Criminal Law 1 Case Digests

July 22, 2017 | Author: Iñigo Mathay Rojas | Category: Mens Rea, Murder, Crime & Justice, Crimes, Criminal Law
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One *= One Case CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS August 26- General Principles of Criminal Liability Outline: A. Definition of Felony- Art. 3 B. Elements of Criminal Liability 1. Physical element (Actus reus) a. Act b. Omission** 2. Mental element (Mens rea) a. Deliberate intent (Dolo) i. Elements ii. General and Specific Intent* iii. Mistake of Fact** iv. Malum prohibitum- exception to mens rea** v. Distinguished from motive b. Constructive intent (Culpa) - Art. 365 i. Elements ii. Imprudence or lack of skill iii. Negligence or Lack of Foresight* c. Transferred Intent - Art. 4 Par. 1 i. Aberration ictus* ii. Error in personae iii. Praeter intentionem- Art. 13 Par.3* 3. Concurrence 4. Resulting harm 5. Causation* C. Liability for incomplete elements 1. Impossible crime- Art. 4 Par. 2** 2. Uncompleted crimes a. Attempted and frustrated felonies, in general- Arts. 6 and 7* b. Examples of Specific Felonies i. Physical Injuries (Art. 236-266), Homicide (Art. 249), Murder (Art. 248) **** ii. Theft** iii. Robbery (Art. 293)* iv. Illegal Trespass (Arts. 280-281)* v. Rape (Art. 266-A) * D. Liability for multiple, complex and continuing crimes - Arts. 9 and 48***

Omission *The omission must be punishable by law

*This omission is not punishable by law People v. Sylvestre and Atienza (1931) Villa-Real, J. RIA No, 35748 Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza Summary of Proceedings: Court of First Instance of Bulacan - both convicted of arson, with Atienza as principal, and Silvestre as accomplice Supreme Court - Judgment against Atienza affirmed; against Silvestre, reversed, with only one half of costs. Facts: On May 16, 1930, a complaint for adultery was filed against defendants Atienza and Silvestre by Silvestre‟s husband, Domingo Joaquin. The defendants voluntarily signed a promise that they would discontinue cohabitation, and they would leave the barrio of Masocol; thus, charges were dismissed. On November 23, 1930, Silvestre met her son, Nicolas de la Cruz in barrio Santo Nino, and with the pretext of asking for nipa leaves, went to his house in barrio Masocol, and remained there. Atienza followed her soon after. On the night of November 25, 1930, Atienza told de la Cruz and his wife Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to burn it, as revenge to the people of Masocol. Atienza was armed with a pistol, so no one dared say anything to him, not even SIlvestre. de la Cruz and his wife left to inform the barrio lieutenant, but shortly after they left, Atienza set the house on fire, forcing them to go back. The fire destroyed about 48 houses. Issue: 1. WON the lower court erred in convicting Silvestre as an accomplice - YES Ratio: 1. An accomplice is one who does not take a direct part in the commission of a wrongful act, but cooperates in its execution by previous or simultaneous actions. Silvestre‟s silence and inaction does not reach a certain degree of complicity in the commission of the crime to be penalized, as there is no evidence that she encouraged or nerved Atienza to burn the house, nor is there evidence that she morally, or materially cooperated with him. In contrast, Atienza set fire to the house without knowing if there are people inside the other houses. So even if the house he set fire to was vacant, he committed the crime of arson as per Art. 550 (2) of the RPC Held: Affirmed with reference to Atienza; reversed for Silvestre, with one half of the costs de oficio. *This omission is punishable by law (Art. 19, par 3, RPC) People v. Talingdan (1978) RIA No. L-32126 Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra

People of the Philippines v. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides, and Teresa Domogma Summary of Proceedings: Court of First Instance of Abra - all accused guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment Supreme Court - Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides sentenced to death, Domogma sentenced to 5-8 years plus costs. Facts: On June 24, 1967, Bernardo Bagabag was shot in his house in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra. One of the accused, Teresa Domogma, is Bernardo's supposed wife. She has been having an affair with her co-accused, Nemesio Talingdan, to the point that Teresa was gone for more than three weeks with Talingdan. Two days before Bernardo was killed, he and Teresa had a violent quarrel, and he slapped Teresa several times, prompting her to call the police. Talingdan, who is a policeman, arrived, and asked Bernardo to come down. When the latter did not come down, the former warned Bernardo that he will kill him. The next morning, Corazon, Bernardo and Teresa's daughter, saw Talingdan, Teresa, and their other co-accused in a hut, and she overheard one of them say 'Could he elude a bullet'. When Teresa saw Corazon, she shoved her away and told her to tell her father that they will kill him. Around sunset the next day, Corazon saw all of the accused 3-4 meters from the batalan, conversing in subdued tones. They were carrying long guns. A few minutes later, she called her parents to supper, but they did not come. After eating, she called her parents again, and when her father came up, she informed him of the people downstairs. Bernardo sat near the door, and suddenly, he was fired upon from below the stairs of the batalan. The four male appellants then climbed the stairs, and Tobias fired at Bernardo, seeing he was still alive. Bides saw Corazon, and warned her not to call for help, or he will kill her. A few minutes after, Teresa came out of her room, and told Corazon not to say anything to anyone, or she will be killed. Teresa, on the other hand, gave an opposite account, saying that she loved her husband very much, she only knows Talingdan as a policeman, she never left the home for long periods of time, and her mother-in-law disliked her because she could not get Bernardo's earnings. Later, when police questioned her, she said that she did not have any suspects in mind. The other accused said that they were in other places when the crime was committed. Issue: 1. WON the appellants are guilty of the crime they are accused of. - Yes and things. Ratio: 1. The Court fully believes the testimony of Corazon, with the exception of Teresa telling her that she will kill her father, because of Corazon's failure to relay the message to her father.

The male accused are guilty of murder qualified by treachery. There was evident premeditation, and conspiracy. 2. There was nothing inherently unnatural in Corazon's testimony, as she is in a stage when she is little influenced by the suggestion of others, lying is distasteful to her, and she would never lose an opportunity to be right in what she affirms. She also has no motive to makeup her account of her father's shooting. 3. The accused failed to present vital witnesses that they mentioned in their respective account, such as Mrs. Bayongan, with whom Tobias, Berras and Bides supposedly stayed during the murder, and Mayor Banawa, with whom Talingdan was supposedly with. 4. Teresa is at the very least an accessory to the crime, because although she did not directly participate in the conspiracy to kill her husband, her claim that she did not have suspects in mind constitutes 'concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime.' Held: Death sentence for the male accused, and five years of prision correcional to eight years of prision mayor with accessory penalties for Teresa Domogma. General and Specific Intent *Accused do not have specific intent for crimes they are accused with People v. Puno (1993) Regalado, J. RIA GR No. 97471 Appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias 'Beloy,' and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias 'Enry' Summary of Proceedings: Regional Trial Court of Quezon City - Guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway Supreme Court - Guilty of robbery Facts: On January 13, 1988, Mrs. Ma. Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento was fetched by the accused Puno from her bakery, because, according to Puno, her usual driver had to attend to an emergency in Pampanga. On the way to their home in Valle Verde, Enrique Amurao was let in on a corner of Araneta Avenue and pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento. Puno asked for all of Sarmiento's money in her bag, which amounted to 7000 Php. Along the way, the two accused told her that they wanted 100 000 Php more. Sarmiento agreed, but asked to be dropped off at a gas station in Makati where the money is. While traversing the North superhighway, Puno asked Sarmiento to issue a check for 100 000 Php. Sarmiento obliged, and wrote three checks.

At one point of the journey, Sarmiento stated that she jumped out of the car and hitchhiked in a fish vendor's van to Balintawak, where she reported the matter to CAPCOM. Both accused were arrested the day after, trying to encash one of the checks in Makati, and charged with kidnapping for ransom. They were found guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway (PD 532) by the QC RTC. However, according to the accused Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion road and let Sarmiento step out of the car. He said he needed the money to cure his ulcers. Issue: 1. WON the accused committed kidnapping for ransom under article 267 of the RPC - No 2. WON the accused committed a violation of PD 532- No 3. WON the accused committed the offense of simple robbery - Yes Ratio: 1. The accused did not commit kidnapping for ransom because there is no 'indubitable proof' that they have motive and specific intent of depriving the complainant of her personal liberty. Their only motive, as they have admitted, is to extort money from Sarmiento. 2. The accused did not commit highway robbery/brigandage because their robbery was perpetrated against a predetermined or particular victim. This is in contrast to the definition of highway robbers/brigandage. To consider such an isolated act to be a highway robbery would be 'an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.' Furthermore, the fact that they happened to be traveling on a highway while the robbery is being committed does not make the simple robbery a highway robbery. The intent of the law should not be subordinated to its literal interpretation. 3. The accused are guilty of robbery as defined in Art. 293 of the RPC, as they have acted with conspiracy, as shown by their 'unity of thought and community of purpose.' They can also be convicted of robbery despite the charge against them being kidnapping for ransom, because robbery is necessarily included in kidnapping for random. The negation of the charge of kidnapping for ransom cannot similarly negate the elements of robbery present. Held: Accused are convicted of robbery, imposing on each of them 4 yrs. and 2 mos. of prision correciona to 10 yrs. of prision mayor, in addition to damages paid jointly and severally to Sarmiento. (7k actual, 20k moral)

Mistake of Fact U.S. v. Ah Chong (1910) Carson, J. JONI US (plaintiff-appellee) vs Ah Chong (defendant-appellant) APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

Summary of Proceedings: Trial court- charged with assassination and found guilty of simple homicide Pascual: August 14 1908, 10pm: defendant was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of his room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, “who is there?” Fearing that the intruder was a robber/thief, he leapt to his feet and called out “if you enter the room, I will kill you.” At that moment, he was struck by the chair which had been placed against the door. He seized a kitchen knife from under his pillow (which he kept for personal protection) and struck out at the intruder who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual. Issue: WON one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of mistake of fact, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide if the actor had known the true state of facts at the time when he committed the act- NO Ratio: There is no criminal liability under such circumstances, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In view of all the facts as they appeared to the defendant, he acted in good faith, without malice/criminal intent, in the belief that he was exercising his right of self-defense. Held: Judgment reversed. Defendant acquitted. People v. Oanis (1943) Moran, J. JONI People of the Philippines (plaintiff-appellee) vs Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta (defendants-appellants) APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Summary of Proceedings: Court of First Instance- defendants charged with murder of Serapio Tecson and found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence Facts: December 24 1938, afternoon: Appellants Corporal Alberto Galanta and Chief of Police/Provincial Inspector Oanis were instructed to arrest escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, appellants went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously or successively fired at him without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. Issue: WON appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties and therefore do not incur criminal liability- NO

Ratio: Appellants cannot claim mistake of fact because they had found no circumstances which would press them to immediate action. Further, they are not justified in using unnecessary force when the arrest could be effected otherwise. Where an unlawful fact is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim is not reckless imprudence. Held: Judgment modified. Appellants found guilty of murder (with the qualifying circumstance of treachery) and mitigating circumstance consisting of the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in Art. 11, No. 5 of RPC. The appellants had acted in the performance of a duty, but the injury committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Malum Prohibitum-Exception to Mens Rea Padilla v. Dizon (1988) Per Curiam JM Administrative Complaint Alexander Padilla vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon FACTS: The respondent judge‟s decision to acquit the defendant in the case of “People vs. Lo Chi Fai” where the defendant was accused of smuggling foreign currency out of the country is the issue in this complaint. After rendering his decision, this administrative complaint was then filed against him, accusing the judge of rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due to, at the very least, gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. The facts of “Lo Chi Fai” are as follows. Lo Chi Fai, a tourist, was caught by a customs guard at the Manila International Airport carrying various foreign currencies and foreign instruments, 380 pieces, that together totalled US$ 355,349.57. This is in violation of Sec. 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank, which provides: Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the mails or through international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

At the time of defendant‟s apprehension, he only had two currency declarations which were far below what was needed to account for the rest of his foreign currency. At the trial he put forth a fanciful story about how he had been collecting investments from various business partners to establish a business in the Philippines, but they had recently decided that with the unrest going on in the country owing to the recent transition in administration, investing in the Philippines was unwise, and so they had decided to pull out their funds. ISSUE: 1. Is mens rea or malice required in offenses that are punished by special laws, and thus are mala prohibita? NO 2. Did the respondent commit his erroneous ruling in good faith? NO RATIO:

1. In crimes that are punished by special laws and are mala prohibita, mens rea, also known as malice or deliberate intent, is not necessary for conviction. The mere act of violation of the special law is enough to convict the violator. Good faith is not a viable defense against crimes mala prohibita. 2. The problem with Lo Chi Fai‟s story is that the SC felt it was too full of holes and was far from plausible, and they proceeded to expose its various inconsistencies and incredulous portions. And yet the respondent judge bought it “hook, line, and sinker,” in the words of the SC. Beyond this however, the insistence of the respondent to require proof of mens rea shows his lack of knowledge regarding crimes mala prohibita, which he as a judge should have been fully aware of. He in fact even gave back the sum of $3000 to Lo Chi Fai despite it not being required anywhere in law. And so the SC wrote: “These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.” HELD: The respondent judge was ordered DISMISSED from the service. Magno v. CA (1992) Paras, J.JONI APPEAL BY CERTIORARI to review decision of Court of Appeals Magno (petitioner) vs. Court of Appeals (respondent) Summary of Proceedings: Regional Trial Court of QC- accused petitioner found guilty of four counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 Court of Appeals- affirmed in toto RTC‟s decision Facts: -Lacking funds to purchase equipment to put up his car repair shop, petitioner Oriel Magno approached Corazon Teng, VP of Mancor Industries (Mancor) which was a distributor of his needed car repair service equipment. - Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance) and advised its VP, Joey Gomez, that Mancor could supply the necessary pieces of equipment if LS Finance could provide petitioner with credit facilities. - Petitioner entered into an agreement with LS finance whereby (a) petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit (Php29, 790) which shall be refunded to the lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of lease (b) LS finance would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same - Prior to entering the agreement, petitioner requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the warranty deposit. Unknown to petitioner, it was Teng who advanced the deposit in question on the condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan with interest. - Petitioner issued six postdated checks as payment for the loan (on the warranty deposit). 2 checks were cleared while 4 were held momentarily by Teng on the request that they were not covered with sufficient funds.

- Petitioner subsequently could not pay LS Finance for its monthly rentals and it was then he became aware that it was Teng who advanced the warranty deposit. - Teng was approached by petitioner who promised to pay but the payment never came and she deposited the checks which were returned for the reason „account closed‟ Issues: 1. WON petitioner is guilty of violating the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22)- NO 2. WON post-dated checks were issued “to apply on account or for value” as required by Sec. 1 of BP Blg. 22- NO Ratio: 1. The warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner since the “cash out” made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner. The “warranty deposit” remained with LS Finance and was not withdrawn by petitioner as it was not his own account. 2. The four checks were issued to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual “account or credit for value”. The charged violation‟s requisite of knowledge on the part of the maker of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is absent in the case since petitioner disclosed that he did not have the funds to pay for the warranty deposit. Held: Appealed decision is reversed. Accused-petitioner acquitted. Note: Mere act of issuing a worthless check is a special offense punishable by the AntiBouncing Checks Law and is Malum Prohibitum. In cases of Mala Prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated and proof of criminal intent is not necessary for the conviction of the accused. The acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. Negligence or Lack of Foresight People v. Pugay (1988) Medialdea, J. JM Petition for Review of Decision in RTC FACTS: On or about May 19, 1982, the accused, Pugay and Samson, set fire to the deceased, Miranda, a retardate, at a town fiesta fair in Rosario, Cavite. Gabion, who was sitting in the Ferris Wheel and reading a comic, witnessed the events and his testimony is the main source of the antecedent facts. After midnight, Pugay and his companions including Samson, arrived at the fair and upon seeing Miranda, who was a friend of Pugay‟s, proceeded to engage in poking fun at him and generally horsing around. At some point, Pugay then grabbed a can of gasoline from under the Ferris Wheel, and poured it on Miranda, while Gabion told him to desist. Samson then set Miranda on fire, turning him into a human torch, and he died as a result. Pugay insists that he did not know that the container was full of gasoline, thinking that it instead contained water. ISSUE:

1. Was there premeditation and forethought as well as conspiracy on the part of the accused-appellants, which would constitute murder as opposed to homicide? NO 2. Was there treachery on the part of the accused-appellants? NO RATIO: 1. The accused were held to have acted separately and thus are responsible only for their individual acts, hence the varying degrees of punishment accorded each one. Thus there was no conspiracy on their part. There was no premeditation as well regarding the death of the deceased, as it all seems to have been a spontaneous meeting which led to an interaction that was originally mere fun and games and horsing around, and there was no prior animosity between any of the parties which might have been cause for a planned attack. Homicide is the proper sentence for the crime at bar. 2. No, because “for the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.” The facts do not support the claim that treachery was involved in this crime. HELD: Decision affirmed with the modifications listed below. Pugay‟s sentence reduced from the range of 12 years (prision mayor) to 20 years (reclusion temporal), to the range of 4 months (arresto mayor) to 4 years and 2 months (prision correcional), for the crime of homicide by reckless imprudence as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. From U.S. vs. Maleza: “A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”

Samson‟s sentence reduced from reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) to 8 years (prision mayor) to 14 years (reclusion temporal) for the crime of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave an act (praeter intentionem). Aberration Ictus People v Guillen MIGGY FACTS: Julio Guillen (defendant-appellant) was arrested for having thrown 2 hand grenades, which caused the death of Simeon Varela and serious injuries of 4 other men, during the meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. The said meeting was attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, and other prominent people in government, among others. According to Guillen, he did it voluntarily in order to kill the President whom he finds disappointing for his alleged failure to fulfill the promises made during the presidential elections campaign. ISSUE: WON the act is considered to be (1) homicide through reckless imprudence or (2) murder and multiple frustrated murder

HELD: Murder and multiple frustrated murder. In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Moreover, Guillen was aware that by throwing the grenade, he would endanger not only the President but also those people around him, a decision he thought was justifiable since these people were associated with the President, leading further credence to the fact that the act was voluntary and done with malice. Praeter intentionem - Art. 13 Par. 3 People v. Albuquerque (1933) Avancena, C.J. JM Appeal of Judgment of Homicide FACTS: The accused-appellant is a 55-year-old widower, who is partially paralyzed and lacks control of his right arm and limps with his left leg. He has nine children, most of whom live with one of his daughters, Maria, as well as himself. Pilar, a daughter of his who lives with Maria, had had intimate relations with the deceased, and bore a child by him. When the appellant found out about this, he urged the deceased to marry his daughter and support her and their child. Of note is that the deceased had already agreed to give a monthly amount of money for the child but had so far failed to carry it out. One day, the accused decided to visit the deceased at his place of work and confront him regarding the situation with Pilar and the child. Upon the deceased‟s refusal of the accused‟s proposal that the former marry Pilar, the latter whipped out his penknife and stabbed the former at the base of the neck. The accused however maintains that it was not his intention to kill the deceased, as he only intended to cut his face and leave a scar, something he had threatened to do in his letters to the deceased. He holds that killing the deceased would have served him no purpose as he had in fact wanted him to marry his daughter and look after their child together. The reason given for the error in the blow stricken is the lack of control in the accused‟s arm owing to his paralysis. ISSUE: 1. WON the accused acted in self-defense. NO RATIO: 1. As the appellant was the one who first brandished a weapon, the penknife, and proceeded to attack, he cannot claim self-defense. However, praeter intentionem may be used as a mitigating circumstance owing to lack of intent to kill. HELD: Decision affirmed, with modifications due to the three mitigating circumstances present, which are 1) lack of intention to cause so grave an injury (praeter intentionem), 2) the appellant‟s voluntary surrender to the authorities, and 3) acting under the influence of passion and obfuscation, as well as there being no aggravating circumstance. Penalty thus

modified from eight years and one day (prision mayor), to indeterminate penalty of 1 year (prision correcional) to 8 years and 1 day (prision mayor), with same costs. Causation Bataclan v. Medina (1957) Montemayor, J. JM Appeal from lower court to CA, but endorsed by CA to SC because of the value involved in the claim FACTS: Shortly after midnight on Sept. 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of Medina Transportation owned by Medina, the owner defendant in the case, and driven by Saylon, its regular chauffeur, was transporting the deceased, Bataclan, along with 17 other passengers including the driver and the conductor, from Amadeo, Cavite to Pasay City. At around 2 in the morning, a front tire burst and the bus zigzagged into a ditch in the area of Imus, Cavite. While the rest of the passengers managed to escape, 4 passengers, Bataclan included, were trapped inside and could not get out. Thirty minutes later, upon cries of help from the passengers, 10 men arrived from the nearby neighborhood, bringing with them a lit torch. Upon approaching the bus, the bus burst into flame, for apparently gasoline had leaked out when the bus had turned turtle, and soaked the bus and the area around it. The 4 passengers trapped inside were burned to death. It was later established that the bus was speeding at the time the tire burst, and besides this that the tires were old and the driver had previously been instructed to replace them but had failed to do so. The lower court only awarded damages against the defendant based on the physical injuries sustained by Bataclan before the bus caught fire, in the belief that the proximate cause of death was not the overturning of the bus but rather the fire that burned the bus. ISSUE: 1. What is the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan and the other trapped passengers? RATIO: 1. The SC cites this passage from American jurisprudence, which states:

“that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”

It was only a natural consequence that in that rural area the people living there would use a torch as a source of light and would innocently approach the overturned bus to see how they could help. The leaking of the gasoline is also a natural result of the overturning of the bus. And so the overturning of the bus, which is due to the negligence of the driver as demonstrated by his speeding and lack of care for the vehicle‟s roadworthy condition with regard to the state of the tires, is still the proximate cause of the deaths of the trapped passengers. In fact, the bus bursting into flame can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier through its agents, the driver and the conductor, to whom it did not occur that gasoline may very well have leaked out of the bus, and so could have warned those bearing the torch not to get too close.

HELD: Affirmed with modifications to the RTC decision from 1000 to 6000 pesos in damages, and from 600 to 800 pesos in attorney‟s fees. Impossible Crime Intod v. CA MIGGY PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner Sulpicio Intod, together with other men, wanted to kill Bernardina Palangpangan due to a land dispute between them. At about 10 o clock in the evening of the same day, he and his men arrived at Palangpangan‟s house, went to the location of the bedroom, and fired at said room. It turned out that Palangpangan was not there at the time. The RTC convicted him of attempted murder and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: WON the crime is attempted murder or an impossible crime RATIO: Impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category; the factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. HELD: PETITION GRANTED; Decision of CA MODIFIED. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months ofarresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs. People v. Saladino JR Appeal to the decision of court of first instance Facts: In the night of June 23, 1948 Corporal Saladino and Private Alejo were sleeping in a house in Paoay, Ilocos Norte together with three policemen of the municipality. They're on patrol duty to apprehend those who fired upon their dwelling on a previous night. They were awakened by cries for help by Felix Pasion saying he was robbed by Luis Bernabe at around midnight. The next morning Saladino and Alejo together with the policemen went to Luis Bernabe's house. They brought the latter to Pasion's house for questioning. Bernabe denied the accusation. Saladino repeatedly boxed and kicked Bernabe in different parts of his body but he continued to deny. Saladino hit Bernabe with a piece of wood and the former called Alejo to take his turn. Alejo reluctantly hit Bernabe four times and left. Saladino continued to question and beat Bernabe. Saladino then tied Bernabe's wrists together and made him hang on the ceiling. He continued to hit Bernabe. One of the

policemen told Saladino to stop and just bring Bernabe to their HQ to continue their investigation. Saladino refused and continued beating Bernabe. Bernabe was untied and was made to sit on a chair. He continued to deny so Saladino kicked the chair causing the former to fall on the floor. Saladino kicked Bernabe until the latter remained motionless on the floor. The former stepped on the latter's throat and chest to show that the latter was faking death. Bernabe was left alone for 15 minutes but he didn't move nor breathe. An old man checked Bernabe's pulse and said that the latter was dead. Saladino ordered Alejo to shoot Bernabe's dead body and just say that he ran away. Alejo complied and shot the body four times. Issues: WON Alejo has criminal liability. WON there was due process given to Bernabe. WON there was conspiracy between Saladino and Alejo. Ratio: Bernabe died as a consequence of Saladino's violent mauling. The latter must be declared guilty of assassination. Alejo did not appear to have conspired with Saladino and is not liable for the death of Bernabe but Alejo is guilty as accessory after the fact because by following the orders of Saladino, the former tried to conceal the crime. Held: Saladino was convicted of the murder of Bernabe and given the penalty that will be in accordance with the law. Alejo was declared an accessory after the fact and given a penalty of imprisonment not less than 3 years of prision correctional nor more than 6 years and 2 months of prision mayor. Attempted and frustrated felonies in general- Arts.6 and 7 U.S. v. Eduave MIGGY FACTS: Protasio Eduave struck a girl toward a vital part of the body; thinking that he had killed the girl, he threw the body into the bushes ISSUE: WON the crime is murder or homicide , and whether it is attempted or frustrated RATIO: Article 3, Penal Code (Article 6 Revised Penal Code): A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. HELD: The crime was frustrated murder. The defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender.

MODIFIED. AFFIRMED WITH COSTS (thirteen years of cadena temporal)

Physical Injuries (Art.263-266), Homicide (Art.249), Murder (Art.248) People v. Borinaga JR Appeal to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the conviction of Borinaga for his crime of frustrated murder Facts: Prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a resident of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On the morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the contract even if only about twothirds of the fish corral had been finished. Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon at that time. Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him. Lawaan left with his men, and Mooney returned to his shop. On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to the window. Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should be stated that Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again the same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it. Issue: WON the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code Ratio: The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his friends for not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed treacherously toward vital organs of the victim. The means used were entirely suitable for accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be qualified as murder because of the presence of the circumstance of treachery. The essential condition of a frustrated crime is that the actor perform all the acts of execution and attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work

of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. Held: Borinaga was declared guilty of frustrated murder and was sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties and the costs. Dissenting Opinion: J. Villa-real It is the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, after all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence had been performed, that constitutes frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the preventing of the performance of all the acts of execution which constitute the felony, as in the present case. The interference of the frame of the back of the chair which prevented the defendant-appellant from wounding Mooney in the back with a deadly knife, made his acts constitute an attempt to commit murder; for he had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and did not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of a cause or accident other than his own voluntary desistance. People v. Kalalo JR Appeal to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas for the sentence given to the two accounts of murder and one account of frustrated murder Facts: Prior to October 1, 1932, the date of the commission of the three crimes alleged in the three informations which gave rise to the three cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo and Isabela Holgado, the latter being the sister of Arcadio Holgado and a cousin Marcelino Panaligan, had a litigation over a parcel of land. On September 28, 1931, and again on December 8th of the same year, Marcelo Kalalo filed a complaint against the said woman in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. His first complaint was dismissed on December 7, 1931, and his second complaint was likewise dismissed on February 5, 1932. Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in question during the agricultural years 1931 and 1932, but when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted. On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, decided to order the aforesaid land plowed. Arcadio Holgado and some laborers went to the said land early that day, but Marcelo Kalalo, who had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by his brothers Felipe and Juan Kalalo, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro Garcia, who were later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively, of the first three. The first five were all armed with bolos. Once they arrived, they ordered those who were plowing the land to stop. Isabela Holgado, Maria Gutierrez and Hilarion Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Marcelino Panaligan, cousin of said Isabela and Arcadio, arrived. Marcelino Panaligan ordered Arcadio and the other laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue the work already began. At this juncture, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio, while the appellants

Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn, approached Marcelino Panaligan. At a remark from Fausta Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with their bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing Arcadio Holgado, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino Panaligan. Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received by them. After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo took from its holster on the belt of Panaligans' body, the revolver which the deceased carried, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene in order to save his own life. Issue: WON the sentences of the Court of First Instance are in accordance with law. Ratio: For case nos. 6858 and 6859: An abuse of superior power constitutes to murder. The deceased were armed with a bolo and a revolver resulting to a balance of power between the two parties. The gun can be considered as effective as three bolos. Due to the circumstances given, there could be no abuse of superior power. For case no. 6860: There was intent to kill Hilarion Holgado because Marcelo Kalalo tried to shoot the former four times but failed by causes independent from his will. This constituted to an attempted homicide. Held: In case No. 6858, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellants is homicide and they hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings of both instances; and by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the said penalty of reclusion temporal is hereby fixed at nine years. In case No. 6859, the court likewise finds that the crime committed by the appellants is homicide, and they are hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Arcadio Holgado in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances; and in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the penalty of reclusion temporal herein imposed upon them is hereby fixed at nine years. In case No. 6860, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellant Marcelo Kalalo is attempted homicide, and he is hereby sentenced to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, it being understood that by virtue of the provisions of said Act No. 4103, the minimum of this penalty is six months, and he is furthermore sentenced to pay the costs of the appeal in this case. People v. Trinidad JR *Not enough proof of intent to kill for homicide Mondragon v. People (1966) Zaldivar, J. RIA No. L-17666 Petition for review by certiorari

Isidoro Mondragon v. The People of the Philippines Summary of Proceedings: Court of First Instance of Iloilo - Guilty of attempted homicide Court of Appeals - affirmed Supreme Court - modified to less serious physical injuries Facts: On July 11, 1954, complainant Serapio Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, when petitioner Mondragon told him, 'Don't you dare open the dike.' Nacionales told Mondragon that he needed to open the dike because he had to plant the next morning, but Mondragon tried to hit him. When Nacionales dodged the blow, Mondragon drew his bolo and hit Nacionales in several parts of his body. The complainant hacked Mondragon with his bolo in self-defense, after which, Mondragon backed down. The complainant had a medical exam the following day, and the government medical officer certified that his wounds would heal in less than 30 days. During his trial, Mondragon admitted that he would do everything to stop Nacionales from opening the dike. From this admission, the Court of Appeals held the Court of First Instance's conviction of attempted homicide. Issue: 1. WON the petitioner should be convicted with less serious physical injuries, instead of attempted homicide. - YES Ratio: 1. The intention of the petitioner to kill was not conclusively shown, as intent to kill must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Firstly, it was not manifest in the fight between the petitioner and the complainant, as the petitioner backed away when the complainant struck him with a bolo. Secondly, his statement that 'he will do everything' to stop Nacionales from opening the dike was made almost five years after the incident. Such statement should be considered as an opinion at most, in addition to the fact that the phrase 'will do everything' has a broad meaning. Lastly, intent to kill duly established, as the injuries inflicted by the petitioner were not necessarily fatal; in fact, they could be healed in less than 30 days. Held: Mondragon is convicted with the crime of less serious physical injuries, with the penalty of 3 mos. and 15 days of arresto mayor, with costs. Theft U.S.v. Adiao ONG No. 13785 October 8, 1918 United States, plaintiff and appellee v Tomas Adiao, defendant and appellant

Petition for review of Certiorari Summary of Proceedings: Municipal Court of Manila- charged with theft but convicted of frustrated theft Court of First Instance of Manila (V. del Rosario J.)- reaffirmed the decision on frustrated theft Facts: Tomas Adiao, customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt, valued at 80 cents, from the baggage of the Japanese named T. Murakami. He then hid the stolen belt in his desk in the Custom House which was later found out by other employees. He was then charged with theft in the Municipal Court however he was only convicted of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He later on appealed to the Court of First Instance which upheld the conviction. His penalties were fine of P100.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to shoulder the costs. Issue: 1. Was the crime properly classified as frustrated theft or consummated theft? Ratio: 1. Consummated theft- offender accomplished all acts of execution necessary for completion of crime. The fact that defendant was under observation and was unable to get the belt out of the Custom house is irrelevant. All the elements of the crime were accomplished. Decision: Reversed and defendant sentenced to 3 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and ordered to pay all costs. People v. Dino RAYMOND Robbery-Art. 293 People v. Dio RAYMOND The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Hernando Dio, accused-appellant Summary of Proceedings: The trial court convicted Dio of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to the death penalty. Supreme Court - Modified judgement to guilty of attempted robbery with homicide and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Crispulo Alega in the amount of P30,000 and to pay one-half the costs. Facts: Crispulo Alega, civil engineer, met his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti, at Pasay City Public Market. There, respondent Dio and Danilo Tobias conspired with one another to rob Crispulo Alega of his Seiko brand watch. When Mr. Alega resisted, Tobias stabbed him in the left side of his chest eventually killing him. The Seiko watch was still attached to the deceased‟s body.

Ratio: The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated because of the resistance offered by the deceased. There would be no reason for death penalty as there was no attendant aggravating circumstance. Held: Modified judgement to guilty of attempted robbery with homicide and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Crispulo Alega in the amount of P30,000 and to pay one-half the costs. Illlegal trespass Arts. 280-281 People v. Lamahang INIGO The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Aurelio Lamahang, defendant and appellant. Appeal from a judgement of the court of first instance of Iloilo Summary of Proceedings Court of First Instance of Iloilo- Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer 2 years and 4 months prison correccional and additional penalty of 10 years and one day of prison mayor for being an habitual delingquent Supreme Court-Sentenced appealed from is revoked and the accused is held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force Facts: Early dawn of March 2, 1955 policeman Jose Tomambing caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron rod the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had only been able to break one board and unfastening another from the wall well the policeman showed up and arrested him. Issue: The lower court erred in convicting accused of attempted robbery Ratio: In the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence in another person‟s dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession for the purpose of gain some personal property. In the case at bar, there is nothing that proves that robbery may be reasonably inferred. Held: Case does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling under article 280 of the Revised penal Code. Wherefore, the sentence appealed is revoked and accused is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force with aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 3 months and 1 day arresto mayor with the accessory penalties Rape- Art.266-A

People v. Orita (1990) RAYMOND Summary of Proceedings: Regional Trial Court - Convicted of Frustrated Rape. Facts: On March 20, 1983, complainant Cristina S. Abayan went home to her boarding house at 1:30 AM. Defendant Orita, a Philippine Constabulary soldier, surprised her and held a knife to her neck. He took her to a room and with said deadly weapon still present, attempted to rape her. There was partial penetration of the vagina but the hymen was still intact. Abayan was able to escape and made a run for it to the nearest municipality office where policemen were stationed. Issue: 1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of frustrated rape? Ratio: There is no such thing as frustrated rape. The moment he has had carnal knowledge of the women, it is consummated rape. Penetration need not be perfect for there to be rape. “Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. “ Held: Orita is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and must indemnify the victim to the amount of P30,000. Liability for multiple, complex and continuing crimes-Arts. 9 and 48 People v. Hernandez ONG Nos. L-6025-26 July 18, 1956 Motion for bail pending appeal of judgement of Court of First Instance of Manila (Montesa, J.) People of Philippines , plaintiff and appelle v Amado V. Hernandez et al., defendant and appellants Summary of Proceedings: Petition for bail- denied by lower court (not specified?) Facts: Around March 15, 1945, the accused conspired, confederated and cooperated with each other as well as 31 other defendants on the crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons

and robberies. The accused were officers, members or affiliated with the Congress of Labor Organization, formerly known as Committee on Labor Organization, an institution of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Their work also were tied to the Huks (HMB) who have risen publicly with the purpose of removing from territory from the Philippines from the government. They initiate armed raids, sorties and ambushes against police, army and civilian targets. The court viewed such activities (murder, arson, planned destruction of property, pillage, looting, etc.) as necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion. Bail is allowed to be granted to petitioners provided the penalty of their crimes is not capital punishment. In this case however, the penalty is dependent on the crime to be classified to which the end penalty would either be prision mayor or capital punishment. Issue: 1. Should the crime be classified as simple rebellion in which all other acts such as murder, arson etc. be lumped together as ingredients of rebellion or should it be a complex crime with factors including murder, arson etc.? 2. Does rebellion with components of murder, arson etc. classify as complex crime or simple crime?- No Ratio: 1. Court ruled that murder, arson etc. are necessary ingredients to initiate rebellion thus classification of simple rebellion due to past jurisprudence where offenders have been classified to commit crime of simple rebellion despite killing individuals. 2. Murder and all the other crimes committed are classified as components and necessary to institute a rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC. Article 135 lists down 5 classes of acts that constitute only one offense which are subject to one penalty only (prision mayor and fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos). 3. Rebellion is classified as a political crime and actions done under the motive of rebellion such as murder and arson by Hernandez et al. was political in nature in order to further their rebellion. The decisive factor is the intent. Common crimes can be committed to achieve a political purpose, making them political crimes. 4. Bail cannot be denied because lower court sentenced Hernandez to life imprisonment and not capital punishment so he has right to seek bail. Appeal by opposition to motion do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete positive act of accused showing that his provincial release during pendency of appeal would jeopardize the security of the State. Decision: Bail petition granted at the sum of P30,000.00 Dissenting Opinions: J. Padilla -Granting of bail is discretionary and security of state is at state J. Montemayor -Murder, arson etc. is not necessary or indispensible to consummate rebellion. Art 134 states that rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against government for the purpose or purposes enumerated in the article. -Idea that one crime absorbing a more serious one with a more serious penalty does not appeal to reasonable and logical mind (murder carries penalty up to capital punishment while rebellion‟s penalty is only prision mayor and fine). -Muder and arson etc. were chosen by the petitioners as mode of rebellion and not necessary to commit rebellion. J. Labrado - concur with J. Montemayor that complex crime of rebellion with murder exists under law - concur with J. Padilla that bail is discretionary and can be waived in the interest of the security of the state

Enrile v. Salazar INIGO Petition for Habaes Corpus filed by Enrile alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. FACTS: On Feb 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the Nat'l Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City. The warrant had issued an information signed by a panel of prosecutors charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco & Erlinda Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with the cirme of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from Nov 29 to Dec 10, 1990. Petition for Habaes Corpus filed by Enrile alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether a complex crime is present in this case Ratio: No. There is no complex crime on rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, or other common crimes. Such common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion. Hernandez doctrine prohibits complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Held: Juan Enrile, spouses Panlilio must be charged with simple rebellion only; hence, said petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction People v. Ducay INIGO The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Aurelio Lamahang, defendant and appellant. Appeal from a judgement of the court of first instance of Iloilo Summary of Proceedings Court of First Instance of Iloilo- Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer 2 years and 4 months prision correccional and additional penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual delinquent Supreme Court-Sentenced appealed from is revoked and the accused is held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force Facts: Early dawn of March 2, 1955 policeman Jose Tomambing caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron rod the wall of a store of cheap goods. The accused had only been able to break one board and unfastening another from the wall well the policeman showed up and arrested him. Issue:

The lower court was erred in convicting accused of attempted robbery Ratio: In the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence in another person’s dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession for the purpose of gain some personal property. In the case at bar, there is nothing that proves that robbery may be reasonably inferred. Held: Case does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling under article 280 of the Revised penal Code. Wherefore, the sentence appealed is revoked and accused is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force with aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 3 months and 1 day arresto mayor with the accessory penalties People of the Philippines vs. Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, accused. Santos Ducay, accused-appellant Appeal from the judgement of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela Summary of Proceedings: Regional Trial Court- Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay charged with the complex crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder. Finding Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but acquitting Edgardo on ground of reasonable doubt. Facts: Lina Labos testified that about 5am, of October 12, 1986, she was sleeping in the sala with her husband Manuel when she was awakened by the pounding of the door on first floor. Santos Ducay and Edgard Ducay appeared in the sala. Santos was carrying a long firearm while Edgardo had a caliber .45 pistol. The two started firing at Manuel and then shot Pacita labos her mother in law causing the death of both. The accused also shot her, Ma. Cristina and Edwin Labos, her brother-in-law. She was hit in the stomach and gall bladder while Ma. Cristina was hit in the right leg, left thigh, and abdomen. She was able to identify the 2 accused who are former neighbors. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused given the presented arguments Ratio: The Court never doubts the participation of Santos Ducay not only on the basis of the positive identification made by surviving victims, Lina and Edwin Labos, the motive Santos Ducay had to avenge the assault done on him by Manuel Labos, but also because his positive identification sweeps aside altogether his defense — that of alibi — a very weak defense in the light of the overwhelming evidence against him. Held: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code the challenged judgment of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 is AFFIRMED subject to the modifications herein indicated. Convicted for 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of frustrated murder.

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