Crim Digests Final

People vs. Page (G.R. No. L-37507)

Facts: On February 13, 1972 Crisanto Camposano, went to the house of William Page. They were friends since boyhood. Page was an eighteen-year old third year high school student at the Arellano' University. At past ten o'clock, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda or intersection of Taft Avenue and F. B. Harrison Boulevard, where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with a balisong knife. Camposano had a revolver. According to Page's confession, he seated himself beside a male passenger who was near the driver on the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney where two female passengers were seated. With the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and Camposano told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M. Roxas Boulevard, and then to turn left going to Parañaque . There, they held up the driver and the three passengers. They got the money and pieces of jewelry of the passengers and the driver. From the rear view mirror of the jeepney, Page saw Camposano dumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard. Then, the two directed the driver to proceed to the airport. Camposano gave Page a watch and a woman's ring as his share of the loot. The woman, who jumped from the jeepney was brought to the hospital, however, she was already dead when she reached the hospital. William Page appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 21, 1973, convicting him of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly ruled that Page, as a fellow conspirator of Camposano, could be held liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only. Held: The SC find that the trial court's conclusion as to conspiracy is borne out by the evidence. Page and Camposano were boyhood friends. About six hours before the crime was committed, they were already together. They were in the Baclaran rotonda at around ten o'clock in the evening or shortly before the holdup was committed. They boarded the jeepney in that place. Inside the jeepney, they coordinated their actions. They directed the jeepney driver to go near the airport or in the vicinity of Page's residence, a place which was well-known to the two malefactors. They left the jeepney together and fled in the same direction. There is not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit robbery existed between Page and Camposano. The fact that the two armed themselves with deadly weapons, a knife and a revolver, signified that they were determined to kill their victims in order to consummate their nefarious objective. The conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of Page and Camposano. Those acts reveal that they had agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). This Court may take judicial notice that that kind of robbery has been frequently committed since the liberation when the jeepney came into existence as a public conveyance. Page and Camposano implemented their agreement when they waited for a passenger jeepney at the Baclaran rotonda and boarded it at the same time. If they had no evil intention, they could have sat together at the back. But, they did not do so. Obviously, as previously planned by them, Page took the front seat so that he could control the driver and at the same time extort money from him and the other passenger in the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney so that he could rob the two female passengers.

People vs. Balmores (G.R. No. L-1896) Facts: Accused Rafael Balmores was convicted for the crime of attempted estafa through falsification of a security. On September 22, 1947, accused tear off the bottom portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29, 1947. Thereafter, he present the said falsified ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding cash. Accused pretended that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55. However, one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused presented the said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said accused right then and there. Issue: Whether or not Balmores committed an impossible crime. Held: No. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was not punishable but is now under article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following: (1) When one tries to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is common salt; and (2) when one tries to murder a corpse. Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care. The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of "treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations and securities" is reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. This being a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Philippines, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period in accordance with article 48. Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.

People vs. Manero (G.R. Nos. 86883-85) Facts: On 11 April 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring with three others of a plan to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers. Among their targets are: Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. They later on nailed a plac ard near the carinderia bearing the names of their intended victims. Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades'carinderia. After a heated confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of Bantil who was able to parry and was hit at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil was able to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his men to surround the house so that Bantil would die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final. Issue: Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of defense of alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill. Held: The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to them, were in a farm some one kilometre away from the crime scene. The court held that ―It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.‖ There is no physical impossibility where the accused can be at the crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were two eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused. Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as long as the person is also Italian priest.

People vs. Pugay (G.R. No. L-74324) Facts: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame. Both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Issue: Whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused-appellant. Held: There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him.

Pomoy vs. People (439 SCRA 439) Facts: Tomas Balboa was a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Iloilo. On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at and arrested Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of st the already defunct 321 Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained along with another suspect, Edgar Samudio. At about 2 o‘clock in the afternoon, petitioner, a police sergeant, directed Balboa to come out from the jail where he is detained, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. When petitioner and Balboa were near the investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. Certain Dr. Palma, who happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary, examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead. Issue: Whether or not the act of the accused was committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. Held: Yes. The act of the petitioner to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody, is a lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer. Aside from the fact that all the elements of accident as an Exempting Circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code were present in this case, which exonerate the accused from criminal liability, the accused was also in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer at that time of the incident. He was a member, specifically one of the investigators of the PNP stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company, and that under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter‘s cell for a routine interrogation. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. He was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself. The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim‘s death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.

Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan (268 SCRA 332) Facts: Through their separate petitions for review, Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the Resolution dated December 20. 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the principal accused — he being charged in all three (3) cases. Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents: Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals (January 10, 16 and 31, 1986). The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors committed by the Sandiganbayan for this Court's consideration. Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of obedience to a lawful order be appreciated in absolving the appellants in the crime charged? Held: The Court reversed the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Accused Tabuena and Peralta are ACQUITTED. It is settled that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior — the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money. Thus, it has been said that: Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation. The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he, upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.

People vs. Beronilla (96 Phil 566) Facts: This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra convicting them for murder. Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting the enemy" . He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy. Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. On the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold. Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla, the prosecutors, the members of the jury, the executioner, the grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the dAefendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits. The case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty was ordered provisionally dismissed. Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as state

witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra. In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court. Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of obedience to a lawful order be appreciated in absolving the appellants in the crime charged? Held: No. The appellaThe Court reversed the decision and acquit the appellants. The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, although it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. No satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof. The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra, Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did, half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience? Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal

must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death. But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation.

People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309)

Facts: On April 6, 1998, Atty. Yap supervising agent of the Dangeroud Drugs Division of the NBI, received an information that certain Roberto Pacis was offering to sell ½ kilo of shabu for the amount of P950 per gram or a total of P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Sr. Agent Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case. The two officer and an informant went to the house of the appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. They negotiated the sale of ½ kilo of shabu. The total price was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed that the payment and delivery of shabu would be made the next day at same place. On April 17, 1998, NBI agents and the informant went to appellant‘s house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag, the latter saw a transparent plastic with white crystalline substance inside. Appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap introduced Congzon to get the money from the car. When Congzon returned, he gave the ―boodle money‖ to Atty. Yap who handed to the appellant. Upon receipt of payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and debunked appellant‘s defense of ―frame-up‖. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the ―buy-bust‖ operation that led to the appellant‘s arrest was valid? Held: In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the wouldbe defendant into the commission of the offense and become co- principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engage in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. The records show that the operation that led to the arrest of the appellant was indeed an entrapment, not instigation. Courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in the regular manner. In entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by the prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold was a dangerous drug. The elements were duly proven in the case herein. The record shows that the appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers.

People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701) Facts: In a flea market, Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater, watching a cara y cruz game. Out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. He saw people running away from the place where there was a cara y cruz game. Next, he saw Alfredo and the accused. Alfredo was soaked in blood while the accused was running towards the basketball court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him. Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The accused was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of bringing Alfredo to the hospital when he saw blood oozing from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died. Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder in the death of Alfredo Senador. Callet appealed his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial Court gravely erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Therefore, his liability should be mitigated. Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet should be mitigated in that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong? Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the accused-appellant‘s conviction. Two witnesses positively identified the person of the accused who stabbed the victim. The lack of ―intent‖ to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefore, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.

Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747) Facts: Petitioner, as President and General Manager of the company, humiliated his employees and blurted out invectives against the latter. He was charged with multip[le grave oral defamation by 5 of his employees who were allegedly the recipient of the said invectives. He was found guilty of oral defamation in 4 out of 5 cases filed against him. Petitioner elevated the judgment from the MeTC to the RTC; however, the latter affirmed his conviction, with modification, accrediting to him the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. His appeal to the CA was to no avail also. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation? Held: NO. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. The penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit.

Considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

People v. Evina (405 SCRA 152)

Facts: Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence of Reclusion Pertpetua for raping certain Ms. Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts, Gerardo took advantage of the time when the victim‘s mother was not around. He would likely forced Maritess to have carnal knowledge against her will and even poked a knife at her while doing the deed in the victim‘s dwelling and threatened the victim to kill her family should she tell her parents what happened. There, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. On November 13, 1991 when the appellant arrived at the Catcharro residence he proceeded inside the bedroom of Marites, the latter ran out of the bedroom and told her mother not to leave her because her Papa Gerry might rape her again. Surprised by what he heard, the following day Maritess was brought to Tacloban City Medical Center for a check-up and found to have lacerations to the victim‘s genitalia. Contrary to the facts above, appellant claimed that the night of the incident he was working as porter until 10 PM, thus it cannot be said that he committed the crime accused of him. Based on the information submitted, aggravating circumstances of use of weapon and dwelling were not alleged. Issue: Whether or not aggravating circumstances proved during trial but was not alleged in the information may be considered? Held: The Supreme Court held in the negative. Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant.

People vs. Antonio (G.R. No. 144266) Facts: On June 16, 1996, accused-appellant Wilson Antonio, Jr. was carrying a gun and walking towards Sergio Mella's house. Wilson's sister Wilfe followed him and pleaded to him to stop but he ignored her and continued going to the house of Sergio. A few minutes later, gunshots were heard coming from inside the house of Sergio Mella. Wilson aimed his gun at Sergio who was asleep on the bed and fired hitting Sergio on the chest, shoulder and back. He was also hit on his left thigh. Immediately after firing his gun, Wilson hurriedly left the room. When the police arrived Sergio was already dead. Fe Antonio, accused-appellant's mother, reported the incident to the police. When the police went to the house of Wilson to arrest him, he was already gone. He eluded arrest for more than one (1) year after the incident or until 23 October 1997 when he surrendered to the police. The killing was admitted by the accused. t was also clearly proved during the trial. The only defense raised by accused-appellant was whether he was insane during the commission of the crime so that he was exempt from criminal liability. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and unlawful entry. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation dwelling and unlawful entry can be appreciated despite failure of the prosecution to allege in the information the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and dwelling and unlawful entry. Held: The SC held that pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, every Complaint or Information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This rule may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The aggravating

circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and unlawful entry, not having been alleged in the Information, may not now be appreciated to enhance the liability of accused-appellant.

People vs. Villamor (G.R. Nos. 140407-08 ) Facts: On November 24, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez and Jelord Velez were on their way home on board a motorcycle which was driven by the former. As they neared the junction of Barangays Lusot and Mitakas, they heard a speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. The brothers ignored the other motorcycle, which caught up with them. As they were about to cross the bridge leading to their home, gunshots rang out from behind them. They abruptly turned the motorcycle around towards the direction of the gunfire. The light of their motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers aboard the second motorcycle. The assailants fired at them a second time and fled. Jerry sustained gunshot wounds on the abdomen and left elbow, but survived and was able to see their assailants. Jelord, however, was not as fortunate, as he died on the spot during the first gunburst. One of the accused, as admitted in their pre-trial, was PO3 Renato F. Villamor.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of murder and frustrated murder aggravated by abuse of public position. Issue: Whether or not the crime was committed with treachery aggravated by abuse of public authority. Held: The SC agreed with the trial court that the killing of Jelord was attended by treachery or alevosia. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing inasmuch as the two conditions for the same are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift, sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. The treacherous manner in which the victim was killed was shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting and apparently unarmed victims but also by the deliberate manner in which the assault was perpetrated. In this case, a totally unsuspecting Jelord Velez held onto his brother Jerry on board their motorcycle on their way home blissfully unaware of the onrushing peril behind them. The Court, however, held that the trial court improperly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position as provided for in Article 14, paragraph 1 of the RPC. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry "Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?" In this case, there was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Jelord Velez or that he used his "influence, prestige or ascendancy" in killing the victim. Accused-appellant could have shot Velez even without being a policeman.

People vs. De Mesa (G. R. No. 137036) Facts: On October 15, 1996, Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas was shot dead while playing a card game with some townmates at a neighborhood store. One of those implicated in the killing was Hernando de Mesa, the appellant in this case. For his defense, accused-appellant recounted his activities on October 15, 1996. Accused-appellant said that he was not aware of any unusual incident that could have disturbed his sleep that night. The next day, October 16, he learned from his neighbors that their barangay chairman had been killed. He did not know who was responsible for the killing. He said that he and his wife attended the wake of their barangay chairman. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with the aggravating circumstances of commission of the crime in contempt of or assault to public authorities and at nighttime. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed? Held: The SC found that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms of attack which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. The circumstantial evidence on record does not prove that there was any conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the accused-appellant to adopt any particular means, method or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. The mere fact that the wounds were found at the back of the victim does not by itself prove that there was treachery. An attack from behind is not necessarily treacherous unless it appears that the method of attack was adopted by the accused deliberately with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without any risk to the assailant from the defense that the party assaulted may make. Hence, treachery cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar, there being no eyewitnesses to the killing or evidence on the manner of its execution. The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. The fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain such aggravating circumstance. For nocturnity to properly attend the commission of a crime, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission and that it was purposely sought by the offender. These facts were not proved in the case at bar. Finally, the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that the commission of the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public authorities. The requisites of this circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are present in this case. In the first place, the crime was committed against the barangay chairman himself. At the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the discharge of his duties as he was in fact playing a card game with his neighbors.

People vs. Tac-an (G.R. Nos. 76338-39) Facts: Renato Tac-an and Francis Escanowere close friends being classmates in high school and members of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on the advice of his mother who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visits to their home. Things started turning sour between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After locating the victim he fired at him but missed. He was later able to hit him in the head as he was running to the door with his classmates to escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher unknowing that Renato was the culprit, asked him for help unwittingly informing him that Francis was still alive. Renato immediately re-entered the room and saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple. Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis down to the ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. Francis died before reaching the hospital. In his defense, Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense. The trial court convicted Renato guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in authority. Issue: Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. Held: The SC held that the trial court erred in finding the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. A careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 of the RPC will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly

vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of 31 Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.

People vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 153119) Facts: On June 11, 1998, it was reported that someone managed to gain entry to the house of Lagrada (victim), a 70-yr old spinster. The policemen saw the bloodied Lagrada, naked from the waist up, sprawled sidewise on the floor opposite the sink near the kitchen. Near the cadaver was a bolo (itak). Gonzales (police) took custody of the bolo. Magpantay (Barangay Captain) noticed that Lagrada‘s neighbors, anxious to know what had happened, were in the vicinity. The appellant, however, was nowhere to be found. It was reported that the accused was within the vicinity and when he was found, he was handcuffed and boarded in the mobile police car. He was told that he was a suspect in the killing of Lagrada. While in the car, the accused was frisked, and found several items including a bank passbook under the name of Lagrada. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant where they found a pair of slippers and the green-colored t-shirt which the appellant wore when he broke into Lagrada‘s house. The appellant denied any involvement in the killing of Lagrada and of robbing her of money and pieces of jewelry. The trial court convicted the accused of the offense of robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstance dwelling of the offended party without any provocation given by the latter and the complete disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her age and sex.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, age or sex. Held: Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim‘s age is applied only to crimes against persons and honor. The bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of sex. For this circumstance to be properly considered, the prosecution must adduce evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused had particularly intended to insult or commit disrespect to the sex of the victim. In this case, the appellant killed the victim because the latter started to shout. There was no intent to insult nor commit disrespect to the victim on account of the latter‘s sex.

The fact that the crime was committed in the victim‘s dwelling, without provocation on the part of the latter, is aggravating in robbery with homicide. However, such circumstance was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rule should be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellant.

People vs. Taboga (G.R. Nos. 144086-87) Facts: On April 1, 1998, Cirilo Urayani woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He went out of the house to fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire.

Marites Ceria, a niece of Francisca Tubon, was also awakened by the explosions. She rushed to her aunt‘s house and, seeing it on fire, shouted for help. She called out the name of her aunt but there was no response. Barangay officials and residents helped in dousing out the fire. When they entered the burned house, they discovered the charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the body and found stab wounds on the chest of the deceased. Later that morning, the incident was reported to the police authorities. Upon investigation, several items and money were found few meters from the burned house. The deceased‘s former farm workers were rounded up, namely, Mario Ceria, Edwin Ceria, Tante Dumadag and Edralin Taboga. Brgy. Capt. Pagao noticed fresh blood stains on the short pants of Taboga. He confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Francisca Tubon and set the flue-cured tobacco stored inside her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned. Accused-appellant Edralin Taboga raised the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he was in the house of the parents of his live-in partner, some 70m away. Accused-appellant further claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and arson. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and disregard of rand age or sex were attendant in the commission of the crime. Held: In any event, the aggravating circumstances alleged attended the killing. The immutable fact remains that the crime of homicide was committed in the victim’s dwelling and without regard to her age and sex. The circumstance of dwelling aggravates the felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter was not given provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. As one commentator puts it, one‘s dwelling is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus one who slanders another in the latter‘s house is more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere. According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in another‘s dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver alarm. Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that the malefactor deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. Neither could disregard of respect due to sex be appreciated if the offender did not manifest any intention to offend or disregard the sex of the victim. In other words, killing a woman is not attended by the aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect towards the offended party‘s sex. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that accused-appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the victim. However, even if disrespect or disregard of age or sex were not appreciated, the four circumstances enumerated in Article 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, can be considered singly or together.

People vs. Melendres (G.R. No. 134940) Facts: In the evening of July 23, 1992, first cousins, Rodrigo Hungoy and Mardie Balasabas together with Mardie‘s brothers, Syrel and Exor, were resting inside the house of one Pacifico Gualingco. The four companions are cultivating the farmland owned by Pacifico and were staying at the house built on the middle of the farm. The house has two floors, the second floor being two and a half feet above the ground and accessible through a stair inside the ―sala‖ of the house. About 9:00 of the same evening, the barking of the dog awakened Rodrigo and Mardie. They peeped through the porch and looked at the front yard where they saw three persons in the yard who they did not immediately recognize because it was dark. The three persons proceeded to the upper portion of the house and pushed the main door which was not locked. Syrel and Exor remained asleep while Rodrigo and Mardie jumped out and hid at the back portion of the house which was not illuminated. They again peeped through a hole in the bamboo walling of the house which was already dilapidated. There, Rodrigo and Mardie recognized the faces of the three appellants because the room where Syrel and Exor were sleeping was illuminated by a ―tingkaro‖, a kerosene lamp. The three went near Syrel and Exor. With the use of a bolo, Catalino and Bernardino proceeded to hack Syrel while Teodulo hacked Exor. After witnessing the hacking of Syrel and Exor, Rodrigo and Mardie went straight to the house of Rodrigo which is about 150 meters away from the house where the incident happened. Rodrigo went directly inside the house ahead of Mardie. Mardie, on the other hand, went to another house which is approximately ten meters away from Rodrigo‘s house, occupied by his parents. He informed Rodrigo‘s father and one Ricardo Palomar about the hacking of Syrel and Exor. Rodrigo‘s father then advised Mardie to go inside the house where Rodrigo was and to close the door.The following morning Rodrigo and Mardie informed the latter‘s mother, Lita Balasabas about the incident that happened the previous night. Together with some relatives and neighbors they then went to the house where the incident occurred and found the dead bodies of Syrel and Exor. They placed the cadavers in coffins and brought them to the ―poblacion‖ and had them autopsied. After securing the death certificates of her sons, Lita, together with other companions went to the police to report the incident. They then buried the bodies on the same day. The principal defense of appellants is alibi. The trial court found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder and imposed a penalty of two (2) reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery and dwelling should be appreciated in this case. Held: The trial court erred in not taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling that attended the killing of Syrel and Exor. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is also present in the instant case. Under Article 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, dwelling is aggravating if the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation. As contemplated under the law, dwelling may mean temporary dwelling. Moreover, dwelling may be aggravating even though the victim was not the owner of the house where the crime was committed. In the present case, it is not disputed that the house owned by Pacifico Gualingco where Syrel and Exor were killed was used by the victims as dwelling.

People vs. Rios (G.R. No. 132632) Facts: On February 7, 1996, appellant Angel Rios, hurled stones at the house of Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto. A few minutes later, and while the Benedicto spouses were tending their store, appellant bought cigarettes. Ambrocio confronted appellant about the stoning incident and an altercation ensued between them. As the two engaged in a verbal tussle, Joselino Mesa and his fellow barangay tanods who were roving the vicinity, chanced upon the disputants. Having heard the appellant shout at Ambrocio, Mesa intervened and requested the two to part ways. He even escorted them to their respective residences. A few minutes later, appellant went back to the store. Just then, Anacita saw her husband go to the terrace of their house. Appellant suddenly approached Ambrocio and stabbed his right stomach. Anacita was only a meter away from the antagonists; she was facing her husband‘s back while appellant was standing in front of Ambrocio. As Anacita started shouting, appellant fled. With only appellant testifying, the defense interposed alibi. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Held: The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada in this case. The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof and therefore it includes the staircase of the house and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime. It was held that the altercation between appellant and Ambrocio that immediately preceded the latter‘s fatal stabbing is not within the purview of the concept of provocation under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The unrebutted facts established by the prosecution show that it was the appellant who started the events that led to his unfortunate killing of Ambrocio, by stoning the latter‘s house. In an apparent show of unmitigated braggadocio, appellant even went to the victim‘s house on the pretext of buying cigarettes after the stone-throwing incident. The victim naturally confronted appellant about that incident. As the two engaged in heated argument, the roving tanods intervened and the two parted ways. However, a few minutes later, appellant returned to the victim‘s house and right at the latter‘s terrace, dealt him the fatal stab wound. Under

these circumstances, to cater to appellant‘s claim that the victim provoked him would amount to erasing the duly established fact that by stoning the victim‘s house, appellant himself instigated the heated argument that resulted in his physical assault upon the victim.

People vs Arrojado (G.R. No. 130492) Facts: Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins. Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He helped care for the victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary. In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. In response, Erlinda, together with her husband Romulo Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico Arrojado, went with accused-appellant to the house where they found the victim dead. The victim, who was bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her bed was a rosary and a cruifix. Near her was a knife. Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast, while all the windows were closed except the window on the east side which was slightly open. As he went to the other room, where the victim's father stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death. The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victim's room "was very neat as if nothing happened." The police saw no signs of forcible entry.

Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness is present. Held: The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The condifence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belied that the former would not abuse said confidence. In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. Thinking that accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked. The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death on accusedappellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent." The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant's sentence to death.1âwphi1.nêt

People vs. Ancheta (G.R. No. 143935)

Facts: On March 20, 1987, Alfredo Roca he was in his farm to thresh palay. Later on, an owner-type jeep with trailer stopped at a spot not far from his hut. He recognized the occupants as accused Antos Dacanay, Edgardo "Liling" Areola, William Ancheta, Lito de la Cruz, Ely Calacala and appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep who all alighted from the jeep. Dacanay, Areola and Ancheta stood on one side of the irrigation canal facing Marjun Roca who was standing on the other side. Alfredo saw Dacanay suddenly pull out a gun and shoot Marjun on the head, causing the latter to fall to the ground. As he lay on the ground, Marjun was again shot, this time by Areola and Ancheta. Thereafter, Ulep, de la Cruz and Calacala started firing at Alfredo‘s hut. Alfredo was not hit, however, because he was able to get out of the hut and dive into the irrigation canal in the nick of time. However, Benita and Febe were fatally hit by the initial volley of gunfire. The assailants fired at Alfredo in the canal but they did not hit him. Ancheta then hurled a grenade which exploded near the hut. When the group ran out of bullets, Alfredo emerged from the canal and hid inside his hut. He saw the group load onto the trailer 35 sacks of palay, each containing an average of 50 kilos valued at P4.50 per kilo. Alfredo owned the stolen palay. Appellant Ulep and his companions then boarded their jeep and left. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery and with a band are present. Held: f the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information,

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only treachery and band were established.

There was treachery as the events narrated by the eyewitnesses pointed to the fact that the victims could not have possibly been aware that they would be attacked by appellant and his companions. There was no opportunity for the victims to defend themselves as the assailants, suddenly and without provocation, almost simultaneously fired their guns at them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. The offense was also proven to have been executed by a band. A crime is committed by a band when at least four armed malefactors act together in the commission thereof. In this case, all six accused were armed with guns which they used on their victims. Clearly, all the armed assailants, including appellant, took direct part in the execution of the robbery with homicide.

People vs. Villanueva (G.R. No. 139177) Facts: On November 15, 1996, at around 12 midnight, Marife Brabante was attending to her duties as cashier a store owned by her mother, Rita Binay-an. She was assisted by Cheryl Dapiaoen and George Bautista. They were about to close the store when appellant, together with a certain Jerry, Teddy and an unidentified person, arrived. They occupied one of the tables and started drinking the liquor which they brought with them. Appellant then asked Marife if they could stay until 5:00 a.m. but Marife refused since they were unruly. When the group was about to leave, Cheryl asked appellant to pay the amount of P35 as cover charge. At this point, appellant became angry and threw two bottles of gin on the floor. Marife‘s brother, Orland, who was sleeping in one of the rooms of the store, was awakened by the noise. He went out and told appellant not to create trouble. But appellant shoved him and left with a warning that he would return to kill somebody. Appellant got on his tricycle and bumped the door of the store while his companions threw rocks at it. Meanwhile, Marife‘s other brother, Otoleo, got up from his bed and asked Cheryl to go with him to buy balut at the nearby store, which was only eight meters away from their store. After 30 minutes, appellant returned to Highlander Store with a knife. He walked past Marife and told her that she was not the one he was going to kill. Appellant went toward the Seven Star Store where Otoleo and Cheryl were then buying balut. Upon reaching the store, appellant suddenly stabbed Otoleo at the back. The victim turned to face appellant but the latter again stabbed him twice on the left armpit. Otoleo fell to the ground and appellant ran away. Marife, who was outside the Highlander Store, rushed to the bloodied body of her brother and hugged him. She brought the victim to the Rosario District Hospital in Rosario, La Union where he was declared dead on arrival. The appellant escaped from prison before the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence. Hence, he was deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence to dispute the charge. The trial court convicted the appellant of the offense charged. Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime are correctly appreciated by the lower court in convicting the accused-appellant. Held: The SC appreciated the presence of treachery. It was clearly established that appellant attacked the victim suddenly, without warning and from behind, and when the unarmed victim tried to face appellant, the latter stabbed him again twice on his left armpit, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare for his defense or enable him to offer the least resistance to the sudden assault. Treachery exists when the means, method or manner of attack employed by the accused assures no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might take. Supreme Court, however, did not agree that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. This circumstance cannot be appreciated against appellant as no evidence was adduced to show that the killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. There was no proof that, when appellant went to the Highlander Store, he already had plans to kill Otoleo. Neither was there any evidence of the time when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of appellant. Likewise, the time interval of 30 minutes between the altercation at the Highlander Store and the actual assault on Otoleo was too brief to have enabled appellant to ponder over the consequences of his intended act.

Also, The trial court also erred in appreciating nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. At the outset, it should be noted that the circumstance of nighttime was not alleged in the information as mandated by law. And even if alleged, nighttime cannot properly be considered in this case because, although the crime was committed late at night, there was no evidence that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or that it was specially sought by the offender to ensure the commission thereof, or that the offender took advantage of 29 it for impunity. The record does not show that appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness when he assaulted Otoleo Brabante. The prosecution established no more than the simple fact that the crime was committed at night. The lower court improperly considered appellant‘s escape from detention as an aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the RPC is exclusive and flight is certainly not one of those specified in said article.

People vs. Silva (G.R. No. 140871) Facts: On September 3, 1996, Edmundo Ceriales, passed by his brother Manuel‘s house. There, he saw six other men. Some of these men were playing tong-its while the others were merely watching the game. Suddenly three men arrived. One pointed an armalite gun to all those present and ordered them to lie on their stomach. Another ordered brothers Edmundo and Manuel to get out of the house. As soon as they were out, they were made to lie face down. Upon the order of the appellant, Edmundo and Manuel were tied together by two armed men (Rodolfo Sandangao and Junjun Flores). Edmundo recognized Sandangao through the light coming from a vehicle. They continued walking side by side as they were tied. Edmundo whispered Manuel that he recognized the assailant. Upon reaching Lucing Guerrero‘s coconut plantation, they were made to sit on a hollow block. It was at this point where appellant Resty Silva focused a flashlight on himself. He then asked the brothers if they knew their abductors. When he and Manuel positively answered, appellant Silva retorted ―Papano yan Dupong, kilala pala tayo, obligado na nating patayin.‖ Edmundo was thereafter separated from Manuel and was brought some 20m away. Sandangao tied the feet of Edmundo. He then tried to free himself jumping away from where he was until he fell into a hole. While there, he tried to untie his hands and feet till he heard the scream of Manuel followed by sound akin to the cutting of a tree. When Edmundo was already untying his feet he was given a warning to come out or they would kill Manuel if he failed. He slowly stuck out his head from the hole and failing to see the three men, he ran away fast until he reached the place of his godfather Andres Macatiag. He spent the night at the house of Macatiag, upon the latter‘s offer. The next day, Macatiag went to Edmundo‘s house to check the latter‘s family. Later that day, the headless body of Manuel was found. Macatiag proceeded were the body was found. He saw that the feet were still tied. Edmundo was able to identify the body because of the clothes he was wearing. Several days after the beheading incident the missing head of the victim Manuel Ceriales was found at Baler, Aurora. Issue: Whether evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

Held: The facts as related by Edmundo, who was a direct witness to the crime, being a victim himself, and as corroborated by the other witnesses, clearly established the crimes of murder and attempted murder. Qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and aggravating circumstances of treachery and nighttime are present. Evidence shows that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation attended the killing of Manuel Ceriales. To establish evident premeditation, it must be shown that there was a period sufficient to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection, a time adequate to allow the conscience to overcome the resolution of the will, as well as outward acts showing the intent to kill. It must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. Accused-appellants deliberately planned to kill the Ceriales brothers. They arrived at the house of Manuel Ceriales in the evening of September 3, 1996 purposely armed with an armalite, bolo and rope. They ordered the Ceriales brothers to come out while the other persons inside the house were told to lie face down. They abducted the brothers, tied them up and brought them to an isolated place several kilometers away where the brothers were questioned about a misunderstanding between the victim Manuel and the father of accused Flores over a parcel of land. This dispute apparently provided the motive for the crime and engendered the plan. Treachery was correctly appreciated as the suddenness of the arrival of the accused-appellants in the middle of the night while the victims were playing a card game, ensured that the victims could be taken without difficulty to an isolated place several kilometers away and killed there. The fact that accused-appellants arrived armed with an armalite gun, a bolo, a rope and a flashlight showed that they deliberately and consciously adopted the means of execution. The act of tying up both hands and feet of the victims with a rope ensured the killing and deprived the victims of any chance to defend themselves. Nighttime, in this case, was also correctly appreciated by the trial court considering that considering that nighttime facilitated the abduction of the Ceriales brothers, the killing of Manuel Ceriales and the attempt to kill Edmundo Ceriales. Evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans. The fact that they brought with them a flashlight clearly shows that they intended to commit the crime in darkness. The fact that the Ceriales brothers were taken together, tied up and brought to an isolated place point to no other conclusion than that accused-appellants intended to kill not only Manuel but also Edmundo. Indeed, the latter would have likewise been stabbed and decapitated had he not been able to escape. The fact that accused-appellants were not able to kill Edmundo was not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but due to Edmundo‘s miraculous escape; hence, they are also liable for the attempted murder of Edmundo

People vs. Baroy (G.R. Nos. 137520-22) Facts: On March 2, 1998, Emeliza Bueno, a GRO, left the place of her work and proceeded to her home While on board a tricycle, two armed men who later on were identified as appellants Alfredo Baroy and Felicisimo Nacional blocked the path being traversed by the tricycle. Then, they asked money from the driver and pulled Emeliza out from the tricycle. The tricycle driver however was able to escape but appellants succeeded in taking Emeliza to a vacant lot. There, Emeliza begged for mercy but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She struggled to get loose but appellants overpowered her. Baroy took off her pants and underwear and pointing a chisel towards the victim succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her while Nacional served as a lookout. After Baroy finished raping Emeliza, Nacional took turn in raping her. Afterwards, Nacional left leaving behind Baroy who raped Emeliza for the second time. The tricycle driver Alfredo Vinuya who was able to escape proceeded to the guardhouse and informed the guards of the incident. Vinuya was able to convince

the security guards to accompany him to the place of the incident to look for the victim. When they searched the place, one of the security guards noticed that someone went out of the bushes and there, they saw the victim Emeliza and appellant Baroy. The guards apprehended Baroy while Vinuya boarded the victim to his tricycle. Baroy was taken to the Barangay Hall and thereafter to the police station where the police learned from him the place where Felicisimo Nacional could be arrested. The RTC gave full credence to the positive and unequivocal testimony of complainant that appellants had taken turns in raping her. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in considering the existence of nighttime and confederation as aggravating circumstances. Held: It is worthy to note that confederation is not enumerated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the RPC. Like conspiracy which must be alleged in and not merely inferred from the information, confederation is but a mode of incurring criminal liability and may not be considered criminal in itself unless specifically provided by law. Neither may confederation be treated as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of any law defining or classifying it as such. Thus, the trial court erred in appreciating it for the purpose of imposing the maximum penalty. On the other hand, nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime, and that appellants took advantage of it. In the instant case, there is paucity of evidence that nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by appellants. The records reveal that they did not utilize the circumstance of nighttime to conceal their identities, as there was sufficient illumination at the scene of the crime that enabled both the tricycle driver and the victim to recognize them easily. Moreover, the fact that they committed the crime at nighttime did not at all facilitate it or ensure their escape, considering that they were immediately apprehended soon after. Clearly then, they did not specifically or purposely seek the cover of darkness, which was merely incidental, in the advancement of their criminal pursuit. Nocturnity is not aggravating when, other than the time, there is nothing on record or even in the testimonies of the witnesses from which it may be inferred that the accused particularly took advantage of the darkness of the night to facilitate their criminal design. Certainly, the mere fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain a finding of nocturnity.

People vs. Librando (G.R. No. 132251) Facts: On December 11, 1996, Edwin Labandero brought his 8-yr old daughter Aileen to market. On their way home, Edwin, Aileen and a relative, Fernando de los Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the trail when they met accused-appellants Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. Raelito inquired from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie Purisima followed suit and delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran but he was chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although it was already dark at that time, Aileen had no trouble identifying the accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted torch. While the men took turns in mauling the deceased, Edwin, Fernando took Aileen with him and ran to report the incident to the Barangay. On December 12, 1996, Raelito voluntarily surrendered himself to the police who came looking for him at his father‘s house while Eddie and Larry were invited for questioning at the police headquarters. The three men were asked to participate in a police line up during which Aileen was asked to identify her father‘s assailants. According to PO2 Dencing, Aileen positively identified Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima as her father's assailants. After the line up, however, only Raelito was detained while Larry and Eddie were released. The trial court convicted them beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place, considered only as one, and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of all the accused, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Issue: Was it proper to consider nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance? Held: The trial court did not err in considering the nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance. In the case of People vs. Santos it has been held that if the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity.

People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)

Facts: Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot were indicted for murder in an information and that the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The case against appellant‘s co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter. When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12, 2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year. On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death. The Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not it is necessary, in recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, to be alleged in the information? Held: The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the accused.This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498)

Facts: On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a resident of Manila, arrived in Basey, Samar, and stayed with her sister Marie. The following day, Marita was fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also known as Meling, and by the latter‘s common law husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as Elming. Upon being told by Meling that they would be going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went with Meling and Elming to the couple‘s house in Sitio Catuhaan in Barangay Serum. Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita stayed with Meling and Elming together with their two (2) small children in a house consisting of only one room without any partition. In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining witness Marita Cajote slept at one end of the room with the two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at the other end. Marita was awakened by the weight of accused who was already on top of her. The accused who was holding a bolo told her to keep quiet or he would kill her. He then placed his bolo aside and held Marita‘s hands with his right hand. With his left hand accused lowered Marita‘s pants as well as her panty down to her knees. Marita shouted for help but her sister Meling just wrapped her head with their mosquito net and pretended to be asleep. Marita struggled continuously against the advances of the accused but he was much stronger, while she was getting weak. The accused first inserted his fingers into Marita‘s private part and later succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. Meling then pulled Elming away from Marita and hit Elming in the eye. Elming boxed Meling on the mouth and kicked her when she fell on the floor. Elming went back to Marita and continued with his beastly acts. By this time, Marita was already too weak to resist. Elming inserted his fingers first and then his penis into her private organ. The older of the two (2) children of Meling cried. Meling who was holding her youngest child helplessly watched the accused rape her younger sister. The trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to show any compelling or justifiable reason to set aside his conviction for rape and his penalty of death, citing Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. Issue: Whether or not crime was aggravated by reiteracion. Held: The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.

People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470)

Facts: On January 2, 2001, when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying her fare. Thirty minutes later, it was discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Later on, it was reported that a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and suspiciously. The accused was later on apprehended and brought to the barangay hall for investigation. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant‘s bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant Edna confessed to the barangay chairman in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the barangay hall that she set her employer‘s house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. The accused was charged and convicted with the crime of arson with multiple homicide. Issue: Whether or not Edna Malngan was guilty of the crime of destructive arson or simple arson? Held: The crime committed by the accused-appellant is Simple Arson and not Arson with Multiple Homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The case falls under simple arson since from a reading of the body of the information it can be seen that it states that ―the accused, with intent to cause damage, deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house, that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, which were the direct cause of their death.‖ It is clear that her intent was merely to destroy her employer‘s house through the use of fire. When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.

People vs. Amion (G.R. No. 140511)

Facts: On January 24, 1994, Chief Inspector Edmundo Sanicas was at his house. As of that date, CI Sanicas has no specific assignment as he had just been relieved of his duty as Chief of Police of the town. CI Sanicas is 51 years of age, married and has been a policeman for nearly 30 years. CI Sanicas told the Court that on that day, two (2) policemen from Escalante town came to see him to deliver the message of the Chief of Police of that town for a coordination with him concerning his projected trip to Manila regarding a police training program. These two (2) policemen in their police uniform, came on board an Escalante patrol car together with a civilian companion. He came to know these policemen later as PO3 Victor Vaflor and PO3 Richard Dejoras both of the Escalante Police Station. After they had a talk inside his house, CI Sanicas conducted the two (2) Escalante policemen as they left his house. As he emerged from the steel gate following the two (2) policemen, he saw SP02 Baltazar Amion, only about a meter away from PO3 Vaflor. SPO2 Amion started shooting at PO3 Vaflor with an armalite rifle as the latter was about to open the door of the Escalante police car. PO3 Vaflor fell. CI Sanicas attempted to take away the armalite rifle but SPO2 Amion refused to surrender it. SPO2 Amion circled around the Escalante patrol car followed by CI Sanicas. Upon reaching the fallen PO2 Vaflor, Amion again fired shots at him. For the second time, CI Sanicas attempted to disarm the accused but the latter refused to surrender the armalite rifle. For the second time, the accused circled the Escalante police car followed by CI Sanicas. CI Sanicas could not distinctly recall whether shots were fired when the accused approached his victim for the second time. PO3 Vaflor was loaded on the Precinct 7 police car upon instruction of CI Sanicas to be brought to the hospital. On the way, the police car driven by the accused passed by Precinct 7 and both the accused and CI Sanicas disembarked. It was here where the accused finally surrendered his armalite rifle to CI

Sanicas. When the victim eventually reached the Bacolod Sanitarium Hospital, he was declared Dead on Arrival (DOA) Issue: Whether Amion acted on self-defense. Whether there was voluntary surrender. Held: No. No self-defense and voluntary surrender. 1. Where the offender admits authorship of the killing, the onus probandi is shifted to him to prove the elements of self-defense, namely that 1) there was unlawful aggression by the victim; 2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such regression was reasonable; and 3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. As abovestated, the first element was not proven. In the case at the bar, unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and expected attack and this was not proven. Moreover, Vaflor suffered multiple gunshot wounds after falling down from the first gunshot. The accused circled the Escalante patrol car, with Sanicas following him in order to disarm him, and upon reaching the fallen Vaflor, fired shots at him again. If he shot the victim merely to defend himself, there would have been no cause for accused-appellant to shoot him again. 2. . The accused-appellant was already in police custody before the warrant of arrest was served. The warrant of arrest itself carries a marginal note "voluntarily surrendered March 5, 1994". SC found no cogent justification to rule that the trial court erred in giving the accused the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

People vs. Nueva (G.R. No. 173248)

Facts: Alfonso Bacar, Jr, testified that he saw Virgilio Revollido, Jr. being chased by John Doe. Virgilio th passed in front of appellant Nueva and Porpirio who were then standing near the corner of 4 Avenue. At that point, appellant held the victim's left hand and led him to the other side of the road. There, Porpirio took a piece of wood and hit Virgilio on the head, causing the latter to fall to his knees. Appellant continued to box the victim until John Doe came. John Doe immediately stabbed the victim at the back. Appellant then pulled out a knife and likewise stabbed the victim. Afterwards, the three accused ran towards M.H. Del Pilar Street. Virgilio stood up, but, after taking two steps, fell to the ground. Thereafter, an unidentified person came and brought the victim to a hospital on board a van. The following day, Virgilio died. An information was filed charging appellant, Porpirio and John Doe with the crime of murder. Of the three accused, only appellant was apprehended. The others remained at large. The lower court convicted the appellant of the crime charged. On appeal, the court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the killing of Virgilio was attended with evident premeditation Held: While evident premeditation was alleged in the Information, the court a quo correctly concluded that this circumstance was not proven. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect on the consequences of his act. Significantly, the prosecution did not even attempt to prove the presence of these elements; Alfonso, the principal eyewitness, was not even aware of any prior incident or any possible reason that could have led the appellant and his co-accused to attack the victim.

People vs. Segobre (G.R. No. 169877)

Facts: Villafaña testified that on March 15, 1997, at around 5:00 p.m., he was walking along Crisostomo Street, Antipolo City, when he saw appellant standing at the nearby electric post. Two minutes later, he saw appellant block the victim Roberto Crescini, who was coming from Sumulong Highway on a bicycle. Appellant then grabbed Crescini‘s right shoulder with his left hand and stabbed Crescini on the right chest. After the incident, appellant ran away. Thereafter, Villafaña left. The following day, he learned that Crescini had died. An information was filed charging appellant with the crime of murder. The lower court convicted appellant of the crime of murder and found the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation to have attended the killing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, but appreciated the circumstance of treachery only. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. Held: The circumstance of evident premeditation could not be appreciated in connection with the killing of Crescini. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. None of these requisites have been shown from the facts of this case. The records do not show the time and date when appellant resolved to commit the crime. Absent this first requisite, the lapse of time as stated in the third requisite cannot be proved. The second element cannot likewise be proved, absent any showing that appellant performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination of killing Crescini.

People vs. Guerrero (G.R. No. 134759) Facts: Orlando Guerrero, Jr., also known as Pablo, together with his father Orlando Guerrero, Sr., nicknamed Dino, was accused of murder. The accuseds, conspired, confederated and mutually helped one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without justifiable cause, attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut off the penis of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which caused his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his lawful heirs. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Orlando interposed self-defense while his father, Dino, denied any complicity in the killing. According to the the witness, Jacalne, he was informed that one Dino Guerrero was inside the house nearby. Dino Guerrero came out with his hands extended forward. SPO1 Emilio Taracatac immediately frisked and handcuffed him. Before Dino was handcuffed, according to the witness, he said that it was his son who had killed the victim. Thereafter, Dino was brought to the police station for custodial investigation. Further, Jacalne testified that appellant Orlando Guerrero, Jr., was not at the scene of the crime during their investigation. But upon their return to the police station, appellant was already there.[11 Appellant admitted killing the victim, according to Jacalne, by clubbing the victim first with the wooden stick, and then cutting his head and his penis with a knife. Another witness, Ireneo Acierto, appellants brother-in-law, testified that while he was resting in his house at past 11:30 in the morning of July 7, 1997, he heard someone screaming. When he looked out from his window, he saw that the person screaming was his sister-in-law, Ana. He went out of the house and went near the porch of the Guerreros, where he saw Ernesto Ocampos head about to be severed by appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed the same on the right side of the victims trunk. After that, appellant cut off Ernestos penis. Ireneo noticed that while the head was being severed, the victim was lying down on the floor, but not moving. Ireneo then told appellant, That is enough, bayaw. Stop it. According to the witness, his wife Ana was also saying, That is enough, Manong. Appellant angrily turned to Ireneo, telling him not to interfere or else he might also be implicated. Ireneo hurriedly went away after that. Ireneo did not see his father-in-law, Dino, at the time of the incident and did not know where Dino was. The trial court convicted Orlando Guerrero, Jr. of murder while his father Dino was acquitted. Issue: Whether or not the lower erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of cruelty and/or outraging and scoffing the corpse in order to classify the killing as murder despite failure of the prosecution to allege the same in the information.

Held: The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of (1) treachery and (2) evident premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in the perpetration of the crime, where there was deliberate and inhuman suffering of the victim and the offender had scoffed at the victim‘s corpse.On treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the requirements of the law. It was held that in the present case, the trial court did not err when it found neither treachery nor evident premeditation. However, the trial court found there was cruelty as well as outraging or scoffing at the corpse, thus, qualifying the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, it was the victim, Ernesto Ocampo, who barged into the family house of appellant. As a witness for appellant said, the victim indeed was looking for trouble. That appellant successfully caused Ernesto‘s fall appears unintended. It was part of appellant‘s action to repel Ernesto‘s attack. The vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately sought nor contrived by appellant to facilitate the hacking of the victim. The vulnerable position of the victim was a result of a series of acts, spontaneous on appellant‘s part, without manifest calculation. Where the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused, but was purely accidental. As to evident premeditation, in order that it may be appreciated, the prosecution must prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. In this case, while the victim‘s widow, Nancy Ocampo, testified that a day prior to the killing, appellant had lightly told her he would kill Ernesto by cutting off his head and penis, she said appellant‘s statement was not taken seriously by her and the victim.According to the trial court, it found the alleged utterances of appellant and co-accused with regard to their intent to kill Ernesto insufficient to prove that, at the time the utterances were allegedly made, there was indeed a determination to kill and that appellant had indeed clung to that determination, planning and meditating on how to go about carrying on their threat. Hence, it ruled out evident premeditation. People vs. Dimailag (G.R. No. 120170) Facts: On October 3, 1993, Josephine Sevillana called up Arlene, who was on duty as a saleslady, to confirm their agreement to meet that afternoon. Arlene, sounding fearful, asked Josephine to go to Northmall, revealing that accused Dimailig, her suitor, had previously threatened to kill her. When at the Northmall, Josephine noticed accused Dimailig standing in front of the Fuji Film Store beside the gift shop. Josephine entered the gift shop and found Arlene alone inside. She did not see Arlene talk to accused Dimailig outside. Later on, they prepared to close the shop and proceeded to the ladies room. They were walking towards the comfort room when, suddenly, accused Dimailig appeared. He pulled Arlene away from Josephine. Then, he stabbed Arlene‘s chest with a balisong several times. Arlene fell to the ground. People milling around the mall started gathering around accused Dimailig. Moments later, several persons began to maul him. Josephine and some salesladies brought Arlene to a hospital, but Arlene was pronounced dead on arrival. Josephine Sevillana executed a written statement the following day, October 4, 1993, positively identifying accused Dimailig as the one who stabbed her sister Arlene. Her mother, Sonia Sevillana y Garchitorena, also executed a statement that day. Accused Dimailig, 27 years old, asserted that Arlene was his girlfriend. They first met on November 21, 1991 when she bought pandesal from the bakery owned by accused Dimailig. Arlene obliged him but did not inform him that she was married and a mother to a child.

The trial court rendered a decision finding accused Dimailig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation. Issue: Whether or not treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. Held: There is treachery "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the latter‘s part. The wounds sustained by the victim were located on the chest, thus indicating a frontal attack. However, eyewitness Josephine Sevillana testified that accused-appellant, armed with a knife, attacked the victim when she was unarmed and without any opportunity to defend herself. Hence, although the attack may have been frontal, the attack was sudden and unexpected, leaving no opportunity for the victim to put up an adequate defense. Thus, treachery attended the commission of the crime. Aside from treachery, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against accused-appellant. In evident premeditation, there must be proof of the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between the determination and execution, to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Evident premeditation is based on overt acts. There must be a demonstration by overt acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. In this case, the trial court found accused-appellant‘s threat to the victim as an overt act manifesting evident premeditation. However, Josephine Sevillana admitted in court that she was not able to confirm the threat made by accused-appellant as she did not hear any word uttered by him when she arrived at the Northmall and her sister did not tell her anything when she arrived at the gift shop. An expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime; there must be a demonstration of outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. Evident premeditation must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning. Thus, evident premeditation may not be appreciated against accused-appellant.

People vs Labuguen (G.R. No. 127849) Facts: The deceased Bonifacio Angeles was engaged in buying cows and selling them to the public market. One day, the accused Vivencio Labuguen went to him and told him that he knows of three big cows for sale and that the place where they are is near. Believing on such declaration, he took money from his cabinet at his house amounting to P40,000 and then drove in his motorcycle with the accused to see the cows. On their way to see the cows, they have been seen together by several witnesses who later on identified them in court as the victim and the accused respectively. The accused according to the witness was wearing a jacket and with a handkerchief tied on his forehead. One of the witnesses, a driver of a minibus testified that while driving

on his way to his destination, he saw a man behind the ‗talahibs‘ and he noticed that he was wiping something from his head and right face. It was the same man whom his conductor identified as the one who stopped their bus and rode on it. His conductor testified further that he noticed that the man‘s jacket was soaked with blood including his pants and that he did not talk when asked where he was headed to and instead just gave his fare. The conductor even noticed that there was a lot of money on the breast side pocket of his jacket and that one bill was even falling. The man then alighted from the minibus after reaching his destination without saying any word. Later that afternoon, a news broke out that a man‘s body was found dead in the middle of the ricefield. He was later on identified as Bonifacio Angeles. Appellant placed reliance on his defense of denial and alibi. Vehemently denying the charge against him, he asseverated that he could not have committed the crime on October 27, 1994 because he left for Maconacon, Isabela on October 17, 1994, to manage the logging operation of a certain Orlando Ramos and stayed there until December 20, 1994. Based on the strength of the testimony of the witnesses, complaint and information were filed against Vivencio and the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced with the penalty of death. The case was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Issue: Whether or not the court has correctly appreciated the employment of generic aggravating circumstance of fraud and craft in the commission of the crime even if not alleged in the information? Held: Though not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft were properly appreciated by the trial court. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. By saying that he would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to buy, appellant was able to lure the victim to go with him. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Robbery with Homicide is reclusion perpetua to death Applying Article 63 of the same Code, the imposable penalty under the premises is death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of craft and fraud and the absence of any mitigating circumstance.

People vs. Amodio (G.R. No. 177356) Facts: On June 10, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., Richard Avila Roda, an assistant manager of a restaurant, went out of the restaurant to invite customers. He noticed that three of the attackers, whom he later identified as accused-appellants Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were regular customers of their restaurant. He saw Lo-oc hold the shoulders of the victim while Marino and Amodia took turns in beating the victim. As a result of the beating, the victim fell on the ground where Roda immediately approached the victim and saw blood oozing out of the back of his head. One of the maulers was about to deliver another blow on the victim but Roda was able to stop him, thereafter the appellants then went inside the restaurant and drank one bottle of beer each. But, Roda did not immediately report the incident because he was threatened by accused-appellants who were still hanging around the area. Later, in the early morning of the same day, there were already some barangay tanods and police officers investigating the incident. The victim, later identified as Jaime Bartina, was then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital and died at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2003. Upon the advice of a person from the La Loma Police Station, Roda went to Camp Karingal in Quezon City to report what he had witnessed.The police then filed an investigation report which became the basis for the filing of an Information against accused-appellants. However, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge against them by denying involvement in the death of the victim and averred alibi as their defense. The RTC rendered a decision finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision affirmed the trial court‘s decision. Issue: Whether or not the killing was qualified by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength? Held: We do not, however, agree that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength had been sufficiently proved. To appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. Mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior strength. There must be clear proof that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked. In this case, although the victim was unquestionably outnumbered, it was not shown that accused-appellants deliberately applied their combined strength to weaken the defense of the victim and guarantee the execution of the crime. Notably, accused-appellants took turns in boxing the victim. When the victim fell, the prosecution witness was able to hold him, preventing accused-appellants from further hurting him. Then accused-appellants simply turned away. To be sure, had accused-appellants really intended to use their superior strength to kill the victim, they would have finished off the victim, and probably even the lone prosecution eyewitness.

To stress, qualifying circumstances must be proved as clearly as the crime itself. In order to appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is further necessary to analyze the incidents and episodes constituting the total development of the event.

People vs. Calpito (G.R. No. 123298) Facts: The prosecution presented its sole witness in the person of Israel Montilla, the grandson of the victim Florentina Villas. In his testimony, he narrated that at around 2:00 a.m. of November 21, 1990, he was sleeping in the sala of the victim‘s residence when he was awakened by the victim‘s shout for help. He then rushed to the victim‘s bedroom which was just 2 ½ meters away from the sofa on which he slept. By the doorway, he met appellant who was holding a fan knife in his right hand and the victim‘s shoulder bag in his left. He grappled with appellant, who suddenly stabbed him on his left upper arm. While Montilla searched for something with which he could defend himself, appellant rushed out of the house through the kitchen door, the lock of which the latter had destroyed. Montilla looked inside the bedroom and saw his grandmother on the bed lying in a pool of blood, with stab wounds all over her body. Montilla further declared that no other person was inside the bedroom when the incident happened. He was able to recognize appellant because of the fluorescent light. He testified that he could not be mistaken regarding the assailant‘s identity, since he had long known appellant, who resided near the victim‘s house. He also stated that appellant, in his haste, left a flashlight and a cap which had the latter‘s name written on its inside portion. He added that he had known appellant to be a drug user, and that at the time of the incident, the latter appeared to be under the influence of drugs. The court a quo, finding the charge of Robbery with Homicide unsubstantiated by evidence, convicted appellant of the crime of Murder. Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength are present. Held: Although the assailed decision did not discuss which of these qualified the killing to murder, a perusal of the facts of the case readily reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In several cases, this Court has ruled that this circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or

took advantage of in the commission of the crime. In a recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor‘s superior strength. The circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-yearold unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a knife. With respect to treachery, this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the present case. This circumstance cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but not the manner the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim‘s death unfolded. It must be noted that in this case, the prosecution‘s lone witness only accounted for what transpired after the stabbing, as he did not see the actual attack on the victim.

People vs. Jamon (G.R. NO. 141942) Facts: Witness Pilar Evangelista Tacla stated that she was the widow of Isabelo Tacla. He died on July 26, 1989. On December of 1995, she married Jimmy Ponce Jamon, a widower, with children of his own. The marriage took place after six years of courtship. They lived with her daughter, Victoria, in the latter‘s house. On July 9, 1998, Pilar said she had a heated altercation with appellant. Pilar was bent on moving out of Victoria‘s house. She said she wanted to transfer to their own house to spare her daughters from the shame and hassle of the couple‘s constant fights over appellant‘s addiction to women, gambling, and booze. Appellant warned Pilar that once they moved out, she could never set foot in her daughter‘s house again. He added in a threatening manner, with his eyes bulging, that if Pilar came back to Victoria‘s house, he would beat her up.

These threatening words were uttered within the earshot of Victoria, who was then cooking in the adjoining room. Chagrined, Victoria ordered her stepfather out of the house. She then gathered appellant‘s clothes on the bed and yelled, ―Take all your clothes!‖ Appellant got his pistol which was hidden inside the cut-out pages of a telephone directory on a nearby table and fired it in the air. Pilar and Victoria were transfixed. Appellant pointed the revolver at Victoria and announced, ―I am going to shoot!‖ Pilar embraced her daughter and was about to bring her out of the room when appellant fired, hitting Victoria at the chest and causing her to fall bloodied on the floor. Afterwards, appellant reloaded the gun and bellowed, ―Sige!‖, while pointing the muzzle of the gun at Pilar. But the gun jammed and did not fire. Appellant quickly fled the scene, leaving mother and daughter in an embrace, which turned out to be their last. In the hospital, Victoria was declared dead on arrival. In his own defense, appellant declared on the witness stand that the shooting was unintentional. The trial court disbelieved appellant‘s claim of accidental shooting. It held that appellant‘s claim was not enough to overcome the positive testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution. The court observed their testimonies to be truthful and credible. Based on the evidence of the parties, the court convicted appellant. It concluded that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present to qualify the crime as murder. Held: The SC agreed with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. In the present case, the victim was a woman with a smaller build. She was unarmed. Appellant was a fifty-one-year-old male, in the prime of his life, and armed with a deadly weapon. The killing indubitably constitutes an instance of abuse of superior strength, hence the offense is qualified to murder, and not merely homicide.

Sison vs. People (G.R. Nos. 108280-83) Facts: On July 27, 1986, in support to the Marcos government, Marcos loyalists had a rally at Luneta. At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting. A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. However, a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting. The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape. Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip 6 Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival. For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis.The trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery. On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present. Held: Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign

against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.

People vs. Aviles (G.R. No. 172967)

Facts: On June 19, 2002, Novelito Contapay was driving his passenger jeep. His lone passenger, the deceased Danilo Arenas, was seated beside him. Arenas suddenly shouted apaya. Contapay turned his head and saw Christopher Aviles stabbing Arenas. Aviles‘ upper body was already inside the jeep with one foot on the running board. Contapay halted the jeep and tried to help Arenas by holding the hand of Aviles, but the latter stabbed Contapay on his left knee. Contapay pushed Aviles who ran away. Contapay alighted from the jeepney, but he was not able to chase Aviles because of his bleeding left knee. Contapay noticed that Arenas was already unconscious, and he brought the latter to the hospital. The policemen investigated the stabbing incident. They went to the hospital but they were not able to interview Danilo Arenas. A nurse informed them that it was Novelito Contapay who brought Arenas to the hospital. Meanwhile, Contapay transferred to another hospital to have his left knee treated. Contapay stayed in the hospital until the following day. Arenas, however, died at 2:00 in the morning of 20 June 2002. The Certificate of Death stated that the immediate cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause was hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound on the medial side of the thigh. Aviles, who was found at his father-in-law‘s house was invited to the police station where he denied having stabbed the victim. He further stated that it was his half-brother who stabbed Arenas. The trial court rendered a Joint Decision convicting Christopher Aviles of the crimes of murder and slight physical injuries. Issue: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the crime to qualify it for murder. Held: Although Contapay testified that he turned around immediately when the deceased shouted "Apaya," he did not testify as to how the attack was initiated. Also, considering that he was driving the jeepney when Arenas was attacked, he could not even have known how the attack was initiated.

There is treachery when the following requisites are present: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory action on the part of the victim and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or manner of execution. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the attack. If the attack is continuous and treachery was present only at a subsequent stage and not at the inception of the attack, it cannot be considered. Rather than being an expression of surprise at the presence of Aviles as held by the Court of Appeals, the shout "Apaya" or "Apay aya," when translated as "Bakit ba," connotes confusion as to why the person to whom it is spoken is acting the way he is acting. This implies the lapse of several moments between the commencement of the attack and Arenas‘ shouting. Qualifying circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself. It cannot be considered on the strength of evidence which merely tends to show that the victim was probably surprised to see the assailant trying to get inside the jeepney.

People vs. Daleba (G.R. No. 168100)

Facts: Around noon of 18 March 1997, appellant and the victim, Renato Angeles (Renato), "barkers" in a bus terminal in Pasay City, quarreled over the division of their earnings. A certain Edwin Bernarte (Bernarte) intervened and pacified appellant and Renato. Renato walked away and headed to his house which was near the terminal. For his part, appellant joined Bernarte's group who had just taken their lunch nearby. Suddenly, appellant ran after Renato, pulled a knife from his waistline, held Renato's shoulder by his left hand, slashed Renato on the right forearm and stabbed him at the back, above the right side of the waistline. Renato died that evening from the stab wound. Appellant, who had gone to his home province in Camarines Sur, was arrested four years after the stabbing incident. Appellant was charged before the trial court with Murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. Appellant invoked self-defense, claiming that around noon of 18 March 1997, he went to the Pasay City bus terminal and, once inside, Renato suddenly grabbed his neck, dragged him to the back of the terminal, and, using his right hand which also held a knife, repeatedly boxed appellant in the face. When appellant was able

to free himself from Renato's hold, he grabbed a knife lying at a nearby table and stabbed Renato with it. Appellant also claimed that Renato had earlier assaulted him at around 9:00 a.m. of the same day. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Held: The SC find merit in the lower courts' finding that treachery qualified Renato's killing. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This circumstance will be appreciated if (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) the offender consciously adopted the form of attack he employed. Here, Renato was walking away from appellant with no inkling of what would soon befall him, when appellant stealthily came up behind Renato, held the latter's shoulder, slashed his forearm and stabbed him just above the waistline. In People v. Delada, Jr., SC held that treachery qualified the stabbing from behind of a victim who, minutes earlier, had quarreled with the assailant.

People vs. Magbanua (G.R. No. 133004)

Facts: On June 12, 1992, Narciso Balucos was gathering his copra on a bridge. Helping him were the victim and Narciso Rellin. Appellant, together with his more than ten companions, later approached and congratulated Balucos for having been chosen as Purok Leader. Shortly thereafter, appellant talked with hostility to the victim concerning the "killing in Lacson, Davao City," a case which involved appellant and the victim‘s cousins. Suddenly, appellant pulled out a handgun from his waist and fired a shot at the creek. Seconds after, while face to face with each other, appellant shot the victim twice in the face, first at the left cheek, then at the forehead. Balucos recalled that the muzzle of the gun was only about five inches away from the face of the victim, who was then standing an arm‘s length away from appellant. He further narrated that after the gunshots, he and Rellin ran away out of fear for their lives. Finding the testimonies of the eyewitnesses worthy of belief, the court a quo convicted appellant of the crime charged. It dismissed the medico-legal‘s contradictory findings as unreliable and appellant‘s version as incredible. It also ruled that the crime was attended by treachery, which qualified the killing to murder. Issue: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the offense.

Held; Time and again, the Court has stated that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself. It is present when two elements concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods, forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, method or forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. In the present case, the first element was sufficiently shown by the suddenness of the attack, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. The prosecution established that appellant, while conversing with the victim, suddenly pulled out a concealed gun from his waist, shot at the creek and, seconds after, shot the victim at the face. While it may be true that, as the defense points out, appellant talked to the victim with hostility shortly before the shooting, there was no evidence that the confrontation was heated or intense, or that appellant was provoked to shoot the victim. It must be noted, however, that mere suddenness of the attack would not, by itself, constitute treachery. There is a further need to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack to insure execution without risk to himself. The circumstances surrounding the case negate the presence of this second element. It was established that the shooting occurred in broad daylight, in an open area, with more than ten people around. The victim then was in the company of two of his friends, who could have come to his aid at anytime. Verily, if appellant wanted to insure that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to shoot the victim. For failure of the prosecution to prove treachery or any other circumstance that would qualify the killing to murder, the Court finds that appellant should only be held liable for homicide.

People vs. Escote (G.R. No. 140756 ) Facts: On September 28, 1996, Juan and Victor boarded a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound for Pangasinan. Twenty minutes or so later, when the bus reached Plaridel, Bulacan, the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with the announcement of hold-up, Juan fired his gun upwards. Victor, meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the back. Both then took the money and valuables of the passengers, including the bus conductor‘s collections. Thereafter, the two approached the man at the back, telling him in vernacular ―Pasensya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo.‖ They pointed their guns at him and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their victim. The two then alighted from the bus and fled. During the investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a policeman. Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. Juan and Victor were charged and found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Issue: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the offense. Held: The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen. Treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in People vs. Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic sense.

People vs. Contenente (G.R. Nos. 100801-02) Facts: On April 21, 1989, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, JUSMAG was ambushed. Upon initial investigation, it shows that on the date and time while on board Rowe‘s car, when gunmen who were on board a Toyota car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away from the site of the ambush. Upon further investigation of the case, it was found that an employee of the U.P. Collegian is involved in the ambush. Accordingly, on June 16, 1989, the CIS investigation team proceeded to the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City to conduct a surveillance on appellant Donato Continente. After accosting appellant Continente inside the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City for questioning. During the interrogation, appellant Continente admitted to his participation in the ambush. Among the documents confiscated from appellant Continente was a letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right hand side of the letter appear the acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team, Regional Command". Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a certain Meriam Zulueta. The testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam R. Zulueta reveals that at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of April 21, 1989, she was about to cross the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance of more or less one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the street to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were firing at the gray car. She recognized appellant Juanito Itaas when the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person, directly behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body was half exposed while he was firing at the gray car with the use of along firearm. The shooting incident lasted for about five (5) seconds only after which the maroon car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue toward the direction of Quezon Boulevard while being followed by a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.

Issue: Whether or not treachery attended the killing of the victims. Held: The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.

People vs. Cachola (G.R. Nos. 148712-15) Facts: On December 28, 1999, two armed men suddenly entered Barnachea residence. The two ordered a 12-year old boy, Jessie E. Barnachea, to drop the floor by hitting him in the back with the butt of a long gun. They hurriedly proceeded to the living room and shot Jessie‘s uncle, Victorino Lolarga, and continued shooting in the kitchen hitting his mother Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr., and his cousin Rubenson Abance. His eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, who then was in his uncle‘s house, noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables dealer," and with the description of the "El Shaddai" parked in front of the fence of their house. Also, the jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors, Russel Tamba and Francisco Andrada. The incident was immediately reported to the police and at around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter brought to the Aringay police station and then turned over to the Bauang police. Jessie was able to identify two of the eight

appellants by the name of Cachola and Amay as the two assailants who entered the house. The next day a paraffin test was conducted on the appellants. The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on her head and three on her body; Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and arms; Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his body, and with his penis excised;Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head and a stab wound that lacerated his liver. RTC convicted all the eight appellants but the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended the affirmance of the conviction for murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the other appellants for failure of the prosecution to establish their identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not excising of penis amounts to ignominy that can aggravate the offense charged? Held: No. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victim‘s moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. In this case, the information states that Victorino‘s sexual organ was severed after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating circumstance. SC sustained the conviction of Cachola and Amay but the rest of the six appellants were acquitted for the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.

People vs. Bunidang (G.R. No. 130630)

Facts: On September 29, 1996, while father and daughter, Melencio and Gloria Imbat, were already asleep in their house, the accused Baliwang Bumidang aged 19 years and half-naked, loudly called Melencio Imbat and asked the latter to open the door. Melencio was aroused from his sleep and he opened the door downstairs because Bumidang threatened to kill them if the door was not opened. Accused Bumidang entered and asked the old man to bring him upstairs. While they were upstairs, Bumidang asked him where he was sleeping. When Melencio indicated that he slept at the place where they were, Bumidang got a spear at the side of his (Melencio's) bed. Pointing the weapon at him in a threatening manner, the accused ordered him to lie in a prone position which he obeyed because he was afraid. Then Bumidang asked the room of his unmarried daughter, Gloria, aged 56. Melencio, 80 years old, pointed the room of his daughter which was in the same room but separated by an aparador. Bumidang went to Gloria's room, still carrying the spear. Suddenly, Gloria screamed for help, but the octogenarian remained in a prone position as Bumidang threatened to kill him if he would help his daughter. Bumidang, a betel nut-chewing man, approached Gloria and poked the spear at her. She recognized him because he was lighting the room with a flashlight. The accused ordered her to stand up and removed her pajama, with the panty going along with it. While the accused was removing her clothes, she sat and struggled. Bumidang then removed his short pants and became completely naked. He used the flashlight to examine her genital. He placed the spear beside her and whenever she attempted to move, he would point the spear at her. The accused then went on top of her, inserted his penis into her pudenda. At this instant, Gloria shouted to her father but the accused pointed the spear at her, and told her, "can you see this?" The accused then made a pumping motion. After he was sated, having satisfied his lust, the accused held her breast and kissed her lips. After resting on top of her, he went to the door and left. Melencio helplessly saw the accused on top of her daughter but he could not move because he was too afraid and weak. Before the accused left, he made the following threat: "If you will report to the authorities, I will come back and kill all of you." The trial court appreciated against BALIWANG the aggravating circumstances of (a) dwelling, because the crime was committed inside the house of the victim; (b) nighttime, because the sexual assault was perpetrated at about 2:00 a.m. to facilitate the commission of the offense; and (c) ignominy, because he used his flashlight to examine Gloria's vagina and raped her in the presence of her old father, thereby making its effects more humiliating. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and ignominy are present. Held: The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. There was a clear violation of the sanctity of the victim's place of abode when Gloria, who apparently did not give any provocation, was raped in her own house. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture. In this case, other than the fact that the crime was committed at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, nothing on the record suggests that BALIWANG deliberately availed himself or took advantage of nighttime nor proved that BALIWANG used the darkness to facilitate his evil design or to conceal his identity. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account if means are employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral suffering. It was established that BALIWANG used the flashlight and examined the genital of Gloria before he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed in the presence of Gloria's old father. These facts clearly show that BALIWANG deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria, thereby aggravating and compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a woman was raped in the presence of her betrothed, or of her husband, or was made to exhibit to the rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her.

People v. Siao (G.R. No. 126021) Facts: On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00PM, accused-appellant Rene Siao, in his residence, ordered Reylan Gimena, his family‘s 17-year old houseboy, to pull Estrella Raymundo, their 14-year old housemaid, to the women‘s quarters. Once inside, appellant Siao pushed her to the wooden bed and asked her to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. Appellant lit the candle and dropped the melting candle on her chest. Estrella was made to lie down on her back on the bed w/ her head hanging over one end. Appellant then poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms w/ his gun pointed to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet and hands w/ an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed. As Siao pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to undress and commanded her to take the initiative on Gimena. Not understanding what he meant, appellant motioned to her poking the gun at her temple. Gimena was then ordered to remove his shorts. He did not do so but only let his penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and shouted for help twice. Siao then ordered Gimena to rape Estrella. At first, Gimena refused because he has a sister. However, Siao said that if they would not obey, he would kill both of them. Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and intimidated at gunpoint by Siao to have carnal knowledge of each other. They performed the sexual act because they were afraid they would be killed. Siao commanded Gimena to rape Estrella in 3 diff positions (i.e. missionary position, side-by-side and dog position as narrated vividly in the case), pointing the handgun at them the whole time. Thereafter, Siao warned them, ―If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers.‖ Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the whole event. He asserts that she retaliated through this accusation because Estrella herself was accused of stealing many of his family‘s personal effects.

Issue: Whether or not ignominy, as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of rape, is attendant to justify the award of exemplary damages? Held: YES. The RTC overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven in the case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.

Still, SC respected RTC‘s finding of facts and found any inconsistencies in the witnesses‘ testimonies inconsequential considering that they referred to trivial matters w/c have nothing to do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even if it was pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a span of less than 30 mins, w/c does not conform to common experience, rape was still present from the evidence because rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied by many people at the time of the crime, rape was still committed because lust is no respecter of time and place. And Estrella‘s and Gimena‘s decision not to flee proves only the fear and intimidation that they were under because Siao was after all their ―amo‖ or employer who threatened to kill them or their family if they did not succumb to his demands. The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of a deadly weapon. Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral damages, w/c is automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in the amount of PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of ignominy justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment affirmed w/ modification of damages awarded.

People vs. Jose (G.R. No. L-28232) Facts: On June 26, 1967, Magdalena de la Riva was abducted outside her own house by Jaime Jose, Edgardo Aquino, Basilio Pineda and Rogelio Canal. They brought Maggie to Swanky Hotel. Jose, Aquino, Pineda and Canal took turns raping Maggie. They decided to leave her on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. They threatened that she would be doused with acid if she would inform anyone of the incident. When she was inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative. When she reached home she informed her mother of the incident Appellant Canal and Pineda executed swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement stating that he and his other three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on

learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him. Issue: Whether or not ignominy is present. Held: Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape.

People vs. Capillas et. al. (G.R. No. L-27177) Facts: on October 5, 1964, Pablo Amante, his wife, Consorcia Melendres, and their two children, one aged 5 years and the other, 3 years, were in the living room of their house situated atop a hill. Amante's wife was resting with their 3 year old child, on a hammock tied in their living room, while Amante was teaching his 5 year old child to count. As it was already dark, he tied their door with a rope. While in this condition, their door

was forcibly broken down, prompting Pablo Amante to stand up and get himself ready for any needed move. Through the broken door entered Romualdo, Antonio, and Julianito, all surnamed Capillas, whom Amante has known for 27 years together with fourth masked man he could not recognize. Upon entry, the group demanded money from Amante. Antonio, who was armed with a short bolo wrestled with Amante but the latter was able to take possession of the bolo. Romualdo, who was armed with a revolver shot Amante‘s wife three times. Because of this, Amante used the bolo to stab Romualdo. The group scampered away taking with them family's trunk containing money and clothings. Amante then immediately went to the succor of his wife. The victim was brought in the hospital, where the police officers got her statement. Shortly after affixing her thumbmark on the instrument, the victim expired. the accused Romualdo Capillas, Antonio Capillas, and Julianito Capillas were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries and not robbery in band with homicide and physical injuries as there was no evidence to show that there were more than three (3) armed malefactors who participated in the commission of the crime. Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place, nocturnity, breaking of the door. Held: The trial court erred in considering as aggravating circumstances uninhabited place, nocturnity, breaking of the door, and disrespect of sex. uninhabited place cannot be considered against the defendants although the house nearest the dwelling of the Amantes was about two (2) kilometers away. It is not apparent from the records that the defendants selected the place of the commission of the crime either to better obtain their object without interference or to secure themselves against detection and punishment. Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent their being recognized as to ensure unmolested escape. In the instant case, there is no evidence that appellant precisely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the crime and to hide their Identities. Despite the fact that the defendants were known to the victims, no attempt to disguise was made by them. To be considered as an aggravating circumstance, breaking the door must be utilized as a means to the commission of the crime. The defendants did not break the door of the victims as a means to commit robbery with homicide. Pablo Amante testified that the appellants first broke the rope which was used to close the door. After the rope was broken, the appellants could already have entered the house. Breaking of the shutters and the framing of the door to insure the elements of surprise does not aggravate the commission of the crime. Art. 14, paragraph 19, of the Revised Penal Code is specific. To be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, breaking the door must be utilized as a means of the commission of the crime. Neither can the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex can be considered in this case. Disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex may be taken in account only in crimes against persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age, or sex. It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. There being no mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling, the maximum penalty of DEATH was correctly imposed upon defendants Antonio Capillas and Julianito Capillas. Likewise, the death penalty was properly imposed on defendants Romualdo Capillas. The mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt is offset by only one aggravating circumstance. No other mitigating circumstance offsets the other remaining aggravating circumstance.

People vs. Mallari (G.R. No. 145993) Facts: Based on the accusatory portion of the Information filed against Rufino Mallari, he was accused of hitting and bumping one Joseph Galang with an Isuzu Canter Elf truck on or about July 7, 1996. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the said incident was preceded by an altercation between Rufino Mallari and Joseph Galang when the latter admonished the former not to drive fast while passing by the latter‘s house. To end the situation Joseph, together with his brothers, who were also present at that time, asked for apology from Rufino. Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of murder and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. Issue: Whether or not Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was driving. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle was correctly appreciated by the trial court in imposing the death penalty? Held: Yes. Rufino deliberately bumped the victim. The SC gave full credence to the testimony of the witnesses of the prosecution, whose statements were same as against the testimony of the accused and his wife, whose statements are inconsistent. Rufino was already in a fighting mood when the deceased admonished him not to drive fast in front of his house. Rufino, who was not appeased with Joseph‘s apology, got the chance to vent his anger to the latter when they went to the basketball court with bladed weapons. The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph. The case of People v. Muñoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latter‘s death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another ―by means of a motor vehicle‖ is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in the information, were not proved. What was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution.

In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.

People vs. Enguito (G.R. No. 128812) Facts: On September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme, a motorela driver who while driving his motorela with his wife on board, picked up a passenger near the Nazareno church. The passenger was later identified as the deceased, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre. Achumbre asked him to bring him across the Marcos bridge towards his home. After travelling a distance of 300 meters more or less and near the Sacred Heart of Jesus Montessori School, Requerme's motorela was bumped by a white motor vehicle. The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing it to run very fast for the next 400 meters until it reached the area in front of Wheels Marketing. Because of the violent push the motorela turned around facing the direction from where it came from and fell on its right side. Felipe Requerme screamed for help thinking that his wife was pinned underneath. A tamaraw pick-up stopped near them and he immediately informed that they were intentionally hit by the white vehicle. A short time later a police mobile patrol arrived and with the assistance of the people around, they pushed the motorela to return it to its natural position. Requerme and his wife were brought to the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw (OKK), a 24-hour police station where all victims of crimes report in Cagayan de Oro. At the OKK the driver of the white service pick-up who bumped his motorela arrived. Requerme identified the driver as Thadeos Enguito whom he pointed inside the courtroom. Later, Requerme and his wife were brought to the city hospital for medical check up. They were also brought to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital to identify the deceased. The following day the Requerme spouses went to the police station and executed their affidavits which are attached to the record. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle was properly appreciated by the lower court. Held: The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-appellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his

attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.

Simangan vs. People (G.R. No. 157984) Facts: on February 10, 1980, the petitioner, Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two other male persons arrived at the store of the spouses Ernesto Flores and Sofronia Saquing. The Flores Spouses, along with their niece were having dinner. The five men were in fatigue uniforms and were armed with long firearms. When they knocked on the door, Lorna responded and inquired what they wanted, and she was told that they wanted to buy cigarettes. Ernesto and Sofronia entertained the men, two of whom were their neighbors, Loreto Bergado and Bening Gumabong. Momentarily, the petitioner asked Ernesto to go with them to serve as a guide. In response, Ernesto invited the men to sleep at their house, but the latter refused. Ernesto then agreed to accompany the visitors. The petitioner warned Ernesto and Sofronia not to tell anyone that they had been to the store. As they were leaving, Romeo Galano, the couple‘s helper at the store, arrived. Ernesto ordered Romeo to go with him, and the latter did as he was told. However, Romeo returned to the store and told Sofronia that Ernesto had sent him back to get money, matches and cigarettes. He also told Sofronia that he and Ernesto were seated as they conversed with each other.

The next morning, Romeo Balunggaya arrived at Sofronia‘s house and told her that Ernesto was dead. Sofronia and Lorna rushed to the place, and found Ernesto‘s body near the creek. Ernesto was lying on the ground, face down, with his hands tied behind his back. The petitioner denied any involvement in the killing of Ernesto. He testified that on the day that Ernesto was killed, he was in his boarding house in Tuguegarao. The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and cruelty. Held: the appellate court erred in appreciating against the petitioner the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and nighttime. In the first place, such circumstances were not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the petitioner committed the crime before the effectivity date of said Rules, the same should be applied retroactively as it is favorable to him. Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty.

People vs. Catian (G.R. No. 139693) Facts: On December 27, 1996Jeofrey Abe went out of his house to watch a television show at the residence of a certain Anselmo Ymbol. On his way home, he chanced upon a group of three (3) persons whom he readily recognized as Freddie Catian, Samuel Sumalpong and Rogelio Calunod. The three (3) were "ganging up" on a man whom he also identified as Willy Ondo. Jeofrey easily recognized them as they were all

his barriomates and the road was not that dark despite the lateness of the hour because it was a moonlit night. From a distance, he saw Catian repeatedly striking Willy with a "chako" on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees. Calunod seconded by striking the victim with a piece of wood on the face. When Willy finally collapsed, Sumalpong picked him up, carried him over his shoulder, and walked away carrying him to an undisclosed destination. Overcome with fear, Jeofrey went running towards home. Jeofrey did not divulge anything about what he had seen for fear that the assailants would hunt him. Since that day, Willy Ondo was missing and already believed to be dead. The skeletal remains of Willy were discovered by a child on January 7, 1997. On the other hand, accused-appellant Freddie Catian vigorously denied the charges against him, explaining that on the day that the incident allegedly took place he was working as a laborer on a project at the Capalasanan public market. The trial court gave full credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Jeofrey Abe, characterizing his testimony as credible, unwavering, categorical and straightforward. The trial court further emphasized that the defense of alibi interposed by the accused which, aside from being inadequately corroborated, also failed miserably to measure up to the required quantum of evidence considering that the accused were not able to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time the killing took place. Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation as well as cruelty and ignominy. Held: It correctly took into account the qualifying circumstance of treachery although for the wrong reasons. In order that treachery may be appreciated the following requisites must concur: (a) the culprit employed means, methods and forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means, that no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. The fact that the culprits resorted to overwhelming force, or that the victim was defenseless, or that the crime was perpetrated under cover of darkness did not in itself connote treachery. There must be a clear and palpable showing that the assailants resorted to a method of attack that would guarantee its execution without fear of retaliation on the part of their prey. The presence of alevosia in the attack cannot be disputed. The witness described the killing in clear terms. There is nary an iota of doubt that the attack, being carried out suddenly and unexpectedly, afforded the victim no occasion whatsoever to defend himself. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. However, the trial court went far astray in its reasoning when it ruled that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty and ignominy were also attendant in the commission of the crime. To authorize the finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish (a) the time when accusedappellants determined to commit the crime; (b) the act showing that they clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow them to reflect [18] upon the consequences of their act. Other than a chance encounter between the witness Jeofrey and the principal antagonists in this case, there is a dearth of information to show that accused-appellants had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and consciously followed it notwithstanding that they had ample and sufficient time to allow their conscience to overcome the determination of their will, if they had desired it, after meditation and reflection. Neither does it appear that the murder of the victim was attended by cruelty and ignominy. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by

the crime. The mere fact that accused-appellants burned the body of the deceased is not sufficient to show that the means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act. Nor may we consider the circumstance of cruelty as found by the trial court because there is no showing that the victim was burned while he was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. No proof was presented that would show that accused-appellants deliberately and wantonly augmented the suffering of their victim.

People vs. Whisenhunt Facts: The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa Santos-Castillo, also known as Elsie, were lovers. On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive for accused-appellant, reported for work and was ordered by accused-appellant to fetch Elsa. He brought Elsa to accusedappellant‘s condominium unit. Later on, Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in Mandaluyong to deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel Manager. He proceeded to the Apex office, and then returned to Platinum. Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive Elsa home. When he had not heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that he was going home. The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellant‘s unit. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. Accused-appellant said that the knife was in his bedroom. Several day after, while Demetrio was in the servants‘ quarters watching television, accused-appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, "May problema ako, Rio." Demetrio asked what it was, and accused-appellant told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, "Bakit mo siya pinatay?" Accusedappellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of "bangungot". Demetrio suggested that Elsa‘s body be autopsied, but accused-appellant said that he had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused. Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary and bloodshot. When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accused-appellant‘s bathroom and found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head by the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsa‘s face. He placed this in a black trash bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts in three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper and rollers. Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and dumped them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the empty bag in the trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said, "Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan." Then they proceeded to the Whisenhunt mansion in Bagac, Bataan. On their way, they threw several garbage bags and belongings of the victims on different areas.

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on September 23, 1993 because he was not feeling well. He denied that he asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa. The trial court promulgated the appealed judgment, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder. Issue: Whether or not the circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. Held: The other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victim‘s head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The sight of Elsa‘s severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.

Licyayo vs. People (G.R. No. 169425) Facts: On 16 February 1992, victim Rufino Guay, along with his friends, Jeffrey and a certain Joel Dumangeng attended a wedding. Petitioner, together with his friends, Paul and Oliver, were also present at the same wedding. After the wedding reception, Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel went to store and ordered bottles of gin. While the three were drinking gin at the said store, Paul and Oliver arrived and likewise ordered bottles of gin. Later, Paul and Oliver left the store. Subsequently, Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel likewise adjourned their drinking session and left the store. Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel dropped by at Famorca‘s Store. Petitioner and his brother, Aron, as well as Paul and Oliver, were also present therein. While Jeffrey was talking to the store‘s owner, Larry Famorca (Larry), a brawl suddenly occurred between Rufino and Aron. As a consequence thereof, Rufino fell to the ground. Aron thereafter placed himself on top of Rufino and punched the latter several times. Jeffrey approached the two and tried to pacify them. Paul entered the scene and punched Jeffrey on the head. Thereupon, a scuffle followed. Police officers responded and they saw petitioner holding a six-inch double-bladed knife and walking towards Rufino and Aron who were then wrestling with each other. One of the officers, tried to stop the petitioner from stabbing but instead the latter attempted to stab the former but to no avail. Afterwards, petitioner approached Rufino, who was then wrestling with Paul, and stabbed Rufino in different parts of the body. A police fired a warning shot while the other immediately pounced on petitioner and disarmed the latter. Petitioner was brought to the Police Station while Rufino was taken to a nearby hospital where he later died due to stab wounds. Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and intoxication may be appreciated in this case

Held: Under paragraph 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a criminal liability may be mitigated if there was sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded the act complained of. To avail oneself of this mitigating circumstance, it must be duly proven that the alleged provocation originated from the offended party. The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. What is evident is that Rufino and Aron suddenly and unexpectedly grappled during the incident. Since it was not convincingly shown that the alleged provocation originated from Rufino, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation should not be appreciated in favor of petitioner. We have held that where there is no evidence as to how the quarrel arose, the accused is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the quantity of liquor taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact that petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and after his drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during the incident. His vivid narration that he had a confrontation with Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel during the drinking session; that Daniel approached and told him that Aron was being mauled; that he immediately went to the scene and saw Aron being beaten by Rufino and Jeffrey; that he pushed Jeffrey away from Aron; that he was allegedly beaten by the companions of Jeffrey; and that he fought back but was allegedly overpowered --- all point to the conclusion that petitioner had complete control of his mind during the incident. Petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication merely on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that he was drunk during the incident. Such testimonies do not warrant a conclusion that the degree of petitioner‘s intoxication had affected his faculties. There must be convincing proof of the nature and effect of his intoxication which petitioner failed to adduce in the present case.

People vs. Mondigo (G.R. No. 167954) Facts: On September 27, 1998, appellant, Damaso Delima, Damaso‘s son Delfin and three other unidentified individuals were having a drinking spree. At around noon, Damaso‘s other son, Anthony, joined the group. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant, using a ―jungle bolo,‖ suddenly hacked Anthony on the head, causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Appellant next attacked Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi (Lumagi), hearing shouts coming from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant repeatedly hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off appellant‘s blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained.

Appellant invoked self-defense. According to him, a quarrel broke out between him and Anthony during their drinking spree. Damaso and Delfin arrived and ganged-up on him. He ran home, followed by Anthony, Damaso, and Delfin. Upon reaching his house, he got hold of a ―flat bar‖ and whacked Anthony‘s head with it. Damaso attacked him with a bolo but Damaso lost hold of the weapon which fell to the ground. Appellant retrieved the bolo and used it to hack Damaso. The court found the appellant guilty of the crime of murder mitigated by intoxication. Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of intoxication. Held: Yes. The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because ―the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking spree.‖ For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accused‘s drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the only proof on record on this matter is appellant‘s testimony that before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin attacked him, he drank ―about 3 to 4 bottles of beer.‖ The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed, and the absence of any independent proof that appellant‘s alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.

People vs. Marquita (G.R. Nos. 119958-62) Facts: On July 3, 1987, appellants Joseph Marquita and Alejandro Marquita were having a drinking session with Sergio Pampilo in the store/house of the latter. Thereafter, an altercation started between Joseph and Sergio over some "small matter." Apparently, Sergio was prohibiting everyone to pass through his dike. Suddenly, Sergio struck Joseph in the face with a bottle of Tanduay Kulafu. When Joseph felt the blood on his face, he became angry and retaliated by stabbing Sergio in the stomach. Alejandro tried to intervene but could not separate them since Joseph was holding a bolo. Alejandro started to run away. After stabbing Sergio, Joseph totally lost control of himself and went on a rampage. He continued to stab even Sergio‘s wife, Rosalinda, who was sleeping inside the house. He also stabbed Sergio‘s daughters, Merlene, Rosalie and Sherly, who were also sleeping inside the house.Romeo Pampilo, Sergio‘s 16 year-old son survived by hiding himself inside a cabinet. Ruby Pampilo, Sergio‘s 4 year-old daughter survived because Alejandro, as he was fleeing, picked her up and brought her to the back of the house. Guillermo Rebutazo, Romeo‘s uncle and a nearby neighbor, heard the cries for help. He rushed to the house and Romeo pointed to two persons running away in different directions as the perpetrators of the massacre. Rebutazo chased Joseph but did not catch up with him. When Rebutazo went back to the Pampilo residence, he saw the bodies of the five victims. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of five counts of murder, the killing having been attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. Issue: Whether or not the alternative circumstance of intoxication can be appreciated in this case. Held: The alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as mitigating in favor of Joseph since it was sufficiently shown that (a) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of certain degree of control, and (b) that such intoxication is not habitual, or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. It was this intoxication which led to his impetuous, frenzied and furious attack on the victims. As to Sergio‘s wife, Rosalinda, the killing was attended by treachery since she was sleeping at the time of the attack, and was in no position to flee or defend herself. As to the three children, Merlene, Rosalie, and Sherly, ages 7, 4, and 2 respectively, the killing was also attended by treachery since they were mere children of tender years who were killed while they were sleeping. Treachery absorbs the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Evident premeditation was not proven with clear and convincing evidence. Considering that the killings were committed in the domicile of the four victims, without provocation on their part, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance by reason of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode, for "he who goes to another‘s house to hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere."

People vs. Marcos (G.R. No. 132392) Facts: On August 19, 1996, Fernando Marcos, Jr. was resting under a mango tree a few meters away from the house of the Marcoses. After a while, his uncle Virgilio arrived and proceeded to the artesian well located just at the back of the house. Subsequently, Fernando saw his uncle Cesar come out of the kitchen door with a bolo in hand and suddenly hacked the unsuspecting Virgilio from behind. Virgilio was hit on the nape of the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Then Cesar hacked him again and this time Virgilio was hit on the right side of the head. Fernando rushed to his uncle Cesar and asked why he did that, to which Cesar replied ―You go away if you do not want to get involved.‖ Out of fear, Fernando could only watch helplessly at Virgilio as the latter was asking him for help. Then Fernando heard Cesar tell Virgilio ―Your life is not enough to pay the money you squandered.‖ Fernando ran to the house of a kagawad for assistance. After learning of the hacking incident, Solomon went with Fernando to go to the Marcoses‘ house. When they reached the house, they saw Cesar seated inside the sala where a bloodied bolo lay on top of the table beside Cesar. Solomon then asked Cesar where the victim was and he motioned towards the back of the house. When they saw the bloodied Virgilio sprawled on the ground near the artesian well, they shifted him to a more comfortable position. Catalino was about to leave to look for a car that would bring Virgilio to the hospital when the policemen arrived and went inside the house. Cesar surrendered his bolo and, without uttering a word, allowed himself to be hauled into the police car together with the body of Virgilio. Solomon and the son of Virgilio went with them. On the way to the police station, Solomon asked Cesar why he hacked his brother, to which the latter answered ―That‘s good for him.‖ Solomon tried to explain to Cesar that he can be jailed for what he did but Cesar simply replied ―Even if I will be jailed.‖ Then Cesar turned to the son of Virgilio and said ―Now you see what happened to your father.‖ When they reached the police station, Virgilio was already dead. Cesar was immediately detained. Issue: Whether or not the alternative circumstance of relationship be considered in the determination of the imposable penalty. Held: In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be taken into consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty, the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degree, of the offender.In the case at bar, prosecution eyewitness Fernando Marcos, Jr. testified that Cesar and Virgilio Marcos are brothers. Accused likewise declared that Virgilio is his brother. That the victim is the elder brother of Cesar is likewise alleged in the Information. The rule is that relationship is aggravating in crimes against persons as when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level such as killing a brother. Thus, relationship was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

In the present case, while the trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery, it failed to make a finding as to the presence of any aggravating circumstance which would justify the imposition of the death penalty. There is here present the aggravating circumstance of relationship but this is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Perforce, pursuant to Article 63, the correct penalty to be imposed should only be reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Gorospe (G.R. Nos. 10644-45 ) Facts: On June 10, 1953, Bernabe Andres, a middle-age fisherman of 50, and his son-in-law Leon Padchanan, then on a furlough, left their house to attend a dance at the house of Andres Queblar. On their way thereto, they passed by the house of Melecio Guillen, the other son-in-law of Bernabe Andres, to take him along with them. While Bernabe Andres and Padchanan were in Guillen's house, a certain Matilde Aganad arrived and reported to Guillen that Melquiades Gorospe, appellant herein, was having a quarrel with his nephew Bonifacio Gorospe at the latter's house. Conscious of his duty as barrio lieutenant, Guillen repaired to the place of Bonifacio Gorospe, accompanied by Padchanan and their father-in-law Bernabe Andres. Once there, Guillen called Bonifacio who in turn invited them to come up. Guillen and Padchanan obliged, while their father-in-law remained downstair. While the trio were talking, appellant Melquiades Gorospe suddenly appeared in the balcony behind Guillen and Padchanan, and without any ado stabbed Padchanan on the right breast with a small bolo. As Guillen was about to turn, appellant held him by the head and stabbed him first on the left forearm and then on the left chest, the bolo penetrating the lung, appellant saying at the same time "I will kill all of you." Taken by surprise, Guillen and Padchanan ran away in different directions, but expired in their flight. Their father-in-law Bernabe Andres upon seeing the stabbing, ran away fearing that he might be the next victim, and hid himself near his house. Appellants in his defense admits having stabbed the two deceased, but alleges that he killed them in selfdefense. Issue: Whether or not the trial court failed to consider the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of instruction or schooling.

Held: With respect to the first circumstance, the evidence does not show that appellant surrendered voluntarily; on the contrary, according to the uncontradicted testimony of the chief of police, he had to take several persons, including appellant, to the municipal building for investigation as nobody in Bonifacio's house volunteered to give information about the killing; and as regards the bolo allegedly surrendered to councilor Bitong, the chief of police assured the court that it was only during the course of his investigation in the municipal building that he learned that the said weapon was hidden in a rice container locally known as "buklod" in appellant's house, and for that reason he had to request the councilor to accompany one Leon Rabor to fetch the bolo. Regarding the second circumstance of lack of instruction, the evidence shows that appellant is really an unschooled fisherman of 50 who had only to use his thumbmark in lieu of signature, and the Solicitor-General agrees that this be considered as mitigating circumstance in appellant's favor. We do not, however, subscribe to this point of view, for illiteracy alone does not constitute the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction, for, as we have ruled in the case of People vs. Ripas, et al., 95 Phil., 63. The fact that the Orbista thumbmarked the document attesting to the promulgation of the decision, a sign that he did not know how to write, is not sufficient to prove the existence of this alternative circumstance. Not illiteracy alone but also lack of sufficient intelligence are necessary to invoke the benefit of the circumstance. A person able to sign his name but otherwise so densely ignorant and of such low intelligence that he does not realize the full consequences of a criminal act, may still be entitled to this mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, another unable to write because of lack of educational facilities or opportunities, may yet be highly or exceptionally intelligent and mentally alert that he easily and even realizes the full significance of his acts, in which case he may not invoke this mitigating circumstance in his favor.

People vs. Batin (G.R. No. 177223) Facts: Eugenio‘s wife, Josephine Refugio testified she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him. When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her

husband, and firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her. Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the street, went between the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na." Issue: Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable as principal by inducement? Held: The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice – were credible and sufficed to prove Castor‘s indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was. While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on crossexamination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor‘s utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil – a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony. Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.Even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same. Castor‘s argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words ‗Sige, banatan mo na‘ cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement. Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. The moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression. There is no doubt in our minds that Castor‘s words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime.

People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939)

Facts: The appellant drove the passenger jeepney with his cohorts on board looking for Luable and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in the opposite direction, the appellant drove the vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo. And when Geronimo fled, the appellant, armed with a bolo, pursued him. When the appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned to the passenger jeepney and drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant urged them on to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts, leaving the hapless Geronimo mortally wounded. After trial, the court rendered judgment acquitting Ramon, but convicting the appellant of murder for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted homicide for attempting to kill Luis. The appellant avers that he and his brother Ramon had no motive to kill Geronimo. The appellant contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were not in agreement as to who killed Geronimo. The appellant noted that according to the testimony of the witness, the appellant stayed in the jeepney and merely yelled to his companions who ganged up on Geronimo, "Sige patayin ninyo, patayin ninyo na, at huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!" The appellant further posits that the prosecution witnesses were not even in accord as to where Geronimo was stabbed to death. The appellant argues that because of the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution, it failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the said charges. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant when the witnesses testimony didn‘t confirm who chased and stabbed the victims? Held: Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or whether the accused merely incited his companions in the jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the determination of his liability because a conspiracy among the occupants of the jeepney has been established. In order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy." The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed that where there are several accused and conspiracy has been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the fatal wound. Where conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their participation because the act of one is the act of all. Article 8 of the RPC provides that there is conspiracy when two or more person agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a

common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. When a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of conspiracy between the appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus, criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he did not actually stab the latter.

Abarquez vs. People (G.R. No. 150762 ) Facts: On 21 November 1993, Jose Buenjijo Paz, Ricardo Quejong and their friends were in the house of one Boyet. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet‘s son. Paz, Quejong and three others decided to go home. Meanwhile, a few meters away from Boyet‘s house, Alberto Almojuela, a certain Ising and Abarquez, were likewise drinking liquor in front of Almojuela‘s house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path. Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion already wounded!" When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the hospital. Quejong died. The trial court found Abarquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. Issue: Whether or not Abarquez is guilty as an accomplice. Held: No. Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by

direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice; that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. The court held in one case that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. In convicting Abarquez in this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz‘s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela‘s criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez‘s action as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquez‘s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.

People vs. Pilola (G.R. No. 121828) Facts: On February 5, 1988, Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselito's intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped

down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito's neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito's head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito's house and informed his wife and brother of the incident. Issue: Whether or not appellant is merely an accomplice. Held: There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victim‘s death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts. Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However,

where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim. People vs. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179) Facts: On February 28, 1996, appellant and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what was it all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila‘s stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheila‘s mother - appellant‘s aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan. Subsequently, Hernan arrived and went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Meanwhile, appellant, together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room. Moments later, Wilfredo with a 2‖x2‖ piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, without saying a word, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek about seven meters away from the house. Upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped and moved closer to the water. At this juncture, Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter‘s instant death. After throwing the victim‘s lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Issue: Whether or not appellant is merely an accomplice? Held: The testimony shows that Tolentino attacked Hernan Sagario. The assault was carried out without the participation of appellant, who did not personally hit or stab the victim, but only subsequently helped carry the latter from the house to the nearby creek. Nothing in the testimony conveyed a coordinated action, concerted purpose or community of design to commit the criminal act. It must be emphasized that Tolentino‘s plan to kill the victim was concocted in the absence of appellant. The latter‘s participation, as shown by the foregoing testimony, was made when the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Further, conspiracy cannot be inferred from the overt acts of appellant. He did nothing to assist Tolentino in the actual commission of the murder. Neither did the former bear any weapon, much less use one to inflict injury on the victim. In fact, appellant, showing clearly his lack of support for the criminal intent of Tolentino, even tried to prevent the latter from hacking the victim, according to the eyewitness.

Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Because of the lack of a united purpose, appellant cannot be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation. Absent a conspiracy, his responsibility, as well as that of his co-accused, is individual -- not collective -- and each is to be punished only for his own separate acts. Neither can appellant be convicted as an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as ―those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.‖ To be convicted as an accomplice, it is necessary that the accused be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime. To consider a person an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the following must concur: (1) community of design -- knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, one concurs therein; (b) cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design. In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or lend support to the nefarious intent of Tolentino. The mere fact that the former had prior knowledge of the latter‘s criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principal‘s criminal intent. That appellant helped Tolentino carry the victim from the house to the creek did not necessarily demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or action. Quite the contrary, the former‘s attempt to dissuade the latter from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution witness. With the nominal role appellant played in the drama that had been thrust upon him, we cannot declare that he was an accomplice in the crime charged. Neither was he an accessory. Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. People vs. Antonio (G.R. No. 128900) Facts: On November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other. The victim, Arnulfo ―Arnie‖ Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound. Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto ―Ambet‖ S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of GAB. It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC. Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or ―pusoy dos‖, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos. The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play ―pusoy dos‖, a game for two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 o‘clock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.

When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred. On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles‘ refusal to pay Antonio‘s winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonio‘s gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles‘ hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. Issue: Whether or not Nieto is liable as an accessory. Held: The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Under Article 19(3) of the RPC, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime committed. The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, ―Sarge! Sarge!‖ Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning. There, they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside until members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated his instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club. While Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to him what he should answer to the questions of the police investigator. The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of the crime demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed. Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead, he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they stayed for more than five (5) hours.

People v. Verzola (G.R. No. L-35022)

Facts: On September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the two appellee to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Appellant Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the piece of wood be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. The police authorities together with the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a photographer went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. They found the body of the deceased Bernardo Molina sprawled at the foot of the bamboo ladder. Blood had oozed from the mouth, nose and ears. There were bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on the beddings of the deceased. The bloodstains led to the bamboo ladder where some of the stains could be found on the steps of the ladder. When questioned by the police, Josefina revealed that the assailant of her husband was Ricardo Verzola. Upon her request, she was brought to the Office of the Chief of Police of Bangued, where at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 1969 she gave a written statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the incident in question and pointing to appellant Verzola as the assailant of her husband. In that extra-judicial statement, she stated that immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28. 1969, appellant Ricardo Verzola went to their house in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued Abra entered the room where she was sleeping with her husband, Bernardo Molina, woke her up and had carnal knowledge of her; that when Bernardo Molina woke up and attempted to rise from the floor, that was the moment when Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting him on the head several times that afterwards, she heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs and the voice of Verzola saying that he was leaving and warning her not to say anything about the incident. She looked out of the door and saw her husband already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was sworn to by her before Municipal Judge Francisco T. Valera. On that same morning, appellant Verzola was picked up by the police and brought to the municipal building, and there he also executed a written statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. Both appellants admit that it was appellant Verzola who inflicted the fatal blows on the victim. The trial court convicted Verzola as principal and Josefina Molina as an accessory to the crime of murder. Issue: Whether or not assisting the principal in bringing the body of the deceased to the ground will make one an accessory to the crime? Held: An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with knows of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. The main difference separating accessories after the fact the responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to the consummation of the crime and subordinate to that of the principal. According to the trial court, " the bringing down of the body of the victim ... was to destroy the body of the crime, or its effect that as to make it appear that the death of the victim was caused by an accident. We disagree. There is no iota of proof that Josefina Molina ever attempted "to destroy the body of the crime" or to make it appear that death of the victim was accidental. It must be noted that Josefina testified that she helped her co- appellant bring the body of the deceased down the stairs because of fear. Even if she assisted her coappellant without duress, simply Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and

leaving said body for anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to or destroy the body of the crime the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime. In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it was easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been any attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crimeAppellant is acquitted.

People vs. Mariano (G.R. No.134847) Facts: Driven by grinding poverty in her home province and lured by the prospect of a lucrative employment in the big city, Michelle Priol, then only sixteen (16), left home for Manila in January 1996 to work as a domestic help. Soon enough Michelle found herself hired at the household of the sisters Ruth Mariano and Ruby Mariano in Bambang, Pasig City. Jenny Priol, Michelle's older sister, testified that she often visited Michelle at the Mariano.residence. However, whenever she would visit Michelle, she and her sister could not freely talk as Ruth and Ruby were always hovering about. Apparently unhappy with the manner she was allowed to visit Michelle - they being constantly watched by the Mariano sisters and denied their privacy - Jenny never went to her sister again after her last visit in November 1996. Sometime afterwards, Ruth and Ruby brought Michelle to her sister Jenny to complain to her that their rice cooker no longer functioned and heaped the blame on Michelle. On that occasion Jenny noticed that Michelle's hair was unevenly cut to the scalp. When asked what happened, Michelle told her that it was Ruby who gave her the ugly haircut. Concerned with the condition of her sister, Jenny confronted Ruby. But the latter angrily replied. Jenny then told Ruby that she was going to take her sister back from them but the furious Ruby hurriedly left with Ruth, taking Michelle with them. That was the last time Jenny saw her younger sister alive. On 17 August 1997, a police received an anonymous call reporting that a woman was seen carrying a rectangular box with a human leg protruding. The caller further informed that the woman then placed the box inside the compartment of a car bearing plate number UPR-561. On the basis of this information, the policemen immediately conducted a "stake-out and surveillance operation" in the vicinity of Bambang as reported. After a couple of minutes, the police officers spotted two (2) women boarding a car with the reported plate number. They turned out to be accused-appellants Ruth Mariano y Lara and Ruby Mariano y Lara. The vehicle was owned and driven by Ruby. The law enforcers, riding in their patrol car followed the vehicle. But the women, perhaps sensing that they were being trailed, drove fast. Alarmed by the suspects' reaction to their presence, the policemen sounded their siren. After a brief chase, the officers overtook the suspects' vehicle and blocked its path. SPO2 Hernandez and SPO1 Fidelino alighted, from their patrol car and introduced themselves as police officers. They ordered Ruth and Ruby to alight from their vehicle. The lawmen then announced that they would be conducting a visual search of the luggage compartment of the vehicle. Initially, Ruby refused saying that only dirty clothes were in the compartment but later relented the police officers insisted. Upon opening the compartment, SPO2 Hernandez was greeted by a putrid odor emanating from a decomposing body inside the box. Ruth and Ruby identified the body as that of their maid Michelle Priol. Ruth and Ruby were then arrested.

With the foregoing findings, Ruth and Ruby were charged with murder. Ruth denied the charge claiming that the victim "died because she got sick, and not because I mauled her." Nevertheless, by her own narration and admission during the trial, Ruth described in lurid details what really happened to Michelle. According to Ruth, Michelle was kind, industrious and respectful at first. However, sometime November 1996 she and her sister Ruby caught Michelle stealing money and jewelry from their bedroom. Thus, they brought her to the police but later desisted from prosecuting Michelle when she pleaded for a second chance and promised that she would not do it again. After that incident, Michelle's attitude changed completely. Ruth claimed that she often caught her stealing money from them and destroying the appliances whenever she cleaned the house, and that whenever she scolded Michelle she would answer back, triggering a fight between them. Ruth confessed in her testimony that she doused boiling water on Michelle several times whenever she was angry. Ruth likewise admitted having pulled Michelle's hair and banged her head (inuumpog ang ulo), and that in the month of July 1997 alone they fought at least six (6) times. She added that she was remorseful afterwards for what she had done and treated Michelle's seared flesh with antibiotics and washed her wounds with guava leaves. On 22 June 1998 Ruth and Ruby were convicted of murder by the trial court. Accordingly, Ruth was sentenced to death while Ruby was found guilty as an accomplice. Issue: Whether or not Ruby, as sister of Ruth Mariano, is considered by law as an accessory exempt from criminal liability by reason of their relationship. Held: While these circumstances strongly indicate that Ruby had knowledge of what her sister Ruth did to Michelle, they are too insufficient to support a finding that Ruby had something to do with the crime so that she should likewise be answerable. With her nominal role, we cannot conscientiously declare that Ruby was a principal or even an accomplice in the crime. The presumption of innocence in her favor has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The SC do not agree with the Solicitor General that Ruby should have been convicted as an accessory after the fact x x x x since her act of driving the car where the corpse of Michelle was hidden, her resistance to stop the car when chased by the police and to immediately open the luggage compartment as requested by the police, her act of lying to the police by claiming that the box in the compartment contained only dirty clothes, and her refusal to open said box sufficiently indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to Ruth Mariano in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent its discovery. Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. As such, their relationship exempts appellant Ruby Mariano from criminal liability under Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding article (underscoring supplied). The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in the above-quoted article. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit accused-appellant Ruby Mariano. As for accused-appellant Ruby Mariano, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt her guilt as an accomplice in the commission of the said crime. Neither can she be held liable as an accessory after the fact, as she is exempt from criminal liability by reason of her relationship with her co-accused pursuant to Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code. Consequently, she is ACQUITTED.

Issue: Whether or not aggravating circumstances proved during trial but was not alleged in the information may be considered? Held: Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant. Although the aggravating circumstances in question cannot be appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier penalty.

People vs. Evina (G.R. Nos. 124830-31) Facts: Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence of Reclusion Pertpetua for raping certain Ms. Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts, Gerardo took advantage of the time when the victim‘s mother was not around. He would likely forced Maritess to have carnal knowledge against her will and even poked a knife at her while doing the deed in the victim‘s dwelling and threatened the victim to kill her family should she tell her parents what happened. There, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. On November 13, 1991 when the

appellant arrived at the Catcharro residence he proceeded inside the bedroom of Marites, the latter ran out of the bedroom and told her mother not to leave her because her Papa Gerry might rape her again. Surprised by what he heard, the following day Maritess was brought to Tacloban City Medical Center for a check-up and found to have lacerations to the victim‘s genitalia. Contrary to the facts above, appellant claimed that the night of the incident he was working as porter until 10 PM, thus it cannot be said that he committed the crime accused of him. Based on the information submitted, aggravating circumstances of use of weapon and dwelling were not alleged. Issue: Whether or not aggravating circumstances proved during trial but was not alleged in the information may be considered? Held: The Supreme Court held in the negative. Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven, these aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant.

People v. Pacifador (G.R. No. 139405)

Facts: On October 27, 1988, Arturo F. Pacificador then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The crime was committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila by Pacificador. After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription of the offense. Sandiganbayan on November 10, 1998 dismissed the Information against the respondent on the ground of prescription. The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. Issue: Whether or not the crime had not yet prescribed as the special law governing the same have been amended increasing the prescriptive period from ten (10) to fifteen (1) years. Held: The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused, cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976. The crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender.

Sta. Catalina v. People (G.R. No. 167805)

Facts: Lorenzo Ballecer entered into a joint business venture with Arnold Sta. Catalina involving importation of Jute sacks from China. Petitioner told that he had a ready buyer in the Philippines which was willing to buy the jute sacks at P12.25 per piece. Convinced, Ballecer ordered one container to Sta. Catalina. Thereafter, Ballecer and Sta. Catalina proceeded to Citytrust Bank to open a letter of credit. They were required to post a marginal deposit amounting to P100, 000. The two went to United Coconut Planters Bank to encash a check. After the encashment, they went back to Citytrust but arrived after banking hours. Sta. Catalina suggested that the money be deposited in his account which Ballecer agreed. Few days after, while preparing the supporting documents for the letter of credit, Ballacer found that there was an overpricing on the cost of the jute sacks. Realizing that his business venture was losing proposition he asked Sta. Catalina to return the P100, 000, however, the latter failed to return the money despite repeated verbal and formal demands made by the former. Sta. Catalina as defense alleged that there was no misappropriation of the money. He further claimed that the said money was spent and used for the office expenses, salaries and other expenses of the office which both of the occupy. The trial court convicted Sta. Catalina for the crime of Estafa. Aggrieved, he appealed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. However, the public prosecutor filed a manifestation stating that Ballecer is no longer interested in pursuing his complaint and the case should be decided based on Ballecer‘s Affidavit of Desistance. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Ballacer will justify the dismissal of the action? Held: The Supreme Court held that an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. In the case at bar, Ballecer made the so-called pardon of Sta. Catalina after the institution of the action, almost two years after the trial court had rendered its decision.

The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who had given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.

Balderama vs People (G.R. Nos. 147578-85) Facts: Rolando Balderama and Rolando Nagal are employees of the Field Enforcement Division of LTO. On the other hand, Juan Armamento is the operator of SJ Taxi. On July 14, 1992, the team of Flying Squad flagged down one taxi owned by Armamento. They impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective, however, upon inspection and testing by the LTO the results showed that the meter was functioning normally. Feeling aggrieved, Armamento filed a complaint for Bribery and violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting protection money from him in exchange of non-apprehension and non-impounding of his vehicles. Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine (9) Information for violation of Direct Bribery and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. During the pendency of the action, accused De Jesus died. The cases against him were dismissed but the hearing proceeded against Balderama, Nagal and Lubrica.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, convicting Balderama, Nagal and Lubrica for the above violation. They filed a motion for reconsideration but were denied by the former. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Whether or not Armamento‘s affidavit of recantation will result to the dismissal of the complaint? Held: The Supreme Court held that the complaint shall not be dismissed. A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. In this case, there is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on the guilt of the accused Balderama and Nagal.

People v. Dimaano (G.R. No. 168168)

Facts: Maricar Dimaano is the daughter of the accused Edgardo Dimaano. A complaint was filed by Maricar charging Edgardo with two counts of Rape and one count of attempted rape. Maricar alleged that she was

only 10 years old when her father Edgardo started sexually abusing her. It was only on November of 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother. The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Maricar and her mother went to Camp Crame upon the advised of a relative. The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state. On the other hand, the accused denied such accusations. He contended that he could not have raped Maricar because he was always in the office. He claimed that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter because there were other people in the house. He further argued that had he raped Maricar, then she would have not accompanied him to the Paranaque Police Station to apply for police clearance. The trial court rendered its Decision, convicting Edgardo of the crime of Rape. Aggrieved, he appealed his case before the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the Affidavit of Desistance by Maricar is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint against Edgardo? Held: The Supreme Court held that by itself, an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the accused arrested by the police, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. In the case at bar, Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.

People v. Novio (G.R. No. 139332)

Facts: On September 23, 1994, 13-year-old Maricel B. Talisay, together with her minor brothers Jun and Joey slept side-by-side at their store. Their parents were caretakers of a beach house and needed to sleep there at that time. At 3:00 in the morning, a ticklish sensation and stabs of pain in her vagina awakened Maricel. When she woke up, she saw the accused, Noli Novio, naked on top of her. Her duster was rolled up to her neck and her panty has already been removed by the accused. Noel Novio was able to penetrate his penis inside Maricel‘s Vagina. Meanwhile, Maricel‘s parents were awakened by their neighbor and reported to them that a man was inside their store. Nenita, Maricel‘s mother immediately got hold of her bolo and flashlight and proceeded to their store. Nenita saw a man‘s sandals at the doorstep. Nenita knocked and called out to Maricel and ordered her to open the door. Despite repeated demands to open the door, Maricel was not able to do so. Nenita was able to forcibly open the door and beamed the flashlight to Maricel and saw Noel Novio on top of her. The accused was holding the hands of Maricel with his left hand and covered her mouth with his right hand. Nenita mounted to hack Novio with her bolo but the accused immediately took his jogging pants and ran away leaving his shirt, wallet, underwear and sandals. Nenita immediately reported the incident to the barangay and went to the police for investigation. Maricel submitted herself to medical examination right after the incident. Noli Novio denied the allegations and argued that Maricel and him are sweethearts. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape and sentenced him to 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of these proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the proper penalty for the crime of rape? Held: No, the Supreme Court held that the penalty imposed by the trial court is void. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, the prescribed penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. However, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirty years of reclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court is void.Although under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic 7659, reclusion perpetua has a range of twenty years and one day to forty years, by nature, the penalty remains a single and indivisible penalty. It cannot be divided into periods or equal portions. If the law prescribes reclusion perpetua as a single and indivisible penalty for a felony, the trial court is mandated to impose said penalty, absent any privileged mitigating circumstances conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court is not authorized to vary the penalty provided for by law either in the character or the extent of punishment inflicted. There was no need for the trial court to specify the duration of thirty years of reclusion perpetua whenever it is imposed as a penalty in any proper case. The Court is not impervious to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which pertinently provides that, in applying the so-called ―three-fold rule,‖ i.e., that ―(w)hen the culprit has to

serve two or more penalties, . . . the maximum duration of the convict‘s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him‖ – ―the duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years.‖ The imputation of a thirtyyear duration to reclusion perpetua in Article 70 is, as this Court recently held, ―only to serve as the basis for determining the convict‘s eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.

People vs. Zacarias (G.R. No. 138990 ) Facts: Sergio Pelicano, Sr., on direct examination, testified that on June 23, 1993 at about 12:30 in the morning while waiting for his son, he heard a commotion outside his house. When he looked outside, he saw Christopher Sacay, son of his long-time friend, being chased by Sammy Zacarias, Rodel Zacarias, Wally Ticalo and Rene Matugas. The boy ran towards the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Pelicano followed the group and when he was only about 10 meters away from the four men, he saw Rodel Zacarias hold the victim while the rest took turns in stabbing and hacking the boy.However, Ticalo claimed that on the day of the said incident, he was working in the farm and had a drinking spree with the owner of the farm until 10:00 in the evening. The owner of the farm even contended that the town where his farm was was far distant from the town where the stabbing incident took place. The trial court sentenced Ticalo to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the death of Christopher Sacay Issue: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding Ticalo guilty of the crime charged? Held: No, the Supreme Court is not convinced with the contention of Ticalo, however, a word, in passing, about the manner the trial court imposed the penalty. In the scales of penalties under the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately higher than reclusion temporal which has a duration of twelve years and one day to twenty years. The minimum range of reclusion perpetua should then, by necessary implication, start at 20 years and 1 day while the maximum thereunder could be co-extensive with the rest of the natural life of the offender. Article 70, however, provides that the maximum period in regard to the service of sentence shall not exceed 40 years. Reclusion perpetua remains to be an indivisible penalty and, when it is the prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety, i.e., reclusion perpetuasans a fixed period for its duration, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. In prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua,its duration in years, in fine, need not be specified.

People vs. Ramirez (G.R. No. 138261) Facts: On May 21, 1993, Montano Bañez, after entertaining his visitors on the occasion of the town fiesta was strolling in the public plaza where he met Jonathan ‗Jojo‘ Alkuino, a former resident of the barangay. Montano Bañez took him aside and invited Jojo to a drinking spree in a nearby store. They sat side by side on a bench outside the store and while exchanging pleasantries and drinking, appellant Pedro Ramirez suddenly came in front of them. Appellant ordered beer. Then he calmly approached Jojo hitting him on the right side of the body just below the ribs. Jojo Alkuino was brought to the hospital and was examined and treated. Although the victim was conscious and alive when he was admitted, he, however, died the following day.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to prove accused‘s guilt and whether treachery attended the commission of the offense. Held: Time and time again, the Court has held that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of a clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. Indeed, the lower court had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified. In this case, appellant has not given us any valid ground to reverse or modify the trial court‘s assessment. There is treachery when one employs means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime without risk to oneself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, treachery was not negated by the mere fact that the attacker and the victim had spoken to each other briefly. The prosecution established that the attack was sudden and that the victim was defenseless, unarmed and with no opportunity to retaliate. In line with current jurisprudence, SC affirmed the award of indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000. This award needs no proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise, we sustain the award of P50,000 for moral damages, which has evidentiary basis. The victim‘s father testified that as a result of the crime, he suffered ―heaviness of heart‖ as well as ―mental anguish.‖ We disagree with the trial court, however, in sentencing appellant ―to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua.‖ There was no justification or need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment, because reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The significance of this fundamental principle was laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit: ―Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.

People v. Latupan (G.R. Nos. 112453-56)

Facts: On April 29, 1991, Ceferino Dagulo heard shouts of a woman and a child coming from the north. He saw accused Gerardo Latupan walking in his direction, carrying a thin, bloodied knife. Accused Latupan entered the house of Ceferino and started chasing Ceferino's wife, who was able to run. The house of Emilio Asuncion known as ―Emy‖ was 100 meters from Ceferino's house. He reached his house and found his wife, Lilia, dead on the ground with several stab wounds on her body and his 3 children (Leo, Jaime, and Jose) wounded. Doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime, However, Jose was transferred to another hospital due to seriousness of his wounds. Jose was declared dead on arrival. On May 25, 1993, at arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. During the pre-trial conference of the four cases (Criminal Case No. 379-T, Criminal Case No. 380-T, Criminal Case No. 381-T, Criminal Case No. 382-T), accused offered to change his plea of not guilty to guilty of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. On August 25, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused Latupan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Double Murder and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs. Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of double murder? Held: The trial court, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the "complex crime of double murder" and separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." The instant case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances when a complex crime is committed. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." Thus, accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime of double murder, but for two separate counts of murder, and separate counts of physical injuries. Further, the trial court incorrectly assumed that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was included in the plea of guilty. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances, which are taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of penalty to be imposed, must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense. Thus, evident premeditation cannot be presumed against accused-appellant. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. In this case, there was no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to show when accused-appellant meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at the time of the commission of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion temporalmaximum to death. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder and sentenced him to ―life imprisonment.‖ The proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment. Obviously, the trial court intended to impose reclusion perpetua. However, the penalty of life imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties. First, ―life imprisonment‖ is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, ―life imprisonment‖ does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, ―life imprisonment‖ does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified inasmuch as under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. Thus, the courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the Revised Penal Code, such as “reclusion perpetua,” not ―life imprisonment‖ or “ten days of arresto menor,” not ―ten days of imprisonment. People vs. Bautista (G.R. No. 96092) Facts: On January 12, 1987, while the victim Allan Jone Clemente was having drinks with Orlando Ocares in a house in Tondo, Manila, accused-appellant Alexander Bautista arrived and asked Clemente to accompany him home. Clemente obliged and the two walked with accused-appellant placing his left arm around Clemente‘s shoulder. When they passed in front of the house of Danilo Enrique Cancio, they stopped. Danilo was on the terrace, on the second floor of his house, watching those playing basketball near the street. Henry Narciso, another resident, met accused-appellant and Clemente while the two were on their way to accused-appellant‘s home. Suddenly accused-appellant pulled out a balisong (fan knife) with his right hand and stabbed Clemente with it, hitting the latter on the lower right abdomen. Accused-appellant afterwards fled to an alley leaving his victim in critical condition. Clemente managed to go home, but he collapsed upon reaching their house. He was rushed to the Chinese General Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila, where he later expired. The Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him of life imprisonment. Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment. Held: The trial court, however, erred in sentencing accused-appellant to life imprisonment. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. As there was neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty, following Art. 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua. But reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment as the trial court seems to think. As this Court has explained time and time again, the two have important consequential differences. As held in People v. Ballabare: While ―life imprisonment‖ may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perpetua, in reality, it goes deeper than that. First, ―life imprisonment‖ is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under The Revised Penal Code. Second, ―life imprisonment,‖ unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, ―life imprisonment‖ does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails

imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)

Facts: At around 7:00 o‘clock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert‘s father, Jaime Agbanlog. Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son. As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robber Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the hospital for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital for wounds sustained which the grenade explosion inflicted. Robert‘s companions sustained shrapnel injuries.

The appellants were arrested the following day but denied any participation in the incident, claimed they were elsewhere when the incident occurred and that they had no animosity towards the victims whatsoever. After trial, the court a quo convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder for having conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with the use of an explosive.

Issue: Whether or not the use of explosive qualifies the crime to murder? Whether or not appellants conspired to kill the victims?

Held: Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. The information alleges that both treachery and the ―use of explosive attended the crime. Since both circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudencesupport this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance. No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.

People v. Sanidad (G.R. No. 146099)

Facts: On 16 January 1999, Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Rolando Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg left Budac, Tagum, Abra, on board a passenger jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the town of Lagangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined the residents in a drinking spree that lasted the following morning.

Accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong and several other residents of Lagangilang joined them in drinking. Marlon Tugadi and accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies and members of the CAFGU before then. On 17 January 1999, Jimmel Sanidad and his companions finished drinking and left. Shortly after, the group of Marlon Tugadi also stopped drinking and headed home for Budac, Tagum, Abra, boarding the same jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo. As the jeepney moved closer, the accused in a classic case of ambuscade suddenly and without warning unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney.Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with the exception of Rolando Tugadi, survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid in a culvert on the side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the scene. Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid on the side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the scene. An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and malicious mischief was filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, John Doe and Peter Doe. The defense of the accused rested on bare denial and alibi. The trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused and convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, and sentenced them to death. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder and imposing upon then the supreme penalty of death? Held: The Supreme Court fully agreed with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.

Monteverde vs. People (G.R. No. 139610) Facts: Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR. The amount was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial statement with copies of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR. Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay General Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period July 16, to December 1990. Nevertheless, petitioner was not convicted of falsification as defined by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, because there was no proof that she had taken advantage of her position in committing the 17 crime. Instead, she was convicted of falsification under Article 172. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. Held: Appellant was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. However, even if the SBN itself doubted whether the Information had properly charged a complex crime, it was, as quoted earlier, "constrained to go along with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes -- that of Estafa and that of Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her." We clarify. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Well-known is the principle that an information "must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." When more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information. On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner that since she was acquitted of estafa, she could no longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial document. Having, in effect, been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not necessarily lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based on its own merits, and conviction will depend on the proof of the elements of each particular offense. Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still, acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal from the other (or others).

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime. We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved.

Ponce Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. No. 92163) Facts: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City Branch 103 in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator enrile, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. Issue: Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compelio) arising from an offense being a necessary for committing another which is referred to in the second clause of Art. 48 of the RPC. Held: There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the RPC cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant namely; (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, dependingupon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, Art. 48 said penalty could not have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner‘s counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhethoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the RPC; simple rebellion. Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court‘s reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner‘s case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner‘s right to have provisional libery pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court‘s earlier grant bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become functus oficio.

Ramsical vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 169727-28) Facts: In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigation (Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate BlueRibbon Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and thealleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces of the PhilippinesPhilippine Retirement BenefitsSystems (AFP-RSBS). In its Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, amongothers, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna andIloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and described the modus operandi of the perpetrators asfollows:The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions withtwo deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateraldeed). Another deed of sale would be signed by the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed). These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid bythe System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation wasobviously to evade payment of the correct taxes to the government and save money for theseller(s), broker(s) and who knows, probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officialsof RSBS, the buyer.Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecuteand/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, whohad signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land,"Ombudsman Investigators conducted a factfinding investigation. They executed a JointAffidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., amongothers, may be charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e)and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.

Issue: Whether or not the five counts of estafa through falsificationof public document is considered as only one offense and classified as a continuous crime. Held: On petitioner‘s claim that he should be charged with only one count of estafa through falsification of public document instead of five (5) charges, respondents counter that the criminal acts petitioner and his co-accused are not continuous crimes. Respondents argue that a continuous crime may exist only if there is only a single criminal intent and the commission of diverse acts is merely a partial execution of said single criminal resolution. In the instant cases, the requirement of singularity of criminal intent does not exist because there are as many criminal intents as there are anomalous transactions, causing grave damage to the government at each instance. There was no need for the accused to perform another or other delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents maintain that petitioner was motivated by separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in character; hence, it is but proper that corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and every act of falsification committed. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the contention of respondents and ruled that the determination of (a) the charge/s and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the sound discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution. Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and his coaccused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado or classified as concurso de

delitos; or involve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.

Santiago vs. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266) Facts: On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992. On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment. More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April 12, 1993. Issue: Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code? Held: The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply. The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws. In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

People vs. Opera (G.R. No. L-48796) Facts: On April 27, 1978, Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the House International Hotel, was informed by Demetrio Barcing another security guard, that the latter picked up a little girl about three years old loitering at the second floor of the building. Rafael Ordona a janitor of the House International Hotel, told Oliver that the little girl is residing at Room 314 of the hotel. Oliver called up Room 314 by telephone and when nobody answered, he and Barcing brought the little girl to said Room 314. Upon reaching Room 314, Oliver knocked at the door, and when nobody answered, he pushed the door open but he smelled foul odor emanating from the room. Oliver covered his nose with a handkerchief and together with Barcing and the little girl, they entered the room where they saw prostrate on a bed a dead person with the face down and both feet tied. Oliver called up the homicide division of the Manila Police. Patrolman Fajardo who was assigned to investigate the report of Oliver, together with some funeral parlor men arrived at the scene, and they saw a small baby crying and trying to get out of a crib near the bed of the dead person. The dead body at Room 314 of the House International Hotel was that of Liew Soon Ping, Room 314 had been ransacked and personal belongings thrown all around. The hands and feet of the dead person were tied and the body was bloated. A towel was tied around the mouth of the victim. Patrolman Fajardo made an advance report naming therein three suspects, namely, Diego Opero, Milagros Villegas, Asteria Avila and a fourth unidentified suspect. The names of these suspects were furnished by neighbors of the victim to Patrolman Fajardo.

Appellant advances the theory that he never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, for if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he could have easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his liability should be only for robbery Issue: Whether or not the accused intended to kill the victim.

Held: Appellant's theory finds no basis in the law or in jurisprudence. It was been repeatedly held that when direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. If the circumstances would indicate no intention to kill, as in the instant case were evidently, the intention is to prevent the deceased from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline, "caused by the victim's own movements, " according to Dr. Singian. The movements of the victim that caused the "pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however, attributable to what appellant and his co-accused did to the victim, for if they did not hogtie her, she could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation.chanrobles virtual law library It may not avail appellant to contend that the death was by mere accident for even if it were so, which is not even beyond doubt for the sliding of the pandesal into the neckline to produce asphyxiation could reasonably have been anticipated, it is a settled doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident. What is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. These Spanish doctrines were cited by this Court in People vs. Mangulabnan, et al. Appellant would also have Article 49, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code apply to him. In the instant case, the intended victim, not any other person, was the one killed, as a result of an intention to rob, as in fact appellant and his co-accused, did rob the deceased. As stated earlier, what may be appreciated in appellant's favor is only the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, an entirely different situation from that contemplated under paragraph 1, Article 49 of the same Code, whereas already explained, the different felony from that intended, befalls someone different from the intended victim, as when the person intended to be killed is a stranger to the offender, but the person actually killed is the offender's father, thereby making the intended felony which is homicide different from the crime actually committed which is parricide. People vs. Espina (G.R. No. L-43556) Facts: The appellant was charged in the lower court with the crime of theft of articles valued at P585.15 and, having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional and, being a habitual delinquent, to an additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional. Issue: Whether or not the lower court imposed the correct penalty appreciating habitual delinquency. Held: The principal penalty imposed by the court is not correct. The amount stolen is more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000 and, under article 309, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. Being a recidivist and having pleaded guilty, both circumstances should compensate each other and the penalty should he imposed in its medium period, that is, one year, eight months and twenty-one days. As the appellant is a habitual delinquent,

this being his third conviction, the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional should also be imposed upon him. The question whether, in imposing the additional penalty on the appellant as habitual delinquent, recidivism, as an aggravating circumstance inherent of habitual delinquency, should still be taken into consideration in filing the principal penalty, has already been expressly decided in the affirmative by this court in People vs. Melendrez. There is no doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing additional penalty on a habitual delinquent is to punish him more severely. However, the result would be otherwise if, for imposing the additional penalty, recidivism could not be considered as aggravating circumstance in fixing the principal penalty. This may be clearly understood from the following example. An accused who has already been previously convicted twice of the crime of theft, having served the sentences imposed upon him commits, within ten years after service of his last sentence, the crime of robbery, inflicting on occasion thereof some of the physical injuries punished in subsection 1 of article 263 (article 294, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal Code). This crime is punished with reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Being a habitual delinquent, the penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional should be imposed upon him in addition to the principal penalty. Without taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the principal penalty to be imposed upon him would be seventeen years, four months and one day. Adding the additional to this principal penalty, the resulting penalty would be nineteen years, eight months and two days. However, if the additional penalty for habitual delinquency were not imposed, by imposing the principal penalty, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the penalty would bereclusion perpetua which is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law, or thirty years, if he is pardoned thereafter.

People vs. De Jesus (G.R. No. L-45198 ) Facts: Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case No. 52270 of said court, of the theft of an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P2.65 committed, according to the information, on April 28, 1936. He was therein sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor with the

accessory penalties, to indemnify Francisco Liwanag in the sum of P2.50 representing the value of the umbrella which was not recovered, and being a habitual delinquent, the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day ofprision correccional with the corresponding accessory penalties was also imposed upon him in conformity with the provisions of subsection 5, paragraph (a), of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. Not agreeing with said penalties he appealed from the sentence undoubtedly for the review of his case. Issue: Whether the proper penalty was imposed to the accused. Held: The imposition of the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day upon the appellant is justified by his own admission of guilt because the rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that when one pleads guilty of the crime imputed to him in an information, it is understood that he admits all the material facts alleged therein (U. S. vs. Barba, 29 Phil., 206; U.S. vs. Santiago, 35 Phil., 20), not excluding those alleging his former convictions of other crimes. When the law has prescribed the additional penalty for habitual delinquency in a manner susceptible of division into periods and has enumerated it among the penalties that may be imposed by incorporating it into the Revised Penal Code, it was for no other purpose than that all the circumstances present in every case be taken into consideration in order to avoid arbitrariness in the determination of the period in which said penalty should be imposed. It would be arbitrary, in the absence of any circumstance, to impose the maximum of the additional penalty upon a habitual delinquent, as it would also be arbitrary to impose the minimum thereof upon him when there are circumstances justifying its application in the maximum period. We should not lose sight of the fact that when the Legislature incorporated the provision relative to habitual delinquency into the Revised Penal Code, it was aware — this, at least, is the presumption of law — that recidivism was, as it continues to be in the majority of cases to this date, an aggravating circumstance the effect of which, as the name itself implies, is to aggravate the criminal responsibility of the delinquent. But unlike other circumstances, as treachery, evident premeditation, sex, craft, relationship, public position, dwelling, not to mention several others so as not to be tedious, which may be aggravating, qualifying and inherent as the case may be, recidivism is and can be nothing else but an aggravating circumstance. This is the general rule; but as such it certainly is not without its exception as other general rules. The exception is found in the case of habitual delinquency, as recidivism is precisely one of those that constitute and give it existence, the other being former conviction, but it is not necessary that both be present at the same time.

De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 154579)

Facts: On February 8, 1995, in the City of Makati, petitioner De Guzman, stole several pieces of jewelry valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine Gongora.The trial court rendered its decision finding de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed a penalty of imprisonment, as well as the penalties accessory thereto. The Court further finds the accused De Guzman civilly liable and orders her to pay the private offended party. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but reduced the award of damages. During the appeal in the Supreme Court, on January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the Court that the petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003.The death of the petitioner resulted from a vehicular accident, as indicated in the Certificate of Death attached thereto. Issue: Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the petitioner is extinguished by reason of her death? Held: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.Although both the trial and the appellate courts found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, she had the right to appeal her case to this Court of last resort and challenge the findings of the two courts below. The judgment of conviction was pending review until her untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained finality. Thus, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the instant petition for review. The Court is dismissing the case because there is no longer a need to continue with the review of the appeal. The lower court‘s decision has thus become ineffectual.

People vs. Pacana (G.R. Nos. 97472-73)

Facts: on January 28, 1979, after playing basketball, Edwin Sormillon passed by a store along V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City. Accused-appellant Vicente Pacaña was at the store drinking with friends. He invited Edwin for a drink but the latter begged off as he had to go home to take a bath. When he got home, Edwin was told by his sister that Vicente maligned her and challenged their father to a fight. Edwin immediately went out to talk to Vicente. Their confrontation led to a fistfight. Later, a friend of Edwin, Felizardo del Solo, accompanied by his cousin, Raul Leyson, tried to talk to Vicente to settle his dispute with Edwin. Vicente brought Felizardo and Raul upstairs to accused-appellant Victoriano Pacaña‘s house. At the balcony, Felizardo was met by Victoriano, Virgilio and Bernardo Pacaña. Felizardo asked Vicente what was the cause of his quarrel with Edwin. Vicente suddenly hit Felizardo in the face. Felizardo hit him back. While the two were fighting, Bernardo stabbed Felizardo but he was able to parry it, and was injured on the right wrist. Bernardo again tried to stab Felizardo, this time hitting him on the chest. Meanwhile, Raul tried to stop the fight and was struck at the back of the neck with a lead pipe by Victoriano. This caused Raul to stagger forward. Bernardo, Vicente and Virgilio ganged up on him and stabbed him. He then fell backwards, and Victoriano also stabbed him at the back. Suddenly, the lights went off. Felizardo slowly went downstairs and met Edwin Sormillon at the yard. Together, they boarded a jeepney to the Cebu City Medical Center. He was later transferred to another hospital where he was treated for several days and later released. Raul was rushed to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The trial court convicted all the accused. All of them appealed. During the pendency of their appeal, appellants Vicente, Bernardo and Virgilio, who are confined at the National Bilibid Prison, filed a motion to withdraw their appeal. In a Resolution dated August 30, 1999, the Court, after confirming the voluntariness of their withdrawal of appeal, granted the motion insofar as Vicente and Virgilio were concerned. Accused-

appellant Bernardo, on the other hand, was required to confirm the voluntariness of his motion to withdraw appeal. However, a return from the Bureau of Corrections shows that he died on April 5, 1999. Issue: Whether or not the civil liability of Bernardo was extinguished with his criminal liability. Held: The death of an accused extinguishes his criminal liability even if his death should occur during the 7 pendency of his appeal. Accused-appellant Bernardo‘s death not only extinguished his criminal liability concerning the personal penalties but also whatever pecuniary penalties have been imposed on him, considering that he died before final judgment, as provided in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. --- Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; x x x x x x x x x. Both Bernardo‘s civil and criminal liability were extinguished by his death.

8

Where a person is charged with homicide, for instance, the civil liability for indemnity is based solely on the finding of guilt. If he is acquitted because of self-defense, the heirs of the deceased have no right to indemnity. Should the offender die before final judgment, their right to indemnity is likewise extinguished as there is no basis for the civil liability. Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final 9 judgment. Therefore, the appeal of accused-appellant Bernardo Pacaña should be dismissed. Only the appeal of Victoriano Pacaña is left for adjudication. The appeal with respect to the deceased appellant Bernardo Pacaña is DISMISSED, his liabilities having been extinguished by his death.

People v. Abungan (G.R. No. 136843)

Facts: On August 4, 1992, at Capulaan, Villasis, Pangasinan, the accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death. An Information, dated March 9, 1993, was filed charging appellant Pedro Abungan, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with murder. The trial court rendered a decision finding Abungan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. During appeal, in a letter dated August 7, 2000, however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the appellant is extinguished by reason of her death? Held: In the present case, it is clear that, following the case of People vs.Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)

Facts: Cawili and his business associate Tongson borrowed from Panaguiton (petitioner) sums amounting to 1,979,459. They issued checks signed by both of them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon presentation.Panaguiton made demands to pay but to no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24, 1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutor‘s Office. Tongson moved to drop his name from the case as his signatures were allegedly falsified. Case against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding that Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the chief state

prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.Tongson moved for reconsideration but denied. In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the complaint for the action has prescribed pursuant to Act 3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She claims that the filing of the complaint on August 24, 1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the law refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the filing of the complaint in the prosecutor‘s office tolled the prescriptive period? Held: Yes. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutor‘s office tolls the prescriptive period for violations of BP22.When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary investigation of cases was done by the justices of peace, and not by agents of the executive department (i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time is that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of peace (a judicial process). However, since then, the conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to the function of the executive department. Today, the term proceedings must be understood to mean either executive or judicial proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of investigation may ultimately lead to sufficiently toll prescription. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays not under his control. As seen in this case, various conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his cause. Aggrieved parties who do not sleep on their right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of circumstances beyond their control.

Brillante vs. CA (G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 ) Facts: In these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari, petitioner Roberto Brillante, questions his convictions for libel for writing and causing to be published in 1988 an open letter addressed to then President of the Republic of the Philippines Corazon C. Aquino discussing the alleged participation of Atty. Jejomar Binay, then the "OIC Mayor" and a candidate for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Makati, and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another candidate for Mayor of Makati at that time. On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay. The journalists who attended wrote news articles of the same and caused its publication. As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscal‘s office four complaints for libel against Brillante. Francisco Baloloy, who was identified in the open letter as among the persons who attended the meeting organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of Syjuco, likewise filed a criminal complaint for libel against Brillante, Domingo Quimla, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita, and Sison as President of A. Sison and Associates. The RTC-Manila acquitted Sison but found Brillante guilty of libel on four counts.

With respect to the issue of prescription, Brillante claims that the prescriptive period of a crime is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint in court and not the filing thereof with the fiscal‘s office. Issue: Whether or not the offense has prescribed. Held: No. With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of Article 90 of the RPC provides that the "crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." In determining when the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses. The said provision expressly states that prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" in Article 91 has been settled in the landmark case of People v. Olarte, where the Court settled divergent views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of the offense. The Court therein held that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. It explained thus: …the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused 59 because no prima facie case had been shown. Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals clarified that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal‘s office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a crime: As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.

Pangan vs. Gatbalite (G.R. No. 141718 )

Facts: The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3.

During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioner‘s constant absence at hearings. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.

Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that: (a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code. Issue: Whether or not the penalty has prescribed.

Held: The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code: "The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. The elements of prescription are: 1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment; 2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence; 3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another crime; 4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict. In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal

Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained at large.1a\^/phi1.net "There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty."

Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo (G.R. No. 139033) Facts: Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987. During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. Issue: Whether or not the penalty has prescribed. Held: The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum. The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978 Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the case, We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory character when it provides that: Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.‘ The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article 25 in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years. The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended. The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24, 1996. The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed.

The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows: ‗1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence. 2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. 3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or committed another crime. 4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict. In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner‘s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)

Facts: On August 16, 1990, an Information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., for killing Alfredo Arevalo. Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. On January 20, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision convicting the herein accused-appellant. Thus, Accused-Appellant filed his appeal. However, while his appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. After a careful verification and evaluation on the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It, thus, recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty. The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC. In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 on May 17, 1996.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of amnesty in favor of Jose Patriarca, Jr. - while the various criminal cases filed against him were pending - shall completely extinguished his criminal liability? Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given: "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense." This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

Nuguid v. Nicdao (G.R. No. 150785)

Facts: Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00. As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner a open dated Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check. In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the [respondent]. Issue: Whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum ofP1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the aggregate amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid? Held: From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability. Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest on a daily basis. In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount. From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].

Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code]. By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.

Nueva Espana vs. People ( G.R. No. 163351) Facts: On May 15, 1998, petitioner Antonio E. Nueva España was driving a passenger bus owned by Vallacar Transit, Inc. He was then traversing the national highway and was southbound going to Dumaguete City. While negotiating a curve, the passenger bus collided with a northbound Honda motorcycle. As a result, Reynard So, the driver of the motorcycle, and Nilo Castro, the person riding in tandem with him, were killed. 1 An information for reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide was filed against petitioner who was also accused of failing to extend aid or assistance to the victims. The father of So testified that his son was 30 years old at the time of his death and he was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. He was likewise a sugar cane planter and maintained a sari-sari store. So‘s father claimed that his son was earning P30,000 a month from his copra business and sari-sari store, and P50,000 a 2 month from selling sugar cane. He added that his family spent P87,200 for the wake and funeral. He also demanded payment of attorney‘s fees of P30,000. The mother of Castro, on the other hand, testified that her son was 26 years old when he died. He worked as welder in Manila and earned P8,000 a month. She allegedly spent P30,000 for her son‘s wake and burial. Issue: Whether or not the award of damages given by the lower court should be modified.

Held: When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) a civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney‘s fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases. CIVIL INDEMNITY ex delicto Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victims. The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto ofP50,000 each for the heirs of both So and Castro is in order. ACTUAL DAMAGES: INDEMNITY FOR CAPACITY AND OTHER COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

LOSS

OF

EARNING

With respect to indemnification for loss of earning capacity, the Court, in the case of People vs. Mallari, enunciated: The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence if there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice is taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, neither of the two exceptions applied. The earnings of So and Castro were both above the minimum wage set by labor laws in their respective workplaces at the time of their death. This being the case, the general rule of requiring documentary evidence of their earning capacities finds application. Unfortunately for their heirs, no such proof was presented at all. It was therefore erroneous for both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to award compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity on the basis alone of the oral testimonies of So‘s father and Castro‘s mother. The lack of documentary evidence notwithstanding, since loss was actually established in this case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 each may be awarded to the heirs of So and Castro, respectively. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages (which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages) may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. With respect to other compensatory damages, the Court in People v. Agudez declared that competent evidence must likewise be presented to support the claim for such damages. In the case at bar, the father of So claimed that he spent P87,200 for the wake and burial of his son but all he was able to support with receipts were the payment to the funeral parlor of P20,000 and the cost of the burial site of P53,000. Regarding the claim for reimbursement of the actual expense allegedly incurred by the mother of Castro, the Court opts to award her temperate damages, in lieu of actual or compensatory damages, because she failed to submit any evidence in support thereof. Again, temperate damages should instead be given since it was to be expected that she spent for the burial and funeral services although the amount thereof was not determined with certitude.

Pangonorom vs. People (G.R. No. 143380) Facts: On July 10, 1989, Carlos R. Berba was driving a car belonging to his morther. With him inside the car were his mother Mary Berba who was seated in front beside him and his auntie Amelia Berba who was at the back seat. They were cruising along EDSA when their car was bumped from behind by MMTC Passenger Bus driven by herein accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was estimated at P42,600.00. The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs.The MMTC bus driven by the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally occupied the second lane and bumped his car. Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified that he was a driver since 1976, having worked as a truck driver in Mindanao.

The trial held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property. Issue: Whether or not MMTC, bus company, is estopped and therefore subsidiary liable to the incident. Held: It is therefore not correct for the Court of Appeals to state in its Resolution dated 5 May 2000 that the MMTC failed to appeal seasonably the issue of its alleged ―non-subsidiary liability‖ as Olimpio‘s employer. However, due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense in the present case. The law involved in the present case is Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100 and 102 of the same Code Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee‘s civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof here of Olimpio‘s insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused-employee‘s insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced. In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer‘s subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employee‘s primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some time after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course. The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpio‘s insolvency.

Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People (G.R. No. 147703) Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman, driver of petitioner company was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages . The court further ruled that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mentioning that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused. Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to petitioner‘s notice of appeal.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. Held: No. Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court‘s jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief. Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee. What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter‘s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accusedemployee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.

Basilio vs. CA (G.R. No. 113433) Facts: On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double physical injuries. That on July 15, 1987, the said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused uilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula. On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration‖ praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and dismissed Basilio‘s appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. The other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991 Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in connection to its subsidiary civil liability. Held: The statutory basis for an employer‘s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent. There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process. Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship. With the convict‘s application for probation, the trial court‘s judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time.

Francisco v. People (G.R. No. 146584) Facts: Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita Rodriguez. Pacita, through her brother Macarion, sold to petitioner Ernesto Linghon several pieces of jewelry stolen from Rodriguez. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, found petitioner Ernesto Francisco guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter, and to pay the corresponding value of the subject pieces of jewelry. The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the charge, and that Macario sold the said pieces of jewelry to him. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court‘s decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Held: The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry. We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the instant case. Tan v. People (313 SCRA 220) Facts: Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries; upon inventory, she found that several pieces of equiptment were missing. Manuelito Mendez was a former employee of Lim, who left her employment before Lim found out that her goods were missing. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant‘s forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Tan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6)

YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner? Held: The SC resolved the issue in favour of petitioner. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The Supreme Court stated that there was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. The theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.The Court held that accused Tan could not be held guilty because there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.

Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People (G.R. No. 111426)

Facts: Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH testified that when he arrived his residence on February 2, 1988, he immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the case. He likewise reported the matter to the police. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their participation. As such, they went Manila and that he and his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring

studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud;1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000; and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000. The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that no civil liability should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testified to by Teodoro Encarnacion, the petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not know they were stolen [and that] she surrendered the items and gave them to his wife. Issue: Whether or not all the elements of fencing are present so as to convict petitioner under the PD 1612. Held: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the RPC or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the RPC or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants. Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.

People vs. Temporada (G.R. No. 173473)

Facts: From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, as factory workers in Hongkong. After complainants had submitted all the requirements consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI clearances and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates, collected and received from them placement fees in various amounts. Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused remained at large. After joint trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellant of all the charges. Issue: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa despite the insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution. Held: The SC affirmed the conviction for the five counts of estafa of the CA except as to the indeterminate penalties imposed. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres; hence its decision should be reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal of the appellate court‘s Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as determined by the latter, were erroneously computed and must necessarily be rectified. The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this is within the range of prisión correccional minimum and medium. On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum toprisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is not prisión mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccionalmaximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.

People vs. Enriquez (G.R. No. 158797) Facts: On January 24, 1985, Rogelio Andico, Edwin Pugay, Esmi Saquilayan, and twenty-one-year old Alexander Pureza were conversing in front of the Barangay Hall when Elpidio Enriquez arrived on board a tricycle driven by Emiliano Enriquez. Elpidio pulled out his gun and singled out Alexander and dragged him into the tricycle.

Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were convicted of kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 16, and each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as

maximum. They appealed to the Court of Appeals which not only affirmed their convictions but imposed upon each of the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals refrained from entering judgment and certified the case to us pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 13 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue: Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentnce Law applies in this case. Held: In sum, we find that the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. All the elements of the crime of kidnapping, to wit: (1) the accused is a private individual; (2) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code are present, have been proven through the eyewitness account of Rogelio Andico, corroborated by Feliciano Castro, who have not been shown to have any improver motive in testifying in this case.

Finally, we come to the correctness of the penalty. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it. Republic Act No. 7659 which classified kidnapping as a heinous crime punishable by death took effect on December 31, 1993. The crime at bar was committed in 1985. We have ruled that R.A. No. 7659 cannot be applied to a crime that transpired prior to its effectivity under the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws which are unfavorable to the accused. Consequently, reclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed against the appellants. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, cannot be applied in the case of appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2: ―This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment.‖

Lagrosa v. People (G.R. No. 152044) Facts: Petitioners were found guilty by the RTC, of violation with Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, for having found in possession of forest products without permit. They appealed the decision to the CA, but it affirmed their conviction, with modifications as to the penalty imposed by the lower court; from 2-8 years to 6 months to 1 year. Petitioners applied for probation but was denied by the trial court, and subsequently affirmed by the CA. Issues: Whether or not petitioner can still apply for probation?NO

Whether or not Fransisco v. CA applies in this case?YES Held: The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty – to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this proposition, especially given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the petitioners‘ appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own undoing.

Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203) Facts: Petitioner was convicted for violation of an ordinance against peddling fish outside of market, as well as for the crime of resisting and disobeying an agent of a person in authority. Petitioner filed an application for probation, but subsequently withdrew it and filed a notice of appeal. MTCC granted the withdrawal of application for probation butdenied her notice appeal for being filed out of time.The court ordered petitioner to furnish the City Prosecutor‘s Office a copy of her memorandum and the assailed judgement of conviction. Petitioner failed to do so, and the court dismissed her special civil action for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on ground of petitioner‘s failure to comply with the earlier Order of the same court? Held: NO. The fact that the City Prosecutor‘s Office has not yet entered its appearance is no justification to petitioner‘s adamant and continued insistence not to comply with a lawful order of the court. Every court has the power to enforce and compel obedience to its orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings pending before it. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a

waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application for probation.

Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747) Facts: Petitioner, as President and General Manager of the company, humiliated his employees and blurted out invectives against the latter. He was charged with multip[le grave oral defamation by 5 of his employees who were allegedly the recipient of the said invectives. He was found guilty of oral defamation in 4 out of 5 cases filed against him. Petitioner elevated the judgment from the MeTC to the RTC; however, the latter affirmed his conviction, with modification, accrediting to him the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. His appeal to the CA was to no avail also. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation? Held: NO. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. The penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. Considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.