is  an  accomplice.       Held:   Yes.   First,   as   to   appellant   Simeon,   evidence   shows   that   the   malefactors   met   in   his   house   to   discuss   the   plan   to   rob   the   bank.     This   circumstance   alone  doesn’t  conclude  his  guilt  beyond  reasonable   doubt.    The  facts  do  not  show  that  he  performed  any   act   tending   to   the   perpetration   of   the   robbery,   nor   that   he   took   a   direct   part   therein   or   induced   other   persons   to   commit,   or   that   he   cooperated   in   its   consummation   by   some   act   w/o   w/c   it   would   not   have   been   committed.     At   most,   his   act   amounted   to   joining   in   a   conspiracy   w/c   is   not   punishable.     Simeon  then  was  not  a  principal  both  by  agreement  

Rañeses  150     and  encouragement  for  his  non-­‐participation  in  the   commission  of  the  crime.    Nor  was  it  clearly  proven   that   he   had   received   any   part/fruits   of   the   looted   money   as   to   make   him   an   accessory.   As   recommended   by   SolGen,   Simeon   Doble   is   entitled   to   acquittal   w/   no   sufficient   evidence   to   establish   his  guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt.     Next,  as  regards  Romaquin  &  Doble,  the  malefactors   who   waited   in   the   banca,   both   contend   that   their   extra-­‐judicial  statements  upon  w/c  their  conviction   was   principally   made   to   rest,   are   inadmissible   for   having   been   allegedly   obtained   by   force   and   intimidation,   torture   and   maltreatment,   and   in   violation  of  basic  consti’l  rts  to  counsel  and  against   self-­‐incrimination.     However,   it   must   be   noted   that   they  didn’t  present  any  medical  cert  to  attest  to  the   injuries   allegedly   inflicted.     More   so   that   their   testimonies  match  each  other’s.    And  it  should  also   be   noted   that   Celso   Aquino’s   testimony,   as   one   of   the  accused,  admitted  that  no  violence  was  inflicted   on   him   to   procure   his   statement.     This   is   evidence   enough   that   the   appellants   could   not   have   been   dealt  w/   differently   as   their  co-­‐accused   Aquino   who   was  allowed  to  give  his  statement  freely.     The   extra-­‐judicial   statements   of   the   appellants   are   convincing   to   show   that   their   liability   is   less   than   that   of   a   co-­‐principal   by   conspiracy   or   by   actual   participation.     Cresencio   was   merely   in-­‐charge   of   the   banca   and   had   no   knowledge   of   the   concrete   plan   and   execution   of   the   crime.     The   mastermind   obviously   did   not   extend   confidence   in   him   as   he   was  only  asked  to  provide  a  banca  just  a  few  hours   before   the   commission   of   the   crime.     Nor   was   Romaquin   considered   a   principle   malefactor   as   there   was   a   gun   pointed   at   him   by   Cresencio   to   prevent   him   from   fleeing   away   from   the   scene,   evident   to   show   that   he   never   joined   in   the   criminal   purpose  and  that  his  acts  were  not  voluntary.     An   accomplice   is   one   who,   not   being   principal   as   defined   in   Art   17   RPC,   cooperates   in   the   execution   of   the   offense   by   previous   or   simultaneous   acts.     There   must   be   a   community   of   unlawful   purpose   between   the   principal   and   accomplice   and   assistance   knowingly   and   intentionally   given   to   supply   material   and   moral   aid   in   the   consummation   of   the   offense.     In   this   case,   the   appellants’   cooperation  is  like  that  of  a  driver  of  a  car  used  for   abduction  w/c  makes  the  driver  a  mere  accomplice.   But   it   isn’t   established   by   evidence   that   in   the   mtg   held   in   the   house   of   Simeon   that   they   all   agreed   to   kill  and  not  just  rob.    The  finding  that  appellants  are  

liable   as   mere   accomplices   may   appear   too   lenient   but   evidence   fails   to   establish   their   conspiracy   w/   the   real   malefactors   who   actually   robbed   the   bank   and  killed  several  people.     Wherefore,   Doble   &   Romaquin   are   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   as   accomplices   for   the   crime   of   robbery   in   band.     The   penalty   imposable   upon   appellants  is  prision  mayor  min.    The  commission  of   the   crime   was   aggr   by   nighttime   &   the   use   of   a   motorized   banca.     There   being   no   MC,   both   appellants   should   be   sentenced   to   an   indeterminate   penalty  of  prision  correccional  from  5  yrs,  4  mos,  21   days  to  8  yrs  of  prision  mayor  as  maximum.     People  v.  Doctolero,  193  SCRA  632  (1991)   Facts:     • Ludovico,   Virgilio,   and   Conrado   were   stoning  the  house  of  Marcial.   • After  the  two  women  inside  protested  their   acts,  the  three  went  up  the  house.   • While   inside   the   house,   Ludovico   boloed   both  women  inside,  as  well  as  a  child.     Issue:  WON  defendants  are  liable  as  accomplices.     Held:  Yes.   • It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  Conrado  and   Virgilio   merely   stood   by   as   Ludovico   was   boloing   the   two   deceased   women.   Their   presence  gave  Ludovico  the  encouragement   and  reliance  to  proceed  as  he  did.   • This   is   similar   to   the   case   of   US   v.   Balili   where   it   was   held   that   one   who   goes   with   the   principals,   and   in   staying   outside   of   the   house   while   the   others   went   inside   to   rob   and   kill   the   victim,   effectively   supplies   the   criminals   with   material   and   moral   aid,   making  him  guilty  as  an  accomplice.    

Accessories     RPC,  Art.  19     Accessories.   -­‐   Accessories   are   those   who,   having   knowledge   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   and   without   having   participated   therein,   either   as   principals   or   accomplices,   take   part   subsequent   to   its  commission  in  any  of  the  following  manners:   1.  By  profiting  themselves  or  assisting  the  offender   to  profit  by  the  effects  of  the  crime.  

 

Rañeses  151     2.   By   concealing   or   destroying   the   body   of   the   crime,  or  the  effects  or  instruments  thereof,  in  order   to  prevent  its  discovery.   3.   By   harboring,   concealing,   or   assisting   in   the   escape   of   the   principal   of   the   crime,   provided   the   accessory  acts  with  abuse  of  his  public  functions  or   whenever   the   author   of   the   crime   is   guilty   of   treason,  parricide,  murder,  or  an  attempt  to  take  the   life   of   the   Chief   Executive,   or   is   known   to   be   habitually  guilty  of  some  other  crime.   RPC,  Art.  20   Accessories  who  are  exempt  from  criminal  liability.  -­‐   The  penalties  prescribed  for  accessories  shall  not  be   imposed   upon   those   who   are   such   with   respect   to   their   spouses,   ascendants,   descendants,   legitimate,   natural,   and   adopted   brothers   and   sisters,   or   relatives   by   affinity   within   the   same   degrees,   with   the  single  exception  of  accessories  falling  within  the   provisions   of   paragraph   1   of   the   next   preceding   article.  

 

  Reyes:   1. An   accessory   does   not   participate   in   the   criminal   design,   nor   cooperate   in   the   commission   of   the   felony,   but,   with   knowledge   of   the   commission   of   the   crime,   he   subsequently   takes   part   in   three  ways:   1. Profiting   from   the   effects   of   the   crime   2. Concealing   the   body,   effects   or   instruments  of  the  crime  in  order  to   prevent  its  discover   3. Assisting   in   the   escape   or   concealment   of   the   principal   of   the   crime,   provided   he   acts   with   abuse   of   his   public   functions   or   the   principal   is   guilty   of   treason,   parricide,   murder,   or   an   attempt   to   take   the   life   of   the   Chief   Executive,   or  is  known  to  be  habitually  guilty  of   some  other  crime.     2. An   accessory   must   have   knowledgeof   the   commission  of  the  crime,  and  having  that   knowledge,   he   took   part   subsequent   to   its  commission.     3. Knowledge   may   be   established   by   circumstantial  evidence.    

4. Two   classes   of   accessories   are   contemplated   in   paragraph   3   of   Article   19.   1. Public   officers   who   harbor,   conceal   or   assist   in   the   escape   of   the   principal   of   any   crime   (not   light   felony)   with   abuse   of   his   public   functions.   i. Requisites   1. The   accessory   is   a   public  officer   2. He  harbors,  conceals,   or   assists   in   the   escape   of   the   principal.   3. The   public   officer   acts  with  abuse  of  his   public  functions.   4. The  crime  committed   by   the   principal   is   any   crime,   provided   it  is  not  a  light  felony.     2. Private   persons   who   harbor,   conceal   or  assist  in  the  escape  of  the  author   of   the   crime   -­‐   guilty   of   treason,   parricide,   murder,   or   an   attempt   to   take   the   life   of   the   Chief   Executive,   or  is  known  to  be  habitually  guilty  of   some  other  crime.   i. Requisites:   1. The   accessory   is   a   private  person   2. He   harbors,   conceals   or   assists   in   the   escape   of   the   author   of  the  crime.   3. The  crime  committed   by   the   principal   is   either   (a)   treason,   (b)   parricide,   (c)   murder,   (d)   an   attempt   against   the   life   of   the   President,   or   €   that   the   principal  is  known  to   be   habitually   guilty   of  some  other  crime.     5. One  who  kept  silent  with  regard  to  the  crime   he  witnessed  is  not  an  accessory.     6. Conviction   of   an   accessory   is   possible   notwithstanding   acquittal   of   principal   if   the   crime   was   in   fact   committed,   but   the   principal   not   held   criminally   liable   because   of  an  exempting  circumstance.    

Rañeses  152     7. Apprehension   and   conviction   of   principal   not   necessary   for   the   accessory   to   be   held   criminally  liable.     8. Arraignment,   trial   and   conviction   of   accessory  during  the  pendency  of  a  separate   case   against   the   principal   are   null   and   void.   Accessory   may   be   prosecuted   and   convicted   when  principal  is  not  yet  apprehended.     9. Principal,   accomplice   and   accessory,   distinguished.     1. The   accessory   does   not   take   direct   part   or   cooperate   in,   or   induce   the   commission  of  the  crime.     2. The   same   does   not   cooperate   in   the   commission   of   the   offense   by   acts   either  prior  thereto  or  simultaneous   therewith.     3. The  participation  of  the  accessory  in   all   cases   always   takes   place   after   the   commission  of  the  crime.     10. Exemptions   in   Art.   20.   Based   on   ties   of   blood   and  the  preservation  of  the  cleanliness  of  one’s   name,   which   compels   one   to   conceal   crimes   committed   by   relatives   so   near   as   those   mentioned  in  the  article.     11. Principals   related   to   accessories   exempt   from  criminal  liability.     1. Spouse   2. Ascendant   3. Descendant   4. Legitimate,   natural   or   adopted   brother,  sister  or  relative  by  affinity   within  the  same  degree.     12. Accessory   is   not   exempt   from   criminal   liability   even   if   the   principal   is   related   to   him,   if   such   accessory   (1)   profited   by   the   effects   of   the   crime,   or   (2)   assisted   the   offender  to  profit  by  the  effects  of  the  crime.       People  v.  Talingdan,  84  SCRA  19  (1978)     Facts:  Bernardo  Bagabag  was  murdered  in  his  own   house   in   Abra   on   June   24,   1967   by   Talingdan,   Tobias,   Berras,   Bides   and   Teresa   Domogma,   his   alleged   wife   [whom   cannot   be   charged   with   parricide   because   no   certificate   or   proof   of   marriage   could   be   presented   by   the   prosecution].   The   murder   was   witnessed   by   Corazon   [12],   the   eldest  child  of  Bernardo  and  Teresa.  She  testified  to   the  crime  committed  by  the  accused-­‐appellants.     Summary   of   Corazon’s   testimony:   Prior   to   the   violent   incident,   Bernardo   and   Teresa   have   had   several   conflicts   in   their   married   life.   She   would   often  withdrew  from  their  house.  The  longest  even  

for  more  than  3  weeks.  It  was  suspected  that  Teresa   is  having  an  illicit  affair  with  Talingdan,  a  policeman   who   lives   nearby.   Two   days   before   the   crime,   Teresa   was   slapped   several   times   by   Bernardo   after   a   violent   quarrel.   She   sought   the   help   of   Talingdan   who   challenged   Bernardo   to   come   down,   but   the   latter  refused.  Then,  Talingdan  left  after  shouting  "If   I   will   find   you   someday,   I   will   kill   you."   Two   days   before   the   commission   of   the   crime,   Corazon   overheard   her   mother’s   meeting   with   the   other   accused-­‐appellants  about  their  plot  to  kill  her  father   as   one   of   them   said,   “Shall   he   elude   a   bullet?”   Corazon   was   then   driven   away   by   her   mother   saying,   “You   tell   your   father   that   we   will   kill   him.”   On   the   night   of   the   murder,   Corazon   was   cooking   food   for   supper   when   she   saw   her   mother   talking   with  the  other  accused-­‐appellants  in  their  “batalan”   armed   with   long   guns.   After   a   while,   Teresa   went   inside   the   room   to   put   her   baby   to   sleep.   After   eating   supper   alone,   Corazon   told   her   father   about   the  persons  outside  but  he  ignored  her.  He  went  to   the  kitchen  and  sat  on  the  floor  near  the  door  then   he   was   fired   at.   Talingdan   and   Tobias   fired   their   guns   again.   Bides   threatened   to   kill   Corazon   if   she   would   ask   for   help.   Corazon   confessed   to   her   father’s   relatives   the   identities   of   the   murderers   during   his   burial.   The   trial   court   found   them   guilty   of   the   offense   and   so   the   five   accused   appealed   to   their  conviction.     Trial   Court:   Murder.   Life   imprisonment   with   indemnity   to   the   offended   party,   the   heirs   of   the   deceased   Bernardo   Bagabag,   in   the   amount   of   P12,000     Contention   of   the   Accused:   Teresa   denied   having   an   illicit  affair  with  Talingdan,  having  quarrels  with  or   being   maltreated   by   the   victim,   and   leaving   home   for  so  long.  She  contends  that  her  in-­‐laws  used  her   daughter   to   testify   against   her   because   they   don’t   want   Teresa   from   the   start.   She   even   added   that   Bernardo   had   some   enemies   during   his   lifetime.   Talingdan   said   that   he   escorted   the   Mayor   as   a   bodyguard,   while   the   other   three   accused   also   claimed   that   they   were   at   a   certain   Mrs.   Bayongan’s   house  during  the  night  of  the  murder.     Contention   of   the   People:   The   sworn   statement   of   the   13-­‐year   old   Corazon   was   true.   She   knew   the   accused   because   they   live   nearby.   Besides,   the   accused-­‐appellants   testimonies   are   indefensible   and  futile.  Moreover,  her  mother  claimed  to  have  no   suspect   in   mind   during   the   investigation   in   their  

Rañeses  153     house   although   she   was   in   conspiracy   with   the   other  four  accused.     Issue:  WON  Teresa  is  an  accessory.     Held:   Yes.   There   are   two   aggravating   circumstances   present,   treachery   and   evident   premeditation,  with  no  mitigating  circumstances  to   offset   the   accused-­‐appellants.   Talingdan,   Tobias,   Berras,   and   Bides   are   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt  of  murder  and  are  sentenced  to  DEATH  to  be   executed  in  accordance  with  law.  Teresa  Domogma   is   guilty   as   accessory   to   the   same   murder,   and   is   hereby   sentenced   to   suffer   the   indeterminate   penalty  of  5  years  prision  correccional  as  minimum   to   8   years   of   prision   mayor   as   maximum,   with   the   accessory  penalties  of  the  law.     Teresa   was   more   or   less   passive   in   her   attitude   regarding   her   co-­‐appellants'   conspiracy,   known   to   her.  After   Bernardo   was  killed,   she  became   active   in   her   cooperation   with   them.   These   subsequent   acts   of   her   constitute   "concealing   or   assisting   in   the   escape   of   the   principal   in   the   crime"   which   makes   her  liable  as  an  accessory  -­‐-­‐-­‐  par.  2  and  3  of  Article   19,  RPC.     Vino  v.  People,  178  SCRA  626  (1989)   Facts:  At  about  7:00  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  March   21,  1985,  Roberto  Tejada  left  their  house  at  Burgos   Street,  Poblacion,  Balungao,   Pangasinan   to   go   to   the   house   of   Isidro   Salazar   to   watch   television.   At   around   11:00   P.M.,   while   Ernesto,   the   father   of   Roberto,   was   resting,   he   heard   two   gunshots.   Thereafter,   he   heard   Roberto   cry   out   in   a   loud   voice   saying   that   he   had   been   shot.   He   saw   Roberto   ten   (10)   meters   away   so   he   switched   on   the   lights   of   their   house.   Aside   from   Ernesto   and   his   wife,   his   children  Ermalyn  and  Julius  were  also  in  the  house.   They   went   down   to   meet   Roberto   who   was   crying   and   they   called   for   help   from   the   neighbors.   The   neighbor   responded   by   turning   on   their   lights   and   the   street   lights   and   coming   down   from   their   houses.   After   meeting   Roberto,   Ernesto   and   Julius   saw   Lito   Vino   and   Jessie   Salazar   riding   a   bicycle   coming   from   the   south.   Vino   was   the   one   driving   the   bicycle   while   Salazar   was   carrying   an   armalite.   Upon   reaching   Ernesto's   house,   they   stopped   to   watch   Roberto.   Salazar   pointed   his   armalite   at   Ernesto   and   his   companions.   Thereafter,   the   two   left.     Lito   Vino   and   Sgt.   Jesus   Salazar   were   charged   with   murder   in   a   complaint   filed   by   PC   Sgt.   Ernesto   N.  

Ordono   in   the   Municipal   Trial   Court   of   Balungao,   Pangasinan.   However,   on   March   22,   1985,   the   municipal  court  indorsed  the  case  of  Salazar  to  the   Judge  Advocate  General's  Office  (JAGO)  inasmuch  as   he   was   a   member   of   the   military,   while   the   case   against   Vino   was   given   due   course   by   the   issuance   of  a  warrant  for  his  arrest.  Ultimately,  the  case  was   indorsed   to   the   fiscal's   office   who   then   filed   an   information  charging  Vino  of  the  crime  of  murder  in   the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  Rosales,  Pangasinan.     Upon  arraignment,  the  accused  Vino  entered  a  plea   of   not   guilty.   Trial   then   commenced   with   the   presentation   of   evidence   for   the   prosecution.   Instead   of   presenting   evidence   in   his   own   behalf,   the   accused   filed   a   motion   to   dismiss   for   insufficiency   of   evidence   to   which   the   prosecutor   filed   an   answer.   On   January   21,   1986,   2   a   decision   was   rendered   by   the   trial   court   finding   Vino   guilty   as   an   accessory   to   the   crime   of   murder   and   imposing   on   him   the   indeterminate   penalty   of   imprisonment   of   4   Years   and   2   months   of   prision   correccional   as   minimum   to   8   years   of   prision   mayor   as   maximum.   He   was   also   ordered   to   indemnify   the   heirs   of   the   victim   in   the   sum   of   P10,000.00  being  a  mere  accessory  to  the  crime  and   to  pay  the  costs.     Issue:  WON  Vino  is  an  accessory.     Held:   Yes.   Petitioner   was   charged   as   a   principal   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   of   murder.   Under   Article  16  of  the  Revised  Penal  Code,  the  two  other   categories   of   the   persons   responsible   for   the   commission  of  the  same  offense  are  the  accomplice   and  the  accessory.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  crime   of   murder   had   been   committed   and   that   the   evidence   tended   to   show   that   Jessie   Salazar   was   the   assailant.   That   the   petitioner   was   present   during   its   commission  or  must  have  known  its  commission  is   the   only   logical   conclusion   considering   that   immediately   thereafter,   he   was   seen   driving   a   bicycle   with   Salazar   holding   an   armalite,   and   they   were   together   when   they   left   shortly   thereafter.   At   least   two   witnesses,   Ernesto   and   Julius   Tejada,   attested  to  these  facts.  It  is  thus  clear  that  petitioner   actively   assisted   Salazar   in   his   escape.   Petitioner's   liability  is  that  of  an  accessory.     In  the  present  case,  the  commission  of  the  crime  of   murder   and   the   responsibility   of   the   petitioner   as   an   accessory   was   established.   By   the   same   token   there   is   no   doubt   that   the   commission   of   the   same   offense   had   been   proven   in   the   separate   case  

Rañeses  154     against   Salazar   who   was   charged   as   principal.   However,   he   was   acquitted   on   the   ground   of   reasonable  doubt  by  the  same  judge  who  convicted   Vino   as   an   accessory.   The   trial   court   held   that   the   identity  of  the  assailant  was  not  clearly  established.   It  observed  that  only  Julius  Tejada  identified  Salazar   carrying  a  rifle  while  riding  on  the  bicycle  driven  by   Vino,   which   testimony   is   uncorroborated,   and   that   two   other   witnesses,   Ernesto   Tejada   and   Renato   Parvian   who   were   listed   in   the   information,   who   can   corroborate   the   testimony   of   Julius   Tejada,   were  not  presented  by  the  prosecution.     PRESIDENTIAL  DECREE  No.  1612     ANTI-­‐FENCING  LAW  OF  1979     WHEREAS,   reports   from   law   enforcement   agencies   reveal   that   there   is   rampant   robbery   and   thievery   of   government  and  private  properties;     WHEREAS,   such   robbery   and   thievery   have   become   profitable  on  the  part  of  the  lawless  elements  because  of   the  existence  of  ready  buyers,  commonly  known  as  fence,   of  stolen  properties;lawphil.net     WHEREAS,   under   existing   law,   a   fence   can   be   prosecuted   only  as  an  accessory  after  the  fact  and  punished  lightly;     WHEREAS,   is   imperative   to   impose   heavy   penalties   on   persons  who  profit  by  the  effects  of  the  crimes  of  robbery   and  theft.     NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  FERDINAND  E.  MARCOS,  President   of   the   Philippines   by   virtue   of   the   powers   vested   in   me   by   the   Constitution,   do   hereby   order   and   decree   as   part   of  the  law  of  the  land  the  following:     Section   1.   Title.   This   decree   shall   be   known   as   the   Anti-­‐ Fencing  Law.     Section  2.  Definition  of  Terms.  The  following  terms  shall   mean  as  follows:     (a)  "Fencing"  is  the  act  of  any  person  who,  with  intent  to   gain   for   himself   or   for   another,   shall   buy,   receive,   possess,   keep,   acquire,   conceal,   sell   or   dispose   of,   or   shall   buy   and   sell,   or   in   any   other   manner   deal   in   any   article,   item,   object   or   anything   of   value   which   he   knows,   or   should   be   known   to   him,   to   have   been   derived   from   the   proceeds  of  the  crime  of  robbery  or  theft.     (b)   "Fence"   includes   any   person,   firm,   association   corporation   or   partnership   or   other   organization   who/which  commits  the  act  of  fencing.     Section  3.  Penalties.  Any  person  guilty  of  fencing  shall  be   punished  as  hereunder  indicated:    

(a)   The   penalty   of   prision   mayor,   if   the   value   of   the   property   involved   is   more   than   12,000   pesos   but   not   exceeding   22,000   pesos;   if   the   value   of   such   property   exceeds   the   latter   sum,   the   penalty   provided   in   this   paragraph   shall   be   imposed   in   its   maximum   period,   adding  one  year  for  each  additional  10,000  pesos;  but  the   total   penalty   which   may   be   imposed   shall   not   exceed   twenty   years.   In   such   cases,   the   penalty   shall   be   termed   reclusion  temporal  and  the  accessory  penalty  pertaining   thereto  provided  in  the  Revised  Penal  Code  shall  also  be   imposed.     (b)  The  penalty  of  prision  correccional  in  its  medium  and   maximum  periods,  if  the  value  of  the  property  robbed  or   stolen  is  more  than  6,000  pesos  but  not  exceeding  12,000   pesos.     (c)   The   penalty   of   prision   correccional   in   its   minimum   and   medium   periods,   if   the   value   of   the   property   involved   is   more   than   200   pesos   but   not   exceeding   6,000   pesos.     (d)   The   penalty   of   arresto   mayor   in   its   medium   period   to   prision   correccional   in   its   minimum   period,   if   the   value   of   the   property   involved   is   over   50   pesos   but   not   exceeding  200  pesos.     (e)  The  penalty  of  arresto  mayor  in  its  medium  period  if   such   value   is   over   five   (5)   pesos   but   not   exceeding   50   pesos.     (f)  The  penalty  of  arresto  mayor  in  its  minimum  period  if   such  value  does  not  exceed  5  pesos.     Section  4.  Liability  of  Officials  of  Juridical  Persons.  If  the   fence   is   a   partnership,   firm,   corporation   or   association,   the  president  or  the  manager  or  any  officer  thereof  who   knows   or   should   have   known   the   commission   of   the   offense  shall  be  liable.     Section   5.   Presumption   of   Fencing.   Mere   possession   of   any   good,   article,   item,   object,   or   anything   of   value   which   has   been   the   subject   of   robbery   or   thievery   shall   be   prima  facie  evidence  of  fencing.     Section   6.   Clearance/Permit   to   Sell/Used   Second   Hand   Articles.   For   purposes   of   this   Act,   all   stores,   establishments   or   entities   dealing   in   the   buy   and   sell   of   any   good,   article   item,   object   of   anything   of   value   obtained   from   an   unlicensed   dealer   or   supplier   thereof,   shall   before   offering   the   same   for   sale   to   the   public,   secure   the   necessary   clearance   or   permit   from   the   station   commander   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   in   the   town   or   city   where   such   store,   establishment   or   entity   is   located.   The   Chief   of   Constabulary/Director   General,   Integrated   National   Police   shall   promulgate   such  rules  and  regulations  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of   this  section.  Any  person  who  fails  to  secure  the  clearance   or  permit  required  by  this  section  or  who  violates  any  of   the   provisions   of   the   rules   and   regulations   promulgated  

Rañeses  155     thereunder   shall   upon   conviction   be   punished   as   a   fence.   lawphi1.net     Section   7.   Repealing   Clause.   All   laws   or   parts   thereof,   which   are   inconsistent   with   the   provisions   of   this   Decree   are  hereby  repealed  or  modified  accordingly.     Section   8.   Effectivity.   This   Decree   shall   take   effect   upon   approval.     Done  in  the  City  of  Manila,  this  2nd  day  of  March,  in  the   year  of  Our  Lord,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventy-­‐nine.     RULES   AND   REGULATIONS   TO   CARRY   OUT   THE   PROVISIONS   OF   SECTION   6   OF   PRESIDENTIAL   DECREE   NO.  1612,  KNOWN  AS  THE  ANTI-­‐FENCING  LAW.     Pursuant   to   Section   6   of   Presidential   Decree   No.   1612,   known   as   the   Anti-­‐Fencing   Law,   the   following   rules   and   regulations   are   hereby   promulgated   to   govern   the   issuance   of   clearances/permits   to   sell   used   secondhand   articles   obtained   from   an   unlicensed   dealer   or   supplier   thereof:     I.  Definition  of  Terms     1.   "Used   secondhand   article"   shall   refer   to   any   goods,   article,  item,  object  or  anything  of  value  obtained  from  an   unlicensed  dealer  or  supplier,  regardless  of  whether  the   same  has  actually  or  in  fact  been  used.     2.   "Unlicensed   dealer/supplier"   shall   refer   to   any   persons,   partnership,   firm,   corporation,   association   or   any   other   entity   or   establishment   not   licensed   by   the   government  to  engage  in  the  business  of  dealing  in  or  of   supplying   the   articles   defined   in   the   preceding   paragraph.     3.  "Store",  "establishment"  or  "entity"  shall  be  construed   to   include   any   individual   dealing   in   the   buying   and   selling   used   secondhand   articles,   as   defined   in   paragraph   hereof.     4.   "Buy   and   Sell"   refer   to   the   transaction   whereby   one   purchases   used   secondhand   articles   for   the   purpose   of   resale  to  third  persons.     5.   "Station   Commander"   shall   refer   to   the   Station   Commander  of  the  Integrated  National  Police  within  the   territorial   limits   of   the   town   or   city   district   where   the   store,   establishment   or   entity   dealing   in   the   buying   and   selling  of  used  secondhand  articles  is  located.     II.  Duty  to  Procure  Clearance  or  Permit     1.   No   person   shall   sell   or   offer   to   sell   to   the   public   any   used   secondhand   article   as   defined   herein   without   first   securing  a  clearance  or  permit  for  the  purpose  from  the   proper   Station   Commander   of   the   Integrated   National   Police.  

  2.   If   the   person   seeking   the   clearance   or   permit   is   a   partnership,  firm,  corporation,  or  association  or  group  of   individuals,  the  clearance  or  permit  shall  be  obtained  by   or   in   the   name   of   the   president,   manager   or   other   responsible  officer-­‐in-­‐charge  thereof.     3.  If  a  store,  firm,  corporation,  partnership,  association  or   other  establishment  or  entity  has  a  branch  or  subsidiary   and   the   used   secondhand   article   is   acquired   by   such   branch   or   subsidiary   for   sale   to   the   public,   the   said   branch  or  subsidiary  shall  secure  the  required  clearance   or  permit.     4.  Any  goods,  article,  item,  or  object  or  anything  of  value   acquired   from   any   source   for   which   no   receipt   or   equivalent   document   evidencing   the   legality   of   its   acquisition  could  be  presented  by  the  present  possessor   or   holder   thereof,   or   the   covering   receipt,   or   equivalent   document,   of   which   is   fake,   falsified   or   irregularly   obtained,   shall   be   presumed   as   having   been   acquired   from  an  unlicensed  dealer  or  supplier  and  the  possessor   or  holder  thereof  must  secure  the  required  clearance  or   permit  before  the  same  can  be  sold  or  offered  for  sale  to   the  public.     III.  Procedure  for  Procurement  of  Clearances  or  Permits     1.   The   Station   Commanders   concerned   shall   require   the   owner   of   a   store   or   the   president,   manager   or   responsible   officer-­‐in-­‐charge   of   a   firm,   establishment   or   other   entity   located   within   their   respective   jurisdictions   and  in  possession  of  or  having  in  stock  used  secondhand   articles   as   defined   herein,   to   submit   an   initial   affidavit   within   thirty   (30)   days   from   receipt   of   notice   for   the   purpose   thereof   and   subsequent   affidavits   once   every   fifteen   (15)   days   within   five   (5)   days   after   the   period   covered,  which  shall  contain:     (a)   A   complete   inventory   of   such   articles   acquired   daily   from   whatever   source   and   the   names   and   addresses   of   the  persons  from  whom  such  articles  were  acquired.     (b)   A   full   list   of   articles   to   be   sold   or   offered   for   sale   as   well   as   the   place   where   the   date   when   the   sale   or   offer   for  sale  shall  commence.     (c)  The  place  where  the  articles  are  presently  deposited   or  kept  in  stock.     The  Station  Commander  may,  at  his  discretion  when  the   circumstances   of   each   case   warrant,   require   that   the   affidavit  submitted  be  accompanied  by  other  documents   showing   proof   of   legitimacy   of   the   acquisition   of   the   articles.     2.  A  party  required  to  secure  a  clearance  or  permit  under   these   rules   and   regulations   shall   file   an   application   therefor   with   the   Station   Commander   concerned.   The   application  shall  state:  

Rañeses  156       (a)  The  name,  address  and  other  pertinent  circumstances   of   the   persons,   in   case   of   an   individual   or,   in   the   case   of   a   firm,   corporation,   association,   partnership   or   other   entity,   the   name,   address   and   other   pertinent   circumstances   of   the   president,   manager   or   officer-­‐in-­‐ charge.     (b)  The  article  to  be  sold  or  offered  for  sale  to  the  public   and   the   name   and   address   of   the   unlicensed   dealer   or   supplier  from  whom  such  article  was  acquired.     In   support   of   the   application,   there   shall   be   attached   to   it   the  corresponding  receipt  or  other  equivalent  document   to   show   proof   of   the   legitimacy   of   acquisition   of   the   article.     3.  The  Station  Commander  shall  examine  the  documents   attached   to   the   application   and   may   require   the   presentation  of  other  additional  documents,  if  necessary,   to  show  satisfactory  proof  of  the  legitimacy  of  acquisition   of  the  article,  subject  to  the  following  conditions:     (a)  If  the  legitimacy  of  acquisition  of  any  article  from  an   unlicensed  source  cannot  be  satisfactorily  established  by   the   documents   presented,   the   Station   Commander   shall,   upon   approval   of   the   INP   Superintendent   in   the   district   and   at   the   expense   of   the   party   seeking   the   clearance/permit,   cause   the   publication   of   a   notice   in   a   newspaper   of   general   circulation   for   two   (2)   successive   days   enumerating   therein   the   articles   acquired   from   an   unlicensed   dealer   or   supplier,   the   names   and   addresses   of  the  persons  from  whom  they  were  acquired  and  shall   state  that  such  articles  are  to  be  sold  or  offered  for  sale  to   the   public   at   the   address   of   the   store,   establishment   or   other   entity   seeking   the   clearance/permit.   In   places   where   no   newspapers   are   in   general   circulation,   the   party  seeking  the  clearance  or  permit  shall,  instead,  post   a   notice   daily   for   one   week   on   the   bulletin   board   of   the   municipal   building   of   the   town   where   the   store,   firm,   establishment   or   entity   concerned   is   located   or,   in   the   case   of   an   individual,   where   the   articles   in   his   possession   are  to  be  sold  or  offered  for  sale.     (b)   If   after   15   days,   upon   expiration   of   the   period   of   publication   or   of   the   notice   referred   to   in   the   preceding   paragraph,   no   claim   is   made   with   respect   to   any   of   the   articles   enumerated   in   the   notice,   the   Station   Commander  shall  issue  the  clearance  or  permit  sought.     (c)   If,   before   expiration   of   the   same   period   for   publication   of   the   notice   or   its   posting,   it   shall   appear   that   any   of   the   articles   in   question   is   stolen   property,   the   Station   Commander   shall   hold   the   article   in   restraint   as   evidence  in  any  appropriate  case  to  be  filed.  Articles  held   in   restraint   shall   be   kept   and   disposed   of   as   the   circumstances  of  each  case  permit,  taking  into  account  all   considerations  of  right  and  justice  in  the  case.  In  any  case   where  any  article  is  held  in  restraint,  it  shall  be  the  duty   of   the   Station   Commander   concerned   to   advise/notify  

the   Commission   on   Audit   of   the   case   and   comply   with   such   procedure   as   may   be   proper   under   applicable   existing  laws,  rules  and  regulations.     4.   The   Station   Commander   concerned   shall,   within   seventy-­‐two   (72)   hours   from   receipt   of   the   application,   act   thereon   by   either   issuing   the   clearance/permit   requested   or   denying   the   same.   Denial   of   an   application   shall   be   in   writing   and   shall   state   in   brief   the   reason/s   therefor.     5.   The   application,   clearance/permit   or   the   denial   thereof,   including   such   other   documents   as   may   be   pertinent   in   the   implementation   of   Section   6   of   P.D.   No.   1612  shall  be  in  the  forms  prescribed  in  Annexes  "A",  "B",   "C",   "D",   and   "E"   hereof,   which   are   made   integral   parts   of   these  rules  and  regulations.     6.  For  the  issuance  of  clearances/permit  required  under   Section  6  of  P.D.  No.  1612,  no  fee  shall  be  charged.     IV.  Appeals     Any   party   aggrieved   by   the   action   taken   by   the   Station   Commander  may  elevate  the  decision  taken  in  the  case  to   the   proper   INP   District   Superintendent   and,   if   he   is   still   dissatisfied   therewith   may   take   the   same   on   appeal   to   the   INP   Director.   The   decision   of   the   INP   Director   may   also   be   appealed   to   the   INP   Director-­‐General   whose   decision   may   likewise   be   appealed   to   the   Minister   of   National   Defense.   The   decision   of   the   Minister   of   National   Defense   on   the   case   shall   be   final.   The   appeal   against   the   decision   taken   by   a   Commander   lower   than   the   INP   Director-­‐General   should   be   filed   to   the   next   higher  Commander  within  ten  (10)  days  from  receipt  of   notice   of   the   decision.   The   decision   of   the   INP   Director-­‐ General  should  be  appealed  within  fifteen  (15)  days  from   receipt  of  notice  of  the  decision.     V.  Penalties     1.  Any  person  who  fails  to  secure  the  clearance  or  permit   required   by   Section   6   of   P.D.   1612   or   who   violates   any   of   the   provisions   of   these   rules   and   regulations   shall   upon   conviction  be  punished  as  a  fence.     2.   The   INP   Director-­‐General   shall   recommend   to   the   proper  authority  the  cancellation  of  the  business  license   of  the  erring  individual,  store,  establishment  or  the  entity   concerned.     3.   Articles   obtained   from   unlicensed   sources   for   sale   or   offered   for   sale   without   prior   compliance   with   the   provisions   of   Section   6   of   P.D.   No.   1612   and   with   these   rules   and   regulations   shall   be   held   in   restraint   until   satisfactory   evidence   or   legitimacy   of   acquisition   has   been  established.     4.   Articles   for   which   no   satisfactory   evidence   of   legitimacy   of   acquisition   is   established   and   which   are  

Rañeses  157     found  to  be  stolen  property  shall  likewise  be  held  under   restraint   and   shall,   furthermore,   be   subject   to   confiscation   as   evidence   in   the   appropriate   case   to   be   filed.   If,   upon   termination   of   the   case,   the   same   is   not   claimed  by  their  legitimate  owners,  the  article/s  shall  be   forfeited  in  favor  of  the  government  and  made  subject  to   disposition   as   the   circumstances   warrant   in   accordance   with  applicable  existing  laws,  rules  and  regulations.  The   Commission  on  Audit  shall,  in  all  cases,  be  notified.     5.  Any  personnel  of  the  Integrated  National  Police  found   violating   the   provisions   of   Section   6   of   P.D.   No.   1612   or   any  of  its  implementing  rules  and  regulations  or  who,  in   any   manner   whatsoever,   connives   with   or   through   his   negligence  or  inaction  makes  possible  the  commission  of   such   violations   by   any   party   required   to   comply   with   the   law  and  its  implementing  rules  and  regulations,  shall  be   prosecuted   criminally   without   prejudice   to   the   imposition  of  administrative  penalties.     VI.  Visitorial  Power     It   shall   be   the   duty   of   the   owner   of   the   store   or   of   the   president,   manager   or   responsible   officer-­‐in-­‐charge   of   any   firm,   establishment   or   other   entity   or   of   an   individual   having   in   his   premises   articles   to   be   sold   or   offered   for   sale   to   the   public   to   allow   the   Station   Commander  or  his  authorized  representative  to  exercise   visitorial   powers.   For   this   purpose,   however,   the   power   to  conduct  visitations  shall  be  exercise  only  during  office   or   business   hours   and   upon   authority   in   writing   from   and  by  the  INP  Superintendent  in  the  district  and  for  the   sole  purpose  of  determining  whether  articles  are  kept  in   possession  or  stock  contrary  to  the  intents  of  Section  6  of   P.D.  No.  1612  and  of  these  rules  and  regulations.     VII.   Other   Duties   Imposed   Upon   Station   Commanders   and  INP  District  Superintendent  and  Directors  Following   Action  on  Applications  for  Clearances  or  Permits     1.   At   the   end   of   each   month,   it   shall   be   the   duty   of   the   Station  Commander  concerned  to:     (a)   Make   and   maintain   a   file   in   his   office   of   all   clearances/permit  issued  by  him.     (b)   Submit   a   full   report   to   the   INP   District   Superintendent   on   the   number   of   applications   for   clearances   or   permits   processed   by   his   office,   indicating   therein  the  number  of  clearances/permits  issued  and  the   number   of   applications   denied.   The   report   shall   state   the   reasons   for   denial   of   an   application   and   the   corresponding   follow-­‐up   actions   taken   and   shall   be   accompanied   by   an   inventory   of   the   articles   to   be   sold   or   offered  for  sale  in  his  jurisdiction.     2.   The   INP   District   Superintendent   shall,   on   the   basis   of   the  reports  submitted  by  the  Station  Commander,  in  turn   submit   quarterly   reports   to   the   appropriate   INP   Director  

containing   a   consolidation   of   the   information   stated   in   the  reports  of  Station  Commanders  in  his  jurisdiction.     3.   Reports   from   INP   District   Superintendent   shall   serve   as  basis  for  a  consolidated  report  to  be  submitted  semi-­‐ annually   by   INP   Directors   to   the   Director-­‐General,   Integrated  National  Police.     4.  In  all  cases,  reports  emanating  from  the  different  levels   of   the   Integrated   National   Police   shall   be   accompanied   with  full  and  accurate  inventories  of  the  articles  acquired   from  unlicensed  dealers  or  suppliers  and  proposed  to  be   sold  or  offered  for  sale  in  the  jurisdictions  covered  by  the   report.     These   implementing   rules   and   regulations,   having   been   published   in   a   newspaper   of   national   circulation,   shall   take  effect  on  June  15,  1979.     FOR   THE   CHIEF   OF   CONSTABULARY   DIRECTOR-­‐ GENERAL,  INP:     PRESIDENTIAL  DECREE  No.  1829     PENALIZING  OBSTRUCTION  OF  APPREHENSION  AND   PROSECUTION  OF  CRIMINAL  OFFENDERS     WHEREAS,   crime   and   violence   continue   to   proliferate   despite  the  sustained  vigorous  efforts  of  the  government   to  effectively  contain  them;     WHEREAS,   to   discourage   public   indifference   or   apathy   towards   the   apprehension   and   prosecution   of   criminal   offenders,  it  is  necessary  to  penalize  acts  which  obstruct   or  frustrate  or  tend  to  obstruct  or  frustrate  the  successful   apprehension  and  prosecution  of  criminal  offenders;     NOW,  THEREFORE,  I,  FERDINAND,  E.  MARCOS,  President   of   the   Philippines,   by   virtue   of   the   powers   vested   in   me   by  law  do  hereby  decree  and  order  the  following:     Section   1.   The   penalty   of   prision   correccional   in   its   maximum   period,   or   a   fine   ranging   from   1,000   to   6,000   pesos,   or   both,   shall   be   imposed   upon   any   person   who   knowingly   or   willfully   obstructs,   impedes,   frustrates   or   delays   the   apprehension   of   suspects   and   the   investigation   and   prosecution   of   criminal   cases   by   committing  any  of  the  following  acts:     (a)   preventing   witnesses   from   testifying   in   any   criminal   proceeding   or   from   reporting   the   commission   of   any   offense   or   the   identity   of   any   offender/s   by   means   of   bribery,  misrepresentation,  deceit,  intimidation,  force  or   threats;     (b)   altering,   destroying,   suppressing   or   concealing   any   paper,  record,  document,  or  object,  with  intent  to  impair   its   verity,   authenticity,   legibility,   availability,   or   admissibility   as   evidence   in   any   investigation   of   or   official   proceedings   in,   criminal   cases,   or   to   be   used   in  

Rañeses  158     the   investigation   of,   or   official   proceedings   in,   criminal   cases;     (c)  harboring  or  concealing,  or  facilitating  the  escape  of,   any   person   he   knows,   or   has   reasonable   ground   to   believe   or   suspect,   has   committed   any   offense   under   existing   penal   laws   in   order   to   prevent   his   arrest   prosecution  and  conviction;     (d)   publicly   using   a   fictitious   name   for   the   purpose   of   concealing  a  crime,   evading   prosecution   or   the   execution   of   a   judgment,   or   concealing   his   true   name   and   other   personal   circumstances   for   the   same   purpose   or   purposes;     (e)   delaying   the   prosecution   of   criminal   cases   by   obstructing   the   service   of   process   or   court   orders   or   disturbing   proceedings   in   the   fiscal's   offices,   in   Tanodbayan,  or  in  the  courts;     (f)   making,   presenting   or   using   any   record,   document,   paper   or   object   with   knowledge   of   its   falsity   and   with   intent  to  affect  the  course  or  outcome  of  the  investigation   of,  or  official  proceedings  in,  criminal  cases;     (g)   soliciting,   accepting,   or   agreeing   to   accept   any   benefit   in   consideration   of   abstaining   from,   discounting,   or   impeding  the  prosecution  of  a  criminal  offender;     (h)   threatening   directly   or   indirectly   another   with   the   infliction   of   any   wrong   upon   his   person,   honor   or   property  or  that  of  any  immediate  member  or  members   of   his   family   in   order   to   prevent   such   person   from   appearing   in   the   investigation   of,   or   official   proceedings   in,   criminal   cases,   or   imposing   a   condition,   whether   lawful   or   unlawful,   in   order   to   prevent   a   person   from   appearing   in   the   investigation   of   or   in   official   proceedings  in,  criminal  cases;     (i)  giving  of  false  or  fabricated  information  to  mislead  or   prevent   the   law   enforcement   agencies   from   apprehending  the  offender  or  from  protecting  the  life  or   property   of   the   victim;   or   fabricating   information   from   the   data   gathered   in   confidence   by   investigating   authorities   for   purposes   of   background   information   and   not   for   publication   and   publishing   or   disseminating   the   same  to  mislead  the  investigator  or  to  the  court.     If   any   of   the   acts   mentioned   herein   is   penalized   by   any   other  law  with  a  higher  penalty,  the  higher  penalty  shall   be  imposed.     Section   2.   If   any   of   the   foregoing   acts   is   committed   by   a   public   official   or   employee,   he   shall   in   addition   to   the   penalties   provided   thereunder,   suffer   perpetual   disqualification  from  holding  public  office.     Section  3.  This  Decree  shall  take  effect  immediately.    

Done  in  the  City  of  Manila,  this  16th  day  of  January,  in  the   year  of  Our  Lord,  nineteen  hundred  and  eighty-­‐one.    

B. In  Light  Felonies     *Refer  to  p.  141  for  Art.  16.     Reyes:     1. Accessories   are   not   liable   for   light   felonies.   2. Rules   a. Light   felonies   are   punishable   only   when  they  have  been  consummated.   (Art.  7)   b. But   when   light   felonies   are   committed  against  persons  or  prope   c. rty,  they  are  punishable  even  if  they   are   only   in   the   attempted   or   frustrated   stage   of   execution.   (Art.   7)   d. Only   principals   and   accomplices   are   liable  for  light  felonies.  (Art.  16)   e. Accessories   are   not   liable   for   light   felonies,   even   if   they   are   committed   against   persons   or   property.   (Art.   16)