Criminal Law 1 Cases Under Atty. Ticman

Diego vs Castillo On January 9, 1965, the accused Cresentia Escoto, using the name of Lucena Escoto, (bothe Filipino) contracted marriage with Jorge De Perio with Mayor Reyna of Dagupan City as solemnizing officer. The accused adopted the name “Lucena Escoto” in her marriage contract, purporting herself as single. Thereafter, De Perio acquired a decree of divorce against the accused, issued by a family court of Harris County, Texas (274th jud. District). The accused then contracted marriage to the brother of De Perio, Manuel Diego. The marriage was solemnized before Fr. Godoy, local priest of Dagupan. The accused again adopted the name “Lucena Escoto” in her marriage license, purporting herself as having the status of single. A criminal case for bigamy (Art 349, RPC) was filed with the court of the public respondent, against the accused. The respondent judge acquitted the accused, holding the following, to wit; 1. That the accused did not demonstrate any criminal intent in contracting a second marriage despite the subsistence of a previous valid marriage. 2. That the bigamous marriage was contracted in good faith, with the accused believing that the previous marriage was effectively dissolved by virtue of the foreign decree of divorce granted to the husband.

Herein complainant Diego filed the present administrative action against judge Castillo for gross ignorance of the law. The complainant alleged that the judgment rendered by the respondent is contrary to law and the evidence presented. The respondent filed his answer thereto, alleging that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent. The judge further alleged that the accused committed a mere mistake of fact which justifies the commission of the crime. WON the respondent is liable for gross ignorance of the law by rendering an unjust judgment. (1.) Yes, the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. There exist no mistake of fact in the present case. What is present is mistake of law which cannot justify the commission of a crime. In the similar case of Bitdu, the SC held that in bigamy cases, good faith of the accused in contracting a bigamous marriage on the basis of the latter’s ignorance that such constitutes a criminal offense does not exempt him from criminal liability. The law presumes that everyone is presumed to know the law (ignorance of the law excuses no one), and mistake of law does not extinguish criminal liability. (2.) Under the case of Scheckenberger, an accused who secured a foreign divorce decree, and later contracted another marriage within the Philippines, despite the belief that the decree is valid, is still liable for bigamy. (3.) The respondent judge is not liable for rendering an unjust decision on account that there is no showing that such was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to commit injustice. However, the respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

US vs Ah Chong The accused Ah Chong was employed as a cook at the office headquarters No. 27 of Fort Mckinley. The deceased Gualberto was employed as a house boy at the same office. The headquarters was situated around 40 meters from the nearest building. The servants stayed therein and jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, the accused who was retiring in bed awoke around 10 pm due to the noise of someone forcefully attempting to open the door the quarters. He sat on his bed and shouted twice “who is there?”, but no answer was availed. The room was very dark due to the excessive growth of vines on the porch. Afraid that the intruder was a thief, he averred “if you enter, I will kill you!”. Due to the forceful opening of the door, the chair which was jammed to it was thrown at the direction of the accused and was consequently hit by the same. Believing that the strike was an attack to his person by the intruder which he though of as a thief, he immediately took a kitchen knife he hides on his pillow and stroke it at the general direction of the intruder. The accused suddenly recognized the intruder as his room mate Gualberto. He then after sough help from the other inhabitants of the nearby building. It appeared that the deceased, together with 2 companions, went for a walk around the vicinity before retiring to bed. The accused then was arrested, charged with assassination of the deceased. During trial, the accused interposed the defense of self defense. He admitted to the stabbing of the deceased, but he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act. He alleged the following, to wit; 1. That there had been several robberies that transpired within Fort Mckinley prior to the date of the incident, and one of which transpired in a house in which the accused was employed. 2. That there was an agreement between him and the deceased that if either of them returned at night, the person who wants to enter the bunks must identify himself.

The accused was then after found guilty of simple homicide with extenuating circumstance. WON the there was a valid self defense on the part of the accused. (1.) Yes, there was a valid self defense. The RPC provides the requisites for self defense, to wit; there is an illegal aggression, there was reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The accused believed in good faith that there was aggression, he exerted reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent the danger by shouting thrice “if you enter, I will kill you”, and that there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The accused sufficed the requirements of law in invoking the self defense.

(2.) Although there was really no illegal aggression exerted by the deceased, there exists a mistake of fact committed by the accused. The accused, considering the surrounding circumstance, had reasonable reason to believe that the deceased posed an immediate threat to his life and limb. Ignorance or mistake of fact can lead to an acquittal if such mistake is sufficient to negative a particular criminal intent which is an ingredient of the crime committed, except when there is the presence of criminal negligence and bad faith. The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so. The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent; without it, there could be no crime. The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him. If one has reasonable cause to believe that there exist facts which would justify a killing, if such belief was engendered without his fault or negligence, he could not be held liable for homicide. (3.) The accused deserves an acquittal on account that he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent in the belief that he was merely exercising his right to self defense.

People vs Villacorta The accused Villacorta was charged with the murder of the deceased, Danilo Cruz. During trial, the prosecution presented as witness Mandeja and Dr. Belandres. The accused pleaded not guilty. During trial, Mandeja testified that on January 23, 2002; 1. she was tending to her Sari Sari store in C-4, Navotas; 2. that she knew the deceased and the accused as regular customers of the store; 3. that when the defendant was ordering bread around 2 am, the accused suddenly appeared and stabbed the deceased on the latter’s left side using a bamboo stick; 4. that she tried to run after the accused but to no avail, and upon returning to the scene, she saw her neighbor, Aron, removing the bamboo stick on Cruz’s body; 5. that she brought the deceased to Tondo Medical Center and was treated as an out – patient.

Dr. Belandres testified to the following; 1. that he was the head of the the Tetanus Department of San Lazaro Hospital, 2. that the accused was brought to San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, but did not attend personally to the accused; 3. that the accused died on February 15, 2002, due to tetanus infection, secondary to the stab wound.

The accused denied the stabbing, and alleged he went home around 2am at the night of the incident, and that he drank coffee upon arrival and went outside to buy cigarettes. Went he was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arms around the shoulders of the accused. This lead to a fist fight. Afterwards, the accused went home. The trial court convicted the accused of murder, qualified by treachery. The PAO of the accused timely filed a notice of appeal with the CA. The accused and the OSG filed their respective briefs. The CA subsequently affirmed the conviction. The accused sough an appeal with the SC, asserting that Mandeja’s testimony is replete with inconsistencies and that if indeed he is found to have perpetuated the stabbing, he should only be then liable for slight physical injuries on account that the proximate cause of the death is due to tetanus infection. WON the accused is guilty of slight physical injuries

(1.) Yes, the accused is guilty of slight physical injuries, and must be acquitted of murder. Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred In the present case, the stabbing incident occurred on January 23, 2002, while the death occurred on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present any evidence as to the activities of the deceased during such period. (2.) In the similar case of Urbano, the accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt and that there is a likelihood that the wound was just the remote cause of the death, and that the proximate cause of such was due to infection, perhaps due to the failure to take necessary medical precautions. In the present case, there had been an interval of 22 days between the stabbing and the death. If Cruz acquired severe infection directly from the stab wound inflicted by the accused, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days. Tetanus has an incubation period of less than 14 days, and symptoms usually appear within 2 to 3 days from the injury. Under these premises, the accused must be acquitted due to reasonable doubt. (3.) The proximate cause of the death might have been due to Tetanus infection, and that the stab wound was a mere remote cause thereof. The Tetanus infection was the efficient intervening event between the time of the stabbing and the death of the accused.

Seguritan vs People The accused Rono Seguritan was charged with homicide, for the death of his uncle, Lucrecio Seguritan. The accused pleaded not guilty. During trial, the prosecution alleged the following; 1. that the accused was having a drinking session with his uncles, Lucrecio, Baltazar, and Melchor; 2. that the accused claimed that the carabaos of Lucrecio entered his farmland and destroyed his crops; 3. that a heated discussion ensued, whereby the accused threw 2 punches on the person of the deceased (head shot) when the latter was about to stand up; 4. that due to the punches, the deceased fell face up to the ground onto a hollow block used as an improvised stove. 5. that the deceased lost consciousness but awaken with assistance of Baltazar; 6. that the deceased, afterwards, proceeded home and went directly to the bedroom and slept 7. that around 9pm, the wife of the deceased found the latter with darkened complexion and with a foaming mouth 8. that he latter died the same night.

The defense alleged that the deceased died due to a heart attack. He asserted that when he was about to punch the deceased, the latter was seated on the other side of the bench, and upon standing up, he ost his balance and fell head first on the hollow block. The defense presented as witness Dr. Flor, the municipal health officer, and testified that the deceased died of a heart attack, as per the death certificate which they identified. The trial court convicted the accused with the crime of homicide. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, hence the appeal of the accused with the SC, arguing that the deceased sustained the head injury when he accidentally fell head first on the said hollow block, when he fell on the other side of the bench. He also

insisted that the latter dies due to a heat attack. He finally submitted that he should be liable for wreckless imprudence resulting to homicide due to the lack of criminal intent on his part. WON the accused is guilty of homicide (1.) Yes, the accused is guilty of homicide. It was sufficiently proved with the lower court that the accused threw 2 punches against the deceased, causing the latter to fall down face first on the hollow block. The testimony of Melchor, his uncle, corroborated the medical findings of the medico legal who conducted the autopsy. (2.) The accused’s reliance on wreckless imprudence does not hold water. Under article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended. Under these premises, although the accused did not have an intention to kill, his unlawful act of punching the deceased produced the effect of killing the latter. (3.) The defense of the accused that the deceased died of a heart attack is without merit. The death certificate does not have much evidentiary weight on account that the issuance of the municipal heath officer of death certificates is merely ministerial and they don’t personally inspect the cadaver to determine the true cause of death.

People vs Marco The accused Rafael Marco, Simeon Marco, and Dulcisimo Beltran, were charged with murder, for the death of Bienbenido Sabelbero. Marco ->Rafael and Simeon.

Salbabero -> Vicente, Constancio, Bienvenido.

Events -> during the local fiesta around 230 pm, Simeon Marco (brother) approached Constancio Salbelbero and asked him if he was the one who boxed the formers brother. The latter said no. (He then asked him for a cigarette. when Constancio said he had none, Simeon uttered “I have some, here is my cigarette /knife/) Simeon -> chased Constancio. During the chase, Constancio passed by the father of Simeon, Rafael marco (father) where the latter struck Constancio at the ear and shoulder with his wooden cane. Vicente Salbabero (father of Constancio) who was at the vicinity saw his son about to be stabbed by Simeon. He then grabbed the hand of Simeon in an attempt to disarm the latter. All of the sudden, Rafael Marco approached Vicente Salbabero wielding a cane and a knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to his sons Constancio and Bienvenido who appeared at the scene to run. Constancio managed to run away, however, Bienvenido was chased by Rafael and was stabbed at the hand when he parried the blow of the accused. Bienvenido then ran farther, but tripped when his foot got caught on a vine. Out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Betran appeared and stabbed the deceased on the buttocks. When Simeon caught up, he then stabbed the deceased on the left breast and on the upper left arm. The deceased then managed to walk to a nearby store of one Pinda, where he died.

The trial court convicted the accused Rafael and Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran of murder, qualified with abuse of superior strength. The accused Rafael Marco appealed before the SC, arguing that there is no conspiracy between al of the accused and that he is merely guilty of slight physical injuries by stabbing the hand of the deceased when he chased the latter. WON the defendant appellant is merely guilty of slight physical injuries. (1.) Yes, Rafael Marco is guilty of slight physical injuries. As to the conspiracy, it appeared that there exist no conspiracy on the part of Rafael. Rafael’s participation was merely that he stabbed the deceased on the hand. The fatal wounds were inflicted by Beltran and Simeon, and it was not shown by evidence that Rafael really was in connaivance with the other accused to kill the deceased. (2). Although article 4 of the RPC provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by a commission of a felony, although the resultative effect of such was different to what was originally intended. Even thou there is no dispite that Rafael Marco caused a stab wound upon the hand of Bienvenido Sabelbero, it was shown that the death of the latter was due to the stab wounds by Simeon and Bienvenido. THERE WAS AN EFFECTIVE INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH WAS NO OTHER THAN THE APPEARANCE OF BELTRAN AND THE LATTER’S PARTICIPATION WITH SIMEON IN THE KILLING.

People vs Andres The accused Pacheco and Andres were charged with the crime of homicide, against the deceased Quinto (11 yrs old). On November 13, 1995, while the deceased was playing with his friend Garcia, they saw the accused Pacheco and Andres exploring a drainage culvert which was about 1 meter both in height and width, with water about a foot deep. The accused invited the deceased to go fishing with them in the culvert. Garcia did not assent thereto, but Quinto did. The three then proceeded inside the culvert. After a few while, Pacheco went out of the culvert holding a fish, without uttering a word. Andres followed, but emerged again to the drainage and went out carrying with him the body of the deceased. The body of the deceased was laid to the grass. Garcia, frightened, fled the scene, while Andres proceeded to the house of the deceased to inform the mother. The mother hurried to the scene where she saw her son’s lifeless body. The NBI conducted an investigation and took the sworn statements of Quinto, Pacheco and Garcia. After which, the NBI conducted an autopsy of the body of the deceased. An information was then after filed against the accused. During trial, the prosecution presented its witness, the medico legal who testified that the deceased had a hematoma at the back of the head caused by a strong force from a blunt instrument. He also testified that the throat of the deceased was filled with muddy particles, indicating that the deceased died from drowning.

The medico legal also testified that the deceased might have slipped on a slippery object (a rock), and hit his head on the pavement and rendered him unconscious. The defense filed a demmurrer to evidence which was granted by the trial court on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The private complainant filed an appeal with the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC, holding that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. The private complainant sought recourse from the SC. WON Pacheco and Andres are guilty of homicide. (1.) No, they are not guilty of homicide. The demurrer to evidence is proper on account of insufficiency of evidence to prove that Andres and Pacheco caused the fatal blow to the head of the deceased. The proximate cause of the death of the child was the strong force by a blunt object, which could have rendered him unconscious and lead to his drowning. There is no evidence to show that the accused caused the blow to the head of the child. Secondly, the medico legal testified that the head injury may have been likely caused by the deceased slipping from an object and thereby hitting his head on the pavement. Garcia also testified that the drainage culvert was dark and he himself was afraid to go in. Lastly, the court took judicial notice of the fact that a person would not commit a serious crime for no reason at all. The petitioner in this case did not produce any evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of the accused. Andres even informed the mother immediately after the incident.

Jacinto vs People Jacinto, together with Busog and Capitle, were charged with qualified theft committed against Megafoam Inc. One Baby Aquinohanded over a BDO check amounting to 10K to the petitioner, who was then the collector of Megafoam. However, the latter did not turn over the check, but was deposited instead in a Landbank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Capitle. Capitle is the sister of the petitioner, and also an officer of Megafoam. An employee of Megafoam, Ricablanca, received a phone call from a Land Bank employee who was looking for Generoso Capitle to inform the latter that the check of Baby Aquino bounced. Ricablanca then asked Valencia, a neighbor of Capitle who was also working for Megafoam, to inform Capitle of the bounced check. Valencia suddenly asked Ricablanca to have Baby Aquino pay in cash, and they would divide the same in 4 equal shares. Ricablanca did not accede thereto and reported the matter to the owner of Megafoam. With this, the owner of Megafoam coordinated with the NBI which conducted an entrapment operation.

The entrapment operation was successful, where the marked bills were recovered from the accused when Ricablanca acted to accede with the plan. The trial court convicted the accused of qualified theft. Upon appeal of the accused with the CA, the CA modified the decision of the RTC and reduced the penalty of Valencia and Capitle is acquitted. Jacinto’s sentence is affirmed. With this, Jacinto sought an appeal with the SC, arguing that she is not liable for qualified theft on account that the post dated check is valueless and was subsequently dishonored. WON the petitioner committed an impossible crime. (1.) Yes, the accused is guilty not of qualified theft, but an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime under art 4(2) are as follows; 1. The act performed constitutes a crime against persons or property, 2. The act was done with evil intent, and 3. The accomplishment is inherently impossible, or the means employed is ineffectual or inadequate. In the present case, all elements of qualified theft are present, however, the thing which was stolen is of no value. Under the RPC book two on crimes against property, theft is committed by taking a thing or object which is of value. The fact that the check was dishonored fortifies that the stolen object is of no value at all.

Valenzuela vs People The accused Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with the crime of theft (consummated). The accused pleaded not guilty on arraignment. During trial, the prosecution alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused, around 4:30 pm were sighted at the Super Saver’s Club supermarket adjacent to SM North Edsa complex in QC, 2. That herein witness, Lago, a security guard who manned the parking lot of the supermarket, spotted the accused wearing an ID with the mark “receiving dispatching unit”, 3. That the accused during that time was pushing a cart loaded with tide detergent products and unloaded the same in the open parking lot where Calderon was waiting, 4. That after hauling, the accused hailed a taxi cab and tried to load the same therein 5. That upon reasonable suspicion of Lago approached the accused and demanded the presentation of receipts when the two tried to flee on foot, 6. That Lago, to alert his fellow guards, fired a warning shot; where the accused were then after apprehended and brought to the police station ad underwent inquest proceedings. The accused Valenzuela alleged by way of defense admitted that he was around the vicinity but was merely for the purpose of withdrawing from his ATM accompanied with a friend. He allegedly then proceeded outside, in curiosity, due to the warning shot where he was surprisingly apprehended by the guards. Calderon alleged that he was on queue for a tricycle ride when he suddenly heard a gunshot. He then proceeded to the place of the incident where he was suddenly apprehended by the guards. The trial court found to be credible the evidence presented by the prosecution, sufficiently identifying the accused. It ruled to convict the accused for consummated theft. Upon appeal of Valenzuela to the CA, he contended that he should merely be held guilty of frustrated theft on account that he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the alleged stolen articles. The CA upheld the RTC conviction, ruling that the theft is consummated. WON the theft is consummated or frustrated. (1.) The theft is consummated. In cases involving theft, such is considered as consummated when the following requisites concur; 1. A property which belongs to another, 2. Taking of such property, 3. Taking is met with intent to gain, 4. Taking is without consent of the owner, 5. Taking is accomplished without any threat or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Theft is committed and consummated when there is deprivation of property by one who has intent to gain. It is immaterial if the accused did not have the freedom to dispose of the property taken and such cannot lead to a conclusion that the crime is merely frustrated. Upon taking, the crime consummates. Hence, in cases involving theft, there can only be consummated or attempted stage. (2.) The court abandons the ruling on Dino, and upholds the ruling in Viada as controlling.

People vs Palaganas The accused Palaganas was charged with (2) counts of frustrated murder and (1) count of consummated murder. During arraignment, the accused pleaded no guilty. During trial, the prosecution alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the Ferrer brothers (Servillano, Melton, Michael) were on a drinking spree on their residence and transferred the festivities at Tidbits Videoke Bar, Manaoag, Pangasinan, arriving around 9:45 pm. 2. That around 10:30 pm, the Jaime and Ferdinand Palaganas arrived at the bar and sat near the table of the Ferrer brothers. 3. That when Jaime was singing (my way), Melton Ferrer suddenly joined him in singing, which the former considered as mockery. 4. That a fight ensued between the parties when Jaime confronted the Ferrer brothers; during the rumble, Ferdinand Palaganas proceeded outside and was pursued by Michael Ferrer, but the latter was halted by Servillano Ferrer, 5. That the Ferrer brothers, after mauling Jaime, proceeded outside the bar to locate the missing wristwatch of Servillano, where Ferdinand Palaganas suddenly appeared and shouted “they are the one’s, shoot them!” 6. That upon the order of Ferdinand, the accused Rujjeric Palaganas shot the Ferrer brothers; Sevillano was hit on the stomach, Michael on the shoulder, and Milton on the head, causing his death. The accused invoked as a defense self defense, alleging that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers, where the latter threw rocks at him upon sight. He also alleged that he fired a warning shot to deter the imminent danger, but to no avail; hence he did not have any option but to shoot. The trial court convicted the accused of (1) count of homicide and (2) counts of frustrated homicide; not murder on account that it was not proven by evidence that the accused and Ferdinand Palaganas were in conspiracy. Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges. Upon appeal of the accused with the CA, the CA affirmed the trial court decision with modification, holding that there exists a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by the accused even before the issuance of a warrant. Hence, the penalty was reduced. The accused appealed wit the SC. WON the accused is guilty of (2) charges of frustrated homicide. (1.) No, the accused is guilty of (1) count of frustrated, and another for attempted. Frustrated felonies are those which the essential ingredients for the execution are accomplished, but does not produce the felony due to causes independent of the will of the accused. Attempted felonies are those where the accused has not done all the necessary ingredients of the felony which will produce it by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In cases involving homicide, its is frustrated if the wound which was inflicted is a fatal or mortal one which would lead to death, but does not due to some causes; immediate medical assistance in the present case done to Servillano. Its is attempted homicide when the wound inflicted is not fatal or mortal, such in the present case of Michael who was merely wounded on his shoulders.

Velasco vs People The accused Velasco was charged with attempted murder. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. During trial, the prosecution alleged the following facts, substantiated by the complainant and Armando Maramba. 1. That the private complainant Freidrik Maramba was washing his car in his residence around 7:30 am, 2. That a tricycle suddenly stopped near him, whereby the passenger thereof alighted thereto, 3. That the private complainant tried to identify the accused who was wearing a chaleco, but 10 seconds after, the latter fired several shots to Maramba, 4. That the private complainant was hit on his upper arm, causing him to fall down, but stood back up again and ran to safety while the accused proceeded in shooting several bullets, 5. That the accused flee the scene riding the same tricycle being driven by the prosecution witness, Armando Maramba (uncle of complainant), and ordered the latter to drop him off to a particular place, where the latter boarded another tricycle, 6. That the shooting incident was reported to the police station; the arresting officers proceeded pursue the accused based on the description by the complainant, and subsequently managed to arrest the latter. The accused interposed as alibi as defense and alleged that he was at Lingayen the night before the shooting and rode a Volkswagen of his friend en route to Calasiao the day after; that he alighted at the outskirts of the city where he boarded a tricycle. He was then apprehended by the arresting officers. The trial court convicted the latter for the crime of attempted murder. Upon appeal with the CA, the accused challenge the credibility of Armando Maramba as witness, considering that he is the uncle of the complainant. He also alleged that the trial court committed errors in appreciating factual matters. The CA however ruled to affirm the decision of the trial court, hence the appeal of the accused with the SC. WON the accused is guilty of attempted murder. (1.) Yes, he is guilty thereto. An attempted felony is when the accused commences the criminal act by overt acts but failed to perform all the necessary ingredients for its execution due to some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused. In the present case, the accused already commenced the act of shooting for the purpose of committing murder, but was not consummated due to causes independent of his will. Such cause is the inaccurate/bum shooting of the accused and the swiftness of the complainant. In the present case, the intent to kill is substantiated by the seven shots fired. Murder is also the proper charge on account that there is alevosia, performing a surprise attack on the complainant.

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Baleros vs People The accused was charged with the crime of attempted rape. The accused during arraignment pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses and testified to the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused, a medical student of UST, prior to the incident was at a party held north greenhills. Around 1am, the accused proceeded to the Celestial Marie Building in Sampaloc, 2. That the accused was able to enter the premises despite the initial apprehension of the guard on duty, 3. That the accused, wearing a white T shirt (with emblem of his fraternity, sigma phi) over a barong and black shorts with white stripes, knocked room 306, the unit of his friend Joseph Africa, 4. That after Africa retired in bed, the accused proceeded to a window in room 306 leading to the adjacent room 307, the room of the private complainant, 5. That while the complainant was asleep around 1:50 am, the accused, holding with him a handkerchief soaked with chloroform, an anesthetic drug, forcefully covered the mouth of the complainant to render her paralyzed, and laid on top of her 6. That the complainant was then able to see the clothing of the accused and hold his private part to ascertain the latter’s gender, 7. That she was able to kick the accused and got her left arm free, afterwards the accused flee the room, 8. That the accused, seen by some witnesses, was able to drop his bag in room 310. 9. That around 6:30, Joseph was awakened by the accused and informed the former that no one was allowed to leave the building; then after the CIS agents arrived around 8:30 am. During trial, the accused for his defense alleged that he was asleep at the time of the incident and was awaken by Joseph around 6 am and informed him that the building admin was not allowing anyone to leave the premises due to the said incident. The trial court ruled to convict the accused for attempted rape, giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses and for positive identification of the latter. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the conviction of the trial court and held that the attempt to paralyze the complainant was a mere interlude to the crime of rape, whereby the shredding of clothes and attempt to penetrate will come later after the victim is subdued. The accused sought recourse with the SC and argued that he is merely guilty of unjust vexation. WON the accused is guilty of attempted rape. (1.) No, the accused is merely guilty of unjust vexation. In crimes of rape, the controlling ingredient is carnal knowledge THROUGH PENETRATION. In connection with attempted felonies, attempted rape is committed when the accused has, by overt acts, tried to have carnal knowledge with the victim; shredding of clothes, attempt to penetrate, groping, etc. In the present case, the accused merely tried to paralyze the victim. There is no evident to prove an overt act in having canal knowledge. There is no logical connection with the attempt to paralyze and the commission of rape. The accused’s act of attempting to paralyze the victim is not an overt act that logically will ripen into rape. The CA erred in deviating from rules on evidence and is guilty of conjecture and speculation to conclude that such act is an attempt to rape the victim.

People vs Almazan The accused Alamzan was charged with murder and frustrated murder. The two cases were consolidatedDuring arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, with its witnesses, testified to the following facts, to wit; 1. That the deceased and the private complainant, Noli and Noel Madriaga, were at front of the residence of Vicente Madriaga (father of Noli, grandfather of Noel), where the latter was playing chess with one “Allan”; one of the spectators is Angel Soliva, 2. That all of the sudden, the accused appeared brandishing a gun to exact vengeance against Angel, the person he suspected to have stolen his fighting cocks, 3. That he pulled the trigger twice, but did not fire, giving Angel an opportunity to flee, 4. That Vicente tried to calm down the accused, but to no avail; then the accused pointed the gun to Noli who was then holding his 2 – year old daughter, and shot him on the left stomach despite the plea of Noli to desist, 5. The accused then fired at Noel who was shot at the left thigh; after the accused flee, Vicente, with the assistance of his neighbor brought the victims to the hospital; Noli however died afterwards, and Noel was treated and released the same day for his wound on the thigh. The accused for his defense invoked self defense, alleging that we proceeded to the house of the Madriaga’s to inquire regarding the theft of his cocks. However, he alleged that he was mocked by the group while Angel tried to shoot him with a gun twice, but did not fire. He alleged then to have taken the gun from Angel and shot Noli when the latter tried to stab him with a broken bottle. The trial court convicted the latter of murder and frustrated murder due to the presence of alevosia and evident premeditation. The accused sought recourse with the SC, arguing that he is merely guilty of attempted murder in relation to the case of Noel. WON the accused is guilty of attempted murder. (1.) Yes, he is guilty of attempted murder. Based on the testimony of the attending physician who treated Noel, the injury sustained was a minor one and may heal within a weeks time and for which the victim is in no danger of dying. In the present case, the accused must be held liable only for attempted murder on account that the injury sustained is not one which is fatal or mortal which would lead to the death of Noel. According to jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury that was not fatal, and could not cause his death, the crime would only be attempted.

People vs Listerio The accused Listerio and De La Torre were charged of the crime of murder and frustrated murder in (2) separate cases. The accused pleaded not guilty thereto during arraignment. During the trial, the prosecution, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, stated the following facts, to wit; 1.That victims are Jeonito and Marlon Araque, brothers, proceeded to the residence a certain Tino around 5 pm to collect a sum of money; but such was to no avail, 2. That the victims then turned their back and passed by Tramo, near Tino’s place where they passed upon the group of the accused who were then armed with knives and GI lead pipes, 3. That the group of the accused suddenly attacked the Araque brothers, where the accused stabbed Jeonito (3) times at the right portion of his back, (1) at the lower portion and another on the left side of the back, 4. That Marlon was hit by the accused on the head with the GI pipe and lost consciousness; the accused fled the scene, 5. That Marlon regained consciousness after (3) minutes where he saw his brother already dead. The accused, for his defense, alleged that he was awaken around 5 pm by some of his companions and informed him that there was an altercation near the railroad tracks. When the arresting officers passed by the residence of the accused, the former invited the accused to the police station for questioning. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused for murder and attempted homicide on account that the wound exacted to Marlon is not one that is fatal or mortal. The accused then sough an appeal with the SC, contending that he is merely guilty of the attempted homicide of Marlon. WON the accused is guilty of attempted homicide. (1.) No, the accused is guilty of frustrated homicide. It was held by the SC that the accused passed through the subjective phase of the crime. Worthy to note is that a crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. The crime is a frustrated, not an attempted offense considering that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlon’s attackers apparently thought he was already dead and fled.

People vs Campuhan The accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, with the testimony of the mother of the victim, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That Corazon Pamintuan, mother of the victim named Crysthel (4 year old), went down from the second floor of their residence to prepare Milo drinks for her 92) children, 2. That she saw thereat the accused, who was the helper of Corazon’s brother, preparing water bags to be made into ice to be frozen at the freezer located on the 2nd floor, 3. That while Corazon was preparing the drinks, she heard her daughter cry “ayo’ko, ayo’ko”; she immediately proceeded upstairs and saw the accused kneeling before Crysthel who’s underwear and pajama pants were removed, while his shorts were down to his knees, 4. That Corazon allegedly saw the accused forcing his penis to the genitals of her daughter, yelled an expletive, and tried to box the accused, 5. That the accused managed to dodge the punches of Corazon and tried to flee, but was apprehended by Corazon’s brother, uncle, and cousin. The accused for his defense alleged that Corazon has ill will against him for an errand that he did not accomplish; and that at the time of the incident, Crysthel was in a playful mood and wanted to ride his back when the child suddenly pulled him down, causing both of them to fall down on the floor. He also alleged that Corazon went histerical when she saw the position of the accused over the victim. The trial court ruled to convict the accused for statutory rape, with the penalty of death. By automatic review of the Supreme Court, the accused alleged that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Corazon as to the alleged penetration, consummating the offense. WON the rape was consummated. (1.) No, the rape is merely attempted. Based on the findings of the medico legal and by the testimony of the victim, it is conclusive that there is no penetration; hence the conclusion that the crime was consummated does not hold water. In cases involving rape, the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis is capable of consummating rape. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean skin contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof. In the present case, the allegation of the mother that there was penetration cannot be given credence on account that based on the ultimate facts as to the position of the accused, the mother is positioned in such a way that she cannot determine if there is penetration.

People vs De La Cruz The accused Rosemarie De La Cruz was charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. During arraignment, she pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, as based on the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused was seen by the witness Caparos, neighbor of the victim, Whiazel Soriano (grade 1 pupil) holding the hands of the victim leading the latter away, 2. That due to reasonable suspicion, Caparos approached the accused and inquired regarding who she was, her relationship with the victim, and her purpose in dragging the child with her, 3. The explanation of the accused that she will fetch the child and bring her to the mother did not prove to be sufficient for Caparos, 4. That Caparos insisted that they proceed to the guidance councilor, which the accused did where she reasoned thereto that she was at the school seeking dental attention from a certain Dr. Medina who was performing dental care even for outsiders; that she was merely walking along with the child when she was apprehended by Camparos, 5. That the victim however said that she was asked by the accused to assist the latter in locating her child, 6. The parties proceeded to the office of the assistant principal, where the assistance principal called the attention of the police. The accused for her defense alleged that she went to the school (Aurora Quezon, Malate) for the purpose of seeking dental care from Dr. Medina, the schools resident dentist; that she stumbled upon the victim on the while looking for the dentist’s office; she did not speak to her nor asked her assistance. The trial court convicted the latter of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, holding that the crime had been consummated on account that there deprivation of the liberty of the victim only if for a moment of time. The accused filed an instant appeal with the SC, arguing that her liability is merely for attempted kidnapping. WON the accused is attempted kidnapping. (1.) Yes, the accused is guilty of attempted kidnapping. The child was merely deprived of her liberty only for a very short span of time, from the accused held the hand of the victim to when Caparos apprehended the accused. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated.

People vs Orita The accused Orita was charged with the crime of rape. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, as based on the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the private complainant was a 19 year old freshmen student of St. Joseph’s College, Samar, who came from a party the night of the incident, 2. That the victim was left by her friends upon arriving at the dormitory of the latter when all of the sudden, the accused from behind held a knife to her neck, 3. That the victim identified the accused who was then a member of the PC; the accused ordered the victim to go upstairs to her room, and when they got to the 2nd floor, the accused ordered the victim to open the door of her dormitory unit, 4. That upon entering the room, the accused hit her head on the wall while the latter undressed himself, 5. That the accused ordered the victim to remove her clothing, which she did; he then after ordered the victim to lie down on the floor and ordered the victim to lie down, 6. That the accused cannot penetrate; only a portion of his penis entered as the victim kept on moving, 7. That the accused laid down and ordered the victim to mount him, which she did; but penetration was not met; only a part of the penis was inserted at the vagina, 8. The victim had the chance to flee and proceeded but naked to the nearby police station; the victim underwent then a medical examination. The trial court then convicted the accused of frustrated rape. Upon the appeal of the accused with the SC, he contended that there is no frustrated rape. WON the charge of frustrated rape is proper. (1.) In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. There’s a uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ. In the present case, it is not conclusive based on evidence that there was penetration. As based on the testimony that there was partial penetration, there is actually consummation of the same.

Soplente vs People. The accused Nicanor and Rogelio Soplente were charged of homicide and frustrated homicide. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty (self defense). During trial, the defense, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused, brothers Soplente, were watching a singing contest around 9:30 pm being held at a local church, that they were standing around a few meters from a groups of persons who were drinking at the store of a certain Diola, 2. That they were suddenly approached by (2) individuals from the group of the complainant Leyson, and compelled Nicanor Soplente to join their party; that Rogelio immediately intervened to stop the harassment against his brother, 3. That Nicanor proceeded to a nearby store of a certain Malig – on to “order orange”, and illustrated to the store owner regarding the harassment, after which the latter told his cousin, Susing, about the incident, 4. That after the singing contest was concluded around 12 am, the wife of the accused’s cousing, Bukay, requested the brothers to assist her in looking for her children who were lost in the crowd, they separated to cover more ground, and eventually found the children and went home, 5. That on the way home, Rogelio found himself surrounded by (10) men armed with canes and lead pipes headed by the complainant Leyson, that Rogelio ordered Nicanor to flee the scene, which he did, 6. That Leyson drew his gun towards the accused and fired, but the latter parried it by holding the base of the gun, that the accused stabbed the complainant once, 7. That immediately after the complainant fired his gun, the deceased Notarte mauled the accused, which lead the latter to stab Notarte, that the accused fled the scene after the incident and sought refuge in his cousin Susing’s residence where he was apprehended (voluntary surrender). 8. That Notarte died and Leyson survived. The accused admitted to the stabbing, but invoked the justifying circumstance of self defense due to the unlawful aggression. After trial, trial court ruled to acquit Nicanor from all the charges; Rogelio was acquitted of frustrated homicide of Leyson, but was convicted of homicide for the death of Notarte. The CA affirmed the conviction of the trial court, hence the recourse of the accused with the SC, arguing that he is justified in killing Notarte due to the unlawful aggression which endangered his life and limb. WON there’s a valid self defense in the present case. (1.) Yes, there was a valid self defense. The requisites of a valid self defense are as follows; 1. Unlawful aggression, 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it, 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Although the kicking of the deceased against the accused may be considered as insufficient as an act of unlawful aggression, there was previous animosity between the parties even before the incident. Rogelio had reasonable belief that the companions of Leyson also have the intent to kill him. The kick by Notarte, in the eyes of the accused, is a prelude to a more intensive aggression against his life.

There exists the surrounding circumstance that would lead the accused to reasonably believe that the group had the same homicidal intent. It is not proper to expect a person who stares the eye of danger to ascertain if the subsequent attack is constitutes unlawful aggression against his life.

People vs Narvaez The accused Narvaez was charged with murder. The accused during arraignment pleaded not guilty thereto. The prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the court took judicial notice regarding the prior legal dispute of the deceased Fleischer, that the company of the deceased acquired through a public bidding a tract of land where the house of the accused was located, 2. That a civil case was filed by a group of residents of the land, including the accused, to annul the award of the DENR over the said land in favor of the deceased’s company, that the accused entered into a leasehold agreement with the company to avoid trouble during the pendency of the civil case, 3. That the accused defaulted in payment of the monthly dues, where the deceased compelled the accused to vacate the said land within (6) months, 4. That at the day of the incident, the accused was sleeping around 2:30pm when he suddenly heard a chiseling sound on the wall of his house, that he saw the deceased Fleischer and Rubia, together with some laborers, constructing a fence, 5. That the fencing required the chiseling of the accused’s house, that the accused prayed to the deceased to halt the fencing on account that he would not have access to his house and bodega due to the fences, 6. That the deceased did not heed the request and shouted “No, god damn it, proceed, go ahead”, 7. The accused palpably lost his equilibrium, got his shot gun and shot Fleischer, causing his death, 8. That as Fleischer fell down, he shot Rubia who was running towards their jeep in order to get his gun, 9. That the accused voluntarily surrendered after the incident, that both Rubia and Fleischer died due to the shooting. The accused invoked the defense of self defense and defense of his rights during trial. He argued that the unlawful aggression came from Fleischer in destroying his house. He furthered that he was exercising his lawful rights of ownership over the land in question. He also alleged that he exercise his right to self defense on account that Rubia had in mind to kill him by trying to get his gun in the jeep. The trial court however convicted the accused of the crime of murder. The accused sought recourse from the SC. WON there was valid self defense. (1.) There was incomplete self defense in the present case. There was unlawful aggression by Flesicher by ordering the chiseling of the accused’s house without any color of authority to do so. Under the civil code on the laws on property (539,429), “no possession may be acquired through force or intimidation if there exists a lawful possessor of the property”, and that “the lawful possessor thereof may use reasonable force necessary to prevent or repel the physical invasion of the property.

However, the accused did not resort to using reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. When he discovered the unlawful aggression, he fired his shotgun from the window, killing the deceased. His resistance was disproportionate to the attack. (2.) The third element however is present, that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. He was merely sleeping when the aggression manifested. His plea to halt the destruction is no provocation at all. (3) The accused is found guilty of homicide, not murder on account of the absence of qualifying or aggravating circumstance, but mitigated by incomplete self defense.

People vs CA and Tangan The accused was charged with the crime of homicide with the used of an unlicensed firearm. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That around 11:30 pm, the accused Navy Captain Tangan who just came from an intelligence operation in Buendia, was driving along Roxas Blvd heading south, 2. That the deceased Generoso, a 29 year old optometrist, accompanied by his uncle, was driving along Roxas as well, coming from Ramada hotel, 3. That the deceased all of the sudden swerved on the direction of the vehicle of the accused to avoid hitting firecrackers which was thrown on the road, nearly hitting the car of the accused, 4. Generoso let the accused overtake, but the accused persistently block the lane of the deceased, 5. That upon approaching Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to take a U – turn, when the deceased pulled over and alighted from his car to shout expletives to Tangan, 6. After a heated argument (Generoso slapped thehand of Tangan when the latter pointed the same to him), Tangan proceeded to his car, got his 38 caliber gun and shot the deceased on the stomach who was a foot away from the guns muzzle, 7. That the uncle of the deceased tried to grapple the gun away from Tangan with the help a certain Cruz, and upon taking hold of it, a man wearing a red shirt took hold of it, but the uncle recovered the gun. The defense alleged the following facts; that during the grappling incident, the gun fell on the back side of the accused’s car, and fired upon hitting it. Consequently, the bullet hit the person of the deceased. The trial court convicted the accused of homicide with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self – defense, passion and obfuscation and sufficient provocation from the offended party. The CA affirmed the conviction. The OSG filed a special civil action of certiorari against the CA and prayed to reverse and modify the finding of incomplete self defense. WON there was incomplete self defense in the present case. (1.) There was no incomplete self defense. In invoking incomplete self defense, it is required that one of the requisites of a valid self defense is present.

In the present case, the medical examiner testified that looking at the trajectory of the bullet when in hit the deceased, it is conclusive that the muzzle of the gun was not morethan 3 inches from the person of the accused. They were facing each other when the gun was discharged with the gun almost perpendicular when shot. The shooting was intentional. (2.) The exchange of insulting words between the parties does not constitute unlawful aggression, exept when physical assault ensues. There was also sufficient provocation on the part of the accused, when he tried to block the lane of the deceased prior to the shooting incident. Sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance means that the provocation came from the offended party. People vs Boholst – Caballero The accused was charged with parricide. During arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty (due to the invocation of self defense) The defense, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused lived with her husband Cabalero at her parent’s house, and that their marriage was not a harmonious one, 2. That they transferred to a house of their own, but the accused together with her daughter had not choice but to return to the parents due to the physical and emotional maltreatment of the deceased husband, 3. That on the night of the incident, she went caroling with her friends around the vicinity and that they went home around 12 am after caroling at the house of a certain Barabad, 4. But the accused stumbled upon her husband before she could proceed home and immediately held the collar of her dress and yelled expletives to her (where have you been prostituting, you SOB), 5. After a heated exchange of expletives, the deceased held her hair, slapped her, and pushed her on the ground, that she held onto the waist of the deceased to keep herself from falling, and in doing so, she managed to draw the deceased’s knife tucked into the left side of the latter’s belt, 6. That the deceased pushed her down where she fell on her back, and that the accused knelt doen and started to choke her on the neck, 7. That the accused, having no other recourse, pulled out the knife and thrusted the same on the left side of the deceased’s body, hitting the “belt line” just above the left thigh, 8. That after the incident, she proceeded home and voluntarily surrendered the day after. The prosecution on the other hand alleged that upon seeing the deceased, the accused immediately stabbed the latter when he was approached her. After trial, the trial court convicted her of the crime of parricide. It gave more credence to the testimonies of the sole witness for the prosecution, hence the appeal of the accused with the SC, alleging self defense. WON there was legitimate self defense in the present case. (1.) Yes, there is a valid exercise of self defense. During direct examination of the accused, as well as during the cross examination, it was illustrated well by the accused how the attack on her person was done, relative to the position of the stab wound. As testified by the lone witness of the prosecution, he averred that the accused immediately stabbed the decease on sight.

It is however repugnant to the testimony of the accused, corroborated by the testimony of the attending physician as to the location of the wound. The testimony of the accused fits snuggly with the location of the fatal wound. It is highly improbable that the attack would be at the lower portion of the person of the deceased if the accused truly stabbed the latter upon sight. If the testimony of the lone witness is true, then the stab wound would have been on the upper torso of the deceased. The dress which she wore during the incident was also found to be torn up and shattered, when it was surrendered to the police; hence an evidence of prior physical assault by the deceased. (2.) All the requisites for an the invocation of self defense are present; there is unlawful aggression, no sufficient provocation on the part of the person invoking the same, and that there was reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression. It is understandable that the husband would be mad if the wife is found gallivanting in the wee hours of the morning, but such does not constitute sufficient provocation. She was just carolinging.

People vs Toring The three accused, headed by Toring, were charged with murder by conspiracy (but later ruled out conspiracy, hence, principal, accomplice, accessory). During arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That during a local festivity, the daughter of the deceased Samuel was nominated as the princess of the benefit dance, with the latter’s daughter proclaimed as the winner, 2. That the “Kwaknit Gang”, headed by the accused “alas king”, Toring, were also present, (the group was known for their bird – like dance, and provoking trouble) 3. That after the proclamation, Samuel started to serve alcoholic beverages to the guests and officers of a local association which took charge of the affair, 4. That Samuel stepped out of the dance area to answer to the call of nature, and in connection therewith, the witness, Brgy. Tanod Felix, saw the group of Toring whispering to each other while proceeding to a dark area, 5. That one of the accused handed a knife to Toring, and that the latter approached the deceased from behind and stabbed the latter on the right side of the abdomen, 6. That Toring pulled out the knife when they were seen by Felix, and fled the scene towards the dark, 7. That a certain Sorono who was (6) meters away from the deceased, saw that the other two accused was supposed to box Samuel, but Toring immediately stabbed the deceased. The defense alleged that it was Samuel who exerted unlawful aggression. They alleged that it was Samuel who proceeded to their group and started to hit 2 of their companions, one on the chest, and Escobia on the chin, with the butt of his shotgun. The defense furthered that upon seeing the assault of Samuel against his companions, he got his knife, proceeded at the back of Samuel and stabbed the latter one without any intention to kill him. He invoked defense of his relatives, the Escobia being his first cousin through their fathers.

The trial court convicted the accused for murder (principal, accomplice, accessory)believing that the deceased did not carry a firearm during the incident on account that he is not a public official entitled to possess a firearm; and would have been arrested if he truly carried one. The accused appealed with the SC, arguing that there is a valid defense of a relative on account that the deceased was assaulting his first cousin, Escobia. WON there was a valid invocation of defense of a relative. (1.) No, there was no valid defense of a relative in the present case. During trial, Escobia testified that Samuel pointed his shotgun towards him when he was about to dance with a girl and averred “do you like this dong?”; that Samuel got a bullet and loaded it in the shotgun and pointed the same to Escobia; that upon seeing such, Toring stabbed the deceased. This testimony is not controverted by the prosecution, hence must be given full credence. HOWEVER, the accused also admitted in open court and alleged in his sworn statement that he was previously shot in 1979 by Edgar Agusto, the brother of Samuel. It cannot be said however that Toring was impelled by benevolence to protect or defend his alleged cousin. As discovered by the court, the brother of Toring was shot at the leg by Arsenio Agusto, the brother of the deceased. The attack against Samuel was fueled by revenge due to the running feud between the Samuel and Toring faction.

People vs Chua Hiong The accused Chua Hiong was charged with the crime of libel. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. The defense, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the complainant, Gocheco, is his nephew; that the latter is obsessed with a persecution mania against the accused, 2. That the complainant Gocheco instituted numerous cases against him, one of which was filed with the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of the alien certificate on account that he is an illegitimate child of a Chinese woman not of Tita Umandap, another with the BIR for tax evasion, etc. 4. That the complainant sent a letter purporting himself to be a certain “Soplico”, attached a roped thereto and wrote the words “its for your personal use”, 4. That in pursuit of his right to defend his honor, the accused caused the publication of the alleged libelous article, illustrating the ill motives of the complainant, 5. That the complainant has ill motives against him on account of the intestate proceeding of the late Paulino Gocheco, in which the accused won, with the complainant as the loosing party, 6. That Gocheco caused the publication of an article entitled “Doubtful Citizenship”, relating to the questionable citizenship of the accused. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of libel, hence the appeal of the latter with the SC, alleging that the publication was by virtue of his right to defend his honor against unscrupulous allegations and indiscriminate threats committed by no other than the complainant himself. WON the publication of the accused is a legitimate exercise of self – defense. (1.) Yes, it is an exercise of self defense. Persons victimized by libel are justified to retaliate with the use of libel as well. Self defense is a man’s inborn right. Defamed persons due to malicious imputations by another may “hit back with another libel provided that it is adequate; if so, such retaliative libel is justified. (2.) During cross examination of the complainant Gocheco, he testified in open court that he caused the publication of an article titled “Doubtful Citizenship”, in which he attested that caused to be filed numerous cases against the accused, and that he is in a persecution mania. (3.) The ill motive of Gocheco against the accused was due to the intestate proceeding he lost, and was decided in favor of Chua Hiong.

Ty vs People The accused Ty was charged with (7) counts of BP 22 violations for issuing worthless checks. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its respective witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the complainant Manila Doctors Hospital was nursing the mother and sister of the accused, 2. That the accused signed the acknowledgement of responsibility of payment” in the admission contract for her mother, 3. That the accused caused to be issued the (7) checks for payment of the hospital bills of her sister and mother, 4. That upon presentment for payment to the drawee, Mertobank, the said checks were all dishonored due to insufficient funds, 5. That despite the demands by the complainant made to the accused for payment, the latter did not settle, hence the present suit. The defense invoked the justifying circumstance of “uncontrollable fear of greater injury”, where she issued the bum checks due to the fear that her mother’s mental condition would further deteriorate (suicide) if the latter would still be nursed by the hospital. She alleged that the hospital had ceased to provide the necessary care and facilities to her mother and had exercised “debasing treatment” to the latter due to the delinquency in payment for the hospital bills. The trial court ruled to convict the accused. She alleged the same defense in her appeal with the CA, with the CA later on affirmed the trial court decision. The accused sought recourse from the SC, alleging that she involuntarily issued the bum checks due to the uncontrollable fear that her mother’s health would deteriorate if payment to the complainant is not made. She also alleged that the payee had knowledge of the fact of the impending dishonor due to lack of funds. WON there was an uncontrollable fear of greater injury which was sought to be avoided by issuing worthless checks. (1.) There was no fear of greater injury in the present case. For a successful invocation of the justifying circumstance, the following requisites must be present, to with; (1.) existence of an uncontrollable fear, (2.) fear must be real and imminent, (3.) fear of an impending injury must be greater or at least equal to the felony committed. In the present case, there was no evidence to prove that her mother’s heath would deteriorate due to the alleged “maltreatment” of the hospital. There was also no evidence to prove that there was actually maltreatment. The alleged uncontrollable fear of greater injury (deterioration of health) are speculative, and not real and imminent. The fear was not also of an insuperable nature that would lead the accused to issue the bum checks. She did not also prove that she didn’t have any choice but to commit the felony, as she herself affirmed that she may have took advantage of some options such as giving collateral.

(2.) In her invocation of “state of necessity”, the requisite of which are not present; (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it; the evil is merely anticipated. Baxinela vs People The accused SPO2 Baxinela was charged with homicide for the death of the deceased Sgt Lajo by gunshot. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto and informed the court that he would invoke the defense of self defense, hence a reverse trial. The defense, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That around 12 : 35 am, the accused was with Inspector Regimen, looking for a tricycle ride home, when Manuba informed them that there is an intoxicated armed man, wearing white, who was making trouble at the nearby Playboy Disco Pub, 2. That the accused, together with the inspector, proceeded to the pub and thereat saw SPO4 Legarda (retired) who invited them to sit at his table, 3. That inspector Regimen spotted the deceased Sgt. Lajo who was wielding a gun at the back side of his waist, that Baxinela ordered Regimen to call the police station while he would accost the man, 4. That when the deceased saw Regimen stand up, he immediately tried to egress from the pub, that the accused Baxinela immediately approached the former, 5. That Baxinela uttered “why are you wielding a gun?”, that the accused did not reply and tried to draw his gun to the accused, 6. That upon seeing that the deceased was about to turn around and intended to shoot him, the accused drew his gun and shot the deceased at the left arm, 7. That Baxinela got hold of the gun and wallet of the deceased and ordered the security guards to rush the deceased to the hospital. The prosecution, with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged that the accused and is companions were already at the pub as early as 11pm, and there was an altercation between the deceased and another customer. When Lajo was about to leave, he was followed by Baxinela whose gun is already drawn out; that Baxinela asked who the deceased was, where the latter replied “Im an MIG, pare”. Baxinela then shot the left arm of the deceased from behind. The trial court ruled to convict the accused. The CA, upon appeal, affirmed the RTC decision with modifications as to the sentence, hence the recourse of the accused with the SC, invoking the defense of fulfillment of a lawful duty. WON the homicide is justified by fulfillment of a lawful duty / self defense. (1.) No, there is no self defense. There existed no unlawful aggression by the deceased. It was actually Baxinela who exerted the unlawful aggression by grabbing the shoulder of the deceased and asked him who he was. The deceased was merely trying to pull out his wallet while turning around, not intending to draw the gun. The accused committed a mistake of fact; that he believed that the deceased was going to draw his gun. Mistake of fact cannot be alleged by Baxinela on account of his negligence by immediately shooting the deceased upon turning around. There is a number of procedure that he can take advantage of in cases of imminent danger from an armed man. Baxinela, who is not anymore a rookie, could have taken precautionary measures instead of pulling out his gun.

(2.) Fulfillment of a lawful duty cannot also be applicable. It must be proved that (1.) the accused must be in the performance of duty or exercise of a lawful right or office, (2.) the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the performance of duty or exercise of a lawful right or office. In the present case, the shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty on account that the latter did not pose any threat during the time of the shooting. Due to the anxiety of the accused and the desire to take no chances, he exceeded his authority by immediately shooting, instead of accosting further the deceased for further inquiry. 2nd requisite is wanting. The court held that there was incomplete defense of fulfillment of a lawful duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.

Pomoy vs People The accused Sergeant Pomoy was charged with the crime of homicide, for the death of Balboa, the master teacher of Conception College. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trail, the defense, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the deceased was arrested around 7 am in connection with a robbery which transpired several years from therefrom, and was detained in Camp Janaldoni, 2. That around 2pm, the accused Pomoy went to the detention area and asked the deceased to proceed with him to the interrogation room for tactical interrogation, that the accused brandished a gun tucked in a holster on his right side, 3. That when the parties were about to enter the interrogation room, Balboa suddenly tried to get hold of the gun of the accused, that there was wrestling for the gun for a few seconds, where the accused held the gun with his right hand to prevent it from being drawn, with the left trying to parry the blows of Baldboa, 4. That during the altercation, the gun slipped out of the holster and discharged (2) shots by accident, hitting Balboa on his left chest and stomach, causing his death. The prosecution alleged in rebuttal that it is not an accident on account that (2) gunshots were fired, illustrating the homicidal intent of the accused; that based on testimonies of the witnesses, the gun was locked prior to the altercation, and the safety lock was released by the accused to shoot the deceased. The trial court ruled to convict the accused. Upon appeal, the Ca affirmed the trial court decision and applied the case of People vs Reyes, where it was held that a revolver gun will discharge only upon applying considerable pressure to the trigger. The CA held that the shooting was intentional due to the pulling of the trigger of the accused. The accused sough recourse with the SC, invoking defense of lawful performance of a duty/ lawful exercise of a right or office. WON there the shooting was accidental. (1.) Yes, it was accidental. Based on the testimony of the witness who was at the interrogation room during the altercation, she testified that the both were struggling to get hold of the gun, with the accused’s right hand and the deceased’s left hand on the gun. It is difficult to conceive that the accused managed to release the safety lock and aimed the gun towards the victim during a scruffle as such. The accused did not have control of the gun due to the wrestling, hence discredits the intention to kill. The CA also erred in applying the case of Reyes on account that what is involved in the present case is a semi automatic pistol. The case of Reyes involved the discharge of a gun when the accused handed over the same to the victim.

(2.) The elements of accident are all present, to wit; 1. The accused was performing a lawful act with due care, 2. The resulting injury is due to accident, 3. Such accident is without fault or intent to cause injury on the part of the accused. The accused was a member of the PNP during the incident and was in the lawful performance of his duty when he tried to get possession of his gun when the deceased tried to get hold of it. It is a duty of a police officer to secure his gun from being taken by any person, specially a person under hiss custody. There is no negligence on the part of the accused on account that he had locked the gun previously and had kept it inside his holster the whole time prior to the incident. (3.) The shocked reaction of the accused subsequent to the shooting is not a manifestation of guilt through remorse. He was in a state of shock. Angcaco vs People The accused Angcaco, together with other 3 co accused, were charged with the crime of homicide, for the death of Ganancial. During arraignment, all pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused together with the others were policemen proceeded to the house of the Brgy. Captain, Restituto Bergante around 4am to serve him a warrant in connection with a robbery case, 2. That the accused Edep fired his carbine and shouted “Kapitan, you come down here”, causing the deceased and his cousins (Bergantes) to wake up, that they replied that their father is in Puerto Princessa, 3. That the accused ordered the Bergantes brothers and the deceased Ganancial to go outside, which they did, where they were manhandled by the accused, 4. That Edep approached Ganancial and said “you are tough”, and pushed him, and that shots were fired from the firearms of both Edep and Decosto, causing the latter to fall down, 5. That the crew left for about 15 minutes and came back, turned over the cadaver of Ganancial and placed a bolo on his right hand. The defense alleged in refutation that when they were trying to serve the warrant, a person came down from the house, when warning shots were fired to prevent him from proceeding. However, there was another man wielding a bolo who was approaching Edep. The accused alleged that he prevented an unlawful aggression posed against Edep by shooting the bolo wielding man, who turned out to be Ganancial. The trial court ruled to convict Angcaco of the crime of homicide, while the other 4 were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The CA affirmed the RTC decision upon appeal, hence the recourse of the petitioner with the SC, invoking performance of a lawful duty or lawful exercise of a right or office. WON the accused may invoke lawful exercise of a duty (1.) The accused cannot claim that the killing was done in fulfillment of a lawful duty. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. The lawful duty is to give effect to the warrant of arrest.

But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless asRestituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

People vs Toring

The three accused, headed by Toring, were charged with murder by conspiracy (but later ruled out conspiracy, hence, principal, accomplice, accessory). During arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That during a local festivity, the daughter of the deceased Samuel was nominated as the princess of the benefit dance, with the latter’s daughter proclaimed as the winner, 2. That the “Kwaknit Gang”, headed by the accused “alas king”, Toring, were also present, (the group was known for their bird – like dance, and provoking trouble) 3. That after the proclamation, Samuel started to serve alcoholic beverages to the guests and officers of a local association which took charge of the affair, 4. That Samuel stepped out of the dance area to answer to the call of nature, and in connection therewith, the witness, Brgy. Tanod Felix, saw the group of Toring whispering to each other while proceeding to a dark area, 5. That one of the accused handed a knife to Toring, and that the latter approached the deceased from behind and stabbed the latter on the right side of the abdomen, 6. That Toring pulled out the knife when they were seen by Felix, and fled the scene towards the dark, 7. That a certain Sorono who was (6) meters away from the deceased, saw that the other two accused was supposed to box Samuel, but Toring immediately stabbed the deceased. The defense alleged that it was Samuel who exerted unlawful aggression. They alleged that it was Samuel who proceeded to their group and started to hit 2 of their companions, one on the chest, and Escobia on the chin, with the butt of his shotgun. The defense furthered that upon seeing the assault of Samuel against his companions, he got his knife, proceeded at the back of Samuel and stabbed the latter one without any intention to kill him. He invoked defense of his relatives, the Escobia being his first cousin through their fathers. The trial court convicted the accused for murder (principal, accomplice, accessory)believing that the deceased did not carry a firearm during the incident on account that he is not a public official entitled to possess a firearm; and would have been arrested if he truly carried one. The accused appealed with the SC, arguing that there is a valid defense of a relative on account that the deceased was assaulting his first cousin, Escobia. WON there was a valid invocation of defense of a relative. (1.) No, there was no valid defense of a relative in the present case. During trial, Escobia testified that Samuel pointed his shotgun towards him when he was about to dance with a girl and averred “do you like this dong?”; that Samuel got a bullet and loaded it in the shotgun and pointed the same to Escobia; that upon seeing such, Toring stabbed the deceased. This testimony is not controverted by the prosecution, hence must be given full credence. HOWEVER, the accused also admitted in open court and alleged in his sworn statement that he was previously shot in 1979 by Edgar Agusto, the brother of Samuel. It cannot be said however that Toring was impelled by benevolence to protect or defend his alleged cousin.

As discovered by the court, the brother of Toring was shot at the leg by Arsenio Agusto, the brother of the deceased. The attack against Samuel was fueled by revenge due to the running feud between the Samuel and Toring faction. People vs Chua Hiong The accused Chua Hiong was charged with the crime of libel. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. The defense, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the complainant, Gocheco, is his nephew; that the latter is obsessed with a persecution mania against the accused, 2. That the complainant Gocheco instituted numerous cases against him, one of which was filed with the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of the alien certificate on account that he is an illegitimate child of a Chinese woman not of Tita Umandap, another with the BIR for tax evasion, etc. 4. That the complainant sent a letter purporting himself to be a certain “Soplico”, attached a roped thereto and wrote the words “its for your personal use”, 4. That in pursuit of his right to defend his honor, the accused caused the publication of the alleged libelous article, illustrating the ill motives of the complainant, 5. That the complainant has ill motives against him on account of the intestate proceeding of the late Paulino Gocheco, in which the accused won, with the complainant as the loosing party, 6. That Gocheco caused the publication of an article entitled “Doubtful Citizenship”, relating to the questionable citizenship of the accused. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of libel, hence the appeal of the latter with the SC, alleging that the publication was by virtue of his right to defend his honor against unscrupulous allegations and indiscriminate threats committed by no other than the complainant himself. WON the publication of the accused is a legitimate exercise of self – defense. (1.) Yes, it is an exercise of self defense. Persons victimized by libel are justified to retaliate with the use of libel as well. Self defense is a man’s inborn right. Defamed persons due to malicious imputations by another may “hit back with another libel provided that it is adequate; if so, such retaliative libel is justified. (2.) During cross examination of the complainant Gocheco, he testified in open court that he caused the publication of an article titled “Doubtful Citizenship”, in which he attested that caused to be filed numerous cases against the accused, and that he is in a persecution mania. (3.) The ill motive of Gocheco against the accused was due to the intestate proceeding he lost, and was decided in favor of Chua Hiong.

Ty vs People

The accused Ty was charged with (7) counts of BP 22 violations for issuing worthless checks. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its respective witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the complainant Manila Doctors Hospital was nursing the mother and sister of the accused, 2. That the accused signed the acknowledgement of responsibility of payment” in the admission contract for her mother, 3. That the accused caused to be issued the (7) checks for payment of the hospital bills of her sister and mother, 4. That upon presentment for payment to the drawee, Mertobank, the said checks were all dishonored due to insufficient funds, 5. That despite the demands by the complainant made to the accused for payment, the latter did not settle, hence the present suit. The defense invoked the justifying circumstance of “uncontrollable fear of greater injury”, where she issued the bum checks due to the fear that her mother’s mental condition would further deteriorate (suicide) if the latter would still be nursed by the hospital. She alleged that the hospital had ceased to provide the necessary care and facilities to her mother and had exercised “debasing treatment” to the latter due to the delinquency in payment for the hospital bills. The trial court ruled to convict the accused. She alleged the same defense in her appeal with the CA, with the CA later on affirmed the trial court decision. The accused sought recourse from the SC, alleging that she involuntarily issued the bum checks due to the uncontrollable fear that her mother’s health would deteriorate if payment to the complainant is not made. She also alleged that the payee had knowledge of the fact of the impending dishonor due to lack of funds. WON there was an uncontrollable fear of greater injury which was sought to be avoided by issuing worthless checks. (1.) There was no fear of greater injury in the present case. For a successful invocation of the justifying circumstance, the following requisites must be present, to with; (1.) existence of an uncontrollable fear, (2.) fear must be real and imminent, (3.) fear of an impending injury must be greater or at least equal to the felony committed. In the present case, there was no evidence to prove that her mother’s heath would deteriorate due to the alleged “maltreatment” of the hospital. There was also no evidence to prove that there was actually maltreatment. The alleged uncontrollable fear of greater injury (deterioration of health) are speculative, and not real and imminent. The fear was not also of an insuperable nature that would lead the accused to issue the bum checks. She did not also prove that she didn’t have any choice but to commit the felony, as she herself affirmed that she may have took advantage of some options such as giving collateral. (2.) In her invocation of “state of necessity”, the requisite of which are not present; (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it; the evil is merely anticipated. Baxinela vs People

The accused SPO2 Baxinela was charged with homicide for the death of the deceased Sgt Lajo by gunshot. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto and informed the court that he would invoke the defense of self defense, hence a reverse trial. The defense, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That around 12 : 35 am, the accused was with Inspector Regimen, looking for a tricycle ride home, when Manuba informed them that there is an intoxicated armed man, wearing white, who was making trouble at the nearby Playboy Disco Pub, 2. That the accused, together with the inspector, proceeded to the pub and thereat saw SPO4 Legarda (retired) who invited them to sit at his table, 3. That inspector Regimen spotted the deceased Sgt. Lajo who was wielding a gun at the back side of his waist, that Baxinela ordered Regimen to call the police station while he would accost the man, 4. That when the deceased saw Regimen stand up, he immediately tried to egress from the pub, that the accused Baxinela immediately approached the former, 5. That Baxinela uttered “why are you wielding a gun?”, that the accused did not reply and tried to draw his gun to the accused, 6. That upon seeing that the deceased was about to turn around and intended to shoot him, the accused drew his gun and shot the deceased at the left arm, 7. That Baxinela got hold of the gun and wallet of the deceased and ordered the security guards to rush the deceased to the hospital. The prosecution, with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged that the accused and is companions were already at the pub as early as 11pm, and there was an altercation between the deceased and another customer. When Lajo was about to leave, he was followed by Baxinela whose gun is already drawn out; that Baxinela asked who the deceased was, where the latter replied “Im an MIG, pare”. Baxinela then shot the left arm of the deceased from behind. The trial court ruled to convict the accused. The CA, upon appeal, affirmed the RTC decision with modifications as to the sentence, hence the recourse of the accused with the SC, invoking the defense of fulfillment of a lawful duty. WON the homicide is justified by fulfillment of a lawful duty / self defense. (1.) No, there is no self defense. There existed no unlawful aggression by the deceased. It was actually Baxinela who exerted the unlawful aggression by grabbing the shoulder of the deceased and asked him who he was. The deceased was merely trying to pull out his wallet while turning around, not intending to draw the gun. The accused committed a mistake of fact; that he believed that the deceased was going to draw his gun. Mistake of fact cannot be alleged by Baxinela on account of his negligence by immediately shooting the deceased upon turning around. There is a number of procedure that he can take advantage of in cases of imminent danger from an armed man. Baxinela, who is not anymore a rookie, could have taken precautionary measures instead of pulling out his gun. (2.) Fulfillment of a lawful duty cannot also be applicable. It must be proved that (1.) the accused must be in the performance of duty or exercise of a lawful right or office, (2.) the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the performance of duty or exercise of a lawful right or office. In the present case, the shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty on account that the latter did not pose any threat during the time of the shooting. Due to the anxiety of the accused and the

desire to take no chances, he exceeded his authority by immediately shooting, instead of accosting further the deceased for further inquiry. 2nd requisite is wanting. The court held that there was incomplete defense of fulfillment of a lawful duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.

Pomoy vs People The accused Sergeant Pomoy was charged with the crime of homicide, for the death of Balboa, the master teacher of Conception College. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trail, the defense, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the deceased was arrested around 7 am in connection with a robbery which transpired several years from therefrom, and was detained in Camp Janaldoni, 2. That around 2pm, the accused Pomoy went to the detention area and asked the deceased to proceed with him to the interrogation room for tactical interrogation, that the accused brandished a gun tucked in a holster on his right side, 3. That when the parties were about to enter the interrogation room, Balboa suddenly tried to get hold of the gun of the accused, that there was wrestling for the gun for a few seconds, where the accused held the gun with his right hand to prevent it from being drawn, with the left trying to parry the blows of Baldboa, 4. That during the altercation, the gun slipped out of the holster and discharged (2) shots by accident, hitting Balboa on his left chest and stomach, causing his death. The prosecution alleged in rebuttal that it is not an accident on account that (2) gunshots were fired, illustrating the homicidal intent of the accused; that based on testimonies of the witnesses, the gun was locked prior to the altercation, and the safety lock was released by the accused to shoot the deceased. The trial court ruled to convict the accused. Upon appeal, the Ca affirmed the trial court decision and applied the case of People vs Reyes, where it was held that a revolver gun will discharge only upon applying considerable pressure to the trigger. The CA held that the shooting was intentional due to the pulling of the trigger of the accused. The accused sough recourse with the SC, invoking defense of lawful performance of a duty/ lawful exercise of a right or office. WON there the shooting was accidental. (1.) Yes, it was accidental. Based on the testimony of the witness who was at the interrogation room during the altercation, she testified that the both were struggling to get hold of the gun, with the accused’s right hand and the deceased’s left hand on the gun. It is difficult to conceive that the accused managed to release the safety lock and aimed the gun towards the victim during a scruffle as such. The accused did not have control of the gun due to the wrestling, hence discredits the intention to kill. The CA also erred in applying the case of Reyes on account that what is involved in the present case is a semi automatic pistol. The case of Reyes involved the discharge of a gun when the accused handed over the same to the victim. (2.) The elements of accident are all present, to wit; 1. The accused was performing a lawful act with due care, 2. The resulting injury is due to accident, 3. Such accident is without fault or intent to cause injury on the part of the accused.

The accused was a member of the PNP during the incident and was in the lawful performance of his duty when he tried to get possession of his gun when the deceased tried to get hold of it. It is a duty of a police officer to secure his gun from being taken by any person, specially a person under hiss custody. There is no negligence on the part of the accused on account that he had locked the gun previously and had kept it inside his holster the whole time prior to the incident. (3.) The shocked reaction of the accused subsequent to the shooting is not a manifestation of guilt through remorse. He was in a state of shock. Angcaco vs People The accused Angcaco, together with other 3 co accused, were charged with the crime of homicide, for the death of Ganancial. During arraignment, all pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused together with the others were policemen proceeded to the house of the Brgy. Captain, Restituto Bergante around 4am to serve him a warrant in connection with a robbery case, 2. That the accused Edep fired his carbine and shouted “Kapitan, you come down here”, causing the deceased and his cousins (Bergantes) to wake up, that they replied that their father is in Puerto Princessa, 3. That the accused ordered the Bergantes brothers and the deceased Ganancial to go outside, which they did, where they were manhandled by the accused, 4. That Edep approached Ganancial and said “you are tough”, and pushed him, and that shots were fired from the firearms of both Edep and Decosto, causing the latter to fall down, 5. That the crew left for about 15 minutes and came back, turned over the cadaver of Ganancial and placed a bolo on his right hand. The defense alleged in refutation that when they were trying to serve the warrant, a person came down from the house, when warning shots were fired to prevent him from proceeding. However, there was another man wielding a bolo who was approaching Edep. The accused alleged that he prevented an unlawful aggression posed against Edep by shooting the bolo wielding man, who turned out to be Ganancial. The trial court ruled to convict Angcaco of the crime of homicide, while the other 4 were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The CA affirmed the RTC decision upon appeal, hence the recourse of the petitioner with the SC, invoking performance of a lawful duty or lawful exercise of a right or office. WON the accused may invoke lawful exercise of a duty (1.) The accused cannot claim that the killing was done in fulfillment of a lawful duty. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. The lawful duty is to give effect to the warrant of arrest. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante.

There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless asRestituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

People vs CA and Tangan The accused was charged with the crime of homicide with the used of an unlicensed firearm. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of the witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That around 11:30 pm, the accused Navy Captain Tangan who just came from an intelligence operation in Buendia, was driving along Roxas Blvd heading south, 2. That the deceased Generoso, a 29 year old optometrist, accompanied by his uncle, was driving along Roxas as well, coming from Ramada hotel, 3. That the deceased all of the sudden swerved on the direction of the vehicle of the accused to avoid hitting firecrackers which was thrown on the road, nearly hitting the car of the accused, 4. Generoso let the accused overtake, but the accused persistently block the lane of the deceased, 5. That upon approaching Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to take a U – turn, when the deceased pulled over and alighted from his car to shout expletives to Tangan, 6. After a heated argument (Generoso slapped the hand of Tangan when the latter pointed the same to him), Tangan proceeded to his car, got his 38 caliber gun and shot the deceased on the stomach who was a foot away from the guns muzzle, 7. That the uncle of the deceased tried to grapple the gun away from Tangan with the help a certain Cruz, and upon taking hold of it, a man wearing a red shirt took hold of it, but the uncle recovered the gun. The defense alleged the following facts; that during the grappling incident, the gun fell on the back side of the accused’s car, and fired upon hitting it. Consequently, the bullet hit the person of the deceased. The trial court convicted the accused of homicide with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self – defense, passion and obfuscation and sufficient provocation from the offended party. The CA affirmed the conviction. The OSG filed a special civil action of certiorari against the CA and prayed to reverse and modify the finding of incomplete self defense. WON there was incomplete self defense in the present case. (1.) There was no incomplete self defense. In invoking incomplete self defense, it is required that one of the requisites of a valid self defense is present. In the present case, the medical examiner testified that looking at the trajectory of the bullet when in hit the deceased, it is conclusive that the muzzle of the gun was not morethan 3 inches from the person of the accused. They were facing each other when the gun was discharged with the gun almost perpendicular when shot. The shooting was intentional. (2.) The exchange of insulting words between the parties does not constitute unlawful aggression, exept when physical assault ensues. The expletives and repeated blowing of horns coming from the deceased cannot be considered as sufficient provocation in relation to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation. There was also sufficient provocation on the part of the accused, when he tried to block the lane of the deceased prior to the shooting incident. Sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance means

that the provocation came from the offended party. In the present case, neither incomplete self defense nor sufficient provocation as mitigating circumstances is present. In incomplete self defense as a mitigating circumstance, the provocation must not come from the offended party. On the other hand, sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation necessitates that the sufficient provocation came from the offended party.

People vs Taraya The accused Ampie, together with the co – accused named Jonar and Arly, were all charged with the crime of murder (qualified with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength). During arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused Armpie is the nephew of Arly, and that Jonar is the cousin of the former, and son of the latter, 2. That the deceased Salvador was with some companions drinking at a local pub around 10 pm, that the deceased was having a conversation with a certain woman when all three accused approached the deceased, but dispersed immediately when the companion of the deceased hollered at them, 3. That Some time after, several witnesses saw the deceased urinating, when the three assailants again appeared, with Arly and Jonar approaching from the back, while Ampie approached face to face the deceased, 4. That the accused Ampie, brandishing a bolo, hacked the deceased, hitting the latter on the neck, causing the latter’s death, 5. There were several witnesses who testified as to the positive identification of the accused. The defense, particularly Arly and Jonar, invoked the defense of alibi, alleging physical impossibility for them to be at the scene of the crime upon its commission, and contended that the witness of the prosecution wanted to implicate them to the murder due to previous altercations. Ampie, the principal accused, invoked the defense of self – defense, alleging that when he was on the way home to the house of his brother around 2 am, he was suddenly approached by the deceased, brandishing a lead pipe and tried to attack him therewith; that he managed to parry the blow and threw a hacking blow towards the deceased in self defense. Ampie also invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, alleging that he surrendered himself to police authorities when he was informed by her sister that the police were looking for him. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the all the accused of murder due to treachery, abuse of superior strength, and palpable conspiracy between the accused. The accused sought recourse from the SC, alleging that the trial court erred in holding that there existed conspiracy between the accused, treachery to qualify the crime to murder, and for not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of the accused Ampie. WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated. (1.) No, voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate a felony, the following requisites must concur; 1. That the offender has not been arrested, 2. That the offender had

surrendered himself to a person in authority, 3. The surrender was voluntary, 4. That there must not be a standing warrant for his arrest when he effected the surrender. In the present case, he surrendered to the authorities (5) days after a warrant of arrest against him was issued, therefore, his arrest was already imminent. The essence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is of the premise that the accused admits to the commission of the felony, or would want to avoid the trouble and expense for his search and arrest. (2.) Regarding the conspiracy involving Jonar and Arly, it was not sufficiently proven through evidence by the prosecution that there existed the same criminal design between the accused. Although the other two were at the scene of the crime and that the prosecution witness testified that both were on “stand by” in case of any eventuality, no other evidence to buttress the existence of criminal unity between the accused. (3.) Regarding the treachery, it was held by the SC that the there is no credible witness to testify how the attack transpired. The sole witness testifying as to how the crime was committed is not impartial, as he had a vengeful motive against the accused, his brother earlier being mauled by Jonar. Jonar and Arly are acquitted, while Ampie was convicted of homicide.

Canta vs People The accused Canta was charged with a violation of the Anti Cattle Rustling Law. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the subject cow, (2) years old, is owned by the private complainant, and that the same was put under the custody of a certain Agapay, 2. That Agapay took the cow to graze in the surrounding mountains a few meters away from his house, and that he discovered that the cow was nowhere to be seen the morning after, 3. That upon inquiry, a witness relayed to him that the cow was taken by the accused Canta, 4. That upon instruction of the owner, herein private complainant, Agapay and companion proceeded to confront the accused; that upon being confronted, the accused told the latter to bring up the matter to his father, the Brgy. Captain of the locality, who is in possession of the cow, 6. That the Brgy. Captain was not around during that time, causing the accused to commit that he would call the complainant when his father arrives, to resolve the matter, but such call never arrived, motivating the complainant to seek assistance from police authorities. The accused on the other hand contended that he is the owner thereof, as evidenced by the certificate of ownership duly executed by the Municipal Treasurer. He alleged that he had lost the cow earlier, but upon advise by his uncle that the missing cow was seen with Agapay, he then proceeded to thereto, bringing with him the alleged mother of the lost cow, thinking that the said cow, if his, would suckled to the mother. As the said cow did, he took the cow and immediately delivered it to the office of the Brgy. Captain. The trial court convicted the accused, holding that the certificate offered by the accused was issued not by the municipal treasurer, but the janitor thereof which is a good friend of his. It also buttressed the guilt of the accused due to the finding that the said certificate was antedated.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, hence the present appeal of the accused with the SC, alleging that he took the said cow in good faith, believing that the same was his. He invokes mistake of fact and voluntary surrender on account that he immediately surrendered the possession of the cow to the proper authority to ascertain its ownership. WON the accused is guilty of violating the anti cattle rustling law. (1.) Yes, the accused is guilty thereof. All the requisites of the said violation are present; 1. A large cattle is take, 2. It belongs to another, 3. The taking is done without the owner’s consent, 4. The taking done by any methods or schemes. There was no mistake of fact in the present case. There is negligence on the part of the accused by not identifying first the ownership of the said cow with Agapay, who is his first cousin. As aptly found by the trial court, the certificate of ownership of the accused was not duly executed by a person who has authority to issue, and that the said certificate was antedated. Such facts reveal the unlawful intention of the accused by falsifying documents to buttress his ownership over the subject matter. (2.) The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present. To mitigate the crime under voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be present; 1. The offender had not been arrested, 2. That the surrender was voluntary, 3. That there exist no standing warrant for against the offender, 4. That he surrendered to a person in authority. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the criminal liability, such surrender must be for the purpose of saving the police the trouble and expense of arrest and recovery of stolen items. Such may be applied to the case of the petitioner, where the petitioner, before a warrant is issued against him, immediately and voluntarily surrendered possession of the cow to the office of the Brgy. Captain for the purpose of avoiding the trouble of recovery.

People vs Dawaton The accused Dawaton was charged with the crime of murder. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. However, he offered to the prosecution a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of homicide. The offer was however rejected. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused, together with 3 other companions, including the deceased Leonides, were drinking at the residence of witness Cortez around 12 noon, that they transferred to the residence of the accused’s uncle around 3 pm to continue their drinking (gin), 2. That the group drank at the balcony thereof, and that deceased Leonides retired at a bench to take a nap and recover, right side of the face facing the accused and another companion, 3. That (20) minutes after the deceased fell asleep, the accused left and proceeded to his house, then later on came back, brandishing a stainless knife (2 – 3 inches long), 4. That upon arriving, the accused stabbed the deceased who was asleep on the base of the latter’s neck, 5. That the deceased tried to run, but to no avail as he was grabbed by the accused on the collar and thenafter stabbed several times,

6. That the deceased, despite the stranglehold of the accused, still managed to break loose and ran for a few meters, but fell down immediately; that despite the expiration of the deceased, the accused still persistently stabbed the deceased, and ran towards the house of his uncle. The accused, on the other hand, alleged that the deceased Leonides arrived already drunk, and persistently threw verbal expletives at him, averring the words “magbalikan na tayo ng kandila” (the deceased was the godson of the accused’s son) and threatened that he would grab a grenade and attach it to the person of the accused. When the deceased tried to leave, purporting to get the grenade, the accused grabbed the latter to the collar and stabbed him. The trial court convicted the accused of murder, qualified by treachery, and sentenced the latter to the suffer the penalty of death. The accused sought recourse from the SC, arguing that the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt. WON the plea of guilt may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. (1.) No, the plea of guilt in the present case may not be appreciated. Commonly, a plea of guilt entered by the accused during arraignment is ipso facto considered as a mitigating circumstance. In the present case, however, the plea of guilty was not made during the arraignment for the charge of murder, but was made during pre – trial already, and such plea is merely an offer of the defense to plea to a lesser crime. Under the rules on criminal procedure, the accused may plea guilty to a lesser crime if such is attended by the consent of both the offended party and the prosecutor, which is not present in the present case. (2.) As to the allegation of the accused invoking voluntary surrender, such surrender cannot mitigate the penalty. As per the affidavit of the arresting officers, he actually tried to escape through the cockpit behind the uncle’s house. His argument that he was merely “fetched” by the arresting officers, not arrested, is just mere play of semantics. (3.) The mitigating circumstance of intoxication, however is present, the witnesses having testified that the group had consumed (4) bottles of gin, most of which was drank by the accused. There is also no showing that he is a habitual drinker, nor intentionally intoxicated himself for the purpose of assistance in committing the crime.

De Vera vs De Vera The accused was charged with the crime of bigamy, having contracted marriage with another woman (Juliano), with his marriage with the complainant still valid and subsisting. During arraignment, he initially pleaded guilty to the crime. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. His motion however was opposed by the private complainant, arguing that the accused’s invocation of voluntary surrender is not supported by evidence. However, the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty was granted by the trial court.

After trial, the court rendered a decision convicting the accused, but appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The appreciation thereof motivated the private complainant to file a special civil action of certiorari (65) with the CA, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion of the accused to withdraw the initial plea of guilty. The latter also alleged that the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was met with grave abuse. The CA however denied the petition, holding that there was proper ground for the appreciation of voluntary surrender, and that the mitigation of the sentence is proper. WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in the present case. (1.) Yes, voluntary surrender may be appreciated in the present case. For it to be appreciated, the following requisites must be present; 1. That the accused is not yet arrested, 2. That there is not standing warrant against the latter, 3. That he surrendered to a person in authority, and 4. That the surrender is voluntary. In the present case, the information was filed on Feb 24, 2005. On march 1 of the same year, the court issued an order finding probable cause and for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. On the same day, the accused surrendered himself before the warrant was implemented, and prayed for the reduction of the bail recommended. The issuance of a warrant will not ipso facto defeat the invocation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. In the case of people vs Oco, the accused surrendered himself upon learning that there is a warrant against him, and such warrant was not yet implemented. It is incumbent to the court to determine the surrounding circumstance of the surrender in case a warrant is issued already prior to the surrender. (2.) The special civil action of certiorari does not lie in the present case. It is on the record that it is the complainant who appealed the decision of conviction. This is not permissible on account that such modification shall violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

Fortuna vs People The accused policemen (3 in number) were all charged for the crime of robbery. During arraignment, they pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the private complainant’s testimonies, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the private complainants (Montecillo siblings) were waiting for a ride home around 5pm in the afternoon at Harrison St. in Manila, when the accused, riding a patrol, alighted therefrom and frisked one of the complainants; 2. That upon frisking, one of the accused found a blunt object around the beltline of the complainant; that the accused ordered the private complainants to board the patrol, which the latter did due to fear; 3. That the complainant justified his possession of the alleged “deadly weapon” for purposes of self defense, as he was a polio victim; that upon reaching Ospital ng Maynila, the accused inquired how about how much money were they carrying, and without uttering a word, one of the complainants slipped P1,500 unto the wallet of the other; 4. That the complainant (Diosdada) was made to proceed at the back of the patrol when one of the accused ordered her to empty her bag, discovering that the former had P5,000, that one accused took P1,500 therefrom before the complainant Diosdada was ordered to ingress the patrol, 5. That one of the accused ordered both the complainants to empty their bags and wallets and put all the articles at the console box of the car before they were ordered to disembark at Harrison Plaza, 6. That they requested the assistance of a certain Gen. Diokno, where the latter instructed his constituents to locate and identify the accused, that all the accused were identified during a police – lineup. After trial, the trial court convicted all the accused of conspiracy in the commission of robbery with intimidation of persons and ordered the accused to restitute the amounts extorted. All the accused appealed their respective cases with the CA, but such petitions were denied, affirming the trial court’s decision. Only herein petitioner Fortuna interposed an appeal with the SC, alleging that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy in the present case. WON there was conspiracy in the present case. (1.) Yes, there was conspiracy. The allegation of the petitioner is purely factual which cannot be entertained by the court. There was also sufficient intimidation exerted by the accused by way of threatening the complainants of prosecution and arrest if the latter did not give in to the demands of the accused. Assuming arguendo that the petitioner did not actively participate in the commission of the offense, his silence constitutes indirect conspiracy. As a police officer, he is duty bound to prevent crimes, not instigate them. (2.) The trial court however erred in not appreciating the existed of the aggravating circumstance of “abuse of public position”. They could have not committed the crime, particularly the exertion of intimidation, had they not abused their position as police officers. In “abuse of public position”, it must be that the crime could not be committed without the element of public position.

People vs Tano The accused was charged with the complex crime of robbery with rape. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimony of the private complainant, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused, around 7:30pm, proceeded to the video rental store owned by his cousin and the latter’s wife, finding therein the private complainant De Guzman, an employee of the said establishment, 2. That the accused initially asked the complainant regarding the whereabouts of his cousin, to which she replied that he (cousin) will arrive around 10pm, 3. That accused kept going in and out of the store for a few minutes, where the latter suddenly jumped onto the cashier’s counter and seized the complainant by sticking a knife onto her neck, that the cries of for rescue of the complainant was to no avail for the accused turned the volume of the karaoke machine to the maximum; 4. That the accused, together with the complainant proceeded to the kitchen where he ordered the complainant to undress, and ultimately raping her; but such was interrupted due to the knock on the door; 5. That the accused ordered the complainant to proceed to the 2nd floor, but was halted by the blows of the accused; that the complainant lost consciousness when the accused banged her head onto the dry wall; 6. That upon regaining consciousness, the complainant found herself in the bathroom where she again lost consciousness as the accused banged her head against the toilet; 7. That the accused, before leaving the place of incident, proceeded to the 2nd floor (residence of the owner) and looted several precious jewelries and watches; 8. That upon arrival of the owner and seeing the bloodied victim, the latter was immediately treated to a nearby medical facility. The defense argued in turn. Although there was a judicial admission of the commission of robbery, the defense denied the existence of rape; that the accused admitted to have mauled the complainant for the purpose of robbery. The trial court ruled to convict the accused of robbery with rape, aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling. The court gave credence to the spontaneous and consistent testimony of the complainant regarding the element of rape. The court imposed the penalty of death. The accused sought recourse from the SC, arguing that the finding of rape is fallacious, as it was concluded upon medical examination of the complainant that no lacerations of the hymen was found. WON the conviction for complex crime of robbery with rape is proper // the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may be appreciated. (1.) No, robbery and rape must be charged separately. In the present case, rape preceded the robbery. The robbery was a mere afterthought. As proven by the prosecution, the rape was already committed. The accused attempted to disable the complainant after raping her for the purposes of robbery. Although the medico legal stated that there existed no lacerations of the hymen, it was propounded that the complainant’s hymen was of the elastic type. The court also took judicial notice of the filipina’s inbred shyness and honesty, defeating the allegation of the accused that the charge of rape was fabricated with ill motive.

(2.) The aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated. It was discovered that the 1 st floor where the rape was committed was primarily used for the purposes of business (video rentals). True that complainant was raped in the kitchen, such still forms part of the video rental establishment which is open for public. People vs Malngan The accused was charged with the complex crime of arson with multiple homicide. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of several witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the witness Brgy Captain Bernardo saw the accused leave the house of her employer in a hurry , with her head turning in different directions when she flagged down a pedicab driven by witness Gruta; that the accused initially requested Gruta bring her to Nipa St., Manila, but upon arrival therein, changed her mind and asked to be brought to Nipa St., where she alighted; 2. That after a few minutes, the Brgy officers discovered that the house of the employer of the accused was on fire which spread to the nearby houses, setting ablaze the neighborhood; 3. That the Brgy Capt. Bernardo received information from witness Gruta that the accused was seen acting suspiciously after engrossing from the house of her employer; that she was subsequently apprehended for investigation by Brgy officials; 4. That upon investigation, there was found a disposable lighter from the person of the accused, where she admitted in the presence of the Brgy officials and other homeowners that she burned the house of her employer on account that she was not giver her salary for a year, and when she requested that she be permitted to go to her province, her employer replied in a comedic manner “sige, umuwi ka, sumakay ka sa walis, pag dating mo maputi ka na”; 5. That upon being detained in Santa Ana Fire Station, she admitted to the commission of the crime to the investigators and in front of the media (interviewed by Carmelita Valdez of “True Crimes” by Gus Ablegas), stating that she gathered a pile of newspapers, set it on fire and threw it on the table inside the employer’s residence; The accused filed a Demurrer, alleging the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, but was denied. After trial, the court found the accused to be guilty of the complex crime of Arson with multiple Homicide, for causing the death of several persons who were victimized by the spread of fire. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence the recourse of herein petitioner with the SC, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting circumstantial evidence for her conviction, and its admission of the uncounselled confession with the media and other witnesses. WON Arson can be complexed with Homicide. (1.) No, there is no Arson complexed with Homicide. The accused is simply guilty of Simple Arson under PD1613 which provides that the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death if by reason thereof, death results. 2 kinds of arson; 1. Destructive Arson (RPC, 320) structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments. 2. Simple Arson (PD1613) houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.

In simple arson, homicide is absorbed. (2.) Circumstantial evidence may be admitted in the present case. Based on the corroborated testimonies of the witnesses and the demeanor of the accused right after the commission of the crime, it is conclusive that she is the perpetuator. Although the admission to the Brgy Captain is inadmissible as evidence, the admission to the private person, her neighbor may be admitted. People vs Comadre The accused (3) were charged with the complex crime of murder with multiple murder through treachery, aggravated with the use of an explosive. During arraignment, all pleaded not guilty thereto. Private complainants were having a drinking spree at the terrace of the house of one of the complaint’s father. Antonio Comadre, together with his brother George and Danilo Lozano, were walking along the adjacent street when all of the sudden, Antonio threw a grenade at the room of the residence. The grenade exploded, thereby causing injuries to several complainants and causing the death of the deceased. Defense interposed the defense of alibi. The trial court held that the accused were guilty of murder and attempted murder by conspiracy. SC: No conspiracy. There was treachery on the part of the accused. Elements: 1. Means, methods and form of execution used leaves the offended party unable to defend himself or retaliate, 2. Such means, methods and form of execution was deliberately adopted. The use of a grenade in committing the crime leaves no opportunity for the complainants to defend themselves due to its immediate combustion, leaving them no time to scatter for cover. It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the “use of an explosive” as an aggravating circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can qualify the killing to murder, we should determine which of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case. When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the use of explosives shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance, while treachery is considered as a generic aggravating. For complex crimes: when an act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum penalty. The single act of throwing the grenade, although it brings rise to several and distinct offenses, it must be considered as one crime because the offender was impelled by one criminal purpose.

People vs Villacorta The accused Villacorta was charged with the murder of the deceased, Danilo Cruz. During trial, the prosecution presented as witness Mandeja and Dr. Belandres. The accused pleaded not guilty. During trial, Mandeja testified that on January 23, 2002; 1. she was tending to her Sari Sari store in C-4, Navotas; 2. that she knew the deceased and the accused as regular customers of the store; 3. that when the defendant was ordering bread around 2 am, the accused suddenly appeared and stabbed the deceased on the latter’s left side using a bamboo stick; 4. that she tried to run after the accused but to no avail, and upon returning to the scene, she saw her neighbor, Aron, removing the bamboo stick on Cruz’s body; 5. that she brought the deceased to Tondo Medical Center and was treated as an out – patient.

Dr. Belandres testified to the following; 1. that he was the head of the the Tetanus Department of San Lazaro Hospital, 2. that the accused was brought to San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, but did not attend personally to the accused; 3. that the accused died on February 15, 2002, due to tetanus infection, secondary to the stab wound.

The trial court convicted the accused of murder, qualified by treachery. The PAO of the accused timely filed a notice of appeal with the CA. The accused and the OSG filed their respective briefs. The CA subsequently affirmed the conviction. The accused sough an appeal with the SC, asserting that Mandeja’s testimony is replete with inconsistencies and that if indeed he is found to have perpetuated the stabbing, he should only be then liable for slight physical injuries on account that the proximate cause of the death is due to tetanus infection. WON the accused is guilty of slight physical injuries (1.) Yes, the accused is guilty of slight physical injuries, and must be acquitted of murder. Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred In the present case, the stabbing incident occurred on January 23, 2002, while the death occurred on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present any evidence as to the activities of the deceased during such period. (2.) In the similar case of Urbano, the accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt and that there is a likelihood that the wound was just the remote cause of the death, and that the proximate cause of such was due to infection, perhaps due to the failure to take necessary medical precautions. In the present case, there had been an interval of 22 days between the stabbing and the death. If Cruz acquired severe infection directly from the stab wound inflicted by the accused, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days. Tetanus has an incubation period of less than 14 days, and symptoms usually appear within 2 to 3 days from the injury. Under these premises, the accused must be acquitted due to reasonable doubt. (3.) The proximate cause of the death might have been due to Tetanus infection, and that the stab wound was a mere remote cause thereof. The tetanus infection was the efficient intervening event between the time of the stabbing and the death of the accused.

(4.) The trial court and the CA were correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The requisite for such are all present; 1. The means, methods and the form of execution would render the victim unable to defend himself or to retaliate, 2. That such means, method and form of execution is deliberately employed by the accused. In the present case, there exists the treachery on account of the form of execution used, by sneaking from the back of the deceased’s back while the latter was just buying bread, totally unaware of the impending danger. People vs Escote The accused Escote and Acuyan were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the witness Rodolfo, a driver of Five Star Buses, drove at past midnight from Pasay, heading to Pangasinan, when the accused (2) wearing, jeans and caps, boarded the bus in Balintawak; 2. That when the bus was traversing along Bulacan, the accused suddenly stood up, fired several gunshots and declared robbery; that at the time, the deceased SPO1 Manio who was heading for Pampangga was startled due to the gunshots; 3. That upon ordering the passengers to empty their bags and surrender all monies and valuable items, the accused proceeded to the seat of the deceased and asked him an identification card, whereby they discovered that the deceased was a policeman; 5. The accused confronted the deceased and averred “pasensya ka na pare, papatayin ka naming; baril mo ang papatay sa iyo”; that despite the plea of the deceased of desistance, averring “maawa ka pare, may pamilya ako”, the accused Acuyan indiscriminately fired several shots, hitting the mouth, right ear, chest, and the right side of the latter’s body; 6. That after the shooting incident, the accused proceeded to loot including the bus fair and personal possessions of the passengers; that before they alighted from the bus in Mexico, Pampanga, the accused warned the bus driver Rodolfo about reporting the incident to the authorities, threatening the latter’s life if he does otherwise; 7. That when the accused left, the witnesses proceeded to the police authorities to report the matter; that after a month, police authorities apprehended the accused Escote while driving along a national highway in Tarlac; 8. That they were arrested upon positive identification of the witness Rodolfo during a police lineup. The defense interposed the defense of alibi, alleging that he was implicated to the crime by his former employer, a certain Boy Negro, for not turning over the proceeds of a certain sales transaction, and that he was in Samar when the incident transpired. The trial court ruled to convict the accused of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, meting the punishment of death. The accused sought recourse with the SC, arguing the impossibility of identification by the witness Rodolfo on account that the latter was driving al throughout the ordeal. WON the appeal is meritorious. (1.) No, the appeal is without merit. It might be true that the driver is usually concentrated with driving, evidence showed that the witness Rodolfo had a good look at the accused on account that one of them seated near the driver’s seat before the commencement of the Robbery.

There were also numerous mirrors scattered around the bus for purposes of visibility. The bus was also well lit during the ordeal. Taken together, the testimony of the witness driver cannot be refuted, insofar as identification is concerned. (2.) The trial court is correct in meting the penalty of death for Robbery with Homicide. Under Art. 294, the penalty of death shall be imposed when, in the commission of Robbery, if the crime of homicide, rape, intentional mutilation or arson is present. Although it may be argued that there is treachery to aggravate the crime, by employing means, methods or form of execution to render the deceased unable to defend himself or to retaliate, TREACHERY CANNOT AGGRVATE THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, FOR SUCH IS A CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY. The felony of Robbery, although complexed with Homicide, does not lose its character as a felony against property. Treachery can only be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance as long as the felony charged is a crime against persons.

People vs Yanson – Dumancas

The several accused (Janet & Charles Dumancas, Col. Torres as principals by induction and direct participation; Inspector Abeto & several non – commissioned officers as principals by participation; Pecha as accessories) were charged with the crime of Kidnapping for Ranson with Murder. Upon arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the deceased Lumangyao & Gargar, prior to the killing, swindled the accused Dumancas in a fake gold bar transaction, 2. That around 10:30am, 5th of August, the plan to abduct the deceased was introduced by the accused Lamis to the other accused (officers) in the residence of the accused Fernandez (officer) for the reason that the deceased swindles the accused Dumancas, 3. That the group proceeded the same day, 4:30pm, to the office of the accused Col. Torres to inform the latter of the plan, where the latter ordered the group to locate the deceased and bring them to Dragon Lodge Motel, 4. That around 8:30am, 6th of August, the deceased were invited by state witness Grandeza to eat at a certain “Tinolahan Eatery”; that the latter proceeded thereto where they found that the assailants were waiting for them; that the assailants immediately handcuffed the deceased and were brought to Ceres Compound to confront Dumancas, riding a red Toyota Land Cruiser; 5. That upon arriving thereto, the accused Domancas inquired about the whereabouts of the swindled money, where the deceased replied “it was already spent”; that upon hearing such reply, Domancas uttered to the accused Geroche to “take care of the two”; 6. That around 3pm of the same day, the deceased were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel, while the accused Geroche proceeded to the office of accused Col. Torres to inform the latter of the capture, where the latter ordered them to “keep the deceased where no one would see them”, 7. That the accused Geroche returned to Golden Lodge Motel, where they transferred the deceased to multiple motels, and eventually settled at D’Hacienda Motel around 10am of the 7th of August; that during this time, the accused Geroche hatched a plan to kill the deceased at midnight of the same day, 8. That around 11pm the same day, the accused Geroche proceeded to his house to fetch his baby armalite, and returned to the D’Hacienda Motel; that around 12 midnight of the 8th of August, the group, together with the deceased, proceeded to Brgy. Alijis, riding the red Land Cruiser; that upon arrival, the deceased were made to sit at the sidewalk where the deceased were shot (back of the head/ right lower jaw), causing the latter’s death, that the accused Pecha buried the bodies of the deceased, 9. That the group reported the killing to Col. Torres on the 9 th of August, where the latter instructed the group to hide, as the NBI were investigating the incident; 10. That around August 10, the accused Col. Torres instructed the group to escort him to the residence of the accused Dumancas for the purposes of loaning an amount of money, as he has huge debts to pay; that on the same day, the Domancas issued a check which was encashed by Geroche, where the latter gave to each member of the group the amount of P1,700, 11. That the relative of the deceased sought assistance from Col. Torres, but the latter merely replied that the case is difficult as it involves the “military” and some “bigtime”.

After trial, the trial court ruled to convict the group of Geroche, Col. Torres and Jeannete Domancas as principal by inducement, together with the accessories Pecha and Hilado, while acquitting Charles Domancas. WON the trial court erred in holding Jeannete Domancas gulty as principal by inducement. (1.) No, the accused is not a principal by inducement. Principals by inducement are those who a. directly force the assailants to commit the crime, b. directly inducing the assailants to commit the crime. For force, it may manifest by using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE or UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR. No evidence was presented to prove the existence of such.

For inducement, there must be AN OFFER OF PRICE, REWARD or PROMISE, or by USING WORDS OF COMMAND. There is no evidence to show that Domancas offered a price or reward to the group for the commission of the crime. The only cash transaction involved is the loan extended by Nicolas Domancas to Col. Torres to defray the latter’s other debt obligations. The alleged “command” propounded by the accused, to “take care of the two” does not constitute a command required by law to conclude that Domancas is a principal by inducement. To constitute such command, the following requisites must be present; 1. The inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, 2. Such inducement be the determining cause of its commission by the material executors. (that the inducer produced the strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime) None of the following are present. In the present case, the abduction (indispensible ingredient of kidnap with ransom) was already committed, prior to the time Domancas uttered the words “take care of the two”. Such utterance could not have induced the commission of the crime on account that the crime was already committed. In the present case, neither of the two is manifested by Domancas. It is concluded by the court that the plan to abduct the deceased was already present prior to her involvement (meeting on August 5, where the accused Lamis hatched the scheme).

(2.) Adonis Abeto (one who executed the search warrant in the house of Tortocion) is acquitted. He is not a conspirator, as mere presence at the scene of the crime is not conclusive of conspiracy, absent any proof of previous agreement. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties (serving the search warrant) prevails. (3.) Col. Torres is acquitted of his criminal liability by reason of his death. However, his civil liability survives. (4.) Pecha is guilty as an accessory, by concealing or destroying the body of the crime for purposes of concealment. He has knowledge that the deceased were victims of violence, as the bodies were bloodied and still handcuffed when he buried them.

People vs Garcia The accused Garcia, together with the co – accused, were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom (with illegal possession of firearms for the 2 accused). During arraignment, they pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the private complainant, Atty. Tolieco, was jogging along Gilmore Avenue around 5:30am, when he was stopped by a blue Toyota Corona, from which the 2 assailants alighted therefrom, pointed a gun at him and threw him at the back of the said vehicle, 2. That when the victim was made to crouch at the legroom of the said car, he managed to take a good glimpse of the accused Valler and Garcia, before he was candcuffed and blindfolded, 3. That the assailants drove around 45 minutes while the assailants were pestering him, propounding to be military men, accusing him to be a drug pusher; that he was stripped of all personal belongings before they finally arrived at the safehouse of the accused in De Vega Compound in Fairveiw, 4. That upon arriving, the victim was put to a room, while the assailants made contact with her sister for the purpose of extorting ransom money, the amount of 2 million; that the sister, named Floriana, managed to haggle the amount to 2 million, 5. That after the conversation with the assailants, Floriana sought assistance from the PACC (Presidential Anti – Crime Commission), which immediately proceeded to the residence of Floriana, 6. That the next day, Floriana managed to raise P71,000 which was accepted by the assailants through phone; that the payoff was scheduled around 8pm the same day at Timog, QC, near “lighthouse” and “burger machine”; that Floriana proceeded thereto together with 2 companions, while PACC agents were positioned for surveillance, 7. That the pay-off did not materialize as the assailants, while monitoring the perimeter riding the blue Toyota, thought that the companions of Floriana were police officers; the assailants rescheduled the pay-off the next day at Mcdonalds, Sta. Mesa; the PACC agents tailed the car and discovered that the safehouse was in Fairview, 8. That upon arriving at Mcdonalds in Sta. Mesa, Floriana was approached by the accused Garcia, where the latter got the ransom money and proceeded to the blue car; the PACC agents were able to apprehend the accused Garcia, while the accused Valler who was driving the car manage to escape, 9. That upon arrest of the accused Garcia, PAC agents who were surveying the safehouse conducted a rescue operations which proved to be successful, managing to arrest the (2) accused Lariba and Rogel who were guarding the safehouse, 10. That Valler was also arrested when he arrived at the safehouse.

After trial, the trial court found guilty, through conspiracy, of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom. In a separate case, (2) of the accused were found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. All assailants were meted the death sentence. The accused sought an appeal with the SC, arguing that they should be liable for slight illegal detention (Art. 268), and not for Kindapping with Ransom on account that the private complainant was released from detention by reason of the rescue operations, and not by reason of the payment of ransom. WON the trial court erred in holding Lariba and Rogel as principals. (1.) No, accused Laribal and Rogel are guilty as accomplices. It is shown by evidence that they cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts which aided or facilitated its execution, BUT WITHOUT ANY INDISPENSIBLE ACTS FOR ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT. The accused petitioners merely guarding the house for purposes of either helping the principals in facilitating the successful consummation of the crime and repelling any attempts to rescue the victims. Conspirators and Accomplices have one thing in common, which is knowledge and assent to the criminal design. However, conspirators are the ones who decides that the crime be committed; accomplices merely

concur to it. Conspirators are the authors, accomplices are merely instruments who perform acts which are not essential to the consummation of the crime, but are merely supplementary. Knowledge of the criminal design does not make one ipso facto a conspirator, absent any evidence showing that the accused participated in the decision making. (2.) The participation of Laribal and Rogel are not indispensible, as the private complainant was already subdued ,in line with kidnapping, when the latter was placed in the custody of former. (3.) Kidnapping for ransom is committed in the present case. No specific form of ransom is required for the felony, as long as the payment of an amount is imposed in exchange for the liberty of the victim. (4.) Laribal and Rogel are acquitted of the charge for illegal possession of firearms as there is another crime committed at the same time (kidnapping for ransom).

Garcia vs CA The accused Garcia was charged with murder and frustrated murder. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the deceased Leano, together with witness Corpuz, were conversing along a street in Paco, Manila around 11:30pm, when all of the sudden, the wheel of the pedicab driven by Renato Garcia ran over the foot of the deceased, causing the latter and his companion to pursue the R. Garcia and hurled profanities to the latter, 2. That upon catching up, the deceased was surprised to see that R. Garcia, while yelling expletives to him, was trying to reach for his belt to take out a pistol; that the deceased and Corpuz fled the scene immediately and proceeded to the residence of the deceased’s uncle, private complainant Bernardo, 3. That upon conferring to the uncle about the incident, Bernardo ordered the two to come with him to the police station to have the incident blottered; that the (3) decided to take the jeep of the mother of Bernardo, located at the mother’s residence a few blocks away, 4. That when the (3) proceeded to the residence of the mother by foot, they stumbled across the (3) assailants, R. Garcia, the accused Felipe Garcia, and Gerry Lugos, all carrying handguns aimed towards the direction of the deceased and his companions, 5. That upon seeing the armed men, Bernardo sprinted to the direction of R. Garcia, but was immediately shot on the neck by the former causing him to fall down face flat, while Felipe Garcia and Gerry Lugos acted as lookouts, 6. That upon seeing his uncle shot, the deceased attempted to lift his uncle when suddenly, (3) shot were fired, hitting the deceased at the back of the head, while the witness Corpuz was unscathed as he ducked down when the shots were fired, 7. That upon shooting, the (3) assailants fled the scene, while Corpuz sought assistance from the brother of Bernardo who was then located at a nearby basketball court. 8. That the private complainant Bernardo survived despite the fatal gunshot wound on account of immediate medical attention.

After trial, the trial court found the accused guilty of “homicide” and frustrated “homicide” through conspiracy with the other assailants, although R. Garcia and Lugos were not taken into custody. The lone petitioner – accused interposed the present appeal, arguing that there exists no conspiracy between the alleged assailants, and that he should be acquitted on account that it was R. Garcia who fired the said shots. WON the trial court erred in holding that the accused appellant is guilty as a principal. (1.) Yes, the accused is guilty not as a principal but as an accomplice. Conspiracy is not presumed, as it must be proven by evidence. Mere prior knowledge that a crime will be committed does not make one ipso facto a conspirator. Both knowledge of the crime and participation thereto is inherent in accomplices as well. In case of doubt as to the resolution that an accused is either guilty as a principal or as a mere accomplice, doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and should be considered as a mere accomplice. The witness/private complainant Bernardo testified that the person who discharged the gunshots were R. Garcia, and that the accused and Lugos acted as lookouts. The witness testified that the accused acted as aide. In the present case, although a co-conspirator must suffer the penalty to be meted to the principals, the accused’s participation in the commission of the crime was not absolutely indispensible to its commission thereof; the accused merely acted as a lookout. Insofar as criminal responsibility is concerned, what is controlling is not the existence of conspiracy, but the participation of the assailants in the commission of the crime.

People vs Antonio The accused Antonio was charged with the crime of murder, where police officers Nieto and Cartalla were charged as accessories thereto. During arraignment, all pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused Antonio, former chairman of Games and Amusement Board, proceeded to the IBC (International Business Cub) to meet with its President, Debdani, and the deceased Tuadles, a former professional basketball player; that the meet was for pleasure (3rd night of playing pusoy – dos), 2. That upon arrival of the accused, he alone played with the deceased, as Debdani wasn’t able to come; that the two played until 9am the next morning, 3. That an altercation arose when the two disagreed with the division of winnings, causing the accused to lose his temper, reached his gun at the backside of his belt, and indiscriminately shot the deceased, hitting the latter right at the center of the head, between the eyes, 4. That after the shooting incident, the accused convinced the (2) police officers Nieto and Cartalla, together with the prosecution witness, SG Bobis, to got with him at his residence in Greenmeadowns, QC, 5. That the (2) accessories stayed thereat for several hours while the accused contacted several persons through phone, requesting legal aid, 6. That around 3pm, the accused, accompanied by officer Nieto, surrendered himself and the gun used thereto to San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada.

The prosecution alleged that SPO4 Nieto is an accomplice as he harbored and assisted the principal by failing to arrest the latter and surrender him to authorities. It also alleged that Nieto gave false information to deceive investigating authorities for the purpose of aiding the accused Antonio. SPO1 Cartalla was also indicted as an accessory for concealing or destroying the instrument or body of the crime in order to prevent its discover, by removing the laser sight of the gun used in the said shooting incident and deliberately failing to preserve the evidence at the scene of the crime. The police officers were found by the trial court guilty as accessories. The latter sought an appeal with the SC, alleging that the trial court erred in holding that they are accessories to the crime. WON they are accessories. (1.) Yes, they are guilty as accessories. Accessories to crimes are defined as “one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, but did not take part in it as an accomplice or principal”, but took part in it subsequent to its commission through; 1. profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects, 2. Concealing or destroying the body of the crime or instruments thereto, to prevent discovery, 3. Harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided that such is with abuse of his public functions. In the present case, Nieto is conclusively an accessory, being a public officer who abused his public function when he failed to effect an arrest against Antonio and conduct a speedy investigation thereto. Being a police officer, he is duty – bound to effect an arrest against Antonio for the crime which was committed within his presence. He assisted the accused in escaping by not effecting arrest. Insofar as Cartalla is concerned, he is not an accessory. His failure to produce the laser sight was not for the purpose of concealing or destroying the instrument of the crime. It is discovered through his testimony that the sight was gotten by the other investigators as he was not the one who was assigned to the case. Several witnesses for Cartalla testified that he is a hardworking officer.

People vs Verzola The accused Versola and Molina were charged with the crime of Murder (Verzola as principal, Molina as accessory). Both pleaded not guity during arraignment. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused Molina, wife of the deceased, maintained an illicit relationship with the accused Verzola; that on the night of the incident, Verzola proceeded to the residence of his co – accused, poked her with a bamboo twig for the purpose of waking up the wife Molina, 2. That they proceeded to the house of Verzola to have carnal knowledge and after which, proceeded back to the residence of the wife Molina where the deceased was lying asleep, 3. That Verzola suddenly got a wooden club and violently stroked the same to the head of the deceased while asleep, causing the latter’s death; 4. That after subduing the deceased, Verzola and the widow Molina carried the deceased’s body and threw it right at the front of the house, at the foot of the bamboo ladder used for ingress/egress; that Verzola went back to his residence and threw his blood stained clothes and the wooden club onto the toilet; 5. That the accused immediately went to the municipal office to report an accident regarding the death of the deceased, but was decided to confess to the crime through an extrajudicial confession where he alleged that the attack to the deceased was a preemptive strike for deceased was intending to kill him as well for sleeping with his wife. During trial, the accused repudiated his extrajudicial confession and set up the defense of accident. The co – accused Molina alleged that while she was having a quarrel with the deceased, she was mauled by the latter, causing her to assume a fetal position, where she heard the strike of Molina, purportedly to rescue her. The trial court held to convict both as principal and accessory, respectively. WON the accused Molina is guilty as an accomplice. (1.) No, the accused is not an accessory. An accessory does not partake in the creation of the criminal design nor cooperate in its execution, but knows that a crime was committed and takes part by a. profiting from the effects of the crime b. concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent discovery c. assisting in the escape or concealment of the principals of the crim, provided that eh does so in abuse of authority, et… In the present case, the bringing down of the body of the deceased may be considered as an act of an accessory for the purposes of destroying the body of the crime in an attempt to prevent any discovery (to make it seem as it was an accident). However, the fact that the body was left lying on the floor by the bamboo stairs which is open in public cannot be considered as concealment to prevent its discovery. The fact that the body is left lying for the public to see destroys the allegation that such dragging down from the house to the floor is concealment to prevent the felony’s discovery.

Francisco vs People The accused was charged of violating PD 1612, the anti – fencing law. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, thee prosecution, together with its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wi; 1. That the private complainant Jovita hired Pacita (accused for qualified theft) as a house helper for 3 years; that the latter periodically cleaned the room where the locked cabinet containing precious jewelries were located, 2. That upon leaving the employ of Jovita, Pacita contacted her brother Macario, seeking assistance from the latter as she has some jewelries in her possession, purportedly owned by a friend who was asking for such to be sold, 3. That upon advise of Pacita, Macario proceeded to the shop of herein accused Francisco who was buying precious metals (jewelries, perhaps?), and sold the stolen jewelries to the latter in separate transactions, 4. That upon discovery of Jovita that her jewelries were stolen, she filed an action for qualified theft against Pacita; that she sought the assistance of the PNP counter – intelligence group for the purposes of recovering the said jewelries, 5. That a team of investigators by the PNP managed to locate Pacita and invited the latter to Camp Crame for questioning, where the latter executed a sworn statement, declaring that she sold the jewelries to the accused Francisco; that after such statement, Pacita, accompanied by several officers, proceeded to the shop of the accused, where the latter was invited for questioning in Camp Crame; the questioning however was done at the local police station upon the insistence of the accused, 6. That Jovita subsequently filed the present action against the accused for Fencing; that the private complainant managed to compel Macario to testify for the prosecution, 7. That Pacita was then after found guilty of te crime of qualified theft. The trial court found the accused guilty of violating PD 1612. Upon appeal of the accused with the CA, the CA ruled to sustain the decision of the trial court, hence the recourse of the latter with the SC. He alleged the following: 1. the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelries, 2. Macario does not have personal knowledge that the said jewelries were stolen, 3. Pacita did not testify as witness to prove that she stole the same and sole them to him. WON the accused is guilty of violating the anti fencing law. (1.) No, the petitioner must be acquitted due to reasonable doubt. For a successful prosecution of an anti fencing charge, the following requisites must be present, to wit; (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells the object derived from the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article or item has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the present case, the first requisite is not present. It was discovered that when the court a quo decided upon the charge for PD 1612, the conviction for qualified theft against Pacita is not yet final and executory. The 2nd requisite is also not present. It cannot be concluded that the accused bought the jewelries subjecte of the theft. Although there was an admission by Pacita that she sold the jewelries to herein accused, Pacita did not testify the present case. Jovita, who participated in the present case, did not reiterate in her

testimony the admission of Pacita as to the sale of the jewelries to herein accused in the case for qualified theft. ONLY PARTIES TO A CASE ARE BOUND BY A JUDGEMENT OF THE TRAIL COURT. The findings of the trail court in a separate case cannot be considered as conclusive in another related case filed with another court. (2.) The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Macario brings reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. (3.) In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. Tan vs People The accused Tan was charged with violating the Anti – Fencing Law. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That private complainant Rosita Lim is engaged in the business of manufacturing spare parts for boats and operates an establishment in which the suspected thief named Manuelito Mendez is employed as a helper; 2. That sometime in 1991, Mendez left the employ of herein complainant; that after some lapse of time, the complainant noticed that there are a handful of merchandise that are missing from the storage (i.e. propeller, welding rods, boat spare parts); 3. That upon discovering the loss, the complainant immediately got in touch with Mendez’s uncle who indorsed the former to her for purposes of employment; that Mendez was subsequently arrested in Visayas and later on confessed to the private complainant to the theft of the said merchandise and alleged that he sold the same to herein accused Ramon Tan; 4. That upon such confession, the private complainant filed the present suit against the accused.

The defense denied having met Mendez nor had purchased the said merchandise from the latter. It also contended that the receipts produced by the complainant Rosita Lim to prove ownership over the merchandise were not named under her, but was named to her husband, William Tan. Lastly, it invoked the defense of alibi as he usually goes to the office around 9am, contrary to the testimony of Mendez that he delivered the items around 7 to 8 am. The trial court convicted the accused with violation of the Anti Fencing Law. The CA affirmed the trial court decision upon appeal of the accused, hence the recourse of the latter with the SC. WON the requisites of the Anti Fencing Law are present in the present case. (1.) The requisites for properly prosecuting an Anti Fencing case are not present. The requisites thereof are to wit; 1. Robbery or Theft is committed, 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in its commission acquires, buys, receives, possesses, conceals, disposes the stolen items, 3. The accused know or should know that such property is derived from Theft or Robbery, 4. The accused has the intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the present case, the merchandise were the subject of theft. The corpus delicti of theft (body or substance of the crime, refers to the fact that the crime was actually committed) are 1. That the property was lost by the owner, 2. It was lost by felonious taking.

The felonious taking is not proved in the present case as the private complainant did not complain with police authorities nor file any charges against Mendez (thief) for the alleged felonious taking. The confession executed by Mendez is inadmissible as evidence against the accused for such confession was uncounselled (CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BA ITO??) The accused must be acquitted on account that the prosecution did nit proved by evidence that the latter knew of the fact that such properties were stolen. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person.

People vs Verzola The accused Versola and Molina were charged with the crime of Murder (Verzola as principal, Molina as accessory). Both pleaded not guity during arraignment. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the accused Molina, wife of the deceased, maintained an illicit relationship with the accused Verzola; that on the night of the incident, Verzola proceeded to the residence of his co – accused, poked her with a bamboo twig for the purpose of waking up the wife Molina, 2. That they proceeded to the house of Verzola to have carnal knowledge and after which, proceeded back to the residence of the wife Molina where the deceased was lying asleep, 3. That Verzola suddenly got a wooden club and violently stroked the same to the head of the deceased while asleep, causing the latter’s death; 4. That after subduing the deceased, Verzola and the widow Molina carried the deceased’s body and threw it right at the front of the house, at the foot of the bamboo ladder used for ingress/egress; that Verzola went back to his residence and threw his blood stained clothes and the wooden club onto the toilet; 5. That the accused immediately went to the municipal office to report an accident regarding the death of the deceased, but was decided to confess to the crime through an extrajudicial confession where he alleged that the attack to the deceased was a preemptive strike for deceased was intending to kill him as well for sleeping with his wife. During trial, the accused repudiated his extrajudicial confession and set up the defense of accident. The co – accused Molina alleged that while she was having a quarrel with the deceased, she was mauled by the latter, causing her to assume a fetal position, where she heard the strike of Molina, purportedly to rescue her. The trial court held to convict both as principal and accessory, respectively. WON the accused Molina is guilty as an accomplice. (1.) No, the accused is not an accessory. An accessory does not partake in the creation of the criminal design nor cooperate in its execution, but knows that a crime was committed and takes part by a. profiting from the effects of the crime b. concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent discovery c. assisting in the escape or concealment of the principals of the crim, provided that eh does so in abuse of authority, et… In the present case, the bringing down of the body of the deceased may be considered as an act of an accessory for the purposes of destroying the body of the crime in an attempt to prevent any discovery (to make it seem as it was an accident). However, the fact that the body was left lying on the floor by the bamboo stairs which is open in public cannot be considered as concealment to prevent its discovery. The fact that the body is left lying for the public to see destroys the allegation that such dragging down from the house to the floor is concealment to prevent the felony’s discovery.

Francisco vs People The accused was charged of violating PD 1612, the anti – fencing law. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, thee prosecution, together with its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wi; 1. That the private complainant Jovita hired Pacita (accused for qualified theft) as a house helper for 3 years; that the latter periodically cleaned the room where the locked cabinet containing precious jewelries were located, 2. That upon leaving the employ of Jovita, Pacita contacted her brother Macario, seeking assistance from the latter as she has some jewelries in her possession, purportedly owned by a friend who was asking for such to be sold, 3. That upon advise of Pacita, Macario proceeded to the shop of herein accused Francisco who was buying precious metals (jewelries, perhaps?), and sold the stolen jewelries to the latter in separate transactions, 4. That upon discovery of Jovita that her jewelries were stolen, she filed an action for qualified theft against Pacita; that she sought the assistance of the PNP counter – intelligence group for the purposes of recovering the said jewelries, 5. That a team of investigators by the PNP managed to locate Pacita and invited the latter to Camp Crame for questioning, where the latter executed a sworn statement, declaring that she sold the jewelries to the accused Francisco; that after such statement, Pacita, accompanied by several officers, proceeded to the shop of the accused, where the latter was invited for questioning in Camp Crame; the questioning however was done at the local police station upon the insistence of the accused, 6. That Jovita subsequently filed the present action against the accused for Fencing; that the private complainant managed to compel Macario to testify for the prosecution, 7. That Pacita was then after found guilty of te crime of qualified theft. The trial court found the accused guilty of violating PD 1612. Upon appeal of the accused with the CA, the CA ruled to sustain the decision of the trial court, hence the recourse of the latter with the SC. He alleged the following: 1. the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelries, 2. Macario does not have personal knowledge that the said jewelries were stolen, 3. Pacita did not testify as witness to prove that she stole the same and sole them to him. WON the accused is guilty of violating the anti fencing law. (1.) No, the petitioner must be acquitted due to reasonable doubt. For a successful prosecution of an anti fencing charge, the following requisites must be present, to wit; (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells the object derived from the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article or item has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the present case, the first requisite is not present. It was discovered that when the court a quo decided upon the charge for PD 1612, the conviction for qualified theft against Pacita is not yet final and executory. The 2nd requisite is also not present. It cannot be concluded that the accused bought the jewelries subjecte of the theft. Although there was an admission by Pacita that she sold the jewelries to herein accused, Pacita did not testify the present case. Jovita, who participated in the present case, did not reiterate in her

testimony the admission of Pacita as to the sale of the jewelries to herein accused in the case for qualified theft. ONLY PARTIES TO A CASE ARE BOUND BY A JUDGEMENT OF THE TRAIL COURT. The findings of the trail court in a separate case cannot be considered as conclusive in another related case filed with another court. (2.) The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Macario brings reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. (3.) In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. Tan vs People The accused Tan was charged with violating the Anti – Fencing Law. During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That private complainant Rosita Lim is engaged in the business of manufacturing spare parts for boats and operates an establishment in which the suspected thief named Manuelito Mendez is employed as a helper; 2. That sometime in 1991, Mendez left the employ of herein complainant; that after some lapse of time, the complainant noticed that there are a handful of merchandise that are missing from the storage (i.e. propeller, welding rods, boat spare parts); 3. That upon discovering the loss, the complainant immediately got in touch with Mendez’s uncle who indorsed the former to her for purposes of employment; that Mendez was subsequently arrested in Visayas and later on confessed to the private complainant to the theft of the said merchandise and alleged that he sold the same to herein accused Ramon Tan; 4. That upon such confession, the private complainant filed the present suit against the accused.

The defense denied having met Mendez nor had purchased the said merchandise from the latter. It also contended that the receipts produced by the complainant Rosita Lim to prove ownership over the merchandise were not named under her, but was named to her husband, William Tan. Lastly, it invoked the defense of alibi as he usually goes to the office around 9am, contrary to the testimony of Mendez that he delivered the items around 7 to 8 am. The trial court convicted the accused with violation of the Anti Fencing Law. The CA affirmed the trial court decision upon appeal of the accused, hence the recourse of the latter with the SC. WON the requisites of the Anti Fencing Law are present in the present case. (1.) The requisites for properly prosecuting an Anti Fencing case are not present. The requisites thereof are to wit; 1. Robbery or Theft is committed, 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in its commission acquires, buys, receives, possesses, conceals, disposes the stolen items, 3. The accused know or should know that such property is derived from Theft or Robbery, 4. The accused has the intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the present case, the merchandise were the subject of theft. The corpus delicti of theft (body or substance of the crime, refers to the fact that the crime was actually committed) are 1. That the property was lost by the owner, 2. It was lost by felonious taking.

The felonious taking is not proved in the present case as the private complainant did not complain with police authorities nor file any charges against Mendez (thief) for the alleged felonious taking. The confession executed by Mendez is inadmissible as evidence against the accused for such confession was uncounselled (CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BA ITO??) The accused must be acquitted on account that the prosecution did nit proved by evidence that the latter knew of the fact that such properties were stolen. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. People vs Sanidad The accused Sanidad and Manuel were charged with the complex crime of murder and multiple murder. During arraignment, they pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the private complainants proceeded to the town of Langangilang, Abra to attend a drinking spree with some local residents, and upon arriving, the group started the drinking spree together with the accused Sanidad and Manuel; such lasted up to the wee hours of the morning; that one of the private complainants, Tugadi, personally know the accused Sanidad as they were regular drinking buddies and consequently both members of CAFGU; 2. That around 4 in the morning of the next day, the group headed home riding a jeep driven by the complainant Tadeo; that upon passing through a thick plantation, the private complainants saw a few meters away the accused Sanidad and Manuel, together with (2) John Doe’s, carrying high powered firearms (armalite, .45 pistols, shotguns) beside a mango tree about (15) meters away; 3. That the accused indiscriminately fired upon the private complainants without any distinction, showering the jeepney with bullets, while the driver attempted to drive away from point blank; 4. That when the jeepney finally stalled, the private complainants alighted from the battered vehicle; that one of the complainants, Tugadi, tried to drag his wounded brother away from gunfire, but to no avail as the latter was already dead; 5. That the wounded complainants, including Tugadi, sought refuge from a nearby bushy area around (15) meters away from the jeepney, when the jeepney ignited into flames, bathing the immediate area with light; that while watching afar, the complainants managed to get a good look at the faces of the accused. 6. That upon seeing reaching the burning vehicle, the accused Sanidad averred “my gosh, we didn’t manage to kill them all”; that the complainants only surfaced when the police arrived at the scene.

During trial, the accused invoked the defense of alibi, raising the impossibility of their physical presence in the crime scene during the ordeal. The defense also raised that the doubtful identification of the complainants, as the plantation is not well lit. It submitted that the unexplained lapse of time between its commission and the reporting of such by the complainants with the police constitutes reasonable doubt. The trial court held the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder. WON the accused are guilty of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder. (1.) Yes, they are guilty of the charge. Under article 48 of the RPC, it provides that complex crimes are when “a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, OR when an offense is a necessary means to commit another crime, the penalty for the most serious felony shall be imposed. In complex crimes, although two or more crimes are committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offenders.

In the present case, it is shown that the accused had the collective criminal intention to kill the group, without any distinction nor discrimination from each one of them. Conspiracy is present in the case of the accused, such that their acts, although may be seen as to constitute separate offenses, shall be treated as one offense on account that the purpose of which is to exterminate the group, as buttressed by the statement of Sanidad after the shooting; “MY GOSH, WE DIDN’T KILL THEM ALL”. (2.) It is not uncommon for the complaining parties to cause some delay in reporting a criminal incident. Such delay may be justified by some kind of traumatic effect upon the latter for having been not merely witnesses to the heinous crime, but were actually the intended victims thereof.

People vs Delo Santos The accused was charged with the crimes of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder, and multiple attempted murder. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to all charges. During trial, the prosecution, together with the testimonies of all its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That around 2am, a group of police trainees of the Special Counter Insurgency Operations Unit of the PNP were conducting the last phase of their training, which is a (35)km endurance run; a. the group all wearing black t shirts, black shorts and black & green combat boots, b.they were divided in 3 columns, each having 21 trainees forming a straight line, c. that the group was traversing through the right lane of the road d. that the weather prevailing was overcast and some presence of scattered rainshowers. 2.That the two security guards assigned at the end of each column all of the sudden noticed a vehicle approaching at high speed; that the guards signaled to the vehicle to take the left lane, but to no avail; 3. That the accused De Lo Santos, driving an Isuzu Elf Truck, ran over the police trainees starting from the back lane all throughout the columns, killing several, and wounding others; some with serious injuries while the others with less serious ones; 4. That after the ordeal, the accused surrendered to the Governor of CDO. The defense raised the following defenses, to wit; a. that the accused who is a part of a band was asked by a band member to provide a means of transportation for the band to attend a San Miguel sponsored “Sabado Nights”, b. that the group, before leaving CDO onwards Bukidnon for the event, stopped by a local restaurant where the accused had drank (3) bottled of pale pilsner; that the group went on their way around 12am, c. that the road conditions were unfavorable, the sky being overcastted and the roads slippery, d. that around 4am, the accused was blinded by the lights of an oncoming car traversing southbound, when the accused and the group heard bumping thuds; that the accused did not manage to cause the car to slow down on account of the momentum and adrenaline rush that he felt; e. that the accused only pulled over at the next corner which is relatively distant from the scene, went out to inspect the car and discovered the same to be damaged (windshield cracked, bumpers damaged reaching the radiator) f. that the accused proceeded home due to fear, and surrendered himself upon hearing on the news about the accident where police trainees were rammed to death. The trial court ruled to convict the accused for the complex crime of multiple consummated, frustrated and attempted murder, qualified by the use of vehicle. The trial court found that the accused, in the spirit of dare devilness and mischief, merely wanted to scare of the guards of the police trainees.

It further held that the malice of the accused is illustrated by the fact that he did not stop the vehicle upon hearing the thudding sounds and the absence of any tiremarks which would show an intention to stop. The OSG inferred that the evil motive can be gleaned by the fact of alcohol consumption before the felony’s commission. WON the accused is guilty of the complex crime of consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. (1.) No, the accused is merely guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and serious and less serious physical injuries. The SC considered the following circumstances to conclude negligence; 1. the police trainees were wearing black, 2. The testimony of a Pag – Asa employee regarding the existence of foul weather during the night of the incident, 3. That the accused was driving on the right side of the road, 4. The prosecution’s failure to rebut with evidence that the accused was momentarily blinded by the lights of the oncoming vehicle. The trial court’s finding of malice on account of the fact that the accused did not stop the vehicle may be justifies by the following explanations. 1.The size and momentum of large vehicle would make it harder to stop, 2. The fact that the road was slightly inclined, which would explain the acceleration despite the ramming, 3. The underchassis of the vehicle is wide and elevated (2 persons on top of each other would fit) which would explain the accused’s continued driving as there were no vehicle destabilization, 4. The police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the car, thereby causing less resistance upon impact (movement constituted a force parallel to the truck’s momentum) It is a rule that if the evidence presented is capable of (2) explanations, the one which is congruent to the innocence of the accused must be adopted, in line with the presumption of the accused’s innocence. (2.) Under Art 48 of the RPC, when a single act constitutes bring rise to two or more grave or less grave offense, the penalty for the most serious crime must be meted out. Considering that the incident was not a product of malice, but one of a single act of negligence, the accused must be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, serious and less physical injuries. Slight physical injuries ARE NOT COVERED BY ART 48. In the present case, the cases for less serious physical injuries must have been filed separately. HOWEVER, the accused failed to object to such charges before arraignment, hence HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST SUCH PROCEDURALY INFIRM FILING.

People vs Reodica The accused Reodica was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injuries. During arraignment, the latter pleaded not guilty thereto. During trial, the prosecution, together with its witnesses, alleged the following facts, to wit; 1. That the private complainant Bonsol, driving his Toyota Corolla, was driving along Dona Soledad Ave., Paranaque, when the accused Reodica, driving a van, collided with the complainant’s vehicle due to reckless imprudence, 2. That the collision caused damage to the vehicle of the complainant, as well as bodily injuries upon the person of the complainant which requires medical attention for less that (9) days.

The trial court convicted the accused of the charge and sentenced her to suffer Arresto Mayor in its Maximum Period of (6) months imprisonment with a Php 13,000 fine to defray medical and repair expenses, or otherwise subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The petitioner then sought an appeal with the CA. An attempt to withdraw the petition was made for purposes of availing probation, but was denied by the CA. The CA, after deliberation, ruled to affirm the trial court decision, hence the present recourse of the petitioner with the SC. The petitioner argued that the felony of slight physical injuries and damage to property are both light offenses which cannot be complexed under Art. 48 of the RPC, hence the two offenses must be adduced in (2) separate informations. The petitioner also argued that the action has already prescribed, and that the trial court meted an excessive penalty beyond what the law provides, as illustrated in a similar case of People vs Aguilar, where the court held that slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence is punished by Arresto Menor, not Arresto Mayor. WON the penalty of Arresto Mayor is proper in the present case. (1.) No, the penalty meted is not proper. Under Art. 48 of the RTP, when a felony constitutes//results to two or more grave or less grave felonies, the crime may be complexed. In the present case, however, the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is considered as a light offense, while the reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is a less grave offense.

Following Art 48 and the ruling in the case of People vs Turla, if in a commission of a grave offense arises another felony which is considered as a light offense, such offenses cannot be complexed (vice versa). As a rule, the crimes which may be complexed are grave and less grave felonies, and it cannot be complexed if one of the felonies committed in pursuance of the principal felony is a slight offense. Under such circumstances, the grave// less grave felony and the light felony must be adduced in separate informations. (2.) The accused however cannot contest the infirmity in the allegations in the complaint, as he failed to raise such defect before arraignment. HOWEVER, CASE MUST BE DISMISED ON ACCOUNT THAT THE RTC WHICH HEARED THE CASE DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CASES UNDER BP 129. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries – censure// Reckless imprudence resulting to Damage to Property - Arresto Menor. MTC jurisdiction is for criminal offenses which imposes a penalty of less than (4) years and (2) months. Ponce Enrile vs Salazar The accused Ponce Enrile, together with co accused spouses Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and frustrated murder committed during the failed coup attempt in the late portions of the year 1990. The information was filed by the panel of prosecutors of the DOJ with the sala of herein respondent Judge Salazar. The warrant was issued only a few hours from the filing thereof, with the NBI, headed by Alfredo Lim, conducting the arrest. The petitioner was put to the custody of Brig. General Edgar Dula Torres. Neither the warrant of arrest nor the information recommended an amount for bail, hence the petitioner filed the present petition for the grant of a writ of Habeas Corpus. He alleged in the petition that there rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, as the commission thereof. WON the petitioner is entitled to bail. (1.) Yes, the petitioner is entitled to bail. The Hernandez ruling applies in the present case. Rebellion cannot be complexed with murder or frustrated murder on account that murder in its consummated, attempted or frustrated stage is a necessary ingredient o a natural resultative effect of rebellion. (2.) Art. 48 cannot apply in the present case. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. (3.) The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed

Deutchbank vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue The petitioner Bank withheld and remitted to the BIR a certain amount representing the BRANCH PROFIT REMMITANCE TAX (BPRT) of (15%) earned by its REGULAR BANKING UNIT (RBU) However, it filed a petition with the CIR for a tax refund/credit, believing that it made overpayments. It contended that it overpaid on account of the RP – Germany tax treaty which provided (10%), not (15%). The CIR however denied the prayer for refund, contending that it failed to file an application for tax reduction with the (ITAD) International Tax Affairs Division. When the petitioner filed an appeal with the CTA, the CTA sustained the CIR on account of the failure of the petitioner to apply for the tax treaty entitlement within the reglementary period of 15 days (for tax treary relief) under RMO 1-2000 (Revenue Memorandum). CTA ruled that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign entity, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove that such entitlement indeed apply to the corporation. The said ruling is consistent with the similar case of MIRANT. The petitioner then appealed with the SC. WON the failure of foreign corporations to abide by RMO 1-2000 will deprive them of a benefit under a tax treaty. (1.) No, the foreign corporations may still avail of the tax treaty benefits. The constitution adheres to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, that contracting states must exercise good faith in all treaty obligations it entered into. Contracting states must create legislations to further give effect to its treaty obligations, instead of defeating its application. The BIR must not impose additional requirements which defeats the intention of the treaty. (2.) In the present case, the RP – Germany Tax Treaty does not impose any pre requisite for the availment of the tax benefit. Also under RMO 1-2000, there is not express stipulation which provides that failure to comply with the 15 day filing period will deprive the foreign corporation its tax benefits. (3.) The case of MIRANT does not constitute rex judicata in the present case on account that it was merely adduced in a minute decision.

Section 28(A)(5), NIRC (Income Tax Rates on Foreign Corporations) -

any profit remitted to its head office shall be subject to a tax of 15% based on the total profits applied for remittance without any deduction of the tax component. (Except PEZA registered Foreign Corporations)