CRIM 1 Digests

US v. CUNA / GR No. L-4504 / December 15, 1908 FACTS: Cuna, on June 30, 1907, sold opium to Apolinanaria Gumpal, Filipina, who was not a doctor or a registered user of the drug. He was charged in violation of Sec. 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission. Cuna demurred on the ground that the said act was repealed by Act no. 1761 on Oc tober 10, 1907 and because having repealed during the pendency of the case with no exception regarding the pendency, there was no law in force thus no jurisdict ion of any courts. The trial court dismissed the case. The Government appealed and argued that both Acts penalizes the same crime and should not be construed as having the courts deprive Cuna of trial. ISSUE: Whether Cuna, who committed the crime before the repeal, should be convic ted. RULING: The trial court cited the American and English common-law doctrine in their deci sion. The Supreme Court (SC), although they consider it right, said that those l aws were not in force in the country. The SC said that no retroactive effect of the law shall take effect except when the punishment will be more favorable to the accused. Being that the new law pen alized the same act in the repealed law, there is no retroactivity. The old law should still be prescribed. The SC decided that the Courts have jurisdiction over the case. The decision of the trial court was reversed. COMMENT: People v. Sindiong / GR No. L-335 / February 12, 1947 FACTS: Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were charged of violating Secti ons 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code. They deliberately evaded p aying the percentage tax while being owners of Magazine Center , an establishment d evoted to selling of newspapers from 1936 to1938. Sindiong said that the laws accused to him were repealed by Commonwealth Act (C A) No. 466 and CA No. 503 which were in force in 1939. The new law provides that Sindiong s business does not require paying taxes. ISSUE: Whether defendants are guilty even if the law charged against them has be en repealed and not reenacted. RULING: The Supreme Court pointed out that upon the enactment of the National Internal R evenue Code (CA 466, 503), the defendants were ceased to be bound in paying taxe s. The SC cited doctrines in other cases in which courts can be deprived of jurisdi ction if the new law fails to penalize the offenses in the repealed law. Because CA 466 and CA503 fails to penalize defendants, the SC affirmed their petition. COMMENT: People v. Gatchalian / G.R. Nos. L-12011-14 / September 30, 1958 FACTS: Alfonso Gatchalian was charged with a violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 when he mishandled the wages of his employees. The trial court dismissed the case with his counsel citing that the violation wa s did not constitute a criminal offense but only civil liability and even if it was the law violated does not carry any penalty. ISSUE: Whether the law at bar carries both criminal and civil liabilities. RULING: The Supreme Court points out that the intention of the law is clear. Sec. 18of R A 602 provides the penalty of the accused making the offense both civil and crim inal. The SC also stated that even though Sec. 18 was not mentioned in the information , it cannot be used in deciding. There is no law which requires that in order th

at an accused may be convicted the specific provision which penalizes that act c harged be mentioned in the information. The SC found the law clear and unambiguous. They decided that the trial court er red in dismissing the case and be remanded to the court. COMMENT: People v. Gonzales / G.R. No. 80762 / March 19, 1990 FACTS: Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr. , Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida were all found guilty of murder for killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. All of them except for Custodio Sr. withdrew their appeal. The decision of the trial court was based on the testimony of witness Jose Hunto ria. Huntoria said that appellant was also one of the attackers of the deceased. Appellant maintained that he was asleep at the moment. The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant s defense of alibi. ISSUE: Whether appellant was guilty. RULING: The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria admitted during cross-examination that he cannot determine the group of people stabbing t he deceased. He failed to point definitely that appellant also did the crime. As stated in Arts. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for one to be criminally l iable, an act should be committed. The SC found no sufficient proof that appella nt has acted. Lastly, the SC found Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the tenan t of the deceased. His testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the decea sed s family. The SC found appellant s guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus acquitting him. COMMENT: People v. Wong Cheng / GR No. L-18924 / October 19, 1922 FACTS: Wong Chen, while onboard an English ship, smoked opium while the ship was anchor ed in the Manila Bay. The lower court dismissed the case and alleged lack of jur isdiction. ISSUE: Whether the Philippines has jurisdiction if an offense was held in a ship that is anchored in Philippine territory. RULING: The Supreme Court noted that the English rule, that is followed by the United St ates, in which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances can be tried in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. The SC also said the mere possession is not considered disturbance of public but usage within territorial limits even though aboard on a foreign ship is. The SC remanded the earlier decision to the court of origin. People v. Silvestre / December 14, 1931 / G.R. No. L-35748 FACTS: Romana Silvestre was found guilty by the trial as accomplice to arson with Marti n Atienza as the principal. Silvestre and Atienza were illicit partners and they were charged of adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Silvestre second husband. After pleading to Joaquin, he droppe d the charges and Atienza lived in another barangay. Silvestre still secretly met with Atienza with the pretense of meeting her son f rom his first husband Nicolas de la Cruz. On the day of the incident, Atienza bu rned the de la Cruz house with Silvestre silently watching. ISSUE: Whether Silvestre was an accomplice. RULING: An accomplice means doing nothing on the crime itself but cooperated by executin g acts before or after the crime. The Supreme Court found mere presence and silence do not constitute cooperation. She did not encouraged Atienza to do the act.

The SC reversed the decision on Silvestre while they affirmed the decision on At ienza. COMMENT: PEOPLE v. SUNICO, ET AL / C.A., 50 OG 5880 FACTS: The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks who were to transfer the na mes of voters in other precincts to the list of a newly created precinct. Severa l voters were omitted in the list thus, disallowing them to vote. They were pros ecuted for violation of Secs. 101 and103 of the Revised Election Code. They clai med that they made the omission in good faith. The trial court found the accused guilty. The crime, even though there was no ba d faith in the act of the accused was decided to be malum prohibitum. Even witho ut criminal intent, their act was still criminally punishable. ISSUE: Whether the act was mala in se or mala prohibita. RULING: The Supreme Court decided that the acts of the accused was mala in se. They find that failure to include a voter s name in the registry was not only prohibited bu t it is wrong because it excludes a person from one of his fundamental rights, t o vote. For the accused to be punished, there should be intentional or willful o mission on their part, which the accused at bar did not do. Because the accused was charged in relation to the Revised Election Code and not the Revised Penal Code or its amendments, they cannot be criminally punished. PEOPLE v. CAGOCO / GR No. L-38511 / October 6, 1933 FACTS: The RTC found Francisco Cagoco guilty of killing Yu Luon in a treacherous manner when he hit him on the back of his head and fell down causing a laceration on h is neck. During the incident, Cagoco was not quickly caught but was apprehended when he was place on a line. Yu Yee, the victim s father, along with 2 witnesses p ointed him without hesitation. They also identified him through his facial featu res. Cagoco argued that there was doubt on whether he was the attacker and if he was, the crime committed was only physical injuries and not murder. ISSUE: Whether Cagoco committed murder. RULING: The Supreme Court found the testimony of all the witnesses to be credible especi ally when Yee picked him in a group of eleven. On whether he should be guilty of murder, the SC said that even if there was no intention to kill, he acted in a treacherous manner. He was found guilty of murd er with treachery becoming a qualifying circumstance. His contention of killing with without bad faith only becomes a mitigating circumstance. URBANO v. IAC (INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT / G.R. No. 72964 / January 7, 1988 FACTS: In 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield where he found his sacks of palay soaked from an overflowing canal. He saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe at the scene and asked who did it. Javier admitted and Urbano got angry and struck him with his bolo on his right palm. No charges were filed as Javier and Urbano had an amicable settlement wherein he paid some of the medical dues. A few days later, Javier died from tetanus. The family of Urbano filed a homicide charge against him and was found guilty af terwards. Then the IAC, through a petition, affirmed the RTC s decision. A motion for a new trial was based on their barangay captain where he saw Javier catching fish in the dirty irrigation water days before his death. ISSUE: Whether Urbano s act was the direct cause of Javier s death. RULING: Urbano argues that it was Javier s fault that he got infected with tetanus because his hands were healing days before his death. Javier was not infected days afte r the hacking incident.

The SC found that the wound was infected but it was not because of the hacking a s Javier would only have mild tetanus if that were true. The SC found that the a ct of Urbano was not the proximate cause of Javier s death. The SC acquitted him of the homicide charge but direct him to pay civil liabilit ies. US v. AH CHONG / G.R. No. L-5272 / March 19, 1910 FACTS: Because of recent bouts of burglaries, Ah Chong kept a knife under his pillow fo r protection. On the day of the incident, he also placed a chair in front of the door for further protection. He was awakened when someone was trying to open to door. Ah Chong asked who the person was, twice, but did not reply until the cha ir was struck above his knees. In a fit of panic and confusion and believed that he was being attacked, he grabbed his knife and stabbed the intruder who turned out was his roommate, Pascual. He died after and Ah Chon was charged of murder. ISSUE: Whether was guilty? RULING: The Supreme Court decided that it was mistake of fact. Ah Chong thought that the person behind the door was an intruder. The SC was convinced that he acted in g ood faith and was defending himself. There was no malice and he only protected h is life and property. PEOPLE v. OANIS / G.R. No. L-47722 / July 27, 1943 FACTS: Policemen, Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta, received information regarding whe reabouts of the criminal Anselmo Balagtas who is with Irene Requinea. Once, on t he location, Oanis and Galanta found a man with his back towards and started sho oting him. The man found to be Serapio Tecson, Requinea s paramour. Oanis and Galanta gave the trial court contradictory testimonies which they did not believe and held them guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. ISSUE: Whether Oanis and Galanta was guilty. RULING: The Supreme Court said that the most important fact was that Tecson was shot wit h his back towards the respondents. Even though they acted in mistake of fact an d honest performance of their duty, they found respondents guilty of murder. The SC said that both men had time not to use violent means. Tecson was not resi sting or showing signs of defense. Also, both men committed treachery making it a qualifying circumstance to murder. Their arguments of mistake of fact and honest performance was held as mitigating circumstances. PEOPLE v. MOSENDE / G.R. No. 137001 / December 5, 2001 FACTS: Cayetano Mosende was sentenced to suffer the death penality when he treacherousl y stabbed and killed Enrique Sefriuto. Leticia Sapupo, witness, saw Mosende waited and followed Sefriuto when he urinat ed inbetween his sleep. When he faced Mosende, Mosende stabbed him. Sefriuto cal led for help while shouting that Mosende stabbed him. Mosende was sentenced to death by the trial court with the aggravating circumsta nces of evident premeditation and intoxication. ISSUE: Whether evident premeditation and intoxication was present. The Supreme Court found that the evident premeditation and intoxication were not present during the crime. Evident premeditation requires time and reflection upon a criminal act. The test imonies of the witnesses were only before and during the commission of the crime . Intoxication was also not present. Sapupo said that she saw Mosende drank alcoho l earlier, but there was nothing to show that he was in drunken condition during the commission of the crime. The SC modified Mosende s penality reducing it to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. GUILLEN / G.R. No. L-1477 / January 18, 1950 FACTS: Julio Guillen planned to assassinate then president Manuel Roxas as he was disil lusioned by the president s promise. He threw two grenades during Roxas speech in P laza Miranda which killed Simeon Valera and injured four other people including Roxas. The trial court sentenced Guillen to death for murder and multiple frustrated mu rder. Guillen s counsel contended that trial court erred in finding him guilty of Valera s death, in declaring his crimes to be murder and multiple frustrated murder, and that Art. 49 of the RPC should be ruled. ISSUE: When Guillen s contentions were valid. RULING: The evidence presented by Guillen was enough to prove that he did try to blow up the Roxas meeting. Even though he did not intentionally kill and injure other pe ople, he still had the intention and malice of the doing the act making him resp onsible. The Supreme said that Guillen committed multiple attempted murder and not frustr ated as there he did succeed in killing the others by reason of some cause or ac cident which is not his own desistance. The SC also found Art 48 to rule out instead of Art. 49 as it clearly follows th e first paragraph of the provision and it was ruled that Guillen s act was intenti onal. Although there were other aggravating circumstances, the SC found it necessary a s the maximum penalty of murder was death. The SC affirmed the trial court s decision. PEOPLE v. QUIANZON / G.R. No. 42607 / September 28, 1935 FACTS: Juan Quianzon, after being fed up with Andres Aribuabo applied a firebrand on hi s abdomen. He died after 10 days. Three witnesses corroborated to facts and Quia nzon also owned up to his act. The trial court charged Quianzon of homicide. His counsel argued that it should only be convicted serious physical injuries as Aribuabo died because of his care lessness and his disobedience to his doctors. ISSUE: Whether Quianzon committed homicide. RULING: The Supreme Court said that Quianzon s contention was without merit. The doctor ev en said that it was difficult if the victim would survive or not. His act was th e direct cause of the victim s death The SC held that Quianzon was guilty of murder with additional mitigating circum stance because of his admission to the crime. US v. MARASIGAN / G.R. No. L-9426 / August 15, 1914 FACTS: Filemeno Marasigan struck and slashed the hand of Francisco Mendoza after a scuf fle. As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, with his middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless. Marasigan asserts that he should be given a new trial as the useless middle fing er would be healed through a surgical operation. ISSUE: Whether Marasigan should be allowed to be given a new trial based on his contention. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the offended party is not obliged to offer himself to surigical operation. It does not matter whether the finer can be used again but the fact that his fin gered as rendered useless because of Marasigan s act. The SC denied Marasigan s petition.

PEOPLE v. MARTIN / GR No. L-3002 / May 23, 1951 FACTS: Aniceto Martin was charged of parricide and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpet ua. On the night of the incident, Anselma Martin, found Laura Luiz, respondent s wife, dead with a rope on her neck. When respondent was going to give his statement t o the police, he admitted quickly that he did the act. The couple had a commotio n and while respondent was in the bathroom, Luiz, placed the rope around his nec k. He took it off, snatched it, and used it against Luiz. Luiz was eight months pregnant at that time. During the trial in the RTC, he cited self-defense. ISSUE: Whether Martin can cite self-defense. RULING: The Supreme Court was not convinced of respondent s contention that it was self-de fense. The statement he gave to the police was different from his confession. Th ere was clearly no self-defense as Luiz was weakened by her disease and being pr egnant. The SC found him guilty of parricide but considered unlawful aggression on Luiz p art and the lack instruction as mitigating circumstances. Gabato, Vinson Lance S. Arellano University School of Law 2011-0184 PEOPLE v. TAN G.R. No. L-21805 February 25, 1967 FACTS: The CFI denied an appeal for the re-arrest of Fidel Tan. Tan was to suffer TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEA RS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum. The sentence became final and was committed t o the Director of Prisons. However, provincial warden did not commit Tan to the national penitentiary and retained him in the provincial jail. The warden, then, applied Art. 97 and 99 of the RPC and released Tan before serving his maximum sentence. The warden said that the transfer was not made because of the congestion and blo ody riots in the Bilibid. ISSUE: Whether Tan should be re-arrested. RULING: The SC found the warden's reasons unacceptable. Being sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment, the convict should be confined in a national prison. Also, the warden applying Arts. 97 and 99 was unjustified as the Director of Pri sons is the only one who vests the authority. Assuming that Tan was enititled to good conduct time allowance, he would still h ave 11 months and five days. The SC explained the defendants argument in the lower court. The SC said that th e lower has not lost jurisdiction to amed the judgment of conviction as they als o have the prerogative to see if the convict has served his sentence rightfully. There is no double jeopardy in the re-arrest as it is merely a continuation of the penalty. Lastly, the application of the service of penalties is governed by the RPC and does not depend on the good faith of the warden or prisoner. The SC ordered the re-arrest, and the continuance of the imprisonment Tan, for o ne (1) year, five (5) months and eleven (11) days more.

PEOPLE v. MACEDA / G.R. No. L-48224 / September 23, 1942 FACTS: Generoso and Corazon Maceda was filed for slight slander. The MTC dismissed the case citing prescription as it has been three months since the action was filed and the commission of the crime. ISSUE: Whether the crime has prescribed. RULING: Art. 90 of the RPC states that offenses of oral defamation and slander prescribe in six months and light offenses prescribe in two months. As slight slander is a light offense, it prescribes in two months. The case, therefore, was rightly d ismissed. PEOPLE v. MANEJA / G.R. No. L-47684 / June 10, 1941 FACTS: Dionisio Maneja was charged of false testimony. He did such act on 1933. The cas e he testifed to became final in 1938. Maneja contends that his offense has pres cribed. ISSUE: Whether the crime has prescribed. RULING: The SC ruled that the period of prescripton shall start from the day the crime w as discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. With false testimony, it is not an actionable offense until the case is decided. For one t o be judged of falsely testifying, there should a decision on the case he testif ied to. In short, there is no prescription present yet. The SC reversed the dismissal and remanded it to the court of origin.

Gabato, Vinson Lance S. Arellano University School of Law 2011-0184