crane research study

RESEARCH REPORT:

SAFETY INTERVENTIONS TO CONTROL HAZARDS RELATED TO POWER LINE CONTACTS BY MOBILE CRANES AND OTHER BOOMED EQUIPMENT FUNDED BY THE CENTER TO PROTECT WORKERS’ RIGHTS Suite 1000 8484 Georgia Ave. Silver Springs, MD 20910 301.578.8500

DEVELOPED BY

THE HAZARD INFORMATION FOUNDATION, INC. (HIFI) 705 East Wilcox Drive Sierra Vista, AZ 85635 520.458.6700 [email protected]

MARCH 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Illustrations

ii

Acknowledgements

iii

Abbreviations

iv

Flow Sheet

v

Abstract

1

Introduction

3

Method

10

Analysis

14

Timeline Analysis

14

Critical Analysis by Engineers and Scientists

79

Results

103

Case Studies Charts

104

Standards

110

Court Transcripts

111

Expert Analysis

112

Discussion

115

System Safety Engineering

115

Eliminating the Hazard

118

Guarding Against the Hazard

122

Warning of the Hazard

124

Recommendations

130

Organizational

131

Managerial

134

Technical

136 APPENDICES

A. 50 Case Summaries and Explanatory Note

139

B. Resumes of Participating Engineers and Scientists/ Bibliography

189

C. List of Available Appliances

220

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PARTICIPATING ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS 1. David V. MacCollum: Principal Investigator 2. Rowena I. Davis: Editorial Analyst 3. Jack Ainsworth: Electronic Engineer- Proximity Alarms 4. David Baker: Safety Director, Electric Utility 5. Bob Dey: Consultant, Construction Manager 6. George Karady: Electrical Engineer- Insulating Links 7. Ben Lehman: Retired Admiral, U.S. Navy 8. Melvin L. Myers: Consulting Engineer, Retired Captain, US Public Health Service 9. Jeff Speer: Safety Director, System Safety 10. John Van Arsdel: Consultant, Human Factors

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Illustration I: Warning Label, including the proposed parameters for the mapping of the Red Danger Zone

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Illustration II: Danger Zone Diagram showing both overhead and lateral views

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Illustration III: Aerial Basket Guard

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AUTHORS David V. MacCollum P.E., CSP: Hazard Research and Development Rowena I. Davis: Editorial Analyst Melvin L. Myers: Technical Review ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks to the following parties for their assistance in making this study possible:

Center for the to Protect Workers’ Rights for the funding of the investigation.

Numerous discussions and insight of the participating engineers and scientists:

Jack Ainsworth, David Baker, Bob Dey, George Karady, Ben Lehman Mel Myers, Jeff Speer, John van Arsdel

For over fifty years the research of the many concerned and qualified people who have examined the syndrome of powerline contact has gone overlooked. However, their wisdom has proved to be prophetic. Neil Chitwood, chief of the safety research department of the Portland District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the 1950’s, was a profound mentor of the safety engineering profession as a visionary who recognized that hazards had to be prevented. His logic was that reliance on personnel to overcome worksite hazards was nothing more than an eventual death sentence. He was among the early advocates of pre-construction safety planning to eliminate worksite hazards before the workers and equipment arrived at the worksite. Merril Ely, founder of the Portland Chapter of the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) in 1940 and chief of the safety branch for the North Pacific Division, was a strong supporter of Chitwood’s doctrine. In those early years of safety engineering, Bob Jenkins, the safety director for Chief of Engineers in Washington was one who made the Army’s safety manual EM 395-1-1 a respected reference for nearly fifty years. Without these forerunners and others like them to advocate safe workplaces to preserve human life, this study would have not been written.

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ABBREVIATIONS A/E ANSI ASME ASSE CIMA EMI ENG FIEI HIFI HRPS MADDDC MESA MSHA MOTACC NEC NESC NIOSH NSC OSHA PPCP PSCA SAE USACE

architect/engineer American National Standards Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers American Society of Safety Engineers Construction Industry Manufacturer’s Association Equipment Manufacturers Institute Electronic News Gathering Farm Industry Equipment Institute (Currently EMI) Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. Hazard Reduction Precedent Sequence Mobile Aerial Devices & Digger Derricks Council Mine Enforcement Safety Administration Mine Safety and Health Administration Manufacturers of Telescoping and Articulating Crane Council National Electric Code National Electric Safety Code National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health National Safety Council Occupational Safety and Health Administration Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan Power Crane and Shovel Association (part of CIMA) Society of Automotive Engineers US Army Corps of Engineers

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ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION METHOD

CASES (APPENDIX A)

TIMELINE

EXPERT REVIEW RESULTS

CASE STUDIES

STANDARDS

COURT TRANSCRIPTS

EXPERT ANALYSIS

GUARDING THE HAZARD

WARNING OF THE HAZARD

DISCUSSION

SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERING

ELIMINATING THE HAZARD

RECOMMENDATIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL

MANAGERIAL

BIBLIOGRAPHY/RESUMES (APPENDIX B)

APPLIANCE LIST (APPENDIX C)

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TECHNICAL

ABSTRACT

The Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. (HIFI) has conducted an investigation to develop a timeline of historical and current data on powerline contact by cranes and other boomed equipment. The focus of this investigation is to identify the reasons why existing safety requirements are not effective by looking beyond the behavior of the victim, job site operating personnel, and the immediate employer. The study identifies the opportunities missed by the management of contributing organizations to ensure for detailed safety planning and a safe worksite before the work crew and equipment arrive for the job. It is the intention of this study to compile hazard control data from a variety of sources to create an analysis that concludes with reasonable, enforceable safeguards and guidelines for safe crane and boomed equipment operation. Equipment powerline contact has for more than five decades been a prominent source of worker death as well as crippling injuries and maiming. Time and evolving work practices have done nothing to reduce this hazard, and the problem of powerline contact today remains the same is it did when cranes were widely introduced in the 1950’s. This issue is so serious that in January, 2003, OSHA began to conduct meetings with other representatives from the construction industry to discuss new standards and alternate solutions to this harrowing situation (Timeline 04.01.15). At a time when the issue of boom powerline contact is so obviously important, HIFI believes that the recommendations developed by this study will help to improve the safety of the worker and the integrity of the employer and equipment. A key issue in the study shows that the current reliance on the ten-foot “thin air”1 clearance next to, underneath, and above the powerline has proved to be a killer for more than 50 years. This current precautionary measure to avoid powerline contacts is ineffective and deters other real safety measures from being implemented. The conclusion of this work identifies over thirty alternative strategies and recommendations that have proved to prevent equipment powerline contacts; however, their implementation requires industry-wide management 1

The term “thin air” is a phrase coined by the principal author of this study. “Thin air” is a term describing the nature of the current hazard restraint with deadly accuracy, because to date the only national regulation separating equipment booms from powerlines is a mandated minimum of ten feet of thin air, with no other visual, physical, or audible barriers.

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involvement and cooperation. There exist some positive and hopeful expectations that the trend may be starting to level out due to, increasingly available technology, government safety surveillance2, and awareness that liability is the result of negligence. The ability to reduce powerline contact is within reach, if only management adopts a philosophy of voluntary acceptance and initiates measures of prevention. This study will illustrate that to achieve a safe workplace free from the hazard of equipment powerline contact, safety planning needs to start at the time of design to explicitly involve a Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan that includes specifications to be initiated by all supporting organizations and is able to be easily monitored with compliance assured by the project management.

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Timeline 04.01.15 “ ‘Red Zones’ for Cranes Near Powerlines Discussed by OSHA Rulemaking Committee” News: Occupational Safety and Health, Vol. 34, No.3. Boom powerline contact is a subject that has been receiving increasing government notice and is currently the subject of regulation discussions. See also Illustration I.

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INTRODUCTION Cranes are used to lift and lower loads, but they vary in configuration, capacity, operation, and cost. They all use a boom to hoist the loads, and they include mobile cranes. For the purpose of this study, mobile cranes include a wide variety of boomed vehicles that can be moved under their own power. The category includes aerial lifts, pumpcrete machines, and news gathering vans. NIOSH investigated electrocution incidents that resulted in 244 occupational fatalities during the period from November 1982 to December 1994. Based upon their analysis of these cases, NIOSH found that 18% were associated with boomed vehicle contact with an energized power line. Yenchek (2004) found that 5% of all occupational fatalities result from electrical contact, yet 14% of construction-related deaths are associated with electrical contact. Of all electrical contact incidents, one-fifth occur when high-reaching mobile equipment, such as cranes and boom trucks, contact a power line. About 150 to 160 people are killed or maimed by power-line contact with cranes each year. These contacts occur whenever any metal part of a crane touches a bare, uninsulated, highvoltage line. Most of these contacts occur when the crane’s hoist line, boom, or other parts touch an energized power line while moving materials. Contact with electrical lines also occurs during the transport of materials with cranes in “pick and carry” operations. Some electrocutions occur among the construction workers or rescue workers when a power line automatically re-energizes. In these incidents, the power lines re-energize at the transformer after a de-energized ground fault break was “tripped” by contact with a power line.

Objectives Electrical power line contacts continue to occur, and OSHA is re-examining safety procedures for possible improvements. Objectives of this study are to: 1. Identify the various parties who could have exercised management authority to prevent the injury. 2. Evaluate the potential role for electric utility companies to de-energize power lines, provide temporary insulation, relocate the power lines, and lock-out automatic re-closures at the transformers to avoid re-energizing lines in the event of contact.

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3. Identify opportunities for liaison between industries to delegate responsibility to ensure for minimum contact between equipment and energized powerlines. 4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the 10-foot clearance rule for operations from power lines. 5. Evaluate the distance requirements for using ground marking tape or barricades to mark the danger zone adjacent to power lines. 6. Evaluate the actual effectiveness in the field or potential field use of alarms to warn of proximity around a power line. 7. Evaluate the use of and potential for insulated links to prevent electrical transmission in the event of power line contact as a redundant back up to protect against high voltage exposure. 8. Evaluate the actual field use of a range limiting devices for the boom as an operator aid. Current “thin air” clearance standards have been ineffective in preventing electricalcontact injuries regarding cranes, and solutions for preventing these injuries are needed. The potential effectiveness of possible solutions—power source control, ground marking, proximity alarms, insulation links, and range limiting devices—need to be evaluated with factual information to raise the public awareness of the need for improved controls. This awareness should lead to voluntary adoption of the interventions in consensus standards, national standards, and industry regulations. Timing of this information is especially critical for use in the current OSHA negotiated rulemaking for derricks and cranes. The investigators expect to find that every electrocution case evaluated could have been prevented by one or more of the aforementioned interventions. Moreover, the investigators expect to find that crane operators, riggers, and other crew members working in the current organizational structure cannot prevent power line contacts without specific changes in management priorities for preparing the site prior to the initiation of work. In addition, a specific entrenched belief regarding the unreliability of insulating materials, proximity devices, and range limiting devices needs to be challenged. An example of old information that this study addresses is the criticism that has been related to monitors for proximity alarms that use magnetic sensors, which fail to sense energized power in lines that are not transferring current. New research shows that proximity alarms with electrostatic sensors are reliable in sensing voltage in energized lines, even when current is not flowing. Research beyond this study can be expanded to other construction equipment in which power line contacts have occurred. This equipment includes aerial lifts, backhoes, excavators, pump concrete machines, and dump trucks.

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Overview The overall goal of this study is to identify the practical physical improvements and operational requirements which increase the opportunity to remove the hazard of equipment powerline contact before the personnel and equipment arrive at the worksite. It consists of five phases, which are outlined in the Method section. The Timeline was developed as an aid for the reader to enhance awareness of how historical sequences crafted current ideas and methodology regarding equipment powerline contact. It contains case examples, lists of ANSI and OSHA standards, excerpts from depositions, and articles regarding every aspect of powerline contact. It also includes studies on safety appliances, worker behavior, and effects of electrical current. HIFI has taken pains to present as much published literature as possible to provide an opportunity for the reader to see whole issue surrounding the dangers of powerline contact. By revealing multiple points of view, the timeline is able to provide context and explain why many different opinions and erroneous myths concerning the prevention of powerline contact exist. The Results section provides a broad overview of why current measures are inadequate. The Discussion outlines key points to act as the basis for a successful powerline contact avoidance plan. It also assimilates and reviews data presented in the Timeline and paves the way for the Recommendations. The Recommendations section provides a list of step by step suggestions and actions for management to undertake to significantly reduce or eliminate the hazard of powerline contact. The Observations section is a peer review by several engineers and scientists to highlight how the suggestions in the timeline will reduce human suffering while reducing costs. The three appendixes (fifty examples of powerline contacts, resumes of peer reviewers, and a list of commercially available safety appliances for the prevention of equipment powerline contact) all serve to enhance the available information on powerline contact by providing background information on all facets of the hazard of powerline contact. Of the above-mentioned sections, the timeline is by far the more intricate. Information contained in this section is direct text or text-based, and has been put together with the purpose of illustrating how both workable and unworkable options have evolved, as well as the choices available to prevent further carnage. The timeline also reveals the myths and misinformation, which serve to obstruct, delay and discredit adoption of hazard prevention measures that could prevent equipment powerline contacts.

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A crucial part of the timeline of this study incorporates a list of fifty powerline contact litigation cases. The proposal’s objective to evaluate hazard control depends upon this case file. The file not only addresses the defect that led to the injury, but it also addresses the state of the art (technology) for hazard control given the circumstances of the injury. Thus, the case addresses the cause of the injury and how the injury could have been averted.

Case Studies Although only fifty cases are presented in Appendix A, HIFI alone is aware of an estimated 1,500 instances of litigation involving equipment powerline contact. The number of actual injuries and deaths caused by equipment powerline contact is much greater, because often they do not fall within the reporting requirements of OSHA or MSHA, as many of the victims may be selfemployed and therefore exempt from the reporting requirements of the federal government and various states’ workers’ compensation boards. (Current Federal reporting does not include injuries and fatalities of public employees, self-employed workers, or employees under other jurisdiction such as transportation.) In addition, not all injuries become involved as litigation.3 The listing of fifty occurrences is intended to show the diversity of equipment and hazards that cause powerline contacts. The occurrences are listed chronologically with hazard prevention concepts that arose simultaneously. It is important to start the study of cases in the late 1960’s in order to show both knowledge of and need for various design improvements, a higher safety standard, and measures taken. The timeline is crafted to reflect this evolution and show why some design improvements were developed. Even though many cases that have been litigated date back beyond five years, they are relevant to revisions of the OSHA standard regarding cranes. Including older cases in the timeline shows the repetitious nature of occurrences and the habit of some management to neglect powerline contact prevention over a span of nearly fifty years. The investigators have observed and expect to find in this study that even with the current OSHA standards, which are dated, that they fail to protect workers from electrical contact injury. The sample to be used in this study will be drawn from the period that the current OSHA crane standards have been in effect. 3

Excerpt from the document shown as “Timeline 97.10.00”, Pg. 4: “This study has two main limitations, based on the use of OSHA data. First, the proportion of all crane-related deaths in construction which OSHA investigates is unknown and the detail available for analysis in the OSHA report summaries varies. Electronic reports were sometimes incomplete.”

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The listing of incidents with older equipment is beneficial to this study for another reason: the existing inventory of older equipment continues to present an ongoing hazard as dangerous equipment that is still in use. Since the equipment is the same, (some cranes last for over fifty years) and existing safety standards have shown little improvement from the requirements of the 1960’s to the present4, the chronological link between older and present litigation becomes all the more important. Three-fifths of the 50 example cases, however, occur after 1990, illustrating the severity of the ongoing hazard as the population of crane and other boomed equipment in use has grown dramatically. The case file is a sample listing of real-life tragedies that have taken place over the years evaluated in this study. These accounts represent a fraction of the cases on record. The cases chosen here are not intended to represent proportionate percentages of injuries or deaths from specific causes, but to include all types of equipment and scenarios. Though all these cases were chosen for specific purposes and lessons, a reader of this study must not look upon this sample pool as a microcosm of typical powerline contact instances. The following points must be taken into consideration when assessing the cases: ♦ National statistics suggest that 20-28% of the total equipment powerline contact incidents result in fatalities5. In the list presented in this study, 48% of the incidences resulted in death. This decision was made in order to show the gruesome severity of any potential powerline contact. It is also important to keep in mind that an average of 140 powerline contacts occur every year.6 The total deaths by electrocution that will occur this year exceeds the total number of death instances presented in this study. ♦ In his book Crane Hazards and Their Prevention, (ASSE, 1993) David V. MacCollum gives the statistics that various types of cranes account for over 90% of all powerline contact instances. While this is true, the occasional occurrence of contacts such as the one involving 4

Starting in the early 1980’s some safety appliances such as anti-twoblocking devices, load measuring systems, boom angle and boom length indicators began to be provided as standard equipment by the manufacturer even though the safety standards did not reflect such as requirement. 5 Timeline 1967, “A Survey of Non-Employee Electrical Contacts” (Pamphlet), Research Committee, Utilities Section, NSC. See also Timeline 1971, “Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations 6 According to Crane Hazards and their Prevention (MacCollum, American Society of Safety Engineers) 150 to 160 people are killed or crippled each year by powerline contact. According to OSHA data from 1992-2000, approximately 19 workers are killed every year from powerline contact. If the average ratio of deaths to total accidents is 20%, approximately 100 workers are injured every year. It is important to remember that 21 states have

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the dump truck (see A-23) are all the more damaging because there has been no precaution against them. All boomed and raised equipment must take precautions against powerline contact. ♦ Aerial lift contacts, while disproportionately represented in this case list, nonetheless illustrate a serious epidemic. Proper precaution and insulation for lifts is crucial because this is the equipment used to execute live line work. In lifts not used by the electric utility, the danger remains high because of the person’s proximity to powerlines and their nonexistent escape options. ♦ The listing of all the recent occurrences of injuries and deaths resulting from powerline contact with the mast of an electric news gathering (ENG) van was included to show that corporate management should not leave the delegation of ENG van design safety to the individual network station, as they do not have the expertise to establish design priorities. The assemblers of ENG vans are installers of various pre-designed communication systems, and they are too uninformed in the field of engineering safety. In each of the cases, highly disfiguring or fatal injuries occurred. There is overwhelming evidence by the injureds’ counsel on how the electrostatic proximity detector can be installed to prevent the mast from being raised when the ENG van is underneath or immediately adjacent to the overhead powerline. In all cases, the presence of an electrostatic proximity detector would have been effective in preventing the powerline contact. These cases are a clear example of where the corporate management needs to provide voluntary leadership and possible funding to ensure the safety of the TV newsgathering personnel. A relatively high proportion of cases of this type is represented in the case index to show that this type of incident is an industry- wide, recurring epidemic that must be addressed.

According to “NIOSH ALERT # 85-111: Preventing Electrocutions from Contact Between Cranes and Powerlines”, there were approximately 2,300 lost workday occupational injuries in the U.S. in 1981 which resulted from contact with electrical current by crane booms, cables, or loads, resulting in 115 fatalities and 200 total permanent disabilities. The importance of these numbers lies in the fact that one injury can cause the taxpayer thousands of dollars in social security. Though

their own reporting programs and do not report to OSHA, and of those that do, many accidents are not reported or are reported incorrectly, and final figures are not standardized to any one criterion.

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silencing orders from many courts prohibit an accurate monetary breakdown of lost funds, a statistical review of costs of standard implementation and safety devices would be far less than the money which burdens the economy with medical bills, litigation, lost work time, and damaged equipment. Additional information from the case list (Appendix A) has been withheld and changed for the purposes of the study. The names of the injured have been deleted to protect their privacy. The identity of most defendants is omitted because this information detracts from the focus on the appropriate hazard prevention measures that should have been initiated. By necessity, the specific dollar amounts paid by various defendants to injured parties or their survivors are omitted from this report, as settlement agreements generally prohibit disclosure of this information. 7 In addition to the prohibition of the mention of specific dollar amounts, information on the damages awarded by verdict or settlement agreements, ranging from hundreds of thousands to several million dollars, is not a valid index of the severity of any hazardous condition and serves to develop biases that tend to compromise the voluntary acceptance of available design improvements, use of safety appliances, and management priorities of safety. This issue will be discussed further in the Results section of the study.

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It is important to recognize that the prolific use of gag orders severely impedes the free flow of hazard information and denies the basic right of freedom of speech to the public. Gag orders suppress public knowledge and discussion of the reasons for dangerous conditions and circumstances, allowing them to persist and endangering lives in the future. Associate General Council for ATLA James Rooks, in “Confidential Settlements Under Fire in 13 States” (Lawyers Weekly USA, April 30,2001)discourages gag order by saying “The first principle is one of open courts; there is no recognized right of privacy for corporations. Confidentiality plays a reasonable role in domestic relations or juvenile cases, but beyond those no-brainers, there should be a presumption of openness. A lot of the requests for secrecy in settlements are made to all corporations to continue to hide the information that other lawyers representing clients would like to find.” He goes on to use examples like the secrecy over exploding gas tanks of Ford Pintos and defective Firestone tires, which could have saved many lives if truth about their products had come to light earlier. For more information on gag orders see the article “Strictly Confidential” (Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, 1993, available in the Important Documents section of the Lawyers Weekly USA website.

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METHOD

Phase I of this study screens some 1500 equipment powerline contacts that were in the HIFI computer data bank and select fifty occurrences, which may have met most of the following criteria: ! Cases that had been a subject of a detailed hazard analysis report. ! Cases with sufficient depositions of various defendants and other personnel who should have acted to prevent powerline contact. ! Cases that showed the greatest diversity of equipment involved in a powerline contact. ! Cases that showed the greatest number of parties who had the responsibility to ensure a safe workplace but did not prevent the hazard of equipment powerline contact. ! Those which involved serious crippling injuries or death. ! Those of historical importance to show industry knowledge of alternate methods or use of appliances to prevent equipment powerline contact (usually revealed by litigation discovery). ! Two fifths of the cases selected occurred in a twenty-two year period between 1968 and 1990 to include significant landmark cases establishing judicial safety precedents. ! Three fifths of the cases selected occurred after 1990 to illustrate current circumstances that led to equipment powerline contacts.

Phase II of the study is the preparation of Appendix A, a detailed summary of each of the fifty cases with the pertinent information that identifies: ! Court and case number ! Date of occurrence ! Equipment and facility involved ! Hazard ! Summary of the occurrence, which briefly describes the scenario, the type of powerline, and various parties who were involved ! Available hazard prevention

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! Disposition ! Notes that highlight the key issues

Phase III of the study is analysis process, which relies on the principles of safety engineering. In today’s world the universal use of heavy equipment presents a continual potential to come into contact with powerlines. The following tenet should become the basis for developing alternate rules of management conduct: “Any potential circumstance of equipment usage that will cause a powerline contact is always unreasonable and always unacceptable when reasonable powerline contact prevention planning, design modification, or the use of hazard prevention devices or appliances can be used to eliminate or minimize the possibility of powerline contact.” This is not an arbitrary tenet for management to fulfill upon the realization that a hazard is always present, for a hazard is always found in one of three modes8: ♦ Dormant: unable to cause harm ♦ Armed: able to cause harm ♦ Active: causing harm with little chance of escape This definition has a universal application to all hazards and can be explained in terms that are pertinent to equipment powerline contact. An overhead powerline with a well-established clearance of 18 ft or more above the ground seems not to present a hazard when a crane or other boomed or masted equipment that can reach it is not present. However, though it is unreachable, the powerline silently carries dangerous amounts of electricity. It is, however, potentially lethal. Even though there is no chance of contact under ordinary circumstances, the potential of danger that an energized powerline presents makes the hazard of powerline contact dormant. An overhead powerline hazard becomes armed the moment a crane or other boomed or masted equipment that can reach it is brought into the immediate vicinity. The storage of materials or construction activity under the powerline arms the hazard and becomes a key factor, 8

This definition of a hazard is expressed by David MacCollum in affidavits and sworn court testimony. He introduced it to the field in the ASSE Glossary of Safety (1991) as well as in Crane Hazards and their Prevention (ASSE, 1993). This analysis has been widely accepted by safety engineers and is often used in the process of riskhazard analysis.

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as cranes are used to easily lift the materials in the function of either locating or removing materials from under or adjacent to overhead powerlines. Even the filling of storage bins on farms has resulted in raising equipment booms into a powerline and causing electrocution9. Once the powerline has been contacted the hazard is in the active mode, and for anyone in the ground fault path10, it is usually too late to escape injury. Powerline contact can most effectively be prevented by not allowing the hazard to become armed in the first place. If circumstances are such that it is impossible for crane or other equipment to be physically separated from the powerlines, available technology in the form of various devices provides alternatives that can substantially reduce the probability of actual contact by guarding with insulation or warning of impending danger with an electrostatic proximity alarm. Such devices should not be used as substitutes for a safe work location, but primarily as backup features that provide an opportunity to revise the activity in a safer manner.

Phase IV of the study is the development of a historical timeline to place in chronological order the fifty occurrences, juxtaposing them with publication standards, requirements, studies, treatises, excerpts of sworn deposition testimony, and use and development of a variety of safety devices and operational procedures. With this type of overview, both effective and ineffective hazard prevention measures are identified.

Phase V of the study presents the comments of eight field experts. These comments, entitled “Peer Reviews” provide specialty testimony and provide knowledgeable perspective to expand and clarify ideas brought up in the text of the study. These comments are in turn incorporated into the “Discussion” and “Results” section of the study.

Phase VI of the study utilizes the facts revealed in the timeline to create an evaluation of the current methods and commonly held opinions regarding the continuing occurrence of boom powerline contact. The “Discussion” section of the study pinpoints trends in legislation and accountability that must be reshaped if the hazard of powerline contact is to be successfully 9

See Appendix A7, A8 Ground fault is the term for the path of grounding for an electric current. Current flows in the path of least resistance until it is grounded and the energy dissipates. Ground fault path is the route the electric energy takes to become grounded. When the path is a human body, serious electrical damage or electrocution can occur.

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overcome. The “Analysis” section offers sound and logical reasoning regarding the reliability of commonly proposed safety measures and pinpoints specific situations to perform a situational analysis.

Phase VII of the study develops a listing of recommendations that would serve as effective, practical, and reasonable hazard prevention measures for management to initiate. These recommendations are primarily actions for management to eliminate or minimize the hazards before they become an issue for operating personnel.

Phase VIII provides a working copy to various professionals who provide a peer review, their own conclusions and summaries consistent with their own expertise.

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TIMELINE:

HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

TIMELINE ANALYSIS The timeline developed for this study was compiled from primary sources and utilizes direct quotes and documented information to convey an honest account of the progress towards the adoption of safety guidelines and safety appliances. This includes articles and test accounts that advocate or prove the effectiveness and durability of such standards and appliances as well as the accounts that attempt to disprove it. The negative accounts serve to illustrate the reasons why safety appliances such as insulated links and proximity alarms are today not fully accepted by manufacturers, purveyors, rental agencies, and contractors. The text of this study may refute these accounts in order to expose weakness of argument or logic, thus strengthening the case for adoption of these safe measures and appliances. The primary purpose of the timeline is to provide a concrete basis for the analysis that leads to the Recommendations. Notes inside the timeline are written in purple, and are interjections of the authors of this study for the purpose of clarification and as summarized in the Discussion. Though a bibliography is present in the study, many citations and footnotes in the text will be cited directly from the timeline and will contain the date of the quote or article the way it is presented in the timeline for easy referral. Any additional citations appear in Appendix B in the Bibliography.

Color Guide ♦ Red- Examples of litigation cases of 50 real-life powerline contacts, chronologically interjected in order to illustrate the technological advancements and popular beliefs available at the time of the incident. ♦ Blue- Any standard that can be considered an enforceable mode of regulation; ANSI and ASCI are portrayed in blue, as well as National Safety Council (NSC) standards and military-issued regulations pertaining to at least one organized group. ♦ Green- Excerpts from court transcripts and recorded depositions. In providing the court and case number the study is able to grant access into further research without biasing the reader by listing plaintiffs or defendants. The authors of this study have attempted to provide context enough to make the excerpts understandable while releasing the reader from irrelevant reading. Full transcripts of all depositions used will be provided upon request. ♦

Purple- Notes that have been interjected into the text boxes by the authors of this study for the purpose of comment or clarification.

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A TIMELINE HISTORY OF POWERLINE CONTACT 1951

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 2nd Edition: National Safety Council (NSC); 12-16: “Commercial warning devices are available which work by induction from a powerline, ringing a warning bell in the cab when the boom or cable approaches too close.” Note: This is the first published mention of available safety devices that warn of impending crane powerline contact.

52.10.28

August Albrecht invented a detector for Electrical Powerline for Vehicles with Extended Booms, Patent # 2,615,969

1953

“Power Line Accidents Kill Men, Ruin Equipment, and Delay the Job” National Safety Council Memo reminds workers the proper precautions and steps to avoid powerline contacts.

1954

Data Sheet # 287, Published by the National Safety Council (NSC), 444 N. Michigan Ave, Chicago, IL Pg. 2, P.5: “Various alarm devices have been developed to warn the operator when the boom approaches too closely to the powerlines.”

1955

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 3rd Edition, NSC; 14-12: OVERHEAD POWER LINES “Overhead powerlines within the plant area create an electrocution hazard to workmen when cranes, shovels, and draglines in the vicinity of excavation and other construction work. An electronic safety device for warning crane operators of proximity to powerlines should be installed on the construction crane equipment to be used.” “Such a device will warn crane operators and workmen of proximity to powerlines from a distance of 8 inches up to 400 feet from the lines, depending on the voltage in the lines and the setting of the sensitivity control by the operator. It functions on AC or DC voltages, lines, and shows shallow-buried underground cables.” “The device uses special circuits so that it does not depend upon the current being drawn through the lines to set off the alarm. The presence of voltage is all that is necessary to cause the device to function at a safe distance. To set the device, the boom is swung within the desired safe distance from the transmission lines, and the control is advanced until the horn sounds. The horn will sound again at any time the boom enters this pre-set danger zone.” 19-22: “Electronic devices are available which can be attached to the boom and which will sound an alarm if the boom comes within a predetermined distance from a live wire.”

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1955

The incident of walking a latticework crane boom into a powerline powering a concrete batch plant, causing a loss of power when mixing quick-set concrete, resulted in the requirement to dismantle and replace the two mixers that had become frozen with cured concrete. No injuries were involved, but the incident prompted the Portland District Army Corps of Engineers to initiate special conditions for three dams that would be under construction. The essence of the changes required the following: All powerlines in the work area will be 90 feet above the ground and all crane booms will be less than 80 feet long. During the next ten years during the entire construction cycle no powerline contacts occurred. See item 58.08.00, where this provision would be in the Contractor’s accident prevention plan.

56.01.10

James E. Auld invented the Automatic Control System for Hoisting Apparatus, Patent # 2,730,245

1957

Data Sheet # 448, NSC: Insulated Hook; An electronic safety device for warning crane operators of proximity to powerlines is commercially available. Also commercially available are insulated load-line hooks and insulated crane boom guard.” This reference contains illustrations of these devices.

57.04.16

Daniel R. Winters invents an “Automatic Approach Alarm”, Patent # 2,789,282

58.08.00

Safety Policy and Procedure Manual, North Pacific Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Portland, OR Pg. 18: Part IV- Accident Prevention On Contract Work: “The accident prevention provisions are as much a part of the contract as any other provision set forth in the contract for the control of the work.” Section II: Planning 1. Contractor’s Accident Prevention Plan: “To insure cooperation, coordination, and complete understanding in the application of accident prevention to contract work, District Engineers will address a letter to each contractor immediately following the making of a contract award. This letter will include a brief outline of the objectives of the Corps of Engineers in accident prevention and will stress the importance of the contractual safety obligations of the contract. It should invite attention to the contractual requirement that a written accident prevention plan will be carefully reviewed by both operating and safety engineering personnel. Paragraph 2009.11 O&R, EM 385-1-25. Following this review and prior to the initiation of work, the contractor will be requested to meet in conference with appropriate construction personnel to discuss his accident prevention plan and the inherent and specific hazards of his contemplated operations. The understandings reached at this conference will be tabulated in writing. One copy will be furnished the contractor and one copy will be filed in the official contract file.” Note: This regulation was the first of its kind, and was soon found as a regulation in general safety handbooks throughout the Corps of Engineers. It was the advent of designating responsibility and authority to one overseer. The requirement for the contractor’s accident prevention plan soon became the keystone of the Army Corps of Engineers’ safety program. Variations of this regulation are repeated throughout the timeline, as it has evolved into a key safety requirement.

58.10.00

Sheppard, Paul E. “Crane Contacts can Kill”, National Safety News, NSC: Pg. 130: states “musts” are: crane boom protector, an insulated safety hook, and a powerline proximity warning device.

16

1959

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 4th Edition, NSC; 19-2: “Electronic devices are available which can be attached to the boom and which will sound an alarm if the boom comes within predetermined distance from a live wire.” “Boom guards of wood or of pipe mounted on 15-kv insulators provide mechanical protection against contact.” “If a crane boom comes into contact with a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hooker of others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect against this hazard a load hook with an insulated link, now commercially available, can be used.”

59.07.28 59.09.00

C.B. Ingram invents the Insulated Link, Patent # 2,897,257 Elkins, Sam S. “Crane Booms v. Powerlines”, National Safety News, NSC: Pg. 121 lists several types of electronic warning devices, crane boom guards, and insulated hooks.

1960’s

The military transition of handling bulk supplies included the use of cranes. Until older WWI and WWII supply depots could bury or relocate powerlines, they had considerable success in preventing powerline contacts with boom cages, insulated links, and proximity alarms. These experiences prompted many of the following military orders for the use of safety appliances. See 62.03.00, 64.02.00, 64.02.04, 65.10.01, 66.10.01, 67.01.00, 69.07.28, 69.10.01, 70.04.20, 73.12.00, 74.01.00

1960

“Survey of Contacts with Overhead and Underground Electrical Lines (out of 95 replies received): 1958 National Safety Council Newsletter # 112.03-07030

60.02.09

F.E. Barnes invents the Insulated Tension Link and Method of Making Same, Patent # 2,924,643

60.03.15

William C. Burnham invents the Electrically Insulated Link, # 2,928,893

60.08.23

Arthur J. Thomas invents the Crane Boom Guard Attachment, Patent # 2,950,016

61.06.20

Arthur J. Thomas invents another Crane Boom Guard Attachment, Patent # 2,989,194

62.03.00

U.S. Department of the Air Force, Dept of Defense, T.O. 36C-1-4: Electroduction Protective Devices for Cranes and Shovels: Requires the use of di-electric boom shield and insulated link for all cranes dispatched for use in the vicinity of highvoltage powerlines.

63.08.00

Construction Safety Standards, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior; P 9.1.11C: “An automatic warning device has been installed on the equipment and used together with the utilization of a signalman to warn the operator when the equipment approaches the 10-foot clearance.”

63.08.13

Stuart A. Coffey invents the Crane Boom Life Guard, Patent # 3,100,575

17

1964

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 5th Edition, NSC: 18-24: “Electronic Devices are available that can be attached to the boom and will sound an alarm if the boom comes within a predetermined distance from a live wire.” “Boom guards of wood or of pipe mounted on 15-kv insulators provide mechanical protection against contact. If a crane boom contacts a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hook-on man and others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect these men, a commercially available load hook with an insulated link can be used.”

1964

W.E. Rossnagel, (Consulting Safety and Fire Protection Engineer) Handbook of Rigging for Construction & Industrial Operations,” 3rd Edition Pg. 228: “There are on the market several types of electronic devices intended to be mounted on the top of the boom. Such devices will sound an alarm or stall an engine if brought within a pre-determined distance from an energized electrical conductor.”

64.02.00

Department of the Army, Cir, 385-1 Safety: Provide a di-electric boom shield and insulated link in lifting line above the hook.

64.03.17

Daniel R. Winters invents the Proximity Alarm, Patent # 3,125,751

64.02.04

Cir 385-1 “Use of Cranes, Crane Shovels, Draglines, and Similar Equipment Near Electric Powerlines” Headquarters, Department of the Army “3 a. The most feasible means of reducing the probability of electrocutions and injuries as a result of crane booms and their loads contacting energized powerlines is to equip the crane booms with dielectric shields and to install insulated swivel links in lifting above the hooks. 4. Commanders will analyze Army crane operations, accident experience, and the electrocution potential of the equipment involved and will apply such of the following safeguards as are required to insure safe operations: a.

Provide a dielectric boom shield and an insulated link in the lifting line above the hook.

b.

De-energize powerlines whenever equipment is working close to the lines.

c.

Notify the operating utility when cranes are to be used in close proximity to energized powerlines. Ground the frames of cranes operating in close proximity to energized powerlines.”

d. 65.02.02

H.W. Volberg invents another Proximity Alarm, Patent # 3,168,729

65.10.01

“Memorandum for Record” Directories of Research , Development, and Engineering, U.S. Army Military Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia Discusses Ely Mechanical Boom Swing Limiting Devices and SigAlarm™: “[Range Limiting Devices] provides a positive stop when the stop blocks are set and does not interfere with operation when the stop blocks are removed from the ring.” “SigAlarm™- If properly set, this unit can provide warning upon approach to a powerline.”

66.07.12

H.J. Hirtzer invents the Insulated Connector and Method, Patent # 3,260,796

18

66.10.25

T.O. 36C-1-4: “Electrocution Protective Devices for Cranes and Crane Shovels” Published under the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force 2 a. “A dielectric boom shield and insulated link in the lifting line at the hook will provide approximately 90% protection to personnel working with the equipment in close proximity to high tension electric wires.” 3 c. "Only cranes and crane shovels equipped with the protective device will be dispatched to operate in the vicinity of high tension lines.”

1967

A Safety Handbook for Mobile Cranes, The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents and Institute of Material Handling (Most respected and prestigious safety group in Great Britain) “There are available on the market, proprietary devices designed to give a warning when the crane jib comes within a predetermined distance of the power cables. These devices are attached to the head of the jib and in one case, the device actually cuts off the crane power and prevents its further movement.”

67.01.00

Department of the Army, TB-385-101 Safety: Instructions to equip crane booms with di-electric shields and links.

67.01.03

A. Stenger, Jr., et al receive a patent for the invention of “Voltage Responsive Devices and Methods of Voltage Detection”, first filed on June 24, 1963; Patent # 3,296,494

67.03.00

EM-385-1-1, General Safety Requirements, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, P 15.E.09: “Anytime it is necessary to operate a boom-type equipment where there is a capability of encroachment on specified clearances, the boom shall be equipped with an insulated cage guard and an insulating link shall be installed on the load line.”

1968

USAS B30.5, Safety Code for Crawler, Locomotive, and Truck Cranes, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, (American National Standards, now known as ANSI) 5.3.4.5b: “Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used on cranes.”

68.04.04

A latticework crane boom was pointed directly underneath a live 7,200 V powerline that the electric utility lineman failed to disconnect. A worker lost his right arm and sustained other mutilations when he released the lifting hook from a 60” culvert, causing the boom to raise three feet into a powerline. An insulated link could have prevented injury. See Appendix A-1 This case was among the start of a trend that addressed a third party’s duty and ability to ensure for a safe workplace by de-energizing a powerline to prevent a crane boom contact when placing culvert pipe under a powerline.

68.05.20

“Contacting Overhead Electrical Powerlines”—Mobile Cranes Technical Bulletin #1 (Study by Liberty Mutual) Discussed Proximity indicators, boom enclosures, and insulated links as safety devices.

19

1969

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 6th Edition, NSC: Pg. 430: “Another device that reduces the hazards involved in crane contacts with electric lines is a cage-like insulating guard that can be attached to the top side of the boom. Also available is an insulated safety link that can be installed between the load hook and load attachment cables, or the line hook and sling, to provide protection to the hookup men.” Pg. 560: “Electric devices are available that can be attached to the boom and will sound an alarm if the boom comes within a predetermined distance from a live wire. This equipment is subject to failure and should be used only when it is absolutely impossible to maintain minimum clearances, barricade, or de-energize powerlines.” “Boom guards of wood or of pipe mounted on 15-kv insulators provide mechanical protection against contact. “If a crane boom contacts a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hook-on man and others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect these men, a commercially available load-hook with an insulated link can be used.” Pg. 1566: “When a mobile crane must be operated near electric powerline, the power company should be consulted to determine whether the line can be de-energized. Many fatalities have resulted from contact with powerlines, and often the power companies’ service is seriously disrupted. Various states have enacted legislation distances which booms and cables must be kept from powerlines. A minimum of ten feet is often specified; however, the recommendations of the power company and the legal requirements of the state should be observed.” Pg. 1567: “No load may be lifted or moved without a signal. Where the entire movement of the load cannot be seen by the operator, as in lowering a load into a pit, a signalman should be posted to guide him.”

1969

“Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations This table reports the total number of accidents involving contact with overhead highvoltage lines through equipment from 1960-1969 at 572 in the state of California, with 160 of them fatal. However, we can extrapolate from disclaimers on other studies that this number represents the bare minimum of occurrences.

1969

“A Survey of Non-Employee Electrical Contacts” (Pamphlet), Research Committee, Utilities Section, NSC Detailed Statistics: Fatal- Crane/Boom = 185, Well Drilling Rig = 25, Other Equipment =186, Total =396 Fatalities; Non-fatal- Crane/Boom 826, Well Drilling Rig = 110, Other Equipment = 593 Fatalities occurred in about 20% of all occurrences. Fatalities: 396, Non-fatal: 1529, Total: 1925

69.07.28

Directorate of Research, Development, and Engineering, U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, VA Investigation of Dielectric Boom Shields , Hook Insulator Proximity Alarms, Grounding Shields, et al.

20

69.10.01

SMEPB-RDE-KM “Directorate of Research, Development and Engineering: U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, VA” 5 b. SigAlarm™: “If properly set, this unit can provide warning upon approach to a powerline. The reliability of the system depends upon the electrical circuits, since there are no mechanical parts. The test circuit provides a quick check of the system integrity. The exterior howler alarm might prove difficult to hear in a construction area, however, it was audible to all personnel in the test area, with the crane engine running.”

1970

Though the city highway moving permit required the involvement of the electric utility companies while towing a house through city streets with a trailer, no electric company personnel appeared at the appointed time, and one of the men moving the house was electrocuted when he attempted to use a stick to improve clearance for the house. See A-2 This case illustrates the diversity of opportunities that involve powerline contact and the need for communication and follow-up between contractors and the third party participant. Cooperation is necessary to ensure for a safe workplace.

1970

Hauf, R., “Requirements For Grounding Practices and Standards- The Revision of Report 479” This is a detailed study that examines duration and intensity of electrical shock to determine the effects of both factors on the human body. Though many factors, such as where the shock occurred on the body and condition of the skin, yielded differing results, the report states that frequencies as low as 50/60 Hz are enough to cause fibrillation in some cases.

70.04.20

AMSME-Z: Dielectric Safety Shielding for Military Cranes and Booms, Commanding General, U.S. Army Material Command: “The primary conclusion drawn from the investigation of crane electrocution accidents was that no “add-on” safety device can replace or minimize the need for proper action by crane operators, linemen, and supervisors.” Note: This observation fails to include the experience of AMC in the 1950’s when updating their supply Depots, which required manual handling of their military supplies, to using cranes. At the time these warehousing streets were covered in powerlines as thick as cobwebs, which seriously impeded he use of cranes. Until such time that powerlines could be relocated or buried, AMC successfully avoided crane powerline contact injuries with boom cages and insulated links.

21

70.05.27

Research Laboratories: Ottawa, Canada, Division of Radio and Electrical Engineering: “Tests on Crane-Truck Mounted High Voltage Protection Devices” (I) Miller 25 Ton Swivel Insulator Link & (II) Electrowarn overhead powerline detector. Results: (I) “Water was poured over the link so as to wet the surface as much as possible and the test was repeated. Corona was observed on some of the water drops but no breakdown occurred. (II) “The warning device functions as described in the literature but its usefulness is limited by the fact that it only detects the proximity of a powerline to one point of the crane.” Note: This report overlooks the fact that the insulated links are a redundant back-up safety device and the proximity alarm was developed just to warn of the presence of a powerline and was not designed to be a measuring device to identify the clearance from a powerline.

70.07.20

One worker was killed, one injured and one permanently disfigured with the loss of three limbs when their truck mounted crane struck a mid-span, 35,000 V powerline while guiding a pipe over an eight foot cyclone fence. Both the property owner and the electric utility company had keys to unlock the gate to the property, but did not communicate well enough with the construction crew. See A-3 In this case Robert Jenkins, retired chief of safety for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, related his experience of extending the 6ft thin air clearance to 10ft, a change that did not reduce injuries from crane powerline contacts. He further testified that the use of both links and a boom cage did reduce injuries from crane powerline contact by approximately 90 percent. See trial testimony of 1972.

1971

“Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations This table reports the total number of accidents involving contact with overhead highvoltage lines through equipment from 1962-1971 at 594 in the state of California, with 150 of them fatal. It appears that approximately 25% of powerline contacts are fatal.

71.03.16

August C. Clark, Charles Christianson, Julius Kaminetsky, Edward P. Duffy invent another Insulated Connector and Method, Patent # 3,571,492

71.02.00

Proposed Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, Bureau of Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Construction Safety Act, Subpart N: Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Elevators, and Conveyors, 1518.550, (v): “Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used on cranes, but the use of such devices shall not alter the requirements of any other regulation of this pare even if such device is required by law of regulation.”

71.05.00

Occupational Safety and Health Standards; National Consensus Standards and Established Federal Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1910.180 (j) (2): “Boom Guards. Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used on cranes, but the use of such devices shall not operate to alter the requirements of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph.” 22

1972

Court Transcript of Theodore M. Leigh (Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois: see Appendix A-3) Cross-examination by Mr. Ozmon, Pg. 354, Ln. 1649: “My name is Theodore M. Leigh and I live in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I have been an employee of Link Belt a total of 29 years and presently am the manager of Product Safety. I am both an electrical and mechanical engineer and was previously the Assistant Chief Engineer. Research and development is not in my department but is in the engineering department. As a staff member, I have direct communication with that department. I am the Link-Belt man who makes recommendations on safety programs and fall within my particular job on behalf of Link Belt. I have been aware for over 20 years of a problem relative to crane boom contacts with electrical transmission lines, which often result in injury and death. I am aware that the cranes Link-Belt manufactures are to be used on some occasions in an area where there are overhead energized electrical lines. I’ve also been aware at least 10-20 years, in my position at Link-Belt, of devices developed in relation to this problem. The three major types of such devices are: A form of cage which had dielectric properties for use on the upper end of the crane boom; a link, and a proximity device. I have never on behalf of Link Belt obtained one of the cage-type de ices for testing and examining it myself. In the various positions I have held at Link-Belt, I have never obtained and brought there for testing and examination any of the types of devices known as a link or a proximity device. I have never personally seen a cage-type device, a boom or crane guard, nor a link, nor a proximity device. I have never requested or caused any other type of testing organization to test any boom guard, link, or proximity type device. When such testing is indicated, its initiation by either Link-Belt or an outside organization would fall within my province as Manager of Product Safety. It would not be a fair statement at all to say that my research on behalf of Link-Belt into the problem of crane boom contact with energized lines has been limited to the accumulation of literature of the various manufacturers into a Link-Belt file. You would have to go much farther than adding ‘and possibly the looking into some of the specifications of some of the items’, before I would agree to that statement.” Court transcript of Robert Jenkins; Recross examination by Mr. Davidson, Pg. 357, Ln 3382 “I sent this letter out on the date it bears, March 10, 1971, with copies to Mr. Strnad, the president of the company, Theodore Leigh, Cozad and many others in the usual course of company business. I expressed the view at that time there was a need for warning the operators against electrical hazards. I stated that not putting on these warnings would only increase the possibility of additional accidents that might be avoided if due warning were given.” Cross-examination by Mr. Ozmon, Pg. 368, Ln. 1732: “Plaintiff’s exhibit 91 for Identification has the appearance of a dielectric link. This is the type of item I initiated testing on within the Corps of Engineers when I became aware of it in the 2950’s. Those would be for tests of the manufacturer’s claims of the dielectric ability of the particular substance which they were made of. There were also tests of its strength since it was going to be in the load line.” Ln 1740: Mr. Ozmon: “Mr. Jenkins, as we recessed I was about to ask you to consider your background and your experience, your knowledge as a safety man for a good number of years in relationship to some facts I would like to have you assume, and if you will just listen to these facts for a few moments and then I will ask you a question based on those facts. I would like to have you assume back in the year of 1970, assume a crane in operation, a crane with a thirty-foot boom. Assume on a particular morning in July that this crane was being operated in close proximity to an overhead 23

continued

energized 34.5 kV line. Assume that in this operation that there was required by this crane the picking up of certain metal, steel pipes, and that these pipes were being lifted by means of a metal choker with hooks that went into the ends of each pipe and then the choker lines back to the hook at the end of the load line. Assume that there were three men on the ground holding this load, one man at the end of the metal pipe and two men at the other end of the metal pipe all with their hands on the load guiding and directing as movement was being made by the operator, that in the course of this movement the boom swung and the boom either came in contact with the 34.5 energized line or it came close enough that there was an arcing, and assume the contact point is-looking at Plaintiff’s exhibit #24- here, here and here on this item at the very head of the boom. Assume that is the contact point. Assume by this contact that there was transmission of current down the load line into the bodies of these three men handling the load. Now, assume one other fact. Assume as in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 86 that there had been within the design of that crane a boom cage or boom guard similar to that which appears within this Plaintiff’s exhibit 86, and assume that that cage had been in good operating order, and assume that it had good operating dielectric insulators. Do you have an opinion as a safety man in relationship to the construction industry as to whether the presence of that boom cage within the design of the crane would or would not have prevented the transmission of the current I referred to down the load line and into the bodies of the three men? A: “Yes, sir, I do. Q: What is your opinion relative to that? A: “It would have prevented it.” Q: “I would like to have you assume those same facts again up to the point as to when I asked you to assume the presence of a boom cage in the design of the crane. Assume all the same facts and assume the contact, assume the transmission down the load line and into the bodies of the men. Now assume that there was present within the design of that crane a dielectric safety link within the load line, assume that if you will. Do you have an opinion as to whether the presence of the dielectric safety link within the design of the crane would or would not have prevented the transmission of the electric current down the load line and into the bodies of the three men? A: Yes, sir, I do. Q: What is your opinion on that, Mr. Jenkins? A: It would have prevented it. There are four major categories if safety devices in relation to this electric contact problem: the boom cage type, the safety link, the alarm type and the line hose. Electro Alarm and SigAlarm are the two major manufacturers of the alarm type. The link and cage are designed to prevent transmission of electrical current if there is a contact. The alarm is a warning type of system rather than prevention. I am acquainted with the alarm of proximity type device. As Director of Safety for the Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army, I have initiated tests of the manufacturers’ claims regarding this device. Pg. 379, Ln 1781 “The proximity device requires a setting. This gets it into the area of human error which I was talking about. The Corps of Engineers require the device I was talking about only when working in the vicinity of overhead energized wires. Whenever possible, one of the requirements was to de-energize the powerlines and another was to notify the operating utility when cranes are to be so used. When working with the contractors, we have the preliminary conference advising them to get in touch with the power company. One of the insulating links rates up to 50,000 V. Fifty or sixty thousand is the highest. There are many power transmission lines in the country that will exceed that. You can’t tell by looking at a line whether it has that much voltage or not. If a man is operating a crane in the vicinity of a high powerline instead of being 34 or 50 is 100,000 or 200,000 volts, the insulating line doesn’t provide protection for the men holding the load. It only provides protection for the capacity it 24

Continued

is designed for and would arc right over it. If a man working in the area of a high power line with an insulated on there has got a long boom, if the line itself above the link hits the wire, the wire is energized. The link takes care of what is below assuming it is below those voltage limits. For the boom guard, the little cage, to protect the underside of the boom, you have to get an underside section. Normally, it’s on the top if you want protection. If you have a long boom and are working up there, you might hit it with the end or you might hit it underneath. Then everything is energized if you don’t have the guard underneath. Pg. 380, Ln 1786: “If you have an insulated link and the tip of the boom hits a powerline- let’s assume it’s a high power line under 50,000 V because we know if it’s up to 100,000 it will flip over anyway- and the men are holding a long load that is swinging around and touches the crane, the crane is metal of course and the load will become energized. The safety link isn’t provided for that purpose. You can get a contact by touching the crane or if you energize the load through any means. Recognizing that the crane operator has to operate it and do other things, the signalman’s function in the vicinity of high power lines is to watch that the crane doesn’t get that close. There are usually two signalmen on a job. One signals the operator from the point of operation. He stands where he can observe the men handling the load, or he may be handling it himself, but he is the one who tells the operator when to lift and so forth. The other signalman is the watcher whose job and what he is paid for is to see they don’t get too close to the wires. The Corps of Engineers could not justifiably see requiring a contractor to pay for something where you could get better protection not involving human factors for a couple of month’s wages. A couple of month’s wages would protect the crane for the next eight years. If the work is for a couple of days, it wouldn’t be worth his time to stand there and guide these men. It was partial protection. We have found there is a great reliability factor. This is a man out there in a very boring situation with nothing else to do, looking up all the time with clouds going over, they get so dizzy they are incapable of doing it. When the crane isn’t moving, he goes under a tree and sits in the shade and doesn’t do his job. The foreman on the job is another thing. Cross Examination by Mr. Peterson Pg. 381, Ln 1790 “It’s very difficult for either a crane operator or a signalman to see the precise relationship between the end of the boom and an energized overhead wire. That is one of the reasons I said an operator or a signalman is not as reliable as a sole means of protection. I didn’t say earlier that the ANSI standards were inadequate. I would consider any standard that relied solely on the operator or the signalman inadequate based in my experience. I observed many times that power companies patrol their lines when cranes are in close proximity and have taken this action whether notified or not because electricity can kill so quickly.”

1972

“Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations This table reports the total number of accidents involving contact with overhead highvoltage lines through equipment from 1963-1972 at 587 in the state of California, with 141 of them fatal. Note: Again it appears that 24% of powerline contacts are fatal.

72.04.04

James L. Grasby invents the Guard for Insulating Booms, Patent # 3,653,517

25

1973

A lineman lost several fingers in phase to phase contact when the uninsulated aerial basket he was being lifted in approached a powerline. See A-4 This case addressed the use of insulation to ensure that equipment was safe for its intended use.

73.03.00

“High Voltage Proximity Warning Systems—Colorado River Storage Project” Memo, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior: Found that proximity alarms provide an excellent alarm system.

73.05.15

H.W. Volberg invents the Proximity Detector and Alarm, Patent # 3,733,597

73.07.10

H.W. Volberg improves his original Proximity Alarm, Patent # 3,725,549

73.12.00

Military Specification MIL-T-62089A (AT), “Truck Maintenance; With Rotating Hydraulic Derrick, Air Transportable, 34,500 pounds GVW, 6X4,” U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command, Department of Defense: 3.6.12: “Proximity warning device. When specified (see 6.2), an automatic electronic warning device that sounds an audible alarm as the derrick approaches energized powerlines shall be furnished..”

1974

The mid-span, 7,200 V powerline was in the blind zone of the large crane, and a worker was severely burned when the operator backed into a powerline while he was attaching a load to a lifting beam. See A-5 This case shows both the diversity of equipment that can contact powerlines and inherent blind zones, and highlights the need for safety appliances such as an insulated link between the headache ball and the hook so that the lifting beam is suspended. In addition, proximity alarms to provide warning of danger of powerline contact if removal of the powerlines from the work area cannot be accomplished.

1974

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 7th Edition, NSC; 691: “cagetype boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used on cranes, but the use of such devices should not operate to alter the requirements as spelled out above.” “If a boom contacts a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hook-on man and others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect these men, a commercially available load hook with an insulated link can be used.”

74.01.00

T.O. 36C-1-4, Electrocution Protective and Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes, Crane Shovels, and Line Maintenance Derrick Trucks, U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense: 2.SCOPE a.: “A dielectric boom shield and insulated link in the lifting line at the hook will provide approximately 90% protection to personnel working with the equipment in close proximity to high-tension electric lines. Installation of the boom shield only, will provide approximately 60% to 70% protection against electrical accidents. This insulated link at the hook provides approximately 30% protection, primarily to personnel handling the load being lifted…” b: “A proximity warning device will also enhance optimum operator safety and may be installed on referenced type equipment instead of the dielectric shield.”

26

74.01.02

Chart: “Powerline Contact Protection” and explanation of chart presented in a study by Grove Manufacturing Company Evaluates the effectiveness of appliances such as proximity warning devices, insulated links, insulated boom cages, combination cage and links and compares them with methods such as de-energizing or relocating powerlines. The study finds any appliance less effective than the practice of powerline relocation or de-energization. Note: The results of this study are absolutely correct. There are no foolproof measures to avoid powerline contacts except relocation and de-energization. However, for times when these measures are impossible to achieve, safety appliances provide an extra measure of safety despite the fact that they are not rated as 100% failproof.

74.01.15

Melville M. Moffet invents the Electric Field Proximity Safety Alarm, Patent # 3,786,468

74.08.06

SigAlarm™ Test: Included is a letter from the National Research Council Canada, saying that according to the wishes of the customer they have “blanked out all reference to his name”. The tests revealed that water inserted in the reel would interfere with the function of the device. It is important to note that the reel had been improperly installed upside down by the testing agency, where it could collect water.

74.09.03

Alvin H. Wilkenson invents the Proximity Differential Control, Patent # 3,833,898

75.04.11

“Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” (Volume I) Report to Employers Insurance of Wausau by Packer Engineering CONCLUSIONS: Insulated Link: “It has been demonstrated that the reliability of a link to insulate the hook and personnel from serious electrical injury is seriously absent when only mild contamination is present.” Note that the manufacturer’s installation required the link to be kept clean. Note also that the test only showed the conductivity of unnatural contaminants not normal to the work environment. Proximity Devices: “The proximity device tested exhibits some more favorable aspects that the devices previously mentioned and further development of this concept may ultimately have potential as a safety device for operating cranes. This potential should be enlarged upon.”

75.06.15

“Report of the Interaction Between Crane Mounted Proximity Detectors and Energized Powerline Systems” prepared for Kirkland and Ellis by Jepperson and Associates “It can readily be seen that both the SigAlarm™ and Electro-Alarm supply good protection except when the boom is above the powerline.” Note: The boom should never be raised over a powerline, as it intrudes into the danger zone on each side of the powerline.

75.06.1120

“Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” Packer Engineering This study reveals that electromagnetic proximity warning devices are very inefficient in warning of three phase conductors. Note: The study failed to show that the boom was raised underneath when parallel to the powerline, which is an unsafe work location that should always be prohibited by creating a danger zone, which is present on both sides of the powerline. 27

75.06.30

The hoist line of the crane struck a 7,200 V powerline in the danger zone, resulting in the loss of a worker’s feet and hands. See A-6 This case was the first to introduce human factors considerations regarding the inability of workers to accurately visually estimate clearance from powerlines and as a basis for the use of safety appliances such as an insulated link to prevent injury and electrostatic proximity alarm to warn of impending danger from a powerline contact.

75.09.10

“Reduction of Probability of Electrocution During the Operation of Dico Mobile Material Handlers (Overview Document)” BEI Job Number BE-192-DCDM “SigAlarm™ is unique in the art of power line monitoring. It is a proven device which has been judged as the only reliable, stable, and acceptable device of its type by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation where it is required. The U.S. Air Force has written a Technical Order (T.O. 360-1-4, Jan 26, 1974) pertaining to Electrocution Protective and Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes, Crane Shovels, Line Machinery, and Derrick Trucks requiring its use while working adjacent to overhead powerlines. In addition, SigAlarm™ is cited by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command as a proximity device in MIL-T (AT) dated December 15, 1973.”

75.08.2276.09.15

Preliminary Report, Harnsichfeger Corporation, Field Test Evaluation, Field Demonstration of Harnischfeger Crane Style W-350 Equipped with SigAlarm™ Proximity Indicator. “The test procedures which are described in this report make it very apparent that in order to utilize the proximity indicator, it is necessary for the operator to continuously give it his major attention and make readjustments in sensitivity with each new circumstance brought about by changing the crane’s position or when mobile equipment of high electrical capacitance comes into the operating vicinity.” Note: Their observation presumes that the proximity device is used to measure the clearance from the powerline. It should be used as a warning device to alert the users that they should revise the lifting operation in order to avoid the powerlines.

75.10.14

A worker delivering cattle feed to the farmer’s storage bins was electrocuted when the boom of the feed truck struck a powerline near the bins. See A-7 This case illustrates the wide variety of equipment capable of contacting a powerline and the need for involvement of both electric utilities (cooperatives) for location of the powerlines away from the grain storage bins and the equipment manufacturer for a safe design of the feed truck.

1976

Reynolds, Richard L., Informational Report 1035- MESA Informational Report: Field Evaluation of a Proximity Alarm Device, Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, Department of the Interior Page 5: “Field tests for a period of six months demonstrated that the device is rugged enough for mine use and that it does, indeed, operate with a very good reliability.”

76.10.11

A portable auger conveyor violated the danger zone, and was raised into a 7,200 powerline, resulting in the deaths of two workers and the serious injury of a third. See A-8 This case illustrated how a portable auger-type grain conveyor can reach overhead powerlines and the need to remove powerlines from the work area and a nonconductive cover on the conveyor.

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77.02.00

Wright, M.D. and Davis, J.H., M.D: “The Investigation of Electrical Deaths: A Report of 220 Fatalities” Presentation at the 29th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, San Diego, CA. Accepted for publication on November 30, 1979. R.K. “Fifty-eight percent of the high-voltage victims [of the domain of the study] contacted an overhead wire with a conductive device such as a crane or derrick.” The value of this study lies in its detailed explanation of how electrocution occurs and the measures of amperes at which damage occurs. The “effects” table is as follows: 0.001 ampere- barely perceptible tingle 0.016 ampere- “let go” current 0.020 ampere- muscular paralysis 0.100 ampere- ventricular fibrillation 2.000 ampere- ventricular standstill 20.000 ampere- common household fuse blows Note: To cause fibrillation of the heart takes .100 amperes, and is well above the .005 amperes that activate the ground fault detector.

77.03.11

Letter from the U.S. Department of the Interior to the Corporate Product Safety Coordinator of Bucyrus-Erie Co., enclosing the results of a proximity alarm test conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior. SigAlarm™ passed every test by responding appropriately with audio and visual signals to every situation.

77.04.13

An Electric Utility Lineman was so badly burned by electric current that both arms and shoulders had to be removed. The non-conductive hydraulic hoses had been replaced with hoses reinforced with wire mesh. Maintenance instructions did not warn of the danger of using substitute high-pressure conductive hydraulic hoses. See A-9 This case illustrates the need to ensure for safe maintainability in product design service manual instructions and conspicuous warnings on the non-conductive hydraulic fluid hoses.

77.06.01

Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1; General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03 “Prior to commencement of work at a job site, an accident prevention program written by the prime contractor for the specific work and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual will be reviewed by designated government personnel. The prime contractor’s program will include work to be performed by his subcontractors.” This requirement first published in the North Pacific Division, which was pioneered by the Portland, OR District Corps of Engineers and quickly spread throughout the region. It is a breakthrough regulation in delegating specific authority to ensure for safety and accountability. See 58.08.00 15.I.17 “When materials or equipment are stored under energized lines or near energized equipment, applicable clearance shall be maintained as stated in Table 15-1 and extraordinary caution shall be exercised when mobbing materials near such energized equipment.

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77.07.06

A latticework crane backed into highway powerlines parallel to the highway it was working on. The man guiding the gravel bucket with his hands was electrocuted when he was unable to see that the pinup lines of the boom were going to strike the 7,200 V powerline mid-span. Either an audible warning from a proximity alarm of the presence of an insulated link would have prevented this injury. See A-10 This case indicated the beginning of a trend of defendants to present testimony alleging lack of reliability of safety appliances such as proximity alarms and insulated links.

77.09.1215

George S. Allin, Jack T. Wilson, and Richard E. Zibolski, , “A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes” Paper # 770778: Society of Automotive Engineers Off Highway Vehicle Meeting and Exhibition This article provides data and test methods in evaluation on insulators and proximity warning systems: “These devices are offered as a solution to the problem of crane booms, loads and load lines accidentally contacting electric power lines. This discussion shows that insulator devices and electronic warning systems do not solve the problem of preventing these accidents.” When testing the insulating link, the testers first cleaned it with laboratory soap and allowed it to dry. “A hook cleaned and tried in this manner performs well even up to 50,000 V, the maximum voltage for which it is specified.” When carefully contaminated by grease, water, soil and salt, “It was shown that the salt and other ionizable contaminant produces a conducting surface which caused spark-over at a voltage of 22,000 V… A hook tested under these conditions broke down electrically at voltages between 16,000 and 33,000 volts.” In the tests conducted on proximity alarms: “The first demonstration used the cement truck and concrete bucket. crane picked up the bucket and then was positioned so the boom was parallel to and a distance of thirty feet from the powerlines. The sensitivity adjustment was set so that if the boom was swung toward the powerline the signal would rigger when the tip of the boom was ten feet from the line. When the truck was alongside of the crane, the signal stopped sounding. When the boom was moved closer to the powerline with the concrete truck remaining stationary, the signal did not trigger until the sensitivity adjustment was advanced to the maximum setting.” One of the conclusions stated that “Fields tests for a period of six months demonstrated that the device is rugged enough for mine use and that it does, indeed, operate with very good reliability. If installed on equipment with masts and booms, it will alert the operators of such equipment to the hazards of overhead lines and has the potential to prevent contact electrocutions and save lives in the future.” Note: There no cases in HIFI’s records or in the 50 chosen cases that in any way resemble the scenario in Prox. Test number 1. Note: Authored by employees of crane manufacturers, this paper attempted to erode confidence in the reliability of safety devices. Though it was written from a biased point of view and based on tests designed to fail, it is still frequently cited as “proof” that safety appliances such as the proximity alarm are unreliable. At the time of publication, a number of legal complaints had been filed against various crane manufacturers for failure to provide safety appliances such as the insulated links and proximity alarms. Because this paper was so widely read, it had the effect of clouding the acceptance of insulated links and proximity alarms with doubt.

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77.09.21

Two workers were burned and one lost his life while guiding a load to be lifted on a construction site adjacent to and under energized 7,200 V mid-span powerlines. See A-11 This case indicates that the storage of materials under powerlines should be prohibited.

1978

National Electric Safety Code Interpretations (1961-1977) page 55; request of April 11, 1974 clearly addresses the fact that the eighteen foot clearances of powerlines do not apply to construction activities where high-clearance equipment is used.

78.03.00

Morse, A.R. and Griffin, J.P.: “Test s of Mobile Crane High Voltage Protection Devices for Department of National Defense” National Research Council Canada “The SigAlarm™ is no replacement for an alert operator” but “The tests showed that the SIGALARM™, when adjusted for a given crane position, was CAPABLE of being adequately sensitive to any change in position of the boom.” Note: The authors do not under stand that an alert operator is often distracted.

78.03.24

When the hoist line of a crane struck a 7,200 V powerline mid-span, the operator was instantly electrocuted because he was able to control the crane from the ground, creating a current path through him. See A-12 This case illustrates the need for operating controls for a crane to be located where they cannot be accessible to someone standing on the ground. There are no requirements in ANSI safety standards for overcoming this hazard.

78.05.17

Letter to Mr. Bernie Enfield, President, Construction Safety Training and Associates From D.E. Dickey, Manager, Research and Development Department, Construction Safety Association of Toronto, Canada, stating “Grounding construction machinery is not an option because a human body is such a good conductor that it will always carry some percentage of the current.”

78.06.07

A maintenance man died when raising a 25-foot boom in the confined space of a coal strip mine maintenance area and it contacted an overhead powerline. See A-13 This case illustrates the diversity of equipment vulnerable to powerline contact. It also reinforces the need for design not to make the controls accessible for someone standing on the ground.

78.10.00

Middendorf, Lorna: “Judging Clearance Distances in Overhead Powerlines”, presented and published in the proceedings of the Human Factors Society Annual Conference In this study, subjects act as flagmen and try to determine the correct clearance distance from powerlines from a crane operator’s position and a location which would be the flagman’s position. The subjects are all skilled safety professionals and equipment operators with good vision and a minimum of five years relevant experience. A total of only 15% of critical target clearance judgments were accurate from the operator’s position, and only 20% were accurate from the flagman’s position.

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1979

Data Sheet # 1-287-79 (Revised) NSC: “Various alarm devices are available to warn the operator when the boom approaches too closely to the powerlines. The end of the boom can be enclosed by a wooden frame or a pipe frame insulated from the boom to prevent the flow of current in case of contact. When possible, power lines nearby should be de-energized. The frames of the equipment should be grounded. The effectiveness of these various safety measures, however, vary according to the conditions present.

79.09.09

MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Proceedings of the Fourth International System Safety Conference Reiteration of the breakthrough in system safety sparked by Robert Jenkins and a list of litigation of crane powerline contacts where similar testimony stating the necessity of prevention devices has succeeded in court. “Hopefully, this expertise will be applied to industrial applications during the next decade to provide the insight which will substantially reduce the high incidence of severe injuries and death which is occurring with increased use of production equipment.”

79.09.09

Wessels, Phillip S.: “Electrical and Mechanical Engineering” Proceedings of the Fourth International System Safety Conference New Technology: “A human contact with a distribution line need not be fatal. Modern solid-state switching and signature recognition techniques can be used to reduce the voltage to a lever that will limit the energy flow to a non-lethal level. A device could be designed that would save over 400 lives and 6,000 injuries without interrupting the flow of power.”

79.09.00

Leigh, Theodore M.: “The Construction Machine: Power Line Hazard” Professional Safety, The American Society of Safety Engineers Journal This article presents an account of the deadly seriousness of the hazard of powerline contact, stating accurately: “It cannot be over-emphasized, though, that all electrical lines must be considered energized and deadly, regardless of their voltage. The only true safety when charged electrical conductors are involved is distance…. Give any line whose voltage is unknown plenty of distance: 15-20 feet or more.” The recommendations to avoid powerline contact presented in this article include strong emphasis on de-energization or relocation of powerlines and erection of physical barricades around energized lines to create a danger zone. He recommends the use of polypropylene taglines for their non-conductive properties. He condemns the act of storing materials underneath energized lines. He does not believe that safety appliances such as insulated links, boom cages, or proximity alarms can contribute to the safety of the worker because “it is well known that any moisture, dust, dirt, soot or other foreign matter on the surfaces on such insulators will reduce their insulating properties, sometimes to a very marked degree” as well as the fact that “insulators are rated for certain maximum voltages. Since powerline voltages range up to 750,000 volts [570 kV], insulating devices may not be adequate for the voltages encountered.” He denies the effectiveness of proximity devices by stating that “Passing vehicles, especially with large metal bodies, loads lifted, even the crane booms themselves cause major distortions of such fields. This then requires readjustment of the devices for each position of the boom, load, vehicle, or other variable condition.*” *This quotation of Leigh’s article is footnoted and attributed to SAE paper # 770778, found in the timeline as 77.09.12-15

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79.09.18

Letter written on September 18, 1979 concerning the publication discussed in 77.09.12-15 to CIMA and the Power Crane and Shovel Association from H.L. White, President of SigAlarm™, Inc. The letter is written in response to the knowledge that the members of the association had recently met for the sole purpose of “impeaching” the use of SigAlarm™, even though the company had “never been presented with any data to support that contention [that SigAlarm™ was unreliable].” The letter submits data from third party tests that is favorable to the reliability of SigAlarm™ and offers to donate a unit and an engineer for the purposes of more testing.

79.10.10

Minutes: MADDDC all-member meeting, Des Plaines, IL Section V A #6: Evaluate Proximity Warning Devices (as a result of Tozers’ report on crane case in IV-B) Test proposed 82.04.19 by J. Derald Morgan and Howard B. Hamilton and conducted 82.07.06-09 by the same persons.

1980’s

National Electric Safety Code raised their clearances for Sailboats. The NESC is not retroactive; the electric utilities voluntarily raised their lines over sailboat waterways to prevent electrocution.

1980

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 8th Edition; NSC Pg. 166: “If cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices are used on cranes, such devices must not substitute for the requirements of a specifically assigned signal person, even if such devices are required by law or regulation. In view of the complex, invisible, and lethal nature of the electrical hazard involved, and to lessen the potential of false security, limitations of the devices (if used) shall be thoroughly understood by operating personnel and tested in the manner and at intervals prescribed by the device manufacturer.”

80.01.00

MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Professional Safety, American Society of Safety Engineers Journal This is a groundbreaking article that introduces the idea of system safety in construction. This article compares the idea of “operator error” with the reality of “defective design” and takes steps to isolate and address a list of causes for crane accidents. Many of these concepts are reprinted in the chapter Crane Design Hazard Analysis in the book Automotive Engineering and Litigation.

80.02.22

“Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices” Phase I Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines by the Southwest Research Institute, Page 10 “The SigAlarm™ proximity warning device had the greatest dynamic range of detectable powerline voltages, had very adequate overlapping sensitivity ranges, use solid-state circuitry exclusively, operated well in temperatures from -60° Fahrenheit to +160° Fahrenheit, and provided capability for conveniently adjusting the signal line length as the crane boom length was changed.” “The investigations performed during Phase I of this contract produces the conclusion that of the three devices tested, the SigAlarm™ device was the most reliable and effective unit.”

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80.03.00

White, H.L., President, SigAlarm, Inc “A Critique of: ‘A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes’ (Published by the Society of Automotive Engineers, in the 77.09.12-15 conference as Paper # 70778 by George S. Allin, Jack T Wilson, and Richard E. Zibolski”) “This critique, we believe, will focus on the areas of 770778 wherein objectivity was absent, where the results were misinterpreted, or wherein the test performed did not relate to the ‘real world’.” These remarks contain clarifications and alternative reasoning behind some of the behavior of the SigAlarm™ product. This critique also explains some of the properties of the SigAlarm™ in different words, giving the original paper a more objective perspective.

80.03.21

Letter written to the president of the Society of Automotive Engineers from H.L. White, President of SigAlarm™, Inc. The subject of the letter is Report # 770778, “A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes”, dated December 15, 1977 (see timeline). Mr. White states that though this report is frequently used as “proof” that proximity warning devices are unreliable, the report itself is subjective and therefore cannot be used as “proof.” Further, White states that he has “spoken to attorneys who advise that the authors of this report have had their depositions taken many times and in the opinion of those attorneys the report has been completely discredited as evidence.”

80.04.00

Guidance Note GS6 from the Health and Safety Executive: “Avoidance of Danger from Overhead Electric Powerlines” Health and Safety Executive, Baynards House, 1 Chepstow Place, London W2 4TF 1.

This note has been jointly prepared by HM Factory Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive and Electricity Boards of England, Wales, and Scotland. It is a guide to compliance with the Construction (General Provisions) Regulation 44 (2) of the Factories Act of 1961.

16. Pre-planning of safe working procedures is essential. In all situations, including construction sites, specific advice will be necessary if vehicles, plant or equipment etc. should be allowed to approach or be worked in any position where it is liable to be within 15 meters of overhead lines suspended from steel towers or 9 meters in the case of wood poles unless the Electricity Board’s representative has been approached for advice. Where the Construction Regulations apply, if the lines are not diverted or made dead as indicated below then the contractor is required by law to take all practicable precautions by erecting barriers, etc. to comply with the regulations. 20. The precautions required to prevent accidents involving overhead lines which are not diverted or made dead depend on the nature of the work at that site. There are three broad categories of work on site: a.

sites where there will be no work or passage of plant under the lines. Here barriers are required to prevent close approach.

b.

Sites where plant will pass under the lines. Here defined passage-ways in the barriers must be made.

c.

Sites where work will be done beneath the line. Here further precautions must be taken in addition to the erection of barriers with passageways.

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80.09.01

Hamilton, Howard B. and Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety Devices” In the summary, the authors of the study utilize the refrain of to much fluctuation in the electrostatic fields for the devices to be effective. It is true that fluctuation in the fields around powerlines does affect proximity sensing devices, but the repeated degree to which it affects the tests performed in this instance suggests that the study was carefully designed to exaggerate the weak points of the proximity alarms, leading readers of the study to perceive them as much less reliable than they have been proven to be in other tests. The exact detail that the authors are careful to document in the study is impressive to people who are not experts in electrostatic fields, but the detail exposes the probability that the authors of the study were trying achieve the results of inconsistency of the devices in order to achieve a pre-purported hypothesis. Note: The authors had been retained a number of times by various crane manufacturers as defense witnesses to allege that these devices were unreliable.

80.09.14

A backing forklift was lifting a metal scaffold that struck a 7,200 V powerline midspan. The scaffold and the forklift were not insulated, and the forklift operator was killed when he attempted to leave the forklift. See A-14 This case illustrates the myriad of construction methods that create an opportunity for powerline contact. It also shows the general contractor’s responsibility to oversee that the sub-contractor’s equipment is safe for its intended use.

1981

The National Electric Safety Code interpretations (1978-1980) page 77 request of Oct 17, 1980 supports that powerline eighteen foot clearance does not apply to oversize haulage trucks. Note: Since the clearance is reduced, this amendment enhances the danger of powerline contact by oversize trucks.

1981

The National Electric Safety Code ANSI C2 1981, which governs the design of powerlines from the generator to the user’s meter, deleted rule 210 and 211 which read: 210: Design and Construction: All electric supply and communication lines and equipment shall be of suitable design and construction for the service and conditions under which they are to be operated. 211: Installation and Maintenance: All electric supply and communication lines and equipment shall be installed and maintained so as to reduce the hazards of life so far as practicable. Note: This deletion removed an important safety philosophy.

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81.02.00

Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices, Phase II, Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines by the Southwest Research Institute. “The objective of the Phase II program was to develop a microprocessor-based data acquisition system to collect and measure field strengths at distributed points around the front boom. The developed equipment group (referred to as the Distributed Sensor AC Electrometer) is designed to accurately measure the distributed field strength about a crane boom with obvious error.” “One of the devices, the SigAlarm, used a distributed sensor and displayed significant sensitivity variation with boom orientation. As the boom was rotated from a position parallel to the powerline to a position normal to the powerline, the sensitivity decreased severely. To minimize the sensitivity fluctuation with boom orientation, point sensors are recommended.”

82.01.00

Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: Final Report on an Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety Devices to a major crane manufacturing company. This is the follow-up to the preliminary testing performed in September, 1980. Note: They were extremely negative against the use of safety appliances such as the insulated link and the proximity alarm.

82.10.00

Hamilton, Howard B. and Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Links for Safety Applications for Simon Ro Corporation, National Crane” This test series performed on a variety of insulated links purports them to have too much leakage to be effective as safety devices. Doubtless, the unknown contaminants put on the links for test purposes greatly affected their resistance to current. However, in all of the carefully reported test data, the testers make no mention of the ingredients in the contaminants or the level of carbon in any of the contaminants, all of which would increase the ability of current to flow through the link.

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82.10.04

Deposition of Cecil B. Hickman, (# 279080, 250th Judicial District Court of Travis County, TX) Hickman initiated the use of SigAlarm™ in order to prevent crane powerline contact that may cause serious injury or death. Pg. 45, Ln 19- Q: “What types of units did you purchase at that time? A: I purchased a brand called SigAlarm™. Q: Then after you installed them in early 1970- is that what you said? A: We started installing them early 1970- yes sir. Q: How long was it before you actually had all ten units installed? A: Probably two or three months. Pg. 47, Ln 24- Q: Can you tell us how these units performed so far as you were concerned after they were installed? A: They done the job for me, sir. Pg. 48, Ln 10- A: We ultimately wound up with somewhere between twenty and twenty-five units. In 1975 I made another search of the files to see if there had been any crane contacts from 1970 up to 1975 looking at a ten-year span, five years previous and five years after, and I found no contacts, so in my opinion, they done the job for me. Pg. 51 Ln 3- Q: What was it that they indicated to you was the reason they had taken these items off the crane? A: One of the complaints was that they were afraid the operating engineers operating the cranes might be lulled into a false sense of security, dependant upon a device that, in their opinion, may or may not work.” Q: Do you place on credence on that concern? A: No, sir. Note: If twenty cranes in Hickman’s fleet used the devices for five years apiece, 100 crane years went by without a powerline contact.

82.12.31

Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices, Phase III Bureau of Mines open file report # 100(1)-83 by the Southwest Research Institute “Analysis of the data indicate that the distances at which a single sensor alarm will activate vary by a factor of three to 1, due primarily to variations in boom orientation. The results also indicate that in the case of multiple powerlines, a single electrostatic field sensor cannot reliably be used to determine the distance from a powerline.” “Sensor placement was shown to have an influence on the undesirable sensitivity to boom orientation. In general, sensors located on either side of the boom were much more sensitive to crane boom azimuth that were sensors placed on top of the crane boom. In addition, sensors place near the tip of the boom were much more sensitive to crane boom elevation that were sensors placed near the crane boom pivot point.” “The data analysis showed that under typical combinations of crane boom elevation and crane boom azimuth, a best case performance for a single sensor proximity warning device would produce alarms for distances ranging from 20’-60’ to the powerline depending on the combination of crane boom elevation and azimuth.” Note: Even with a critical analysis the report was able to show that the SigAlarm™ was able to detect the presence of powerlines. In an active crane use situation, workers are often distracted and powerlines are camouflaged by trees, not readily visible, and their clearance distance frequently misjudged.

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1983

Bridges, J.E., “Potential Distributions in the Vicinity of the Hearts of Primates Arising from 60Hz Limb-to-Limb Body Currents,” Ford, G.L.; Sherman, I,A.; Vainberg, M., editors: “Electrical Shock Safety Criteria” Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Electrical Shock Safety Criteria, Pergamon Press, New York This paper expresses the relationship between body weight and current: the more mass on a body, the more current it takes to cause heart fibrillation. In dogs with a mass of 5kg (12 lbs), heart fibrillation started at 40 milliamps. In dogs of 25 kg (55 lbs) heart fibrillation started at 100 milliamps. Imagine the current necessary to cause heart fibrillation on a healthy, 150 lb man.

1983

A crane was being used to assemble warehouses next to a developing industrial park. On the day of the event, the south entrance, used by the construction crew, had an unconnected distribution line conspicuously displayed nearby. The electric utility company did not inform the crew of any energized lines, though at other parts of the park the powerlines were already energized. The construction crane contacted a newly energized 7,200 powerline mid-span and severely burned two workers. See A-15 This case highlights the need for safety communication between the electric utility personnel and contractors when power distribution systems are being built and the energized.

83.03.00

SigAlarm™ sales and endorsements: Even with the overwhelming publicizing against the use of proximity alarms, a few organizations did make their own workplace evaluations and installed the SigAlarm™ on a number of their cranes. For a number of years they all had good results in preventing powerline contact. A listing of statistics is available upon request.

83.06.21

A crane was working in an unmarked danger zone with a raised boom being used to pick up materials stored under 7,200 V powerlines backed into a powerline. The operator, working alone, left the truck cab of the crane to investigate and was badly burned. See A-16 This case reiterates the fact that storage of building materials under powerlines should be prohibited and introduces the fact that small hydraulic cranes have the highest probability of powerline contact. The use of appliances such as the electrostatic proximity alarm would enhance operator awareness of overhead powerlines.

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83.09.23

Cunitz, Robert J. and Middendorf, Lorna: “Problems in the Perception of Overhead Powerlines” Paper Presented at the Sixth Annual International Symposium, System Safety Seminar: This paper explicitly states the problems in accurately gauging and perceiving the danger presented by overhead powerlines, summarized as follows: ♦ Most laymen cannot accurately judge the magnitude of the hazard that powerlines present, so they do not have the mindset to proceed with the necessary caution ♦ Since people see detail best with their central foveal vision, and powerlines against the say or camouflaged by buildings and trees can be a small detail, the powerlines are functionally impossible to see unless being directly looked at. ♦ In addition to seeing the powerlines, the worker is then asked to form a judgment of a safe distance. Judging an object’s distance by its relationship to the individual is also nearly impossible. ♦ Awareness of the proximity of the powerline must be maintained at all times if the hazard is to be managed safely. Usually, everyone involved in the project has other tasks to accomplish, shifting focus away from the danger presented by the powerline. ♦ The paper included corroborating results from empirical studies and field tests.

1984

The National Electric Safety Code NESC Handbook by Allen Clapp, page 17, indicated the change of philosophy to remove the term “practicability” from the text in section 211, as he believed it led to the extreme requirement of “possibility”: “The code subcommittees made every effort to emphasize that it is not merely enough that installation be possible, it must be practical as well- to qualify as a requirement of the code.” Rule 211 was deleted in the 1981 edition. It stated “reduce hazards to life as far as practical” and now states: “it must be recognized that it is not only impractical but is absolutely impossible to provide special clearances or other construction for every location where it is possible for a negligent or impaired human to contact a utility installation with a vehicle or with a crane, antenna, metal ladder, extended paintroller handle, irrigation pipe, portable conveyor, or any other special apparatus. The operators or erectors of such apparatus have a responsibility to take special care to avoid damaging, or otherwise interrupting the service of, utility installations or other facilities in the vicinity of their work or operations.” Note: This change shows a blatant disregard for human safety and effectively denies the crucial role the electric utility must play in safe construction operations. This passage minimizes the responsibility of the electric utility (a deadly force that only trained specialists are qualified to handle) and places the responsibility on the operator of the equipment, a person who has little to do with safety process or procedure.

1984

“Effects of Current Passing Through the Human Body” Publication 479-1 (Second Edition) International Electrotechnical Commission: This study delves into physiological effects such as voluntary let-go and ventricular fibrillation as a function of current through the body. At approximately 50 milliamps fibrillation of the heart may occur.

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1984

A crane was backing up in order to lower the boom so it could be “safely” driven forward into an unmarked danger zone underneath the energized 7,200 V powerlines at the entrance of the site. The operator did not see the powerline behind him when the crane struck it. See A-17 This case tells how testing after injury occurrences showed how the electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned all personnel that the crane was being backed into a powerline. In this case an electrostatic proximity warning alarm was installed on a similar crane several months after the death of the operator and it was found that the device would have alerted the workers to the fact that the crane was being backed into a powerline.

84.07.29

Deposition of Arthur C. Gregr (Case # CI-83-5060, Circuit Court for Orange County, Florida) Pg. 8, Ln 24; Q: Would you tell the jury- first of all, this SigAlarm™ device that you are talking about, is that the same thing as a proximity warning device? A: Yes. That was our trade name. Q: SigAlarm™ is a trade name for a proximity warning device? A: Yes. Q: Would you tell the jury basically what a proximity warning device is? A: A proximity warning device establishes the fact that the hazard exists. It helps you identify the hazard and it helps you maintain a correct and legal distance away from the hazard my monitoring the electrostatic field that surrounds the powerline. Q: Now, what hazard are you talking about? A: The overhead powerlines Q: What is the theory of how a proximity warning device works? A: Is senses the electrostatic field that surrounds the powerline. Pg. 16, Ln 20; Q: Did you ever see a crane with a proximity warning device being operated in a high humidity area? A: Yes, I have. Q: And where was that, sir? A: In Florida. Q: What part of Florida? A: Around the Lakeland area. Q: And did the device work acceptably in a high humidity area? A: Yes, it did.

40

Continued

Q: Did you have any complaints from customers who used the proximity warning device in a high humidity area? A: No, sir. Q: Did you, in your experience with the company you worked for, ever observe a crane with a proximity warning device being operated in a high dust area? A: Yes. Very definitely. Q: And did you ever note any discrepancy in how the proximity warning device worked in a high dust area? A: No, there was no problems with working in that environment at all. Q: Did you ever receive any complaints from any customers who used the device in a high dust area? A: No, not as far as the dust and the dirt affecting the unit’s operation. Q: Have you ever used or seen a crane with a proximity warning device being used with other equipment such as trucks being operated between the crane and the hightension wires? A: Yes. Q: Did the proximity warning device work as it was supposed to work in that condition? A: Yes, they did. Q: Did you ever receive any complaints from any customers, any users of the proximity warning device, that it would not work because of interference of a truck or other device. A: No. Q: Does the proximity warning device work effectively with the electrical system of the crane? A: You can get some errant interference. However, during your installation, that can be taken care of with resistors and with other equipment such as that, shielding, as so that it does not affect the operation of the SigAlarm™. Q: DO C.B. or radio frequency transmissions affect the operation of the SigAlarm™? A: No, sir. Q: Do you understand what the term null area means in relationship to the proximity warning device? A: Yes, I do. Q: Would you tell the jury what a null area is? A: It is a phenomenon that happens with three-phase powerlines, and underneath, directly underneath or directly above the powerline, the electrical fields are negated and so you have no electrostatic field directly beneath the powerline or directly above. Q: From the study that you company did concerning null areas, are those null numbers present in all electrical installations? A: No, they are not.

41

Continued

Q: When the null areas do exist, can you tell me where they exist? A: They only exist directly beneath the power line and/or directly above the powerline. Basically where the two outside wires or two outside insulators are. It does not affect the operation of the power line monitoring system because, number one, you are supposed to maintain a minimum of ten feet away from the powerline, so you would still be in the electrostatic field outside of the null area. And even if you were inside the null area, a portion of the antenna would be there to warn you of the electrostatic field. Q: Do that if a crane with a proximity warning device starts up outside the warning area and moves to a null area, it will get a warning before it gets to the null area? A: Yes, it will. And, of course, it is considered unsafe crane practices to operate a crane directly beneath or directly above a powerline. Q: And that’s the only place a null area is? A: Yes, sir. Q: Have you ever received any complaints from people who actually used this device in the field of null area problems? A: Not from customers that were using the units, no. Pg. 29, Ln 3; Q: While you were in Shady Grove, did you discuss with anyone from Grove Manufacturing the testing that they had done on the proximity warning device? A: Yes, we did. Q: What did those gentlemen tell you about the testing they had done on the proximity warning device? A: They said testing was favorable. Q: Did they have any complaints at all about the proximity warning device at that meeting? A: No, they did not. The next section of the deposition regards a letter written on September 18, 1979 (see timeline) to CIMA and the Power Crane and Shovel Association from H.L. White, President of SigAlarm™, Inc. The letter is written in response to the knowledge that the members of the association had recently met for the sole purpose of “impeaching” the use of SigAlarm™, even though the company had “never been presented with any data to support that contention [that SigAlarm™ was unreliable]. Pg. 45, Ln 13; Q: And could you tell us what the purpose of that letter was? A: Well, Mr. White, date of September 18, 1979, and the subject was their participation in the studies to impeach the product SigAlarm™. Q: Your company was asking to be allowed to participate in the test? A: Yes, we were. Q: Were you ever allowed to participate? A: No, sir, we were not. Q: TO your knowledge, did you ever get a response to that letter? A: No. Pg. 50, Ln. 1; Q: Let’s move on, if we could, away from the Power Crane and Shovel Association Committee and talk about other evaluations that were done by people other than Bower Industries of this proximity warning device. Are you aware of other evaluations that were done during the time frame that you were and employee of Bower Industries and prior to 1977?

42

Continued

A: Yes. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation conducted a test. U.S. Bureau of Mines, under their Mine Safety Enforcement authority, conducted tests. The U.S. Air Force Evaluated SigAlarms™ and which caused all of their lime maintenance trucks worldwide to be equipped with SigAlarm™ Power Line Monitoring Systems. [see timeline 81.02.00] Q: Let’s take— A: Also, the state of Minnesota initiated a law requiring powerline monitoring systems on all cranes that operated within the railroad environment. Q: And these evaluations all occurred before 1977? A: Yes. Pg. 57, Ln. 16; Q: The MESA report which you indicated earlier, is that the type of report which a person with your experience would rely on in evaluation a proximity warning device? A: Yes. Q: Would you tell us whether the MESA report was favorable or unfavorable for the proximity warning device? A: It was favorable. Q: You mentioned that there was also a report done by the bureau of reclamation? A: Yes, sir. Q: What type of evaluation was that? A: It was a similar evaluation, and from that evaluation, they require SigAlarm™ or power line monitoring systems to be installed on cranes in certain work conditions on their projects. Q: And can you tell me whether or not that evaluation was favorable or unfavorable for the proximity warning device? A: It was favorable. Q: You mentioned that there was a technical order by the air force. Is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: Can you tell me how that technical safety order came about? A: It is a result of an evaluation done by the U.S. Air Force and for line Maintenance trucks, and the result of it caused all the line maintenance trucks in the U.S. Air Force, worldwide, as a matter of fact, to have SigAlarm™ installed on them. Q: And then, finally, you mentioned a state law in Minnesota concerning railroads. Is that right? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, did that state law concern cranes? A: Yes, sir. Q: What type of cranes? A: All cranes working within the railroad environment. In other words, all cranes, and that included both high rail cranes, the rails that- I mean, the cranes that worked in the rails of the railroads and also cranes working in the vicinity of the rails. Q: Have various other state and governmental bodies accepted the proximity warning device as a safety device for cranes? A: Yes, we have approval for the installation and operation of power line monitoring within several of those states. Q: Can you tell the judge and jury some of the ones you have gotten approval for? A: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, to name several. Texas. 43

Continued

84.12.14

Pg. 59, Ln 24; Q: When did Reynolds Electric in Nevada start to use the SigAlarm™ device? A: In 1965. Q: Okay. A: They bought a unit for test and evaluation. Q: When did your sales occur? A: 1970, ’71. Q: Do they use the units now? A: No, sir. Q: Do you know when they stopped using the units? A: I believe it was 1977 when they removed the units from their cranes. Q: Do you know why the units were removed? A: Because it was the opinion of—it was their safety director—that they were not reliable. Q: When did you first learn that Reynolds Electric was having a problem with the safety device? A: Several—well, I first heard about it in 1975. Q: Did you cause an investigation to occur? A: Yes, I did. Q: What investigation did you do? A: I went to Las Vegas, Nevada, and in the company of our dealer, American Equipment in Las Vegas, want on the test site and visited with several people there. Q: What did your investigation reveal? A: Our investigation revealed that many of the units had been installed incorrectly on their cranes. Pg. 61, Ln 12 Q: And would you train the maintenance people? A: Yes, and I talked to the operators and discussed it with various people on the test site, yes. Q: Was the initial use of the proximity warning device as expected by your company? A: Yes. Q: Were the results favorable to the use of the device? A: Yes. Deposition of Collin W. Dunnam (Case # 88-043, Twenty-seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Landry, State of Louisiana) Dunnam is the contractor’s safety director for the Mercury Atomic Test Site, a government facility in Nevada, which performs many tests on atomic weapons. These tests usually required the use of cranes that had to be driven (walked under their own power) along roadway test sites. Distribution powerlines infrequently crossed the roadways. Powerline contacts occurred when the crane operator failed to see the powerline in time to lower the boom. Pg. 55, Ln 20- Q: “Did REECo, during its testing of the proximity warning device and its evaluation, discover any particular hazards that may confront a crane operator that’s operating a crane with a proximity warning device on it?” A: “We felt that the operator might have a false sense of security and rely on the mechanical device that we felt was not reliable to keep him out of trouble.” Pg. 59, Ln 6- Q: “Have you ever had any contacts with overhead powerlines since you removed the proximity warning devices off your … cranes?” A: “ Yes sir.” Q: “How many, would you tell me, please.” A: “Two.”

44

84.10.00

Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1; General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03 01.A.03: “Prior to commencement of work at a job site, an acceptable accident prevention plan written by the prime contractor for the specific work and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual, will be reviewed by designated government personnel. On contract operations, the contractor’s plan will be job specific and will include work to be performed by subcontractors, and measures to be taken by the contractor to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment provided by suppliers.” 15.I.17: “When materials or equipment are stored under energized lines or near energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 15-1] and extraordinary caution shall be exercised when moving materials near such energized equipment.

1985

Jack Ainsworth, a U.S. Army Senior Electronics Engineer designed and had assembled under his supervision some twenty 4-wheel drive surveillance vehicles for the U.S. Immigration Service. These vehicles transported a night vision system unit that could be raised on a pneumatic mast capable of reaching overhead powerlines. The surveillance was done at night, and the driver and operator in the cab of the vehicles often functioned without headlights to conceal their presence. The SigAlarm™, an electrostatic detector, was installed and wired to prohibit the mast from raising when the van was parked under or adjacent to a powerline. This program has had 18 years of successful use with zero powerline contacts. Note: This is approximately 360 equipment years of the safe use of SigAlarm™.

1985

MacCollum, David V., “Crane Design Hazard Analysis”, Automotive Engineering and Litigation, edited by George A. Peters, J.D., P.E., and Barbara J.Peters, J.D., Garland Law Publishing, New York and London This chapter presents a detailed summary of possible reasons for the continuation of crane hazards and lists 20 common equipment failure modes, explaining each in detail and using human factors as evidence. The section on powerline presents charts documenting the alarmingly high death rate of over 150/year of workers by powerline contact and reviews the availability of preventive devices such as links and proximity warning devices.

85.05.28

The operator of a leased crane lost both arms while removing a locomotive motor from a train wreck site and contacted a 7,200 V mid-span powerline in the vicinity. The leased crane offered no safety options such as insulated link or proximity device. See A-18 This case clearly illustrates an unequal protection from the hazard of powerline contacts, as the railroad companies often equip their cranes with an electrostatic proximity alarm when their contractor’s cranes are unequipped with appliances for work adjacent to and underneath powerlines. The use of the alarm would create among operating personnel a strong incentive to call the electric utility company and have the powerlines temporarily de-energized.

85.07.00

NIOSH ALERT # 85-111: Preventing Electrocutions from Contact Between Cranes and Powerlines According to data gathered for this paper., there were approximately 2,300 lost workday occupational injuries in the U.S. in 1981 which resulted form contact with electrical current by crane booms, cables, or loads, resulting in 115 fatalities and 200 total permanent disabilities. This data indicates that 36% of powerline contact injuries are fatal. 45

85.10.05

The worker guiding a load of pre-cast concrete was injured when the hoist line struck a 7,200 V powerline in an unmarked danger zone. See A-19 This case is a second example of straddle crane powerline contact and the clear need to remove powerlines from the loading area.

1986

A label is developed with explicit warnings of electrocution and an illustration of the danger zone by David V. MacCollum (See Illustration I)

86.03.16

Deposition of Collin W. Dunnam (Case # A 246122, Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada, County of Clark) This is an excerpt of deposition by a crane manufacturer’s expert being questioned by the injured’s attorney. Pg. 82, Ln 14- Q: Did any of these people that you talked to feel that the system should not have been abandoned? A: There was one department manager who had two cranes under his supervision at that time that felt that the proximity device was a good warning device. Pg. 85, Ln 14- Q: Were the results of your investigation and testing published in a national Journal? A: No, Q: How was it that all of a sudden lawyers from all over the country started calling you about the results of that test, do you know how the word got out? A: Yes, because, as I explained previously, I was asked to give a presentation about our experience with proximity warning devices to a group of attorneys in Chicago. Q: And you believe that’s what started the process? A: I believe it is, yes. Pg. 88, Ln 15-Q: During this eight-year period, when did you become aware that there were problems with the SigAlarm System? A: As I indicated, the case where we had a contact is one that first started causing me to question the effectiveness. Then the --, well, I believe that occurred in March 1977. Then I think in September 1977 is when the representatives from our engineering and operations equipment departments came to me and asked permission to remove them. Note: These maintenance personnel work closely with manufacturers for the purchase of spare parts and maintenance services. In such situations it appears that the manufacturers’ service reps could have an opportunity to suggest removal of safety devices.

86.09.00

Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B., “Field Test of Rayco Detek-Thor” Report Prepared for Grove Manufacturing “The Rayco Company ‘Detek Thor’ powerline proximity warning device was recently introduced commercially. It operates on the principle of measuring capacitive current (inversely proportional to distance from powerline) rather than the principle used by SigAlarm™ and others.”

46

86.09.00

Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Field Test of Tinsley Overhead Powerline Detector” Report prepared for Grove Manufacturing; Appendix 1& 2 The test results detail the same system flaws for the Tinsley electrostatic field detecting device than it does for all other safety appliances: positions of the boom directly under the powerlines and over the powerlines do not trigger a constantly sounding signal, and there is a sensitivity discrepancy in certain parts of the powerline when a power pole crossarms carries lines of different voltages in close vicinity to each other. The study also mentioned that the Tinsley device was not as easy to program as the SigAlarm™. This device detects the electrostatic field in which the field strength is proportional to the flow; the lower the voltage the weaker the field. Note: These studies, performed by the same people for the same crane manufacturers are contained in the timeline in order to show the regularity and increasing lack of validity of their observations against appliances of this type.

87.10.00

Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03 01.A.03: “Prior to commencement of work at a job site, an acceptable accident prevention plan written by the prime contractor for the specific work and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual, will be reviewed by designated government personnel. On contract operations, the contractor’s plan will be job specific and will include work to be performed by subcontractors, and measures to be taken by the contractor to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment provided by suppliers.” 15.I.16: No materials or equipment shall be stored under energized bus, energized lines, or near energized equipment, if it is possible to store them elsewhere. 15.I. 17: When materials or equipment are stored under energized lines or near energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 15.1] and extraordinary caution shall be exercised when moving material near such energized equipment. 15.E.02: All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability of encroachment on the clear distances specified in 15.E.08

47

87.10.27

Excerpt from the deposition of Collin W. Dunnam (Case # 60483, Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County) This testimony is an example of more false claims and allegations by the defense witness for a crane manufacturer. Pg. 35, Ln 14- Q: Okay. Am I also correct that you had a number of powerline contact incidents prior to the time that this evaluation of proximity alarms was made? A: Between 1965 and 1970, yes, sir. Q: And how many powerline contact incidents were there during that 5-year period? A: About ten. Q: And after the proximity warning devices were put on the crane, How many powerline contact incidents did you have? A: Only One. Q : Am I --, did that involve a crane? A: Yes sir. Q: Did the boom come into actual contact with the powerline? A: I don’t know. It either came into contact or close enough to cause an arc. Q: Was the proximity warning or alarm on at the time that this incident occurred? A: The operator wasn’t sure whether it was on or not. Q: Since the time that the proximity alarms were taken off the crane, have you had some powerline contact incidents since that time, or have you not? A: Yes, sir, we have. Q: How many have you had? A: Two involving cranes. Q: And have you had some other powerline contacts involving other pieces of equipment other than cranes? A: Yes, sir. Q: What types of equipment would this be? A: Forklift and drill rigs.

88.07.00

Suruda, Anthony “Electrocution at Work” Professional Safety (The American Society of Safety Engineers Journal) “The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reports approximately 1,000 electrocutions of all types each year in the U.S.” However, there is a fair amount of ambiguity of both the sources and the reliability of the statistics. According to the article, heavy equipment was involved in a greater number of inadvertent powerline contacts than any other group.

1989

ASME/ANSI Mobile and Locomotive Cranes B30.5: Includes an illustration of Fig. 17: Radial Distance from Powerlines, which infers that it is safe for a crane boom to work under or above a powerline. Mentions the use of cage-type boom guards, insulating links, and proximity alarms as not a substitute for the 10 foot clearance of 50 kV.

48

1989

“Boom Buoy” 3 Dimensional Range Limiting Device, Rayco System, Ltd. Brochure on implementation and operation of a high-tech range limiting device. This device allows the operator to program the envelope in which the boom can be maneuvered to prevent it from being slued or raised into a powerline.

1989

Price, Dennis L.: “Machinery Operational Safety Near Overhead Powerlines”, published in Hazard Prevention, the journal of the System Safety Society This article is an in-depth discussion of bodily mechanisms that indicate balance and allow fine-tuned perception. The author goes into great detail regarding the ability of most people with normal vision to perceive and recognize overhead powerlines, with some account of human error. This article also primes the way for a study regarding perception of powerlines, the results of which are released in a later paper.

1989

Paques, Joseph-Jean (IRSST), Michaud, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec) van Dike, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec) “Development of a Range-Limiting Device for Mobile Cranes” This piece details development for a more efficient, reliable range limiting device.

1989

Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes” National Academy of Forensic Engineers Journal This is a negative evaluation based on previous research made available for various crane manufacturers.

89.07.00

Price, Dennis L.: “The Detection of Overhead Powerlines” Proceedings of the Ninth International System Safety Conference Two studies to determine perceptive ability to overhead powerlines were conducted for this report. One study required the subjects walking toward the powerline at 90°, and 65° while looking at the powerline, and observing powerlines directly overhead. The next study was conducted with a backing truck with a makeshift boom. The subjects would act as observers and tell the drivers of the truck where to stop. According to the study, all the trucks stopped before they had crossed underneath the powerline, leading to the conclusion: “Observers, who are attentive to the presence of overhead powerlines can detect the line location sufficiently to remain clear.” Note: He fails to mention that crane operators and signalmen can be “distracted” by performing the job at hand. It is impossible to focus on a task and keep constant view of the powerlines. In addition, even in the study, though nobody crossed under a powerline, as it is known that many violate the ten foot “thin air” clearance required by law while working in the vicinity of powerlines.

89.07.24

An operator was seriously maimed when he slued the boom of the flatbed crane into a 7,200 V powerline. The controls were attached to the crane with an electric tether, allowing him to operate while standing in a dangerous position on the ground. The manufacturer of the crane had faced similar lawsuits for malfunctioning control boxes that disobeyed the commands of the crane operator, often resulting in serious injury or death. See A-20 This case summarizes a number of similar occurrences with the use of remote controlled controls on a wire tether. These controls should be outlawed, as the crane and the operator are in direct jeopardy in the boom strikes a powerline.

1990’s

The manufacturers of sailboats began installing insulating plugs in their masts to prevent electrocution.

49

1990

Karady ,G.G., “Efficiency of Insulating Link For Protection of Crane Workers” , published by the International Society of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 90 SM 338-4 PWRD: “The paper concludes that in spite of the shortcomings, the insulator link increases the safety of the crane operation. Furthermore, the developed model and calculation method can be used for the evaluation of new crane insulator systems.” Note: The paper concludes that in spite of minor milliamp current leakage or flashover at high voltages, there are none at 7200 volts, which constitutes 90% of powerlines. The shortcomings, the insulator link increases the safety of the crane operation. Furthermore, the developed model and calculation method can be used for the evaluation of new crane insulator systems.

90.02.23

A seasoned foreman was using a flatbed truck mounted crane to unload steel forms for concrete paving for a new freeway with powerlines running parallel along one side. He did not suspect the presence of a single- phase 7,200 V powerline crossing the road, and died of electrocution when the crane boom contacted it mid-span. After the incident, Mr. Andrews, the contractor Fred Weber, Inc.’s vice-president of safety, immediately purchased a proximity warning device for every crane in his fleet. In an affidavit given on December 29, 1999 (for the case listed in A-27), the same Mr. Andrews talks about the usefulness and life-saving properties of proximity devices. See A-21 This case illustrates a reliable and successful use of the electrostatic proximity device as a warning system.

90.04.00

Pritzker, Paul E., P.E.: “Stopping Construction Sites from Becoming Killing Fields” Electrical System Design While researching the death by electrocution of a crane signalman, consulting engineer Paul Pritzker also finds himself researching lifesaving devices such as links and proximity warning devices. In the article, he mentions information such as the fact that every crane moved onto a navy base must be equipped with proximity alarms, and the fact that there has never been a reported accident on a crane with a proximity alarm installed. He states definitively that an insulated link on the crane he studied would have saved the flagman’s life, and likens the disuse of such devices to the absence of life vests in a boat. “While some safety devices are not 100 percent fail safe, it does not mean that they should not be used.”

90.04.09

A gruesome death resulted after five minutes of continuous serious burns when the hoist line of a crane became entangled in a newly energized powerline. See A-22 This case is an example of where the deceased, working alone, was unaware that utility had energized the powerline. Warning with an electrostatic proximity alarm would have alerted the operator even though there was no current flow.

50

90.05.22

Testimony of Donald A. Pittenger, Acting Chief of Safety and Occupational Health, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on H.R. 4652: The Construction Safety, Health, and Education Improvement Act of 1990, Before Subcommittee on Health and Safety, Committee on Education and Labor, United States House of Representatives Pg. 2: “The first Corps of Engineers safety and health requirements manual was published in 1941… I also point out that our safety and health requirements manual formed the basis of OSHA’s construction safety and health requirements. Today, with over fifty years of experience backing us, the Corps’ safety and health program is a model in the construction industry. In 1988, the most recent year for which the Bureau of Labor Statistics records are available, Corps contractors (working within the United States) had a lost-time accident frequent rate of 1.5- the industry average, 6.8, was over four times higher.”* A key requirement in the aforementioned manual is the implementation of a Pre-job Construction Safety Plan. This plan is incorporated into the timeline at 77.06.01, 84.10.00, 87.10.00, and 92.10.00 under U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements Manual. *These statistics would no longer be considered accurate due to new statistical processing methods.

90.06.13

A workman died while hosing down his dump truck in an area designated for cleaning them. The area contained a 21-foot high 4,600 V powerline in the vicinity. See A-23 This case illustrates the landowner’s responsibility to designate a safe site for washing any high-clearance equipment. HIFI has on record some 48 other occurrences of dump beds raised into a powerline, and undoubtedly there are more.

51

90.11.05

Deposition Excerpt of John H. Crowley (U.S. District Court, State of Kansas, # 902159-0) who was employed by the Equipment Manufacturers’ Institute (EMI), formerly known as the Farm and Industrial Equipment Institute (FIEI) as the director of safety Record deposition on the matter of MACCC/EMI Pg 19, Ln 7- Q: To your knowledge, did the MADDDC engineering and technical committee ever develop a reference library for constituent members of MADDDC to have access to at EMI? A: No, no. Q: Are you aware of whether or not that was ever a recommended project? A: I am not aware. I don’t know that that was. Q: Is there any type of repository for papers, standards, studies, texts, technical bulletins, and periodicals pertaining to aerial devices that’s ever been put together for use of the member companies of MADDDC? A: Yes. Q: What is that composition of material identified as? A: Well, I am not sure exactly what the content is or that it contains everything that you mentioned, but there is a repository of information for MADDDC members and that is—I think it’s called a—syllabus is the word that’s used. It’s a syllabus. If the question is limited to EMI, then the answer is that nothing was prepared at EMI. Q: Was anything prepared, to your knowledge, for MADDDC that is the equivalent of a repository of papers, standards, studies, texts, et cetera, relative to the things pertaining to aerial devices? A: Yes. Q: What type of information is contained in that repository? A: My understanding is that is contains standards like ANSI A92 type standards. It contains records of closed cases involving aerial devices and digger derricks, I believe. That’s as much as I know it contains.

52

continued

Q: When you say it contains records of closed cases, what type of cases are you making reference to? A: Product liability type cases. Q: Do you know what the period of time that’s included in this record of closed cases is? A: No, I don’t know. Q: Have you personally ever looked at any records? A: No. The Standards part, yes, but not the closed cases. Q: Do you know where these records of closed cases are maintained? A: Yes. Q: Where is that? A: In the office of Lord, Bissell, & Brook, a law firm in Chicago. Q: Would that include the standards that you earlier referenced? A: Yes. Q: Those standards— A: To the best of my knowledge, that’s correct. [Defense council: I object. Mr. Crowley has indicated, except for the standards, he’s never seen this material. I believe he’s now speculating about what might be there and where it might be, and I object on that basis because it calls for speculation.] Q: Do you know where at Lord, Bissell, & Brook these documents are contained? A: You mean physically where? Q: Yes, physically. A: No, I don’t. Q: Do you know which lawyer with that firm is responsible for administering these documents? A: At the present time? Q: Yes, at the present time. A: Yes, I do. Pg 23, Ln 1- Q: Are you familiar with any of the various periodicals that may be contained within this repository of reference materials that we earlier referenced or made reference to in this deposition? A: I don’t know what kinds of periodicals are contained in this syllabus, if any. Q: Does EMI maintain any type of library of publications for use by its constituent members? I guess it would be better stated for use by members of its constituent member councils. [Defense council: That’s been asked and answered, and he said no.] A: That’s true for all of EMI as well as for MADDDC; we have nothing—we are not a repository for information. Pg 31, Ln 20- Q: Maybe I didn’t ask it right. Do you personally know why this separate repository is maintained at Lord, Bissell, & Brook? A: Well, the membership of MADDDC told us they wanted to do it that way. Q: Did they tell you why they wanted to do it that way? [Defense council: I object to that, and to the extent that this question might call for attorney/client privileged communications, I instruct the witness not to answer. A: I decline to answer on the advice of council Q: To your knowledge, was their reason related to some advice of council? [Defense council: I am going to object to the question as calling for speculation or conjecture on the part of the witness.]

53

continued

A: I decline to answer on the advice of council. Q: As I understand it, your council advised you not to respond to an earlier question as it related to any communications that council may have made to a MADDDC member that you would be restating based on my inquiry. My question is now whether or not the reasons that this information is stored at Lord, Bissell & Brook is the product of some attorney recommendation, if you know that. Pg 33, Ln 11- Q: I would like for you to look at what’s been identified as Plaintiff’s exhibit No 11 and identify this document for me please? [Defense council: Before doing that, is that something that was produced at this deposition?] Mr. Cherry [plaintiff’s attorney]: Yes. Defense: By Mr. Crowley? Mr. Cherry: That’s correct. Crowley: There are two documents here. Q: [Cherry] Would you identify them by the color of the document? A: One is light brown, and it’s called “Initial Report of Suit” and it’s a form—it shows MADDDC on the top, and it’s a reporting form. Q: Is it a reporting form for accidents and the suits that are produced as a result of the accident; is that your understanding of what the document is? [defense council: objection] Q: Do you know what the document is? A: Yes, I do. Q: Have you seen the document or something similar to that document before? A: Yes, I have. Q: Is it used by MADDDC constituent members in reporting accidents to some committee for MADDDC? [defense council: objection] [defense council: objection] A: It’s not used to report any data to any committee of EMI. Q: Do you know what its purpose is? A: Yes, I do. Q: What is that? A: It’s to report information about accidents in which a lawsuit is involved to Lord, Bissell, & Brook. Q: And who is to make that report, if you know [defense council: objection] A: I can only say what our role is as it has to do with this form, and that is to send the form to member companies of MADDDC. Q: That’s what EMI does? A: That’s what we do, and that’s the extent of it. What we do is simply provide a pad of these forms to MADDDC members. Pg 37, Ln 1- A [Crowley]: That the MADDDC members use this to report information that they know of when there’s a suit. Q; And based on your personal knowledge of this document and where it is to be submitted, to whom is this document once it is completed to be submitted to? A: To John Haarlow of Lord, Bissell, & Brook. Pg 40, Ln 5- A [Crowley]: The document speaks for itself: Initial report of suit.

54

continued

Pg. 42, Ln 6- A [Crowley]: This is a reporting form, and it’s entitled “Report of Closed Case”, and it’s a blank form with a number of different questions, same as the brown document we just discussed. Q: And what is your understanding as to the purpose of that document? [defense council: objection] A: I only know what I see here, that it’s to be addressed to John Haarlow, Lord, Bissell, & Brook, which is clearly stated on the first page of the document. I know nothing more than that. Pg. 42, Ln 17- Q: Are you familiar with the fact that there was accident reporting to Lord, Bissell, & Brook prior to the use of this form? [defense council: objection] A: I don’t know. Q: it is my understanding that you began to work in 1978 with EMI? A: Yes. Q: At the time that you first began your position at EMI, did you know whether or not there was an ongoing accident reporting mechanism for MADDDC constituent members to Lord, Bissell & Brook? A: I know that there was a relationship between MADDDC members and Lord, Bissell, & Brook when I first joined FIEI in 1978, but I don’t know specifically whether or not it involved reporting of accidents.

91.01.11

Letter to Mr. Norman C. Hargreaves, Koehering Cranes and Excavators, Inc. from Mr. Timothy J. Pizatella, Chief, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH “Based on the NTOF data, it is clear that crane contact with overhead powerlines is a problem demanding the attention of crane users, crane manufacturers, federal and state agencies and others interested in preventing work-related electrocutions.”

91.02.00

“Mobile Cranes and Power Lines” National Safety Council Data Sheet I-743 New 90 Safety and Health “The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) provides regulations… in 29 CFR, 1926.550(a)(15)-…. Mentions the use of cage boom type guards, insulating links and proximity warning devices…” “The important thing is to call the electric utility company early during the prebid planning stage. At that stage you will know (1) if the powerline can be de-energized, or (2) if other precautions will be needed during the job.” “When construction is to start, there should be a meeting of property owners, general contractors, subcontractors, the supervisor of crane operations and any other responsible entities and the electric utility. They need to discuss possible hazards and agree on measures necessary to ensure that equipment will not be exposed to accidental contact with energized powerlines. When any crane lift or other operation is to be done near energized powerlines, the crane operator or job supervisor should advise the electric utility and should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure safety throughout the project. Storage under powerlines of any equipment or material that might be lifted by a crane should be prohibited. A job safety analysis can be conducted for the anticipated crane operations.” “The operator may be unable to maintain the required clearance by visual means because the human eye is not capable of judging with any degree of accuracy the distance to a smooth horizontal wire in space.”

55

91.0203.00

“Do Insulated Links Help?” Lift Equipment: Yes- Robert J. Mongeluzzi, Plaintiff’s attorney; No- J. Derald Morgan, defense witness Yes: A link must be able to reduce the current traveling through it to less than 50 milliamps. (Heart fibrillation starts at 50-75 milliamps; severe tissue damage occurs at about 500.) “Tests performed by Harnischfeger and American Hoist and Derrick Co. show that contaminated links restricted current to no less than eight milliamps, which would cause a mild shock with no permanent physical injury.” The grand majority of tested links met or exceeded these criteria. No: “A further refinement of the criteria [for considered success] was to adopt the position that any current flow over the link, while possibly limited to non-lethal levels, which could be felt by an unsuspecting worker that would cause involuntary shock reactions or reflex actions that could cause a serious accident involving the reacting worker or their co-workers is considered unsafe. To this end, a maximum leakage current level of one milliamp was adopted as the acceptable maximum limit under any test conditions.”

91.03.00

MacCollum, David V., “Hunting Down Crane Hazards” Lift Equipment This article presents human factors as evidence that crane powerline contacts are not preventable solely through worker awareness, and stresses management pre-job planning as the first place to start to overcome the hazard of powerline contact. (See Illustration II on how to map the danger zone)

91.06.18

Three men were injured when laying pipeline across an electric utility encasement. The pipeline company had previously contacted the electric company with a request to temporarily turn off the power, and the request was ignored. See A-24 This shows that the diversity of boomed equipment includes side-mounted booms on crawler tractors used in pipelines, and all can easily reach powerlines.

91.09.00

Paques, Joseph-Jean “Cranes and Overhead Powerlines” Published at the 13th International Convention ISSA for Construction, Bruxelles This paper looks closely at crane powerline contacts and suggests many measures to prevent them, including communication with the electric utility companies to cut off power or relocate or bury the lines, grounding the machinery, proximity devices and ground markings. He also suggests many methods of insulation, including insulating controls between the control panel and the machinery.

91.09.10

Letter containing incidents of electrocution involving boomed equipment from 19801988. To: Ms. Suzanna E. Ellefson (Kelly, McLaughlin & Foster) from Ms. Suzanne Kisner, Statistician, Injury Surveillance Section, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH Total recorded deaths by electrocution: 34.8*, % construction incidents: 46.6 * “Cases of work-related fatal injuries may be missed……For this reason, the data presented should be regarded as the absolute minimum number of events.”

56

92.01.28

Last update: Safety Code for the Construction Industry, Quebec, Canada S-2.1, r.6 5.2.1: The employer shall ensure that no one performs work liable to bring any part, load, machine component or person closer to an electrical line than the minimum approach distance. 5.2.2: The employer who wishes to carry out work liable to bring any part, load, machine component or person closer to an electrical line than the minimum approach distance specified in section 5.2.1, may proceed to such work provided that one of the following conditions is complied with: c) extensible construction equipment, such as a backhoe, a power shovel, a crane or a dump truck shall be equipped with a device that has two functions: i) to warn the operator or to stop the equipment from operating, so that the minimum approach distance specified in section 5.2.1 is respected: ii) to stop the equipment from operating, should the device fail to perform its first function.

92.02.10

Murray, Charles J.: “Remote Control System Reduces Crane Accidents” Design News This article informs the public about a new preventive device for cranes. A remote control system “prevents electrocution by eliminating the conductive path between a high voltage wire and an operator.” This device allows the operator to limit the range the boom can be positioned by using a computer system. New technology to improve safety is appearing all the time. This device presents yet another option on ways to help eliminate boom powerline contacts.

92.07.00

MacCollum, David V.: “Designing Out Electrical Hazards” CraneWorks This article places equipment safety first and foremost in the hands of the project management team. During prejob planning it is key to carefully survey the area for any hidden hazards and map the Danger Zone on the ground so it is clearly visible to all personnel. Planners must also work closely with the Electric Utility company, in compliance with OSHA. It is also a good idea to post the telephone number of the Utility company on the side of the crane as an added reminder for who to call in the event that the crane boom needs to be extended into the danger zone under the powerline. See illustration I

92.09.21

A worker lost both arms during new freeway construction when the hoist line contacted a powerline mid-span. None of the construction plans included an attempt to bury or relocate the powerlines, even through the budget allowed for it. See A-25 This case included testimony that an insulated link would have prevented the crippling injuries.

57

92.10.00

Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03 01.A.07: “Prior to initiation of work at a job site, an accident prevention planwritten by the prime contractor for the specific work and hazards of the contract and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual- will be reviewed and found acceptable by designated government personnel.” Pg. 3: Guidelines for the Preparation of Accident Prevention Plans: B. Administrative responsibilities for implementing the accident prevention plan; identification and accountability of personnel responsible for accident prevention. C. Means for coordinating and controlling work activities of contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers; responsibilities of subcontractors in effecting the requirements of the accident prevention plan. D. Plans for safety indoctrination and continued safety training. 11.E.01(b): All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability to encroach on the clear distances specified in 11.E.04 (0-50 kV-10’, 51-100 kV-12’) 11E.02: Work activity adjacent to overhead lines shall not be initiated until a survey has been made to ascertain the safe distance from energized lines. 11.H.11(b): Materials and equipment shall net be stored under energized bus, energized lines, or near energized equipment if it is possible to store them elsewhere. If materials or equipment must be stored under energized lines or near energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained and extraordinary caution shall be exercised in maintaining these clearances when operating equipment or moving materials near such energized equipment.

58

1993

MacCollum, David V.: Crane Hazards and Their Prevention, Book published by the American Society of Safety Engineers, Des Plaines, IL Chapter 4: Powerline contact- “Cranes and powerlines are not compatible and should not occupy the same workspace. Powerline contact presents the highest risk in crane operations. It is probably the most devastating, continually reoccurring type of personal injury and property damage. A single contact can result in multiple deaths and/or crippling injuries. From my review of OSHA and MSHA injury data and injury data available from litigation experience, my best estimate shows that each year approximately 150 to 160 people are killed or crippled by powerline contact and about three times that number are seriously injured. On an average, eight out of ten of those injured were guiding the load at the time of contact.” Types of cranes involved in 400 powerline contacts were: 1. Truck Carrier, Latticework Boom:

26%

2. Truck Carrier, Hydraulic Boom:

24%

3. Mobile Hydraulic Boom, Rough Terrain

19%

4. Flatbed, Hydraulic Boom

16%

5. Flatbed, Trolley Boom, Remote Control

11%

6. Crawler Carrier, Latticework Boom

4%

The personnel were injured or killed when: 1. Guiding the load

71%

2. Getting on or off crane and/or touching crane 21% 3. Other activity

8%

(See Illustration II) 1993

Paques, Joseph-Jean: “Crane Accidents by Contact with Powerlines”, Safety Science, 16 Studies powerline contacts in Quebec and Ontario, Canada, and the USA. Breaks down information by type of vehicle or equipment used, and the features of those pieces of equipment. Recommendations suggest that further precautions can be made based on type of equipment. Paques also continues to investigate and improve the usefulness of the range limiting device.

1993

AS 2550.1 Australian Standard: Cranes- Safe Use (e) “Where necessary, provide ground barriers to warn operators.” Note: These barriers are labeled as “Personal Protection Barriers”. The use of these devices makes the danger zone visible and immutable to all personnel; they are more likely to be aware of the danger and cannot physically penetrate into the danger zone. (f) “Use non-conducting taglines when these are required.” (g) “Do not allow any person, other than the crane operator, to be in contact with any part of the crane or the load, except with a non-conducting tagline, once the lift has commenced.”

59

93.02.01

A worker using a non-insulated aerial lift on a movie set raised it into a 7,200 V powerline while working within the danger zone, sustaining head and shoulder burns so serious and disfiguring that he had to wear a sack over his head for three years so as not to frighten his family while he underwent skin grafts. See A-26 This case highlights the many occurrences and also illustrates why uninsulated aerial lifts cannot be used safely in the vicinity of powerlines. Moreover, this case shows that the movie lot owner has a duty to provide a safe workplace for any workers who are employees of movie producers that lease the facility. A safe place for aerial lifts would most likely entail buried powerlines in the area behind the sets.

93.05.00

MacCollum, David V.: “Cranes and Power Lines make Fatal Combination” Construction Newsletter This article reiterates the supreme importance of prejob construction planning, especially creating, accurately mapping, and remaining aware of a danger zone surrounding powerlines. The ground must be marked, preferably with barricades, and operators or managers are encouraged to call the electric utility company if a line or boom penetrates the danger zone. In ideal situations, power would be turned off or lines relocated or buried before the job starts.

93.06.26

Excerpt from the deposition of J. Derald Morgan, (Case # CJ92-549-92791 District County, Grand Forks County, North Dakota) Q: Well, what is excessive leakage of current in the field? What we’re talking about is human lives now. A: Any current over one milliamp. Note: As illustrated earlier in the debate between Morgan and Mongeluzzi (91.02-03) and other amperage measures, one milliamp of current can barely be detected by the human body. There are no documented cases of one milliamp being sufficient to cause death or damage to human tissue.

93.10.08

A company’s refusal to buy an insulated basket for a crane being used as an aerial lift resulted in the amputation of a worker’s arm due to a shock sustained when he was loading materials stored under a 7,200 V powerline onto a truck. See A-27 This case re-iterates the need to prohibit storage of materials under powerlines, as it only invites the use of cranes in a dangerous location.

93.11.01

“Occupational Safety and Health Standards for the Construction Industry” (29 CFR Part 1926), newly amended Subpart N, 1926.550 (15)(iv) “A person shall be designated to observe clearance of the equipment and give timely warning for all operations where it is difficult for the operator to maintain the desired clearance by visual means.” (15) (v) “Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity devices may be used on cranes, but the use of suck devices shall not alter the requirements of any other regulation of this part even if such device is required by law or regulation”

93.11.09

A crane’s boom was rotated in an arc towards a 7,200 V powerline while working in the danger zone, severely burning the worker guiding the load. Had the crane been rotated in an arc 180 degrees away from the powerline the contact would not have occurred. See A-28 This case illustrates one of the many situations where marking the Danger Zone with ground tape aids the operator in avoiding powerlines, as shown in Illustration II.

60

1994

ASME B.30.5a: (Mobile and Locomotive Cranes) Operating Near Electric Powerlines Figure 17a (Danger Zone for Cranes and Lifted Loads Operating Near Electrical Transmission Lines) amends the danger zone to extend to the ground ten feet in either direction under powerlines. However, Figure 17b nullifies this instruction by allowing longer cranes to slue their booms into the danger zone ten feet below the powerlines. Note: Has no requirements prohibiting the use of crane controls accessible to operator when standing on the ground or using remote controls on an electric cable tether.

94.02.22

A host of news gathering vans from various networks had assembled for the breaking of a major news story. The news changed when a news worker sitting on the side of the van with an open door with his feet on the ground raised the antenna of his van into trees concealing an overhead 7,200 V powerline. He was instantly electrocuted, and his gory death was filmed by another news station. Yet the occurrence remained buried, and the news networks did nothing to circulate news of the danger of powerline contact or increase safety by insisting on available safety devices as developed in 1985 by Jack Ainsworth for the immigration service (see pg. 15). See A-29 This case is the first in a series of Electronic News Gathering Van (ENG) suits that involved raising a pneumatic mast and antenna into powerlines. It was known that the U.S. immigration service used electrostatic proximity alarms on their immigration surveillance vehicles. They were installed to prevent the pneumatic mast from being raised when immediately adjacent to powerlines.

1994 Q2

MacCollum, David V.: “System Safety Analysis of Workplace Equipment and Facilities” Hazard Prevention (the System Safety Society Journal) Included in this piece on equipment safety is a convincing cost-benefit analysis in favor of implementing system safety. System safety on cranes can be easily accomplished by installing insulated links and proximity warning detectors to help prevent powerline contact, saving the manufacturers money through the prevention of possible litigation.

94.07.05

Inappropriate tools were provided to an electric utility lineman, making it necessary to raise the boom in order for him to continue working. The raised boom contacted a 7,200 V powerline and the lineman was killed. See A-30 This case illustrates the need for all boomed equipment used near or adjacent to powerlines should use the insulated models.

94.08.09

Working fast to cover a news breaking story, the mast of a newsgathering van was raised into an unseen 7,200 V powerline, causing amputation of a worker’s foot. See A-31 This is the second news gathering van serious injury that HIFI has chosen to report on.

94.11.08

MacCollum, David V.: “Planning Safe Crane Use”, 13th Crane Inspection Certification Bureau (CICB) Crane Conference, Tropicana Resort and Casino, Las Vegas, NV, Session 10: This presentation stresses the importance of sound construction planning and suggests ways employers can plan to prevent powerline contact. The presentation also broaches the idea that thorough planning eliminates liability because of their prevention of injuries often requires more stringent measures than current safety codes require. 61

94.12.28

The boom of a shingle conveyor was rotated into an unseen 7,200 powerline near dusk one December day. The untrained eighteen-year old worker placing tools into storage in the side of the truck was electrocuted and died. See A-32 This case resulted in the manufacturer redesigning his boom conveyor to be nonconductive, and then initiating a recall to retrofit his conveyors, preventing countless possible powerline contacts.

1995

MacCollum, David V.: Construction Safety Planning, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 605 3rd Ave, New York, NY, 10158-0012 Pg. 17: Powerline contacts used as an example of manufacturers burying information after litigation and keeping the hazard open, instead of using the safety information to make a positive change in the industry and improve safety for all. Pg. 81: “OSHA requirement 1926.550(a)(15)(v) refers to the much-debated efficacy of insulated links and proximity alarms. Tests have consistently demonstrated that any leakage of amperage on insulated links deliberately contaminated for the test is approximately the same as that acceptable for triggering ground-fault interrupters (GFI) and well below the paralysis threshold established by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). An insulated link is capable of protecting a rigger guiding a load if the boom or hoist line should come into contact with a powerline. …..No known personal in jury litigation has arisen because of a failure of an insulated link or proximity alarm when used in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.” Pg. 88: “Construction planning must include consideration of the power sources needed on the project. Almost all operations rely upon electric power and its distribution system…… Because powerlines do not mix with boomed and highclearance equipment, the location of existing power distribution systems and proposed permanent or temporary powerlines on or adjacent to the job site must be reviewed before any work is commenced.” “One of the first priorities of the construction manager is to notify the electric utility so that it can participate; if possible, in project safety planning, the prebid safety conference, and the pre-notice-to-proceed conference, to create a clear understanding and firm agreement in the separation of cranes and powerlines.” Powerline safety plans must be incorporated into any Construction Safety Plan as a priority sub-plan.

95.04.24

Row houses in a historical community were being restored. Cranes were used to lift plasterboard through an upstairs front window, though the electric utility had not shut off nearby powerlines. A crane with a knuckle boom was being operated by an operator standing on the ground using an umbilical remote control. When the boom contacted the 13,200 V powerline mid-span the current flowing through the operator into the ground caused him to lose both hands and sustain other severe burns. See A-33 This case shows the diversity the various types of crane booms, which is an articulate knuckle with three or four sections that can be folded up, rather than being retracted by telescoping. This is also another case of a conductive remote control tether, which is inherently dangerous in the event of a powerline contact. The architect of the historical restoration project should have incorporated buried electric utilities into the restoration project plan; that would have enabled him to portray the buildings as they were when they were built and would have afforded as safe work site, as the street was the only access to the area.

62

95.04-05

Petit, Ted: “Insulated Links: The Next Generation” Lift Equipment This article focuses on the benefits of insulated links, especially links made with polyurethane, a substance very effective in stopping the flow of current. The article also retells a real-life scenario where a worker guiding the tagline of a load lost his life when a crane contacted a powerline, and states “At a subsequent civil trial, a leading opponent of insulated links was discredited. Under cross examination, it became apparent that in an effort to cause insulated links to fail, the expert subjected links to a high humidity environment…. [that] far exceeds normal use conditions.”

95.05.00

NIOSH ALERT # 95-108: Preventing Electrocutions of Crane Operators and Crew Members Working Near Overhead Powerlines NIOSH describes six electrocutions occurring from crane powerline contact and states the OSHA recommendations such as de-energizing powerlines, using independent, insulated barriers, maintaining the minimum clearance between the crane and the powerline, use a signalman where operator visibility may be compromised, and using additional safety equipment such as boom guards, insulated links, as a secondary means of safety while maintaining all other regulations.

95.05.23

While constructing a bridge, the electric utility company agreed to relocate the powerlines, but they were moved far enough to finish only half the job safely. When work began on the other side of the bridge, the boom contacted a “newly relocated” 7,200 V powerline mid-span, severely shocking a worker. See A-34 This case provides an additional occurrence among many that the pinup guys on the “A Frame” supporting the latticework boom are high enough to reach the powerlines, resulting in severe injury or death.

95.06.00

MacCollum, David V., “Planning for Safe Crane Use” Presentation #927 at the American Society of Safety Engineers Professional Development Conference and Exposition, Orlando, FL This is a checklist for safe crane use, presented by David V. MacCollum, which includes assessing the site, the load, and the crane itself, including checking insulated links and proximity alarms. Section IV is dedicated to the responsibilities of the management personnel involved.

95.07.13

The conductive load, a steel “I” beam, severely burned a worker guiding it when the boom of the crane lifting it contacted a 7,200 powerline. See A-35 This case provides illustration of the reality of the amount of space powerlines in an area can take up. The load below the hook rotated into a powerline, proving that there is never too much powerline clearance. The use of a non-conductive tagline would have prevented this injury.

63

96.01.17

The ladder of a fire truck contacted a 7,200 V powerline mid-span, injuring a fireman who was connecting a snorkel hose to the fire truck. See A-36 This case again shows that all boomed equipment is vulnerable to powerline contact. At a later date, fire truck standards required a platform for firemen to stand on to isolate them from the ground, stating in Paragraph 7.9.2 of NFPA’s standard 1904 for Aerial Ladder and Elevating Platform Fire Apparatus: “Provisions shall be made so the pump operator is not in contact with the ground. Signs shall be places to warn the pump operator of the electrocution hazard.” However, this standard gave no clue that the design should include a non-conductive platform and handholds for firefighters who had the task of connecting water hoses to the aerial ladder and elevating platform apparatus.

1996

Another death resulting from a news gathering van contacting a 7,200 V powerline. See A-37 (See A-27). The multiple occurrences of this nature show that this is a criminal situation. Many states, most notably California, held a public forum and decided not to mandate utilization of the electrostatic proximity alarm, which had proven its ability to prevent powerline contacts by the U.S. Immigration service in 1985, to save lives by preventing the news van mast from being raised into a powerline.

96.07.00

“Focus: Equipment Powerline Contact” Hazard Information Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 4 This informative article gives a brief list of reasons as to WHY powerlines occur, mainly as the result of limits of human perception. The list of ways to prevent powerline contacts includes planning and extensively mapping the danger areas and guarding cranes with proximity devices and insulated links. This newsletter also debases myths regarding the reliability of available safety devices. A helpful list breaks down powerline contact by types of equipment: Aerial lifts, Antenna installation vehicles, Booms (all types), Conveyors, Cranes (all types), Crawler tractors (side boom), Delivery trucks with elevating beds, Draglines, Drilling Rigs (portable), Dump Trucks, Excavators, Feed trucks with boom), Fire trucks (snorkel units, water towers, and aerial ladders), Flagpole instillation devices, Forklifts, Grain Elevators (portable), House moving equipment, Kite/model plane with umbilical cord controls, Power shovels, Pumpcrete trucks, Railroad equipment (track mounted cranes, salvage cranes), Sailboats, Satellite-link vehicles with pneumatic masts (ENG vans), Scaffolds (mobile & self propelled), Sign instillation devices, Tree-trimming equipment (See illustration I and II, figures 1 & 2.)

64

96.09.03

Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.07: Before initiation of work at the job site, an accident prevention plan-written by the prime contractor for the specific work and hazards of the contract and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual- will be reviewed and found acceptable by designated Government personnel. a.

b.

The plan will be developed by qualified personnel and will be signed by a competent person and a representative of the prime contractor’s project management team. On contract operations the contractor’s plan will be job-specific and will include work to be performed by subcontractors and measures to be taken by the contractor to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment provided by suppliers.

11.E.01 (b) All electric power of distribution lines shall be placed underground in areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capacity to encroach on the clear distances specified in 11.E.04 (0-50 kV- 3m, 51-200 kV- 4.5m) 11.H.12 (b) Materials and equipment shall not be stored under energized bus, energized lines, or near energized equipment if it is possible to store them elsewhere. If materials or equipment must be stored under energized lines or near energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 11-5] and extraordinary caution shall be exercised in maintaining these clearances when operating equipment or moving materials near such energized equipment. (c) Taglines shall be of non-conducting type when used near energized lines.

96.10-11

CraneWorks advertisement section: promotional highlights for range limiting devices and proximity warning alarms state “Keep in mind that alarms are designed to provide an early warning that powerlines are in the vicinity. They should not be used as a measuring device to allow lifting close to powerlines.

96.10.11

The electric utility company, contacted to bury powerlines at a job site, did not have the trenching equipment available and instead decided to move the powerline to right above an outside doorway. The tip of a crane hauling sheet steel contacted the 7,200 V powerline in an unmarked danger zone, and one victim needed all four of his limbs amputated while the other lost fingers. See A-38 This again illustrates that the electric utility is a crucial part of safe crane operation. In this case, if the utility company did not have the equipment available to bury the powerline, the utility should have given the landowner the option of digging a proper trench to bury the powerlines and make for a safe workplace.

97.01.21

The signalman, positioned a hundred feet away, failed to maintain safe clearance of the transmission lines running between two utility poles. The electric utility had provided an uninsulated basket to lift fiber-optic cable to a delicate position between the poles. The aerial lift itself was situated in a precarious position on the slope of the easement, and the operator sustained serious burns to his hands, resulting in the amputation of several fingers. See A-39 This case illustrates that aerial lifts should not be designed with alternate controls that are accessible by someone standing on the ground. To date, there are no requirements that prohibit the design of these controls accessible to someone standing on the ground.

65

97.10.00

Suruda, Anthony, M.D. M.P.H., Egger, Marlene PhD., Liu, Diane, M. Stat., “Crane Related Deaths in the U.S. Construction Industry”, Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and Environmental Health “For the 11 years 1984-94, 502 deaths occurred in 479 incidents involving cranes in the construction industry. … Electrocution by powerline contact was the most common type of incident, with 198 deaths (39%) reported.” Though this study carefully gathered and assimilated statistical information, it did not mention any of the most rudimentary causes of crane fatalities and the needed hazard prevention measures.

97.09.03

A journalism novice attempted to rescue her co-worker when he raised the antenna of his news gathering van into a 7,200 V powerline and was severely shocked herself, resulting in injuries to her head and feet. See A-40 Here we are again with the same preventable very serious injury as a result of a total lack of safety oversight by the major news networks.

97.11.06

Edwards, Robert and Krasny Alex, “Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom”, written by an employer’s trade association of pumpcrete machine users. Of the five people who participated in the test, four worked for or represented the crane manufacturer Schwing America, Inc. The duration of the test was three hours. In the twenty-five tests performed in that time, the device failed significantly on two tests. The first time it failed, the boom was fully extended ten feet underneath a powerline, the next time it failed the boom was fully extended up and over the powerline, both tests attempting to pour concrete on the other side of the powerline. These actions violate every safety regulation currently associated with crane use. It is a blatant disregard of a known danger zone, and no pumpcrete operator should ever attempt to maneuver a machine into either of these positions, as they are both dangerous and foolhardy. The first conclusion stated that “these tests demonstrated that the SigAlarm™ PWD will not protect the workers on or near a concrete pump of the operator relies on it to be his eyes and attention,” as well as “It cannot be considered a substitute for an attentive operator.” Safety rules in construction are set up to avoid powerlines first and foremost. Note: authors of this analysis never considered that the device was never intended to replace the importance of pre-job safety planning and on-the-job awareness, but as a life-saving warning of powerlines and the need to initiate some other safer methods of concrete placement is required.

1998

A water-well service truck rig contained its boom controls in the back, making visibility very difficult. It was being used to move a pump engine a short distance and traveled with the boom raised. The repositioning of the truck caused the boom to be lowered onto its travel-mode position it contacted a 7,200 V powerline mid-span, killing the equipment owner and seriously maiming another worker. See A-41 Besides illustrating the infinite variety of equipment at risk of powerline contacts, this is a classic example of how the landlord, who was overseeing the work, made no effort to be responsible by contacting the electric utility and requested that the powerline, which powered only his irrigation wells, be de-energized while work was in progress next to the powerlines.

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98.03.00

Morgan, J. Derald Ph.D., “Review of ‘Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom’ by Robert Edwards and Alax Krasny of Schwing America, Inc” Note: Edwards and Kransy conducted the study for the Pumpcrete Trade Association In this report review, Morgan praises the report for it’s attention to minute technical detail and its clear reporting of performed tests. He states that “..detection of powerlines as purposed by SigAlarm™ when working in the proximity of powerlines is based on a flawed concept and will not work in many circumstances.” The review of this report corroborates his own findings of fifteen years ago when he ran similar tests for two other crane manufacturers. It says nothing regarding the evidence of the reliance of SigAlarm™ in tests run by the Bureau of mines for the U.S. Department of Interior. All of Mr. Morgan’s reports were for clients who were defendants in litigation for the failure to provide these safety appliances.

98.05.00

NIOSH Bulletin: Worker Deaths by Electrocution- A Summary of Surveillance Findings and Investigative Case Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Part of this booklet presents a list called FACE (Fatality Assessment Control Evaluation) Electrocution Cases for Monograph, and documents a number of electrocution deaths over the past sixteen years. However, the data they supply on these 220 cases (of which two involved crane powerline contact and four involved dump truck powerline contact) is insufficient, as adequate information on both the circumstances of the accident and listing of the management groups who should have selected a safe location are not provided. The list fails to show any accountability.

98.05.07

An operator in an uninsulated aerial lift unsafe for such tasks was attempting to install television cable where overgrown oak trees blocked the view of the 7,200 V powerline. With his obstructed view, he did not see the mid-span powerline, and died when the lift contacted it. See A-42 This is an example of the electric-cooperative failing to clear the powerline of brush before leasing their poles to a cable company creates a condition inherently dangerous for any use.

98.06.22

In a very cramped construction site, a crane operator was rotating raised cable straps in an unmarked danger zone near a powerline to avoid hitting other equipment. The crane cables contacted the 7,200 V powerline and the electricity transferred from the crane to the wire-encased hose of a drill rig that was dropped over one of the crane’s outriggers. The drill operator was killed and another worker was injured. See A-43 This case is an example of where an insulated link could have saved a life. As a further preventative, the area could have been mapped on the ground with barriers or with tape to identify that it was a dangerous area that a crane should not be rotated into.

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98.12.00

MacCollum David V., “More on the Nature of Safe Design Profits” Hazard Information Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 9 This article performs a sample cost-benefit analysis on an unidentified product hazard in order to create an illustrative model of the real cost of a hazard. According to the model, the cost of lawsuits, recalls, and legal fees of an unchecked hazard could quadruple the initial cost per unit of the entire production of the particular product, resulting in a loss of money for the manufacturer and anyone else responsible for the hazard. The cost of fixing a hazard is substantially cheaper and much more prudent than assuming that the unsafe product can be defended in court for a lesser amount. The responsible manufacturer is rewarded by increased reliability, higher profit, and a product record.

1999

ANSI/SIA A92.6 (for Self-propelled elevating work platforms) 4.6.2: “Lower controls shall be readily accessible from the ground level and shall: 1) override upper controls for powered functions. 2) Be provided for all type of powered functions except drive and steering. 3) Be of the type that automatically return to the “off” or neutral position when released. 4) Be protected against activation other than that initiated by the operator. 5)Be clearly marked.” Note: Conspicuously absent in these standards is a clause to prevent the ground operator from receiving a shock from a ground fault current if one tries to control the lift while it is contacting a powerline. To prevent shocking a ground operator, ground controls should be located so the operator can not reach them when standing on the ground.

99.12.27

A worker lost three limbs when guiding a concrete bucket to pour concrete into a wastewater channel that ran in easements along the path under powerlines. Most likely, this job could have been accomplished without the use of boomed equipment such as a front-end loader, thus eliminating the constant danger of live lines overhead. See A-44 This case exemplifies first how the design of the waterway was in an unsafe location, and how a lack of construction safety planning places the workman in serious harm’s way. A plan detailing alternate methods of concrete placement should have been in the specifications. There is no excuse to tempt danger with boomed equipment in the vicinity of powerlines when the job could be easily accomplished without boomed equipment. Planning is the key to any successful job endeavor.

99.12.29

Affidavit of James R. Andrews, State of Illinois, County of St. Clair Nine years after the death of the worker listed in the case in Appendix A-21, former employee of Fred Weber, Inc (a freeway construction contractor) states that his belief in the safety provided by proximity warning devices continues to increase. As the retired Vice President Safety and Health of Fred Weber, Inc., James Andrews was responsible for the installation of the safety devices, and positively testified to the usefulness and necessity of these appliances for the case listed in Appendix A-27. Note: At the time of this study there have been no powerline contacts at his company since the devices were installed on 15 cranes in 1990. To date this approximates almost 210 crane years of preventing powerline contacts with audible warning devices.

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2000

ANSI/ASME B30.5: Mobile and Locomotive Cranes This issue, In section 5-1.6 Controls, and all prior issues have no design suggestions to limit the hazard of electrical current flow through the body. Standards should conform to reduce this aspect of powerline contact by prohibiting: ♦ Controls that are accessible to the operator standing on the ground. ♦ Remote controls using an electric cable tether that allows the operator to stand on the ground, Section 5-3.4.5.3 suggests the use of non-conductive taglines to further isolate the individuals guiding the load from the flow of electric current through them in the event of powerline contact. Figure 17(a) of section 5-3.4.5.3(c) is an excellent description of where all cranes should be located in relationship to powerlines. It clearly illustrates placement of the crane where it cannot reach the danger zone (see Illustration I).

00.04.11

Excerpt of the deposition of John H. Crowley (Circuit Court of Buchanan County, State of Missouri, division 4, # CV 398-2925 CC) Pg. 59, Ln 8- A [Crowley]: The syllabus, to my knowledge, secondhand knowledge, included information related to closed cases. Q: Now—and we know about the reports of – the accident reports were sent directly to Lord, Bissell & Brook? A: Yes Q: Do you know personally why a separate repository is maintained at Lord, Bissell, & Brook? [defense council: objection] A: I don’t know all the reasons why that is the case. Q: Is it true that the membership of MADDDC told you they wanted it that way? A: Yes Q: Did the membership tell you why they wanted it that way? A: No. Q: In your work with the technical and safety committee of MADDDC, did Lord, Bissell, & Brook ever provide you with any reports or summaries of accidents or incidents on aerial devices and digger derricks to share with the membership? [defense council: objection] A: I was never provided with any direct information for me to give to MADDDC engineering technical safety committee. Note: Until the committee’s council shares their hazard data the development of hazard prevention design features or the use of safety appliances will continue to be dangerously hindered and continue to expose workers to unequal protection.

00.05.02

After dark, a news van raised its antenna in a parking lot after doing a spot check for overhead wires. The area surrounding the van was lit and created a glare that made it virtually impossible to see the 7,200 V wires that the mast contacted, seriously injuring two people. See A-45 As exemplified from the previous cases, mast powerline contact on ENG vans is a growing, serious epidemic. The tragedy of this fact is that passing simple legislation to use the technology that has already been available for at least 20 years could easily rectify it.

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00.05.19

Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project, Jefferson Parish, L: Construction Solicitation and Specifications IFB # DACW29-00-B-0069 3l) Cranes: The Contractor shall have cage boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices on cranes that will be working adjacent to powerlines. These devices shall not alter the requirements of any other regulation of this parteven if law or other regulation requires such a device.

00.05.17

Expert Witness Report: Dr. George G. Karady (District Court, Jefferson County, 13th district, Texas, #D-157188) Dr. Karady illustrates how and why safety devices such as insulated links installed on cranes are invaluable in preventing injuries.

00.05.22

The slight slope of a driveway caused the mast of a news van to tip just to contact the 3,200 V powerline. The plastic antenna dish caught fire and melted, causing a ground fault. A anchor news casting lady lost one arm, one leg, the other foot and fingers on her hand when she was told the van was on fire and attempted to escape See A-46 The only pattern to present here is that this is a category of injuries and deaths that should not have happened. This is the fifth preventable ENG van mast raised into a powerline causing the loss of parts of all four limbs listed in the timeline.

00.06.01

A worker was electrocuted when he used a crane to move necessary construction equipment stored mid-span under a 7,200 powerline. Further investigation revealed that the electric utility company was aware of the practice of storing construction materials underneath live lines but made no attempt to move the equipment or relocate the powerlines. The worker had been given no instruction on how to identify or map a danger zone, and was most likely unaware of the danger. See A-47 This case again illustrates how materials should not be stored under powerlines, and utility easements should prohibit this practice.

00.06.17

The city had recently received a grant to restore an old building. An eighteen year old worker was provided an uninsulated lift to retouch the mortar when the lift touched a 7,200 V powerline located three feet from the wall. Because the city did not turn off the power from the municipal electric company that it owned, the boy is a quadriplegic who breathes through a ventilator. The grant architect should have included a requirement to bury the powerlines. See A-48 This case shows the complete absence of a concern for safety by the city management team who oversaw this project. The employer who rented the boomed equipment procured equipment unsafe and unfit for the project, and they completely disregarded the ten foot clearance rule. The aerial lift company, who was aware of where it was intended to be used, should have refused rental to an incompetent employer. The powerlines should have been buried before anyone thought about painting the eroded mortar between bricks.

00.07.14

While building a flood-control pond out of concrete, a concrete finisher was killed when the boom of a pumpcrete truck contacted a 7,200 V powerline mid-span. The truck was positioned behind a tree, obscuring the view of the powerlines, and the deceased was forced to work in a position with his back to the boom while directing the flow of concrete. See A-49 First, this case shows a complete disregard for the lives and safety of others, when the settling pond was designed underneath powerlines that should have been relocated. This case also fully illustrates that the use of pumpcrete machines must be positioned where the radius of the boom is always outside the danger zone created by the power company (see illustration of 1986 of the Danger Zone). 70

2001

Nietzel, Richard L.; Siexas, Noah S.; Ren, Kyle K., “A Review of Crane Safety in the Construction Industry” Applied Occupational and Industrial Hygiene, Vol. 16(12): 1106-1117 This article provides an oversight and statistical review of crane safety hazards and methods that can counter them. It recognizes crane hazards as among the most severe in the construction industry: “Although the majority (87%) of crane-related deaths occur among workers other than crane operators, the number of operator fatalitieswhile low when considered in terms of absolute numbers- is tremendous when the relatively small population of operators is considered… The 1996 OSHA study of 502 crane fatalities identified the leading causes of death as electrocution (39%)...” On anti-current devices: “Testing has shown these [insulated] links to be highly effective, even when contaminated with mud and other substances, although contamination does cause some breakdown in their insulating properties. Proximity alarms can be very effective in pick-and-carry operations… While these devices provide a secondary means of preventing cranes from becoming energized, and should be used wherever feasible, they must not be used as a primary method for avoiding powerlines.”

2001

Homace, G.T.; Crawley, J.C. (Senior Member, IEEE); Yenchek, M.R. (Senior Member, IEEE); Sacks, H.K. (Member, IEEE), “An Alarm to Warn of Overhead Power Line Contact by Mobile Equipment” Paper presented to NIOSH This article focuses on the development of an alarm that sounds during equipment powerline contact in the mining industry, stating that “Even when excluding injuries that occur during electrical maintenance work, over one fourth of electrical fatalities in the mining industry are due to accidental overhead line contacts, and for each fatality nearly two serious non-fatal injuries occur due to such contacts. In incidents involving high-reaching mobile equipment, many of the victims touched the equipment after the fact, unaware that the machine frame had become energized by the line contact. MSHA data for accidents involving overhead powerline contacts in the mining industry between 1980 and 1997 reveal that in 57% of the cases personnel were unaware of the accidental line contact until one or more workers touched the equipment or a hoisted load and were injured. ...This suggests that a device that alerts workers when a powerline has been contacted could help prevent many of these injuries.” Note: While injuries may be prevented with this device, it is totally ineffective in the prevention of powerline contact. Incident prevention is the only way to assure fewer injuries and decreased liability. However, a similar article appears at 02.04.01 of this timeline in order to offer more information and allow the reader to reach individual conclusions.

2001

ANSI/SIA 92.2 (Vehicle-Mounted Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices) 4.3.3: “Lower controls shall be readily accessible and shall provide for overriding the boom positioning upper controls provided the upper control system is intact. The override mode shall maintain its function while unattended.” Note: In 2001 the standards were still not revised to incorporate a non-conductive ground control system. It is especially important to have isolated non-conductive parts on the total parts of all aerial equipment.

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2001 Q1

MacCollum, David V., “Hazard Prevention Engineering” Journal of System Safety Among other points, this article urges people to closely examine the cost-benefit analysis of system safety. This article contains many strong arguments regarding the financial soundness of hazard prevention engineering, including the benefit to the taxpayer in the loss of workers’ compensation claims. Powerline contacts are an example of hazards recounted.

01.09.10

The hoist line of a crane killed the worker guiding the load around cars in a pick and carry operation. The employer took no real safety precautions, as he assumed the 1,200 V powerlines were easy to avoid. See A-50 This case clearly shows that the exclusive remedy of the workers’ compensation laws, removes the active participation of the employer in ensuring for a safe workplace.

01.11.30

“Hazard Analysis of Unintentional Raising of a Pneumatic Mast of an Electronic News Gathering Van into Powerlines” The Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. study (forwarded to the state of California Industrial Safety Board) The study gives a brief history of boomed equipment powerline contact and its successful preventative measures, including the failure of the thin air clearance and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization service’s utilization of proximity warning devices on their trucks in 1983. It also provides a list of ENG van manufacturers who offer equipment with a proximity alarm and a list of television stations that have installed alarms on their van fleet. It also uses extensive appendixes, including a list of ENG Van Mast powerline contacts. (see timeline) Recommendations “to prevent serious injury or death from unintentional raising of pneumatic masts on ENG vans into overhead powerlines and reliable control this hazard” are as follows: 1.

“ Provide and install an electric (electrostatic) field detector to prevent the mast from being raised when the ENG van is parked under or immediately adjacent to overhead powerlines. Such detector should also prevent the mast from being raised until the van is positioned at least thirty feet lateral distance from the powerline. Further, the manufacturer shall certify installation is calibrated and locked into adjustment for that particular van to ensure that the mast cannot be activated when the ENG van is parked under powerline or immediately adjacent to them.”

2.

“For failsafe redundancy, insulating materials should be incorporated in the design of accessories that are mounted on the top of the pneumatic mast to prevent current flow in excess of five (5) milliamps when contact is made with 7,500-volt powerlines.”

3.

“Training needs to include (a) a summary of previous injuries due to inadvertent raising of pneumatic masts on ENG vans into powerlines, (b) the propensity for error-provocative circumstances during the use of ENG vans and (c) the need for proven safety accessories on ENG vans as standard equipment.”

Note: On May 10, 2002, this information was Package submitted to Jere W. Ingram: Chairman, Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board for the State of California, regarding the discussion on whether to change Title 8 of the California Code for republications concerning Electronic News Gathering Vans. By providing the State of California a copy of this study, HIFI hoped the rules to provide equal life saving protection for users of ENG vans would be adopted. .

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02.02.05

Contracting firm H.B. Zachry (San Antonio, TX) informed Doyle Peeks of Craneaccidents.com that they are installing SigAlarm™ on over 200 of their cranes. Note: To date, Zachry has completed 400 accident-free crane years since the safety appliances were installed.

02.04.01

Homace, Gerald T.; Crawley, James C.; Sacks, H. Kenneth; Yenchek, Michael R.; “Heavy Equipment Near Overhead Power Lines?” Engineering and Mining Journal This article focuses on solutions to the hazard of powerline contact, stating that “Earlier studies point out that while training solutions are often suggested for electrical hazards, the intervention effort must shift toward engineering control solutions ‘to reduce the hazard at its source.’ Subsequent studies suggest that a change in the attitude of behavioral scientists is slowly occurring, placing greater emphasis on engineering control solutions.” The article then advocates the development of a device that sounds an alarm when the equipment or vehicle contacts a powerline, warning personnel to stay in the vehicle or move away. Use of this device, the article states, will reduce injuries by powerline contact. Note: A reason for industry rejection of an insulated link stated in the above article was the fact that not all workers are protected by it. Likewise, few workers would have the opportunity to be protected by this device, either. It appears to the authors of this study that this device nullifies the concept of powerline contact prevention, as it provides no opportunities to prevent such incidents from occurring.

03.09.01

“Crane Accident Kills Three” A mere highlight on a page mentions the incident that cost three more construction workers their lives. The crane operator was backing up on an incline and became entangled in a powerline, was thrown or fell from the crane, and two other workers, not knowing the crane was electrified, died when they rushed to his aid. This report gives no details on the crane manufacturer or other specifics, prohibiting the reader from accurately gauging the identity of the real culprit.

03.10-11

“Readers’ Choice Award” Lift Applications and Equipment InsulatUS™ Load Insulator was mentioned in the awards for its resistance to extreme temperatures and black box system that acts like a computer and self-tests the link, records any contacts and their external conditions, and emits audible warnings if the unit is not working properly.

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03.11.03

Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.11: Before initiation of work at the job site, an APP with appropriate appendices written in English by the Prime Contractor for the specific work and hazards of the contract and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements for this manual- will be reviewed and found acceptable by the GDA. (a) The plan will be developed by qualified personnel and will be signed in accordance with Appendix A.1. The contractor shall be responsible for documenting the qualified person’s credentials. (b) On contract operations, the Contractor’s plan will be job-specific and will include work to be performed by subcontractors and measures to be taken by the Contractor to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment provided by suppliers. -11.E.01 (b): All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability to encroach on the clear distances specified in 11.E.04 (0-50kV- 3m, 51-200kV-4.5m) 11.H.12 (b): Materials and equipment shall not be stored under energized bus, energized lines, or near energized equipment if it is possible to store them elsewhere. If materials or equipment must be stored under energized lines or near energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 11-3] and extraordinary caution shall be exercised in maintaining these clearances when operating equipment or moving materials near such energized equipment. (c): Tag lines shall be of a non-conducting type when used near energized lines.

03.11.05

Associated Press, www.mlive.com Two workers were killed and a third injured in St Clair Shores, MI when a crane touched a powerline on a house construction site.

03.11.26

Bugbee, John, Evening Sun, www.eveningsun.com/cda/article/print/o,1674,140%7E9956%7E1792523,00.html A worker in South Grove, VA was electrocuted while preparing to sandblast and paint a cement plant. The worker was using the ground controls to position an aerial lift when it contacted a nearby powerline. This incident directly echoes case A-39 in the timeline and reinforces the idea that emergency lift controls are dangerous when they are positioned in a place accessible to a worker standing on the ground.

03.11.28

Husty, Denes III, [email protected], “Construction Accident Kills Worker” news-press.com A construction worker belonging to a crew moving cement pipes to be installed along a road was electrocuted when a backhoe contacted a power pole, causing live lines to fall. The accident happened in North Naples at 8am.

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04.01.15

“ ‘Red Zones’ for Cranes Near Powerlines Discussed by OSHA Rulemaking Committee” News: Occupational Safety and Health, Vol. 34, No.3 This article relates the details of meetings that have taken place to amend the national construction safety rules to try to reduce crane injuries. “As discussed by the committee, employers would be required to follow strict safety requirements in a so-called red zone when the crane or is load were within a certain number of feet from a powerline….. The committee, which includes employers, union representatives, and crane manufacturers, set out strategies for what safety precautions would be required and got agreement on them.” “Noah Connell, the OSHA representative on the committee, said Jan. 12 that under the proposal discussed, and employer would be required to do certain things if the cranes load or load line were within a certain specific distance from a powerline, although there was no final agreement on what that distance ought to be.” The committee also discussed creating a yellow zone, an area where the crane or part of a load might intrude into the red zone: “Committee members discussed what would be required of crane operators and employees in the various zones. Suggestions included requiring an insulating link to stop the flow of electricity, a proximity warning device that sounds an alarm when near a power line, or a dedicated spotter using visual aid. The committee supported the idea of requiring insulating links in the red zone “Connell said that requiring the use of some kind of visual aid is related to the fact that it is difficult for the human eye to judge the distance between a power lie at height and a crane boom. Visual aids could include a line on the ground to represent a certain distance from the power line, or a rope with flags on it to indicate to the crane operator and workers when the crane is getting close to the power line.” Note: This discussion is current, as crane and construction safety continues to be an issue of importance.

04.11.00

MacCollum, David V., “Crane Safety on Construction Sites”, Chapter 18, Construction Safety Management and Engineering, American Society of Safety Engineers This paper discusses the ineffectiveness of “Thin Air” clearances and how the hazards of powerline contact should be removed before the workmen and crane arrive on the work site.

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ILLUSTRATION I: WARNING LABEL

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ILLUSTRATION II: DANGER ZONE DIAGRAM

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ILLUSTRATION III: AERIAL BASKET GUARD

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EXPERT COMMENTS: PARTICIPATING ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS 1. Jack Ainsworth 2. David Baker 3. Robert Dey 4. George Karady 5. Ben Lehman 6. Melvin Myers 7. Jeff Speer 8. John van Arsdel January 2, 2004

Memorandum For: David MacCollum From: Jack D. Ainsworth Subject: Peer Review Comments on HIFI Report: Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contacts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment, December 2003.

My comments on subject report stem from experience throughout a 35+ year career as an engineer, and manager of engineering efforts in the military environments. Not only has that experience dealt with designing safe electronic systems and safe working environments for subordinate engineers, it dealt with providing a secure environment for sensitive information in a highly technical information technology world. My comments introduce the concept of providing several layers of safety, overlapping sometimes, but integrated to provide an even higher degree of overall safety, a concept I have chosen to call “Safety in Depth,” then culminating with a specific application of one of those layers of safety from which I have personal knowledge and involvement. Safety in Depth As with most situations in today’s environment, establishing and maintaining a safe working environment for industrial workers is a complex issue. Typically no one measure will address and ensure worker safety. The information technology (IT) industry discovered that protecting information as it is being recorded, as it is being transported, as it is being stored for future use, cannot be accomplished through only one initiative. IT coined a phrase, “Security in Depth,” as a way to acknowledge the complexity of the information security problem. Information is protected from disclosure, unauthorized manipulation, unauthorized modification, through more than one capability. In effect protection of the information is provided much like layering of an onion – each layer providing is own unique protection. Worker safety is improved when several initiatives are employed. Initiatives come from several different sources, such as: Management; Training; Contract Terms; Equipment. Contract Terms is addressed in the report annex by Mr. Robert Dey. The other aspects I address below. Management A .Management’s perspective and focus about a safe work environment sets the tone for all. When management takes a positive, proactive position about safety, employees at all levels notice that perspective and they reflect a corresponding respect for safe work practices also. If management is lax and portrays no interest in safe work practices, workers at all levels follow a lax attitude also. Some of the initiatives management can endorse for providing a safe work environment include providing safe equipment, providing safety equipment, providing training on proper, safe operation of equipment whether is be new to the inventory or existing, and

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providing a continuing safety training program to remind and refocus workers upon the safe work objective. Training A.

Employees at all levels of an organization should be provided training on safety. They should be acquainted with safety through classes which teach safe work habits. Safe work habits include the proper and respected operation of equipment and tools used at the job site. Training on safe work habits will be reflected through the practice of safe work habits on and around the work site. The training may require reinforcement by on-site managers and supervisors who correct unsafe situations and compliment safe conduct. A sound training program will also teach the proper utilization of safety equipment provided by employer.

Equipment A number of physical capabilities are available in the market place to enhance the safe working conditions of equipment. Some of these are listed and discussed below. A.

Insulated tag lines – Tag lines are typically used to stabilize a payload from rotation when it is being moved one location to another by a lifting crane of similar piece of equipment. Since the ends of the tag lines are held by workers who are making contact with earth, an electrical ground, the tag lines offer an opportunity to complete an electrical circuit whenever the boom or the lifting cable of the crane, or the payload makes contact with overhead power lines. The consequence is usually electrocution of the workers holding the tag lines. As a safety measure, insulated tag lines break the electrical circuit and provide the workers safety from the electrocution hazard.

B.

Insulated Boom Sections – In a similar manner, nonconductive sections of the lifting boom can be employed to serve as an insulating link in the hazard of the electrical circuit provided contact is made such that the insulating properties are employed as intended. If contact occurs in the region of the lifting cable however, workers on the ground holding tag lines quite possibly will not be protected. Both insulated boom sections and insulated tag lines would be necessary to provide the essential protection from electrocution – an example of “Safety in Depth.”

C.

Insulated Links – By electrically separating the boom section and lifting cable from the payload, tag lines, and ground workers, a safe work environment can be established to protect ground workers from hazardous contact of the crane with overhead power lines.

D.

Insulated Sleeves – Under most conditions, electrical power lines should be de-energized before work begins wherein contact with the lines by service equipment such as a lifting crane or boom truck is possible. In such situations, installing insulating sleeves is a

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practice which offers protecting from the possible accidental contact with service equipment and the completion of an electrical circuit. Installation of insulating sleeves must follow very careful procedures to protect the installers from possible electrocution. The use of insulated work platforms such a fiberglass buckets (see next) adds to the safety of such practices. E.

Insulated Work Platforms (Bucket) – Bucket trucks permit workers to elevate to a position to service established overhead power lines. The work platform is made of fiberglass, a material which is non-conductive to electrical current, thereby providing the workers with a safe work environment. Contact of the bucket or the workers with energized power lines does not complete an electrical circuit, and present the electrocution hazard. Buckets must be carefully maintained to preserve the nonconductive properties of the fiberglass.

F.

Slew Limiters – Limiting the amount of rotation possible by the boom can also add to the in-depth aspect of a safe work environment. In this case, the extent a the boom can rotate can be limited by limit switches so that the boom is prevented from entering the hazardous zone of the energized power lines. This will require a pre-work safety zone survey to define where the limits are to be established.

G.

. Proximity Sensors – Electrical sensing equipment is available in the marketplace to sense the presence of energized power lines. This equipment takes advantage of the physics applicable to electricity to determine when an energized power line is in the operating proximity. These sensors provide visual and audible alerts to notify the operator of a crane or boom truck of the close proximity of an electrical hazard. When fully integrated into the control system of a crane or boom truck, a proximity sensor can cause the halt of moving the boom or crane into the hazard zone.

H.

Installation of SIGALARM

In the mid-1980’s, while managing and supervising an engineering evaluation facility for the US Army, I was asked to develop a prototype Border Patrol Night Surveillance Vehicle. Attributes of the vehicle were to be able to deploy in a high aerial position, payloads which could detect the presence of humans entering the borders of the United States on foot, but not through one of the controlled entry positions. The concept of operation was to raise a sensing device such as an infrared camera or a closed-circuit television camera to a height of about 40 to 50 feet and permit agents in the vehicle to monitor an area for presence of suspect individuals. All equipment, devices and capabilities must be from commercially available sources if at all possible. A. Design considerations included stabilizing the vehicle in uneven terrain to prevent possible roll-over, interchangeability of the payload, overall weight of the vehicle. Since the vehicle was to usually be deployed during night time hours, protection of the equipped vehicle and

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operators from accidental contact with aerial power lines must be accommodated. It is this last mentioned attribute which is of significance in this discussion. B. The operational concept for the vehicle was: a.) Outriggers were deployed from each of the four corners of the vehicle to stabilize and level the operating platform; b.) The pneumatic mast, stored in a horizontal position inside the vehicle during transport, was rotated into a vertical position; and c.) The pneumatic mast was pressurized to raise the surveillance payload to the fully deployed position. C. As system engineers concerned with all aspects of the development, we quickly recognized a hazard potential that the mast and payload could be deployed into energized overhead power lines, especially since normal operation was under nighttime conditions. Research of the marketplace identified a device manufactured by SIGALARMTM which detected the electrostatic presence of electrical hazards such as overhead power lines. Since the device detected the presence of electrostatic source, a beneficial by-product was the ability to detect the possibility of a lightning strike, a condition not uncommon in the southwest United States during parts of the year. The SIGALARMTM was fully integrated into the control system of the surveillance vehicle to that the detection of an electrostatic source in the area would either prevent erection of the pneumatic mast to deploy the payload to its operating position, or if erection was initiated, the process would be terminated and the mast returned to the vertical resting position.

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POWERLINE CONTACTS BY MOBILE CRANES

There are several measures that if implemented would reduce overhead powerline contacts from mobile cranes and other equipment possessing the capability to reach energized powerlines. Some of these are pro-active actions and some are regulatory reactions. In any case the results of any effort to reduce these contacts will be directly related to the effort, or lack of, from the various management entities involved. This includes both the business operating the exposed equipment and the local electrical utility.

Regulatory statutes and enforceable standards are usually established as a last resort. If all else fails, get the government involved. That has been the past practice. This is not to say that these agencies are bad. OSHA and in many cases the state corporation or public utility commissions have had a positive effect on reducing overhead powerline contacts. The problem is that in order for someone to follow the rules they must know the rules. Arizona has an “Overhear Powerline Law” and all electrical contacts with energized overhead powerlines must be reported to the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC). The ACC then requires the offending company to send its exposed employees to an “Electrical Safety Class” given by the electrical utility that experienced the contact. The thought process is that this will eliminate future contacts from the same company. It does have some effect on those employees who may stay with that company for a period of time. But, the key is to educate as many exposed individuals as possible prior to any unfortunate and potentially deadly contact.

Most electrical utilities currently do, or in the past have, conducted electrical safety programs within their respective school systems. These proactive programs are usually directed at fourth or fifth grade classes. The students are intrigued by the potential for disaster and damage an electrical contact can produce. The message to “Stay Away” is usually learned. In regard to the adult worker this same approach can be effective if the “Electrical Safety Classes” are designed

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to cover three general areas; how to prevent an overhead contact, what to do if you experience an overhead contact, what outcome can you expect from an overhead contact. As with any learning exercise the use of real scenarios is encouraged. The phrase “Don’t do this or else!” is only effective when you utilize the “or else” to emphasize the key points.

The ability to properly educate the exposed workers is, as stated earlier, a function of management. The equipment operators must seek assistance and the local electrical utilities must actively pursue those who are exposed. One of the more effective methods of mating the two groups is through trade associations. Most of these associations are renowned for offering safety classes for either no or a nominal fee. Companies like this economic approach. Participation in these associations also provides a conduit for the electrical utilities to reach a large audience of potential energized powerline contactors.

“Safety Days” or similar annual programs are held by a variety of groups. Some are unique to a particular company while others may be conducted by local government agencies and once again the trade associations. These activities offer ample opportunities to reach exposed workers and other individuals. The state “One-Call” centers, Blue-Stake in Arizona, usually offer free training for everyone. As a stake holder in these centers the local electric utilities can easily become involved in these exercises. Some communities hold shows for construction equipment. These are a prime candidate for educational classes. It is easy to convince smaller companies to hold annual Christmas or Holiday functions with an Electrical Safety program included in the festivities.

All regulatory required clearance distances, all no entry zones, all company safe work procedures, all corporate safety manuals, all insulating devices, all warning devices, and any other method of controlling contact with energized electrical powerlines are of no use unless the personnel who are exposed to these energized sources are also educated in the proper application

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and use of the safety methods listed. Although education is key, the management of each company is still responsible for insuring that their employees adhere to these protections. From the electric utility perspective, involvement in educational activities that help to reduce the potential for loss of life, human pain and suffering, damage to others property, damage to company equipment, customer outages, and adverse public opinion can only be positive.

David B. Baker Safety Supervisor, Tucson Electric Power Risk and Business Services Mail Stop SC214 P.O. Box 711 Tucson, AZ 85702 [email protected]

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December 10, 2003

Memo for Dave MacCollum From: Robert Dey Subject: Peer Review Comments on HIFI Report: Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contacts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment, December 2003. My comments are based upon experience throughout a period of 45 years as a manager of construction in both military and commercial environments, representing the interests of both an owner and a general contractor at different times. I have contracted for engineering design and construction services, and have supervised both design and construction throughout my career. In my reading of the subject report, I focused primarily on the Voluntary Goals and Guidelines (Hazard Prevention Options, Part II). I found these specific suggested practices to be sensible and competent, and their adoption and use would serve to eliminate accidents related to powerline contacts. Having said that, there is a major issue unresolved regarding major construction projects, namely, how to assure such safe practices actually are used on a project. To resolve this issue requires an examination of the contractual processes that control a construction site, how such contracts evolve, and who is empowered to enforce the contract provisions. Without an effective implementation strategy, the best goals and guidelines will be lost in the normal process of project development, and the deaths and injuries will continue. As background, we must consider the normal process of planning, designing, and constructing a project. Importantly, an owner may (and normally does) contract with different business entities for the three separate phases of this process. An Architect Engineer accomplishes the initial planning, defining the concepts, constraints and scope of design needed to satisfy the owner's requirement. The detailed design work then proceeds to produce drawings, specifications, and estimates of cost and time required to construct the facility, including the documents needed to procure construction services ("contract documents"). This detailed design may be completed by the originating A/E firm, or, (increasingly) it may be re-competed and performed by another engineering design firm. In either case, the designer then either hands over the contract documents to the owner for them to contract directly with a constructor, or the engineering firm or a construction management firm performs this as a professional service for the owner. An important concept must be raised at this point. While many engineers and contractors are self motivated to work safely and prevent accidents, many are not. We cannot assume safety, or rely on sound safety practices occurring during the design or construction phases of a project unless it is covered in the contracts between the owner and the firms providing services. Even then, we

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cannot rely on a contract being enforced unless there is incentive to do so. This is the real world of the construction industry. Now to combine the concepts discussed above, I want to go back to the process by which contracts are produced. The terms of a contract between an owner and A/E, designer, or contractor are normally drafted and proffered by the engineering professionals. In other words, the A/E firm will offer a contract form for use by an owner in obtaining planning and design services. Likewise, the final designer will develop contract provisions and specifications for use in procuring (contracting for) construction. These contracts tend to be "cut and paste" throughout the industry, with time- and court-tested versions passed around for use in contracts worldwide. These versions generally are not adequate to assure a safe jobsite. Here's why. Unfortunately, unless an owner intervenes and insists on emphasizing certain aspects such as safety, he will tend to get the standard "plain vanilla version" of a contract, including a safety program for his project. Furthermore, as engineers and architects act in their own self interest, the safety burden will generally get dumped on the constructor, ignoring the preventive design and planning responsibilities of the engineering firms involved. Most specs developed by engineering firms will simply require the constructor to submit a safety plan as a deliverable. There may be no standards for such a plan, and no realistic requirement to implement it. Further, quite often there is no requirement for the plan to define responsibilities for control of jobsite safety (who's in charge?). In this type of project scenario, the chance of HIFI's guidelines for avoiding power line contact being incorporated into the design and construction contracts are very slim. In order to avoid financial penalties from death and injury, and to prevent such tragedy from the standpoint of simple respect for the lives of our countrymen, I submit that ALL the parties involved in the design/construct process must do the following: " Start the job safety plan from the beginning by insisting it be a requirement in the very first contract between the Owner and the A/E for concept planning. The intent is to pass this plan on as a requirement to the designer, who will further develop it during design with special attention to designing and planning the job in such a way as to eliminate hazards so the constructor will not have to deal with them. Here is a sample spec I developed for use by a client owner for the initial planning work on a major rail project: Design for Safety. Consultant will consider designs and processes that enable the elimination or control of hazards to persons and property during the construction and operation of the planned facilities. Consultant will submit a plan to the Contracting officer within 45 days of NTP that describes Consultant’s process of integrating professional safety engineering, construction safety, and rail operations advice into the design process. Documentation of the results of this plan will be a required deliverable to assure continuity of safe design into the final design process (PS&E).

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• Assure this initial safety plan is fully developed in turn by the final designer such that it can be incorporated directly into the contract documents that form the basis for contracting with the constructor. This project safety plan will pass on to the contractor two very important things. First, it will detail the planner's and the designer's safety considerations that have been incorporated into the design, especially those that involve a construction process that contains or has eliminated a hazard. Secondly, the plan will set standards for the required constructor's safety plan, including such standards as those described by HIFI for avoiding powerline contact. In other words, it will require that the constructor deal with safety issues such as subcontractor safety, responsibility on the jobsite, hazard elimination, and other known issues. Such a safety plan will be an enforceable part of the contract, empowering the construction manager to act decisively to enforce the sound safety standards that are set out in the plan. A strong unambiguous contract is a must for good safety. Once a construction manager and/or contractor is saddled with a weak contract, he is almost powerless to deal effectively with safety or any other issue on the job. Without starting a safety plan during the design, and assuring that proper safety standards such as those suggested by HIFI are set and enforced, there is virtually no chance that the construction process will consistently and reliably police itself to avoid death and injury. Owner management is key to preventing injury, damage, and loss of life, and it is clearly in their financial and humane interests to do so. The other parties to the process (professional engineering and planning, and constructor management) can also be enlisted to support a continuum of effective safety planning and execution for a project, however the likelihood of their doing so without owner support is small. Labor and safety advocates must help create this environment by working in concert with engineers and constructors to carry this message throughout the industry. The payoff in terms of lives and dollars saved is enormous, and it's… "the right thing to do".

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Insulating Link George G Karady The most frequent accident scenario is when a crane works dangerously close to a high voltage line and the crane load line touches the high voltage conductor and produces a short circuit. The short circuit current electrocutes workers handling the load. Fig 1 shows the typical accident scenario. Crane line contact

Arrows show typical current path

Tiers flashover

Fig 1 typical crane accident scenario This type of accident can be prevented by using insulating link. Insulating link description Fig 2 shows the concept of insulating link application on a crane. The insulating link is a glass fiber rod, which is inserted in the load line just above the hook. In case of a contact between the line and the crane the insulating link insulates the worker from the energized crane and prevents the accident.

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Boom Cage

Insulator Link

Figure 2. Concept of crane protection Figure 3 shows an insulating link made by Hirtzer in California. The link has metallic hardware used to insert the link into the crane line. The metallic hardware parts are insulated by fiberglass and other insulating material. The outer surface has water repellent coating. The manufacturer specifying the rated voltage of the link and tests each links about twice of this voltage. Also the permitted mechanical working load is specified for the link.

he

Figure 3. Typical example for insulator link (Hirtzer) Flashover probability Several measurements performed by different laboratories on insulator links were reviewed [2, 3, 4, 5, and 6]. The author of this report also performed tests on commercially available links at Arizona State University. Tests performed by Morgan, Ontario Hydro, and others show that the flashover voltage of the presently available insulated links is dramatically reduced when heavily contaminated. The

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same tests also indicate that the dry and wet flashover voltage remains high. As an example the report of Mr. Morgan [1] shows that the tested Miller and Hirtzer links withstand more than 57 kV in dry condition and more than 21 kV in wet conditions. The minimum flashover voltage under salt spray was 25 kV. Contamination caused insulator flashover is described in literature and is well understood. Dry contamination is usually non-conducting; therefore it has no effect on the flashover voltage. The insulator contamination causes flashover only when drizzling rain and fog slowly wet the insulator. A flashover in contaminated conditions requires the simultaneous occurrence of the following: 1. Contamination deposit on the link surface in the form of a thin layer (dust layer, mud or tar like deposit from roads, etc.) 2.

The insulated link wetted slowly by fog or drizzling light rain. Normal or heavy rain washes down the contaminant and eliminates the danger of flashover.

3.

The insulated link energized by an accident.

The simultaneous occurrence of these three events is rare. The contamination on a utility insulator surface is due to airborne deposit. The wind drives dust, cement powder, industrial exhaust, salt water and other pollutants to the insulator surface. The amount of pollution depends on the local atmospheric and other conditions. Relatively few places in the USA experience the heavy pollution used to test insulator links. Fig 4 exhibits the results of an industrial survey showing the distribution of insulator use at different contamination levels. 47% 36%

14%

7%

Figure 4. Distribution of insulator use at different contamination levels This figure indicates that only 7% of the insulators are operating in heavily contaminated conditions. Cranes are operating all over the USA. Therefore, it is prudent to assume that only 7-10% of the links are subjected to heavy pollution. Furthermore, the manufacturers require that the insulated links be regularly cleaned and maintained by the operator. Therefore, the build up of heavy contamination is unlikely. The most probable scenario is negligent dragging of the link in dust or mud. Experiments performed by ASU show that the rolling of an insulated link in dust or mud results in medium to light contamination. However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that 10% of the insulated links are heavily contaminated.

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The second criterion is the wetting of the insulators, which requires fog or light rain. A survey of an US meteorological report shows that the number of days with light rain or fog is about 8-90 per year. This number depends on the location. In Arizona, the number of foggy or light rainy days is significantly less than in Wyoming. Using the maximum (90 days) and minimum (8 days) values, the probability that the link will be wetted is between 8/365 = 2.19% to 90/365 = 24.6%. The probability that the link is heavily polluted and wetted simultaneously is 10% x 24.6% = 2.46% or less than 3%. This means that, the link will fail to provide protection only less than 3 times out of hundred (100) accidents. Crane to power line contacts, in the USA, cause about 300 fatal accidents yearly. The use of insulated links would reduce this number to 8-10. The results of this risk analysis re-enforces the conclusion that the insulating link improves crane safety and that failing to use insulating link, when a crane is working in the vicinity of a power line is negligent. Leakage current The wet insulating link conducts leakage current for a short period of time when the carne touches a high voltage line. The accident triggers the line protection, which typically switch of the within 4-10 cycles, which corresponds to a time 83-167 milliseconds. The worst case the protection operation is delayed when the line is de-energized less than 0.5 second. The clean or wet insulating links conduct less than 5 mA current when energized without flashover. ASU measured the leakage current of polluted insulating links [10]. The leakage current of a Hirtzer link 5T, 50kV, was 0,3 mA at 15kV and in wet and polluted condition the leakage current was 3.325mA at 1.5kV and 44.9mA at 30 kV. It can be concluded that the leakage current is less than 50mA below 30kV at light pollution. The international standard 479 IEC 1994 provides data on current effects on humans. The standard specifies four zones; AC 1, AC 2, AC 3 and AC 4. The first three zones the sinusoidal, 60Hz current has only transient temporally effects. Fig 5 and explanation is word by word copy of the IEC 479. “AC 1 Usually no reaction AC 2 Usually no harmful physiological effect AC 3 Usually no organic damage is expected. Like hood of cramp like muscular contractions and difficulty of breathing for duration of current flows more than 2s. Reversible disturbances of formation and conduction of impulses in the heart, including arterial fibrillation and transient cardiac arrest without ventricular fibrillation increasing with current and time. AC 4 Increasing with magnitude and time dangerous pahtophysiological effects such as cardiac arrest, berthing arrest and sever burns may occur in addition to the effects of zone AC 3. AC 4.1 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 5%. AC 4.2 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 50%. AC 4.3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing above 50%.

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Fig 5 Current effects on human being (copy from 479 IEC 1994) The measurement indicated less than 0.5 mA pollution at dry condition, when the link is energized to 15 kV voltage, this is in AC 1 zone, no harmful effect. The polluted link current was less than 50mA, when the link is energized to 30 kV voltage for less than 0.5 second, this is in AC 3, “Reversible disturbances of formation and conduction of impulses in the heart, including arterial fibrillation and transient cardiac arrest without ventricular fibrillation increasing with current and time”. At 15 kV the leakage current is about the half value, which practically eliminates the danger of deadly electrocution at distribution level. References H. B. Hamilton, J.D. Morgan, “Final Report on Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety Devices”, a report to Bucyus Eric Inc., 1982. J. Derald Morgan, Howard B. Hamilton, “Evaluation of Link for Safety Applications”, a report to R.O. Corporation and National Crane Company, 1982. J. Derald Morgan, “Evaluation of Insulated Links for Cranes”, unpublished test data prepared for Grove Manufacturing Inc. 1985, (Not reviewed). Martin N. Kaplan, “Test of Insulating Links Used on Cranes Under Field Conditions”, 1990. J. Derald Morgan, Howard B. Hamilton, “Insulating Devices for Cranes. Test Results”, manuscript containing the summary of tests performed in [1, 2, 3]. J. Derald Morgan, “Insulated Link and Standoff Evaluation for Grove Manufacturing Inc.”, A.B. Chance Test Laboratories, Centralia, Missouri, 1990. J. Derald Morgan, “Insulated Link Test Using IEC 507 Artificial Pollution Methods”, A.B. Chance Company, Centralia, Missouri, 1992. Ontario Hydro Report No. ET91-94-P, “Electrical Tests on Insulating Crane Links”, August 13, 1991.

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George G. Karady, “Efficiency of Insulating Links for Protection of Crane Workers”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 6, No 1, Jan. pp. 316-323, 1991. George G. Karady, “Test of Insulator Links”, report, Arizona State University, 1993. George G. Karady, Minesh Shah, D. Dumora, “Probabilistic Method to Assess Insulating Link Performance for Protection of Crane Workers”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. I 1, No 1, Jan. pp. 212 -323, 1996.

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Ben J. Lehman Rear Admiral [Engineering] US Navy Ret. Professional Engineer - President, MechElexTex Inc. David V. MacCollum, Chairman Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. P.O. BOX 3962 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636 Dear Mr. MacCollum: I have read your outline for a study of electrical power line contacts with great interest. As an expert consultant and witness in at least fifty electrical power line matters since 1976, I have found them to involve many types of equipment. One equipment with whose hazard of electrical injury I was very familiar was a type of recreational boat. The passengers in this type of boat could have been protected by known and economical means from the time of its original design. However, the argument against the use of protective devices included the "false sense of security theory" and apparently it had some influence. The use of the word "theory" is misleading. The argument is simply the hypothesis that persons who believe themselves to be protected by any device which decreases the probability of injury to themselves are more likely to expose themselves to situations involving that risk. I spent many hours in libraries trying to find reports of incidents in which this hypothesis was correct: I did not find any. On the contrary, I did find papers reporting psychologist’s efforts to validate the hypothesis: all concluded that it was incorrect. Both the major manufacturer of the type of sailboat involved in these mishaps and the standards and regulatory bodies concerned have taken action to reduced this risk of injury. As a result, so far as I know, there has been no litigation at all involving this product since the manufacturer’s last actions about 10 years ago Briefly, the use of a small catamaran boat having a higher aluminum mast than existed on previous boats of that size permitted contact between the mast and power lines in locations where such incidents had not occurred previously. The standards and regulations for the minimum height of electrical power lines over lakes, bodies of water, and launching sites did not require sufficient elevation. First, the standard was changed. While not legally required to, most power companies quickly raised their lines over water. Second, the manufacturer instituted an aggressive campaign to notify and educate the owners of existing boats about the hazard. Third, the manufacturer changed his design to include a protective device.

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These three actions have apparently eliminated injuries from this hazard. Similar actions by crane manufacturers and electric power utilities would be very likely to accomplish the same result. Original Signed Ben J. Lehman

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Melvin L. Myers, MPA 1293 Berkeley Road Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002-1517 February 23, 2004 David V. MacCollum Chairman, Board of Governor Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. (HIFI) P.O. Box 3902 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636-3962 Dear Mr. MacCollum: Powerline contact is a significant cause of death among construction as well as other workers, and I have had an opportunity to review a draft of your report entitled, Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contacts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment. I am in full agreement with the need and necessity for a “Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan” as presented in the report. The elimination of the hazard is possible and should be required on construction sites. Indeed, many sites such as industrial parks and housing develops are burying their electric lines, which eliminates the hazards. Likewise, this approach for burying (or relocating) power lines has become a recognized practice in industrial construction, such as by Jacobs Construction on their joint venture in the Spallation Neutron Source Project at Oakridge, Tennessee. The HIFI report addresses the improved technology (boring equipment) and approaches (underground mapping and pre-dig programs) that augment placing electrical lines underground. The elimination of the hazard as a first priority is consistent with engineering safety and public health approaches for controlling hazards. Fundamentally, this priority is to control the problem at the source as a first line of protection. In safety engineering, this means get rid of the possibility of electrical contact, and in industrial hygiene, it is to substitute the technology with something less dangerous. The second priority in engineering safety and public health is to place a barrier between the source of the hazard and the person at risk. In the report, distance is a barrier by relocating the overhead power line. Another barrier is the use of insulating guards to obstruct the path of current flow in case of an overhead power contact. This secondary line of protection must be used in anticipation of a power line contact that may arise during the transport of equipment or where lines are obscured by overcast days or other circumstances. The third line of protection in engineering safety and public health is to warn of the hazard. The use of the “Powerline Danger Zone” to mark the ground near overhead power lines is a

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recognized warning procedure, and the use of proximity warning devises is another approach to alert the crane operator to the nearby hazard of power lines. Every worker has a right to safe and healthful working conditions, and the duty to provide a worksite free of recognized hazards such as overhead power lines is placed upon the employer. However, the duty chain traces back to the sources of the hazard and its prevention: the planners of the project, the manufacturers and purveyors of the equipment used, and the utilities that place the power lines. No matter the line of protection provided, those planning and engaged in working with or near mobile-boomed equipment need training related to eliminating, guarding against, and warning of electrical power line contact. The use of a “Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan,” especially as related to controlling the problem at the source, is a necessary step in assuring that the worksite be free of the possibility of power line contact. Melvin L. Myers

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Jeff Speer 25 February 2004 P. O. Box 685 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636 Hazard Information Foundation Incorporated P.O. Box 3962 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636-3962 SUBJECT: Review of Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contracts by Mobile Cranes

This review of the “Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contracts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment” by Hazard Information Foundation Incorporated (HIFI) incorporates a system safety perspective at time facility and equipment design. The system safety process involves the application of engineering and management principles, criteria and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, recommend risk reduction techniques and document system hazards, which assist in optimizing all aspects of safety within the constraints of cost, schedule and design requirements throughout all phases of the system life cycle. The very nature of construction project activities can be considered a system since it involves a composite of people, procedures, materials, tools, equipment, facilities, software and design being used together in an environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific production, support, or project requirement. Incorporating the system safety process into construction project management and mobile crane operations will assist in maximizing the creation of a safer work environment and lessen the potential for power line contracts. The HIFI study uses both an extensive timeline with selected case studies to provide a systematic evaluation of the powerline contact hazard and control of the hazard. These design activities follow the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence (HRPS) used within system safety. There is an order of precedence that HRPS follows to satisfy system safety requirements and resolving identified hazards: design to eliminate hazard, design to reduce hazard, provide safety devices, provide warning devices, and provide special procedures and training. The most effective involves design to eliminate the hazard. Throughout the study, HIFI has shown the powerline contracts occurrence happen due to poor preplanning and reliance on “thin air clearances” (procedural control). In the ‘Recommendations’, the combination of ‘Organizational’ and ‘Managerial’ categories identified by HIFI reflect an understanding of how the principles of HRPS incorporated into effective Construction Safety Plan will eliminate the powerline hazard contact. . Elimination of overhead powerlines is the most effective means for reducing powerline contacts available to management to use. A key element identified in the HIFI study is the role played by various management levels, summarized in the ‘Recommendations’ under the category of ‘Managerial’. The incorporation of system safety principles within construction and facilities

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maintenance management programs allows examination of the interrelationship of all components within these programs, identified hazards and resolution, made available the management review process for automatic consideration in a total program or project perspective. It provides management with an effective means of identifying what hazard elements exist and means of implementing solutions to eliminate or control the hazard prior to requiring crane operations.

Another key element within system safety is the performance of hazard analyses, both during design but especially during the operational phases. As HIFI timeline illustrated, an evolution of a variety of engineering design elements, such as the insulated link and the electrostatic proximity alarm has occurred within the crane industry to increase operational safety. Accomplishment of hazard analyses allows identification of hazards, which will require resolution. HIFI has identified several elements, which need to become integral parts of an effective safety program, i.e. Powerline Contact Prevention Plan, providing a safe environment for crane operations. A planned and implemented safety program must integrate safety analyses with other factors to influence management decisions to ensure a safe work environment prior to the arrival of equipment and personnel. An important element within any safety program is feedback. Feedback allows for the verification of the implementation and effectiveness of hazard control and it can be iterative until the prevention of an incident or accident event successfully occurs. The HIFI study provides critical knowledge allowing the reader to learn from the various elements presented and to translate and implement this knowledge to any activities requiring crane operations to support or complete required tasks without an incident or accident occurrence. This study represents a system safety process and recommends implementation of a number of corrective actions before the task (crane operations) may proceed.

Original signed Jeff Speer System Safety Engineer

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Human Factors Perspective

The research study, with its Thirty (30) recommendations, addresses the frailties of the ten foot clearance rule, which is the current OSHA guideline for operating personnel. The key issue lies in gaining the involvement and cooperation of all management; working together to remove all possible proximity to power lines before the use of equipment commences. If this cannot be achieved, it becomes the responsibility of management to provide available safety accessories and to enforce the integrity of the danger zone. The paper focuses upon the hazards of power lines to various types of equipment and operators, as well as pleasure craft and operators, all of which are operated by human personnel. The many facets of electrified overhead power lines, and the hazards to operators of equipment of several applications and configurations, has been carefully addressed and effectively presented in the study. A clearance zone no matter how high, under any power line where operating equipment or pleasure craft of any description may be moved or operated, is never enough! Various regulations, rules, and directives that have been developed to date in the matter of power lines have failed to provide appropriate protection for human beings in their pursuit of human activities! I have heard it said, “You cannot legislate morality; it must be learned through better teaching (whether in the home or in the school)!” A similar observation may be made about “common sense”! That is, “Common sense” really means: The application of appropriate methods and operational procedures performed with ability and proper tools to accomplish a given task safely and effectively under identified conditions! This is achieved only through fully cooperative effort from management level, through all levels of the operational hierarchy, to the working level of skilled tradesmen. This also means training at every level in the operational organization. Every level of management, down through the ranks, to the machine operator level, must be trained in his own particular area of proficiency. Every person, at every level in an organization, must have the training to become more efficient in providing safe operating conditions at the worker level! This is especially true when the hazard condition involves power lines. Review of the study timeline clearly illustrates the reliance by all parties upon the ineffective ten-foot clearance decree. During the last fifty years, there is evidence of a consistent absence of management concern to take effective measures such as relocation or de-energization of power lines, in order to protect workers. This action should be a top priority and, if it is not an option, the emphasis must be placed on providing boomed equipment with all available safeguards, such as, insulating materials, proximity detectors, range limiting devices, and nonconductive taglines. Check sheets that remind management personnel of the appropriate provisions are identified in the Hazard Prevention Options Part II; the above suggestions are an effective aid that an organization can use to ensure effective compliance of all the necessary safety measures. Every pilot that flies an aircraft safely uses a check sheet before he/she embarks on a flight!

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Specific focus on Appendix A shows that in nearly every case during the last fifty years, the primary tendency has been to hold the operating personnel responsible for maintaining a ten-foot thin air clearance! This approach has not been successful and is not feasible. Extensive tests were conducted and carefully documented; it has been well demonstrated, in all validly conducted tests, that human beings are not able to make the proximity judgments that are required. A fundamental and primary need is the collective cooperation of management personnel of the electric utilities, equipment suppliers, and construction management to remove the powerlines from the worksite before the arrival of the equipment and crew. Backup equipment, in the form of functional safety appliances, must be included in the check lists of all required safety measures and actions; this will provide and ensure optimal effectiveness in the prevention of power line contact.

John H. Van Arsdel, PhD Human Factors Scientist Consultant

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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Identify the various parties who could have exercised management authority to prevent the injury. This objective is most clearly illustrated in Table 4, and is used in context to contribute to the creation of the “Organizational” and “Managerial” sections of the Recommendations. 2. Evaluate the potential role for electric utility companies to de-energize power lines, provide temporary insulation, relocate the power lines, and lock-out automatic reclosures at the transformers to avoid re-energizing lines in the event of contact. This objective is also illustrated in Table 4. It is expanded by David Baker’s expert comments (See pgs. 79-81). 3. Identify opportunities for liaison between industries to delegate responsibility to ensure for minimum contact between equipment and energized powerlines. A comprehensive list of cross-industry delegation of responsibility is found in Table 5. 4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the 10-foot clearance rule for operations from power lines. The “Standards” subset in the “Results” section discusses the failure of the USACE plan to prevent more powerline contacts by raising the minimum clearance distance from six feet to ten feet. It is clearly detailed in the Timeline 5. Evaluate the distance requirements for using ground marking tape or barricades to mark the danger zone adjacent to power lines. This is discussed in “Standards” under “Results”. See MacCollum’s 1986 label and subsequent articles on how to mark the danger zone. The Australian Standard (Timeline, 1993) also covers this issue. 6. Evaluate the actual effectiveness in the field or potential field use of alarms to warn of proximity around a power line. The “Warning” subset of the “Discussion” section evaluate the effectiveness of proximity alarms. Jack Ainsworth’s expert comments (pgs. 75-78) answer any other questions. 7. Evaluate the use of and potential for insulated links to prevent electrical transmission in the event of power line contact as a redundant back up to protect against high voltage exposure. The “Guarding” subset of the “Discussion” section goes into detail about the use of insulated links. George Karady’s expert comments (pgs. 85-90) provide additional insight. 8. Evaluate the actual field use of a range limiting devices for the boom as an operator aid. Range Limiting devices are required in Canada (see Timeline). Additional information can be found in information on LMI’s as they are usually included in the design.

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RESULTS 1. Case Studies Charts For the purposes of discovering trends and similarities in the case file, information in this section is presented in table format and key points are summarized at the end of each table. Table 1

Equipment Capable of Powerline Contact TYPES OF EQUIPMENT

CASES

Cranes: Total number of cranes

TOTAL 21

Mobile Hydraulic Telescoping Booms:

A6, A11, A15, A18, A20, A25, A28, A35, A38, A44, A47, A50

12

A1, A3, A10, A17

4

A12, A16, A22

3

Straddle

A5, A19, A34

3

Knuckle Booms

A33

1

Electronic News Gathering Vans (pneumatic masts)

A29, A31, A37, A40, A45, A46

6

Aerial Lifts: Insulated

A4, A9

2

A26, A27, A39, A42, A48

5

House moved on trailer truck

A2

1

Shingle Conveyors

A49

1

These by far are the most frequent types of crane to make contact with powerlines. Latticework booms This is the fourth most frequent type of crane to make contact with powerlines. Flat-bed mounted pedestal hydraulic telescoping booms This is the second most frequent crane to make contact with powerlines.

(These deaths are the result of phase to phase contact, resulting in gaps in insulation) Uninsulated Many lifts use hydraulic telescoping booms. Since this is by far the most frequent type of boom to contact powerlines insulation of this type of lift becomes a dire necessity.

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Forklifts

A14

1

Drill Rigs

A13, A41, A43

3

Fire truck

A36

1

Dump truck

A23

1

Agricultural Grain/ feed conveyors

A7, A8

2

Pumpcrete booms

A49

1

Table 1: No type of boomed equipment is safe from the hazard of powerline contact. While hydraulic equipment with a telescoping boom is the most susceptible to powerline contacts in this study, an alarming number of powerline contact occurrences happen without the use of a crane with a long boom. A more wary relationship with overhead powerlines must be established for every activity involving masted or boomed equipment. In construction sites, the first pre-job planning is to eliminate the danger of powerline contact by relocating or burying the powerlines. As the cases illustrate, the hazard of powerline contact could be dramatically reduced in long term, on-site jobs with the proper coordination with the owner, leasor or contractor and the electric utility. However, many aerial lift occurrences involving electric utility linemen, virtually all fire truck occurrences and portable conveyors and every single ENG van mast powerline contact take place in environments that provide little opportunity for preventative measures (See Table 4) such as disconnecting electric power or relocating lines. In these situations electrostatic warning devices and insulated features are crucial in the avoidance of powerline contacts.

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Table 2

Types of Equipment Contact With Powerlines MODE OF EQUIPMENT CONTACT

CASES

TOTAL

Phase to phase (aerial lift)

A4, A9

2

Contacted hoist line of crane

A6, A11, A12, A15, A19, A22, A25, A28, A44, A47, A50

10

Point of powerline contact was mid-span of powerline, and the ground personnel were momentarily unaware of closing distance from the powerline

A1, A3, A5, A10, A11, A12, A14, A15, A18, A21, A22, A23, A24, A25, A27, A28, A32, A33, A36, A39, A41, A42, A44, A47, A48, A49, A50

27

Work was performed in a confined work area, constituting a violation of the danger zone and ten-foot clearance.

A6, A7, A8, A16, A17, A19, A20, A23, A24, A25, A26, A27, A34, A35, A38, A39, A43, A44, A47, A48, A49

21

Load contacted powerline

A35

1

Contacted back of equipment

A5, A10, A16, A17

4

Moving raised boom directly into powerline

A13, A21, A24

3

Sluing (rotating) boom into powerline

A20, A32, A34, A39, A43

5

Raising or lowering boom or mast into powerline

A1, A3, A23, A26, A29, A30, A31, A36, A37, A39, A41, A45, A46

13

Inadequate clearance underneath powerline

A2, A14

2

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Table 2: Several modes of operation that can lead to powerline contact. Though hoist line contact is the most common, raising or lowering a boom or mast into a powerline happens often. In over half of the cases the point of contact was mid-span of the powerline where visibility is low and perception is especially difficult. This statistic proves that the ten-foot of thin air clearance law is not effective. Workers cannot stay ten feet away from a line that they do not momentarily see. Further, twenty-one of the cases were caused by work performed within the boundaries of the danger zone. Some work, such as pick and carry operations along highway easements, is necessary to be performed within a confined and dangerous space. When workers are exposed to extremely hazardous conditions such as these, they must be adequately protected. In the cases of ENG vans, the situation of a possible powerline directly overhead arises. In this case (which should have been eliminated by other means in any planned site) human perception of these lines is especially fallible. Proximity warning devices must be utilized as a “third eye”, equipped with a feature that prevents the mast being raised at all in the vicinity of a powerline.

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Table 3

Mode of Victim Contact with Electricity TYPE OF OCCURRENCE

CASES

TOTAL

Victim using a tethered electrical umbilical remote control.

A7, A8, A12, A13, A20, A29, A31, A33, A39, A41,

7

Equipment stored in appropriate place, such as under a powerline in the danger zone.

A11, A16, A27, A47

4

Victim was guiding the load or the hoist line

A1, A3, A5, A6, A10, A11, A15, A18, A19, A21, A22, A25, A28, A34, A35, A43, A44, A50

14

Victim touching equipment

A2, A17, A23, A42,

4

Victim on equipment

A14, A26, A46

3

Cases involving the use of an insulated link or a proximity warning device.

N/A

0

Table 3: Shows the most common situations of powerline contacts. In our case pool, controls accessible to an operator standing on the ground, storage of materials under powerlines, and hoistline/guyline contact accounted for 50% of all powerline contact incidents. However, in a review of all litigated cases the average is approximately 70%. Each of these three problems can be eliminated by any one of three actions: ♦ Prohibit the storage of material under powerlines by mandating a clear mapping of a 30’ wide danger zone as an “off limits” area around every live powerline. ♦ Installing insulated links and advocating their use would obstruct current to flow to the load. That could save the lives of many workers. ♦ Eliminate use of cranes with ground-accessible controls by prohibiting their use in the ANSI standards and government regulations, and design out the hazard by retrofitting cranes with differently located controls. These controls are easy to implement, and if they had been taken, half of the cases HIFI has chosen to study would have been prevented.

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Table 4

The Role of Various Parties in Contribution to Powerline Contact Occurrences PARTY and SITUATION

CASES

TOTAL

The immediate employer, usually a subcontractor, was found by the court to be incompetent, as it condoned a dangerous workplace and a lack of safety oversight. However, state workers’ compensation laws provide immunity from litigation.

A1, A5, A10, A11, A13, A14, A16, A17, A19, A25, A27, A33, A44, A48, A49

15

The crane rental firm rented equipment to a court-declared incompetent contractor and was aware that it would be used in a dangerous location.

A10, A11, A17, A18, A25, A26, A43, A47

8

The equipment manufacturer failed to offer or provide a crane safe for its intended use, including foreseeable use near powerlines, and did not endorse or suggest the use of safety appliances or preventative design.

A4, A7, A12, A20, A26, A32

6

The electric utility failed to advise, consult, or prohibit hazardous operations to be conducted on their easement in their danger zone underneath their powerlines.

A1, A2, A3, A6, A7, A8, A15, A21, A22, A24, A25, A34, A40, A42, A48

15

The construction management failed to oversee the work of the various contractors to ensure that boomed equipment would not penetrate the danger zone.

A5, A6, A10, A11, A16, A21, A34

7

The landowner failed to ensure the relocation or de-energization of powerlines before work began at the worksite or acted otherwise irresponsibly.

A3, A7, A8, A23, A41, A48

6

The designer of the facility made no effective effort to relocate or bury the powerlines.

A13, A25, A33, A38

4

The crane or equipment operator was incompetent, poorly trained, and did not exercise authority to refuse to operate the equipment within the danger zone or in other dangerous situations.

A9, A28, A32, A47, A48

5

Table 4: Shows the various ways that every party contributes to the epidemic of powerline contact injuries. Many cases in this table appear in two or more different categories, illustrating neglect from not just one source but of the industry as a whole. If one landowner had showed more concern, an electric utility cooperated, management made a bit more of an attempt to “contact proof” the designated work area, most of these cases could have been prevented. The good news that this table reveals is that there are many junctures at which management and other involved parties have an opportunity to initiate measures to prevent powerline contact. The sad news is that the industry has such a lackadaisical approach to this deadly epidemic that all controls had been neglected, leading to a tragic end for the workers involved.

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2. Standards

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (U.S. Army, 1958) have more rigorous standards than any other body examined in this study. Consequently, they have had markedly fewer injuries and lost-work hours; about one fourth the national average in 1988 (90.05.22). Starting in 1977, (EM 385:1-1, 01.A.03) these standards include a written pre-construction plan with a “prime contractor” responsible for all safety operations, including sub-contractors working for him. The same manual mentioned the danger of storing materials under powerlines in section 15.I.17

and prohibits the practice unless absolutely necessary11. By 1987 (87.10.00)

requirements included 15.E.02: All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability of encroachment on the clear distances specified. 1996 standards (96.10.01) mandated the use of non conductive taglines in appropriate situations in section 11.H.12(c). Because of the stringent guidelines and lower injury rate that is maintained by USACE to this day, many recommendations are based on standards already implemented in these manuals. The National Safety Council’s (NSC) first mention of safety devices that warn of potential powerline contact was published in 1951 (NSC, 1951). In 1955, the National Safety Council warned of the electrocution hazard from electrical contact with powerlines and recommended that powerline proximity alarms be installed on construction cranes (NSC, 1955). However, though the NSC continues to recommend safety appliances, they are not yet mandatory. Indeed, many standards are set at a baseline, and as history has proven, must be exceeded in order to offer any measure of ensured safety. ANSI standards must be regarded in the same light. The 1989 B30.5 standard features a drawing that shows that booms may be extended horizontally into the 10’ prohibited area as long as they maintain a ten foot clearance around the powerlines. Since human perception is highly flawed and expert reports have been written about the perception of powerlines (78.10.00 and 83.09.23) this clause voids any purported protection by relying on visual estimates of a safe clearance.

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Another problem encountered in ANSI standards can be found in 92.6 (ANSI 1999). The standard states that emergency controls must be accessible from the ground. However, unless all parts of the boom are properly insulated or guarded, controls handled by an operator on the ground can create a electrocuting ground fault circuit in the event of powerline contact. This clause is also found in ASME standard B30.5a (1994). By far the most serious violation of public welfare, however, is found in ANSI’s National Electric Safety Code (NESC). In 1984, the wording of a stringent requirement was altered, diminishing the responsibility of the electric utility to ensure for public safety. The word “practicability” was changed, as was the law regarding it. 1977’s NESC handbook rule 211 read “All electric supply and communication lines and equipment shall be installed and maintained so as to reduce hazards to life as far as is practical.” By 1984 the rule was eliminated completely, and placed the responsibility for electric safety during construction on the operator of the equipment instead of the designs and rules governing the electric utility powerlines(NESC, 1984).

3. Court transcripts Court transcripts were included in this study because of their link to prominent individuals in many fields and their value as sworn testimony. Listing these views depicts the beliefs and biases that shaped the evolution of rejection or acceptance of many safety devices. For instance, Theodore Leigh (1972) served in the capacity of the head of safety for Link-Belt, a major crane manufacturer, but had never investigated or inquired about safety appliances. In a later article, he stresses the importance of burying or relocating powerlines during construction work, but refused to consider safety appliances as a redundant safeguard (79.09.00). However, Robert Jenkins, the director of safety of the US Army Corps of Engineers, definitively stated that an insulated link would have saved the lives and prevented mutilations if it had been employed during the instance he was questioned about (1972). When asked about the monetary efficiency of safety appliances as opposed to extra signalmen, he replied “The USACE could not justifiably 11

Perhaps the OSHA accident rate would be reduced further if they prohibited this practice.

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see requiring a contractor to pay for something where you could get better protection not involving human factors12 for a couple of months wages.” Though appliances are not currently required in any national standard, the USACE has maintained a stellar record of safety by drafting their own requirements above and beyond mere compliance13. States Jenkins: “I would consider any standard that relied solely on the operator or the signalman inadequate based on my experience.”14 In another instance, Cecil B. Hickman (87.10.27) was in charge of a fleet of cranes that had been fitted with 25 SigAlarm™ devices. In the five years they were used, not a single powerline contact occurred. Then they were taken off in order to avoid operators being lulled into a false sense of security. The “false security” reason mirrors the one given by Collin Dunnam, as he states that safety appliances decrease the alertness of the operator (82.12.04). In spite of the supposed heightened awareness of crane operators with no safety devices, the operators in his jurisdiction sustained two powerline contacts after he removed the devices. Court transcripts also uncover the intent of some industry guilds to squash knowledge of hazard encounters and keep them secret from litigators and the public. In depositions taken by John Crowley in 1990 and again ten years later (90.11.05 and 00.04.11) he reports the existence of a closed case file, including accident reports and lists of litigations, locked into a room in a law firm in Chicago. If these documents were made accessible to the public they would help define the seriousness of construction injuries, raising awareness and motive improve the situation.

4. Expert Analysis The following results summarize the comments of the scientists and engineers that provided a critical analysis for this study. Ainsworth in a tiered approach stressed the need to assure that employees at all levels of the organization be trained in safety including the proper use of safety equipment. Similarly, Baker recommends education as key to crane safety methods 12

Italics added See “Standards” section above. 14 Testimony of Rebert Jenkins, Illinois Appellate Court, #59549, page 381, Line 1785. 13

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including clearance distances, no entry zones, safe work procedures, safety manuals, insulating devices, and warning devices. Likewise, Van Arsdel emphasized the need to train all management and each person at every level in crane safety, and Myers emphasized the need to train any person involved in the planning or use of cranes in the elimination of, guarding against, and warning of possible powerline contact. Speer addressed the system safety process as a planning tool by using the Hazard Reduction Procedure Sequence (HRPS) to eliminate or minimize the hazard at the time of design. The HRPS is the fundamental building block of system safety engineering, as its philosophy and implementation are based around elimination of the hazard. Design to eliminate the hazard is the first concern, followed by design to guard against the hazard and, finally, warn against the hazard. This aggressive approach to safety is a philosophy HIFI feels would be effective in elimination of powerline contacts, and Speer writes “Incorporating the system safety process into construction project management and mobile crane operations will assist in maximizing the creation of a safer work environment and lessen the potential of powerline contacts.” Dey agreed with the recommendations of this report but stressed the need to cover crane safety in contracts and enforce the conditions of the contracts with owner management as the key factor. He emphasized the need to insist in the concept planning contract between the owner and A/E in which designing and planning for elimination of the hazards was paramount. This safety plan must be incorporated directly into contract documents for the job. It details the safety considerations for eliminating or containing the hazard. Moreover, it must deal with subcontractor safety, jobsite responsibility, and hazard elimination as well as other issues that include the recommendations of this report. Van Arsdel also emphasizes the need to eliminate the possibility for powerline contact prior to the use of cranes or other boomed equipment. He also stressed that clearance zones are ineffective in preventing powerline contact and that regulations requiring clearance zones have failed. He recommends the relocation of or deenergiztion of powerlines with relocation as the first choice. There should be no option, he stresses, to this intervention. Myers stressed that the first line of protection is to eliminate the hazard by burying the powerline.

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With eliminating possible exposure to energized power lines as the first priority, Van Arsdel recommended as a second priority by various guarding devices such as insulating materials, proximity alarms, range limiting devices, and non-conductive taglines. Ainsworth suggested a concept of “Safety in Depth” that, in addition to training, includes several guards against electrical hazard that result form powerline contact. These guards include insulated taglines, boom sections, links, sleeves, and work platforms. In addition, he suggested slew limiters (range limiting devices) to keep the boom of crane from moving into the proximity of a powerline. Karady addressed insulating links as an intervention to prevent electrocution when a crane load line touches a high voltage conductor. He reported that about 7% of links are used when heavily contaminated. Nonetheless, his tests show that even with contamination and the resulting current leakage, the amperage and duration of current flow are so low that they would have no harmful physiological effect. Lehman referred to the success of a protective device in aluminum masts on a particular type of sailboat as effective in preventing injuries from powerline contact. Myers identified the second line for preventing powerline contact was to relocate the line and use insulating devices. Ainsworth also suggested warning systems. These included proximity alarms, which sounds an audible and visual alarm when the crane boom moves near an electrical hazard. He identified a product, SigAlarm, which detects the proximity of an electrical contact hazard by sensing an electrostatic source. Myers identified the third line of defense as the use of proximity warning devices and the mapping and identification of powerline danger zones.

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DISCUSSION

The following discussion is formatted according to the steps outlined in the HRPS in order to illustrate how legislation, standards, and industry, have failed to achieve a successful system safety program in the past and outline the steps it must take as a group in order to achieve it in the future.

1. System Safety Engineering Necessity and Overview Powerlines present an inherent electrical hazard on construction sites and during transport operations to and from the site. Powerlines present a high likelihood of electrical contact on construction sites and during lifting or “pick and carry” operations to and from the site. The injury consequence as a result of contact is serious including electrocution, heart failure, and severe burns. The combination of the inherent hazard, potential for powerline contact, and serious injury consequence combine for to present a danger to life and limb for crane operators, co-workers, and those transporting the crane. The only way to reduce this hazard is to adhere to the principles of safety engineering and strive to eliminate the chance for powerline contact through planning and design. The concept behind system safety engineering creates a system of operations that decreases the opportunity for close proximity between powerlines and boomed mobile equipment. From the beginning of a project, A/E staff, construction managers, and other high authority is responsible for designing out the possibility of powerline contact by creating project plans and methods that ensure that equipment and workers do not share space with a live powerline. For instance, planning of crane and other boomed equipment operations should prohibit storing materials underneath or immediately adjacent to overhead powerlines, as that situation only becomes an invitation to use cranes in a dangerous and prohibited area. Many workers have been electrocuted by using boomed equipment to retrieve these dangerously located materials.

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However, no requirements are drafted to prevent this deadly situation, and such a clause is rarely found in electric utility easement agreements. Planners must embrace the concept of safety engineering in the design phase and anticipate ways to avert common situations that lead to the mixing of powerlines and boomed equipment.

Legislation and Incentive An important era of minimal and outdated safety legislation was the 1940’s, when the newly improved crane was increasingly accepted by the construction industry as an ingenious and invaluable tool. Its cost-effectiveness lay in its efficiency, and

despite malfunctions

(sometimes deadly malfunctions) they were still more efficient than using other heavy construction equipment. The cases listed in Appendix A1 and A3 were landmark litigations, as they were construction third party lawsuits for the hazard of crane powerline contact injuries. The case labeled Appendix A3 identified the responsibility for the crane manufacturers to provide, or at least endorse, the use of the insulated link and proximity alarm. A3 was also the case where Robert Jenkins, Chief of Safety for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, testified that he had raised the mandatory clearance around powerlines from six feet to ten feet, but this action had been met with little success until the use of proximity alarms. These cases set a precedent for the safety duty of electric utility and upper management to not place the cause of the powerline contact on the fault of the personnel on the job site. The discovery process involved at the liability litigation is a far more intensive factfinding process than are conventional investigations, which generally pursue an analysis of the actions of one party. This process can be allegorically compared to an onion: one must eliminate many outer layers to identify all the core issues by all parties who could have made a difference. The first layer to peel away is immunity granted by various state laws in the form of workers’ compensation funds acting as an exclusive remedy for management negligence. The current laws are so lenient that they offer little incentive to the employer to ensure that cranes and other boomed equipment are effectively isolated from powerlines so workers are protected. The second layer is the legal precedents that set limits on disclosure of previous occurrences. These limits hinder disclosure of errors of the various parties and highlight the

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behavior of the victim, instead of focusing on the factors contributing to an unsafe workplace.15 The discovery process attempts to identify what incentives placed the injured in jeopardy or concealed the danger, which the victim had few chances to overcome. The combination of these two factors can be largely blamed for the continuation of unsafe practices and management neglect, as both of these laws excuse the employer from liability when the harmful incident was the result of gross negligence. The balance between industry and public welfare has been a constant conundrum since the mid-1700’s, when Adam Smith theorized that the living standards (which include workplace safety) would improve with a marketplace unfettered by regulation. However, whenever any party is relieved of accountability a free marketplace does not exist. For the most part, employee’s safety is a paramount responsibility, but there is a small minority who, through ignorance, incompetence, and greed, fail to ensure for the welfare of their workers, skew the marketplace with overwhelming costs of serious injury, death, and property damage. A solution to overcome the obvious handicaps created by the current workers’ compensation laws is to improve the system when progressive and wise legislators of various states give their attorney generals a practical and realistic interpretation of gross negligence, forcing business to be accountable for their gross misconduct and allowing the civil and criminal justice system to provide a balance of enterprise and the welfare of the people. Active participation by various states’ attorney generals to hold the small minority of offending employers at fault in such circumstances would result in substantially reducing workers’ compensation premiums paid by all employers. Prosecution on a criminal level for the most negligent offenders would create an undeniable precedent to illustrate the consequences of irresponsible and negligent behavior that claims the lives of workers. This approach would reduce the cost of workers’ compensation premiums as the small, offending minority of business who violates the public trust with grossly negligent conduct would be driven to change their policies or go out of business. Government can acknowledge standards, but is unable to monitor every workplace all the time; therefore it is the free marketplace that must rely upon the justice system to ensure for a

15

See Introduction, Pg. 2

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level economic playing field for all employers who uphold the public trust by making safety a priority. With a system of business accountability, the ignorant, incompetent, and greedy become liable and are thereby eliminated from the marketplace, as they would have to stand trial for comparative negligence with all the other defendants in liability litigation. A truly free marketplace would reward responsible employers with lower premiums, less lost work time, and fewer costs of lost equipment and medical bills, as there would be fewer injuries and deaths due to violations such as equipment powerline contact, and little cause for lawsuits. Additionally, the social security funds would have fewer disability and death claims due to fewer powerline contacts. The good news is that public priorities now demand that housing developments and industrial parks be designed with underground electric power distribution systems. The state-ofthe-art underground insulating materials have been constantly improving since the 1960’s. The “Blue Stake” underground mapping and pre-dig programs have minimized excavation hazards and interruptions. Another bit of good news is that modern horizontal direction boring equipment eliminates the need to dig trenches under roadways. The practicality of buried powerlines is no longer an issue because the initial added cost eliminates the hazard, lowering cost of insurance, lost production time, and damage to life and property. Advances in safety engineering such as those mentioned above are able to utilize technological advances and a priority shift towards safety to create a workplace free from the hazard of powerline contact. 2. Eliminating the Hazard

Pre-Construction Planning The ten-foot rule, as well as even greater distances, has proven to be ineffective, as thin air does not prevent, nor give any warning of, powerline contact. Sole reliance of the work crew on the job site to ensure for the success of thin air clearance is a dangerous, speculative assumption that presents a recipe for disaster and has never been a valid method of preventing powerline contact. A detailed and comprehensive examination of all the facts concerning each equipment powerline contact reveals that:

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♦ There are usually a variety of parties who were involved in creating hazardous conditions leading to equipment powerline contact16. ♦ There was ample opportunity for each of these parties to have independently and voluntarily acted in a responsible manner to initiate controls that would have substantially reduced the hazardous conditions and the probability of an equipment powerline contact. ♦ These same parties must overcome their inherent professional and trade isolation from each other and collectively develop a liaison by their safety staffs to ensure that all reasonable controls are initiated to achieve optimum reduction of equipment powerline contact.

Pre-construction planning starting at the time of design with the active participation of all parties who oversee the worksite is the primary remedy for prevention of powerline contacts. The cases listed in Appendix A present a forty-year history of repetitious occurrences that could have been prevented by careful planning (discussed in the following Recommendations). Management of various defendants have attempted to find and rely upon a single silver bullet of thin air to prevent a wide variety of equipment under a myriad of differing circumstances from contacting powerlines. There is no such single cure-all that allows management to delegate the responsibility of avoiding equipment powerline contacts down to the lowest operating level. The first priority of workers and crane operators at the worksite is to complete the task in a timely fashion. Management of all the various parties must develop liaisons to eliminate the danger before the crew arrives at the worksite, and when this cannot be done, worksite operating personnel must be provided all the tools: appliances, written guidelines, training and authority to cease operations until management can provide safer alternatives that do not involve bringing boomed equipment within the danger zone which surrounds all powerlines. Most importantly, a clear delegation of safety management must be enforced by the site manager, whether it be the construction manager or the controlling contractor. Owner and contractor Robert Dey states that “To resolve this [safety] issue requires an examination of the contractual processes that control a construction site, how such contracts evolve, and who is 16

“Conclusion” Table 4 recaps the immediate negligent action of parties who contributed to the circumstances that led to powerline contact. In many cases, such as A1 and A26, more than one party engaged in negligent action.

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empowered to enforce the contract provisions. Without an effective implementation strategy, the best goals and guidelines will be lost in the normal process of project development, and the deaths and injuries will continue”.17 This person must have the authority to stop all work in an unsafe area and perform any other tasks that ensure for the safety of the worker. It is this person who has the last clear opportunity to bring together each party at a pre-job worksite planning meeting to discuss and execute all available safety measures for the job.

Any person so

delegated would also be directly accountable for any transgressions or violations of safety protocol, and this direct accountability will make each workplace a more safety-conscious area. After delegating such a person in the construction done by the Army Corps of Engineers, statistics for 1988 showed that their lost-time injury rate was one fourth the national average. The USACE also uses Activity Hazard Analysis to identify potential hazards and their sources. The “Organizational” section of the “Recommendations” presented in the study focuses on implementation and designation of authority, accountability, and pre-planning to ensure for optimum safety before the arrival of any crew. Equipment powerline contacts are generally a failure of all the parties involved in the planning of the activity. Manufacturers who produce cranes with unsafe design or a failure to endorse or produce safety devices are as responsible for the continuation of powerline contacts as the firm that owns or leases the cranes to incompetent or semi-competent operators. The electric utility has a responsibility to be a source of expertise to landowners, users, and contractors for the safe location or de-energization of powerlines. Some utilities are developing communication with contractors and crane rental firms regarding ways the powerlines can be relocated before work commences. Lastly, the contracted company is responsible for not making safety more of a priority.

17

Robert Dey focuses on the subject in further detail in the “Peer Reviews” section of the study.

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Communication The major cause of contact occurrences is the reluctance of third party executive management to communicate and collaborate to ensure that cranes and other boomed equipment do not occupy the same work space. This neglect is a fundamental problem and is shared by the following groups: "

Landowners and developers who retain the architects, design engineers, and construction managers.

"

Contractors with their sub-contractors, suppliers, and service providers.

"

Electric utilities, telephone and TV cable and other systems utilizing power poles.

"

Equipment manufacturers and their distribution chain of dealers and rental agencies.

"

Various federal, state, and local agencies with administration of applicable safety-related laws and standards.

In many of the cases in Appendix A, several parties failed to take steps to prevent powerline contact combined with a practice of delegating responsibility downward to the worksite personnel, who do not have the authority to improve the layout of the worksite or secure the applicable safety appliances. In A7, for example, neither the equipment manufacturer, electric utility company, nor landowner take the proper steps to ensure for complete worker safety. This fact is further illustrated in Table 4, which gives a breakdown of parties contributing to powerline contact instances. An obvious solution to this problem is to involve all parties in a system of written and signed communication with each other. Written contact would not only verify the time and subject of communication. It would be easy to store in a safety file to serve as documentation and protection from liability. This file, in turn, would hold management of electric utilities, construction managers, and other communicants all accountable for their orders and actions. The “Managerial” section of the

“Recommendations” focuses

on

enhanced

communication and cooperation, promoting a cross-industry concern and responsibility for a safe work site.

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2. Guarding Against the Hazard Standards and Design Mechanics

Many people are familiar with the horrible conditions found in many factories in America during the turn of the last century18 as well as the lack of labor legislation to protect workers’ rights. By the 1950’s, many improvements had been legislated and complied with, but there were still many holes in the overall safety system, such as safer machine design. Many incomplete standards still apply today, and some of the Recommendations are created as an effort to fortify the patchy protection provided by current legislation. In the early 1890’s, with the enactment of the Railroad Safety Appliance Act, the introduction of selfcouplers and air brakes became mandatory. The enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act provided little leeway to require “safety appliances”, but focused primarily upon worker safety rules that the employer should administer for compliance. Simple compliance with standards that fail to address the hazards that lead to worker entrapment is worthless when it comes to the prevention of equipment powerline contacts. Industry practices allowing the use of insulated aerial lifts must be closely monitored to ensure that equipment standards and work routines provide forgiveness of foreseeable human error. It goes without saying that all work near powerlines such as TV cable and telephone systems should never use all-metal uninsulated aerial lifts, as they are inherently dangerous for such use. How many more lives will be taken before management realizes that further safety measures such as proper insulation or isolation of all possible parts must be voluntarily included in equipment design? The current and outdated regulations regarding insulation prove that compliance with legislation is not sufficient to maintain safe workplace operations. Examination of standards concerning the design of cranes and aerial lifts (self-propelled elevating work platforms) and even those aerial lifts used by linemen (vehicle mounted elevating and rotating aerial devices) have no requirements that controls shall not be accessible for an operator standing on the ground. Appendix A-12, A-29 & A-31 (pneumatic mast) A-41, shows 18

One classic example of unsanitary conditions is Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. Though it focuses on conditions of meat packing plants, the work conveys a strong idea of the expendability of employees and the blatantly hazardous conditions of industry 100 years ago.

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that this faulty design idea has been at least one source of serious injury or death when the boom of the equipment accidentally contacts a powerline, as the unfortunate operator provides a direct path for a ground fault current. Further, cranes mounted on a flat bed with a remote control make no mention that the operational control shall be of a design that is non-conductive. Again, this is a substantial source of operator injury or electrocution (see Appendix A-20, A-33).

Insulation Insulation on key parts of the various equipment is a form of guarding and is an effective, life-saving material. Too many injuries and instances of death continue to occur because of a manufacturer’s failure to properly insulate. Industries such as electric utilities have long used insulated aerial lifts. In some cases lack of insulation created design defects that endangered the lineman; many were identified in litigation, and later insulation was incorporated into with lifesaving results. 19 The vast majority of injuries and death, totaling 70% of all powerline contacts, occurs when a crane boom or hoist line contacts a powerline and those on the ground guiding the load become victims. In such instances, an insulated link and non-conductive taglines generally have the ability to interrupt the flow of current, as most powerlines carry voltages of 7,200 volts to ground. It is interesting to note that the use of insulated plugs in the masts of sailboats and non-conductive conveyor booms were not the result of standards. After being identified in litigation as safer design, real application was found to be able to prevent injury and save lives. Similarly, safety appliances for boomed equipment have also been proven to save lives, as there have been no reported powerline contacts with equipment utilizing either a proximity alarm or an insulated link. Such devices are strong prevention aids and should be used without the mandate of a standard. Personnel on the ground who are in contact with the crane directly or indirectly account for approximately another 8% of the victims. It is true that the 8% who touch the crane are not protected by the insulated link if the powerline contact is made above the link. Yet it is better to

19

The “Technical” section of “Recommendations ” lists broader and more effective uses for insulation.

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protect 70% of the victims of powerline contact rather than to discard the link because the 8% are not protected. The argument that insulated links should be rejected because they are easily contaminated and do not block sufficient current can be quickly unraveled. While it is true that conductive contaminants affect a link’s ability to block current, most contaminants found on a construction site are not strong enough to significantly increase current leakage, and proper daily maintenance to wipe the link clean will provide insulation to block current to well below the harmful level (Timeline 91.02-03 and Timeline 82.10.00). Tests conducted by Harnischfeger and American Hoist and Derrick Co. recorded current leakage that created a mild shock with no permanent consequences, about eight milliamps. However, critics of the insulated link maintain that any current leakage above one milliamp could be considered dangerous (Timeline 91.02-03 and Timeline 93.06.26). The registered amount of harmful current, however, is gauged between 25 milliamps for the beginning of muscular paralysis to 100 milliamps for ventricular fibrillation (Timeline 1983 [Bridges, J.E.]). There is also an argument that links cannot block all current flow of 69,000 volt transmission lines. The truth is that the number of lines carrying power over just 30,000 volts is so small that it is almost insignificant. The vast majority of powerlines contacted are 7,200 volts to the ground are less. These facts enhance the value of these safety appliances to the point where they should be considered indispensable.

3. Warning of the Hazard

Safety Appliance Reliability: Proximity Alarm However, when courts began to direct responsibility towards upper management and proper safety planning, crane manufacturers and construction management started to

isolate

themselves from safety. The crane manufacturers at this time began to question the reliability of safety appliances such as the insulated link and proximity alarm. This group undertook to promote or fund tests and studies to reveal inherent dangerous shortcomings that may exist with the use of the insulated link and proximity alarms. The minutes of the crane subcommittee of the PCSA

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technical committee of the Construction Industry Manufacturers Association meetings from 1973 to 1975 denoted an “important” agenda to repeatedly and rigorously test crane safety appliances through the sponsorship of crane and other equipment manufacturers. One letter to the deputy director of the Construction Industry Manufacturers Association (CIMA) states “[a member of] Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., and I have joined together to completely test and analyze various types of alleged safety devices which are supposed to prevent injury in the event of overhead electrical distribution line contact. We believe we can produce films, photos and facts that these devices cannot be considered fail-safe, and in fact, can produce an increase rather than a decrease of contact accidents… At present we have the tentative interest and support of three manufacturers…20” These tests overlook the comparison of speculation of the reliability of safety appliances to the known absence of human reliability, which is the result of work priorities, distractions, absence of training or supervision, or unsafe workplace equipment. The U.S. 60 cycle powerlines are easily detectable, as they create both an electrostatic field and a magnetic field. The electrostatic field strength remains constant with the voltage on line, while the magnetic field varies with current flow (the less current flow, the weaker the field). In either case, with multiple phase wires the primary function of the proximity detector is to identify the powerline at a horizontal distance parallel to the powerline. A common complaint is the fact that proximity alarms do not always sound when parallel to or directly between the phase lines of a powerline. However, a boom in either of these positions would be in a strictly prohibited area and would constitute a gross violation of the danger zone. The argument to reject proximity alarms because of their ability to detect only alternating current becomes nullified when one considers the fact that direct current transmission lines constitute only a small fraction of one percent of the powerlines in America. There is also the speculation to limit the use of proximity alarms because the presence of immediately overhead powerlines may blur detection, as the electrostatic fields can cancel each other. But one must remember that the existing rule of a ten foot clearance allows work only in 20

Letter: Bernie Enfield, Safety and Training Associates, 1 S. 646 Fairview, Lombard, Il 60148 to H.T. Larmore, Deputy Director, Construction Industry Manufacturers Assn, 111 E. Wisconsin Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53202, July 7, 1973.

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areas where live powerlines are sufficiently separated to not interfere with each others’ electrostatic fields. A forest of power poles is a proven visual warning of a strictly prohibited zone. In circumstances similar to those encountered in ENG vans, the prevention of raising the mast into overhead powerlines requires the proximity detectors’ probes (antennas) to be configured in a manner that is at right angles to the powerlines. This overcomes the cancellation of parallel force fields inherent to three-phase transmission lines. The vast majority of powerline contacts occur somewhere in the mid-span of the powerline suspended between the supporting poles where visibility is the lowest. Only in rare circumstances are there any other powerlines positioned at right angles or parallel to those that were the point of contact. Many safety appliance studies are funded by industry guilds and crane manufacturers (Timeline 74.01.02, 75.06.01, 75.08.22). This fact helps to explain the difference of results between seemingly similar studies. Note the difference in the language of the National Research Council Canada study: “The SigAlarm™ is no replacement for an alert operator” but “The tests showed that the SIGALARM™, when adjusted for a given crane position, was CAPABLE of being adequately sensitive to any change in position of the boom” (Timeline 78.03.00). and the language of “The test procedures which are described in this report make it very apparent that in order to utilize the proximity indicator, it is necessary for the operator to continuously give it his major attention and make readjustments in sensitivity with each new circumstance brought about by changing the crane’s position or when mobile equipment of high electrical capacitance comes into the operating vicinity” (Timeline 75.08.22). The Southwest Research Institute puts it yet another way: “One of the devices, the SigAlarm, used a distributed sensor and displayed significant sensitivity variation with boom orientation. As the boom was rotated from a position parallel to the powerline to a position normal to the powerline, the sensitivity decreased severely. To minimize the sensitivity fluctuation with boom orientation, point sensors are recommended” (Timeline 81.02.00). These three studies all cover the issue of the sensitivity of the SigAlarm™. The first one says the device is capable of adequate sensitivity to a change in boom position. The Southwest Research Institute study says SigAlarm™ “displayed significant sensitivity variation with boom

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orientation.” The study by the Harnschfeger Corp. says this fact makes it “necessary for the operator to continuously give it his major attention and make readjustments in sensitivity with each new circumstance”, portraying the amount of device sensitivity in different lights. Throughout the timeline, there is no study that says SigAlarm™ is failsafe. No device is failsafe. But the continuous presentation of negative information published by some studies creates the image of a device much more finicky than exists in reality or on the construction job. For instance, the 1977 SAE study “A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes” (Timeline 77.09.12) had the effect of eroding the concept of reliability for proximity alarms, insulating links, and range limiting devices due to its negative presentation of fact. Its appearance as an SAE paper hindered the acceptance of safety appliances, as this paper is frequently cited by litigation as a reason for not adopting equipment safety appliances. The fact that the SAE paper was authored by employees and associates of crane manufacturers does not make its data false; however, manufacturer- sponsored or associated documents frequently convey a prearranged point of view. Another example of this conundrum can be found in the Exxon-funded studies on jury settlements. Thirteen recent papers on the unreliability of jury behavior have been published in books and journals by prominent psychologists and sociologists. Many of them were used as new evidence in the appeal of the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez verdict, arguing that “these articles present recent social science research demonstrating that jurors are generally incapable of performing the tasks the law assigns to them in punitive damage cases”21. Exxon refrained to mention that it was the principal sponsor of the research. However, the studies had their desired effect. In 2001, the court ruled in Exxon’s favor and lowered the award. Since 1999, judges in ten cases have invoked studies by Exxon, shaping an aspect of courtroom culture. This newspaper article illustrates the fact who funds the research can be a factor in the results of the research. No research has denied that there have been no reported powerline contact incidents when proximity alarms have been in use, and no recorded injuries during the use of an insulated link. This study is aware of 1070 crane years (one crane year being the use of one crane for one year; 200 crane days is the use of 200 cranes for one day) (Timeline 82.10.04, 1985 (Jack 21

Quoted directly from “Funding Studies to Suit Need”, LA Times, December 3, 2003 by Alan Zarembo.

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Ainsworth), 99.12.29, 02.02.05) that have passed without a contact incident during the use of proximity alarms. See Table 3. Records of actual absence of powerline contact over a long period of time with the use of safety appliances is a better measure of safety effectiveness that speculation based upon unlikely or improper circumstances22. For many responsible construction managers and workers, safety appliances such as the proximity alarm, insulated link, non-conductive taglines, and range limiting devices have earned a reputation in a myriad of work circumstances for being good back-up devices, proven by their use in the field over a number of years. They are extremely useful in situations such as one-time lifts or pick and carry activities; as well as other circumstances when the crane will be used near a live powerline. It has been found that when these appliances are made available the crew seems to develop greater awareness of the danger of powerline contact, as there is no record of any kind of injury or failure when these appliances were provided. The “Technical” section of “Recommendations” addresses the issue of safety appliances in further detail. However, the use of safety appliances must never replace construction safety planning. Their use must be purely secondary, as no safety appliance may substitute for competent operators and complete planning.

Cost-Benefit Example This fact is clearly illustrated by a general breakdown of individual dollar amounts: The cost of a small, 30-ton, five year-old crane ranges from $115,000 to $150,00023. If powerline contact occurs, the crane is likely to be severely damaged. If third-party injury liability is filed, defense is likely range into the tens of thousands, with a verdict of hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars. The cost to install an insulated link on one crane ranges from $3,000 to $6,00024, depending on the size of the crane. The cost of installing a SigAlarm™ ranges from $3,000 to $4,00025. Maximum machine protection through safety appliances costs less than $10,000, or less than one tenth the initial cost of the crane, and could result in the conservation of hundreds of thousands of 22

In a Study entitled “Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom”, with tests performed by Robert Edwards and Alex Krasny, the SigAlarm™ device failed when positioned directly over and beneath live powerlines. Both of these positions violate the primary principle of avoidance of a danger zone. See Timeline 97.11.06. 23 Prices from Crane Hotline, Vol 6, Iss.3, March 2002 24 List prices, Hirtzer™, InsulatUS™ 25 SigAlarm™ List Price

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dollars. H.B. Zachry recently equipped 200 cranes with SigAlarm™ (Timeline 02.02.15). The total estimated cost for this endeavor was probably in the range of $700,000. For about the cost of one powerline contact incident, this construction firm now has major protection from liability, time lost, destruction of property, and the invaluable loss of a worker’s well-being. In short, safety appliances are a sound method of investment protection on many different levels. When an unsafe condition or circumstance is first identified as the basis of a personal injury liability claim, when the exposure of hundreds or thousands of similar conditions or circumstances exist, it is a foolhardy business practice to ignore the installation of the design improvement or the use of a safety appliance, as the same legal complaint will be made again, repeating itself and growing to result in a monetary tidal wave of jury verdicts and costly settlements. These concepts, coupled with the recounting of these tragic occurrences, illustrate the need for management to voluntarily adopt policies that will foster the elimination of or dramatically minimize the hazard of equipment powerline contact before the equipment or personnel is exposed to the hazard. When juxtaposed with information available at the times of litigation, a pattern of denial and neglect from manufacturers, equipment dealers, rental agencies, landowners, architects, prime contractors, construction managers, sub-contractors, and others emerges, and the need and reasonability for a system safety approach becomes obvious. The lesson apparent in the study is that everybody in the business has a key role to play to prevent needless deaths and injuries. There is no one solution or “quick fix” to eliminating this hazard. To prevent equipment powerline contact all parties need to be accountable for their failure to initiate preventative measures within their span of control. As the following charts will show, there are many situations that can lead to powerline contact. No one action or design improvement will eliminate this danger. Yet when management is willing to follow all suggested requirements and realizes that different measures apply to different situations, substantial progress can be made towards saving lives, time and money by reducing equipment powerline contact. The following recommendations list different preventive measures to be taken at different phases of planning and operation to ensure for a complete system of preventive safety. When instituted voluntarily by the appropriate parties, these guidelines have the power to make equipment powerline contacts a thing of the past.

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RECOMMENDATIONS Construction Safety Plans for the prevention of powerline contacts with cranes and various types of boomed equipment must be a cooperative effort formed by all pertinent parties of the industry. These plans should always include representatives of power companies, landowners, architects, design engineers, building permit agencies, construction managers, and owner/leasors of the crane or boomed equipment, by designated persons with authority to implement the measures necessary to eliminate the hazard of electrocution by equipment powerline contact. The plans must ensure that the operating conditions are such that a crane or boomed equipment will be positioned only where it cannot be raised, lowered, rotated, intruded underneath or driven into an area within a ten foot lateral distance of any energized powerline. Additionally, liaison should be established whereby the worksite personnel are appraised of the measures to be initiated and why they must be in place before work commences. An Activity Hazard Analysis can clarify communication between parties and pinpoint specific risks of specific tasks. Because a comprehensive and effective plan requires attention on many levels from many arenas, the following suggestions are broken down into three categories: Organizational, Managerial, and Technical. Organizational guidelines and pre-planning are crucial to reduction of powerline contacts because they address the hazard in the pre-planning stage, eliminating many unsafe conditions before they endanger people with hazardous circumstances. Managerial guidelines are an extension of the plans drafted in the Organizational phase When Organizational and Managerial plans are implemented correctly, the hazard of powerline contact is practically eliminated. Technical guidelines directly pertain to on-site activity, and are the practical physical implementations of pre-planning and construction site safety. They enhance site safety and ensure an extra margin of safety to compensate for the inevitable human error. Because many parties are often responsible for safety implementations outside a specific arena, the guidelines are color-coded to highlight specific responsibility of various industry groups. Green designates construction management and related activities. Blue designates architectural and design activities. Black designates governmental administration and oversight. Red designates electric utility and related communication systems. Purple designates crane manufacturers, dealers, rental

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agencies, inspection services, and operator certification groups. To achieve the maximum effects from these voluntary guidelines, the following measures should be included into a national standard or widely adopted by area rulemaking committees and safety overseers and always incorporated into all worksite Powerline Contact Prevention Plans:

ORGANIZATIONAL: 1. A safety plan drafted by the architect, primary contractor, or construction manager shall incorporate a clear chain of command and accountable person whose authority affords constant oversight throughout the length of the construction project. 2.

At the time of design a system safety plan should be developed whereby the coordination with the construction manager to ensure that either the design concept and build or the design and bid to build provides and opportunity to identify powerline hazards and develop a construction safety plan that incorporates all of the necessary requirements that may be applicable. Requirements should include stringent conditions in the contract that affords the construction manager unquestionable authority to pursue this intent.

3. Architects and engineers shall not design facilities to be located underneath powerlines, and their plans and drawings shall detail how the powerlines will be relocated or buried to eliminate the hazard of powerline contact during construction or maintenance. Consistent with the various states’ Professional Licensing, these drawings shall be stamped and signed to ensure for the safety of the public. 4. In the event of a change of circumstances requiring a stop-work order, the construction manager shall reconvene with the project committee if the changes need the participation of other managers. 5. Contract provisions for highway construction for federal, state, county, and municipal projects shall include specific requirement for the relocation or burial of powerlines from the work area whenever it is anticipated that cranes or other boomed equipment will be used. The

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proper government overseer will ensure that powerlines have been relocated before construction commences by written contact with the controlling contractor or construction manager. 6. The contract drawing shall identify the “Red Danger Zone26” created by an energized powerline shall be measured at a minimum of 15 feet on each side of the powerline pole to create an identifiable Prohibited Operating Area 30 feet wide (see Illustration I & II). This area shall be identified as a prohibited area for entry with any part of a crane or boomed equipment. Instructions on the drawings will require marking on the ground by ground markings, engineer tapes, hazard cones or barricades so that all personnel can easily see the Danger Zone. For transmission towers, the Danger Zone shall extend 10 feet beyond the measured vertical clearance from the outmost wires plus the additional clearance of 0.4 inches for every kV over 50 kV, including 345kV, and 16-foot clearance for voltages up to and including 750kV. This is in accordance to section 1926.550 (a): 15 (i, ii, iii) of the Federal Code of Regulations (OSHA) for cranes, derricks, hoists, elevators, and conveyors. See illustration I. 7. Powerlines supplying or adjacent to construction sites shall have the ground fault circuit recloser devices deactivated by the electric company during the construction period as set forth in subpart V 1926.995 (e) 5 of OSHA. This measure provides equal protection to construction workers as provided for Electric Company linemen. 8. The purpose of incorporating these provisions in the contract and the project drawing is to ensure that the Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan shall be initiated so there will be sufficient time to implement the agreed upon provisions before either the crane or boomed equipment or work crew arrives at the work site. 9. The project construction manager or controlling contractor shall be responsible for providing ANSI B30.5 (Mobile and Locomotive Cranes), A10-33 (Construction and Demolition Operations- Safety and Health Program Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects) or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers EM 385-1-1 Health and Safety Requirements Manual criteria 26

The Powerline Danger Zone, as developed in Illustration I in 1986 by David MacCollum is here termed the “Red” Danger Zone to echo the terminology used by the OSHA rulemaking committee.

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as a basis for the controlling contractor or construction manager for developing a “Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan” that is consistent with developing a Job Hazard Analysis. 10. Power Companies should, as far as reasonably practicable, advise their subscribers who are contractors, owners, and users of cranes and other boomed equipment that their operating facilities and construction sites must comply with the provisions outlined above. The power companies’ safety director would be the appropriate coordinator and counselor of such programs, and would provide all other management personnel with guidelines to ensure for prompt support. Their easement agreement should prohibit the storage of materials under a powerline immediately, and include instructions to notify them when boomed equipment is going to be used at least ten days in advance. 11. Municipalities and other agencies involved in the approval of building permits should incorporate pertinent provisions requiring that a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan, as outlined, and be a condition for approval in any construction plans where the use of a crane or boomed equipment is anticipated. 12. The National Commission for Certification of Crane Operators is considered to be the largest and most authoritative crane operator licensing organization within the United States. They should include in their written examination questions pertaining to items 1 through 30. In this way, every certified operator has a full understanding of how to map the Red Danger Zone and a clear responsibility to uphold the prohibition of entering the Red Danger Zone with a crane or other boomed equipment. 13. Training needs to be developed for executive management of electric utilities (including power, telephone, and cable companies), industrial landowners, architects, and developers of their own responsibility to ensure within their span of reasonable control that cranes and all boomed equipment shall be, by design and planning, isolated from energized powerlines. Executive management must be aware of all options available to the various parties in order to ensure for the prevention of equipment powerline contacts. This knowledge will further ensure for a coordinated effort by all parties engaged in planning to incorporate all necessary measures to prevent equipment powerline contacts.

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MANAGERIAL: 14. Every effort must be made to bury powerlines or relocate them away from the job site. However, if relocation of powerlines cannot be accomplished, the construction manager should develop alternate construction methods that do not require the use of boomed equipment for activities conducted in the danger zone or adjacent to powerlines. 15. Construction utilizing a crane or a boomed vehicle in the Red Danger Zone is prohibited, and the powerlines shall be relocated or buried before use of the crane or boomed vehicle is allowed to begin. The construction manager is responsible to ensure for the successful relocation of powerlines. 16. In the event that work schedule changes arise, the project manager shall be immediately alerted if dangerous proximity to a powerline exists, and crane operations must immediately cease until the danger is removed or another method of operation with safe distance can be established. 17. Only a written permit, co-signed by the project manager and the district manager of the power company, witnessed on site by a designated individual, will allow a de-energized powerline to suffice for a compliance with the intent of a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan. The powerline shall not be re-energized until written authorization stating that all powerlines are undamaged and all cranes and boomed equipment are located outside the Red Danger Zone is gained from the power company. 18. The construction site manager and crane operator shall be instructed and tested to be proficient in the skill of mapping the Danger Zone with the proper identifying markers or barricades, in the event that a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan was not prepared or implemented before the crew’s arrival at the work site. 19. Before any crane or boomed equipment commences work, the Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan shall require that a designated individual responsible and in charge of the work shall secure from the electric power company a written certificate stating that the automatic reclosing feature of the circuit interrupting devices has been made inoperative for all

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powerlines adjacent to or servicing the project. This guideline is consistent with section 1926.955, (e) live line barehanded work: 5 of OSHA federal codes and regulations. 20. The Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan shall require that any sub-contractor, leasor, or other party providing a crane or other boomed equipment will include accurate written instructions on how to map a powerline Danger Zone (as written in 13 above) in the rental contract. The contract shall further include a clause wherein the designated crane or boomed equipment operator agrees to position the equipment in a location as to be impossible in any boom or mast configuration, extension, angle or rotation to penetrate the Red Danger Zone at any time. See illustration II 21. When cranes or other boomed equipment are to be used in activities that involve the travel of the crane with the boom extended on public roads, (e.g. “pick and carry” operations), or any other situation rendering guidelines 1-18 inapplicable, the use of non-conductive tag lines, electrostatic proximity warning devices, insulated links or range-limiting devices shall be written into the project contract by the project engineer and enforced by the controlling contractor or construction manager to ensure for worker safety. This can be reinforced by requiring the use of a Job Safety Analysis. 22. When electric utilities lease space on their powerline poles to telephone, TV cable, or other service or communication companies, to reduce their exposure to liability the following considerations should be part of such agreements: ♦ Before any lines are to be installed by these parties, notice shall be provided 30 days in advance so the electric utility can ensure that overgrown vegetation is removed prior to installation of service communication lines (see appendix A42). ♦ Any party in contact with the power pole or the lines themselves (including those leasing pole space for service lines, tree-trimmers and maintenance workers, and installers of utility or communication systems) shall use only properly insulated aerial lifts with emergency controls not accessible from the ground (see appendix A12, A39). Further instruction in this clause is found in Guideline # 29. See illustration III 23. Manufacturers of boomed equipment should adopt system safety as a pro-active method of identifying all types of circumstances which may arise to afford an opportunity for powerline

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contact. The provision for design modification and or safety appliances is the most practicable method of preventing injury or death from foreseeable powerline contact. 24. The manufacturers, in order to assist crane and boomed equipment operators and users, shall prepare and implement a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan to incorporate mapping instruction and pertinent provisions, as outlined in items 1 through 22 above, in their new operating manuals, as well as providing a revised supplement for their existing manuals.

TECHNICAL 25. Practical and specific methodology for the placement of concrete needs to be developed and provided whenever the work is done underneath powerlines. This method will be a working substitute for either cranes or pumpcrete machines that are prohibited entry into the Red Danger Zone described in Paragraph 5 (see appendix A44, A49). 26. No materials, supplies, or equipment shall be placed or stored anywhere in the Red Danger Zone at any time (see appendix A11, A16, A27, A47). 27. Any worker guiding a load shall use a non-conductive tagline attached to the load instead of touching the load itself (see appendix A3, A6, A11, A15, A19, A25, A50). 28. Crane manufacturers or rental firms have the responsibility to provide range limiting devices, proximity alarms and insulated links to the crane owners and users as safeguards against powerline contact every time a crane will be used in the vicinity of powerlines. If the hazard of powerline contact cannot be eliminated by the assistance of the electric utility company, workers are entitled to be provided the option of every safety appliance available. 29. Insulated aerial lifts consistent with ANSI standards A92.2 2001- (Vehicle-Mounted Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices) have proven to provide reasonable safe work platforms for trained electrical linemen. These same equipment requirements shall be extended to personnel doing tree-trimming, workers installing or maintaining telephone and television cables and those who work with any other systems attached to electric powerline poles. Aerial lifts used adjacent to powerlines to install, service or maintain advertising signs and bill boards shall meet ANSI standard A92.2 2001 and shall be equipped with a nonconductive framework barrier to isolate the individual in the basket from contact with a powerline. See illustration III See also Guideline # 20.

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30. Aerial lifts which raise the utility lineman or tree-trimmers where they are within touching distance between phase wires of a powerline shall incorporate sufficient insulation between and around all metal parts to prevent a phase to phase contact. (See appendix A4, A9). 31. Further equipment used in support of powerline construction and maintenance such as digger derricks and other similar equipment should be evaluated for foreseeable operating misuse and provided insulated coverings on boom sections that can be raised into powerlines. Write specific instructions for the use of short Kelly bars to eliminate the need to raise the boom to elevations that will reach powerlines (see appendix A30). 32. No boomed or elevating mast equipment shall have controls that are accessible to an operator while standing on the ground, as it provides a path through the operator for a ground fault circuit in the event of a powerline contact, which could result in electrocution (see A7, A8, A12). 33. No boomed or elevating mast equipment shall be controlled with a conductive remote control on a tether or umbilical cord, as it provides a path through the operator for a ground fault circuit in the event of a powerline contact. There are remote controlled options which are non-conductive, such as fiber optic, pneumatic and radio (see appendix A20, A33). 34. Specialized equipment such as news gathering vans or portable lighting mobile communication systems, which are equipped with a telescoping pneumatic mast to raise antennas and other communication receptors or floodlights, shall be equipped with an electrostatic proximity detector attached to the antenna system so that the mast cannot be raised when the van is located underneath or immediately adjacent to a powerline. The manufacturers’ authorized installer shall ensure that the electrostatic powerline detector is properly installed, adjusted, and the probe (antenna) is configured to operate correctly via individual vehicle inspections and operating certificates. Further, as a redundant safeguard, the antenna systems or any other devices mounted on top of the telescoping mast shall be guarded with non-conductive framework, as is necessary to physically prevent a ground fault in the event of powerline contact (see appendix A29, A31, A40).

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Table 5 Duty of a variety of entities for electrical safety involving cranes Entity Owner

A/E

Primary contractor

Organizational Require relocation or burial of powerlines away from above the work area, Receive executive training on the removal of powerline contact hazards Safety plan, Identify powerline hazards, Design relocation or burial of powerlines, Identify “Red Danger Zones” on drawings, Receive executive training on the removal of powerline contact hazards Safety plan, Identify powerline hazards, Re-evaluate hazards under each stop-order

Construction manager

Safety plan

Electric utility companies (also telephone and cable companies)

Deactivate ground fault circuit recloser devices, Advise subscribers of powerline relocation or burial necessity and of the need for a Prevention of Powerline Contract Plan (PPCP) Receive executive training on the removal of powerline contact hazards. Require a PPCP

Building code authorities Crane operator certifier

Managerial

Technical Provide means to successfully implement PPCP, such as budgeting for stop-work time and onsite meetings to avoid unexpected problems.

Hiring of competent overseers (primary contractor, construction manager) dedicated to safety engineering principles, assure enough authority to enforce these goals Implementation of PPCP, Availability of proper materials: barricades, etc. Assure for written communication between parties Hold enough authority to stop work when possibility of hazard arises

Assure for written communication between parties

Require knowledge of mapping the Red Danger Zone

138

Enforce use of safety appliances and insulation as necessary, hold meetings when any unexpected problems arise Enforce use of safety appliances and insulation as necessary, hold meetings when any unexpected problems arise Attend meetings, stipulate proper and maximum insulation requirements

APPENDIX A:

CASE FILES

APPENDIX A-1 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, Maricopa County, AZ, #228130 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 4, 1968 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1970 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A crawler latticework crane used to lower four-foot diameter concrete culvert sections in order to construct a surface water drainage system down the center of a highway. HAZARD: Inadequate clearance for top of the boom from a 7200 V overhead powerline which was mid-span in the center of the highway and provided no visual clues on the ground to warn of an overhead powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Pre-job planning overlooked the presence of a singlephase powerline that extended across the highway to power a well. During construction, the district service linemen for the utility passed the construction activity four times a day and was aware of the danger, even gave one oral warning an hour prior to the contact, but did not temporarily disconnect the power for the period that the crane would be used under the powerline. The injured worker was in the trench releasing the lifting hook from a culvert section and the boom, which was nearly parallel to the ground, was raised approximately three feet into the powerline upon the release of tension. The injured sustained a loss of his right arm and other mutilations. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: The pre-job planning with the investor-owned utility failed to identify this powerline crossing for removal and provide an underground conduit, which was a pay item for the other powerlines. The utility district service lineman had not been instructed to de-energize the powerline whenever a powerline contact was imminent. The contractor was unaware of the availability of insulated links. As an employer, he was immune to liability. DISPOSITION: On June 13, 1973, a trial was held by agreement before a judge without a jury. As workers' compensation benefits were inadequate to support the disabled and the injured’s family, the judge ruled in behalf of the injured because the utility had failed to de-energize the powerlines while aware of imminent danger. NOTES: This case has become a landmark, as it was one of the very few first litigations that addressed liability of third parties as a defendant who could have eliminated the hazard. The issue of the adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits and social security is identified here to show that injury litigation arises to approportion to other parties who had the ability to prevent injury yet failed to act. This information generally applies to the other case studies in this appendix.

139

APPENDIX A-2

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U. S. Court, Oklahoma City, OK, # CJ-70-2177 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1970 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1970 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A house moving activity requiring it being placed on an extrawide lowboy trailer towed by a tow truck through the city streets HAZARD: Inadequate clearance from the house rooftop to powerlines SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A city moving permit required assistance of the electric utility companies to raise the powerlines when clearance was inadequate. The utility personnel failed to appear as agreed. The deceased was electrocuted when he positioned himself on the roof and attempted to raise the powerline several inches with a stick to allow passage of the house underneath. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The utility company failed to arrive at the worksite at the agreed time. Clearly, a stronger communication and commitment is needed by both the employer and the utility. ♦ The electric utility company should have lifted the powerlines for this circumstance. DISPOSITION: Settled in 1976 for the deceased. NOTES: This case was listed as representative of other occurrences, as well as to show the wide diversity of foreseeable construction activities which result in contacts with powerlines. It also shows the vital importance of good communication and understanding between house moving construction company and the electric utility.

140

APPENDIX A-3 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Illinois Appellate Court # 59549 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 20, 1970 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1974: Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A 50-foot latticework boom crane mounted on a truck, working adjacent to a 34,500 volt powerline 35 feet above the ground. HAZARD: Crane boom was raised directly into an overhead powerline, which was mid-span between power poles with no ground clues to alert workers to the danger zone created by the powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: On July 20, 1970, at approximately 9:00 am, a pipefitter was killed and two others permanently injured. One worker, after eight days in the hospital, lost his right hand and forearm through the necessity of amputation. By the first week of August, both legs were also amputated. In addition, the injury caused by electric shock required four operations to remove cataracts from each eye, leaving him industrially blind. A year after the accident, all of his teeth had to be removed because of the poor dental hygiene while hospitalized for skin grafts. The incident occurred while the victim was guiding a pipe over an eight-foot cyclone fence in order to reload the pipe on another truck. The boom struck the powerline as it was being raised from a 40-degree angle to a 70-degree angle. Both landowner and power company had keys to the gate of the enclosed area, rendering the lift unnecessary. If the keys had been utilized, the entire cause of the powerline contact would have been eliminated. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The landowner should have ensured access to the worksite to avoid unloading and reloading of the pipe over a fence, under a powerline. ♦ The power company was aware of 12 previous crane powerline contacts and should have avoided this unsafe loading process and made safety planning a priority. ♦ The crane manufacturer was aware of insulated links and boom cages (a wrap-around insulated frame that prevents direct contact of powerline to a boom) as well as electrostatic proximity alarms. They had not tested any of them, nor made an attempt to advise crane users of their availability. ♦ It was agreed by both the Power Company and the crane manufacturer that it is difficult to precisely judge the distance between the boom tip and wires from any vantage point when looking into the sun. Therefore, the above listed devices could have prevented the boom powerline contact and resulting death and maiming injuries. DISPOSITION: The trial court issued a directed verdict in behalf of the plaintiff, which was affirmed in 1978 by the Illinois Appellate Court. NOTES: This case includes the trial testimony of Bob Jenkins, who retired in 1964 as Chief of Safety for the entire U.S. Army Corps of Engineers after some 30 years with the agency. In his career, he was aware of a history of some seven hundred crane powerline contacts, experienced worldwide by Army Corps of Engineers on their construction projects. His testimony included that the original clearance of six feet did not appear adequate, so he raised the Corps standard to ten feet and found that this additional clearance (of thin air) did not reduce the occurrence of crane boom powerline contact. Additionally, he also developed requirements in the Corps of Engineers for the use of link and boom cages, all of which are included in this study’s Timeline. This historical information revealed a pattern of circumstances that is consistent with powerline contacts. The pattern needs to be broken by examining the specific causes that invite the crane operating personnel to be entrapped by a dangerous worksite. (Refer to the 1978 Commerce Clearinghouse, Inc., court reporting service, section 8175).

141

APPENDIX A-4 COURT AND CASE NUMBER:

Missouri Circuit Court, Jackson City, # CV75-0950

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1973 DATE CASE FILED: 1975 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: An insulated utility lineman’s aerial lift as defined in ANSI A92.2: Vehicle Mounted Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices, with specifications for “Insulating devices” was being used with a small metal jib boom attached to the lineman’s basket, which was not isolated by insulation from an uninsulated control handle. HAZARD: A phase to phase fault path for the operator in the lineman’s bucket when undertaking live hot line work. The boom of the equipment touches a live wire, which energizes the vehicle but does not allow for a ground fault circuit. When the utility lineman contacts a different wire, the current energizing the vehicle flows through him from the first wire into the second, seriously burning him in the process. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The lineman lost several fingers when the boom was presumed insulated and it brushed against one of three conductors on a power pole crossarms. The operator was using the boom to lift a transformer and made a fault current from the phase to phase when he brushed against a powerline with the boom when using the uninsulated control handle. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Absent was complete insulation in a non-conductive boom jib and insulated control handle. ♦ No warnings of the hazard or advising use of rubber gloves when positioning the aerial lifts. DISPOSITION: Settled on February 7, 1978, in behalf of the plaintiff. NOTES: This was the first of a number of such instances in which the jury was presented with expert testimony by the defense witness that the use of insulation is not a reasonable safeguard, as it promotes operator inattention. Several years later this company initiated a retrofit program to provide insulation on older models and started to include insulation as standard on newer machines. No design standards address this hazard.

142

APPENDIX A-5

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, El Paso County, CO, 80CV2309 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1974 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1981 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A straddle crane approximately 20 feet tall with dimensions of 30 by 40 feet. HAZARD: Straddle crane of sufficient height to reach the 7200 V powerlines and blind zones; the operator is unable to see overhead obstructions when traveling, and the point of contact was mid-span, offering no clear view of either supporting power pole to warn of imminent danger. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured was severely burned when while holding a shackle to attach a load to the lifting beam, the operator backed the straddle crane into a powerline that crossed the work area of an outdoor plant. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: The removal of overhead powerlines from areas where high clearance equipment is used. (See National Electric Code interpretations), which provides no safe clearance for high clearance equipment. An insulated non-conductive lifting beam assembly and the use of an electrostatic proximity alarm to warn when powerlines are being approached. There needs to be a closer inter-dependence of communication between utility companies and industrial work sites. DISPOSITION: Settlement in behalf of the injured. NOTES: This was the first of several occurrences where high-clearance overhead straddle cranes struck overhead powerlines.

143

APPENDIX A-6

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Henry County, IN # 77-C-470 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 30, 1975 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1976 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A mobile rough terrain, 18-ton hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom, being used to construct a water treatment plant. Powerlines had not been removed from the work area. HAZARD: Crane hoist line contact with 7,200 V powerline, as the work area for the crane violated the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The foreman lost feet and hands while guiding materials being unloaded from a truck and the hoist line struck a 13,800 V powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Remove the powerlines from the construction area before work commences. ♦ Use of insulated link and electrostatic proximity alarm as a backup safeguard. ♦ Provide users with instructions on how to map the danger zone created by the powerline. DISPOSITION: A jury verdict was decided in behalf of the injured. Case appealed and upheld by Appellate Court. NOTES: Dr. Middendorf was the first psychologist to present testimony of inaccuracies of visual estimates of crane boom or hoist clearances from powerlines.

144

APPENDIX A-7

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Merced, CA DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 14, 1975 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1976 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Auger/Agricultural feed truck with a boom used to fill a feed bin at a dairy farm. HAZARD: Powerlines were strung immediately next to the feed bin, where weekly deliveries are made and operator is required to stand on the ground operating boom controls. The bin should have been located outside the danger zone created by the powerlines. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Feed-truck delivery man electrocuted while positioning a conductive auger boom to load the feed bin and struck a powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Electric utility improvement district should have coordinated a relocation of the powerlines with the landowner (farmer), to provide for safe feed-bin loading. ♦ The controls for controlling the feed truck boom should be totally non-conductive to prevent a ground fault current flow. ♦ The boom of the feed truck should consist of non-conductive materials DISPOSITION: Case was settled for the injured in 1975. NOTES: This case was listed to show the variety of equipment which is capable of making powerline contact and the need for a greater coordination of hazard identification between the electric utility and the property owners. Further, the operator’s station should be designed so the operator cannot operate the controls when standing on the ground.

145

APPENDIX A-8

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: McAllan, TX DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 11, 1976 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1978 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A portable (wheel mounted) small Auger conveyor used to load round, 20 foot tall, corrugated grain storage bins. These portable small Augers can be rolled from one area to another to load grain dumped on the ground. The work area included a 7,200 V powerline. HAZARD: This upraised conveyor could be rolled into an overhead powerline. The powerlines and grain bins instantly create a hazard when they are close to each other, regardless of the use of boomed equipment. No equipment should penetrate the powerline danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Two men were electrocuted and one seriously injured while they were moving the elevating auger to position in order to load another bin. They misjudged the clearance and the boom struck the powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The rural Electric Cooperative should have coordinated powerline location with the farmer to ensure that it did not pose a danger of conflict with portable auger elevators. ♦ Design of these augers should incorporate an insulating plastic sleeve on the upper portion of the portable elevator to prevent injury in the event of powerline contact. DISPOSITION: Settled in 1985 with ample lifetime provision for the two widows. NOTES: This case was included because it addresses a dire need for electric cooperatives to work with their member owners to eliminate hazardous powerline locations. It is also a reminder that no elevating vehicle is exempt from the hazard of powerline contact.

146

APPENDIX A-9

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, King County, Seattle, WA # 827915 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 13, 1977 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1982 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A utility lineman’s mounted rotating aerial insulated lift, used to work on energized powerlines. HAZARD: A phase to phase contact, which often involves utility linemen in aerial lifts with uninsulated parts. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The Electric Utility Lineman lost both arms, which had to be surgically removed at the shoulders as the aerial lift insulation had been compromised when insulated hydraulic hoses were replaced with steel re-enforced conductive hoses in order to overcome the frequent rupture of non-conductive hoses. Maintenance personnel were not provided adequate information in the maintenance manual nor specific warnings for the type of authorized manufacturer’s hoses that were to be used. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Parts and components specifically designed to overcome a specific hazard should include a permanent warning label to ensure that maintenance personnel are aware of the inherent hazards and danger of the use of unauthorized components. ♦ The manufacturers should identify critical parts with a warning system for design review to ensure for product safe maintainability. DISPOSITION: 1978 verdict in behalf of the injured. NOTES: These lineman’s aerial lifts were the subject of previous litigation concerning lack of design insulation (see A-4), and this case serves to reveal yet another lack of insulation failure mode.

147

APPENDIX A-10

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Cook County, Chicago, IL # 78L 15211 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 6, 1977 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: July 31, 1978 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental crane with a latticework boom being used to place gravel along a freeway. HAZARD: The presence of 7,200 volt powerlines parallel to the work area. The point of contact was mid-span between the power poles. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The rental crane was backing into the powerline and the pinup guylines that support the latticework boom contacted the powerline. The workman who was in front of the crane guiding the gravel bucket was electrocuted. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Pre-job planning to identify adequate space to position the crane with its back to the powerline. ♦ Use of an insulated link on the hoist line would have interrupted the flow of current to the worker. ♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have provided warning the powerline was being approached from the rear of the crane. DISPOSITION: Case settled in behalf of the family of the deceased. NOTES: The crane rental firm was aware of the location close to powerlines where the crane was intended to be used and did not offer or provide an insulated link or proximity device. During litigation, the crane manufacturer and rental council presented several witnesses who speculated that the insulated link and electrostatic proximity alarm could not have prevented the death of the worker.

148

APPENDIX A-11 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 250th Judicial District, Travis City, TX # 279080 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 21, 1977 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1980 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental mobile hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom working at a construction site adjacent to 7,200 V powerlines. HAZARD: Hoist line struck the powerline somewhere mid-span between the supporting power poles. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: One man was killed and two seriously burned when guiding a load to be lifted. The hoist line struck the powerline when it cleared the ground. The crane rental firm was aware that the crane would be used in close proximity to powerlines, but did not offer to equip the crane with safety appliances nor deny use of the crane to the construction firm. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The storage area of construction materials underneath the powerline was unsafe. ♦ Pre-construction planning would have identified an unsafe construction operating area for cranes, therefore the “Danger Zone” would be breached only with special caution. ♦ An insulated link would have interrupted the flow of current, preventing the loss of life and the injuries of two men. ♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have certainly ensured for greater worker awareness of a serious life-taking hazard. ♦ The crane rental company should have denied rental of the crane to be used in such a dangerous location or equipped the crane with an insulated link and proximity alarm. DISPOSITION: Settlement in behalf of the deceased and injured. NOTES: This case introduces the need to prohibit storage of construction material under or adjacent to powerlines. This is also a case where defense presented several witnesses who speculated that the use of insulated links and proximity alarms could not have prevented the death and injuries.

149

APPENDIX A-12

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. Federal Court, Eastern District, Philadelphia, PA # 79-989 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: March 24, 1978 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1979 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A truck mounted pedestal crane with the controls accessible to an operator standing on the ground, used in a construction site. HAZARD: In the event of a powerline contact the current goes directly through the operator, who is made the primary ground-fault circuit, as the truck has rubber tires and its outriggers are on dry wooden pads. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The operator was instantly electrocuted when the hoist line struck the 7,200 V powerline at a point mid-span between the power poles. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ This type of crane, with controls accessible to an operator standing on the ground, is inherently unsafe. ♦ A system safety analysis should have been performed at the time of the design. DISPOSITION: Case settled in behalf of the plaintiff. NOTES: This type of control arrangement was discontinued, as the various manufacturers of this type of flat bed mounted pedestal cranes recognized that they were inherently dangerous. Crane safety standards do not address this hazard nor require the controls to be located where they cannot be operated by someone standing on the ground.

150

APPENDIX A-13

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Law Division, Cook County, Chicago, IL # 78L 2395 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 7, 1978 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1978 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Rotating Auger drill rig with a 25-foot mast, used at a coal mining operation service center located under powerlines. HAZARD: The mast contacted an overhead powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The maintenance man was electrocuted when he raised the mast of the drill rig in a confined service area and it struck an overhead powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ A raised operator’s platform would isolate the operator from a ground fault circuit. ♦ A Proximity alarm would warn of the overhead danger. ♦ Removal of the powerlines from the strip mining operations is the most effective way to eliminate the hazard. DISPOSITION: On September 19, 1978, the case was settled in behalf of the injured. NOTES: Some of the newer machines of this type had an enclosed operator’s cab, which removed the operator from this hazard. However, this type of contact was not an isolated occurrence, as in strip mining activities powerlines often cross the mining area.

151

APPENDIX A-14 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, 11th Judicial District, Dade County, FL # 81-12663-CA-30 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 4, 1980 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1981 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A forklift used to create a mobile staging for assembling a metal building. HAZARD: A mid-span contact between 7,200 V powerline and staging. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Forklift operator, when backing the forklift carrying a metal scaffold under a powerline, struck the powerline with the scaffold. The current traveled through the metal scaffold and energized the forklift. Apparently the operator was electrocuted when he attempted to leave the forklift. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Construction safety planning would have identified the limited space for operating a forklift supporting a scaffold. ♦ The scaffold could have been constructed of non-conductive materials. ♦ Remove or relocate powerlines away from construction work area. DISPOSITION: The case was settled in 1984 on behalf of the widow. NOTES: This case was included to illustrate the fact that the use of a forklift can involve a powerline contact, and stresses the need to relocate or otherwise remove the powerlines when any equipment with a high clearance is used.

152

APPENDIX A-15 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 131st Judicial District, Bexar County, San Antonio TX, #84-CI04130 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1983 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1984 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A mobile hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom was being used to help develop an industrial park. Initially, there were many unenergized powerlines in the alleyways. HAZARD: Hoist line of crane struck a previously de-energized municipal powerline mid-span between the poles. It had been re-energized with 7,200 V of power. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Two workmen were seriously injured: one lost both legs one arm while the other had badly burned feet and hands. They were guiding materials to assemble a roof. The crane was being used by various contractors to assemble tilt-up warehouses. When the work commenced no powerlines had been strung in the alleyways. As the development progressed, the powerlines being erected were not available for service, and contractors were required to use their own portable generators. The industrial park had two roads from the main highway. The south entry was used by the workmen at this project, and the pole at this entry had a large coil of distribution line conspicuously hanging on the cross arms, preparing to connect across the highway to the transmission line. Unseen by the workers, a half-mile to the north road, the powerlines were attached to the main transmission line. The municipal electric company did not inform the various contractors that the powerlines had been energized. The utility lineman’s logic stated that such a warning was unnecessary, as everyone should consider every powerline to be energized. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The industrial park should have been designed with underground electric utilities. ♦ He municipal utilities should have advised all the contractors when they energized the powerlines. ♦ An insulated link would have prevented the injuries. ♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have alerted the crane operator that the powerlines had been energized. DISPOSITION: In December 1984 the utility company settled in behalf of the injured. NOTES: The defendants presented an expert witness who said it was normal to energize the powerline when the service was not being provided. The National Electric Safety Code specifically requires that powerlines not immediately used or abandoned should not be energized. This case also stresses the vital nature of workplace communication, especially between independent contractors using cranes. Paragraphs 210 and 211 of NESC 1977 state that all practical measures must be taken to ensure worker safety, and even NESC 1984 tries to promote communication between construction and electric utility. The electric utility has no excuse for a situation like this.

153

APPENDIX A-16

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Columbia Division, SC # 3:84-3141 & 3044-0 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 21, 1983 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1984 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A truck-mounted pedestal hydraulic telescoping boom crane used in construction. HAZARD: Backing with a raised boom into the unmarked danger zone of a powerline on the worksite. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured, working alone, (loading materials stored under powerlines) received serious 3rd degree burns from a 7,200 V powerline when he exited the truck to investigate what had just happened. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned the injured that he was backing into a powerline. ♦ Do not store construction materials under powerlines. ♦ A signalman to guide the operator and map the Danger Zone should have been provided to work with the operator. DISPOSITION: The case was settled in June, 1987. NOTES: A flatbed truck-mounted pedestal hydraulic vehicle has a great deal of utility for picking up small loads for delivery on the worksite where workmen need building materials, and because of its versatility should be equipped with an appliance such as an electrostatic proximity alarm.

154

APPENDIX A-17 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Oklahoma County; Oklahoma City, OK # CJ-84-52 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1984 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1984 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large truck-mounted latticework boom rental crane, being used to remodel an electric utility substation. HAZARD: Powerline contact in an unmarked danger zone, with a frame and pinup guys that support the boom. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The crane was leased with an operator by the contractor remodeling the substation. The work was completed and crane needed to be backed to have room to lower the boom so that the crane could be driven off the premises under the powerlines over the entryway. In so doing, the signalman was unaware that the crane was being backed into the 7,200 volt powerline to the rear of the crane. The operator jumped out of the crane to see what was wrong- it is presumed he believed the circuit breaker had momentarily de-energized the line, and when attempting to get on the truck to move it forward was electrocuted. At the time of the occurrence his co-workers were calling a warning not to board the truck until the arcing had stopped AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned all of the personnel that the crane was approaching the powerline to the rear of the crane. ♦ The work area should have been mapped with cranes or other marks to show on the ground the safe limits of movement of the crane before the crane was to be positioned in order to cover the boom. DISPOSITION: The subcontractor settled on behalf of the deceased, but the crane manufacturer and crane rental firm were found blameless for not providing an electrostatic proximity alarm. NOTES: The same model of crane was brought to the work site and an electrostatic proximity alarm was installed with a sensing antenna inside of the boom. This location was unique, as there were other powerlines in the immediate vicinity. When the crane was positioned in the same location the proximity alarm worked perfectly to warn that the crane was being backed into the powerline to the rear. Tests were recorded on video and still available. The judge would not allow the jury to see the tape or hear testimony that the proximity alarm was a lifesaving device, as the tests were done after the fatality occurred. 155

APPENDIX A-18

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Cook County, IL # 85-L-15975 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 28, 1985 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1985 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental truck mounted hydraulic crane leased by the railroad for work on a train wreck site. HAZARD: Hoist line struck a 7,200 V powerline mid-span. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured worker lost both arms while removing a motor from a locomotive for the railroad, and clearance from the powerline was misjudged. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ An insulated link would have saved the worker from loss of both arms. ♦ The electric cooperative should have been contacted to de-energize the powerlines. ♦ The use of electrostatic proximity alarm could have alerted the railroad workers to the fact that the boom and the hoist line were too close to the powerlines. DISPOSITION: Settled in 1989 in behalf of the injured. NOTES: Railroad cases do not appear in OSHA reporting. This makes the hazard all the more dangerous because all such occurrences are not recorded. Fortunately, several of the larger railroads install the electrostatic proximity alarm on their own cranes. A number of railroads have installed proximity alarms on equipment that they own, and have succeeded in avoiding all powerline contacts. In this case the railroad leased a crane with an operator with no requirements for a link or proximity alarm.

156

APPENDIX A-19 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 79th Judicial District, Wells County, TX # 24 978 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 5, 1985 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1986 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large straddle crane used to lift pre-cast concrete beam for loading on trucks at a pre-cast concrete plant. HAZARD: 7,200 V powerline contact in an unmarked danger zone in the work area. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The truck driver was electrocuted while guiding the load for placement on his truck’s trailer and the straddle crane struck a powerline spanning the work area. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Remove the powerlines from the work area. ♦ Map the Danger Zone where movement of the straddle crane is prohibited. DISPOSITION: Jury verdict against the planer owner for a dangerous truck-loading location. NOTES: This case example also shows the diversity of types of equipment which contacts powerlines, and illustrates that this type of equipment has had multiple powerline contacts (see Appendix A-5).

157

APPENDIX A-20

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: # 902-01524

Circuit Court, St. Louis, MO; Division 1

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 24, 1989 DATE CASE FILED: 1990 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: Hydraulic raised flatbed mounted cable trolley boom controlled with an electric tether. HAZARD: Powerline contact from boom raised approximately 30 degrees and rotated into the 7,200 V powerline. The boom was controlled by an electric cable remote control held by an operator who was standing on the ground. The crane was being used in an unmarked danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured lost both hands and feet while using the tethered cable control as he rotated the boom that brushed against overhead powerlines. The boom truck was located adjacent to the powerline, requiring the block to be unloaded from the bed of the truck that the crane was mounted on. The task required that a pallet of concrete block be rotated under the powerline and placed on the staging where a building wall was being erected. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Relocation of the powerline prior to the commencement of construction ♦ Insulated boom ♦ A non-conductive control system of either fiber optics, radio, or pneumatic DISPOSITION: settled on behalf of the injured. NOTES: This incident was part of a cluster of some 32 occurrences involving umbilical booms made by the same manufacturer. It was also found that some of the relays were unreliable due to low quality and had caused the control system to not perform correctly, such as an instance when the control system directed the boom to lover but the boom continued to raise. When working in the vicinity of powerlines, this sort of malfunction often resulted in serious burns to the operator. The crane safety standards have no requirements for remote controls to be nonconductive.

158

APPENDIX A-21

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, City of Saint Louis, MO # 912-09826 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: February 23, 1990 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1992 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A flat bed, truck mounted pedestal hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom used to unload highway curb forms along a highway construction project. HAZARD: Powerline contact mid-span across a freeway being constructed resulted from raising boom into powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The deceased was a longtime foreman who was assisting the laying out of curb forms for concrete paving of a new freeway. He and the truck driver would drive a few feet ahead, stop the truck, unload a curb form, then move on ahead to repeat the task. They visually were aware of a transmission powerline and avoided raising the crane boom. A half-mile down the highway under construction, a single-phase 7,200 V powerline (single wire) crossed the roadway. When picking up the first steel form to be unloaded from the flat bed and slued the boom to the side and towards the front of the truck, the hoist line struck the powerline and the foreman who was standing on the ground guiding a curb form to where it should be placed. Neither he nor the crane operator (the truck driver) was aware of the powerline crossing the road. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Provide an electrostatic proximity alarm. ♦ Provide an insulated link. DISPOSITION: Settled in 1994 on behalf of the widow. NOTES: The contractor immediately purchased an electrostatic proximity alarm and an insulated link and used both of them for a month with an opportunity for each of their crane operators and crew to use the devices. They then purchased fifteen of the proximity alarms and installed one on each of their cranes and a pumpcrete machine. They have used them continuously for the last decade and have had NO powerline contacts. Each of the crane operators considers the proximity alarm essential for their safe operations. See timeline for Mr. Andrew’s affidavit on December 12, 1999.

159

APPENDIX A-22

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Hale County, Alabama # CV- 90- 75 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 9, 1990 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1990 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: An 8-ton flatbed mounted pedestal crane used to conduct a one-time off-load aeration machinery for the catfish ponds being constructed. HAZARD: Contact mid-span with newly installed powerlines presumed not to be energized, as the facility was still under construction. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Deceased was electrocuted when the crane’s hoist line became entangled with the powerline. The deceased fell down onto the outriggers and received serious burns for five minutes before the hoist was disengaged from the powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Coordination between the electric utility and the construction company. ♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned the crane operator and workers that the powerline was now energized, even if no one else had. ♦ An insulated link would have prevented a fatal flow of current. DISPOSITION: Settled in 1992 in behalf of the widow. NOTES: This case example is a reminder of the importance of communication between the electric utility companies and any site or situation where there could be boomed equipment. The electrostatic proximity alarm is a reminder that one must always respect the presence of powerlines.

160

APPENDIX A-23

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Muskegon County, MI, # 90-27050- NO DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 13, 1990 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1990 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Sixth wheel semi dump truck bed which could be raised 24 feet in the air, which was being cleaned at a location designated for cleaning. HAZARD: The bed was raised somewhere mid-span into a 4,600 V powerline only 21 feet high. The powerline was in a designated work area that was inside a danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A workman was electrocuted when hosing down the semi truck bed when it struck a powerline. Workers were unaware that the dump bed could reach the powerlines. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Locate a work area designated for cleaning away from any powerlines. ♦ Provide insulation on the upper rims of the dump bed. ♦ An electrostatic proximity warning device could detect the overhead powerline and be interlocked to prevent raising the dump bed when under powerlines. DISPOSITION: Settled in June 1992 in behalf of the widow. NOTES: This case was selected to be part of the 50 case samples to illustrate the diversity of types of equipment that comes into contact with powerlines. Though a dump truck seems an unlikely vehicle to contact powerlines, incidences happen much too often to be considered a rare occurrence. Records indicate at least fifty cases of dump beds raised into powerlines, resulting in death and serious injury. Typical of other occurrences is the delivery of gravel to a residential site and the dump bed is raised into a powerline. Usually someone is touching the truck (for instance, to pay the driver) when the bed raises into the powerline. Presumption that this type of an occurrence is a “freak accident” only intensifies the need to develop managerial acceptance that the hazard of powerline contact is their responsibility. The workforce cannot be assumed to be responsible to avoid the hazard when provided a location under powerlines to wash their trucks.

161

APPENDIX A-24

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, San Bernardino County, CA, # HBCV008492 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 18, 1991 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1992 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A side mounted tractor boom laying oil pipeline under a transmission line. HAZARD: The boom contacted a powerline mid-span in a workplace that was within a danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Pipeline company requested permission for laying pipeline across an electric utilities transmission line easement; the utility company ignored the request and offered no coordination on how the task could be completed safely. The work proceeded without clearance and three men sustained serious electrical burns when they were in contact with the pipe when it was being maneuvered into the trench under the sagging transmission powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ This case shows the dire need for utility and construction management to ensure for safety coordination in pre-construction safety planning. ♦ Tractor side-mounted booms should have a warning chart showing the boom elevation at various angles. DISPOSITION: Settled in behalf of the injured on April 4, 1995. NOTES: This case was included to show the diversity of equipment involved in powerline contact and the importance of management involvement in construction pre-job safety planning. The tractor manufacturer began providing warning labels for their tractor pipe laying side booms.

162

APPENDIX A-25

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Montgomery County, MD, # 117274-V DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 21, 1992 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: November 12, 1996 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental mobile hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom used to place concrete on a freeway overpass and interchange. HAZARD: The crane hoist struck the powerline mid-span in a workplace that entered into the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A worker, when standing on a partially completed elevated access ramp underneath another access ramp, was guiding a concrete bucket to pour paving at ground level, two stories below. An overhead powerline had not been relocated, as the general contractor believed that the interchange construction could complete the work without relocating the powerline. Even highway construction funds authorized such an expense. The electric utility company at the construction planning meeting made no effort to recommend burying the powerline before construction commenced. The State Highway Department did not include powerline relocation as part of the design. Additionally, the crane rental firm, when monitoring the use of the crane for maintenance purposes, was fully aware that the crane was being used dangerously close to the powerlines, but made no effort to intercede. The worker lost both of his arms. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Preplanning at the time of design would have included relocating the powerlines ♦ Relocating the powerlines at the time of construction would have been a funded change order. ♦ The crane rental firm had authority to remove the crane from a dangerous location. ♦ Provision for an insulated link would have prevented the injury. DISPOSITION: Settled in August 1997 in behalf of the injured. NOTES: Dr. George Karady presented his test data in deposition that the use of an insulated link would have prevented the injury.

163

APPENDIX A-26

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: State of North Carolina, General Court of Justice, County of New Hanover # 94-CVS-997 DATE OF OCCURRENCE:

February 1, 1993

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1994 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Non-insulated aerial lift used in a movie lot to construct and remodel sets from the service area, which contained overhead powerlines that supplied power to all the movie sets. HAZARD: Operator of the aerial lift made contact with a 7,200 volt powerline in a work area that was in the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The aerial lift operator sustained serious head, shoulder and arm burns when he raised the lift into an overhead powerline while working on remodeling a movie set from the service area at the rear of the set. The injured party’s burns were so disfiguring that he had to wear a sack over his head for three years so he would not frighten his wife and children while undergoing numerous skin graft operations. The injured did not see the powerline, as he was blinded when looking into the sun. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The hazard could have been eliminated at the time of construction by simply following the suggestions of the power company to bury the powerlines. ♦ The aerial lift should have been equipped with a non-conductive boom with an insulated basket. An insulated basket with a non-conductive frame of plastic piping would have guarded the operator from contacts with the powerline.

DISPOSITION: The jury verdict in July, 1999 ruled in favor of the injured. The insurer of the lot appealed the judgment to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the verdict in behalf of the injured was upheld. The aerial lift manufacturer and rental agency settled prior to trial. NOTES: This is an excellent example where the involvement of the landowner was needed to ensure for buried powerlines, so the movie lot would have been safe for its intended use. Further, the crane manufacturer and its dealer/rental agency had an aerial lift model with a non-conductive boom, which was suitable for use. The aerial lift manufacturer’s sales literature and operating manual showed an illustration of the aerial lift in use under a powerline. They also made another model of the same lift that incorporated non-conductive booms, as used by electric utility linemen. Had a crane such as this been used, the powerline contact would not have caused injury, as the injured would not have been grounded.

164

APPENDIX A-27

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: TX #94-CV-1233

District Court, 212th Judicial District, Galveston Co,

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 8, 1993 DATE CASE FILED:

1994

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: A telescoping pedestal hydraulic crane mounted on a flat-bed truck equipped with a makeshift uninsulated basket. HAZARD: Mid-span 7,200 V powerline contact with the uninsulated man basket in the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured sustained the loss of his right arm, which had to be amputated from a high-voltage shock. He was attempting to hook the hoist to the lifting straps of a load to be lifted onto the bed of the boom truck. The materials to be lifted were stored under a powerline. The crane manufacturer offered for sale an insulated man basket for their crane, but the victim’s employer had chosen not to purchase it. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Materials should not be stored under powerlines. ♦ The use of the manufacturer’s insulated man basket would have prevented contact and therefore injury. ♦ The use of an insulated link would have prevented the injury ♦ A range limiting device would have prevented the boom from being raised into the powerline. DISPOSITION: Settled in 2000 just prior to trial in behalf of the injured. NOTES: Again, the storage of material under powerlines only invites workers to use a crane. The practice of storing material under powerlines should be prohibited. Years later, the plaintiff’s attorney who inherited this case at the time of the original attorney’s retirement contacted Mr. Andrews (from Case A-21) and secured an affidavit taken on 99.12.29 (listed in the timeline) attesting to the benefits of safety appliances.

165

APPENDIX A-28

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Saint Louis, MO, # 942-08925 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: November 9, 1993 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1995 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rough terrain mobile hydraulic rental crane with a telescoping boom being used on a construction site. HAZARD: Hoist line contact with a mid-span powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The crane operator chose to rotate the boom 180 degrees East to West on the side towards the powerlines when there was ample room to rotate the boom 180 degrees on the side away from the 7,200 V powerline. The worker guiding the load was severely burned. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The crane operator/supervisor should have mapped the Danger Zone created by the powerline and had the area clearly marked, requiring the crane operator to rotate the crane away from the powerline. DISPOSITION: The injured settled for a small amount rather than risk a trial and the inherent harassment by the defense counsel. NOTES: This is a case where human factors play a large roll. The crane was swung in the improper direction, but it most likely would not have been if the Danger Zone had been properly marked. The most obvious warnings that show the location of the Danger Zone on the ground save the most lives.

166

APPENDIX A-29

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Federal Court, District of Colombia, Washington, D.C., # 000142 b-95 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: February 22, 1994 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1995 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: An Electronic News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast, owned and maintained by a major television network. HAZARD: Raising a pneumatic mast of a News Gathering Van into a 7,200 V powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Pending the TV reporting of an important news story, all of the major network news gathering vans had assembled on the same site. One van pulled into a parking spot immediately behind another station’s van, whose mast and antenna was already raised. While sitting on the floor of the van with the side door open, the deceased raised the pneumatic mast of his van into the parkway shade trees and was apparently unaware of the overhead powerlines. He was immediately electrocuted, and the terrible occurrence was videotaped by several of the other TV networks while aid was being rushed to the victim. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Some five years prior to this occurrence, the U.S. Army developed border surveillance SUV’s with pneumatic masts, but had equipped these vehicles with electrostatic powerline proximity detectors wired so that the mast could not be raised when parked under or near a powerline. The reason for this safeguard on some 25 vehicles used along the Mexican border was because the surveillance was done at night with a quick set-up, with little time to look for powerlines. The manufacturer of the pneumatic mast had been notified by the army of this safety development, but had yet to act on it. ♦ The van’s antenna system should have incorporated some type of insulation framework to prevent the antenna from touching the powerline. ♦ Mast raising controls should be located in the van in such a way that they cannot be manipulated unless the operator is standing safely inside the van and cannot operate them when standing on the ground. DISPOSITION: Some of the parties settled. Others proceeded to a jury verdict in behalf of the deceased’s dependants. NOTES: All of the news media is quick to make public the misfortune of other organizations, yet held information back when an incident struck so close to them. The management of the major networks had a wonderful opportunity to inform their local stations and subscribers of the life-saving need for use of the electrostatic proximity warning device, and assist in funding these necessary appliances. Instead, they kept silent, shirking their responsibility to ensure for own industry’s workplace safety, which led to additional wrongful injuries of the same nature (see Appendix A-31, A-37, etc).

167

APPENDIX A-30

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, Southern District, IA, #3-96-CV70065 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 5, 1994 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: May 23, 1995 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A digger derrick on a telescoping boom truck, multiple purpose vehicle used by electric utility linemen. HAZARD: The truck’s boom contacted a 7,200 V powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The deceased utility lineman was instantly electrocuted when the boom tip struck the powerline while he was using a long Kelly bar to rotate a screw anchor. He was not provided a short Kelly bar, which would have prevented the need for raising the boom to begin placing a screw anchor for a guyline anchor underneath a powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Provide a short Kelly bar for installing guy line screw anchors to avoid the need to raise the boom close to the powerline. ♦ Provide a non-conductive boom tip and a plastic shield for digger derricks as it is foreseeable that these digger derricks will be operated under powerlines to install screw anchors and excavate holes for setting new power poles. DISPOSITION: Case was settled in 1998 NOTES: Previous to the incident, plastic shielding was developed and installed on vehicle mounted aerial lifts used by linemen to prevent phase to phase injuries to linemen. The same use of insulation would have redundant backup protection of workmen from powerline contact by equipment known to be used near powerlines.

168

APPENDIX A-31

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District of South Carolina, Charleston Division # 2:96-2106-1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: August 9, 1994 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1995 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: An Electronic News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast. HAZARD: Injured unintentionally raised mast into unseen 7,200 V powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The operator, when covering a news breaking story, was unaware of the overhead powerline and raised the antenna while standing on the ground and reaching into the van to raise the mast and received burns that required his foot to be amputated. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Since their debut in the Army surveillance unit, proximity warning devices for pneumatic-masted vehicles have been met with overwhelming popularity as effective tools against powerline contact. The manufacturer of the van and owner of the news network should have acquired this appliance for the van. ♦ The van’s antenna system should have incorporated a type of insulation. ♦ Mast raising controls should be located in the van in such a way that they cannot be manipulated unless the operator is standing safely inside the van. DISPOSITION: Settled in behalf of the injured. NOTES: This case was included in the Appendix to show how the management of even a relatively tight knit, specialized industry is unable to provide a retrofit throughout the whole industry.

169

APPENDIX A-32

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, State of Washington, County of King, # 94-2-32501-9 SEA DATE OF OCCURRENCE: December 28, 1994, 5:00 PM DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1994 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Truck equipped with a boomed shingle conveyor was being used in a residential area with overhead 7,200 V powerlines. HAZARD: Conveyor boom truck curb-side mid-span powerline contact where visibility was impaired by a cloudy dusk background. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Worker was instantly electrocuted when a truck mounted shingle conveyor contacted a powerline after they had loaded the shingles onto the roof of the residence and were preparing to leave. The untrained employee was a recent high school graduate and was placing tools in the storage cabinet on the side of the conveyor truck. He was unaware that the conveyor boom was being rotated into the powerline. The boom operator misjudged the clearance of the boom, as it was approaching nightfall on a cloudy late afternoon in December. A powerline contact, and the ending of a life, occurred as the operator rotated the boom back to travel position. The truck was equipped with no safeguards such as in insulated non-conductive boom or electrostatic proximity warning alarm. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The feasibility of designing a non-conductive boom and conveyor was well within the state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture. ♦ Provide an electrostatic proximity warning device to alert the operator that the boom was being rotated into a powerline, so he would have the opportunity to avoid the dangerous collision. Such a device could also have warned the deceased if he had been trained about the hazards of powerline contact. DISPOSITION: Settled in favor of Plaintiff on May 17, 1996. NOTES: One year after settling the case, the defendant conveyor company designed and installed a non-conductive boom on all new equipment manufactured. They also initiated a retrofit program to enhance the safety of all of their existing equipment. The development of a non-conductive conveyor boom was a progressive and proactive approach to electrical safety, and corroborates the notion that the most important route to safe workplaces is achieved by design.

170

APPENDIX A-33

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, PA April Term 1997 # 2386 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 24, 1995 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1996 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Knuckle-boom crane equipped with a hardwire remote control electrical umbilical cord. Adjacent row houses were being restored in a historic part of Philadelphia, where overhead powerlines had been installed rather than buried. HAZARD: A knuckle-boom contact with a 13,200 V mid-span powerline – the conductive wire remote control system created a ground-fault path to the crane operator. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The worker sustained severe disabling injuries including the loss of both hands, and burns on the legs and stomach. He was holding an electrical hardwire remote control to a truck-mounted knuckle boom underneath a 13,200 volt powerline to off-load twelve foot long sheet rock into the upstairs of a row house. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Buried electric utilities have been feasible for years, and would have eliminated the hazard of powerline contact, making safer the foreseeable use of cranes in restoration projects. In addition, the historical ambiance of the neighborhood would be vastly enhanced, as there were no powerlines in the early 1800’s when the row houses were built. ♦ Handheld radio remote controls are safer than hardwire remote controls. DISPOSITION: Settled in favor of plaintiff in January 1999. NOTES: Historic district restoration planning should address the issue of buried utilities for both safety and aesthetic purposes. Safety standards should include requirements for non-conductive remote controls, as this hazard is the source of many injuries and deaths.

171

APPENDIX A-34

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: State of Indiana, County of Lake # 45DO5-9704-651 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 23, 1995 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: August 9, 1995 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large truck mounted crane with a latticework boom, used for pile driving for a bridge building project. HAZARD: Contact with relocated 7,200 V powerlines that were in the work area danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: When attaching the sling to the hoist line hook to lift a piling into the dragline leads, the workman sustained injuries from severe shock. The crane was being rotated to position the hook near the pile to be lifted and the “A” Frame to the rear of the crane cab, which supports the boom’s pinup guys, brushed against the relocated powerlines. At the time the electric utility had made plans to relocate the powerlines, but there was no coordination between the utility and power company and the contractor. The relocation of the lines only provided safe clearance of the crane from the powerlines when the pilings for the bridge footings would be driven on the south side of the river. No consideration was given to the need for safe clearance when driving pilings on the north side of the River. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ When the power company is notified by a contractor, a safety planning meeting must be established between the power company and the contractor. It should encompass the equipment and area that the crane will be using for the entire project, rather than the decisions made by the utility line personnel, who arrive on the job site when it is inactive and make a judgment that is inadequate for the jobsite’s needs, such as the one to relocate the powerlines on the North side of the river because of the assumption that the crane will remain, and be safe on the South side. ♦ Warning could have been achieved with an electrostatic proximity alarm. ♦ An insulated link would have prevented hazardous current flow to the rigger who was attaching a sting to the hook. DISPOSITION: The case was settled in March 2002. NOTES: Construction safety planning to avoid crane powerline contact requires management involvement of both the contractor and the electric utility safety director and the contractor’s safety director to ensure that the powerlines will be relocated out of harm’s way is time well spent.

172

APPENDIX A-35

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, District of South Carolina, Andover Division # C.A. 8-96-1064-20 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 13, 1995 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1996 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A 35 ton truck-mounted hydraulic crane with telescoping boom working adjacent to a powerline, next to a facility under construction. HAZARD: Unwieldy, conductive steel “I” Beam contacted 7,200 V powerline, and there was nothing to block the flow of current. The crane was being used within the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: While lifting a steel “I” beam next to a powerline, the worker sustained serious burns to hands and feet, requiring seven surgeries, including amputation of toes and fingers, tracheotomy, and skin grafts. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Use of non-conductive taglines would have prevented this injury. ♦ Pre-construction powerline safety planning must involve the general contractor, subcontractor, and electric utility company in order to relocate powerlines before construction commences. ♦ An insulated link would have been able to stop the flow of current down the crane, thus preventing this injury. ♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have created awareness of the crane operator and operating crews. They would have realized that this operation put the crane within too close a proximity to powerlines, and that other arrangements needed to be taken before the lifting could proceed. DISPOSITION: A verdict for the injured was established on December 11, 1996 NOTES: The total area in which to lift large beams was inherently unsafe, too close to powerlines. The powerlines should have been removed before the work started. The use of the electrostatic proximity alarm provides the worker an opportunity to request management for a change to safer methods as well as heightening operator awareness.

173

APPENDIX A-36 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County, PA # 98-CIV-147 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: January 17, 1996 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1998 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A fire ladder tank and pumper truck with a snorkel hose, being used to fight a warehouse fire where people were believed to be living in a converted loft space. HAZARD: The elbow-style ladder was lowered into a 7,200 V powerline while a fireman on the ground was trying to make a hose connection. The current traveled through the ladder and hose and caused severe burns to the fireman. The contact was made somewhere in the midspan area. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The fire fighting crew arrived at the burning warehouse with intent to use the snorkel hose to douse the roof fire with water. The snorkel nozzle was mounted on the personnel basket, which was mounted on the ladder lip, making it possible for firemen to enter the building to look for occupants presumed to be inside. This procedure requires the use of water in the tank of the ladder truck until the pumper is attached to a city fire hydrant. While the snorkel is using water in the truck’s tank, a hose connection was hurriedly being made when the ladder boom struck an energized powerline. The fireman making the hose connection while standing on the ground sustained serious burns. Simultaneous to the construction of this particular fire truck was the revision of fire truck safety standards. The revised standard included the requirement of an insulated platform to isolate the fireman from the ground when operating or making hose connections. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned the fireman that the powerline was still energized, as in the event of fire had not turned the power off. ♦ Provide of a non-conductive platform as now required by the standards, for the firemen to stand safely on. ♦ Insulation on the lower side of the fire truck ladder would prevent a powerline contact from causing flow when the ladder is lowered into a powerline. ♦ Develop an automatic call system to alert the electric utility when a fire occurs and establish a code to identify the location where automatic reclosures could be disconnected. DISPOSITION: Settled in 2000. NOTES: Product manufacturers should ensure for a system safety analysis of their products at the time of design to incorporate the latest available safety standards and technology. Paragraph 7.9.2 of NFPA’s standard 1904 for Aerial Ladder and Elevating Platform Fire Apparatus states only: “Provisions shall be made so the pump operator is not in contact with the ground. Signs shall be places to warn the pump operator of the electrocution hazard.” However, this standard gave no clue that the design should include a nonconductive platform and handholds for firefighters who had the task of connecting water hoses to the aerial ladder and elevating platform apparatus.

174

APPENDIX A-37

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Washington County, MS, # C120-0139 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1996 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2002 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast. HAZARD: The mast of the van was raised into a 7,200 V powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Deceased was unaware of the overhead powerline, and raised the mast and antennas into it. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Electrostatic Proximity Warning Sensor wired to prevent raising the mast when under or adjacent to a powerline. ♦ The van’s antenna system should have incorporated a type of insulation ♦ Mast raising controls should be located in the van in such a way that they cannot be manipulated unless the operator is standing safely inside the van. DISPOSITION: unknown NOTES: There is a conspicuous absence of involvement of the television industry to ensure for safe equipment using known safeguards and old technology. The U.S. Army adopted similar methods in 1985, yet an unknown number of ENG vans, mostly in urban areas, are without this protection.

175

APPENDIX A-38 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: # D-157188

District Court, Jefferson County, 13th District, TX,

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 11, 1996 DATE CASE FILED: 1997 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC:

A hydraulic crane.

HAZARD: Contact with a 7,200 V powerline as a result of a work area that was within the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: One man guiding a sheet of steel eight feet wide and forty feet long sustained severe burns, requiring amputation on parts of all four limbs. A co-worker suffered severe burns on one hand, requiring amputation of several fingers. The workplace had undergone several previous expansions where the utility company had been requested to bury the powerlines in order to afford access to cranes to carry materials. The same request was made to bury powerlines in front of the doorway into a new fabricating shop where the victims were attempting to guide the sheet of steel when the crane boom tip contacted a powerline. The powerline had been raised by the doorway rather than being buried because the electric utility company installing the new powerlines did not have a trench ditcher immediately available and would have to delay the powerline instillation. The landowner was not given the option to dig the trench necessary to bury the powerline so to immediately provide power to the new facility. The powerlines were not buried. The electric utility company, seeking no one’s permission, just raised the powerlines in front of the new facility doorway. The crane was not equipped with an insulated link, nor did the manufacturer recommend the use of any safety devices. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ When working with conductive materials it is especially important to bury nearby powerlines. ♦ An insulated link would have stopped the flow of current and protected the workers guiding the load. DISPOSITION: Settled October 2000. NOTES: This is an incredible instance of the lack of communication that regularly exists between construction and the utility company. Policy and procedure must be streamlined to improve efficiency while showing a greater concern for the role electric utility companies play in construction safety.

176

APPENDIX A-39

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: # 326 of 1999

Court of Common Pleas, Luzenne County, PA,

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: January 21, 1997 DATE CASE FILED: 1999 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC:

An uninsulated aerial lift

HAZARD: 69,000 V transmission powerline contact was made mid-span in a work area that was in the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The operator sustained serious electrical burns while operating the aerial lift when he was standing on the ground using the alternate emergency control located at the rear of the truck-mounted aerial lift. His task was to raise the boom, which was raising fiber-optics cable that was supported on the basket of the aerial lift. The fiber-optics cable was being installed between two 69,000 V transmission lines. Due to its frail nature and the rough terrain the cable was being lifted in the middle of its span between supporting poles. The electric utility had selected this uninsulated aerial lift to be used in their narrow easement space between the two high-voltage transmission lines. The operator had to rely on a coworker positioned over a hundred feet away who was acting as a signalman to maintain safe clearance. The signalman failed to estimate safe clearance as the aerial lift’s telescoping boom was being rotated in the process of aligning the cable in the center of the narrow easement. The uninsulated boom struck the powerline, injuring the operator. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ An uninsulated aerial lift is not intended to be used in locations where it can be raised or rotated within excess of 10 feet of powerlines as required by OSHA. ♦ The design of insulated aerial lifts for utility linemen by the same manufacturer provided the alternate controls in a location where they cannot be operated by someone standing on the ground. DISPOSITION: Settled in behalf of the injured. NOTES: Any boomed equipment capable of reaching powerline should not be designed with controls accessible to someone standing on the ground.

177

APPENDIX A-40

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, Southern District of Iowa, # 4-98-CV-80131 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 3, 1997 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1998 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast at a news story location. HAZARD: The mast of the van contacted a 7,200 V powerline and an uninterrupted flow of current caused mass injuries. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A lady news reporter, a recent graduate with a degree in journalism and new to the job, attempted to rescue a co-worker who was operating the mast-raising control from outside of the van. The lady journalist received a severe burn to her skull that caused a lengthy coma and loss of toes. Recovery required months of painful surgery and skin grafting. Her coworker sustained serious burns to his arms. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ In the hazard of possible electrocution, the only prevention measures are necessary measures that should be immediately taken. Electrostatic Proximity Warning Devices, available since 1985, as well as controls that can only be used when the operator is standing inside the van, are the only way to eliminate this deadly hazard. ♦ Insulation on antenna equipment would also lessen the incidence of electrocution. DISPOSITION: Settlement in behalf of the injured. NOTES: This case is included because it clearly illustrates the major networks’ lack of top management awareness, exhibited by their complete lack of action to ensure that all vans are equipped with an electrostatic proximity system, insulation, and controls not accessible when standing on the ground. Abdication of the responsibility and dependence of the local channels poses a compromise of civil rights for those who work in the TV reporting industry. By this time some 10 to 15 percent of the vans equipped with pneumatic masts are, according to the manufacturer of the electrostatic proximity detectors, wired so the mast cannot be raised when parked under a powerline.

178

APPENDIX A-41 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 3rd Judicial District, Las Cruces, NM, # CV-99-1135 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1998 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1999 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A water well service truck rig raising a submerged pump had a boom that, in the travel mode, laid flat over the truck bed and cab. The controls to raise the boom were at the rear of the truck where the operator stood on the ground and blocked the view of the boom while being raised or lowered. HAZARD: Contact of a 7,200 V powerline at the mid-span point while lowering the boom. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The equipment owner was electrocuted and a coworker lost an arm and a leg while the boom was being lowered. The crew was using the boom in a near-vertical position to load a pump engine onto a trailer. As they had to move the engine several feet lateral distance, they would pick the motor up and move the truck forward so the engine could be lowered onto a trailer. When they lowered the boom, the new position of the truck did not allow it to clear the powerline as it did when raised. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The land owner should have requested the electric cooperative to turn the power off. ♦ The well service unit needed the controls located where there was a view of the arc any time the boom was raised or lowered. ♦ Boomed equipment should have the controls located so the operator cannot stand on the ground. DISPOSITION: The case was settled in behalf of the widow and the injured. NOTES: This case was included to show the diversity of equipment that can reach powerlines and the need for uniform design standards stating that the controls should not be reached by an operator when standing on the ground.

179

APPENDIX A-42

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: # 00-210-277

277th District Court, Williamson City, TX,

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 7, 1998 DATE CASE FILED:

1999

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: A non-insulated aerial lift used to install TV cable supported by electric utility powerlines. HAZARD:

Mid-span 7,200 V powerline contact.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: An aerial lift operator was electrocuted while attempting to install a TV cable where heavily overgrown oak trees blocked the view of the powerline. Almost immediately, the lift brushed the operator against an unseen powerline, killing the operator. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The electric utility should have cleared the powerline easement through the overgrown oak trees before leasing space on their poles to install TV cable. ♦ The uninsulated aerial lift should not be used to install TV cable underneath powerlines. DISPOSITION: Unknown NOTES: This case reminds us of the importance of simple maintenance. The oak trees should always be trimmed to make all powerlines visible.

180

APPENDIX A-43

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Perry County, AL, # CV-99-125 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 22, 1998 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1999 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large hydraulic rental crane with a telescoping boom used at a bridge construction site. HAZARD: When the boom was rotated by the 7,200 V powerlines, one contacted steel cable straps hanging from the hook, causing current to be sent through the entire crane. The work area was in the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The construction site was very confining, with construction equipment making maneuvers difficult. When the operator was rotating the raised cable straps by the powerlines to avoid striking other equipment, the steel straps brushed against the powerline causing the crane to become momentarily electrified. A pneumatic drilling rig was supplied: compressed air with a hose encased in a wire web sheath to prevent wear. Due to the cramped conditions, This hose was dropped over one of the crane’s outriggers, and one drill operator was electrocuted and another was injured. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Pre job construction planning to require relocation of the powerlines away from the bridge construction project. ♦ An insulated link would have prevented death an injury. ♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have created a greater job site awareness that powerlines were too close and should have been relocated. DISPOSITION: On July 7, 2003 the case was settled in behalf of the widow and injured. NOTES: This case provides an excellent example of the many ways insulated links can prevent injury and death by preventing the crane from becoming electrified. Dr. Karady’s deposition presented testimony that an insulated link would have prevented death an injury.

181

APPENDIX A-44

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: This case has not been filed. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: December 27, 1999 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: N/A EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rough terrain hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom used on a construction project to build a concrete-lined wastewater channel in the St. Louis area. HAZARD: The hoist line of the crane contacted a 7,200 V powerline at mid-span in a work area in the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A workman lost three limbs when guiding a concrete bucket to pour concrete in a concrete-lined wastewater channel. The design of this channel ran directly underneath a transmission line and along its easement. The construction contract contained no worker provisions requiring the concrete to be placed without the use of boomed equipment, and require the use of a front end loader to transport concrete into the Danger Zone under the powerlines. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ A pre-construction planning meeting to plan alternate methods of moving the concrete to avoid the use of a crane in this location. ♦ The concrete should have been poured into the bucket of a front-end loader that would transport it the short distance from the ready-mix truck to the wastewater channel. ♦ An insulated link would have prevented these injuries. ♦ The electrostatic proximity alarm would have provided worker awareness that it was unsafe to attempt to place concrete underneath powerlines. ♦ The crane operator needed training on how to map the danger zone and should have been given the authority to decline use of the crane in this inevitably unsafe location. DISPOSITION: Pending. NOTES: A key issue in the construction contract should had specific requirements on how the concrete would be placed without the use of boomed equipment under powerlines.

182

APPENDIX A-45

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, District of Colombia, C.A. 1:01CV01114 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 2, 2000 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2000 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A news gathering van with a sixty-one foot pneumatic mast located at a national guard parking lot at night where a 7,200 V transmission line was located. The line had only 49 feet of clearance from the ground. HAZARD: The mast of the van contacted the powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Two people were seriously injured. The operator made a visual spot check and did not see overhead powerlines. A human factors psychologist duplicated the setup at night and found that the area lighting produced by the van created a glare whereby overhead powerlines could not be seen. A camera man was also injured, as the cable tether supplying power to the TV camera conveyed the fault current. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ In the hazard of possible electrocution, the only prevention measures are necessary measures that should be immediately taken. Electrostatic Proximity Sensing Devices, available since 1985, as well as controls that can only be used when the operator is standing inside the van, are the only way to eliminate this deadly hazard and prevent the mast from being raised under a powerline. ♦ Insulation on antenna equipment would also lessen the incidence of electrocution. DISPOSITION: Pending NOTES: This case was chosen to express the near impossibility of accurately judging distances in a dark environment. Human eyes, which can make faulty distance judgments in optimum lighting conditions, cannot possibly be relied upon in the darkness as the only means of preventing a deadly hazard. By this time some 10 to 20 percent of theses vans are equipped to prevent the mast from being raised into powerlines and no standard exists to provide this safeguard to all vans in the industry.

183

APPENDIX A-46

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Unaware of the present status. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 22, 2000 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: Not yet applicable EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A news gathering van with a mast of 40 feet located on a city street at a business driveway to prepare for a TV news story. The site was beneath a tree containing powerlines of different voltages. HAZARD: The mast of the van contacted a powerline. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The driveway was at a slight slope, which caused the mast, while being raised, to tilt into the second layer of powerlines. The dish antenna mounted at the top of the mast touched a 3,200 V powerline. It took a few moments for the plastic antenna dish to melt down, thus catching on fire and causing a ground fault. The injured, an anchor reporter for the TV station, was in the front of the van at her “desk” preparing her interview notes when alerted that the van was on fire. When she attempted to escape, the electric current caused burns that resulted in the loss of a leg, a foot on the other leg, one arm, and the fingers on the hand of the other arm. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Electrostatic proximity warning device to prevent the mast from being raised beneath a powerline. ♦ Insulation on mast DISPOSITION: Not yet applicable NOTES: With a limited population of some 1600 masts on newsgathering vans with some 10 to 20 percent of them already equipped with electrostatic proximity warning devices, it seems almost a discriminatory violation of civil rights that some workers have protection and some don not. Due to network absence of safety management, a majority of newsgathering van users are denied a safe place to work.

184

APPENDIX A-47 COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, 7th Judicial District, Natrona County, WY #80 696-B DATE OF OCCURRENCE:

June 1, 2000

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2000 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A flat bed truck mounted hydraulic rental crane and operator with a telescoping boom, being used at an equipment supply yard for oil well drilling rigs. HAZARD: The crane hoist line contacted an overhead 7,200 V powerline mid-span, where the stored materials were in the danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: On Memorial Day holiday the deceased was at the equipment depot to load out equipment to be used at a well drilling site. A leased crane and operator was at the work site and the shipment was ready to leave for delivery. Two short pieces of pipe, approximately 6 feet long, too heavy to be lifted by hand, were needed. They were stored in a big steel box, about 6’x 6’x 6’, underneath a powerline. The entire area under the powerline was designated for heavy equipment storage and the box with the pipe was behind another box of similar size. The storage yard had a forklift available for moving the boxes away from the powerline; however, it was presumed that the deceased believed he could quickly remove the pipe with the crane. He then climbed onto a box and placed a choker around the pipe and was motioning the crane operator to bring the lifting devices closer. While reaching for the hook and attempting to put the eye of the choker in the hook, the hoist line struck the powerline. The deceased became comatose and was flown to Salt Lake City, where he died the next day. It was found that the electric utility was well aware of the use of cranes for handling the equipment stored under the powerline. Examination of the records showed that the power company had not negotiated for locating the powerlines over the storage yards properly. The crane operator had received no training from his employer on how to identify a Danger Zone, and no instructions not to lift any materials within that Danger Zone created by powerlines. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The well drilling supply company needed requirements prohibiting storage of equipment in the danger zone created by powerlines. ♦ The electric utility company needed a program to ensure for easements for their powerlines. Where such powerlines would be over stored materials, buried powerlines would be required. ♦ An insulated link would have saved the well drilling supply company’s employee’s life. ♦ A proximity alarm could have developed a greater awareness of their immediate hazard of powerline contact. ♦ The rental company provided an incompetent operator who knowingly extended the boom into the danger zone. If operators are provided with the equipment it is up to the client renting from the firm to discover whether the operators are acceptably trained. DISPOSITION: Settled NOTES: This case illustrates the need for specific requirements prohibiting storing materials under powerlines.

185

APPENDIX A-48

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, OH # 02CV113622 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 17, 2000 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2002 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A steel conductive telescoping boom aerial lift was being used to lift a workman so he could retouch the mortar on a brick wall of an 1816 building that had 7,200 V powerlines located three feet from the wall. HAZARD: The lift inevitably touched the mid-span powerline in a danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: An eighteen-year-old apprentice working alone was provided the above described aerial lift with no prior training from his employer. The city, which owned the municipal utility company, was administering a federal grant for restoring the 1816 building. The supervising architect/engineer made no requirements for the powerline to be buried as a condition of the grant. The injured is now a quadriplegic who requires a ventilator to breathe. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The project planning needed to remove the powerlines before the contract for the repair of the brick walls was negotiated. ♦ The rental firm should not have provided the lift that was unsafe for this use. DISPOSITION: The disposition of this case is pending. NOTES: The absence of safety planning to eliminate this work circumstance is reprehensible. Not only the immediate job supervisor, who allowed an untrained hand to work in a dangerous situation, but the city planners and grant engineer showed a gross disregard for worker safety, and are all responsible for the condition of this young, 19-year old apprentice.

186

APPENDIX A-49

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Hidalgo County, TX 322 District # C-0130-00-F DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 14, 2000 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2000 EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Pumpcrete machine with a 28-ft boom being used in the construction of a concrete flood-control holding pond underneath a powerline. HAZARD: Pumpcrete boom mid-span 7,200 V powerline contact in a danger zone. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Self-employed concrete finisher was electrocuted as he was handling the hose at the end of a pumpcrete truck boom while pouring wet concrete for the lining of a flood control improvement district at a construction site in Kingsland, TX. The general contractor at the site had previously subcontracted with a pumpcrete company to furnish a pumpcrete truck with an operator, so that the truck’s articulated boom could be used to transfer the wet concrete from ground level into the excavation site, where the deceased and his finishing crew were working. Three other workers were also injured when the operator of the pumpcrete truck manipulated the truck’s 28-foot boom into contact with the powerline. The design of this pond was under a 7200 V powerline made by an architect/engineer for an improvement district. The general contractor allowed that the pumpcrete machine would be positioned behind a tree where the operator was unable to view the position of the boom and its relationship to the powerline. The deceased was relied upon to act as a signalman while busy directing the flow of concrete. Because he had to stoop over so his shoulder could push the hose and direct the flow of concrete, it was necessary for the deceased to have his back to the operator in order to maneuver the heavy six-inch diameter hose full of concrete. Therefore, he was unable to look up and estimate the clearance of the pumpcrete machine’s boom from the powerline. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ The architect/engineer should have relocated the powerline around the flood control area on the property owned by the landowner. There was a clear need for the project designer to include in the contract drawing and specifications the relocation of the powerlines on the site of the facility, away from the settling pond. ♦ The General Contractor should have provided a construction safety plan that designated a positioning of the pumpcrete machine where the operator would have clear view of the work area. ♦ The pumpcrete subcontractor should have had specific written procedures for the operator to preclude operation of the boom inside of the powerline danger zone. ♦ The pumpcrete machine should have been equipped with an electrostatic proximity warning alarm, such as those provided on equipment used by a large pumpcrete firm in California and a construction firm in the St. Louis area. DISPOSITION: This case we settled in behalf of the deceased. NOTES: Safety standards should prohibit the placement of concrete underneath a powerline by boomed equipment.

187

APPENDIX A-50

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: The case has not been filed. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 10, 2001 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: N/A EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A forty ton mobile hydraulic rough terrain crane with a telescoping boom at a construction site engaging in a pick and carry activity. HAZARD: The hoist line contacted the 1,200 V powerline mid-span. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The deceased was guiding a load to prevent the load from striking parked vehicles in a pick and carry activity when the hoist line contacted a 7,200 V powerline which crossed the line of travel. This activity was conducted under the direction of the employer, who assumed that powerlines could be avoided. AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: ♦ Construction safety planning by the employer (who was a construction contractor) not to engage in pick and carry operations in the vicinity of powerlines. ♦ Use of an insulated link would have prevented this death. ♦ Use of a proximity alarm would have alerted the crane operator and deceased that they were approaching a powerline, even when they were distracted by the task of guiding the load. DISPOSITION: Case was not filed, as the manufacturer at the time of the accident no longer exists. NOTES: The workers’ compensation provided the employer immunity from liability, even in the case of gross negligence

188

APPENDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESUMES

BIBLIOGRAPHY Allin, George S, Wilson, Jack T., and. Zibolski, Richard E, “A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes” Paper # 770778: Society of Automotive Engineers Off Highway Vehicle Meeting and Exhibition, Sep 12-15, 1977 Andrews, James R., ( Case #94-CV-1233 State of Illinois, County of St. Clair: District Court, 212th Judicial District, Galveston County, TX), Affidavit Dec 29 1999 ANSI/ USAS B30.5, Safety Code for Crawler, Locomotive, and Truck Cranes, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1968 ASME/ANSI Mobile and Locomotive Cranes B30.5: 1989 ASME B30.5 (a) Mobile and Locomotive Cranes 1994 ANSI/ASME B30.5: Mobile and Locomotive Cranes, 2000 ANSI/SIA A92.6 (for Self-propelled elevating work platforms), 1999 ANSI/SIA 92.2 (Vehicle-Mounted Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices): 2001 AS 2550.1 Australian Standard: Cranes- Safe Use, 1993 Associated Press, www.mlive.com Nov 25, 2003 BEI Job Number BE-192-DCDM, “Reduction of Probability of Electrocution During the Operation of Dico Mobile Material Handlers (Overview Document)”, September 10, 1975 Bridges, J.E., “Potential Distributions in the Vicinity of the Hearts of Primates Arising from 60Hz Limb-toLimb Body Currents,” Ford, G.L.; Sherman, I,A.; Vainberg, M., editors: “Electrical Shock Safety Criteria” Proceedings of the First International, 1983 Bugbee, John, Evening Sun, www.eveningsun.com/cda/article/print/o,1674,140%7E9956%7E1792523,00.html Nov 26, 2006 Bureau of Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Construction Safety Act, Proposed Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, February, 1971 Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior; Construction Safety Standards, P 9.1.11C, August, 1963 Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior: “High Voltage Proximity Warning Systems—Colorado River Storage Project” Memo, March, 1973 Clapp, Allen, The National Electric Safety Code NESC Handbook, 1984 www.Craneaccidents.com CraneWorks, Oct-Nov, 1996, Advertisement Crawley, John, (Case #90-2159-0, U.S. District Court, Kansas), Deposition, November 5, 1990 Crawley, John, (Case # CV 398-2925- CC, Buchanan County, Division 4, State of Missouri) Deposition, April 11, 2000

189

Cunitz, Robert J. and Middendorf, Lorna: “Problems in the Perception of Overhead Powerlines” Paper Presented at the Sixth Annual International Symposium, System Safety Seminar: September 23, 1983 Department of the Air Force, Dept of Defense, T.O. 36C-1-4: March, 1962 Secretary of the Air Force, T.O. 36C-1-4: “Electrocution Protective Devices for Cranes and Crane Shovels” Published under the authority of the October 10, 1966 Department of the Army Cir 385-1 “Use of Cranes, Crane Shovels, Draglines, and Similar Equipment Near Electric Powerlines” Headquarters, Feb 4, 1964 U.S. Army Military Equipment Command, “Memorandum for Record” Directories of Research , Development, and Engineering, Fort Belvoir, Virginia October 1, 1965 Department of the Army, TB-385-101 Safety: January, 1967 U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, VA” SMEPB-RDE-KM “Directorate of Research, Development and Engineering: October 1, 1969 U.S. Army Material Command: AMSME-Z: Dielectric Safety Shielding for Military Cranes and Booms, Commanding General, April 20, 1970 U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command, Department of Defense: 3.6.12: Military Specification MIL-T62089A (AT), “Truck Maintenance; With Rotating Hydraulic Derrick, Air Transportable, 34,500 pounds GVW, 6X4,” December, 1973 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1; General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03, October, 1984 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03, October 1987 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03 October 1992 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.07, September 3, 1996 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1; General Safety Requirements Manual 01.A.03, November, 2003 Department of the Interior: Letter to the Corporate Product Safety Coordinator of Bucyrus-Erie Co., enclosing the results of a proximity alarm test conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior, March 11, 1973 Dickey, D.E., Manager, Research and Development Department, Construction Safety Association of Toronto, Canada: Letter to Mr. Bernie Enfield, President, Construction Safety Training and Associates May 17, 1978 Division of Industrial Safety, State of California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations: “Electrical Work Injuries in California” 1969, 1971, 1972 Division of Radio and Electrical Engineering: “Tests on Crane-Truck Mounted High Voltage Protection Devices” Research Laboratories: Ottawa, Canada, May 27, 1997

190

Dunnam, Collin W., (Case # 88-043, Twenty-seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Landry, State of Louisiana) Deposition, Dec 14, 1984 Dunnam, Collin W., (Case # A 246122, Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada, County of Clark) Deposition, March 16, 1986 Dunnam, Collin W., (Case # 60483, Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County) Deposition, Oct 27, 1987 Edwards, Robert and Krasny, Alex “Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom”, Nov. 11, 1997 Elkins, Sam S. “Crane Booms v. Powerlines”, National Safety News, NSC, September, 1959 Enfield, Bernie, Safety and Training Associates, 1 S. 646 Fairview, Lombard, IL 60148: Letter to H.T. Larmore, Deputy Director, Construction Industry Manufacturers Assn, 111 E. Wisconsin Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53202, July 7, 1973 Gregr, Arthur C., (Case # CI-83-5060, Circuit Court for Orange County, Florida) Deposition, July 7, 1984 Grove Manufacturing Company, Chart: “Powerline Contact Protection” and explanation of chart presented in a Study, January 2, 1974 Harnsichfeger Corporation, Preliminary Report, Field Test Evaluation, Field Demonstration of Harnischfeger Crane Style W-350 Equipped with SigAlarm™ Proximity Indicator. August 22, 1975 to September 15, 1976 Hauf , R., “Requirements For Grounding Practices and Standards- The Revision of Report 479”, 1970 Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. Study: “Hazard Analysis of Unintentional Raising of a Pneumatic Mast of an Electronic News Gathering Van into Powerlines” November 30, 2001 Health and Safety Executive, Guidance Note GS6 from the Health and Safety Executive: “Avoidance of Danger from Overhead Electric Powerlines” Baynards House, 1 Chepstow Place, London W2 4TF: April, 1980 Hickman, Cecil B., (# 279080, 250th Judicial District Court of Travis County, TX), Deposition, October 10, 1982 Homace, G.T.; Crawley, J.C. (Senior Member, IEEE); Yenchek, M.R. (Senior Member, IEEE); Sacks, H.K. (Member, IEEE), “An Alarm to Warn of Overhead Power Line Contact by Mobile Equipment” Paper presented to NIOSH, 2001 Homace, Gerald T.; Crawley, James C.; Sacks, H. Kenneth; Yenchek, Michael R.; “Heavy Equipment Near Overhead Power Lines?” Engineering and Mining Journal April 1, 2002 Husty, Denes III, [email protected], “Construction Accident Kills Worker” news-press.com Nov 28, 2003 Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. National Electric Safety Code Interpretations (19611977) page 55; request of April 11, 1974 Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. National Electric Safety Code Interpretations (19781980) page 77: Oct 17, 1980 International Electrotechnical Commission: “Effects of Current Passing Through the Human Body” Publication 479-1 (Second Edition), 1984

191

Karady ,G.G., “Efficiency of Insulating Link For Protection of Crane Workers” , published by the International Society of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 90 SM 338-4 PWRD: 1990 Karady: George G., Ph.D, (Case #D-157188, District Court, Jefferson County, 13th district, Texas) Expert Witness Report, May 17, 2000 Kisner, Suzanne, Statistician, Injury Surveillance Section, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH: Letter to Ms. Suzanna E. Ellefson (Kelly, McLaughlin & Foster), containing incidents of electrocution involving boomed equipment from 1980-1988. September 10, 1991 Leigh, Theodore M. (Illinois Appellate Court # 59549, after Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,) Deposition, 1972 Leigh, Theodore M.: “The Construction Machine: Power Line Hazard” Professional Safety, The American Society of Safety Engineers Journal September, 1979 Liberty Mutual: Study, “Contacting Overhead Electrical Powerlines”—Mobile Cranes Technical Bulletin #1 May 20, 1968 Lift Applications and Equipment “Readers’ Choice Award”, October, November, 2003 MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Proceedings of the Fourth International System Safety Conference, September 9, 1979 MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Professional Safety, American Society of Safety Engineers Journal, January, 1980 MacCollum, David V., “Crane Design Hazard Analysis”, Automotive Engineering and Litigation, Edited by George A. Peters and Barbara J. Peters, Garland Law publishing, New York and London, 1984 MacCollum, David V., “Designing Out Electrical Hazards” CraneWorks, July, 1992 MacCollum, David V.: Crane Hazards and Their Prevention, Book published by the American Society of Safety Engineers, Des Plaines, IL, 1993. MacCollum, David V.: “System Safety Analysis of Workplace Equipment and Facilities” Hazard Prevention (the System Safety Society Journal) 1994 Q2 MacCollum, David V.: “Planning Safe Crane Use”, 13th Crane Inspection Certification Bureau (CICB) Crane Conference, Tropicana Resort and Casino, Las Vegas, NV, Session 10: Nov. 8, 1994 MacCollum, David V., Construction Safety Planning, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 605 3rd Ave, New York, NY, 10158-0012, 1995 MacCollum, David V., “Planning for Safe Crane Use” Presentation #927 at the American Society of Safety Engineers Professional Development Conference and Exposition, Orlando, FL, June 1995. MacCollum, David, “Focus: Equipment Powerline Contact” Hazard Information Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 4, July 1996. MacCollum, David V., “More on the Nature of Safe Design Profits” Hazard Information Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 9, December, 1998 MacCollum, David: “Cranes and Power Lines make Fatal Combination” Construction Newsletter May, ’93 MacCollum, David V., “Hazard Prevention Engineering” Journal of System Safety, 2001 Q1

192

MacCollum, David V., “Crane Safety on Construction Sites”, Chapter 18, Construction Safety Management and Engineering, American Society of Safety Engineers, 2004. “A Survey of Non-Employee Electrical Contacts” (Pamphlet), Research Committee, Utilities Section, NSC, 1969 Middendorf, Lorna: “Judging Clearance Distances in Overhead Powerlines”, presented and published in the proceedings of the Human Factors Society Annual Conference, October 1978 Mongeluzzi, Robert J. & Morgan, Derald J. “Do Insulated Links Help?” Lift Equipment: Mongeluzzi, Plaintiff’s attorney, Yes; Morgan, defense witness, No; Feb-March, 1991 Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety Devices” September 1, ‘80 Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Evaluation of Links for Safety Applications for Simon Ro Corporation, National Crane” October, 1982 Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Field Test of Tinsley Overhead Powerline Detector” Report prepared for Grove Manufacturing; Appendix 1& 2, September, 1986 Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes” National Academy of Forensic Engineers Journal 1989 Morgan, J. Derald (Case # CJ92-549-92791 District County, Grand Forks County, North Dakota) Deposition, June 26, 1993 Morgan, J. Derald Ph.D., “Review of ‘Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom’ by Robert Edwards and Alax Krasny of Schwing America, Inc” March, 1998 Morse, A.R. and Griffin, J.P.: “Test s of Mobile Crane High Voltage Protection Devices for Department of National Defense” National Research Council Canada, March, 1978 Murray, Charles J.: “Remote Control System Reduces Crane Accidents” Design News Feb. 10, 1992 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 2nd Edition: National Safety Council (NSC); 1951 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 3rd Edition, NSC; 1955 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 4th Edition, NSC, 1959 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 5th Edition, NSC: 18-24: 1964 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 6th Edition, NSC: 1969 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 7th Edition, NSC, 1974 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 8th Edition; NSC, 1980 Data Sheet # 287, Published by the National Safety Council (NSC), 1954 Data Sheet # 448, NSC, 1957 Data Sheet # 1-287-79 (Revised) NSC, 1979 National Safety Council Data Sheet # I-743 New 90 “Mobile Cranes and Power Lines” Safety and Health, Feb. 1991

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National Safety Council Memo: “Power Line Accidents Kill Men, Ruin Equipment, and Delay the Job”, ‘53 National Safety Council Newsletter # 112.03-07030, “Survey of Contacts with Overhead and Underground Electrical Lines (out of 95 replies received), 1960 News: Occupational Safety and Health, Vol. 34, No.3: “ ‘Red Zones’ for Cranes Near Powerlines Discussed by OSHA Rulemaking Committee” Jan 15, 2004 Nietzel, Richard L.; Siexas, Noah S.; Ren, Kyle K., “A Review of Crane Safety in the Construction Industry” Applied Occupational and Industrial Hygiene, Vol. 16(12): 1106-1117, 2001 NIOSH ALERT # 85-111: Preventing Electrocutions from Contact Between Cranes and Powerlines July, 1987 NIOSH ALERT # 95-108: Preventing Electrocutions of Crane Operators and Crew Members Working Near Overhead Powerlines, May 1995. NIOSH ALERT # 95-108: Preventing Electrocutions of Crane Operators and Crew Members Working Near Overhead Powerlines May, 1995 NIOSH Bulletin: Worker Deaths by Electrocution- A Summary of Surveillance Findings and Investigative Case Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 1998 Occupational Safety and Health Standards; National Consensus Standards and Established Federal Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1910.180, May, 1971 Occupational Safety and Health Standards for the Construction Industry (29 CFR Part 1926), newly amended Nov. 1, 1993. Packer Engineering, “Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” (Volume I) Report to Employers Insurance of Wausau, April 11, 1975 Packer Engineering, “Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” June 1120, 1975 Paques, Joseph-Jean (IRSST), Michaud, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec) van Dike, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec) “Development of a Range-Limiting Device for Mobile Cranes”, 1989 Paques, Joseph-Jean “Cranes and Overhead Powerlines” Published at the 13th International Convention ISSA for Construction, Bruxelles, September 1991. Paques, Joseph-Jean: “Crane Accidents by Contact with Powerlines”, Safety Science, #16, 1993. Petit, Ted: “Insulated Links: The Next Generation” Lift Equipment, April-May 1995 Pittenger, Donald A: Acting Chief of Safety and Occupational Health, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on H.R. 4652: The Construction Safety, Health, and Education Improvement Act of 1990, Before Subcommittee on Health and Safety, Committee on Education and Labor, United States House of Representatives, Court Testimony May 22, 1990 Pizatella, Timothy J., Chief, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH: Letter to Mr. Norman C. Hargreaves, Koehering Cranes and Excavators, Inc. Jan. 11, 1991. Price, Dennis L.: “Machinery Operational Safety Near Overhead Powerlines”, Hazard Prevention, the journal of the System Safety Society, 1989

194

Price, Dennis L.: “The Detection of Overhead Powerlines” Proceedings of the Ninth International System Safety Conference July 1989 Pritzker, Paul E., P.E.: “Stopping Construction Sites from Becoming Killing Fields” Electrical System Design April 1990 Reynolds, Richard L., Informational Report 1035- MESA Informational Report: Field Evaluation of a Proximity Alarm Device, Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, Department of the Interior, 1976 Rossnagel, W.E. (Consulting Safety and Fire Protection Engineer) Handbook of Rigging for Construction & Industrial Operations,” 3rd Edition, 1964 The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents and Institute of Material Handling (Most respected and prestigious safety group in Great Britain), A Safety Handbook for Mobile Cranes, 1967 Safety Code for the Construction Industry, Quebec, Canada S-2.1 r.6, January 28, 1992 Sheppard, Paul E. “Crane Contacts can Kill”, National Safety News, NSC, October, 1958 SigAlarm™ Test, March 1983 Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project, Jefferson Parish, L: Construction Solicitation and Specifications IFB # DACW29-00-B-0069, May 19, 2000 Southwest Research Institute, “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices” Phase I Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines, Feb. 22, 1980 Southwest Research Institute: Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices, Phase II, Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines. February, 1981 Suruda, Anthony “Electrocution at Work” Professional Safety (The American Society of Safety Engineers Journal) July 1988 Suruda, Anthony, M.D. M.P.H., Egger, Marlene PhD., Liu, Diane, M. Stat., “Crane Related Deaths in the U.S. Construction Industry”, Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and Environmental Health, October 1997 Source Unknown, “Crane Accident Kills Three” September 1, 2003 Wessels, Phillip S.: “Electrical and Mechanical Engineering” Proceedings of the Fourth International System Safety Conference Sep 9, 1979 White, H.L., President of SigAlarm™, Inc.: Letter to CIMA and the Power Crane and Shovel Association, September 18, 1979 White, H.L.: President, SigAlarm, Inc “A Critique of: ‘A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes’ (Published by the Society of Automotive Engineers, in the 77.09.12-15 conference as Paper # 70778 by George S. Allin, Jack T Wilson, and Richard E. Zibolski”) March, 1980 Wright, M.D. and Davis, J.H., M.D: “The Investigation of Electrical Deaths: A Report of 220 Fatalities” Presentation at the 29th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, San Diego, CA. Accepted for publication on November 30, 1979. R.K. February, 1977 Zarembo, Alan; “Funding Studies to Suit Need” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2003; http://www.latimes.com/la/me-exxon3dec03,1,7170586.story

195

PARTICIPATING ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS

1.

David V. MacCollum: Principal Investigator

2.

Rowena I. Davis: Editorial Analyst

3.

Jack Ainsworth: Electronic Engineer- Proximity Alarms

4.

David Baker: Safety Director, Electric Utility

5.

Bob Dey: Consultant, Construction Manager

6.

George Karady: Electrical Engineer- Insulating Links

7.

Ben Lehman: Retired Admiral, U.S. Navy

8.

Melvin L. Myers: Consulting Engineer, Retired Captain, US Public Health Service

9.

Jeff Speer: Safety Director, System Safety

10.

John Van Arsdel: Consultant, Human Factors

196

DAVID V. MACCOLLUM 1515 Hummingbird Lane Sierra Vista, AZ 85635 (520) 458-4100 Fax (520) 458-4093 E-mail : [email protected] Since 1972, a consultant specializing in safety research and technical assistance for high-risk hazards, including hazard analysis and evaluation by referencing applicable safety standards, literature, and available technology.

Has prepared system safety hazard analyses and safety program management evaluations and given expert court testimony covering a broad range of safety engineering applications, especially as to cranes and other heavy construction equipment, application of rollover protective systems (ROPS) on a wide variety of equipment, and construction safety planning.

1951, B.S. degree, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon. Special education: System Safety, University of Washington; Safety Management, New York University; Radiological Safety, Ft. McClellan, Alabama; and has attended numerous other Army service schools.

1972-76, provided technical assistance for construction of tunnel support systems in Europe and the U.S. for Bernold of Switzerland. 1972-74, served on the advisory body that drafted the Arizona Occupational Safety Act; was a member of the Arizona Review Commission of Appeals for state citations. He is a Registered Professional Engineer (Industrial), AZ; a Registered 1972-73, retained as an instructor by the University of Arizona for a Professional Engineer (Safety), CA; and a Certified Safety Professional series of courses on System Safety, Safety Management, and Safety (CSP). Program Evaluation; developed special safety engineering seminars for 1975-76, National President, American Society of Safety Engineers University of Arizona, Michigan Technological Institute, University of Oklahoma, University of Wisconsin, and NIOSH (crane safety). (ASSE). 1961, President, Portland, OR Chapter, ASSE. 1968, President, Cochise Chapter, AZ, Society of Professional March 1970, testified before a US Senate hearing for the Product Engineers. Safety Commission on hazards of unvented heaters; April 1977, before US Senate hearings on product liability insurance; and 1984 before a Member of: US Department of Labor hearing on cranes and derricks. ASSE System Safety Society 1969-72, served on the US Department of Labor=s Construction Safety National Society of Professional Engineers NSPE Advisory Committee; was chairman of the subcommittee for Subpart V Veterans of Safety. of OSHA for power transmission and distribution; and was on the board investigating tunnel disasters. Past member of: 1958-62, was a member of a standards setting committee for the State Society of Mining Engineers of Oregon, for material handling equipment. National Safety Council 1956-58, developed design criteria for ROPS --10 years before the Human Factors Society Military Engineers. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) developed its standard -- that was adopted by the US Army Corps of Engineers (CofE), US Bureau 1995, author of book, Construction Safety Planning, published by John. of Reclamation, and State of Oregon and later incorporated into OSHA Wiley & Sons. 1993, author of book, Crane Hazards and their standards; and made studies on cost-effective and safe use of Prevention, published by ASSE. Is a well-known author of articles scaffolding and on crane load- testing on construction projects that was appearing in Professional Safety, Western Construction, National adopted by the CofE. Safety News, Rural Electrification, Power, Professional Engineer, Prentice-Hall=s ΑNewsletters,≅ Business Insurance, Journal of EMPLOYMENT Industrial Hygiene, Hazard Prevention, Control, CraneWorks, Lift, and 1955 to 1972 employed by the Department of Army: numerous other professional and trade journals. Director of Safety, Strategic Communications Command, Ft. He has spoken before international and national groups: the British Huachuca, AZ, a worldwide command with sixteen Ministry of Technology, the American Medical Association, the Edison subcommands. Electric Institute, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Safety Director, Electronic Proving Ground, Ft. Huachuca; the National Institute of Cooperative Education, the National Safety developed doctrine for product testing for safety. Council, the American Society of Safety Engineers, the System Safety Safety Director, 4th and 32nd Infantry Divisions and support Society, and the Crane Inspection and Certification Bureau. functions, Ft. Lewis, WA; responsible for maneuver and tactical safety in large-scale field exercises for combat AWARDS training. Assistant Chief, Safety Branch, Portland, OR District, Corps 1999, elected Fellow by ASSE for superior achievement in the safety of Engineers; developed design criteria for ROPS, reverse profession. signal alarms, emergency braking systems, and haul-road 1970, Engineer of the Year, AZ Society of Professional Engineers. safety. 1969, First Place for Outstanding Contribution to Safety Engineering 1951 to 1955 employed as a safety engineer by the State of Oregon Literature; 1983-1984, another First Place; and 1990-91, Third Place, Industrial Accident Commission. by ASSE and Veterans of Safety. Listed in Who=s Who in Engineering.

OTHER

Served 9 years on the Board of Directors, Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., serving southeastern Arizona. Past member of Sierra Vista, AZ, Planning and Zoning and 2000, principal founder of the Hazard Information Foundation, Inc., a Utility Commissions. nonprofit foundation that maintains a resource library of safety and ACCOMPLISHMENTS

hazard information.

Married with three grown children.

1995, established the Center for Hazard Information, which published the monthly Hazard Information Newsletter for three years.

197

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS David V. MacCollum, 1515 Hummingbird Lane, Sierra Vista, AZ 85635 "Report on the Collapse of the Owyhee Bridge Reconstruction", 1952. “ How Crane Load Tests Prevent Accidents" Pacific Builder & Engineer, Mar.1957. "How Proper Scaffolding Cuts Costs” Western Construction, Sept. 1957. Study and “ Tractor Canopies in Rollover Accidents” Evaluation, January 1958. "Tractor Canopies” "Pacific Builder & Engineer, October 1958. “ Testing and System Safety" USAEPG, November 1967. "A Systems Approach for Design Safety" Professional Engineer, Nov. 1968. Safety", Professional Engineer Letters, "Construction Professional Engineer, December 1968. "Arizona Cities - Fuel for Firestorms” AZ Professional Engineer, Jan. 1969. "Testing for Safety" National Safety News, February 1969. Annual Southwest Safety "A Systems Approach to Safety" Congress Exposition, April 1969. "A Systems Approach to Safety" Proceedings of Seventh Guided Weapons Contractors' Safety Officers' Conference, British Ministry of Technology, London, England, Nov. 12, 1969. Published statement at National Commission on Product Safety Hearing, Washington, D. C., March 3, 1970. "Reliability as a Quantitative Safety Factor" ASSE Journal, May 1969. First Place Technical Paper Award from ASSE/Veterans of Safety, 1969. Reprinted in Selected Readings in Safety, Academy Press, 1973. Also reprinted in Directions in Safety, Charles C. Thomas, publisher, 1976. National Safety "A Systems Safety Approach to Mining" Congress and Exposition, Chicago, IL, October 1970. "Executive Action," Tucson presentation as Director of Safety, USA STRATCOM, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, 1971. "Systems Approach to Safety", Oklahoma Center for Continuing Education, The University of Oklahoma, April 19, 1971. "Getting Back to the Fundamentals of Safety" Construction Industry Sessions, 1972.

198

"New Safety Requirements for Power Line Construction" Rural Electrification, February 1972. "New Horizons for Safety Engineering" Professional Engineer, June 1972. "Coping with OSHA" approximately 108 monthly articles starting July 1972, Construction Foreman's & Supervisor's Letter, a Prentice-Hall publication. "Construction Safety" and "Utility Safety" approximately 68 monthly articles in Construction Foreman's & Supervisor's Letter and Utility Safety, May 1975 to January 1981. A series of seven safety articles Arizona Currents, March thru July 1972, Summer 1974, and June 1975. Analysis--The Key to Tunnel Safety" "Systems Western Construction, August 1972. "What Is the Value of a Disaster?" Valuation, American Society of Appraisers' Journal, September 1972. "Federal Safety Act Brings Money to Your State" Rural Electrification, November 1972. "What Safety Can Do For Local Government" VOL 8 National Safety Congress, 1973. "Diverse Forces Motivate Greater Safety Awareness" Arizona Review, January 1974. "Employer Enforcement of Safety - How Tough?" National Safety Congress, 1974. "Coping Effectively with Safety & Health Act" 1973-74 Yearbook of Cooperative Knowledge, published by The American Institute of Cooperation, Washington, D. C. "Ten Steps Show Way to Plant Safety" Power, McGraw-Hill, July 1974. "The Bernold Support System" Western Construction, August 1974. "Why Professionalism?" Professional Safety, October 1974. "A Week Without Accidents" Professional Safety, January 1975. "Has Workmen's Compensation Made for a Safer Workplace?" IAIABC Magazine, March 1975. "Guest Comment" Professional Engineer, May 1975. "A Danger Greater Than Sellout" Rural Electrification, May 1975. National Emphasis Program, Hazard Prevention, JanuaryFebruary 1976. Ten editorials to the membership as President of the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) Professional Safety, July 1975 to May 1976. "Tunnel Design ... the Criteria for Safety", Proceedings: Second International Systems Safety Conference, San Diego, California, July 1975. "Fundamentals of Safety" Control, National Safety Council of Australia, August 1975. "The Safety Engineer's Viewpoint" NIOSH, 1976. “ A Bicentennial Look at Safety & Engineering" Professional Engineer, January 1976.

199

"Safety in the Seventies" National Safety News, January 1976. "Voluntary' Approach to Safety Needs Incentives" Business Insurance, January 12, 1976. "OSHA - A Look Ahead" US Dept of Labor, July 1976. “ 1975-76, A Year of Change" Professional Safety, September 1976. "The Safety Engineer's Viewpoint" Health/Safety Teamwork, July 1977, NIOSH Occupational Safety and Health Symposia, Sept. 1976. Statement on Proposed Kansas State Senate Bill 209, March 1977. "Public Safety", Edison Electric Speech, April 1977. "Systems Safety and Tunnel Support" National Safety News, Dec. 1976. Statement at hearing before Sub-Committee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, U. S. Senate, April 27, 28, and 29, 1977, on Product Liability Insurance, Serial No. 95-26. "What Are the Nation's Top Safety Priorities?" Professional Safety, August 1977. "Safety: Are We Making Progress?" Professional Safety, February 1978. "Accident Reporting--An Exercise in Futility?" National Safety News, August 1978. "Freak Accidents?" Hazard Prevention, September/October 1978. "How Safe the Lift?" Proceedings of the Human Factors Society--22nd Annual Meeting, October 1978. ASSE "Safe Product Design -The Key to Profitability" Professional Conference, June 1979. "Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design" 4th International System Safety Conference, July 1979. reprinted in "Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design" January 1980. Professional Safety, "How Do We Get Workers More Involved in Safety - Authority Must Be Centralized" National Safety News, September 1979. "Methodology of Hazard Identification"--ASSE's Consultant's Conference, June 21, 1980, Houston, Texas. "Crane Safety" U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Training Study, NIOSH, March 1981. ASSE's Consultant's "Methodology of Risk Evaluation" Section, Professional Development Conference, June 14-17, 1981, Salt Lake City, Utah. System Safety "Methodology of Hazard Identification" Conference, July 26, 1981, Denver, Colorado. "Fire Hazards", letter to the Editor, The Arizona Daily Star, October 25, 1982. "Lessons from 25 years of ROPS” Professional Safety, January 1984. First Place Technical Paper Award from ASSE/Veterans of Safety, 1983-84.

200

Chapter 8, Automotive "Crane Design Hazard Analysis" Engineering and Litigation, Volume 1, by George & Barbara Peters, Garland Law Publishing, 1984. Statement for OSHA Hearing on Proposed Standard for Crane or Derrick Suspended Personnel Platforms September 7, 1984. "There is no such thing as a liability crisis--it's the absence of hazard prevention that's hurting us!" 1985 (unpublished). "Foreword," "Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design," and "Lessons from 25 Years of ROPS," Readings in Hazard Control American Society of Safety and Hazardous Materials, Engineers, 1985, (Consulting Editor). Corps of Engineers Safety Plan, 1986. Letter to the Editor, Hazard Prevention, September/October 1986. "The Liability Crisis", Professional Engineer Talk, Austin, Texas, November 10, 1986. "Safety Management System Success,", Safety Management Newsletter, The Merritt Company, December 1986. "Safety and Its Application to Construction," Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc., Conference, Boston, 1987. "What should we be doing better?", Towards the Millennium, by Allan St. John Holt, IOSH Publishing Limited, 1987. "Rollover Protective Systems (ROPS)” , Chapter 1, Automotive Engineering & Litigation, Volume II, by George and Barbara Peters, Garland Law Publishing, 1988. "Hazards of Craning," Crane Inspection & Certification Bureau, 10th Annual Crane Conference, November 9, 1988, Las Vegas, Nevada. "Construction and Industrial Equipment Safety," Chapter 19, Automotive Engineering and Litigation, Volume 3, by George and Barbara Peters, Garland Law Publishing, 1990. “ Cranes and Derricks, The reasons for crane accidents,” OSHA Instruction CPL 2-2.20B, Directorate of Technical Support, June 14, 1990. Liability Project Safety Machine Tools and Heavy Equipment, The Brookings Institute Conference, Washington, D.C., June 19 & 20, 1990 A Guide to Crane Safety, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, North Carolina Department of Labor, by David V. MacCollum, printed October 1991. "Time for Change in Construction Safety," Professional Safety, American Society of Safety Engineers, February, 1990. Third Place Technical Paper Award from ASSE/Veterans of Safety, 1990-91. "Hunting Down Crane Hazards," Lift Equipment, February-March, 1992. "Designing Out Electrical Hazards," CraneWorks, July, 1992. "Excuses Equal Disaster," CraneWorks, December, 1992. "Lessons Learned too Late," CraneWorks, December, 1992.

201

"Cranes and Powerlines Make Fatal Combinations," Construction Newsletter, National Safety Council, May/June, 1993. Crane Hazards and their Prevention, book published by the American Society of Safety Engineers, December 1993. “ Anatomy of an Accident” CraneWorks, March/April 1994 (Pinchpoint). “ Anatomy of an Accident” CraneWorks, May/June 1994 (Soft footing). Safety Analysis of Workplace Equipment and “ System Facilities," Hazard Prevention, the Journal of the System Safety Society, Second Quarter 1994. "Planning Safe Crane Use," presented at the 13th Crane Conference of the Crane Inspection and Certification Bureau in Las Vegas, Nevada, November 10, 1994. Construction Safety Planning, book published by Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY May 1995. "Planning for Safe Crane Use," Proceedings of the 34th Annual ASSE Professional Development Conference & Exposition, Orlando, Florida, June 17-24, 1995. “ Avoid pinch point hazards on stand-up rider forklifts,” Lift Magazine, October/November, 1995. “ Hazard Information Newsletter,” the newsletter of the Center for Hazard Information. Published monthly, from April 1996. The Nature of Hazards/ Equipment Rollover/ Crane TwoBlocking/ Equipment Powerline Contact/ Moving Parts of Machinery/ Forklift Hazards/ Blind Zones on Moving Equipment/ Fall Prevention/ Unsafe Equipment Control Systems/ Nuts, Bolts, Pins and Other Connectors/ Falling Objects/ Large Truck Hazards/Dangerous Access and Work Platforms/ Trenching/ Fire Prevention/ Fall Protection/ /Hazardous Secondary Voltages/ Dangerous Compressed and Confined Gases/ Killer Hooks/ Lockout/ Tagout/ Carbon Monoxide/ Mobile Crane Upset/ Electric ARC Welding/ Conveyors/ Steel Erection/ Ladders/ Construction Management/ Facility Design Hazards/ Confined Spaces/ Traffic Control for Road Construction and Maintenance/ Concrete Formwork/ Dust Hazards/ Masonry/ Wood Framing/ Nature of Hazards - Recap “ How Can We Be Prepared to Meet Industry’s Need for System Safety In the 21st Century?” Proceedings, 16th International System Safety Conference - September,1998. Keynote Speaker, The Nature of Hazards, Traffic Accident Reconstruction and Litigation Seminar, Lawyers and Judges Publishing, November 6, 1998.

202

ROWENA I. DAVIS

P.O. Box 1841 Bisbee, AZ 85603 (520) 432-6617

[email protected]

EDUCATION Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA Bachelor of Arts, May 2002 Major: English Minor: Political Science

Strong course study in journalism with emphasis on investigative research; independent/community based analysis

EXPERIENCE Research Analyst, Hazard Information Foundation, Inc., Sierra Vista, AZ April 2003-present Collect, refine, and categorize information from a wide variety of sources, edit all outgoing material, implement filing and cross-referencing systems, verify factual information, Urban Alternatives, Mount Holyoke College and Hadley, MA. September-December 2001 Met with members of the Hadley Planning Board, city officials, and concerned citizens; assessed local urban development in Hadley and created planning alternatives, including a critique of zoning laws and implementation of Calthorpian ideas. Tutor, Girls, Inc, Holyoke, MA. August 2001-January 2001 Tutored up to 15 girls, aged 7-12, with homework and reading skills, helped supervise excursions, mediated conflicts with on the spot creative problem solving. Data Analysis, Mount Holyoke College and Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) S. Hadley/Holyoke, MA. October-December 2000

Collected and analyzed data on several major mortgage companies and their lending patterns in the Holyoke/Springfield by reading census tracts, attempting to prove predatory lending action. Server/ Jr. Assistant Manager, Denny’s Restaurant, Tucson, AZ. June 1999-June 2000 Supervised second shift; responsible for money drop and customer/ staff relations. Developed ability to think quickly under pressure and implement spontaneous solutions.

LEADERSHIP Co-Chair, Lapidary Club, September 2001-May 2002 Key email contact, recruited members, provided hands-on instruction for stone shaping, assisted the master silversmith in equipment maintenance and tool instruction. Co-captain, Mount Holyoke Ice Hockey, October 2001-March 2002 Ran practices in absence of coach, arranged transportation to practices and games, dissipated team conflicts in and out of practice.

SKILLS Extensive knowledge in Microsoft Word, Works, WordPerfect, PowerPoint, Microsoft Excel; experience in Linux and alternate operating systems; Experience as freelance editor, Conversational knowledge of French

AWARDS Group winner, Sally Montgomery Prize in Community Based Learning, 2001 Merit Scholarship to Whitman College, 1997 Dean’s Scholarship to Lewis and Clark College, 1997 National Merit quarter- finalist, 1995 Merit Scholarship to attend Green Fields Country Day School, 1993

203

Resume For Jack D. Ainsworth Professional Education Bachelor of Science, Electronics Engineering with Bio-Medical Option, University of Wyoming, 1966 Master of Science, Bioengineering, University of Wyoming, 1968 Professional Experience 1968: U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO: Research Engineer, GS-09; Research in electronics techniques to monitor human physiologic parameters for manned space flight. 1969-1970: U.S. Army, White Sands Missile Range, NM; Research Engineer, Military; Development, fabrication, installation, test and acceptance of electronics technologies to detect high altitude winds through the echo of radio waves from ion clouds caused by meteors, and monitoring the movement of the clouds. 1970-1974: U.S. Army, Langdon, ND; Field and Installation Engineer GS09 thru GS-12; Installation of communications and electronics equipment in direct support to the SAFEGUARD Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. 1974: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Staff engineer, GS-12; Design, installation, implementation of electronic systems for airfield operations- air-to-ground communications and radar tracking; plane-toground (on the ground) communications and radar tracking; safety support systems for fire suppression and personal protection. 1974-980: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Project Manager, GS-13; Development, installation, test and acceptance, implementation of computer based, high reliability electronic message systems. 1980-1985: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Research and Development Electronics Engineer, GS-13; Application and adaptation of emerging technology to advance the state of Army communications capabilities; Test and evaluation of newly developed communications-electronics systems; Development of fast relocating surveillance system for the U.S. Border Patrol. 1985-1989: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Research engineer and supervisor, GS-13; Investigation, test, and evaluation of newly developed systems for application to military communications requirements. 1989-1994: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Branch Chief, GS-14; Design, development, test and acceptance, implementation of automation based digital communications systems for military command and control, administration and logistics support. 1994-1998: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Senior Systems Engineer, GS-14; Design, development, test and acceptance, implementation of automation based digital communications systems for military command and control, administration and logistics support; Application of new technology to improve effectiveness and efficiency of organizational operations. 1998-2001: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Director of Information Systems Engineering, GS-15; Supervised design, development, test and acceptance, implementation of automation based digital communication systems for military command and control, administration and logistics support; and ensuring protection of information in transition from disclosure and exploitation. 2001-2002: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Director of Mission Support, Chief Operating Officer, GS-15; Supervising the operations for an organization designing, developing, testing and acceptance, implementation of a wide spectrum of electronics technologies to meet military communications, voice and data, for the command and control, administration, logistics support for national defense. Professional Associations 204

Member of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers since 1964

David Bryant Baker 2115 W. 33rd Street Tucson, AZ 85713 520-622-0558 BACKGROUND SUMMARY •

Eleven years of experience in development, implementation, evaluation, and administration of a corporate safety program.

•

Fifteen years of technical experience in research and development, systems testing, engineering support, and industrial systems modification.

•

Twelve years of administrative and organizational experience as a volunteer with a non-profit organization.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS •

TEP’s Public Safety program is based on my concept of utilizing a rattlesnake to compare the similarities of a downed powerline and a commonly understood danger.

•

Designed a root cause accident investigation method that can be utilized at most levels within an organization.

•

Evaluated various Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) Systems. Negotiated with vendor for the best financial arrangement. Supervised the installation of a customized corporate MSDS system.

•

Convinced the state electrical utilities to organize and take a pro-active approach by working with the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the State Industrial Commission in the interpretation and implementation of new OSHA standards.

•

Directed a research team in the design, construction, instrumentation, and operation of experimental apparatuses. This work led to several U.S. patents.

•

Founded the American Youth Soccer Organization Region 244. Appointed by National Board of Directors as its first Regional Commissioner

•

Applied for and received a $20,000 “Samantha Smith” Grant from the U.S. Government in conjunction with a Youth Cultural Exchange Program between a Tucson youth group and a University group in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, USSR.

•

Received a 2000-2001 “Leader Ahead of the Curve” recognition award from the Western Energy Institute.

205

EDUCATION/CERTIFICATION •

Received Certified Safety Professional (CSP) from Board of Certified Safety Professionals, Certificate # 16859. (July, 2001)

•

Received Certified Utility Safety Administrator (CUSA) from the National Safety Council’s Utility Division. Certificate #903. (August, 2000)

•

Received Bachelor of Arts Degree in Interdisciplinary Studies incorporating the fields of Safety, Communication, and Psychology from the University of Arizona (December, 1999)

•

Received Certified Hazard Control Manager (CHCM) designation at Master Level by Board of Certified Hazard Control Management, Certification # 2730. (July 1998)

•

Received Associates of General Studies from Pima Community College. (December, 1997)

•

Received certification as an Instructor for Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Safety Courses from Federal MSHA. (August 1996)

•

Received certification as an Airframe and Powerplant Mechanic from the Federal Aviation Administration after completion of six quarters (18-months) at Eastern New Mexico University, Certificate # 2060284. (December 1970)

• EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Tucson Electric Power Co. Tucson, AZ

Safety Supervisor (Risk Man) Sept. 1991 to present Plant Operations July 1986-Sept 1991

IBM Tucson, AZ

Electronic Technician (temporary position)

Sept 1985-Apr 1986

ARCO Metals Tucson, AZ

Research Technician

Jan. 1982-Apr 1985

Duval Corp Tucson, AZ

Maintenance Mechanic

May 1973-Dec 1981 Dec 1970-May 1973

US Army Korea

Radar Technician MOS 24B20

Apr 1971-May 1973

Robert’s Chevron Roswell, NM

Night Manager Auto Mechanic

Apr 1970-Dec 1970 June 1969-Apr 1970

Grumman Aircraft Eng. White Sands Missile Range, NM

Mechanical Technician

July 1968-May 1969

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Robert A. Dey Mr. Dey is a Senior Manager for industrial, engineering, and construction programs. He is experienced in decision making, operational responsibility, and leadership-management of large organizations. He was educated at the United States Military Academy and Stanford University with a M.S. degree in Civil Engineering (Construction). Mr. Dey has experience across a broad range of technical, financial, and management issues. During military service he commanded major military engineer combat and construction units up to Brigade level. He is trained and experienced in effective communications and leadership at all levels of government and industry. He was selected as a White House Fellow in a national competition in 1971 and during that fellowship served as Special Assistant to the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. He served as a senior manager for the Morrison Knudsen Company, Inc., for over thirteen years, specializing in the delivery of professional management and contracting services for construction, engineering, and industrial programs. He has operated as an independent consultant since 1997, providing services in the field of construction management for clients such as Amtrak

EXPERIENCE •

Mr. Dey was hired by Morrison Knudsen (MK) in 1982 as part of a management team chartered to market and then manage the delivery of professional engineering and construction management services. He prepared major proposals for management of programs (engineering, procurement, and construction by others), acting to represent the best interest of an owner. The client base was both public and private sector. He was often teamed with architect-engineer (A/E) firms or major construction companies for proposals. He was sent to Los Angeles as a consultant under an MK contract with the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) to assist them in developing their management plan for engineering procurement, and construction of the Long Beach to Los Angeles light rail system. Thereafter, he worked in proposal joint venture with the Fluor Corporation as part of the MK team to develop the proposal for management of the Los Angeles subway system construction.

•

Mr. Dey led MK’s successful effort to provide a management concept and an on-site consulting team to supplement the Washington State Department of Transportation in completing Interstate 90 in Seattle. This program was valued at $1.3 billion in Federal and State highway funds. He marketed this contract by directly approaching the State Secretary of Transportation and his deputy for highways. He helped to provide the management organization concepts, performed estimates, run the master schedules for engineering contracting and construction, and provided specialized personnel to the state. He represented the company as a senior manager, selected the key members and launched the MK team during startup, developed and negotiated a professional services Joint Venture with H.B. Lochner (a Chicago-based AE firm). He was then relocated to Seattle to establish an Area Office with oversight of the project. 207

•

As Seattle Area Manager, he assured the quality performance of the I-90 team and generally monitored compliance with the contract. In addition, he marketed MK’s highway construction management services on a national basis providing business development with state highway departments nation-wide. During this period, he assisted with the reorganization and transfer of professional management services and international marketing form Boise to MK’s San Francisco-based engineering company. He acted as the Division Manager of the Program Management/Construction Management Division of that company until a successor was assigned. Later, he was the proposal manager for a major proposal for management of the U.S. Embassy Security Program, a complex proposal for the U.S. Department of State (DOS) which involved travel to coordinate the joint venture team as well as visits to the DOS in Washington, D.C. for marketing purposes.

•

When the company reorganized, he returned to Boise where he was assigned to the Equipment/Manufacturing sector of the company. He performed a special market analysis study of remanufacturing of Government vehicles and aircraft, securing both an Army and Coast Guard helicopter component overhaul contract. He marketed several major proposals to Army Material Command Agencies (Tank-Automotive Command and Aviation Systems Command), working with Untied Technologies Corporation as a team to combine aerospace analytical capability and technology with MK’s remanufacturing capacity.

•

Mr. Dey managed the startup of MK’s contract at the Hornell, New York plant to remanufacture a major portion of New York Transit Authority’s (NYCTA) subway fleet of “R46” cars. This contract involved engineering design, procurement, and remanufacturing plant operations, valued at over $300 million. He coordinated the various MK plant entities and performed liaison with the NYCTA client. Thereafter, he developed concepts for improved network scheduling of manufacturing for the successor contract with the Chicago Metropolitan Transit Authority (METRA).

•

Mr. Dey was responsible for the project support functions for the Texas High Speed Rail Project. These functions included master scheduling, cost control, contracting, procurement, financial management, and personnel. This project was valued at $6 billion and would have produced the country’s first 200 mile per hour high speed train service between major Texas urban centers. The project was canceled by the sponsors in 1994, due to lack of funding.

•

Mr. Dey was part of MK’s Transit Group as the Program Manager designee for the rebuild of the Bay Area Rapid Transit car fleet. Tasks involved developing the plans and selecting people to execute this work if awarded. Planning included the management of design, procurement, system integration, quality and test programs, and production in MK’s California facilities. The competing bid was substantially below MK’s price for the work.

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Mr. Dey was transferred to Amerail (the spin-off company of MK’s former Transit Group) as Director of an on-going California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) Program valued at over $200 million. The program included design, development, subcontracting for materials, and production of 113 commuter and rail cars in eight different configurations. He was directly responsible for all client relations and negotiations in this program. The contract was successfully re-negotiated from its initial loss position, and internal changes made to staff and procedures. He helped to reverse the previous pattern of late deliveries and cost overruns, resulting in the attainment of all revised cost and schedule objectives, reducing projected losses by at least $40 million.

•

As an independent consultant, Mr. Dey was retained by Amtrak to provide project management services to the AMTRAK Los Angeles Engineering Office. Services included development and construction of major train maintenance facilities on the west coast (Los Angeles, Oakland, and Seattle). He acted as Project Manager for the Oakland Maintenance project, and advised and produced actual models and templates for the establishment of management teams, schedules and budgets, facility maintenance concepts, and review processes for other Amtrak projects.

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Robert A. Dey EXPERIENCE OUTLINE General Management: • Defining and planning function and organizations. • Maintenance of facilities and equipment. • Development and execution of capital and operating budgets along functional and objective alignments. • Development of network schedules for programs. • Procurement of goods and services in both government and private sector. • Effective communications at executive or craft labor level. • Information architecture. Industry: • Rail and transit ∗ Planned the organization and systems to control and administer the Texas High Speed Rail Project, estimated at over $6 billion. ∗ Served as Project manager for design, procurement and assembly for two major transit car rebuild programs, each valued at over $300 million. ∗ Framed the organization and management options for the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission to design and construct the LA Long Beach light rail system. ∗ Developed concepts and management templates for program management of rail transit car contracts. ∗ Provided Project Management services to Amtrak for the development and construction of three major west coast maintenance facilities. •

Vehicle Remanufacturing ∗ Conducted market analysis, developed concepts and proposal which were presented to the U.S. Army in a teaming arrangement with the United Technologies Corporation to integrate aerospace technology into military vehicle remanufacturing.

•

Construction ∗ Marketed, organized, and assisted in the startup of professional services rendered to the Washington State DOT for the Interstate 90 completion project in Seattle. Services included engineering management, program scheduling and control systems, and construction management assistance for this program which cost in excess of $1 billion. The program was completed by the State DOT on planned schedule and budget. ∗ Managed the proposals for Morrison Knudsen Company on two major construction management programs of national interest, namely, the Los Angeles subway system, proposed in joint venture with the Fluor Corporation, and the U.S. Embassy Security Program of the U.S. Department of State. These proposals required extensive preparation, planning, and presentation.

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Aviation ∗ Planned, marketed, and participated in the execution of aviation component rebuild contracts with the U.S. Army and Coast Guard. ∗ Piloted military and civilian aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing, single and multi-engine for over 2800 hours.

Government: • White House Fellow ∗ Selected in national competition in 1971 to participate in the White House Fellowships. ∗ Was appointed as special assistant to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. ∗ Participated in representational and national policy development trips to Africa and Asia. Military: • Command ∗ Commanded a combat engineer company and battalion. Commanded the U.S. Army Engineer Center Brigade of over 2,400 combat, administrative, and medical personnel. • Staff ∗ Army General staff experience in the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army • Engineering and Construction ∗ Military project construction in the U.S., Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. ∗ Planning and initial engineering of projects through the Corps of Engineers for middle-eastern governmental agreements with the U.S. Projects were located in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt. ∗ Facility engineer training at major installation level. EDUCATION SUMAC West Point, Bachelors Degree (1958) Stanford University, Graduate Degree in Civil Engineering/Construction Management (1963) The Army War College, Postgraduate Studies in National Security (1980)

INTERNATIONAL Europe: Assignments in residence in Germany (6 years) and Italy (3 years) Asia: Tours in Korea and Vietnam (3 years) Travel on assignments to Japan, Indonesia, and Thailand Africa: Representational trips to Tunisia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, and Zaire. Middle East: Assignments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt

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Arizona State University Department of Electrical Engineering

GEORGE C. KARADY Professor, Salt River Chair Degrees Doctorate in Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Budapest, 1960 Candidate of Technical sciences, Hungarian Academy of Science, 1959 Diploma in Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Budapest, 1952

Professional Experience 1986-Present 1977-1986 1969-1977 1952-1969

Salt River Project Chair Professor, Arizona State University BASSO Services, Chief Consulting Electrical Engineer Chief Engineer Computer Technologies and Manager of Electrical Systems Hydro Quebec Institute of Research, Member of Research Staff, Program Manager and IREQ fellow Technical University of Budapest, Teaching Assistant, Associate Professor and Deputy Department Head

Membership in Scientific and Professional Studies IEEE Senior Member, 1969, senior member, 1971, fellow 1978 CIGRE member, 1981-present PHI KAPPA PHI, honor society, 1988-present

Canadian Electric Association, 1971-78 Hungarian Association of Electric Engineers, 1952-68 SAE, Society of Aerospace Engineers member, 1988

Professional Society Activities Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Transmission and Distribution committee (T&D) Member, 1977 to present T&D Committee, Working group on Non-Ceramic Insulators; Chairman, 1978 to present T&D Committee, Lightning and Insulation Subcommittee, Vice-Chairman 2985-1988; Chairman, 1988 to present T&D Committee, Working Group on HVDC System Performance; Chairman, 1974 to 1986 T&D Committee, HVDC Subcommittee, Member since 1970 and Secretary, 1978-1982 Fellow Committee, Member, 1983-1986 T&D Committee, Working Group on Flexible AC Transmission Systems, Member, 1991 to present Power Engineering Education Committee, Member, 1980 to present Power Engineering Education, Technical Sessions Subcommittee, Chairman 1992 to present Power Engineering Education, Fellow Committee, Member, 1990 to present PES, Working Group on Insulation Coordination, Chairman, 1992 to present CIGRE, International Conference on Large High Voltage Electrical Systems, 1981 to present Vice President, U.S. National Committee, 1981-1985 Treasurer/Secretary U.S. National Committee, 1981-1985 Technical Committee, Member, 1994 to present Working Group on Insulators, Member, 1980 to present Working Group on Insulators Contamination, Canadian Representative, 1973-1976 International Study Committee 22, U.S. Expert Advisor, 1986 to present

Honors and Awards -

IEEE Fellow, 1978 Working Group Recognition Award (IEEE-PES Education Committee), 1993 Student Affairs Recognition, ASU, 1992; Student Affairs Recognition, ASU, 1990 Working Group Recognition Award, IEEE-PES, 1989 Transmission and Distribution Committee Award for Outstanding Working Group, (IEEE), 1988 Surge Protective Devices Committee Award for Prize Winning Paper, (IEEE), 1983 Working Group Recognition Award, (IEEE T&D Committee), 1981, Technical Paper Award (IEEE- India), 1981 Diploma, College of Relay Engineers (NARM), 1969

Student Graduation Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D 2), Master of Science (MS) 23 Author of over 22 Professional Journal Papers in the last five years, expert witness on approximately six crane/hoistline powerline contact litigations. 212

BEN J. LEHMAN, Rear Admiral USN (Engineering) Retired Professional Engineer, Certified Safety Professional Registered P.E. in New York 1949, California 1953, Alabama 1976, Louisiana 1976, Florida 1976 (lapsed). Born 1922. Certified as a Safety Professional in 1979 by BSCP, Savoy, IL. Education: C.C. N.Y. Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering 1942; Manhattan College 1943 (evening) - Industrial Psychology and Safety; Pratt Institute 1943 (evening) – Electronics; U.S. Naval Academy Post-Graduate School – Electrical and Mechanical Engineering – 1944 to 1945; Harvard University, Graduate School of Engineering – Mechanical and Chemical Engineering – Masters Degree In Mechanical Engineering 1949; Stanford University – Design Philosophy and Advanced Stress Analysis - 1957 to 1959 (part- time). Editor-in-Chief C.C.N.Y. VECTOR Magazine. Honorary Fraternity: Tau Beta Phi Experience: Student Engineer, Mack Truck Co., Allentown PA 1941; U.S. Navy Shipyard Management and Contract Administration, 1942 to 1946 & 1950 to 1953; Engineer, General Electric Co., 1946 to 1948; Engineer, Bethlehem Steel Co. Shipbuilding Div. Central Technical Department, Quincy, MA 1949 to 1950; Engineer, power plant construction and safety, Refinery design, Bechtel Corp, 1954 to 1955; Project Engineer: Sylvania Electric, 1955; Kaiser Electronics, 1956; Beckman Instruments, 1957 to 1959; Engineering Manager, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Sunnyvale CA 1959 to 1969; Director of Engineering, Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co., Seattle WA 1969 to 1972; Vice-President of Engineering, Litton Industries Ship Systems, Los Angeles CA and Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Pascagoula MS 1972 to 1975; Private Practice, 1975 to present. Professional Societies: Systems Safety Society American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) IEEE Dielectrics & Electrical Insulation Society American Soc. Of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers American Society of Naval Engineers American Boat and Yacht Council Risk Analysis Society Mechanics Institute of San Francisco Panelist, American Arbitration Association P.O. Box 3480, 169 Juniper Drive, Stateline, NV 89449 PHONE 702/ 588 - 7765 FAX 702/ 588 – 587

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Melvin L. Myers 1293 Berkeley Road Avondale Estates, GA 30002-1517 Education 1967 1977

Phone (404) 288-7085 Fax (404) 288-7166 e-mail: [email protected]

B.S., College of Engineering, University of Idaho (Agricultural Engineering) M.P.A., School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University (International Environment Policy, Science and Technology Management)

Professional Experience 1982-2002 Consultant 2002-2003 Assistant Professor, Voluntary Faculty, University of Kentucky, Southeast Center for Agricultural Health and Injury Prevention 1992-2002 Assistant Professor, Adjunct Facility, Emory University, Rollins School of Public Health, Teach Occupational and Environmental Health Policy 1995-1998 Deputy Director, Office of Extramural Coordination and Special Projects, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Atlanta, GA 1996-1998 Senior Editor, Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4th Ed. Geneva: International Labour Office (ILO) Chapter Editor, Agriculture and Natural Resource Based Industries, Vol. 3, pp. 64.1-69 Chapter Editor, Livestock Rearing, Vol.3, pp. 70.1-38 1988-1994 Special Assistant to the Director, NIOSH, Atlanta, GA Coordinator, Agriculture Program, NIOSH Project Officer for the Surgeon General’s Conference on Agricultural Safety and Health, 1991 Acting Director, Alaska Activity, NIOSH, 1991 Member, Agriculture Steering Committee Member, Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health, OSHA, 1998-1990 Executive Secretary, Mine Health Research Advisory Committee, DHHS, 1987-1992 Committee Management Officer, NIOSH, 1987-1994 1981-1988 International Coordinator, NIOSH. Project Officer for Cooperative Agreement with the World Health Organization 1986-1988 Deputy Assistant Director, NIOSH, Atlanta, GA. Director, Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, NIOSH, Rockville, MD 1979-81, Atlanta, GA 1981-86 1975-1979 Technical Assistant to the Assistant Administrator, Office of the Assistant Administrator, Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Washington, D.C. 1971-1975 Center Staff Officer, National Environmental Research Center/Research Triangle Park, Office of Research and Development, EPA, Research Triangle Park, NC 1969-1971 Engineer-Economist, National Air Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Public Health Service, Cincinnati, OH and Raleigh, NC 1967-1968 Design Engineer, Hyster Company, Portland, OR 1966 Engineering Aid, Department of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Idaho 1963-1967 Engineering Aid, Idaho Department of Highways Membership in Scientific Societies American Public Health Association, Occupational Safety and Health Section American Society of Agricultural Engineers 214

American Society of Safety Engineers Commissioned Officers Association of the USPHS National Institute for Farm Safety Chair, Long-Range Planning Committee National Safety Council Honors 2002 1998 1998 1994 1993 1992 1991 1991 1990 1989 1988 1988 1987 1986

1986 1986 1985 1985

1985 1984 1979 1979 1977 1976-77 1966-67 1966-67

NAMIC Engineering Safety Award, American Society of Agricultural Engineers Outstanding Service Medal, U.S. Public Health Service Unit Commendation, U.S. Public Health Service Outstanding Unit Citation, U.S. Public Health Service Outstanding Unit Citation, U.S. Public Health Service Unit Commendation, U.S. Public Health Service Surgeon General’s Exemplary Service Medal, U.S. Public Health Service Special Assignment Service Award, U.S. Public Health Service Commendation Medal, U.S. Public Health Service Public Health Citation, U.S. Public Health Service Meritorious Service Medal, U.S. Public Health Service Unit Commendation, U.S. Public Health Service Special Achievement Award, Centers for Disease Control Certificate of Appreciation for Contributions to the Success of the Second National Symposium on Prevention of Leading Work-Related Disease and Injuries, Centers for Disease Control Letter of Appreciation from Jimmy Carter for Participation in the Global Health Consultation, The Carter Center Superior Work Performance Award, U.S. Public Health Service Assistant Secretary for Health Award for Exceptional Achievement, Department of Health and human Services Certificate of Appreciation for Contributions to the Success of the First National Symposium on Prevention of Leading Work-Related Disease and Injuries, Centers for Disease Control Certificado Assistio al Serninsho, Pan American Health Organization, Paipa, Columbia Commendation Medal, U.S. Public Health Service EPA Award, Pioneer of the Nuke Watch, Three Mile Island EPA Recognition for Outstanding Contribution Phi Alpha Alpha (Public Affairs and Administration honorary) Education for Public Managers Fellowship Student Honor Award (Idaho Student Branch, American Society of Agricultural Engineers Alpha Zeta (Agricultural honorary) Chancellor, Idaho Chapter

Significant Performance Served as Project Officer for the Annual Report to the Congress, The Economics of Clean Air, March, 1971. Served as the first Project Officer for the Annual Report from the Administrator, EPA to the Congress, Research Outlook 1978-1982. Assured in 1978 that expert witnesses were provided to a major enforcement program within the Environmental Protection Agency covering the utility, iron and steel, pulp and paper, and chemical industries. Acted in 1979 as Executive Officer for the Environmental Protection Agencies response to the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island, PA. 215

Coordinated international activities at NIOSH from 1982 to 1988, over which 17 international documents and books were published and a system of international, regional, and bilateral coordination was established. Served as the project officer on and active sponsor-representative for an Institute of Medicine study that resulted in the publication of The Role of the Primary Care Physician in Occupational and Environmental Medicine in 1988. Managed the planning committee, the convening, and the publication of papers and proceedings from the Surgeon General’s Conference on Agricultural Safety and Health, 1991. Opened a field office in Anchorage, Alaska for NIOSH in 1991 to conduct demonstration programs in the prevention of occupational injuries. Served as a senior editor for and edited two chapter in the ILO Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety, which was published in 1998. One chapter was “Agriculture and Natural Resource Based Industries” and the other chapter was “Livestock Rearing”. Served as managing editor for a special issue of Statistics in Medicine, in which the proceedings and papers from the Seventh Biennial Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Symposium on Statistical Methods held in 1999 were published in May 2001. Mel Myers has also authored over 50 articles for publication.

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JEFFREY C. SPEER P.O. Box 685 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636 520.458.8056 Results oriented individual with strong problem solving experience. Skilled in organizing, SUMMARY: developing, and implementing industrial safety, ergonomic and environmental programs. Strong interpersonal abilities combined with excellent analytical and management skills. EDUCATION: CENTRAL MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY- Warrensburg, Missouri 64093 Master of Science- Industrial Safety/Management UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO- Toronto, Ontario Canada Honors Bachelor of Arts EXPERIENCE: 1995 to Present

Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal Command (NETCOM) Title: Safety Engineer (1995-1997) Safety Director (1997- present)

Is the principal staff advisor, technical consultant and coordinator to the NETCOM Commander and the staff in planning, organizing, directing and evaluating all safety and occupational health efforts involving 12,500 personnel worldwide. Expert in system safety engineering and management to support design, installation, operations, maintenance and sustainment of worldwide tactical, strategic, and power projection signal support systems for the Army. Principal activity is to provide safety engineering design assistance to developing engineers of both hardware and software of electronics and support products to ensure that the end products are safe for their intended use. This function requires innovation of alternate designs that eliminate or minimize the hazard to the operating personnel and users. This also includes application of human factors considerations to overcome foreseeable operator and user error. Established NETCOM safety, occupational health and system safety engineering program and policy and procedures. Manages and conducts analysis or NETCOM accident data to evaluate hazards and control measures. Develops safety guides and control procedures for safe design specifications, equipment layouts, facilities, processes, and personal protective equipment, devices and materials. Assesses the effectiveness of safety and technical guidance on the integration of risk management processes and MANPRINT safety. 1994 to 1995

Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Command Title: Safety Engineer

Reviewed and evaluated operations, programmatic system safety requirements and techniques in a manufacturing environment that included concept, design, development, testing and production phases. Assessed and resolved industrial safety, ergonomic, health physics and industrial hygiene problems. Participated on accident and mishap investigation teams to assure that safety considerations were inherent in contractors’ programs and activities. Assured that contractors had properly applied industrial safety and environmental standards to engineering plans, production operations and maintenance, and hazardous operations. Developed and performed engineering studies, hazard analyses and risk assessments in the areas of hazard identification and hazard control. Coordinated and provided safety training classes. Conducted safety inspections, surveys and audits of contractor operations with authority for immediate work stoppage, if found to be in serious non-compliance with regulatory standards. 1994

Steelcase Incorporated, Athens, AL 35611 Title: Production Line Associate

Performed quality control inspections of production line product and periodic audits for compliance with ISO 9000 requirements. Provided technical and hazard identification assistance to management. 1989 to 1994

Technical Analysis, Incorporated, Huntsville, AL 35806 Title: Safety Engineer

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Mission service contractor to the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, AL. NANA Industrial Safety Office representative for facility design/construction/activation or a 2.7 billion-dollar chemical/manufacturing processing multi-complex facility. Reviewed facility, equipment and process specifications and design drawings for compliance with statutory health and safety, ergonomic and environmental (RCRA, TSCA, SARA) requirements. Assessed applicability, developed and implemented OSHA Process Safety Management Program to MSFC operations at various locations. Evaluated engineering, technical, process development, manufacturing, or operational issues for the Space Shuttle program. Revised MSFC safety instructions and manuals to comply with new OSHA standards. Established a base line questionnaire for evaluating safety and health program compliance. Evaluated contractor safety program plans, hazard analyses and engineering changes. Performed inspections and audits of all MSFC contractor facilities and operations. 1986 to 1989

Los Angeles County Department of Public Works, Alhambra, CA 91803 Title: Safety Officer

Developed, implemented, and administered a comprehensive safety and accident prevention program, policies, and procedures for a newly consolidated Los Angeles County Department of Public Works to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local health and safety requirements. Reviewed safety reports, investigations, and prepared reports of industrial and automobile accidents. Inspected and evaluated Department facilities, equipment, work practices, and safety devices for code compliance. Analyzed work activities and equipment for potential health and safety hazards and identified personal protective equipment. Prepared and conducted safety training for employees including: Hazard Communication, Confined Space, Hearing Conservation, Respiratory Protection and Asbestos Abatement. Generated risk assessment reports for senior management on status of safety program on a monthly, quarterly, and yearly basis. Provided liaison and technical support for the Department of Safety committees. Assisted with Preparedness and Emergency Response manual, policies, and procedures. 1985 to 1986

Handyman of California, Incorporated, Santa Maria, CA 93438 Title: Technical Consultant

Responsible for customer assistance and service involving building material selections and purchases. Completed sales floor maintenance and weekly inventory procedures. 1983 to 1985

Central Missouri State University, Warrensburg, MO 64093 Title: Teaching Assistant

Developed and taught driver education program for high school students and adults including theoretical and practical aspects of motor vehicle operations. Program instructor for defensive driving, as well as winter driving techniques and traffic safety programs presented to various State of Missouri police forces. Demonstrated the Seat Belt Convincer at community functions statewide to encourage seat belt usage. 1979 to 1983

Algoma Steel Corporation, Limited, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario Title: Coke Oven Operator Safety Specialist

Assisted the Cokemaking Superintendent in the development and implementation of the department safety program and the first phase of a Coke oven Battery Emission Control Program to meet government standards. Responsible for the preparation of the department safety manual, safe maintenance and shutdown procedures, and personal protective equipment program. SPECIAL TRAINING:

ISO 9000 Inspections Industrial Hygiene Solid Waste Management Accident Investigation/Reconstruction Health Hazard Evaluation Confined Space Hazardous Materials Management

ORGANIZATIONS:

American Society of Safety Engineers System Safety Society National Fire Protection Association Society of Explosive Engineers

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System Safety Certified First Aid Construction Inspection Manprint Hazard Recognition Configuration Management Process Safety Management

Dr. JOHN H. VAN ARSDEL P.O. Box 2894 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636-2894 (520) 459-3836 email – [email protected] EDUCATION B.S., Industrial Technology, Engineering Major, Purdue University. M.A., Ph.D, Post Graduate credits and honors, University of Denver, Commonwealth University. Seminars and Technical Training in Operational Areas. HIGHLIGHTS OF ASSIGNMENTS * * * * * * *

Twenty years experience electronics and human engineer. Extensive writing and presentation experience. Supervisor particularly in human engineering applications. Experience in large scale military oriented projects. Eight years computer experience: main frame to micro & mini. Project experience in identifying and resolving problems. Human factors Scientist – NORAD Computer Systems, Space Comp. Ctr. RELEVANT SKILLS and EXPERIENCE

ELECTRONICS ENGINEER . Developed test plans, conducted tests, wrote test reports: equipment and aircraft testing, electronic instrument and control systems. . Developed tables for solar and X-ray data for C-E HF predictions. . Prepared, coordinated C-E multiservice standardization documents. . Developed/reviewed C-E standards and practices for effectiveness. . COR's technical representative in C-E standards efforts. HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEER (MANPRINT) . Developed, conducted human engineering tests of pilots and technicians, non-standard instruments and controls, wrote reports. . Directed technical teams, extensive missile testing programs. . Developed Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI), Human Factors Design Compliance, Personnel System Test and Evaluation reports. . Lead human engineer, Minute Man III Post Boost Propulsion System. . Human Factors Scientist, updating Cheyenne Mountain Space Computational Center and NORAD computer systems. SUPERVISORY . Acting Supervisor in Air Training Command assignments. . Coordinator of technical, training teams for missile testing. . Lead human engineer, Minute Man III Post Boost Propulsion System. . Supervisor Computer Laboratory in University. Supervising Human Factors Scientist for updating Cheyenne Mountain Space Computational Center and NORAD computer systems.

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RELEVANT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE USAISEC SED-ASQB-SET-N, Electronics Engineer, Fort Huachuca, AZ. USAISEC SED-ASQB-SET-T, Electronics Engineer, Fort Huachuca, AZ. USAISEC ASBI-SST, Electronics Engineer, Fort Huachuca, AZ. USACEEIA ASC-CED-CE-TP, Mathematician, Fort Huachuca, AZ. USACEEIA CCC-EMEO-ECD, Operations Research Analyst, Fort Huachuca, AZ. US Army Academy of Health Sciences, Technical Reviewer and Operations Systems Analyst, Ft Sam Houston, TX. USAF Contract, Officer Training, Lackland AFB, TX. USAF Contract, Space Computational Center and NORAD Computer System 427M Improvement Program, Supervising Human Factors Scientist, Colorado Springs, CO. Univ. of Denver, Supervisor Computer Laboratory, Denver,CO. USAF Contract, Lead Human Engineer, Minute Man III, Post Boost Propulsion System, Niagara Falls, NY. US Army Contract, Senior Systems Engineer, Tucson, AZ. USAF Contract, Senior Development Engineer, Goodyear, AZ. US Army Contract, Technical and Training Coordinators, Multisystem Test Equipment Program (missile testing), Burlington, MA. USAF Contract, Human Engineer, Dyna-Soar Project, Cherry Hill, NJ. US Army Contract, Electronics Engineer and Human Engineer, Electronics Flight Instrumentation and Controls Testing, USAEPG, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

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APPENDIX C:

APPLIANCE LIST

SAFETY APPLIANCES AVAILABLE TO HELP PROTECT AGAINST THE OCCURRENCE OF POWERLINE CONTACT ♦ Boom Swing Limiting Device: This device employs two spring bumpers mounted on the revolving superstructure directly below the boom, which are pointed in opposite directions. These bumpers stop the rotation of the crane when they come into contact with stop blocks which are connected by two pins to a ring welded to the crane carrier. The stop blocks can be set to allow as much or as little rotation as is desired or can be removed completely for normal operation. The unit also is equal with switches which contact the stop blocks about one foot ahead of the bumpers, activating a bell in the cab to warn the operator that the crane is approaching the stop blocks. This device varies slightly to fit various models of cranes. It can be designated to fit most truck cranes and some crawler cranes. Rayco Boom Ranger Model R420 Rayco Electronics, U.S.A. Inc. (Wylie Systems) P.O. Box 225 4323 Lincoln Way East Fayetteville, PA 17222 717.352.2121 Fax 717.352.8707

Rayco R2420 Range Limiting Device Rayco Electronic System 2440, Avenue Dalton Sainte-Foy, Québec, Canada 418.266.6600 Fax: 418.266.6610 [email protected] Rayco Boom Buoy Rayco Electronic System Ltd 1370 Chemin Filteau Berniéresm Qc G7A 2K1 418.831.6137

♦ SigAlarm: This device is equipped with a sensing aerial running the entire length of the boom. The purpose if the aerial is to pick up electrostatic fields which are present around any alternating current transmission line. The strength of these electrostatic fields at any point in space is directly proportional to the power of the transmission line and inversely proportional to the distances of that point from the powerline. The aerial on a crane is connected to electrical circuitry which activates a light and a buzzer when the aerial enters a field of a

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certain strength. This must be adjusted by the crane operator at every site due to the variation of power carried by transmission lines and to the distances from the line at which the operator chooses to work. Battery power from the crane is used to operate the warning devices, and to energize the detector circuit. This device is available with several options which enable it to be used. With any crane on any type or crane-shovel operation. 647 Progress Way Sanford, FL 32771 1.800.589.3769 407.328.9479 Fax: 407.328.5889 www.SigAlarminc.com ♦ Other Proximity Warning Devices Detek-Thor Proximity Warning Device Model R600 Rayco Electronics, U.S.A. Inc. (Wylie Systems) P.O. Box 225 4323 Lincoln Way East Fayetteville, PA 17222 717.352.2121 Fax 717.352.8707 Will-Burt ISO 9001 D-TEC Trip Will-Burt 169 South Main Street Orrville, OH 44667-0900 330.682.7015 330.684.1190 www.willburt.com H.J. Tinsley & Co Ltd Spittlegate Level Grantham, Lincolnshire England NG31 7UH Tel: Grantham (0476) 77297 Wylie Systems (A Hinderliter Company) 1240 N. Harvard Tulsa, OK 74115-6103 918.832.9035 www.wyliesystems.org.uk

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Saf-T-Boom® Dielectric Shield Safe-T-Boom Corp. #1 Skyway Dr. Little Rock, AR 72201 501.375.3291 ♦ Insulating Links: Load Insulator® Insulatus 708 Marks Rd, Suite B Valley City, OH 44280 1.888.323.5623 Fax: 1.888.323.1733 www.insulatus.com Miller ISO Link Miller Products 41 Fremont St. Worcester, MA 01603 800.733.7071 www.millerproducts.net also available through Safety Products Engineering, Inc. 707 Mullet Dr. Ste. 204 Cape Canaveral, FL 32920 800.589.3769 Safety Link Safe-T-Boom Corp. #1 Skyway Dr. Little Rock, AR 72201 501.375.3291 ♦ Other Equipment: Pneumatic Shock Guard (Pneumatic Remote Control) US Truck Cranes Inc. (USTC) R.D. 6, Box 34-B York, PA 17404 800.233.1961

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