Criminal Law 1 digest

February 16, 1935 G.R. No. L-42288 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant. The facts are as follows: The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license therefor; that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked his motor car; that he was sixty-three meters from the electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior. The evidence shows, however, that the defendant was only ten or twelve meters from the polling place when he was found standing near his automobile with a revolver in his belt, and that the municipal building could not be seen from the polling place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a senator for that district, and that he had been sent to Pontevedra, a municipality adjoining Pilar. The defendant did not arrest Tomas de Martin, nor does it appear that he caused him to be prosecuted. Tomas de Martin was not called as a witness in this case. Furthermore there is one other fact of record which completely discredits the testimony of the defendant. Major Agdamag, to whom the defendant claims he intended to deliver the revolver, was not the provincial commander of Capiz, but an officer sent from Cebu to Capiz for the purpose of supervising the elections in that province; and taking into consideration the intelligence of the defendant and the nature of his employment. Issue: Whether or not appellant’s intent should be taken into consideration in the instant case. Held: No. Appeal is denied.

The court does not believe that appellant did not know the location of the polling place in question. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. “Care must be exercised in

distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. …” (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.)

March 22, 1921 G.R. No. L-16486 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant. Facts:

About noontime of November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow. The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult them. The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more. Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for Gargantel’s death Held:

Yes. The deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, “If a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.” (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.

The Court affirmed the decision that the accused be convicted of the offense of homicide with the attenuating circumstance of the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.) Accused is to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs.

[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant. Facts: The Pilapil brothers Eugene and Juan Jr. were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun and struck Eugene with it. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together. Due to their operating pumpboat breaking down, Catantan boarded another pumpboat and ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you."Juanito, terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed. In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532. Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he

and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy. Issue: Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion or Piracy under PD 532 Held: The Court affirmed the sentence of reclusion perpetua upon EMILIANO CATANTAN being guilty for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532. The Court does not agree with appellant’s abovementioned contentions. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, xxx by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, xxx in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong." The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

G.R. No. L-1293 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MACARIO MANZANARES, accused-appellant.

Facts: Perfecto Manzanares, an octogenarian, received a bolo thrust on his abdomen from one of his sons, killing him. a complaint for the crime of parricide was filed against Macario Manzanares. The lower court found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to pay an indemnity in the amount of P2,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Accused hereinafter filed this appeal. The opposing theories of prosecution and defense are, respectively, made to stand on the testimonies of their witness which the court carefully analyzed and weighed. The defense and the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses each.

According to the prosecution it was appellant Macario Manzanares who killed his own father; while according to the defense it was Pio Manzanares who, while engaged in a bloody affray with Macario, accidentally hit the deceased with a bolo thrust aimed at Macario. Issue: Which of either defense or prosecution witnesses testimonies deserves merit Held:

Weighty reasons has compelled the court to accept the prosecution’s theory. The testimony of Pio Manzanares appears to us to be natural, positive, straightforward and convincing, including the part given under cross-examination by the defense. It is fully corroborated by two ocular witness, Isabel Manzanares and Rodolfo Manzanares, whose declarations, notwithstanding their tender age, had remained unscathed under the severe test of crossexamination. The judge presiding the lower court, who had the opportunity of hearing for himself the testimonies and the observing how the witness testified, gave credence to the witness for the prosecution.

There are inherent improbabilities and contradictions found in the declarations of the witness for the defense that induce us to reject their testimonies. Also, Appellant capitalizes on the fact that it took many months after the restoration of civil government in Bantayan, in June, 1945, before the prosecution filed its complaint in August, 1946. Such delay in the filing of the complaint cannot be adduced to attack the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Appellant is guilty of the crime of the parricide