Crim1 Compiled Digests

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Art. 2. Applicability of provisions US vs. Bull Facts: H.N. Bull was master of steamship Standard , which transported 677 cattle and carabaos on 2 Dec 1909 without proper means of securing them or bedding, thus, a number were cruelly torn (ropes were tied on nose rings), bruised, and killed. Ship route: Formosa-Phils. Issue: WON Phil. laws apply, as there is no information regarding where this occurred. Held: Yes; this was ongoing as the ship entered the Phil. territory, therefore, Phil. laws apply.

- Feliciano

People vs. Wong Cheng Facts: Wong Cheng smoked opium while aboard merchant vessel Changsa , anchored in Manila Bay 2.5 miles from shore. Issue: WON Philippines has jurisdiction over Merchant ships in its territory? Held: Yes; smoking within territory allows substance to produce pernicious effects, which is against public order. It is also an act of defiance of authority. -Feliciano

US vs. Look Chaw Facts: Mrs. Jacks and Milliron found sacks of contraband substance opium on steamship Errol on Errol on 18 August 1910 in, around 11-12 am. 3 sacks were found containing 49, 80 packs, (4) packs each; total = 129 packs to be sold, 4 for personal consumption. The 129 were supposedly going to be sold in Mexico and Ver a Cruz. Issue: Was Look Chaw accountable, as he didn‘t bring down the opium from the ship and did not intend to sell within Philippines? Held: Yes; investigation showed that he did sell to a secret service agent while in the port.

- Feliciano

US vs. Ah Sing Facts: Ah Sing as onboard steamer Shun Chang  which docked on Cebu from Saigon on 25 April 1917. He had bought 8 cans of opium there, which were found on the ship, hidden in the ashes below the boiler of ship engine. No evidence regarding intent to import was brought to court. Issue: Is he guilty of importing when intent was not so proven? Held: Yes, without reasonable doubt; it‘s illogical that he would transport from Saigon-Manila-Saigon for pleasure, and he could not possibly need as much for just him. -Feliciano US vs. Lol-lo and Saraw Facts: 2 Dutch boats left Matuta on 30 June 1920, headed for Peta. First boat had 1 person aboard and the second had 11 men, women and children. After a few days, at 7pm, the second boat arrived between the isles of Buang and Bukid and was stopped by 6 vintas with 24 men, all armed. They asked for food, took cargo, hurt men, and raped women. Then, 2 women were taken, the rest were put back on boat made to sink. Lol-lo raped one of the women on the way to Maruro, where both women escaped. Issue: Given that piracy is punishable in all jurisdictions, does Art. 153 still apply since is still says ―Spain…‖ instead of ―Philippines…‖ etc?

Held: Yes; all laws still applicable in Philippines until so changed or repealed.

-Feliciano

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Art. 3. Definition of felony US vs. Ah Chong Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in mess hall at Fort McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio) and stayed there at Bldg. 27. One night, he woke up to the sound of someone trying to force his way into the room. There was no way to know who it was as it was dark and the room only had 1 door and 1 window, and vines covered the window; all he could do was ask who it was. He asked twice, and then, when no response came, he threatened the attacker that if he continued, he would be killed. He took a knife which he kept under his pillow because of the robberies occurring recently, and when he was hit on the knee by a chair he uses to keep the door closed, he attacked and killed the man who turned out to be his roommate, Pascal Gualberto. He called for help immediately but it was too late. Issue: Is he liable for the crime? Held: No; it was a mistake of facts. The act would have been lawful if the facts had been as he believed them to be. -Feliciano People vs. Oanis and Galanta Facts: Under instructions to seize Balagtas (escaped convict), the two policemen went to a house where they suspected Balagtas to be hiding. Upon finding a sleeping man inside, they shot him. He turned out to be Tecson, an innocent man. Issue: Are they liable? Held: Yes; unlike in Ah Chong, facts did not show that they tried to ascertain that they had the right man. As they did not exercise due precaution, they were guilty of murder. -Feliciano

Art. 4. Criminal Liability People vs. Iligan Facts: A brawl started and the defendant chases Asis and Lukban with a bolo. Later on, as the two were walking with Esmeraldo Quinones, the 3 reappeared again. Macandog hit Quinones on the face with the bol o as the 2 ran away. a way. It is uncertain whether or not there was truly a vehicle that ran over Quinones. Issue: Who is liable for the death? Held: Iligan is guilty by virtue of their chase being the proximate cause of the death, if indeed a vehicle did run over Quinones. -Feliciano

People vs. Mananquil Facts: At 11pm, 6 March 1965, defendant bought 10c worth of gasoline from Esso gasoline station, put it in a coffee bottle and went to her husband‘s guard post at NAWASA. She poured th e gasoline on him and burned him. He died of pneumonia, a complication caused by the burns (weakened immune system; he caught the pneumonia in the hospital where he was being treated). Issue: Is she liable for the death when all she intended to do was burn him? Held: Yes; the death is a consequence of her act of burning him. -Feliciano

US vs. Brobst Facts: Saldivar had been fired from the mining company he was working for (he was a thief and was not welcome among his colleagues). Brobst had been told not to let him back in. However, Saldivar came in with 3-4 friends, looking for a job, and ignored Brobst‘s orders to leave. Brobst then struck him a blow which caused his own bolo to hit

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Art. 3. Definition of felony US vs. Ah Chong Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in mess hall at Fort McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio) and stayed there at Bldg. 27. One night, he woke up to the sound of someone trying to force his way into the room. There was no way to know who it was as it was dark and the room only had 1 door and 1 window, and vines covered the window; all he could do was ask who it was. He asked twice, and then, when no response came, he threatened the attacker that if he continued, he would be killed. He took a knife which he kept under his pillow because of the robberies occurring recently, and when he was hit on the knee by a chair he uses to keep the door closed, he attacked and killed the man who turned out to be his roommate, Pascal Gualberto. He called for help immediately but it was too late. Issue: Is he liable for the crime? Held: No; it was a mistake of facts. The act would have been lawful if the facts had been as he believed them to be. -Feliciano People vs. Oanis and Galanta Facts: Under instructions to seize Balagtas (escaped convict), the two policemen went to a house where they suspected Balagtas to be hiding. Upon finding a sleeping man inside, they shot him. He turned out to be Tecson, an innocent man. Issue: Are they liable? Held: Yes; unlike in Ah Chong, facts did not show that they tried to ascertain that they had the right man. As they did not exercise due precaution, they were guilty of murder. -Feliciano

Art. 4. Criminal Liability People vs. Iligan Facts: A brawl started and the defendant chases Asis and Lukban with a bolo. Later on, as the two were walking with Esmeraldo Quinones, the 3 reappeared again. Macandog hit Quinones on the face with the bol o as the 2 ran away. a way. It is uncertain whether or not there was truly a vehicle that ran over Quinones. Issue: Who is liable for the death? Held: Iligan is guilty by virtue of their chase being the proximate cause of the death, if indeed a vehicle did run over Quinones. -Feliciano

People vs. Mananquil Facts: At 11pm, 6 March 1965, defendant bought 10c worth of gasoline from Esso gasoline station, put it in a coffee bottle and went to her husband‘s guard post at NAWASA. She poured th e gasoline on him and burned him. He died of pneumonia, a complication caused by the burns (weakened immune system; he caught the pneumonia in the hospital where he was being treated). Issue: Is she liable for the death when all she intended to do was burn him? Held: Yes; the death is a consequence of her act of burning him. -Feliciano

US vs. Brobst Facts: Saldivar had been fired from the mining company he was working for (he was a thief and was not welcome among his colleagues). Brobst had been told not to let him back in. However, Saldivar came in with 3-4 friends, looking for a job, and ignored Brobst‘s orders to leave. Brobst then struck him a blow which caused his own bolo to hit

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him, and Saldivar staggered away to his sister‘s house. He arrived th ere 2 hours later and died on her doorstep. The death was attributed to possible internal bleeding. Issue: Is Brobst liable, given that it wasn‘t his intent to kill Saldivar, and he had a right to expel Saldivar from the property?

Held: Guilty; even thou gh no evidence was provided to ascertain that the ―blow‖ was strong enough to cause death, no evidence was provided to show he intervened to help Saldivar either. -Feliciano Impossible crime People vs. Balmores Facts: Balmores was found guilty of attempted estafa through falsification of a government obligation. He attempted to cash in a sweepstakes ticket that was obviously falsified (the ¼ ticket was split into ⅛, and the winning ticket number written in ink at the bottom left part of the halved ticket). He presented his falsified ticket to a PCSO booth. The PCSO employee manning the booth saw that the ticket was obviously falsified, and had Balmores arrested. Balmores waived the right to counsel, and pleaded g uilty to the crime of attempted estafa. Issue: WON Balmores committed an impossible crime. Held: No; The recklessness and clumsiness of the act of falsification did not make the crime an impossible one under 1 Paragraph 2 Article 4 of the RPC. The alteration of a losing sweepstakes ticket would constitute a crime only if an attempt to cash it were done, which is what occurred in this case. -Adapt Intod vs. CA Facts: Intod and company were tasked to kill P alang-pangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room. However, she was in another city then thus they hit no one. Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder? Held: No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime —an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a cr ime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where: (1) The motive, desire and expectation expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) There is no intention intention to perform perform the physical act; (3) There is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) The consequence resulting resulting from the intended act does does not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been com mitted had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. -Adapt:

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Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the RPC reads: [ Criminal Liability shall be incurred] by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

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Art. 6. Stages of commission US vs. Eduave Facts: The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues there. The accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her a nd with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother‘s querido and was living with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committed Issues: WON the crime murder or homicide if the girl had been killed, WON the stage of commission is attempted or frustrated Held: The crime committed was MURDER; The attack was made treacherously. Qualified by the circumstance of alevosia (Sp. treachery, a-le-vo-SI-a), the accused making a sudden attack upon his victim partly from the rear and dealing her a terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo. The stage of commission is FRUSTRATED; Not attempted murder because defendant PERFORMED ALL OF THE ACTS which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. -Adapt Art. 6: Rape People vs. Orita Facts: Victim: Cristina Abaya, 19 years old, freshman at St. Joseph‘s College in Borongan, Eastern Samar  At around 1:30 am, after attending a party, Abayan came home to her boarding house. As she knocked at the door, Orita suddenly held her and poked a knife at her neck. She pleaded for him to let her go but instead of doing so, Orita dragged her upstairs with him while he had his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand holding and poking the balisong at the victim. At the second floor, he commanded Christina to look for a room. Upon finding a room, Orita held her against the wall while he undressed himself. He then ordered her to undress. As she took off her shirt, he pulled off her bra, pants and panty, and ordered her to lie on the floor. He then mounted her and, pointing the balisong at her neck, ordered he to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. In this position, only a portion of his penis entered her, so he ordered Abayan to go on top of him. With him lying on his back and Abayan mounting him, still, he did not achieve full penetration and only part of his penis was inserted in the vagina. At this instance, Abayan got the opportunity to escape Orita because he had both his hands and the knife on th e floor. Abayan, still naked, was chased from room to room with Orita climbing over the partitions. Abayan, frantic and scared, jumped out of a window and darted for the municipal building and was finally found by Pat. Donceras and other policemen. Due to darkness though, the failed to apprehend Orita. In the medico legal, Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude had the following findings: circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck, linear abrasions below left breas, multiple pinpoint marks at the back, abrasions on both kness, erythemetous areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal cavity tight, no discharges noted Issue: Whether or not rape is consummated Held: Rape was consummated. Perfect penetration is not es sential. For the consummation of rape, any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient to qualify as having carnal knowledge. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carna l knowledge of the victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that moment, the essential elements of the offense have b een accomplished. -Adapt

People vs. Campuhan Facts: Primo Campuhan was accused of ra ping four year old Crysthel Pamintuan. Camp uhan was caught by child‘s mother on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of Corazon‘s brother was allegedly

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kneeling in front of the child with both their pants do wna dn child was crying ―ayoko, ayoko‖ while Primo forced his penis into child‘s vagina

Issue: WON crime is rape? Held: No. Modified to attempted rape 1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape. Mere touching of external genitalia considered when its an essential part o f penetration not just touching in ordinary sense (People v. Orita). Labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated (People v. Escober) 2. Attempted – no penetration or didn‘t reach labia/mere grazing of surface 3. Failed to prove that penetration occur red. Mother‘s testimony questionable with regards to her position relative to Primo and child. They failed to establish how s he could have seen actual contact in her position Man‘s instinct is to run when caught. Primo could not have stayed or to satisfy his lust even if .. seeing 4. Corazon 5. Child denied penetration occurred People v. Villamor consummation even when penetration doubted: pain‘s felt, discoloration of inner lips of vagina or  red labia minora or hymenal tags not visible. Now seen in case, Medico legal officer, though penetration not needed to prove contact, no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact. Hymen intact. -Adapt Art. 6: Theft US vs. Adiao Facts: Defendant: Defendant: Tomas Adiao Adiao, a customs inspector, took a leather belt valued at P0.80 from the baggage of T. Murakami   Adiao kept the belt in his desk at the Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees He was charged with the crime of theft in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila  He was found guilty of frustrated theft  He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and the decision of the Municipal Court was  affirmed and he was sentence to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs The defendant claimed in his appeal that the lower court erred in holding that he was guilty of the crime of  theft as disclosed by the facts appearing of record Issue: WON the act of the defendant is frustrated theft Held: No, the crime cannot properly be classified as frustrated. The defendant has has performed all of the the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the crime of theft. He has taken possession of the belt belt and this already constitutes the crime crime of theft. ―The act of making use of the thing havin having been frustrated, which, however does not go to make the elements of the c onsummated crime‖ (Decision of Supreme Court of Spain) Note: The ponente referred to to the decision of Supreme Supreme Court of Spain in its its decision. It illustrated several situations that constitute consummated theft. -Adapt Art. 6: Robbery People vs. Lamahang Facts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron b ar a wall of a store of cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening another when a patrolling police caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn. Convicted of attempt of robbery Issue: WON crime is attempted robbery? Held: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to a particular and concrete offense which would lead directly to consummation. Necessary to establish unavoidable connection & logical & natural relation of cause and effect. Important to show clear intent to comm it crime. In case at bar, we c an only infer that his intent was to enter by force, other inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from nature of acts

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executed. Acts susceptible of double interpretation can‘t furnish ground for themselves. Mind should not directly infer  intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts themselves obviously disclose criminal objective. -Adapt

People vs. Salvilla Facts:         





 



Petitioner: Bienvenido Salvilla April 12, 1986, at about noon time  – Petitioner, together with Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio (all surnamed Canasares), staged a robbery at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard They were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade On their way inside the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an employee there who was on her way out for her meal break, and informed her that it was a hold-up. They went inside the office and the petitioner pointed his gun at Severino Choco, the owner, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimmie. They informed Severino that all they needed was money. Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000 cash (P5000 acc to the defense) and handed it to the petitioner. Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his 2 daughters and Rodita were kept inside the office. According to the appellant, he stopped Severino from getting the wallet and watches. At about 2:00 of the same day, the appellant told Severino to produce P100,000 so he and the other hostages can be released. Severino told him it would be hard to do that since banks are closed because it was a Saturday The police and military authorities had surrounded the lumber yard. Major Melquiades Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused and appealed to them to surrender. The accused refused to surrender and release the hostages. Rosa Caram, OIC Mayor of Iloilo City, joined the negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000, a coaster, and some raincoats. Caram offered P50,000 instead. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary in going out of the office. One of the accused gave a key to Mayor Caram and with the key, Mayor Caram unlocked the door and handed to Rodita P50,000, which Rodita gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office. The police and military authorities decided to assault the place when the accused still wouldn‘t budge after  more ultimatums. This resulted to injuries to the girls, as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary‘s right leg had to be amputated due to her injuries. The appellant maintained that the money, wallet and watches were all left on the counter and were never touched by them. He also claimed that they never fired on the military because they intended to surrender.

Issues: WON the crime of robbery was c onsummated WON there was a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender Held: 



Yes. The robbery shall be deemed consummated if the unlawful ―taking‖ is complete. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery. The o respondent claimed that none of the items (money, watches and wallet) were recovered from them. However, based on the evidence, the money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the appellant and his co-acc used and thus the taking was completed. It is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber or that he should have o actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it. No. The ―surrender‖ of the appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their favour to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: that the offender had not been o actually arrested, that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent, and that the surrender was voluntary. The ―surrender‖ by the appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of.

Note: The nature of the linked offenses (robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention) was also  discussed. The detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to  commit the same so the nature of the offense was affirmed. -Adapt

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Art. 6: Murder

People vs. Borinaga Facts: Accused: Basilio Borinaga, associated with Juan Lawaan, a maker of fish corral Victims: Harry H. Mooney, American, resident of Calubian Leyte Prior to March 4, 1929, Mooney contracted with Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. On March 4, despite the corral being only 2/3 finished, Lawaan, with some of his men, visited Mooney and attempted to collect the whole amount in their contract. Upon Mooney‘s refusal to pay, Lawaan warned and threatened him that something would happen to him (Mooney). On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of his neighbor, Perpetua Najarro, sitting in front of Najarro, with his back towards a window. Suddenly, Borinaga, from the window, struck with a knife at Mooney. The knife imbedded on the back of the seat though. Mooney fell off from the impact but was not injured. Borinaga left the scene and ran for the market place, where he was heard prior to the incident to say he would kill Mooney, and now saying that he apparently hit the chair instead of Mooney. After ten minutes, Borinaga returned to have another attempt at Mooney but was warded off by M ooney and Najarro frightening him by turning a flashlight on him. Issue: Whether or not the crime is frustrated murder. Held: YES. The Court affirms the judgment of the RTC. As an essential condition of a frustrated crime, Borinaga performed all the acts of execution, attending the attack. There was nothing left that he could do further to accomplish the work. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of his will. Borinaga also voluntarily desisted from further acts. The subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. Dissenting opinion, J. Villa-Real:  “The acts of execution perfomed by [Borinaga] did not produce the death of Mooney as a consequence not could they  have produced it because the blow did not reach his body; therefore, the culprit did not perform all the acts of  execution which should produce the felony. There was lacking the infliction of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of  the body of Mooney.”  What the back of the chair prevented was the wounding of Mooney, not his death. It is the preventing of death by  causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, after all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a  consequence had been performed, that constitutes a frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the preventing of  the performances of all the acts of execution which constitute a felony, as in the present case. Attempted murder only. -Adapt People vs. Sy Pio Facts: Sy Pio shot three people early in the morning of September 3, 1949. Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian and Jose Sy. Sy Pio entered the store at 511 Misericordia Sta Cruz Manila and started firing with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy. Upon seeing Sy Pio fire at Jose Sy, Tan asked ―what is the idea?‖ thereupon, Sy Pio turned around and fired at him as well. Tan was shot at his right shoulder and it passed through his back. He ran to a room behind the store to hide. He was s till able to hear gunshots from Sy Pio‘s pistol, but afterwards, Sy Pio ran a way. Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital where his wound was treated. He stayed there from Septenber 3- 12, 1949. He was released upon his request and against physician‘s advice and was requested to return for further treatment which he did 5 times in a period of 10 days. His wound was completely healed; he spent P300 for hospital and doctor‘s fees. Sy Pio was found by the Constabulary in Tarlac. Lomotan, a police from Manila Police Department went to Tarlac to get Sy Pio. He admitted to Lomotan that he shot the victims and handed him the pistol used in the shooting. According to Sy Pio‘s declaration, some months prior to the incident, he was employed in a restaurant owned by Ong Pian. Sy Pio‘s wife, Vicenta was also employed by Ong Pian‘ s partner. When he tried to borrow money from Ong Pian fpr his wife‘s sick father, Ong Pian only lent him P1. his wife was able to borrow P20 from her employer.

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Afterwards, defendant-appellant was dismissed from his work. Ong Pian presented a list of Sy Pio‘s debts and these were deducted from his wife‘s monthly salary. Sy Pio could not remember incurring such debts. As such, he was resentful of Ong Pian‘s conduct. In Tan Siong Kiap‘s case, a few months before Sept3, Sy Pio was able to realize the sum o f P70 and he put his money in a place in his room. The next day, Sy Pio found that his money was gone. Tan tolf Sy Pio that he had probably given the money to his wife. Thereafter, Sy Pio could hear that he had lost his money gambling. ASo early in the morning of Sept 3, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman who has a pistol was away, he got his pistol and went to a restaurant in Ongpin where Ong Pian worked and shot him. Afterwards he went to Sta Cruz and shot Jose Sy and Tan.

Issues: Trial court erred in not finding that Tan received the shot accidentally from the same bullet that had been fired at Jose Sy. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Lower court erred in sentencing him to pay an indemnity of P350. Defendant-appellant should only be found guilty of less serious physical injuries instead of frustrated murder. Held: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Sy Pio had to turn around to shoot Tan Siong Kiap. There is sufficient proof. (Uncontradicted testimony of the victim, admissions made to Lomotan, testimony of physician, etc.) Assignment of error must be dismissed. Offended party spent P300 for the hospital fees. The fact that he was able to escape which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. The defendant appellant knew that he had not actually performed all acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. -Adapt People vs. Ravelo

Facts: The accused-appellants are members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) stationed at a checkpoint near the airport of Tandag. At approximately 6:30 PM of May 21, 1984, accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano. They then detained Gaurano at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused. Thereafter, they assaulted, attacked, and burned Gaurano, with the intent of killing the latter. Reynaldo Gaurano died on May 22. At about 1AM of May 22, the accused-appellants also kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman. The latter was also brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. At 5AM, Lugatiman was transferred to the house of accusedappellant Padilla. There he was tied to the wall with a nylon line and was told he would be killed at 9AM. Shortly after, accused-appellants had to attend to Gaurano; Lugatiman was thus left alone. He was able to escape. He reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted the accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman. In this appeal, counsel for the accused aver that the lower court erred in finding that accused-appellants are guilty of frustrated murder. Counsel further contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to kill, which is an essential element of the offense of frustrated murder. The trial court merely relied on the statement of the accused-appellants stating they would kill Lugatiman to establish intent to kill. Issue: Whether the statement by the accused stating that Lugatiman would be killed is sufficient proof of intent to convict a person of frustrated murder Held: No Ratio: In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a statement of the aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.

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Tying the victim on 2 by piece of wood and leaving him inside the house of the accused are not acts that would result in death. Notes: Under the circumstances, accused-appellants could not even be convicted of an attempt to commit murder. There was no commencement of the criminal act by overt acts which have a direct connection with the crime of murder intended to be committed. Accused-appellants, therefore, are not guilty of frustrated murder but only of the crime of slight physical injuries. -Adapt

Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances – Self-defense People vs. Boholst-Caballero Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricide—she allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated and abused his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with her friends and when she was on her way home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and acc used her of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab wound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered herself to the police along with the torn dress that she wore the night before. Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in legitimate self-defense Held: Yes, she did. Acquitted Ratio: 1. Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this case, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the husband, was the aggressor. With her husband kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no other choice but to pull the knife tucked in his belt line and thrust it into his side. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife was drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on the r e-enactment of the incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to lunge the knife into husband's left side. 2. Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground then choking her just because she was out caroling at night constitutes unlawful aggression, There was imminent danger of injury. Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not depend upon the harm done but on the imm inent danger of such injury. Lack of sufficient provocation. provocation is sufficient when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband was to be out caroling at night. -Adapt

US vs. Mack Facts: The accused was sitting on a bench a few feet back from the street in the town of Tacloban, Leyte, in an open space some 3 or 4 feet in width between the tienda of a woman named Olimpia and another building. The deceased, with another policeman, approached the place and directed Olimpia to close her tienda; ordered the accused and another soldier to go to their quarters The accused did not obey such order. Some words may have passed between them, which angered the deceased. The deceased dragged himself free from his companion and attacked the accused, at the same time drawing his bolo and brandishing it in a threatening manner.

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Accused got up, drew his revolver, and the deceased having then approached within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet, the accused fired three shots, one hit the left breast the left breast of the deceased, another in the back of his head. Trial court held that the defendant adopted a mode o f defense which was not ―reasonably necessary‖ accused was taller than the deceased deceased was perhaps under the influence of liquor shot a vital part

Issue: Whether there was a ―reasonable necessity‖ for the use of the means employed by accused to defend himself Held: Yes; Mere physical superiority is no protection to an unarmed man, as against assailant armed with a large bolo If it be true that the deceased was under the influence of liquor when he that attack, his intoxication probably rendered him the more dangerous, unless he was so drunk as to be physically helpless, which is not suggested in the evidence. It was dark, the reasonable and natural thing for the accused to do was to fire at the body. The shots were fired in rapid succession in order to repel the attack; it c ould not be said that these were unnecessary. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the appellant acquitted of the crime. -Adapt People vs. Genosa rd

FACTS: Marivic and Ben Genosa, who knew each other since elementary and were 3 cousins, were married in November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Their marriage, save for the first year where, according to Marivic, she lived happily with Ben, had been tumultuous and unhappy because of the many and frequent quarrels of the couple which usually resulted in the cruel treatment of Marivic by Ben. This went on for about 10 or 11 years, occurring around thrice a week when everytime the latter got drunk. On the evening of November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas, his co-worker, after having collected their salary, went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO where they stayed for 3 hours and drank 2 bottles of beer, each. They then went to the Genosa residence but Marivic was not there because, as she explained, she was out with her cousin looking for Ben, knowing that it was a payday and that he was probably out to gamble again. Upon arriving later at the Genosa residence and finding Ben drunk ―because of his staggering walking,‖ Marivic asked Ecel to sleep in the house because she was scared that Ben might again beat her, but Ecel declined for fear of a repetition of an incident a year ago. Ben was in his usual unruly behavior, nagging and yelling at Marivic, even cutting the antenna wire with a bolo to keep her from watching TV. There were basically 2 incidents of ―attack‖ made by Ben: 1) he whirled Marivic, causing her to fall on the bedside, and two hours later when 2) he dragged her out of the room towards the drawer, holding her neck. He tried opening the drawer, failed, so reached for a blade instead in his wallet. At this point, she was aware that he was going to kill her so she smashed his arm, causing the wallet and blade to fall. She also subsequently smashed him with a metal pipe before running to the children‘s room, where she felt overwhelming selfpity and felt nauseous. Marivic admitted killing her husband, however, by shooting him later on. She had ―distorted‖ the drawer where the gun was and shot him. The RTC charged Genosa with parricide, giving her the death penalty. ISSUES:

1) 2)

WON Marivic acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus (invoking BWS) WON there was treachery in the killing of Ben Genosa

HELD:

1) 2)

No, but with 2 mitigating circumstances None

RATIO: 1) Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense — she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed that killing him would save her life. Here, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. The reality or even imminent danger he posed ended altogether the moment he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed, notwithstanding the Court‘s recognition of this special case that requiring the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life ―would amount to se ntencing her to ‗murder by installment‘‖ and that threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense — complete or incomplete —on the part of the victim. Mitigating circumstance 1: Par. 9 and 10 of A rt. 13 of the RPC 

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the cyclical nature of the BWS and repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts  Mitigating circumstance 2: passion and obfuscation  this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust acts or a legit stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason, with 1) there is an unlawful and sufficient act to produce such condition and 2) no considerable length of time when the accused might recover her normal equanimity, as requisites. 

There is no showing of the victim‘s position relative to appellant at the time of the shooting, nor that Marivic 2) chose a specific means of attacking her husband which does not pose as a risk to her. Besides, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel. JUDGMENT: Conviction of parricide affirmed, with 2 mitigating circumstances. Penalty reduced. -Adapt

Art. 11: Defense of Honor People vs. De la Cruz Facts: 

   





 

Evening of February 18, 1934, the defendant Remedios de la Cruz, with Francisco Ramos and his wife, Vrigida Vistada; his sister Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo went to a wake in honor of one Sion. At about 9 pm, the defendant and her friends started home. They were followed about 5 minutes later by the deceased Francisco Rivera who was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendant‘s party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time, the members of the defendant‘s party were walking in single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and the defendant was the hindmost. The defendant was about 2 brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Defendant‘s testimony: a man suddenly threw his arms behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket (she was engaged in selling fruits), opened it and stabbed him in defense of her h onor. That the man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked him who he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help; that when she was with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize his face. Francisco Ramos he ard someone cry out ―Aruy, Dios mio.‖ He went back and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. According to Ramos, it took him 2 minutes to go back towards the house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house, the defendant struck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her. The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon. It should be noted that the deceased had been maki ng love to the defendant and also to another girl.

Issue: Whether or not De la Cruz‘ killing of Rivera may be justified by defense of honor. Held: Yes. She was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her  honor since she had no other means of defending herself. Mistake of Facts: A person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an  act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided that the ignorance or mistake of afct was not due to negligence or bad faith. *** The finding of the trial court that Rivera and defendant were engaged, that she was madly in love with him and was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained by the evidence of record. The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly could have inflicted other wounds if she had desired. In other words, she desisted as soon as he released her. -Adapt

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People vs. Juarigue Facts: Amado Capiña, the deceased, was pursuing Avelina Jaurigue but the latter never showed interest in him. There was an incident of Amado stealing a handkerchief bearing Avelina‘s nickname, ―Aveling‖. (about 1 month before the incident) Then there was also the time when he professed his love for her but still she refused him. But her refusal did not stop Amado from suddenly embracing and kissing her and even touching her breasts. His actions prompted Avelina to slap him and give him fist blows. Since that incident she started carrying around a long fan knife for protection. (September 13, 1942) About midnight, two days after the previous incident, Amado secretly entered the room where Avelina was sleeping with the intention of abusing her. He felt her forehead (which probably awakened her). She then immediately screamed for help. Avelina‘s parents immediately came to their daughter‘s aid. Amado came out from under a bed in Avelina‘s room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, asking for forgiveness. On the other hand, Avelina‘s mother wanted to beat Amado up but she was prevented by Nicolas. The following morning, Nicolas Jaurigue went to Casimiro Lozada, the barrio lieutenant, and to Amado‘s parents, who apologized for the misconduct of their son. (September 15, 1942) On September 20, Avelina was informed that Am ado had been falsely boasting in their neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person. He was even saying that she wanted to elope with him or else she would commit suicide (poison). In the afternoon of the same day, she again was informed of his bragging. At around 8 o‘clock in the evening of September 20, 1942, Avel ina entered the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists (across the provincial road from his house) shortly after her father (treasurer) to attend religious services. The chapel was lighted by electric lights. Amado Capiña was at the other side of the chapel. But upon seeing Avelina Jaurigue he sat beside her and without saying a word placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. This prompted her to take out her fan knife with her right hand from the pocket of her dress with the intention of punish ing Amado‘s offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but she was able to grab her fan knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound about 4 ½ inches deep. Amado died from the wound a few minutes later.

Barrio Lieutenant Casimiro Lozada approached Avelina to ask her why she killed Amado. She placed herself at his disposal. Avelina and her father were advised to stay home. At 10 o‘clock of the same night, three policemen questioned them about the incident. Avelina surrendered her knife and informed the policemen of what happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased. Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Southern Luzon. (I don’t know how the case reached the Supreme Court. ) Issues: 1. WON Avelina acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility. 2.

WON there are mitigating circumstances in Avelina‘s favor.

3.

WON there is the aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime in a sacred place.

Held: (1) No. When Amado sat beside Avelina and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh they were seated on a bench near the door of the barrio chapel. Moreover, there were already around 10 people in the chapel, Avelina‘s father and the barrio lieutenant included. The chapel was also said to be lighted by electric lights. There was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. (The second requisite is not present.) (2) Yes. The court acknowledged 3 mitigating circumstances in this case: (a) She had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her moments before. This produced in her a temporary loss of reason and self-control. Another mitigating circumstance is the fact that (b) Avelina immediately and

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voluntarily surrendered and admitted stabbing the deceased. And finally, (c) she had not intended to kill the deceased. She just wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife. (3) No. There was no evidence that Avelina had murder in mind. She is not a criminal by nature. JUDGMENT: The appellant was found to have committed the crime of homicide with no aggravating circumstances and at least 3 mitigating circumstances. Judgment modified; penalty reduced. -Adapt Art. 11: Defense of property People vs. Apolinar Facts: 

      

Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land o wned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land when he observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the defendant called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant fired in the air and then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his house and consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the spinal column - which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of an inch, according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he sustained. The defendant surrendered to the authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of Um ingan on December 23, 1936.

Issue: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property Held: No; the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as a  justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. -Adapt US vs. Bumanglag Facts: On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag noticed that 40 bundles of palay which were kept in his granary were missing. He searched for the missing palay the following morning and found them in an enclosed field which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance of about 100 meters from his granary. For the purpose of ascertaining who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who might return to get the palay. Guillermo Ribis appeared and attempted to carry the palay away him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued, Ribis fell down and died instantly. Issue: WON there is defense of property. Held: NO. Defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person  of one entrusted with said property. (People v. Apolinar) The bolo worn by the deceased was in its sheath and hanging from his waist. It can not be concluded that the deceased even intended to assault his murderers with his bolo either before he was attacked by them or during the fight. Without unlawful aggression and the other requisites which would exempt the accused from criminal responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted Ribis with sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by direct participation, fully convicted, together with his codefendants who are already serving their sentence. -Adapt

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People vs. Narvaez Facts: In the afternoon of August 22, 1968, GRACIANO JUAN, JESUS VERANO, CESAR VERANO, CESAR IBANEZ, GEORGE FLEISCHER and FLAVIANO RUBIA were fencing the land of George Fleischer, situated in MAITUM, SOUTH COTABATO. At the place of fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant MAMERTO NARVAEZ. At that time appellant was sleeping and was awakened by the sound of the chiseling of the walls of his house. He then arose and saw the fencing. If the fencing continued appellant would be prevented from entering his house and rice mill bodega. So he addressed the group, through Rubia to stop and talk things over. To which Fleischer answered no and continued the fencing. At this instance, appellant lost his equilibrium and got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing that there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died Issue: WON the aggression was unlawful Held: YES, it was unlawful. The angry order of Fleischer to continue the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the wall of appellant‘s house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill is an aggression against appellant‘s property rights. However, when the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. The third element is also present. There was no provocation on the part of the appellant, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all. Appellant‘s act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. The crime committed is HOMICIDE on two counts mitigated by the privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense as well as by t wo generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation. He was sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment and considering that appellant has been under detention for 14 years since his voluntary s urrender, his immediate release was ordered. -Adapt Art. 11: Defense of reputation People vs. Chua Hiong Facts: Cesario Gocheco, nephew of Federico Chua Hiong (accused-appellant), published an article in the Manila Chronicle on February 11, 1952 entitled ―Doubtful Citizenship‖ questioning the latter‘s citizenship. Aside from that, Gocheco also filed various charges against the appellant with different government agencies. To answer this, on February 21, 1952, Chua Hiong published an article in the Manila Chronicle accusing Cesario Gocheco of persecution mania and sending the appellant a threatening letter under the pseudonym Benito Solipco. Chua Hiong also alleged that Gocheco was trying to damage his reputation to retaliate. In an earlier case, Gocheco and his family lost 2/3 of the inheritance left by his father. Chua Hiong was behind the prevailing parties, helping them with the expenses of the case. Thus, for the article, Chua Hiong was charged with and found guilty of the crime of libel. Issue: Whether or not the appellant was justified by virtue of defense of reputation when he published article in the Manila Chronicle dated the February 21, 1952 containing libelous material 1.

Held: ―In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no harm to repel. But that is not the case when it is aimed at a person‘s good n ame. Once the aspersion is cast, its sting clings and the one defamed may avail himself of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back with another libel, which, if adequate, will be justified.” (emphasis supplied)

Note: However, it is justified as self-defense only when it is clearly intended to explain or deny what was previously said of the one making the libelous statement. (People vs. Pelayo) Appellant acquitted with costs de-officio. -Adapt

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People vs. Pelayo Facts: On Nov.15, 1956 Pelayo told Atty. Clapano in his office and within hearing distance of three other people that upon his investigation about the existence of gambling in the community, a Chinese operator named Lim Peng told him that then Gov. Alejandro Almendras (now Senator) used to receive from him P500 protection money. The following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in city council session wherein he did not directly mention but insinuated through his interpellations that the governor was receiving ―tongs‖. Pelayo admits having the said conversation with Clapano. Issues: (1) WON the conversation was said in confidence and covered by the rule on privileged communication (2) WON the crime charged which is serious slander should only be intriguing against honor (3) WON words were uttered in Self Defense to what the governor had said about him previously Held: (1) NO  – this contention of confidence is inconsistent with contention of self-defense, there were others who heard the remarks he made to Clapano thus could not have given the com munication in confidence. (2) NO - it cannot be Intriguing against honor because the source of the information can be pin-pointed= Lim Peng. When the source can be determined and the information was passed for the purpose of causing dishonor, the act is slander (3) NO  – even if on a previous occasion the governor made derogatory remarks against Pelayo, the retaliation with scurrilous words cannot be self-defense. It will only exist of the defendant did not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him for the purpose of repairing the effect of the damage caused to him. There is no justification for him to hit back of make the same imputation of accusation because this is not an act of defense but an aggression itself -Adapt Art. 11: Avoidance of a greater evil People v. Hernandez Facts: Complainant’s version: Vivencio Lascano, 19, started courting Maria Norma Hernandez sometime in August 1954. Appellant accepted Vivencio on January 6, 1955. On the same date, appellant requested Vivencio to bring his parents with him to her house and ask her hand for marriage before her parents. On February 6, 1955 Vivencio‘s parents and aunts brought about 30 chickens and goats to appellant‘s house. The parents of both parties agreed to the marr iage, to be held on March 19, 1955. On February 21, 1955, appellant and Vivencio applied to the municipal treasurer for marriage. On March 5, 1955 marriage license was issued. Vivencio, his parents, appellant and her parents went to the parish priest of Taal, Batangas to arrange the proclamation of marriage. Appellant‘s wedding gown was delivered to her house on March 16, 1955; but there was no one in the house so it was just left in the balcony.

The parents of Vivencio cleaned the appellant ‘s yard and did other chores on March 16, 17 and 18, 1955. On March 18, they constructed a temporary wedding shed and a temporary stove for the feast; they likewise slaughtered goats, chickens and pigs and served around 90 guests. March 19 came and they served around 70 guests. Vivencio and his parents waited for appellant until twelve midnight but she was nowhere to be found. She never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation.  Appellant’s version:

She never honestly loved Vivencio. She was coerced by her parents and her uncle Agapito Mortel to accept him. She ―felt a sense of torture‖ and so on March 11, 1955 she left for a cousin in Calapan, Mindoro where she stayed until April of 1955 when she was fetched by a cousin because she was under arrest.

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She denied receiving a wedding gown. Vivencio and his parents did not go to their house on March 17 and 18 and there was noshed constructed and no food were prepared by them. Issue: Whether or not Maria‘s failure to ful fil the marriage agreement by not attending the celebration constituted slander by deed. Held: No; there is no malice, a requisite of s lander. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to the marriage after mature consideration. Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to Art. 11, paragraph 4 of RPC. Regina vs. Dudley Facts: 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

Two Defendants together with one Brooks and the deceased, Richard Parker (between 17-18 y/o) was cast away in a storm on high seas, 1600mi from Cape of Good Hope on July 5, 1884. All were able-bodied English seamen of an English yacht. They had no food and no fresh water except for 2 1lb. tins of turnips which they ate for 3days and stock up rain water. th th On 4 day, they caught a turtle & ate it up to the 12 day. For the next 8 days they ate nothing. th On 20 day, petitioners spoke to Brooks about sacrificing one in order to save the others. Brooks disagreed. Parker, deceased was not consulted. A proposal to cast lots was raised but was never carried out because brook disagreed (July24). They talked about their families implying and suggesting that boy was in a better position to be killed than all of them because he has no family of his own. Dudley proposed that if no vessel appears the next day (July 25) the boy should be killed. July 25, still no vessel and defendants helping each other while distracting Brooks, sought to kill the boy. Deceased was at the moment, lying at the bottom of the boat quite helplessly and extremely weakened by famine that he is unable to put up any resistance. Dudley, after telling him what is about to come, struck a knife in his throat killing him. The three fed on his body and blood for the next four days. On the fourth day they were rescued.

Issue: WON killing of deceased is justifiable. Decision: Modified. No legal justification of Homicide but willful Murder. Held/Ratio: NO. Extreme necessity of hunger does not justify killing of the boy. Self-defense along justifies the taking of life of another. It is a general assumption that one ought rather to  die himself than to kill an innocent. No jurisprudence supports any of the defendant‘s contentions (That they would have died of hunger within  the four days before they were rescued of they did not feed on the body of the deceased, or that the boy, being of weaker health was most probable to die first under the circumstances) Lord Baron commenting on maxim of ―Necessity carrieth a privilege in itself‖ highlights 3 kind of necessity:  (1) necessity of conservation of life, (2) necessity of obedience, and (3) necessity of act of God or of a stranger. The first kind being of closest resemblance to the case it hand cannot be applied. “The temptation to the act was not what the law has ever called a necessity.” A man has no right to declare temptation to be an excuse. ―There is no absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one‘s life.‖ It cannot be compared to man‘s duty of a necessity to conservation of life in times of war as in the latter, it a duty imposed by the Sovereign on a soldier to defend his country. There is no such excuse of necessity in the deliberate killing of this ―unoffending & unresisting boy‖. The crime is undeniably, willful murder.

Though law and morality are not the same, and many things immoral are not necessarily illegal, the absolute divorce of law from morality (as will be the result if the temptation to murder in this case is upheld by law), will have fatal consequences. -Rosales

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Ty vs. People Facts: Petitioner Vicky C. Ty filed the instant Petition for Review, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated 31 July 2001. The decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Manila, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22, the ―Bouncing Checks Law.‖ Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465 corresponds to the seven instances for violation of BP. 22. (Quoted from Criminal Case No. 93-130465) 30 May 1993, petitioner made, drew and issued to Manil a Doctors‘ Hospital to apply to account or for value to Editha L. Vecino a Metropolitan Bank Check dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30, 000.00, said accused knowing that at the time of the issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty. The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty‘s mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctor‘ s Hospital from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient‘s daughter, Ty signed the ―Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment‖ in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.‖ As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657, 182.40. Ty‘s sister, Judy Chua was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418, 410.55. The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1, 075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed the payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven checks, each covering the amount of P30, 000.00 were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the ‗Account Closed‖ advice. For her def ense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an ―uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.‖ She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother‘s food and refusal to change the latter‘s gown and bed sheets. She also bewailed the hospital‘s suspending medical treatment of  her mother. The ―debasing treatment,‖ she pointed out, so affected her mother‘s mental, psychological and physi cal health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mother‘s immediate discharge.‖ 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven counts of violation of BP 22 and sentenced to suffer penalty of imprisonment of Six Month per count or a total of 42 months. Against this decision Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks ―under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. In its decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty ―to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60, 000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.‖ The Court of Appeals rejected Ty‘s defenses of  involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospital‘s knowledge of her checking account‘s lack of funds. It held that BP. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable, regardless of the purpose and terms and conditions relating to its issuance. Petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court alleging the same issues but raising errors ascribed to CA on the following grounds: 1. There is clear and convincing evidence that petitioner was forced to or compelled in the opening of the account and the issuance of the subject checks. 2. The checks were issued under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. 3. The evidence on record patently shows absence of valuable consideration in the issuance of the subject checks. 4. It is an undisputed fact that the payee of the checks was fully aware of the lack of funds in the account. 5. The honorable court of appeals, as well as the honorable trial court, should not have applied criminal law mechanically, without due regard to principles of justice and equity. In its memorandum, the Office of the S olicitor General contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check, it falls within the ambit of BP. 22. What the law punished is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum . The Court finds the arguments a rehash of the arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Court, likewise, discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. They find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Ty‘s conviction.

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Issue: Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant defendant exemption from c riminal liability. 

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Held: No; For this exempting circumstance to be invoked the ff. requisites most concur: 1. existence of an uncontrollable fear, 2. the fear must be real and imminent, and 3. the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. In this case fear was not uncontrollable or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital‘s threats and demands. The fear evoked on Ty was not real and imminent either but speculative, expected and anticipated; as for fear that her mother‘s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital, or worse commit suicide. Ty also failed to satisfy the last criteria because the Court is not convinced she was left with no choice but to commit the crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. Therefore, the defense of state of necessity is also non-existent. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. She even testified her counsel advised her not to open an account nor issue postdated checks. In all these, she failed to give evidence of coercion and compulsion from the hospital. Furthermore, a defense of state of necessity requires that the injury expected is not brought about by negligence, imprudence, and the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of bouncing checks was brought about by Ty‘s own failure to pay her mother‘s hospital bills. BP 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee an obligation. The Thrust of the law (BP. 22) is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by BP. 22. -Marcaida

Art. 11: Fulfillment of duty People vs. Delima Facts: Lorenzo Napilon is a convict who escaped from jail and defendant, Felipe Delima was policeman tasked to look for him. Delima found him in the house of one Jorge Alegria. The fugitive was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance while the defendant with a revolver. The latter demanded his arrest but the former answered instead with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it and to impose his authority, fired his revolver but did not hit Napilon. When the criminal ran away, defendant pursued him and fired another shot that which hit and killed Napilon. CFI Samar convicted defendant with homicide. Issue: WON defendant is justified in killing Napilon in performance of his duty. Held: YES. The killing was done in performance of a duty. The deceased being under the obligation to surrender had no right to assault and commit disobedience against police officer. The resistance of deceased compelled defendant to apply extreme means which although fatal is justified by circumstances. -Rosales

People vs. Belbes Facts: Accused together with Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned to maintain peace and order at the prom of Pili Brgy. High School. At 9:00 pm, two students approached them and their teacher saying someone was making trouble.  Accused and Pat. Pabon who were armed with an armalite and .38 caliber respectively, responded forthwith.  Meanwhile, Fernando Bataller and two of his company. Bataller was drunk and was vomiting and holding on  to the bamboo wall of the school‘s temporary building when the bamboo‘s broke. At this instance, the accused and Pat. Pabon appeared and without warning Accused fired his gun.  Bataller fell and the two patrolmen fled.  Accussed version of the facts: Upon responding and arriving at the scene: Bataller was a little tipsy but not vomiting. They introduced  themselves as policemen but Bataller didn‘t mind them. Bataller then stabbed Pabon with a knife which accused said he knew because he saw the glint of the blade  and he was only 1 meter away from Pat. Pabon. The latter unfortunately was not hit. After two more thrusts were made towards him, Pabon retreated but accused was stabbed in his lower left  shoulder. 

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The accused firearm was slung over his shoulder. As Bataller made another thrust, Accused gave a shot, which after doing so, Bataller suddenly grabbed the firearm. Bataller‘s two other companions had also ganged up on him. They struggled with each other and the gun went off. It was semi-automatic, so one squeeze at the trigger would fire a shot. After the armalite went off, Bataller fell. He took the knife and that was the time people started to gather. They went to the police station and turned over the knife. Pat. Pabon‘s testimony corroborated with the accused‘ except the part when accused fired a warning shot and the deceased‘ companions ganging up on accused. Accused pleaded not guilty invoking self-defense in the performance of his official duty

Issue: Was the trial court correct in holding accused -appellant guilty of murder? Held: No. It was modified to HOMICIDE. Ratio; 

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To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor, (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. It is incumbent upon an accused who has admitted to inflict fatal injuries to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence in order to avoid criminal liability. Appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self-defense on the face of mortal danger while on police duty the knife used by the deceased was not even subjected to fingerprinting The accused wound was only examined after 21 hours making self-inflicti on a possibility If it was true that accused and Bataller grappled face to face, then the victim should not have been hit sideways TIME FACTOR! It took only about 6 seconds from the time the accused left his seat until the gunshots were heard There are two requisites to invoke self-defense in the fulfillment of a duty: (1) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office The first requisite is present for it was admittedly a performance of his duty. However the second one is lacking for the killing need not be a necessary consequence on the performance of his duty. He exceeded his duty which is only to maintain peace and order when he fired his armalite without warning. Thus, it would account only as an INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE. ON MURDER: Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For it to be a qualifying circumstance, 2 conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate (2) the means, method or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender None of the two conditions were committed. Likewise, suddenness of an attack does not necessarily imply treachery. Thus, ruling our murder. Homicide resulting from reckless imprudence is not recognized either.

Decision: Accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. -Belderol

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Art. 11: Lawful order of superior People v. Beronilla Facts: The accused was a military major of La Paz , Abra in 1941. He received an order form the regional commander of an infantry of the Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit, to prosecute Arsenio Borjal for treason and to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen. The jury found Borjal guilty of the charge and the recommendation of the jury was approved by the Headquarters of the guerrilla unit. For the execution of Borjal, the accused was prosecuted for murder. The accused acted upon orders of superior officers which turned out to be illegal. Issue: WON Beronilla can be considered to be acting upon a call of duty and thus, covered by justifying circumstances which would warrant acquittal Held: Yes; Criminal intent not established; he was acting pursuant to orders of his superiors in the City (orders given through letters/telegrams). As a military subordinate, he could not question the orders of his superior officers. He obeyed the orders in good faith without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on his part. -J. Garcia Art. 12: Exempting circumstances  – Insanity People v. Bonoan FACTS The accused was charged with the murder of Carlos Guison. Bonoan stabbed the latter when he refused to pay the P50 debt he owed the former, and this was evidenced by the testimony of a police officer who witnessed the event. Bonoan‘s arraignment and subsequent trial were delayed a few times because the accused was mentally deranged and at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The accused had also been confined in the insane deparment of the San Lasaro Hospital (suffering from dementia praec ox) in 1922 and in 1926. ISSUE WON there is sufficient evidence to acquit the defendant on the ground of insanity in accordance with par. 1 of article 12 of the RPC HELD Yes Ratio 1.

Dementia precox is covered by the term insanity When a person is suffering from a form of psychosis, a type of dementia praecox, homicidal attack is common because of delusions that he is being interfered with sexually, or that his property is being taken. During the period of excitement, such person has no control whatever of his acts. The unlawful act of the accused may be due to his mental disease or a mental defect, producing an ―irresistible impulse,‖ as when the accused has been deprived or has lost the power of his will which would enabl e him to prevent himself from doing the act. Here, an irresistible homicidal impulse was considered to embrace the term ―insanity.‖ 2.

It has been proven that defendant suffered from dementia four days before the commission of the crime, which, according to experts, is a symptom of dementia praecox which might have revived itself even after years of being dormant or stable

In order to ascertain a person‘s mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind during a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required, nor are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can be known only by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to  determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, will suffice. A person who has been adjudged inane, or has been committed to a hospital or any asylum for the insane, is presumed to be insane. 

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-J.Garcia People vs. Ambal Facts: 

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In the morning of 20 January 1977, the barangay captain found Felicula (Feling), 48 and married to Honorato Ambal, under some flo wering plants near the couple‘s house in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin. She was mortally wounded, having 7 incised wounds in different parts of her body. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance. She was placed in an improvised hammock and brought to the hospital. She died 40 minutes later. Honorato admitted to killing his wife. After leaving their child to a neighbor, he went to the house of the barangay captain and told the latter‘s wife that he had killed Feling. Then, he took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, again confessing that he killed his wife. The policeman confiscated his long bolo, the tip of which was broken. His shirt was torn, he was bespattered with blood, and he appeared to be weak. The two had been married for 15 years, and quarreled and bickered a lot. Feling sometimes didn‘t stay in the home and spent the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. They had 8 children. The immediate provocation for the assault was a fight, because Feling had not bought medicine for Honorato, who then had influenza. She told him that he was better off dead (―Mas maayo ka p ang mamatay.‖) so he attacked her. He was charged with parricide on 27 January 1977 in the municipal court, and was elevated to the CFI on 4 March 1977. He pleaded not guilty. His defense was insanity. Two doctors were brought to the stand: Dr. Maximino Balbas, Jr., the municipal health officer, found him to be have suffered from o ―‘psychosis‘ due to short frustration tolerance‖ during the commiss ion of the crime but was normal before and after the commission. He also said that Ambal was a ―passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality.‖ Dr. Cresogono Llacuna, who undertook a 2-month observation of mental cases and treated around o 100 cases of mental disorders, said that Ambal suffered from a minor psycho-neurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is NOT INSANITY. He was normal but nervous, and HAD NO MENTAL DISORDER. Ambal said that he knew that hi s wife was dead because he was informed of it, but that he didn‘t know that he had killed his wife because at the time of the killing, he didn‘t know what he was doing, not being in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He said that his wife was irritable and they used to quarrel a lot, and that he remembered riding on a tricycle when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident, he got wet while plowing, and that‘s ho w he got sick. Trial court concluded that his behavior immediately after the incident showed he wasn‘t insane and that he acted like a normal human being.

Issue: Should Ambal be exempted from cr iminal liability by reason of insanity? Held and Ratio: No; Trial Court‘s decision is affirmed. ―Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or  mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.‖ (People vs. Bonoan) Imbecile: ―person marked by mental deficiency‖; ―must be deprived completely of reason or  o discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.‖ (People vs. Formigones) Insane person: ―one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder‖; ―there must be o complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the lease discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.‖ (People vs Cruz, People vs. Renegado) Insanity: ―a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less o permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.‖ (Revised Administrative Code). ―The popular  meaning of the word ‗crazy‘ is not synonymous with the legal terms ‗insane‘, ‗ non compos mentis ‘, ‗unsound mind‘, ‗idiot‘, or ‗lunatic.‘‖ (US vs. Vaquilar) Passion and motives of anger, hatred, etc, is not insanity either. Neither is being weak-minded. Brief history lesson on pleading insanity given: In medieval times, insanity wasn‘t a defense. ―Gra dually,  insanity was allowed, but only witin narrow limits. … Then the limits of the defense were expanded … The killer was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of appreciating the difference between right and wrong … not the r ight and wrong of particular case, but right or wrong generally or in the

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abstract, the difference … between good and evil. Later, this was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong generally wo uld not charge with responsibility if there was no capacity to understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.‖ The court presumes that a person is of sound mind unless there is positive proof stating otherwise. In this case, no such proof has been given.

Barredo, J, concurring: Agrees with decision based on jurisprudence. Abad Santos, J, concurring: Adds the observation that Feling was a shrew, and that ―the worst thing that can happen to a person is to have an unbe arable spouse.‖ She was also neglectful and even ―had the gall‖ to tell him that he was better off dead. This, plus the mental disorder, should entitle him to two additional mitigating circumstances: obfuscation and illness. But under the circumstances, appellant is deserving of executive clemency, and so he recommends it. -Feliciano

People vs. Puno Facts: 

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Ernesto Puno, 28, is a jeepney driver. At about 2pm of 8 Sept 1970, he entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, who is a widow. The house is in Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. Aling Kikay was in bed. He said ―Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog‖ then slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead. There were two witnesses: Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, and Lina Pajes, 27. According to them, his eyes were red, and his look was baleful and menacing. He threatened the two and told them not to go to the police. He then went to his parents‘ house in Barrio Tugatong, then to his second cousin‘s (Teotino Puno‘s) house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan. (It was flooded there then; records don‘t show how he got there). Lina went to the police anyway and told Corporal Daniel B. Cruz what happened. He found her body, took the statements of the witnesses down at the police station. Autopsy showed that Aling Kikay had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument. COD: intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage. Puno‘s father surrendered him to the police. He was brought to National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong on 10 Sept 1970. He was charged with murder in the municipal court and was indicted in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig on 21 Oct 1970. Court cited as aggravating circumstances evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex. Puno testified that he didn‘t remember killing Aling Kikay. He believes that there are mangkukulam, mambabarang and mabubuyog and that one harmed by a mambabarang might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by an herbolaryo. It is also necessary to kill the mangkukulam and mambabarang. Zenaida Gabriel, his wife, 30, testified that on the night before the murder, his eyes were reddish and that he complained of a headache. The following day, while he was feeding pigs, he said that a bumblebee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands, but Zenaida didn‘t see any bee. Puno then went upstairs and got the cord of the religious habit of his mother, then asked for another rope when Zenaida told him not to use it. Puno tied their dog to a tree and repeatedly boxed it. Aida Gabriel, who saw this happen, also said that his eyes were bloodshot and he had a ferocious expression about him. According to Teotimo, when Puno came to his house on 8 Sept, he was cuddling a puppy that he called ―Diablo‖ and when asked to eat, didn‘t eat but fed the puppy instead. Puno introduced him to the puppy and sang an English song, and refused to change his clothes (which were wet because of the flood). Later, he tried on Teotimo‘s father‘s clothes and when told that Teo‘s father had been dead for a couple of years, he  just stared at Teotimo. While lying down, he started singing again, then made a moaning sound until he fell asleep. In the morning, he was awakened by the sound of people in the flood, and Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas. Defense brought 3 psychiatrists, who all testified that Puno acted with discernment: Dr. Araceli Maravilla from the Psychiatry Section of Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital: Puno o was an outpatient who could very well live with society although he was afflicted with ―schizophrenic reaction‖, Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis. Dr. Reynaldo Robles of National Mental Hospital: symptoms were ―not socially incapacitating‖ and o that he could adjust to the environment. Agrees with Maravilla.

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Dr. Vicente: not suffering from any delusion and was not mentally deficient. He wouldn‘t have reached third year HS if he were. The report of the three doctors submitted on 14 Dec 1970 said that he is ―presently free from any o social incapacitating psychotic symptoms. The … amnesia of several isolated accounts … do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. [Schizophrenics] may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed.‖ Trial Court said he knew what he was doing at the time and that he would be punished for it, which was why he threatened the witnesses. If he were truly insane at the time, he would‘ve killed the two witnesses as well. Puno was convicted of murder and s entenced him to death. o

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Issue: Was Puno insane at the time of the commission, given that he had been suffering chronic schizophrenia before the crime was committed? Held and Ratio: No. Death Penalty set aside to Reclusion Perpetua. Insanity, to be pleaded, must be characterized by ―total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality  of the mental faculties will n ot exclude imputability.‖ (People vs. Ambal) Puno was not legally insane when he killed Aling Kikay, and he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will, as shown by the facts and findings of the psychiatrists. Murder is correct because there was abuse of superiority (as in, ang nasabi na lang ni Aling Kikay ay ―Diyos  ko.‖ ) There wasn‘t any premeditation proven, nor disregard of sex, therefore, penalty should only be in medium terms. Makasiar, J, dissenting: Appellant had been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic schizophrenia even before  he committed the crime. The said ailment is characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Articles cited by Makasiar shows that ‗social recovery‘ is not the same as being ‗cured‘: ―By this it is meant  that the patient is able to return to his previous social environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor symptoms and signs…‖ What happened was a relapse. ―For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months‘  time. His condition may simply be ―in remission‖ which term means ―social recovery.‖ His records never  showed that he was cured, only that he was ―improving‖ and ―treatment not completed.‖ According to Dr. Vicente, his power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected in such a way that  ―one who has the impulse to kill will kill‖ when he is affected by such an ailment. Vicente also said that he could‘ve been suffering from an onset of the schizo reaction at the time. It was also barely a month and 15 days since his last attack, so the interval was not sufficient time for his full recovery. He was convinced that a mangkukulam was inflicting harm on him, so he killed her in self- defense. ―The  victim was a mere consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the ―mangkukulam‖ as personified by the victim; he did not kill Aling Kikay herself.‖ -Feliciano

People vs. Dungo Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR.

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of t he offense:

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Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in deep thought always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also times that her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him t o the store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parentsin-law's house with people milling around. She asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a number of days, I would die.‖ That sa me day, the accused went to Manila.

Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic.

Issue: WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged. Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts without the least discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which is m anifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act. Evidence of insanity must refer to the m ental condition at the very time of doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts. It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs . Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he committed the act. The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran a way from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim. (This was taken from the trial court's decision). Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED. -scribd People vs. Yam-id Facts: Accused/Appellant: Erlindo Yam-Id Victim: Jerry Tejamo, 6 yrs old  April 1, 1994, 2:00 PM  – Julius Cantutay was sent by his grandmother, Amanda Ceniza to Bgy. Tutay,  Pinamungajan, Cebu to deliver benignit to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry Tejamo was with Julius o They passed by the house of the accused who greeted them, ―Good Evening‖ and after the o greeting, the accused unsheathed a long bolo and ran after the two Julius pushed Jerry and told him to run but Jerry was eventually ov ertaken by Julius o Appellant caught up with Jerry and stabbed him on the left portion of his back, then held him by the o hair and hacked him on the nape. As Jerry fell to ground, the appellant further stabbed him on the right side of his back then the appellant knelt over the prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the blood from his neck

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Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to the latter‘s father, Danilo Tejamo. He informed Ancieta Tejamo, wife of Danilo, who thereafter told Danilo Ancieta and Danilo ran to the site of the incident but before reaching the place they were met by o the appellant After Danilo asked the appellant where his son was, appellant answered, ―I will kill all of you,‖ and o immediately hacked Danilo Danilo was able to dodge the attack but he fell to the ground. Appellant struck at Danilo who got hit o on the bridge of his nose. Danilo tried to stand by appellant hacked him again and hit him in the head The tip of the bolo hit appellant‘s stomach when he held Danilo by the collar to finish him off. o Appellant then ran towards his house and threw the bolo to the ground. Danilo regained consciousness and sought treatment o The appellant denied killing Jerry during the trial and pleaded self-defense for his assault at Danilo At the automatic review at the Supreme Court, the appellant admitted to killing Jerry and pleaded insanity as his defense which contends that he has schizophrenia. The defense of insanity is anchored on the testimony of Dr. Antonio Yapha who said that the testimony of the appellant that he was shot by Danilo is improbable as a gunshot would not have caused a prolapse (intestine slipping out of the usual place). In addition, they claimed that the appellant‘s gruesome action of sucking Jerry‘s blood after he killed him is further proof of insanity o

 

Issue: Whether or not the appellant can use the defense of insanity in killing of Jerry Tejamo 

Held: No. Insanity must be proven beyond reasonable doubt to be existing before or at the very moment the crime was committed, by whoever invokes it as a defense Defense failed to discharge its burden of proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time of o the commission of the crime. No medical certificate was presented to substantiate the claim of insanity and no expert testimony was proffered to support the allegation. Also, no evidence was presented that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime and the fact that the defense of insanity was not even raised during the trial of the case gives the impression that is but an afterthought. -Adapt People vs. Belonio Facts: RTC found Randy Belonio y Landas guilty of the murder of Ramy Tamayo and sentenced him to death. On January 6, 2000, Jennifer Carampatana‘s grandmother was buried and there was a wake in their house in the evening. Her first cousin, the late Ramy Tamayo, arrived in their house with his wife around 10:00 P.M. Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they could sit on a nearby bench, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from a store only a few meters away. The store was furnished with a small opening for the store-keeper to attend to the customers and Ramy was occupying that space in front of the opening to pay when the accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force his way in front of the opening and as a consequence, he bumped on Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look. Jennifer and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused came over and sat on the other end of the bench. Then the accused asked Ramy for the latter‘s cigarette lighter and conversed with him. The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer, who was facing the direction of the approaching accused, saw him and noticed that he was wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not see the accused as he was facing sideways to Jennifer. Without saying a word and without warning, the accused delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger which was concealed in his hand. Ramy was hit on the right chest, Jennifer stood up and ran towards her house shouting for help. There at the gate of the fence of her house, she heard another thudding sound of a stabbing blow. When Jennifer entered her house, she announced that Ramy was stabbed. The accused ran away towards the back of the barangay hall but was later arrested from one (1) of the houses near the barangay hall where he took refuge. Randy Belonio raised the defense of insanity, an exempting circumstance, and relied on the expert assessment of his witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified thus: ―This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia), Chronic Undifferentiated and probably triggered by (s)ubstance abuse of Shabu and Marijuana.‖ RTC found appellant guilty of Murder and that he had full control of his mental faculties. Issue: Whether or not appellant‘s defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance is tenable. Held: Judgment of the lower court AFFIRMED. Appellant is found GUILTY of murder. Ratio: Whoever invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that appellant was insane. The evidence adduced by the defense is sorely insufficient to establish his claim that he was insane at the time he killed Tamayo.

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In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act . Proof of the existence of some abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it can be shown that the offender was not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence. Belonio, after giving the victim a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter, lighted his cigarette and conversed with him. Afterwards, he left and came back armed with a dagger with which he stabbed Tamayo. Immediately thereafter, he escaped and went into hiding. These acts tend to establish that Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would not have attempted to escape and go into hiding. The only other evidence of insanity that appellant pointed to is the medical certificate prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio was suffering from schizophrenia. Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on October 25, 2000 (around nine months after the stabbing incident) the latter was suffering from schizophrenia. However, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight  only if there is also proof of alleged abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of  the crime . Dr. Guazon‘s report was silent as regards the incidents occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which Belonio stands trial. The story narrated by the doctor was a mere life and family history of Belonio. There was no showing that he was actually suffering from schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To demonstrate that he had been suffering from this condition, the doctor pointed to the fact that he has already killed three (3) persons, including the present incident. However, such conclusion is non sequitur and, at best, a circuitous argument. Further, the veracity of these findings is belied by the fact that the accused did not raise this defense during his prosecutions for the other killings. No other circumstances evincing its existence were presented during trial. -Marcaida Art. 12: Somnabulism People vs. Taneo Facts: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and guests were entertained in the house, among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon m eeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months pregnant at that time, died five days later as a result of the wound. The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It appears from the evidence that the day b efore the commission of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to c ome down and fight. When he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, had a s evere stomachache that's why he went to bed in the early afternoon. The defendant stated that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while A badila held his feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down; he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then, he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way. Issue: WON defendant acted while in a dream. Ratio: Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, weren‘t voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to u s. Although an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court found n ot only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of (read: he loved his wife dearly, he tried to attack his father in whose house the lived and the guests whom he invited), but also motives for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind. The wife's wound may have been inflicted accidentally. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife, but that he was defending himself from his enemies. Judgment: defendant not criminally liable for the offense. It was also ordered that he be confined in the government insane asylum and will not be r eleased until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace -Adapt

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Art. 12: Minority People vs. Doquena Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter. The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and c onsequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into consideration: a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed. b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed c) The time he had at his disposal d) The degree of reasoning of the minor Issue: WON the accused acted with discernment Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial. -Adapt Art. 12: Accident People vs. Bindoy Facts: On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and without malicious intent. Issue: WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the groun d of accident. Held: Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is a cquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal Code Ratio: 1.   

2.

There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence. No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other. The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.

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3.

If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly lawful. -Adapt US vs. Tanedo Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one, Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed. Issue: WON the accused is guilty Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also, according to: Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or mi sdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law…  Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without  liability or intention of causing it. Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent  until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal. In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor is it disputed that the accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill the deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the body. The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit." Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction. Decision: Judgment of Conviction is reversed, the accused acquitted, and discharged from custody. -Adapt

Pomoy vs. People Facts:    

Victim: Tomas Balboa, teacher at Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo. January 4, 1990, 7:30 AM: policemen arrived at Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery. Balboa was taken to Headquarters and detained in the jail thereat. Later that day, a little past 2:00 PM: petitioner Pomoy, a police sergeant, directed Balboa to come out of detention for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a gun (.45 caliber pistol) tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt; gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster

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As he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the v ictim suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun; he held the handle of his gun with his left hand, released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of petitioner‘s efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of s econds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; His gun was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked  when it fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell and died as a result Whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident Whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense. Yes, it was the result of an accident. He was not; however, it was unnecessary for him to do so 

1. 2. Ruling: 1. 2. Ratio: 1. Presence of All the Elements of Accident a) accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member of the PNP  o it was in lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that he fetched the victim from the latter‘s cell for a routine interrogation. o Also in the lawful performance of his that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster b) resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to  prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. He had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area c) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the  deceased, much less kill him. Nicostrato Estepar, guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell. consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.  Petitioner not in control of gun when it fired during the scuffle.  - deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts - in the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged  – his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. Release of the gun’s safety lock and firing of the gun both accidental   - though .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless released, would prevent the firing of the gun, a semi-automatic pistol is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle. - two shots fired: a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner Issue:

2.

Self-Defense Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident (no intent to kill)  Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner a  further discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED. -Adapt

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Art. 12: Irresistible force/uncontrollable fear US vs. Caballeros Facts: Four American schoolteachers were murdered and buried. Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to the crime of assassination or murder, having buried the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. They were allegedly coerced. Roberto Baculi, one of the accused and it appears that he took part in the burial of the teachers because he was compelled to do so by the murderers. According to a witness named Teodoro Sabate, Baculi was not a member of the group and that he was in the banana plantation gathering some bananas when Damaso and Isodoro called Baculi and by by striking him with the butts of their guns forced him to bury the corpses. Another accused by the name of Apolonio Caballeros confessed by the promise that nothing would be done to them. Issue: WON the defense under Art12(5) is tenable Held: Yes. Not only is Baculi‘s confession that he only assisted in the burial of the corpses because he was compelled by the murderers, but this was corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Sabate. Sabate said that he was present when the Americans were killed; that Baculi was not a member of the group of murderers but he was in the banana plantation gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns forced him to bury the corpses. As for Caballeros, there was no proof that he took any part in the execution of the crime; there was c onclusive proof to the contrary. Sabate and Baculi declared that Caballeros did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. Their failure to report the crime is not an offense punished by the Penal Code . -Rosales US vs. Exaltacion Facts: On March 26, 1903, Liberate Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco were charged with rebellion  – willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the government of the US, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society (whose purpose was to overthrow the government by force of arms). Exaltacion and Tanchinco claim that they were captured by armed bandits and were compelled to sign documents (containing oath taken in the name of God and a covenant to carry out superior orders of the Katipunan Society and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother country) under threat of death. Exaltacion and Tanchinco reported the incident to the governor, lieutenant of volunteers and the president of Meycauayan. Witnesses testified to this fact as well. Issue: Having signed the said documents, are the defendants guilty of the crime of rebellion? Or did defendants incur criminal liability when they signed the documents? Held: No. The evidence for the prosecution and the documents signed by the accused is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below. The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the Contreras Band, and that they signed the said documents under c ompulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves to the authorities as soon as they were released is corroborative of their innocence. Guilt of defendants was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Judgment: Decision of the lower court REVERSED. Defendants ACQUITTED -Rosales: Art. 12: Insuperable cause People vs. Bandian Facts: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

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Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child‘s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol —she considers him her husband as he considers him his wife —began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they‘ve been eagerly awaiting the bir th of the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed o her pregnancy to Kirol. Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the 7th exempting circumstance, to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (RPC A12(4)). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of. -Adapt Art. 12: Instigation and entrapment People vs. Lua Chu Background of Case: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who represented agents of the real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson & Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of P6K for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the former consult the real owners on how to proceed the payment of P6K & will come over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners. On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung. On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu. Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important facts: 1. Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the Opium. 2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners named Tan and another located in Amoy. 3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng. 4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium. The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins). Facts of Case: An Appeal was made by Uy Se Tieng & Lua Chu & made 10 assignments of errors made by the TC in its judgment. Appelant’s Point of Defense

Held

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Juan Samson induced the defendants 1. to import the opium.

A public official shall be involved in the crime if: He induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain  Does not take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the  crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does  take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders. 2. Even though Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drugs, the ff should be noted that held Samson not guilty for the crime: The accused have already planned and actually ordered the opium  without the consent or participation of Juan Samson. Did not help the accused to successfully implement there plan rather,  Samson assured the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers. Trial judge refusal of exclusion of Juan Not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Samson in the witness stand Procedures eventhough he was already dismissed from the Customs secret service In accepting the transcript taken down 1. The transcript contains certain admissions made by the defendants. by Jumapao as the true & correct 2. Stenographer attested that it was faithfully taken down. conversation between Juan Samson & 3. Corroborated by statement of Juan Statement in the court. Uy Se Tieng Concluding Remarks: Entrapment 1. The practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions 2. It is a scheme or technique ensuring the apprehension of the criminals by being in the actual crime scene. 3. The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime if he have done the following: a. He does not induce a person to commit a crime for personal gain or is not involved in the planning of the crime. b. Does take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. Instigation: This is the involvement of a law officer in the crime itself in the following manners: a. He induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain b. Doesn‘t take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders. -Adapt US vs. Phelps Facts Phelps was charged and found guilty for violating the Opium Law (Act No. 1761). He was instigated by Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, into procuring opium and providing for a venue in which to smoke the opium. Immediately upon Phelp‘s commission of the crime under Smith‘s inducement, Smith reported Phelps and had him arrested. Issues 1. W/N Phelps is criminally liable for having smoked opium Held Decision: No Ratio: Phelps was induced by Smith into making arrangements for the two of them to smoke opium. Smith not onl y suggested the commission of the crime but also expressed his desire to commit the offense in paying the amount required for the arrangements. Such acts done by employees of government in encouraging or inducing persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them are most reprehensible , and should not be encouraged by courts. Smith‘s acts do not des erve credit, and Phelps cannot be held guilty of the crime. Judgment: Judgment reversed; defendant acquitted.

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Note: Difference between instigation and entrapment (Reyes) In instigation, instigator (who is either a public officer or a private detective) practically induces the wouldbe accused into the commission of the offense. Instigation is an ebsolutory cause. In entrapment, ways and means are used in order to catch the lawbreaker in the act of committing the offense. Entrapment cannot be used as a defense.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES Mitigating circumstances are those which, if present in the c ommission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty. They are based on the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence or intent or on the lesser perversity of the offender. CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

-

1. ORDINARY MITIGATING Those mentioned in subsections 1 to 10 of Art. 13. 2.

PRIVILEGED MITIGATING

Par. 1: INCOMPLETE DEFENSE (1) Self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, (c) lack of sufficient provocation (2) Defense of relatives (3) Defense of strangers (4) State of necessity: (a) evil exists, (b) evil  injury caused, (c) no other practical means or less harmful way to prevent (5) Performance of a duty: (a) performance of or lawful exercise of a duty, (b) injury caused is a necessary consequence or due performance thereof (6) Obedience to an order of a superior: (a) order has been issued, (b) lawful purpose, (c) means used is lawful (7) Minority: (a) 9  age  15, (b) NOT with discernment (8) Causing injury by mere accident: (a) lawful act, (b) due care, (c) injury caused by mere accident, (d) without fault or intention [if without due care and with fault/intent, then there is negligence or imprudence] (9) Uncontrollable fear: (a) fear was of an evil  injury caused, (b) evil was of such GRAVITY and IMMINENCE that a normal person would have succumbed to it Par. 2: OFFENDER’s AGE: (a) 9 age  15, aced with discernment, (b) 15



age  18, (b) age



70.

Par. 3: LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG  There must be a notable DISPROPORTION between the means employed by the offender compared to that of the resulting felony. If the resulting felony could be EXPECTED from the means employed, the circumstance does not av ail.  The circumstance does not apply when the cr ime results from negligence, or culpa.  Judge by considering (1) the weapon used, (2) the injury afflicted, and (3) the attitude of mind when the  accuser attacked the other. Not applicable when the offender employed brute force. -Adapt Art. 13: Mitigating Circumstances – Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong People vs. Ural Facts: Ural was convicted of murder by the Zamboanga CFI sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and orderinh im to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola, in the sum of P12K and to pay the costs. The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, former detention prisoner who witnessed what happened. Ural, a policeman, boxed the deceased, Felix Napola, a detention prisoner, inside the jail. As a consequence of the fistic blows, the deceased collapsed on the floor. The accused stepped on the prostate body and left. After a while he returned with a bottle poured its contents on the recumbent body of the deceased, ignited it with a match and left the cell again. As a

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consequence, the victim later on died of the burns. The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Art 248(3), RPC) Held: The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Art 14(1), RPC) but it failed to appreciated the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed." (Art.13(3), RPC). The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. Thus, it may be deduced from the proven facts that the accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts 64(4) and 248, RPC) Par. 4: SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ACT Provocation must be: (1) sufficient, (2) originate from the offended party, (3) immediate to the act  Sufficient: adequate enough to excite a person to commit the wrong and must be accdgly proportionate to its  gravity. Depends on: (1) act constituting the provocation, (2) the social standing of the person provoked, (3) time and place provocation took place. Immediate: If there was an interval of time, the conduct could not have excited the accused to the commission of the crime, he heaving had time to regain his reason and to exercise self-control. But the threat should not be offensive and positively strong. If this is the case, then it gives rise to self-defense, a justifying circumstance. -Adapt

Art. 13: Immediate vindication of a grave offense US vs. Ampar Facts: During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age asked the deceased, Patobo, for some roast pig. In the presence of many guests, the deceased insulted the old man, saying: "There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." A little later, while the deceased was squatting down, the old man came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax. Held: While it may be mere trifle to an average person, it evidently was a serious matter to an old man, to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. The accused was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. In this case, the age of the accused and the place were considered in determining the gravity of the offense. -Adapt Art. 13: Passion or Obfuscation US vs. Hicks Facts: For about 5 years, the accused and the deceased lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wife. Afterwards, the deceased separated from the accused and lived with another man. The accused enraged by such conduct, killed the deceased. Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings, and not those which arise from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions. -Adapt US vs. De la Cruz Facts: The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his common-law wife upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a common acquaintance. Held: In this a case, the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. The facts in this case must be distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where it was found that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man. With a clean and well-prepared

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weapon, he enetered the house, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design. In this case, the cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the accused was his vexation, disappointment and anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do. In the present case, however, the impulse was caused by the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. Judgment: Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 12 yrs and 1 day of reclusion temporal. -Adapt

Art. 13: Illness People vs. Javier FACTS: o

o

o o

o

o

o

o

o

If Sir Barry asks where they lived, say Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union. :P On June 15, 1996, between 2AM and 3AM, Consolacion Javier Panit (Javier‘s dau ghter who lived near them) heard her mother shouting, ―Your father is going to kill me.‖ After hearing her mom scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma (Javier‘s daughter who lived with them), who told her that their p arents were quarrelling. So the sisters went to their brother‘s house (which was also conveniently near the parents‘ house), and together the three of them went to their parents‘ house. Upon entering, Manuel, the brother, found his mother, dead, and his father, wounded in the abdomen. The mom was found dead in the bedroom, drenched in her own blood. Manuel told his sisters that their mother was dead, and that their father had confessed to him that he had killed his wife and then stabbed himself.

SPO1 Rotelio Pacho testified that he had received a call for assistance from the barangay captain because Javier had allegedly killed his wife. Pacho also testified that Manuel had told him that his father had confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to him the supposed murder weapon, a bolo covered with blood, which had been found in the bedroom. Medical findings: Florentina Javier suffered from multiple injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body. Eduardo Javier admitted to killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a sharp bolo. He also said that he‘d killed his wife because he had been unable to sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank, and he didn‘t know what he was doing. He claimed insanity, at the time of the incident. The RTC rejected the defense of insanity and found him guilty of parricide. RTC gave him the death penalty. In the SC appeal, Javier said the RTC erred in imposing the death penalty, considering the presence of 2 mitigating circumstances: illness, and passion and obfuscation. He says he should be given a lower penalty, because at the time of the incident, he had been suffering from loss of sleep over a prolonged period of time, and this caused him to commit the crime. In addition to this, he had a suspicion that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man. This, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to kill his wife.

OSG said that Javier cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of illness, in the absence of medical findings to support his claim. No sufficient evidence, either, for the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation Held: SC held: o

o

The RTC had rejected the defense of insanity for failure of the defense to prove that Javier was indeed insane at the time of the incident. No medical records, no psychiatrists were ever presented to validate the insanity claim. The defense never alleged the mitigating circumstances during the trial, either. The mitigating circumstance of illness has the following requisites: illness must DIMINISH the exercise of willpower of the offender o illness should NOT DEPRIVE the offender of CONSCIOUSNESS of his acts o

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o

o

o

Mitigating circumstance attempt is FAIL, because: no medical finding was pre sented regarding Javier‘s mental condition at the time of killing o no clear and convincing evidence was shown that Javier was suffering an illness which diminished o his willpower Plus: Javier was aware of the acts he committed. The fact that he remembers things from the o time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital shows he was in full control of his mental faculties. This means that if he was suffering from an illness, it was not the kind of illness that diminished the exercise of his willpower. he remembered killing his wife in the bedroom with a bolo, where he mangled her neck  twice he remembered being brought to the hospital  Mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation doesn‘t apply either, because the following elements were not proven to exist in the instant case. Elements: o there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind  said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the  crime by a considerable length of time

No aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Decision modified: reclusion perpetua . -Reyes Art. 13: Analogous circumstances Canta vs. People FACTS: 1. Narciso Gabriel acquired a cow upon its birth on March 10, 1984 2. Narciso left it with his sister in law Erlinda Montes, then he left it with Generoso Cabonce, then with Maria Tura, and then with Gardemo Agapay. 3. Agapay took the cow up a mountain for grazing and it was gone when he came back for it 4. Hoof prints led him to Valejos house and he was told that Canta had taken it. 5. Narciso instructed Maria Tura to get the cow. She met Canta who said that he gave it to his father, the barangay captain. They went to father‘s house and Tura recognized cow. Canta said he will consult with his father on what to do and call her about it later. 6. Canta didn‘t call so Narciso reported it to police 7. In the investigation Canta admitted he took cow, but he contended that it was his cow. He lost it Dec 3 1985. He produced 2 certificates of ownership dated March 17, 1986 and Feb 27, 1988. 8. Narciso presented certificate of ownership dated Mar 9 1986 signed by municipal treasurer. I contained a description of the cow including identifying marks (cowlicks on the head, back and legs; coloring). 4 previous caretakers certify that this is the cow they took care of. 9.

Canta said that he got the baby cow as payment for taking care of Pat. Villanueva‘s cow. It was born on Dec 5, 1984 and was lost Dec 2 1985. He reported loss to Padre Burgos. 10. His uncle said he saw the cow under the care of Agapay. Canta went to the Agapay‘s grazing place with the mommy cow to see if the baby cow would drink its milk, it did so Canta assumed the baby cow was his. 11. He brought it to his father and Maria tried to get it but Canta‘s father refused and asked Narci so to come by so they can discuss. Narciso never came by. Canta took cow to Padre Burgos. ISSUES: 1. Canta‘s Certificate of Ownership a. It was not filed by the municipal treasurer, but by Canta‘s friend Franklin Telen who was a janitor at the municipal treasure r‘s office. Telen issued certificate on March 24, 1986 but he antedated it Feb 27, 1985 at the request of Canta who assured Telen that he owned the cow. No registration recorded in municipal records. b. Trial Court said: Obviously Canta took the cow using strategy and stealth considering Agapay was separated by a hill and couldn‘t see him. Canta tries to justify taking the cow with a certificate of  ownership but Telen said he antedated the certificate. c. It is clear Canta falsified and manipulated the certificate of title. He only got it after the incident happened on March 14, 1986. His claim has no leg to stand on. CA agrees. 2. Petitioner Canta claims good faith and honest belief in his right to the cow

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a. Brought mother cow and calf suckled its milk b. Compared marks on the cow to the recorded marks on his certificate. Match. c. He turned over cow to barangay captain, and later to police when the dispute began d. Filed complaint against Nicolas for cattle rustling. 3. Cattle Rustling requisites a. Large cattle is taken b. It belongs to another i. No question cattle belongs so Narciso Gabriel c. Taking without consent of owner i. Canta tok cow from Agapay even if he knew Agapay was holding it for Narciso. d. Taking done by any means method or scheme i. He falsified certificate of ownership, a scheme e. Taking is with or without intent to gain i. Canta concocted a ploy to obtain ownership so he had an obvious intent to gain f. Taking without violence or intimidation i. No violence g. Fact that Canta went to barangay captain does not prove good faith. He already committed a crime, also the barangay captain was his father. h. Calves suckle on strange cows. It don‘t have to be the mom. 4. Petitioner says that even if his certificate of ownership is ―not in order‖ it does not mean he did not believe in good faith that the cow was his. Merely mistake of fact. a. His certificate was FRADULENT. Negates good faith. b. If he had been responsible he could have verified ownership of cow first. He was negligent c. He was NOT justified to take cow, tried to take law into own hands 5. MITIGATING circumstances a. Analogous with voluntary surrender, which has the ff elements i. Offender not actually arrested 1. In the case: Canta not yet arrested. There was no complaint filed against him when he surrendered cow. The intent to unconditional submission was there. Also there was intent to save authorities the trouble of search and capture. 2. He voluntarily took cow to municipal hall of Padre Burgos and put it in custody of authorities. 3. Can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender ii. Offender surrenders to authority iii. Surrender is voluntary b. PD 533 Anti- Catte Rustling Law is not a special law. It‘s penalties are discussed in RPC. DECISION: One mitigating circumstance equals the case be fixed in minimum period. CA decisions lessened. 4 yrs. 2 mos. (minimum) 10 yrs 1 day maximum. -Escueta

Art. 14: Aggravating circumstances  – Insult to public authorities People vs. Rodil FACTS: April 24, 1971 around 1:00 pm 1. Floro Rodil was found guilty of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court for the death of Lt. Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. 2. Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang Market. 3. While they were eating, their attention was called by Rodil who was outside blowing his whistle. 4. Masana, in civilian clothing, accompanied by Fidel went outside and asked Rodil, after identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked under his shirt had a license. 5. Instead of answering, Rodil attempted to draw his gun but Fidel grabbed the gun and gave it to Masana. 6. The three went inside the restaurant and Masana wrote a receipt for the gun on a coupon bond paper and he asked Rodil to sign it. Rodil refused to do so. 7. Masana refused to return the gun to Rodil and as Masana was about to stand up Rodil pulled out his double bladed dagger and stabbed Masana several times on the chest and stomach causing his death after several hours. 8. While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana who were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from the table, stood up to assist him.

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9.

But Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. 10. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, CaviteVersion of the defense 11. Rodil is claiming self-defense. RODIL’s VERSION 12. Rodil together with his wife was eating inside the restaurant. While they were waiting for their food, Masana approached and inquired whether he was a member of the Anti-smuggling Unit. Rodil answered in the affirmative and Masana invited him to join him in his table, where he sat drinking, alone. 13. Rodil accepted the invitation. During their conversation, Masana asked for identification of Rodil and the latter showed his ID. Masana told Rodil that his ID was fake and Rodil insisted that it was genuine. Masana was demanding that Rodil surrender his ID to him but Rodil refused. When Rodil refused, Masana pulled out his gun and hit the accused on the head with its handle 2 times and as a result blood gushed out from his head and face. Rodil pulled out his dagger and stabbed Masana and then ran out of the restaurant. Rodil went to the direction of the Municipal building where he intended to surrender. While on his way, he met the Chief of Police and he was accompanied to the municipal building and was given first aid treatment. ISSUE: 1. WON self-defense can be availed by Rodil 2. WON the crime committed was murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of authority. 3. WON the AC disregard of rank should be appreciated RULING: 1. NO. Self-defense must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence Accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. Court cannot perceive how the refusal of the accused to give his ID could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt. It is the accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned. 2. Crime committed was only homicide (No complex crime but there is a general aggravating circumstance) No treachery  – assailant and victim was face to face . Attack wasn‘t treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the attack with his hand. In fact, the force of warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing a wound on his head (one Rodil later claimed he got from the Masana hitting him with a gun). But prosecution failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime and making it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing  o means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially to insure its  execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Assault upon person of authority  – the Information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must be expressly and specifically a verred in the Information; otherwise, in o the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in o authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. 3. YES. Whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance is present. Masana identified himself as a PC officer and the accused is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior to both in rank and social status. Rank – refers to a high social position or standing Cases wherein the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated a. People vs. Benito  – clerk murdered assistant chief of the personnel transaction division b. People vs. Torres  – murder of Col. Salgado and injuries to Gen. Castaneda c. People vs. Valeriano  – murder of district judge

D2013 | Criminal Law 1 | Prof. I. M. Gutierrez III | 39

Chief of Police (Panaligan) was present during the incident. Panaligan was the one who wrested the dagger from Rodil and the accused knew him to be the chief of police. Chief of police is considered a public authority or a person in authority for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the law. >> I think the point was, Rodil shouldn’t have committed a crime (much less kill someone) knowing that the Chief of police was there. Parang, you shouldn’t buy pirated DVDs infront of Edu Manzano. Hahaha