Constitutional-Law-II-Reviewer.pdf

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEWER SECTION 1 HIERARCHY Philippine Blooming Mills Human Rights and Right to life are superior to right to property. GENERAL Tupas vs. C.A. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process. JUDICIAL El Banco Español vs. Palanca The failure of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the Court and that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE Webb vs de Leon To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be an allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced (not simply might be), by the barrage of publicity. EXTRADITOIN PROCEEDINGS Sec of Justice vs. Lantion Individuals are bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process because it is sui generis. Gov’t of US vs Purganan The detention of a potential extraditee prior the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. Subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE The proceedings in student discipline may be summary and cross examination is not an essential pat thereof. (Guzman vs. N.U.). The contract between the school and student is not an ordinary contract(Non vs. Dames). The school has the right to determine the continuance of the schooling of a student Page 1 of 54

applying their academic and disciplinary standards.(Garcia vs. L.I.T.). However, penalties imposed by the schools must be commensurate to the offenses committees (Malabanan vs. Ramento). DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS Lao Gi vs. C.A. A deportation proceeding affects freedom and liberty of a person. The Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable in deportation proceedings. REGULATIONS: FIXING RATES AND REGULATION OF PROFESSION Philcomstat vs. Alcuaz(quasi-judicial) As a general rule, notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions, but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. Maceda vs. ERB(quasi-legislative) Price fixing is considered as exercising quasilegislatice function. Corona vs. UHPAP Profession is a property right DISMISSAL Salaw vs. NLRC Right to Counsel is a right even in civil and administrative proceedings. Labor Code granted the right to counsel. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION Castillo-Co vs. Barbers A preventive suspension can be decreed or an official under investigations after changes are brought and even before the charges are brought even before the charges are heard

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since the same is not in the nature of penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. STATUTE Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan When a statute lacks a comprehensible standard, it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially persons targeted by it, fair notice of conduct to avoid, and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of government muscles MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION If a person (in any stage, of any nature) has been deprived of a step in a proceeding, the SC will not ordinarily reverse the decision, if the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration. Failure to file, cures the defect.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS Churchill vs. Rafferty Police power cannot interfere with private property for purely aesthetic purposes. People vs Fajardo The state may not under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. Ermita-Malte vs. City Mayor The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest if public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. Ynot vs IAC If the movement and not the slaughter is banned and carabaos are arbitrarily confiscated, then that what constitute violation of due process of law.

SURETYSHIP Surety is bound to answer all the liabilities of the principal. There is no need to inform the principal if the surety failed to appear in the proceedings as long as he has been informed of the liability.

Balacuit vs. CFI The legislature may not under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business for it is a property right of the owner. Theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions cannot be considered as public utilities.

APPEAL Telan vs. CA Client is not bound to the negligence of a fake lawyer.

Agustin Vs. Edu Promoting safe transit upon and avoid obstruction on roads and streets is a valid governmental interest.

CLOSURE PROCEEDINGS Closure Proceedings are valid exercise of police power of the state to protect the public.

Magtajas vs. Prce Properties Corp. An ordinance must not contravene the constitution or any statutes.

BIDDINGS There must be a bidding! UDHA-RA 7279 Art 13- Procedure of Eviction No Urban poor dweller will be evicted except in a just and humane manner. Page 2 of 38

Bennis vs. Michigan The State is not required to compensate the owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain. Cruzan Health

vs.

Missouri

Department

of

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The due process requirement does not require the state top accept the “substitute judgment” of close family members in the absence of substantial proof that their views reflect the patient’s. however, it may require clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes, it may also choose to defer only those wishes rather than confide the decisions to close family members. JMM Promotion and Management vs. CA Profession is a legitimate subject of police power. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonably regulatory standard no such deprivation of property exists. Ople vs. Torres A statute must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interest and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. Montesclaros vs. COMELEC Public officers is not a property right but a privilege and a public trust. Pilipinas Kao vs. CA The absence of publication is fatal as held in Tañada vs. Tuvera. Even if a Manual of Operation is internal in nature, if its effects reach out other than its employees then it must be published. Philsa vs. Sec of Labor In Tañada vs. Tuvera, it was said that all statutes including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative rules and regulations in so far they enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and letter of instructions issued by administrative superiors need not be published. Whether or not the circular addresses a small group or not, the fact that it is an administrative circular which enforces laws, makes publication imperative. Page 3 of 38

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW People vs. Cayat A classification to be reasonable (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Ichong vs. Hernandez The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. The Supreme Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Pao Ho There is no logic in exacting the payment of fifty pesos from aliens who have already secured a clearance for employment. Fee is unreasonable, because it is excessive and it fails to consider substantial differences in the situation of the aliens required to pay it. The same amount is collected from every alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part-time or full-time, a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Dumlao vs. Comelec Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement because of the need for new blood. Goesart vs. Cleary Gender is a valid classififcation. Ormic Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City Tax must not be passed for a specific entities only for it will not be applicable to future conditions as well. Basco vs. Pagcor(gambling)

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The equal protection clause does not mean that all occupations called by the same name are treated the same way.

official pressure and influence can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan Dismissal of a case against one defendant must apply to other of no reasonable differences exist.

The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs. POEA Te dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb and accessibility to social, civic and spiritual activities.

Binay vs. Domingo Different groups may receive different treatments. Statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled and the less fortunate. NPC vs. de Guzman The PC before the effectivity of RA 6975 were already retitrable at the age of 56 while the local police force plan their retirement which should be earlier than usual because of the new law. Tolentino vs, Sec of Finance Inequalities which result from the singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. There is a difference between a “homeless poor’ and the “homeless less poor” because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the meantime that they cannot buy yet their own houses. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. Himagan vs.People The PNP officers are treated differently from other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as preventive suspension is concerned. It was said that policeman who carry weapon and the badge of law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them needs to be suspended in order to protect his victim and the witnesses against him. Almonte vs. Vasquez The office of the ombudsman is different fro other investigatory and prosecutory agencies if the government because the subject of its jurisdiction are public officials who through Page 4 of 38

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan It is unfair to exempt a similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to others. Sison Jr. vs. Ancheta Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As they do no have to pay overhead expenses, they are not entitled to make deductions fro income tax purposes which is not the caw of professionals in practice of their calling and businessmen. In the case of the latter, there is no uniformity in the cots or expenses necessary to produce their income. Marcos vs. CA The need to continue the prosecution of those who had already committed acts of the mandatory destabilization. There is a distinction between individuals doing acts when such acts are still illegal than those people who did similar acts when such acts are no more illegal. Philippine Judges Association vs. Pardo There is no basis however why all the departments, it would be the judiciary that has been denied of the franking privilege. General Milling Corporation vs. Torres There is a difference in a resident and nonresident alien. Chavez vs. PCGG Special grant of tax exemption in favor of Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation.

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TELEBAP vs. Comelec The law do not single out radio and television station to provide free time. The are important differences in the characteristics of the two media. Radio and television has more impact on people than newspapers. Tiu vs CA There are substantial differences between the big investors who are lured to establish their industries in the “secured area” compared to business operators outside the area. On one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments, on the other, definitely none of such magnitude. The first can give economic impact that is national in scope, the other, merely local. Soriano vs. C.A. Payment of civil liability is not made a condition precedent to probation but is a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same. Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon discretion of the trial court. Aguinaldo vs. Comelec Incumbent running for the same position are not considered resigned because the intention of the laws is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid disruption on the delivery of essential services. Thus, running for different positions are considered resigned because they are considered to have abandoned their present position by their act of running for other posts. International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. De Guzman vs. Comelec Singling out of election officers ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity of election officials by preventing them from developing Page 5 of 38

familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. The purpose of the law is to break an important link in the chain of corruption. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. People vs. Mercado The death penalty law applies to all persons and to all classes of persons – rich, poor, educated or uneducated, religious or nonreligious. No particular group or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed. People vs. Jalosjos The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions, which lift the accused from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Philreca vs Sec of DILG There is reasonable classification under the LGC to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives that are registered with the NEA and those under CDA. Fariñas vs Executive Secreatary. Substantial distinctions exist between appointive and elective officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office foe a definite term and may be removed only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

SUMMARY OF SECTION 1 Proceedings 1.Civil 2.Criminal

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3.Quasi-Judicial/ Administrative 4.Deportation 5.Extradition Proceedings 6.Academic Standard: El Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca De Guzman vs. N.U. (cited in ADMU v Capulong) Ang Tibay vs. C.I.R. Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion EL BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO VS. PALANCA As applied to a judicial proceeding, the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: 1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it: 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person or the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by; a. voluntary appearance of a party in court in submission to its authority b. coercive power of legal process exerted over the person Jurisdiction over property is acquired by: a. seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law b. institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of the laws, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective 3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard 4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing ANG TIBAY VS. C.I.R. The following are the cardinal primary rights, which must be respected in proceedings, Page 6 of 38

which is administrative or quasi-judicial in character; 1. The right to hearing, including the right to present one’s case and submit evidence. 2. The tribunal must consider the evidences presented 3. The decision must be supported 4. the evidence must be substantial 5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing or contained at the record 6. The tribunal must act on its own independent consideration 7. The board/body must render decisions in such manner that the parties in proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered LAO GI VS. COURT OF APPEALS Although the deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional right of a person to due process shall not be denied. The Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Rules of Court are applicable to deportation proceedings because it affects freedom and liberty of the person Minimum Standards: 1. Determine if there’s sufficient cause to charge deportation 2. inform of the charges/ specific grounds for deportation 3. Hearing under the Rules of Procedure presented by the CID Commissioner 4. Order based on the determination of CID Commissioner SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding, which will call into operation all the rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY The proceedings in student discipline may be summary and cross examination is not an essential pat thereof. There are withal

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minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are that: 1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them 2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired 3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them 4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf 5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Note: The proceedings in student discipline may be summary and cross examination is not an essential pat thereof. (Guzman vs. N.U.). The contract between the school and student is not an ordinary contract(Non vs. Dames). The school has the right to determine the continuance of the schooling of a student applying their academic and disciplinary standards.(Garcia vs. L.I.T.). However, penalties imposed by the schools must be commensurate to the offenses committees (Malabanan vs. Ramento).

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SECTION 2-FREEDOM FROM SPEECH EXCEPTION: If search is reasonable

A. With a valid warrant

B. Without a valid warrant

Requirements: (1) issued upon probable cause (2) personally examined by the judge (3) Examined under oath and affirmation (4) Particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized(Section 2 ArticleIII) (5) warrant must not be for more than one offense (Revised Rules of Court)

(1) Incidental to lawful arrest (Sec 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court) (2) Plain view (3) Moving vehicle (4) Consented warantless searches (5) Customs Searches (6) Stop and Frisk (7) Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

A(1) Issued upon probable cause Probable Cause for search- such facts and circumstances that would lead a discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection of the offense are in the place sought to be searched. • Existence of probable cause is determined by the facts of each case • It must be probable cause of something specific (Stonehill vs. Diokno) • It must be defined in relation to the action which it justifies • Mere conclusions of law do not establish probable cause (Corro vs. Lising) (Burgos vs. Chief of Staff)

C. Wihtout warrant (by a private individual) (1) SOP (People vs. Marti) (2) Security Check (People vs Bongcarawan)

•

•

•

•

•

D. Of other nature or purpose (1) Subpoena duces tecum (2) Administrative Ispection

Presentation of master tapes is not an absolute requirement for a search warrant to issue (Columbia Pictures Entertainment) In search warrants, proof of probable cause for a warrant need not point to a specific offender (Webb vs. de Leon) On the spot tip + surveillance + suspicious action + refusal to open bag (People vs. Tangliben) Information about a drug addict + reddish eyes + walking in swaying manner + avoids a policeman (Manlili vs CA) Tip + bulge + suspicious failure to produce passport + description of a Caucasian (People vs. Malmstedt)

• • •

Specific description fits the confidential information (People vs. Bagista) When the smell of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag. Intelligence report of a deep penetration agent (People vs. Lo Ho Wing)

A(2) Personally examined by the judge • The judge must conduct the examination personally and not thorough commissioner or deputy clerk of court (Bache case) • The judge may personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal. (Soliven vs. Makasiar) • The judge cannot rely solely on the certification of the fiscal in the absence of necessary documents that will support such certification (Lim vs. Felix) • Only the judge can determine the probable cause for issuance of a warrant (Salazar vs. Achacoso) (exception: deportation of aliens; [Harvey vs. Santiago]) A(3) Examined under oath and affirmation Oath- an outward pledge given by person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under immediate sense of responsibility to God. (Alvarez vs. CFI) Affirmation- a solemn and formal declaration that an affidavit is true, this being substituted for an oath in certain cases. Here, there is no invocation of God or a supreme being. A(4) Particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized • Must be specific as the circumstances will allow (People vs. Rubio) • Must be conclusion of fact not of law (People vs Rubio) • Things described must be limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Revised Rules of Court) • Must not be too general (Stonehill vs. Diokno) Page 9 of 36

B(1) Incidental to lawful arrest Arrest must precede that search; the process cannot be reversed (Malacat vs. CA) Exception: A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search (People vs. Tudtud citing 68 Am.Jur 2d) B(2) Plain view Requirements: (1) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duty. (2) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be there. (3) The evidence must be immediately apparent (4) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People vs. Valdez) (See Roan vs. Gonzales) B(3) Moving vehicle -The important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warantless search (Caballes vs. CA) - or search is conducted in exceptional circumstances (i.e. checkpoints) (Valmonte vs. de Villa) Requirements for Checkpoints: (1) Existence of exceptional circumstances (2) conducted on a fixed area (3) inspection limited to visual search (4) occupants mot subjected to physical or body search (Caballes vs. CA) B(4) Consented warantless searches Requirements for effective waiver of rights: (1) it must appear that the right exist (2) the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive of the existence of such right. (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

(4) It must be understood to cover only what is included within the terms of the language (Veroy vs. Layague) B(5) Customs Searches Imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of Bureau of Customs as importation is not terminated. (Tariff and Customs Code). BOC acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control. (Papa vs. Mago) B(6) Stop and Frisk 2 Fold interest in stop and frisk (1) Crime prevention and detection (2) Self- preservation -mere suspicion or hunch will not validate stop and frisk. (Malacat vs. CA) -a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s EXPERIENCE and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (People vs. Solayao, Posadas vs. CA) B(7) Exigent and Emergency Circumstances People vs De Gracia People vs. Bolasa D Good cause for production of documents must be established. Documents cannot be used to incriminate the other party. Also, the documents must be particularly described (Material and Oklahoma cases) There must exist reasonable governmental interest in administrative inspection. Only reasonableness of need to conduct periodic, area-wide inspection is needed. Note: What may be the subject of a search warrant? Personal property, which is: 1. subject of the offense, 2. stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or 3. used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Page 10 of 36

SEARCH WARRANT The applicant must show: 1. that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity; and 2. that the items will be found in the place to be searched. The judge must conduct a personal, searching examination of the applicant and his witnesses

Presciption: 10 days

WARRANT OF ARREST The applicant must show: 1. probable cause that an offense has been committed; and 2. that the person to be arrested committed it

The judge need not conduct a personal examination of the applicant and his witnesses. He may rely on the affidavits of the witnesses and the recommendation of the prosecutor. Prescription: Until served

SECTION 2: FREEDOM FROM ARREST EXCEPTION: If arrest is reasonable

A. With Warrant

B. Without Warrant

Requirements: (1) issued upon probable cause (2) personally examined by the judge (3) Examined under oath and affirmation (4) Particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized(Section 2 ArticleIII) (5) warrant must not be for more than one offense (Revised Rules of Court)

Rule 113, Sec 5 Rules of Court (a) when in his presence, the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to into another.

No Fiscal, so the judge personally investigates -Municipal trial court -Municipal circuit trial court -Metropolitan circuit court (non-NRC) With Fiscal, so the judge looks certification and examines the records Process: -Fiscal makes a determination of probable cause (called “certification”) -Judge looks into the certification – must have affidavits -Judge personally examines the records -Judge is not bound to Fiscal’s determination

B(a) when in his presence, the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense; -an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, when the officer SEES the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS the disturbances created thereby and PROCEEDED AT ONCE to the scene thereof (US vs. Samonte) B(b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

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Personal knowledge -Finding lifeless body with stab wounds and an informant pointed to the accused as the assailant. Bloodstains in the accused’s pants were found to be the same blood type as that found on the fatal knife. (People vs. Jayson citing People vs. Jayson) - Policemen went to the scene of the crime and found a piece of wood and concrete hollow block used by the killer. A neighbor who witnessed the killing pointed to the accused as the assailant (People vs. Jayson citing People vs. Garente) - Policemen received a report and immediately responded. One of the victims pointed to the 4 persons one of which was wearing his jacket. When they were approached they ran to different directions. (People vs. Jayson citing People vs. Acol) - When the policemen conducted a surveillance Note: Illegality of arrest may be cured when: -accused voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by pleading not guilty without questioning the illegality of his arrest.(People vs. Escordial)

SEC 3: PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION EXCEPTIONS Lawful order of the court

When Public or Order requires prescribed by law

Note: To come under exclusionary rule, the evidence must be obtained by government agents and not by private individuals acting on their own. People vs. Marti Inspection of the individual was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs. People vs. Bongcarawan Even if the vessel security is armed and tasked to maintain peace and order, he is still a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. BUT Zulueta vs. CA The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other. A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her right to privacy as an individual. [Why are the articles admissible in Marti, Bongcarawan, and Mendoza but not in Zulueta case?]

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SECTION 4 PRIOR RESTRAINT BURGOS SR. vs. CHIEF OF STAFF DOCTRINE: Closure is in the nature of restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes virtual denial of petitioner’s freedom to express themselves in dissent. NEAR vs. MINNESOTA DOCTRINE: Censorship or prior restraint is done by suppressing publication and punishing as contempt further publication. In determining the extent of constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty of freedom of press is to prevent previous restraints of publication. The prior restraint principle is not an unbending rule but admitted exceptions such as when the nation is at war, as primary requirements of decency, incitement to acts of violence and overthrow of government. FREEDMAN vs. MARYLAND DOCTRINE: Non-criminal process, which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor, avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. STANDARD FOR CENSORSHIP TO BE VALID: 1. The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. 2. While the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s determination whether a film constitutes a protected expression because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the

necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression—only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. 3. The procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. NEW YORK TIMES CO. vs. US DOCTRINE: Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries the burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE DOCTRINE: The press is not exempt to the taxing powers of the state, the law granted the press a privilege, the could take back such a privilege any time. In withdrawing the privilege, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have ling ago been subjected, The VAT is not a license tax and therefore, not a form of prior restraint. It is not a tax on the exercise if the privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services. ALEXANDER vs. US DOCTRINE: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act merely forfeits the assets of Alexander so as to prevent him from using such assets to finance his illegal adult entertainment business. There is no prior restraint in this case for prior restraint describes order forbidding certain communications that are issued before the communications occur. The order does not impose any legal impediment on Alexander’s ability to any expressive activity. Alexander’s assets were forfeited for they were related to past racketeering violations

and thus differ from materials seized or restrained on suspicion of being obscene. Obscenity is judicially determined. IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. CA DOCTRINE: The Boards of Review for Moving Pictures and Television has the power to screen review and examine all television programs. The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the state when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantial evil, which the state is duty bound to prevent. However, there is no showing of the type of harm the tapes will bring. Prior restraint on speech cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a SUBSTANTIVE and IMMINENT EVIL. SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT PEOPLE vs. PEREZ DOCTRINE: The attack on Governor-General Wood exceeds the bounds of free speech and common decency. There was a seditious tendency, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the government and obedient to the laws. This case is an example of the application of the dangerous tendency rule where all it requires, for speech to be punishable is that there is a rational connection between speech and evil apprehended. DENNIS et al. vs. US DOCTRINE: In determining whether a circumstance would constitute clear and present danger, the court must inquire whether in each case the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies an invasion of free speech to avoid the danger. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity

and degree. Certainly, an attempt to overthrow the government even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers is a sufficient evil that the congress should prevent. Clear and present danger is not dependent on the probability of success of attempted overthrow and the congress may act even through attempt is doomed from the outset because of inadequate number or power of the revolutionist. EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) vs. DANS JR. DOCTRINE: All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media due to its overwhelming reach and influence. The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stationswhether by government or through selfregulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. GONZALEZ vs. COMELEC DOCTRINE: There should be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In the case of Cabansag vs. Fernandez, the court held that there are two tests that are acceptable criterion for permissible restriction of the freedom of speech, expression, assembly etc. These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the

degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented." The dangerous tendency rule on the other hand provides that if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency, which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil, which the legislative body seeks to prevent. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs. JUDGE IGNACIO M. CAPULONG DOCTRINE: The case of Lagunzad cannot be applied in this case because in Lagunzad the case was filed after the film was completed; therefore there is no PRIOR restraint on the right of free expression. In our present case, the respondent filed the complaint while the film is in production. The respondent judge (Capulong) should not have restrained the petitioners from completing the film because any measure of PRIOR restraint is invalid. Neither the respondent nor the trial judge cannot assert any violation of right since the movie has not yet been completed. The invalidity of measure of prior restraint does not mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an exparte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any

audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. SPEECH AND ELECTORAL PROCESS SANIDAD vs. COMELEC DOCTRINE: The evil sought to be prevented by RESOLUTION NO. 2167 is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. However, this should not be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, the court ruled that the prohibition is valid for it seeks to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus. However, the evil sought to be prevented in an election is not present in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of a specific candidate. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC DOCTRINE: The objective of Section 11 is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the rich candidates from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. Though the rights of freedom and speech are of special importance in a democratic polity, they are not unlimited

because they are not the only important and relevant values. Equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office is also clearly an important value. Therefore, no presumption of invalidity arises with respect to exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for purposes of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. Section 11 (b)-does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office-constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and that of Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections. BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMELEC DOCTRINE: The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile' places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds for it unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution since there is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests-individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other-is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to

justify the curtailment of the citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify the limitation. Moreover, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The provision is so broad that it encompasses even the private citizen’s private property and the freedom to convince others to agree with him. OSMEÑA vs. COMELEC DOCTRINE: What is involved here is simply a regulation of time, place and manner. Section 11B is merely regulatory. Any restriction of speech is only incidental and it is no more than necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality of opportunity. What makes this regulation reasonable is that it applies only to the election period. For content-neutral restrictions such as the case at bar, the O’Brien test must be used. The O’Brien test provides that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if a) it is within the constitutional power of the Government, b) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; c) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; d) and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Unlike the case of Sanidad where prohibiting columnist in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, the restrictions that are content-neutral are not censorial. 11B is not concerned with the content of the speech thus, it needs only a substantial governmental interest to support them. The clear and present danger test is not a remedy to all free speech problems. Since 11B is merely regulatory, the compelling reason to be determined by the

clear and present danger test should not be used. Applying the O’Brien test, we find that RA 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the state to regulate media of communication to ensure equal opportunity. COMMERCIAL SPEECH FRIEDMAN vs. ROGERS DOCTRINE: To enjoy protection, commercial speech must not be false or misleading. RUBIN vs. COORS BREWING CO. DOCTRINE: The congress enacted FAAA in order to establish national rues governing the distribution production and importation of alcohol however, it did not pass the HUDSON test therefore, it is unconstitutional: Hudson Test (Central Hudson Gas vs. Public Service Commission): Requirements: 1. speech must no be false or misleading or proposing an illegal activity 2. the governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must be substantial 3. the regulation must be directly advance the government’s interest 4. the regulation must not be overboard CINCINNATI vs. DISCOVERY NETWORK, ET. AL. DOCTRINE: Respondents do not challenge their characterization as "commercial speech." Nor do respondents question the substantiality of the city's interest in safety and esthetics. It was, therefore, proper for the District Court and the Court of Appeals to judge the validity of the city's prohibition under the standard we set forth in Central Hudson and Fox. The city failed to meet its burden of establishing a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of news racks as the means chosen to serve those interests. The

city's news rack policy is neither content neutral nor, "narrowly tailored." Thus, regardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, it cannot be justified as a legitimate time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech.” CITY OF LADUE vs. GILLEO DOCTRINE: The ordinance prohibiting the placing of signs which pose distinctive societal problems violates the residents’ right to free speech. While said signs are subject to the municipality’s police power, any regulation may be challenged on the ground that it restricts too little speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of sign’s message or on the ground that it prohibits too much protected speech. Although there is valid interest in minimizing visual clutter, the ordinances has almost completely foreclosed an important and distinct medium of expression to political, religious or personal messages. Prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, but such measures can suppress too much speech by eliminating a common means of speaking. The ordinance cannot be justified as time, place manner restriction since handbills and newspaper advertisements are inadequate substitutes for important medium such as the posters that were prohibited by Ladue’s ordinance. UNPROTECTED SPEECH LIBEL POLICARPIO vs. MANILA TIMES DOCTRINE: Newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish news items relative to Judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is

entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and. It must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Such fairness and good faith is not present in the case at bar. The omissions in the newspaper report, which contributed to the unfair picture created, is to be termed as libel by negligence. If the publisher is unaware, when under the facts the truth could have been verified, the publisher is guilty of negligence and was liable for libel, malice being an essential element in libel (Take note: Fr. Bernas dissents to this view). BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. vs. NOEL DOCTRINE: The law against libel is protective of reputation according to community standards and not according to personal or family standards LOPEZ vs. CA DOCTRINE: In preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account to a point of suppression, for honest mistake or imperfection in the choice of words (Quisumbing V. Lopez). For liability to arise without offending the press freedom, there is the test to meet: statements was made with 'actual malice'- ie. knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (NY times v. Sullivan). In the case at bar, Quisumbing v. Lopez is not squarely in point. Here there was no pressure of a daily deadline, no occasion to act with haste as the picture was published in a weekly magazine. Moreover, the requirement of reasonable care is not satisfied. Hence petitioner is liable for libel. LIBEL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES

NEW YORK TIMES vs. SULLIVAN DOCTRINE: The constitutional guarantee prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that is was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. (STANDARD: Bars media liability for defamation of a public official absent proof that the defamatory statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth) ROSEBLOOM vs. METROMEDIA DOCTRINE: The general rule is that there is profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhabited, robust, and wide open. If a matter is a subject of public interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior anonymity. There is constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern is extended without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous but the commitment to robust debate on public issues cannot be displaced. GERTZ vs. ROBERT WELCH, INC. DOCTRINE: A publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim the New York Times protection against liability for defamation on the ground that the defamatory statements concern an issue of public or general interest. To extend the New York Times standard to media defamation of private persons whenever an issue of general or public interest is involved would be unfair for private individuals characteristically have less effective opportunities for rebuttal than do

public officials and public figures, thus, they are more vulnerable to injury from defamation. New York Times standard is inapplicable to private individuals. (Overruled Rosebloom Case)

orderly system of dispensing justice which is as important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.

HUSTLER MAGAZINE AND LARRY FLYNT vs. JERRY FALWELL DOCTRINE: In order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern, the constitution prohibits public figures and public officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not sufficient to deny Constitutional protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. The rule in TIMES case is extended to PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC FIGURES (e.g. newscaster, political analyst etc).

IN RE: JURADO (CASE OF ENRILE vs. SALAZAR) DOCTRINE: A publication relating to judicial action in a pending case which tends to impede embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and in punishable as contempt. To constitute contempt, the publication must have been made under the circumstance as would be calculated to imperil the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process, not remotely or probably, but immediately, and it must constitute a clear and resent danger to the administration of justice which danger must be serious and substantial.

EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT PUBLIC OFFICIALS IS PROHIBITED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNLESS IT BE PROVEN THAT THERE IS ACTUAL MALICE IN RE: JURADO (CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY) DOCTRINE: Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important pubic interest. One of the fundamental pubic interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. The protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and

TIMES DOCTRINE APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE CASES VASQUEZ vs. CA DOCTRINE: An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. The requisites for libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. The RPC provides that if the defamatory statements is made against a public official (in this case, a baranggay official) with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal. BORJAL vs. CA DOCTRINE: It is essential in a libel suit that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not

sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. The questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. The conference, the composition of its members, and the manner by which it intended to be funded prove that its activities are imbued with public interest. In New York Times v. Sullivan the court ruled that “honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials are insulated from libelous judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice.” The burden of proving malice lies on the plaintiff. VICARIO vs. CA DOCTRINE: The petitioner’s act of distributing copies of an article from The Inquirer stating that graft charges were filed against Judge Sidro cannot be considered as malicious. Again, the doctrine of Times should be applied. Unless it is proven that there is actual malice, a public official cannot recover damages. According to the RPC, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Such circumstances are not present in the case at bar. JALANDONI vs. DRILON DOCTRINE: TIMES Doctrine is applicable to Philippines cases thereby; a PCGG Commissioner also comes under this rule. OBSCENITY

MILLER vs. STATE OF CALIFORNIA DOCTRINE: In testing for obscenity, the basic guidelines for the tier of facts must be: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. By community standards (in guideline number 1), it means standards of a specific community, which do not really vary from other communities. To require a national community standard is futile and unrealistic. GONZALES vs. KALAW KATIGBAK DOCTRINE: The ruling in Miller should be applied in Philippine movies. The law frowns on obscenity since it is utterly w/o redeeming social importance. However, determining which is obscene is quite difficult. Obscene material is that which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. This ruling however, is limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. A less liberal approach is given for television since everyone, including children have easier access to television whereas people would have to pay if they would like to view movies. PITA vs. CA DOCTRINE: People vs. Kottinger laid down test for Obscenity: whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprive or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall OR whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, that it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Gonzalez vs. Kalaw

Katigbak held a more specific test, whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient (sexual desire) interest, and that it is a judicial question. Both the Kottinger and Kalaw cases also adhere to contemporary community standards. There is no question that state has rt. to suppress freedom of expression is not without restraint. However, such restraints must be based on standards provided by courts. To bar the exercise of the right, there must be a clear and present danger that would warrant State interference – that a danger must not only be (1) clear, but also (2) present, to justify state action. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger, not relying solely on authority’s own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require. And the burden to show the existence of grace and imminent danger, and obscenity that would justify adverse action lies on the authorities. Also there was neither lawful court order nor search and seizure warrant. What mayor or authorities must do is to secure such warrant and convince the court or judge with jurisdiction that the materials sought to be seized are “obscene,” and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action. BARNES vs. GLENN THEATER DOCTRINE: The Court used the O’Brien test: a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: • It is within the constitutional power of the Government, • It furthers an important or substantial government interest, • Governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and • The incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

The Court found that Indiana’s public indecency statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity. Applying O’Brien: • The traditional police power of the State is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety and morals. The statute reflected moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places. • The public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality • What Indiana prohibited was not dancing as a communicative element but simply its being done in the nude. • Indiana’s requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a g-string is modest and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State’s purpose. FCC V. PACIFICA FOUNDATION DOCTRINE: Stricter rules on obscenity must be followed for radio especially because of its pervasive quality and because of the interest in the protection of children. The prohibition against censorship denies the Commission any power to edit proposed programs in advance and to excise material considered inappropriate for the airwaves. HOWEVER, the prohibition has never been construed to deny the commission the power to review the content of COMPLETED broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory powers. The commission has the right to take not of past program content when considering a licensee’s renewal application, as such is not censorship. RENTON vs. PLAYTIME THEATERS DOCTRINE: Zoning legislation dealing with adult entertainment that does not ban adult theaters altogether is not invalid being properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner of regulation. “Content-neutral time, place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest an do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.

BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. FRASER DOCTRINE: The first amendment does not prevent the school district from disciplining students in giving offensively lewd and indecent speech at a school assembly. The use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making a political point but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted to children in public school. It is highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. It is well within the power of the school to prohibit vulgar language to be used by its students. HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. KUHLMEIER DOCTRINE: Schools had the authority to censor if it could affect the education of others. This case ruled that the censorship in the schools was only acceptable if it were for “valid educational purpose.” Stricter rules should be followed for speech in school because of the nature of the community that is involved and the relationship between school and parents. ASSEMBLY and PETITION EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE STATE TO REGULATE PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES NAVARRO vs. VILLEGAS DOCTRINE: The mayor possessed reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets of public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by other and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder and maintain public safety and order. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS vs. PBM DOCTRINE: The primacy if human rights, freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances-over property rights should be sustained. To regard the demonstration against the police

officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the CBA and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the CBA, is a potent means of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free-expression of peaceful assembly and petition. REYES vs. BAGATSING DOCTRINE: In the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest, there was no justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO DOCTRINE: Disciplinary action may be taken against students for conduct, which materially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Such was the conduct of the students in this case. However considering the importance of the right of assembly and petition, the penalty imposed (in this case, suspension of one year) should be lighter than the usual penalty. TOLENTINO vs. SEC of FINANCE ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC DOCTRINE: An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for. There is nothing wrong with holding exit polls. As a matter of fact, it can be considered as a valid exercise of the freedoms of speech and

press. It is true that although freedom of speech and press are guaranteed, they are not immune to regulation by the state in the exercise of police power. COMELEC cannot justify their ban on exit poll for the very nature of the survey is reflective of the general sentiment of a group or community of people. Second, the exit poll will not replace the official counting of the COMELEC. Lastly, the credibility and integrity of elections are not at stake here contrary to the contention of respondent. All of the respondent’s reasons to ban the exit poll were merely speculations and assumptions. Moreover, the COMELEC cannot give an alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information that an exit poll can gather. COMELEC cannot show a substantial state interest therefore, their order, which in effect suppresses the freedom of speech and communication of the petitioner, cannot be held valid.

before local elections. (United States vs. O’ Brien). Government regulation is sufficiently justified if: 1. if it is within the constitutional power of the government 2. if it furthers an important substantial government interest 3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 4. if the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest Sec 5.4 fails to meet criterion (3) because the causal connection of expression to be asserted governmental interest makes such interest “not unrelated to the suppression of free expression”. By prohibiting the publication of election survey because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, sec 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression concerning the same subject matter by PADER vs. PEOPLE newspaper columnists, radio and TV DOCTRINE: Defamatory words will fall under commentators, armchair theorists, and other one or the other, depending not only upon opinion makers. The prohibition may be for their sense, grammatical significance, and a limited time, but the curtailment of the accepted ordinary meaning judging them right of expression is direct, absolute and separately, but also upon the special substantial. circumstances of the case, antecedents or Even if the governmental interest sought to relationship between the offended party and be promoted is unrelated to the suppression the offender, which might tend to prove the of speech and the resulting restriction of free intention of the parties at that time. Reyes expression is only incidental, sec 5.4 vs. People, SC ruled that the expression nonetheless fails to meet criterion (4) “putang ina mo” is a common enough namely, that the restriction be not greater utterance in the dialect that it is often than is necessary to further the employed, not really to slander but rather to governmental interest. express anger or displeasure. In fact, more Sec 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a often, it is just an expletive that punctuates prior restraint on the freedom of expression, one’s expression of profanity. (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. And suppression is only for a limited period, and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORP V. (3) the governmental interest sought to be COMELEC promoted can be achieved by means other DOCTRINE: Test to be employed to than the suppression of freedom of determine validity of section 5.4 of RA 9006 expression. (Fair Elections Act), which provides that publication of surveys affecting national and local candidates shall be prohibited 15 days before the national election and 7 days

SECTION 4 SUMMARY CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION

1.

2. 3.

PRIOR RESTRAINT Definition: Censorship or prior restraint is done by suppressing publication and punishing as contempt further publication. (Near vs. Minnesota) There is presumption of Invalidity Exemption to the presumption a. Near vs. Minnesota (1) War (2) Obscenity (3) Incitement to acts of violence and overthrow of government. b. NPC vs. COMELEC : There is no presumption of invalidity arises with respect to exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for purposes of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. Movie Censorship a. Freedman vs. Maryland

SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT 1. Test to be considered (a) Dangerous Tendency Rule (People vs. Perez) : for speech to be punishable is that there is a rational connection between speech and evil apprehended. (b) Clear and Present danger (Dennis vs. US; Gonzalez vs. COMELEC, Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) VS. DANS JR; Ayer Productions vs. Capulong). (c) Balancing of Interest (Adiong vs. COMLEC) (d) Regulation of time, space and manner (content neutral restrictions): O’Brien Test (Osmena vs. COMELEC)

O’BRIEN TEST a. it is within the constitutional power of the Government, b. if it furthers an important or 4. substantial governmental interest; d. if the governmental interest is STANDARD FOR CENSORSHIP TO BE unrelated to the suppression of free VALID: expression; a. The burden of proving that the film is e. and if the incident restriction on unprotected expression must rest on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is censor. no greater than is essential to the b. While the State may require advance furtherance of that interest. submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s determination whether a film constitutes a protected expression because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression—only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. c. The procedure must also assure a prompt

final judicial decision to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. b. Gonzalez vs. Katigbak. 5. Constitutional Safeguards a. government carries the burden of showing justification (NEW YORK TIMES CO. vs. US) b. Obscenity is judicially determined (Alexander vs. US) c. Prior restraint is to be justified only by showing of substantive and imminent evil (INC vs. CA). 6. Some forms of prior restraint (Both not existing in the case of Alexander vs. US and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance) a. tax b. licenses OTHER FORMS GUARATEED BY THE SECTION 4 COMMERCIAL SPEECH GENERAL RULE: To enjoy protection, commercial speech must not be false or misleading. (FRIEDMAN vs. ROGERS) TEST: HUDSON TEST (Central Hudson Gas vs. PSC; RUBIN vs. COORS BREWING CO.) 1. speech must no be false or misleading or proposing an illegal activity 2. the governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must be substantial 3. he regulation must be directly advance the government’s interest 4. the regulation must not be overboard CASES: CINCINNATI vs. DISCOVERY NETWORK, ET. AL., CITY OF LADUE vs. GILLEO

ASSEMBLY and PETITION TEST; CLEAR and PRESENT DANGER CASES: NAVARRO vs. VILLEGAS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS vs. PBM REYES vs. BAGATSING

EXCEPTION: a) in School: MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC PADER vs. PEOPLE SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. COMELEC

And KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORP V.

EXCEPTION TO THE CONSITUTIONAL GUARNATEE: UNPROTECTED SPEECH LIBEL Definition: The omissions in the newspaper report, which contributed to the unfair picture created, is to be termed as libel by negligence. If the publisher is unaware, when under the facts the truth could have been verified, the publisher is guilty of negligence and was liable for libel, malice being an essential element in libel. (Policarpio vs CA) Nature of Libel:: The law against libel is protective of reputation according to community standards and not according to personal or family standards (BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. vs. NOEL) 1.

2.

TEST: there is actual malice (Lopez vs CA)

Exemption: Public Officials and Public figures) General RULE: The constitutional guarantee prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that is was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. (STANDARD: Bars media liability for defamation of a public official absent proof that the defamatory statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or 3.

1.

2.

OBSCENITY Guideline: In testing for obscenity, the basic guidelines for the tier of facts must be: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. By community standards (in guideline number 1), (MILLER vs. STATE OF CALIFORNIA) TEST: a. People vs. Kottinger: whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprive or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall OR whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, that it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. b. Gonzalez vs. Katigbak: Obscene

in reckless disregard of the truth (NEW YORK TIMES vs. SULLIVAN) Philippines Cases: VASQUEZ vs. CA; BORJAL vs. CA, VICARIO vs. CA, JALANDONI vs. DRILON a) Debate in public and public information are given importance and more weight (ROSEBLOOM vs. METROMEDIA) b) Private person is constitutionally protected (GERTZ vs. ROBERT WELCH, INC) c) The rule is extended to Private Sector Speech (HUSTLER MAGAZINE AND LARRY FLYNT vs. JERRY FALWELL) Exception to the general Rule: In re Jurado cases

SECTION 5: NO LAWS SHALL BE MADE RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF REHABILITATION, OR PROHIBITING THE FREE EXERCISE THEREOF, THE FREE EXERCISE AND ENJOYMENT OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION OF PREFERENCE, SHALL FOREVER BE ALLOWED. NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS. I. NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ The issuance and sale of the stamps commemorating the International Eucharistic Congress is Valid. The government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the

material is that which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene.. c. Clear and present danger (Pita vs. CA) d. O’ Brien (Barnes vs. Glen Theater) 3.

Constitutional mechanisms a. stricter standard on radio (FCC vs. Pacifica) b. Content-neutral time, place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest an do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. (RENTON vs. PLAYTIME THEATERS) c. Schools (Hazel Wood and Brethel Cases)

incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. GARCES vs. ESTENZO Fiestas, although religious in origin, have a secular aspect to them, which can be legitimate object of state interest. A municipal corporation has a dual character, proprietary and governmental. The purchase of the state is valid, seeing it as a proprietary act of the municipality, Not every governmental activity which gives the expenditure of public funds and which was religious tint is violative of the constitution. IN ORDER FOR A LAW TO COMPLY WITH THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, THREE REQUISITES MUST BE MET: A. SECULAR LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE B. SECOND, ITS PRIMARY EFFECT NEITHER ADVANCES NOR

INHIBITS RELIGION AND LASTLY. C. MUST NOT REQUIRE EXCESSIVE ENTABGLEMENT WITH RECEPIENT INSTIUTIONS

to an establishment clause challenge just because sectarian institutions receive financial benefits,

TILTON vs. RICHARDSON The part of the provision of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 providing for unlimited use after 20 years was invalidated as amounting to a contribution to a religious body.

ISLAMIC DA’WAH vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EO 46, which gives the OMA the sole authority to issue Halal certificates, a purely religious matter, is a violation of the establishment clause.

CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW BOARD vs. PINETTE DISTRICT SCHOOL vs. SCHEMPP Ku Klux Clan questioning the Menorah State sponsored bible readings and prayers allowed at Capitol Square in public schools violates fist and second The Religious expression cannot violate the requisites establishment clause where it: I. is a purely private and BOARD OF EDUCATION vs. ALLEN II. occurs in a traditional or designated The grant of construction aid for science public forum, publicly announced and open to buildings is not violative of the non- all on equal terms. establishment clause having satisfied the first and second requirement. MANOSCA vs. CA What should be significant is the principal LEMON vs. KURTZMAN objective of, not the casual consequence that Salary payments and reimbursement for might follow from the exercise of the power. secular textbooks and other instructional The purpose in setting up the marker is materials under a system involving close essentially to recognize the distinctive government supervision in unconstitutional contribution, of the late Felix Manalo to the for it involves excessive entanglement culture of the Philippines, rather than to between the church and state thereby commemorate his founding of Iglesia ni violating the third requirement. Cristo.

COUNTRY OF ALLEGHENY vs. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION The crèche, which sat on the main and most beautiful part of the country courthouse, a seat of government, sends an unmistakable message that the country supported and promoted the religious message. The menorah, sending a message which is not exclusively religious (Christmas) is constitutional.

II.FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION DUAL ASPECT OF FREEOM OF REIGIOUS BELIEF AND WORSHIP (Cantwell vs. State of Connecticut) A. FREEDOM TO BELIEVE WHICH IS ABSOLUTE B. FREEDOM TO ACT ON ONE’S BELIEF WHICH IS SUBJECT TO REGULATION

ZOBREST vs. CATALINA Secular support for deaf children studying in religious schools Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens without inference to religion were not really subject

VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION The free exercise of religious belie is superior to contract rights, in case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a

fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights must yield to religious freedom.

Only the interest of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.

CANTWELL ET AL vs. STATE OF CONNETICUT A certification exclusively for religious solicitation is in the form of prior restraint or censorship of religion since the determination of whether or not a certification will be released depends upon the secretary of public welfare. Even if interests be weighed, there must be a showing of a clear and present danger in order for the state to limit the freedom of exercise of religion.

TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY of FINANCE Free exercise of religion does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on sales of religious materials by a religious organization.

US vs. BALLARD The absoluteness of the freedom to believe carries with it the corollary that the government, while it may look into the good faith of a person, cannot inquire into a person’s religious pretensions. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint can only be justified on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil, which the state has the right to prevent. (also held in GOLDMAN vs. WEIBERGER; GERMAN vs. BARANGAN) Unless the dissemination is done as a business operation for profit, no license may be required. EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU In Gerona case, salting the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance however, it is stressed in the present case that freedom of religion requires that protesting members be exempted from the operation of the law. WISCONSIN vs. YODER

CENTENO vs. VILLALON-PORNILLOS Solicitation of the Samahan ng Katandaan ng Tikay for Church Renovation Solicitation of contribution in general, which may include contribution for religious purposes, may be regulated by general law for the protection of the public and its citizens. LEE vs. WEISMAN Graduation, rabbi was invited to lead the prayer The minimum constitutional guarantee is that the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way, which “establishes a state religion or religious faith”. CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYEH, INC. V. CITY OF HEILAEAH Laws that burden religious practice do not have to be justified by a compelling governmental interest if they are (1) neutral and (2) of general applicability. The Smith Standard, that is, that laws must be narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted governmental interests, was not met by the laws in question. LAMB’S CHAPEL vs. SCHOOL DISTRICT Since the film series would not have been shown during school hours, nor was it sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, there would be no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed.

LOONG vs. BASA  the religion must involve a moral code As where any member of a religious transcending individual belief corporation is expelled from the membership  a demonstrable sincerity in belief is for espousing doctrines and teachings necessary, and the court must not inquire contrary to that of his church, such an action into the truth of reasonableness of said belief is conclusive upon civil courts. (belief action test – allows absolute protection to belief but not to action) III. RELIGIOUS TESTS  there must be some associational ties The constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed against clandestine SECTION 6: THE LIBERTY OF ABODE attempts on the part of the government to AND OF CHANGING THE SAME WITHIN prevent a person from exercising his civil or THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY LAW SHALL political rights because of his religious NOT BE IMPAIRED EXFCEPTM UPON beliefs. LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT. NEITHER SHALL THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL PAMIL vs. TELERON BE IMPAIRED EXCEPT IN THE INTEREST The law which disqualifies ecclesiastics from OF NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC being elected or appointed to a municipal SAFETY OR PUBLIC HEATH, AS MAY BE office us a religious test which is inconsistent PROVIDED BY LAW. with the religious clause of the constitution (also held in MCDANIEL VS. PATY – A. LIBERTY OF ABODE ministers as candidates to the constitutional convention). But the needed votes were not VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN reached; therefore, said statute was not No one could be compelled to change his or nullified. her home except in accordance with law. IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. CA The freedom to act to one’s belief is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Therefore. The religious program is not beyond review by the Board. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION vs. SMITH The religion clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbid the performance of an act that his religious belief requires if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR The following four criteria must be met for a belief to be considered a religion:  there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believers life.

Thus, when a Mayor of Manila sought to cleanse the city of prostitutes by sending them to Davao, the Supreme Court has to stop him. B. MANNER OF CURTAILMENT OF LIBERTY OF ABODE: LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT AND WITHIN THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY LAW YAP vs. CA The right to change abode is not an absolute right. It can be regulated by a lawful order such as releasing a petitioner on bail. C. RIGHT TO TRAVEL MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS The right to return to one’s country is not covered by the specific right to travel and liberty of abode. Therefore, the requirements prescribed in the constitution relative to the right to travel to not apply.

D. MANNER OF CURTAILMENT: MAY BE CURTAILED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY OR PUBLIC HEATH, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. SILVERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or judicial officer. MARCOS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Right to travel is not absolute and is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. MANOTOC vs. CA A person admitted to bail may be prevented from leaving the country, which is the necessary consequence of the function of the bail bond, which is to secure a person’s appearance when needed. SECTION 7: THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN SHALL BE RECOGNIZED AND PAPERS PERTAINING TO OFFICAL ACTS, TRANSACTION, OR DECISIONS, AS WELL AS TO GOVERNMENT RESEARCH DATA USED AS BASIS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT, SHALL BE AFFORDED THE CITIZENS, SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.  The provision is self-executory. Any person can exercise such right subject to statutory limitations (SUBIDO VS. OZAETA).  While access to official records may not be prohibited, it is certainly regulated for it is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.  Regulation may come from statutory law or from the inherent power of an officer to control his officer and the records under his custody and to exercise some discretion as to

the matter in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the record may exercise their rights.  In MARQUEZ VS. DESIERTO, it was said that bank accounts of suspects in anti Graft cases may be examined pursuant to the Ombudsman Act. Moreover, RA 6770 provides that the Ombudsman may examine and have access to bank accounts and records and order an in camera inspection, provided that there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. The inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. A. RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN LEGASPI vs. CSC "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition thus each case must be examined separately. If it is a matter of public right, every citizen is a real party in interest and therefore, has a standing. Whether or not an information is of public interest or public concern depends upon the determination of the court. AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MORATO Decisions (in this case, the MTRCB) made in an official capacity are public and not private matters. ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE The requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual containing the details and procedure of administering lethal injection with respect to the convict is unduly suppressive for the contents of the same is a matter of public concern. B.

COROLLARY RIGHT OF ACCESS TO OFFICIAL RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS.

VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE Members of the media wanted to get information about certain members of

Batasang Pambansa getting clean loans from GSIS through Imelda Marcos The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same functions of service to the people. It is the clear intent of the constitutional Commission to include government-owned and controlled corporations in the scope of the right to information. The right to privacy belongs to the individual and must be invoked by the individual. Public agency cannot invoke the right to privacy. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

C. LIMITATIONS TO THESE RIGHTS National security matters Intelligence information Trade secrets Banking Transactions Diplomatic Correspondence Executive sessions Closed Door Cabinet meetings Supreme Court Deliberations

CHAVEZ vs. PCGG The following are limitations to the right to information: (1) National Security Matters (2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions (3) Criminal Matters (4) Other Confidential Information (ex. Ethical standards Act) GONZALES vs. NARVASA The Code of conduct and ethical standard for public officials and employees provides that in the performance if their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within 15 working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents or inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to reasonable claims of confidentiality. CHAVEZ vs. PEA

The right covers three categories of information: (1) official records (refers to any document that is part of the public records), (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The information that the petitioner may access includes evaluation reports, expert opinions, recommendations etc. however, the right does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries, etc. SECTION 8: THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE INCLUDING THOSE EMPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS TO FORM UNION, ASSOCIATION, OR SOCIETIES FOR PURPOSE NOT CONTRARY TO LAW SHALL NOT BE ABRIDGED.  The right to due process  The right to contract  Freedom of expression and belief  Right not to join an association TUCP vs. NHC Government employees, which includes everyone covered by the civil service, have the right to form unions as guaranteed in the constitution. SSS vs. CA The right to form unions does not include the right to strike. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHRES ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION Government workers cannot use strike as employed by private sector to secure concessions from their employers for the terms and conditions of employment through statutes and administrative rules and regulations and not through CBA Dissenting Opinion: The government has been deaf to the plight of the teachers who ere merely asking for their basic rights. What the teachers are doing is the essence of freedom of speech thus, the issue is not the

freedom to strike effective speech.

but

the

freedom

of

UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORY UNION vs. LAGUESMA By virtue of the Herrera Veloso Law which amended the Labor law, which gives different definitions to the terms managerial and supervisory employees, managers who are supervisory employees are given the right to form unions separate from those of the rank and file. The constitutional guarantee of right to form organizations is not infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming unions. The right is subjected to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. STA CLARA HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION vs. GASTON The constitutionally guaranteed freedom to form association includes the freedom not to associate. PADCOM CONDOMINIUM CORP vs. ORTIGAS CENTER Under the Torrens system of registration, claims and liens of whatever character except those mentioned by law existing against the land binds the holder of the title and the whole world. PADCOM could have avoided membership by not buying the land. SECTION 9: PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION I.

EMINENT DOMAIN – the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, for public purpose. A.   

(1) Local government units, pursuant to an ordinance enacted by their respective legislative bodies (2) Public utilities, as may be delegated by law B. Elements of the exercise of the power of eminent domain 1. there must be taking of a private property 2. the taking must be for public use 3. just compensation SANTOS vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES Just compensation does not always require to be made fully in money. The smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money primarily because the small landowner would be needing it more than big landowners who can afford bigger balance in bonds and other things. HEIRS OF ALBERTO SAGUITAN vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG Power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature., Such power may validly delegated to local government units as provided by the LGC. The LGU may expropriate provided the following requisites are present:  an ordinance enacted by local legislative council authorizing the exercise of power of eminent domain by local chief executive  power is exercised for public use, purpose and welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless  payment of just compensation  a valid and definite offer has been made to owner but offer was not accepted.

Expropriation comprise of two stages: Those who can exercise the power of  the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent eminent domain domain. It ends with an order if not a The national government dismissal of action declaring that the plaintiff congress executive, pursuant to legislation enacted has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for public use. by Congress

 Determination by the court of just compensation, done with the assistance of three commissioners 1. THE POWER TO UNDERTAKE EXPROPRIATION CASES 2. RIGHTS OF OWNER BEFORE EXPROPRIATION

Compensable taking does not need to involve all the property interests, which form part of the right to ownership. When one or more of the property rights are appropriated and applied to a public purpose, there is taking even if the bare title to the property still remains with the private owner.

OF

PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO Property rights essentially include the full use of the property. When owners are deprived of their property rights, there must be compensation.

REQUISITES FOR TAKING (REPUBLIC vs. VIUDA de CASTELLVI) (1) the expropriator must enter upon the private property (2) the entrance must not be for a momentary periods, that is, the entrance must be permanent (3) the entry must be under the warrant of color of legal authority (4) the property must be devoted for public use (5) utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

REPUBLIC vs. PLDT The government’s forcible use of PLDT’s telephone lines in order to expand the services of the Bureau of Telecommunication to government offices was considered compensable taking.

GREATER BALANGA BALANGGA VELARMA vs. CA

vs.

MUN.

II. ELEMENTS OF TAKING

GARCIA vs. CA Where there is no taking of property for purposes of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings instituted, the basis for determination of just compensation is the time when the trial court made its order of expropriation. Value of land shall be computed from the date of “taking”. CITY vs. JUDGE ERICTA Charity burial for paupers The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate unless there is a necessity to destroy. By confiscating a part of a private cemetery to be given t paupers, the city is not exercising police power but rather, the taking of private property which should be compensated. US vs. CAUSBY

NPC vs. JOCSON Upon filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has he right to take or enter upon the possession of the property. PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY vs. CITY OF NEW YORK There is no taking since the landmark law had not transferred control over the property to the city, but only restricted the appellant’s exploitation of it. A state statute that substantially furthers important public policies and enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city may so frustrate distinct INVESTMENT-BACKED INTERESTS. RUCKELHAUS vs. MONSANTO COMPANY License for chemical products The court also held that so long as the taking has a conceivable public character, the means by which it will be attained is for congress to determine. III. PUBLIC USE SUMULONG vs. GUERRERO Socialized housing falls within the confine of public use. As long as the purpose of the

taking is public, meaning, any act that may be beneficially employed for the general welfare, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION vs. PANIS That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character (also held in MANOSCA vs. CA. Public use now includes a broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage including urban reform and housing. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Therefore, there is public use. REYES vs. NHA It is well settled that expropriation of private land for urban development and slum clearance is for a public purpose even if the developed area is alter sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies. FERY vs. CABANATUAN If a land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. IV.

JUST COMPENSATION

CITY OF MANILA vs. ESTRADA The market value of a piece of land is attained by a consideration of all those facts, which make it commercially valuable. The

rule that should be followed is that: the market value of a property is the price which it will bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who us under no necessity of having it. view of the commissioners who are disinterested landowners is given greater weight than that of an ordinary tier of facts. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs. PAREDES To allow the court to change the amount of the deposit as it sees fit, at any time during the proceeding, the right of possession granted to the railroad company might well become illusory and therefore makes the court’s action unconstitutional. MUNICIAPALITY of DAET vs. COURT of APPEALS When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of the said possession not the filing of the complaint, and the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value. When the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings, it will be the basis of the value of the land. NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS To determine just compensation for lands appropriated by the government, the basis should be the value of the land or price at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government not its future potential. EPZA vs. DULAY In an expropriation proceeding the court technically has the power to determine the just compensation for the property. Provisions which encroaches upon judicial prerogatives and renders the court inutile in a matter which is reserved to it for final determination is void.

MADDUMBA vs. GSIS The nature of land bank bond fortifies the view that respondent may be compelled to accept those bonds at their face value. Agrarian reform cannot be fully realized without the intervention of the government particularly in the payment of just compensation it is only with the support of the government that payment of just compensation to landowner may be realized. B.H. BERKENKOTTER VS. CA Among the factor to be considered in arriving at a fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of the properties, its actual or potential uses and tax declarations. Commissioner’s report although only advisory and persuasive and by no means final, therefore, may be used as basis for determination of just compensation. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PINEDA In an expropriation case such as this one, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation therefore, the appointment of commissioners is mandatory requirement in expropriation cases for it is a substantial right that may not be done away without any reason (also held in NPC vs. CA) LBP vs. CA Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within reasonable time from its taking. RP vs. CA Under the “operative fact doctrine” the effect of invalidated law was allowed to affect transaction completed before the declaration of nullity. JUDICIAL REVIEW

AREAS OF THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN THAT ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW: 1) adequacy of compensation 2) the necessity of taking 3) the public is character of the purpose of the taking DE KNECHT vs. BAUTISTA Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken. Due process must be served. With due recognition of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to bet taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is a victim of partiality and prejudice. REPUBLIC vs. DE KNECHT BP 340 effectively superseded the decision of the court and the trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the enactment of BP 340. Said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the government. MANOTOK vs. NHA Fixing just compensation function. Market value substitute the court’s expropriation proceeding.

is a judicial alone cannot judgment in

MILITANTE vs. CA There is no extreme necessity to involve judicial action if petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies

SECTION 10: NO LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS SHALL BE PASSED When does law impair obligations of contracts:

1.

If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract wither as to the time or mode of performance 2. If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed 3. If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms. A mere change in procedural remedies which does not change the substance of the contract and which still leaves a remedy for enforcement does not impair obligations of contracts. (HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION vs. BLAISDELL; RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN) RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN All contracts are made subject to an implied reservation of the protective power of the state and that therefore statutes, which validly exercise this, reserved power does not impair contracts (also held in DEL ROSARIO vs. DE LOS SANTOS). In all cases:  impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to substantive right,  state must postpone the enforcement of obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile and  the alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hard to pursue. Therefore, police power may only be invoked and justified by: 1) an emergency, 2) temporary in nature, 3) can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions. JUAREZ vs. CA Housing The non-impairment clause is not absolute. As long as the contract affects public welfare, the government may validly assert police power over the impairment clause. PHILIPPINE VETERAN BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK The contract may be altered validly if it involves the public interest, to which private interests must yield "as a postulate of the

existing social order. In Norman vs. Baltimore, the court stressed that every contract involving the public interest suffers infirmity and may be changed if required by public interest. PRESLEY vs. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC A municipal resolution, although not strictly an ordinance is a zoning regulation which is a police power measure which the municipality has the power to pass. (Also held in ORTIGAS vs. FEATI BANK) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT and NEW AGRIX vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK There is violation of the contract clause if the exercise of police power is invalid. LIM vs. PACQUING Franchise is a mere revocable.

privilege,

which

is

C&M TIMBER CORPORATION vs. ALCALA Timber licenses, permits etc are only privileges granted by the state and do not vest a permanent irrevocable right to the particular concession area and products therein. A contract given by the state is always revocable (also held in OPOSA vs. FACTORAN; MINERS ASSOCIATION vs. FACTORAN) HARRISON MOTORS vs. NAVARRO A memorandum order issued to enforce payment of existing BIR tax and custom duties does not enlarge, abridge nor change the intention of the parties. SECTION 11: FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES AND ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE SHALL NOT BE DENIED TO ANY PERSON BY REASON OF POVERTY SECTION 12: RIGHTS OF A PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PEOPLE vs. PAVILLARE

Custodial investigation commences when a must be in a language known to and person is taken into custody and is singled understood by said person. out as a suspect in the commission of the  Right to remain silent crime under investigation and the police  Right to competent and independent officers begin to ask questions on the counsel preferably of his won choice suspect’s participation and which tend to  He must be informed that if he has no elicit information. lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and PEOPLE vs. LEGAZPI that a lawyer may also be engaged by any When none of the people questioned are person in his behalf, or may be appointed by singled out or pinpointed as perpetrators of the court upon petition to the person the crime, the questioning is not a custodial arrested or one acting in his behalf. investigation but merely a part of the general  Whether or not the person arrested has a exploratory stage. lawyer, no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of OCA vs. SUMULONG his counsel or after a valid waiver has been A custodial investigation is an investigation made. conducted by the municipal police, PNP, NBI  Right to communicate or confer by the and such other police agencies of our most expedient means – telephone, radio, government. letter or message – with his lawyer, any member of his immediate family, or any MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by A. Must be recited: him or by any one from his immediate family  You have a right to remain silent or by his counsel, or by visited by or  Anything you say or do will be used conferred with duly accredited national or against you in court international non-government organization.  You have a right to consult with a It shall be the responsibility of the officer to lawyer and to have him during the ensure that this is accomplished. interrogation.  Right to waive any of said rights provided  If you are an indigent, a lawyer will be that it is made voluntarily, knowingly and appointed to represent you. intelligently and ensure that he understood B. Even if the person consents to answer the same. questions without the assistance of  If the person waives his right to a lawyer, counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer he must be informed that it must be done in at any point in the investigation, the writing and in the presence of counsel, interrogation must cease until an attorney otherwise, he must be warned that the is present. waiver is void even if he insists on his waiver C. If the foregoing protections and warnings and chooses to speak. are not demonstrated during the trial to  Person should be informed that he may have been observed by the prosecution, indicate in any manner at any time or stage no evidence obtained as a result of the or the process that he does not wish to be interrogation can be used against him. questioned with warning that once he made such indication, the police may not PEOPLE V. MAHINAY interrogate him of the same had not yet  The person must be informed in a commenced or the interrogation must be language known and understood by him of ceased if it has already begun. the reason for the arrest and he must be  After the initial waiver of silence, the other shown the warrant of arrest, Every other rights may still be invoked at any time during warnings, information or communication the process.

 Any statement or evidence obtained in violation of these rights will be inadmissible. PEOPLE VS. SUNGA The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent. WHEN ARE THE RIGHTS AVAILBLE (PEOPLE vs. TAN) 1. After a person has been taken into custody 2. When a person is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (PEOPLE vs. CAGUIOA) 3. When the investigation is being custody by the government with respect to a criminal offense. (In PEOPLE vs. MORADO, a baranggay captain’s conversation with the accused is part of an ongoing investigation. But in PEOPLE vs. ZUELA when accused talked with a mayor AS CONFIDANT and not as a law enforcement officer, his admission is admissible ) 4. Signing of arrest report and booking sheets (PEOPLE vs. SIMON) PEOPLE vs. TOLENTINO For in custody confessions to be admissible, the prosecution musth show that the constitutional safeguards were observed in obtainng the confession (also held in MAGTOTO vs. MANGUERA) WHEN RIGHTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE 1. During police lineup (PEOPLE VS. TOLENTINO). 2. During administrative investigations (NAVALLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN) 3. Confessions made by an accused at the time he voluntarily surrendered to the police or outside the context of a formal investigation. (PEOPLE vs. TAYLARAN). 4. Statements made to a private person (PEOPLE vs. ZUELA). NOTE: RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in

which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning (PEOPLE vs. DOMATAY; PEOPLE vs. TAN) REQUISITES FOR AN EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION TO BE ADMISSABLE IN EVIDENCE (PEOPLE vs. OLIVARES) 1. confession must be voluntary 2. confession must be made with the assistance of a counsel 3. confession must be express 4. confession must be in writing 5. signed or thumb marked by the defendant SECTION 13: ALL PERSON, EXCCEPT THOSE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG SHALL BEFORE CONVICTION BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT SURETIES OR RELEASED ON RECOGNIZANCE AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED WVWN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED. EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED.

I.

RIGHT TO BAIL

LAVIDES vs. CA Bail should be given before arraignment. Arraignment should not be made a condition to bail. PEOPLE vs. GAKO JR. Judge did not hold hearing, merely based his decision to grant bail from a medical certificate 9 months old. Bail is a matter of right with respect to persons charged with penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, when evidence is strong. Before a bail is granted, a hearing must be conducted in order to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong or not.

YAP vs. CA Imposing bail in excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Setting the bail in the amount of the civil liability is excessive. FACTORS TO CONSIDERED IN SETTING THE AMOUNT OF BAIL (MAGSUCANG vs. BALGOS) a. Financial ability of the accused b. Nature and circumstance of the offense c. Penalty for the offense d. Character and reputation of the accused e. Age and health of the accused f. Weight of evidence against him g. Probability of his appearance in trail h. Forfeiture of their bonds by him i. If the accused is a fugitive from justice when arrested j. Pendency of other cases where he is also under bail. SULE vs. BITENG In hearings for bail, what should be considered is the prima facie evidence and not the penalty. In capital offenses, bail would be granted only if the evidence of guilt were not strong. PADERANGA vs. CA One who is under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered to the jurisdiction of the court has a constitutional right to bail CHIN vs. GUSTILO Even if bail is a matter of right, there is still a need to give notice to the fiscal for him to attend the hearing for bail. II.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT

PEOPLE vs. JUDGE DONATO Accused charged with rebellion.

Compromise agreement is a valid waiver to the right to bail PEOPLE vs. MAPALAO An accused who escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waives any right to seek relief from the Court. III. EXCESSIVE BAIL DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. A bail of one million is clearly excessive. CHU vs. DOLALOS Circular No. 8 which provides that bail should be set at Php 1000 for every year taking into consideration the maximum penalty for the offense is instructive not only to fiscals and their assistants but to the members of the bench as well. IV.

PERSONS NOT ENTITLED TO BAIL

COMENDADOR vs. de VILLA A soldier under court martial does not enjoy the right to bail because of the different disciplinary structure of the military as well as their capability of causing havoc and chaos. PEOPLE vs. NITCHA If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial courts and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a matter of discretion on the part of the court. Bail must not be granted to accused during the pendency of his appeal because his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. GOVERNMENT OF US vs. PURGANAN

Right to bail is not applicable in extradition proceedings. Constitutional bail is available only in criminal proceedings. Extradition, being sui generis and not a criminal proceeding, the accused therefore has no inherent right to bail. The following are exceptions to this rule: (1) applicant is not flight risk (2) there exists a special humanitarian reason. SECTION 14 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (STARTS UPON ARRAINGMENT) 1.

Criminal Due Process (NUNEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN) a. accused to be heard in court of competent jurisdiction (military tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians as held in OLAGUER vs. MILITARY COMMISSION) b. Accused proceeded under orderly process of law c. Accused given notice and opportunity to be heard d. Judgment rendered was within authority of a constitutional law

2.

Presumption of Innocence

3.

Right to be heard by himself and counsel

ELEMENTS: a. the right to be present at the trial b. the right to counsel c. the right to an impartial judge d. the right to confrontation e. the right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witness. 4.

Right to be informed of nature and cuase of accusation against him

CONTENTS OF A CRIMINAL ACTION (PEOPLE vs. QUITLONG) a. the name of the accused

b. the designation given to the offense by the statute c. statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense d. the name of the offended party e. the approximate time and fate of the commission of the offense f. the place where the offense has been committed 5.

Right to speedy impartial and public trial

6.

Right to meet witness face to face

Exceptions: a. admissibility of declarations” b. Trial in absentia. 7.

“dying

Right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production of evidence

Available only if: a. witness is really material b. he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtained the attendance of said witness c. The witness will be available at the time desired d. No similar evidence could be obtained Note: Trial in absentia is only allowed after arraignment, accused duly notified of the trial and absence is unjustified (PARADA vs, VENERACION). SECTION15 THE PRIVELEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION OR REBELLION WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. SECTION 16 ALL PERSONS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITON

OF THEIR CASES BEFORE ALL JUDICIAL, QUASI JUDICIAL OR ADMIISTRATIVE BODIES. Note: Speedy trial in Section 14 covers only the trial phase of criminal cases whereas Section 16 covers all phases of any judicial quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings. PEOPLE vs. SESBRENO The 90 day period applies only after the case is submitted for decision, not from the start of the trial. BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN The right is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. GONZALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed and factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. CERVANTES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Long delay (three years) in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan" was violative of the Constitutional right of "speedy disposition" of cases because "political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. TY-DAZO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: The length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the

assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudiced caused by the delay. Mere Mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Certain fact and circumstances peculiar to each cases must also be taken into consideration. DOMINGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN If the delay, if any, was actually more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to petitioner in that it was intended to afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made against him, there is no violation of right. CASTILLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN While petitioners certainly have the right to a speedy disposition of their case, the structural reorganization of the prosecutorial agencies, the procedural changes brought about by the Zaldivar case as well as the Sandiganbayan's heavy caseload certainly are valid reasons for the delay in the disposition of petitioners' case. For those reasons, the delay certainly cannot be considered as vexatious, capricious and oppressive. LOPEZ vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN The constitutional right to speedy trial is not limited to accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases including civil and administrative cases and all proceeding including judicial and quasi judicial. PEOPLE vs. MONJE To order the remand of the criminal case to the court to enable the prosecution to prevent additional evidence would violate the constitutional right to speedy determination of case. SECTION 17 NO PERSON SHALL BE COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAISNT HIMSELF TWO TYPES OF EVIDENCES

Real Evidence – Evidence furnished by things themselves on view or inspection as distinguished from a description of them by the mouth of the witness B. Testimonial evidence – any form of communication which requires the application of intelligence elicited from a witness, it may be oral or written. A.

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS This right may be invoked against testimonial compulsion only. UNITED STATES vs. NAVARRO ISABELA SUGAR CO. vs. MACADAEG Usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of the said elements. The right thus includes a right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness. US. vs. TAN TENG What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evide when it is material. Thus, substance emitting from the body of the defendant can be received as evidence. (also held in US. vs. ONG; VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS) BELTRAN vs. SAMSON Writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention, therefore, it constitutes an evidence against the accused. (also held in BERMUDEZ vs. CASTILLO) CHAVEZ vs. CA Compelling a petitioner to take the witness stand is a violation of Section 17. PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS The constitutional guarantee against self incrimination extends even to administrative

proceeding which possess criminal or penal aspect. PEOPLE vs. GAMBOA Paraffin test is admissible. (also held in PEOPLE vs. CANCERAN; In PEOPLE vs. TRANCA, it was held that Ultra violet ray test is also admissible). PEOPLE vs. GO Certification regarding the receipt issued to defendants that said defendants are the owners of the seized drugs cannot be used as evidence against the because it would be tantamount to an admission of guilt where counsel is needed. REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Lawyers cannot be compelled to reveal the names of their clients because this in effect will be incriminating to them. PEOPLE vs. MALIMIT The right against self-incrimination does not apply when the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Note: This right may be invoked in any judicial or administrative proceeding or in any official government enquiry from the moment one is asked to testify.

SECTION 18 (1) NO PERSON SHALL BE DETAINED SOLELY BY REASON OF HIS POLITICAL BELIEFS AND ASPIRATIONS (2) NO VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE IN ANY FORM SHALL EXIST EXCEPT AS PUNISHMENT FOR A CRIME WHEREOF THE PARTY SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY CONVICTED  Protects the freedom of political belief  The guarantee does not ad anything to the substantive due process clause not to the guarantee of freedom of speech, press and expression in section 4.

 Involuntary servitude connotes compulsory service EXCEPTIONS: (a) punishment for a crime where the party was duly convicted (b) national defense requirement (c)a validity issued return to work order, especially with regards to industries affecting public interest. (d) Merchant mannes may be compelled to remain in such service until the end of voyage for which he contracted. Otherwise, it would be possible for its crew to desert the ship in a foreign port. (e) A POSSE COMITATUS – persons/males of a certain age may be validly pressed into service for the apprehension of criminal via legitimate exercise of police power. (f) Parental authority US vs. CABANAG While the constitutional prohibition operated to nullify agreements violative if it, suppletory legislation was required to give the prohibition penal effect. DE LOS REYES vs. ALOJADO Domestic service is always to be remunerated, and no agreement may subsist in law in which it is stipulated that any domestic service shall be absolutely gratuitous. ACLARACION vs. GATMAITAN The court stenographer may be compelled under pain of contempt to transcribe stenographic notes he had failed to attend to while still in service. Such a compulsion is not the condition of enforced, compulsory service referred to in the constitution.

SECTION 19 EXCESSIVE FINES SHALL NOT BE IMPOSED, NOR CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT INFLICTED. NEITHER SHALL DEATH PENALTY BE IMPOSED, UNLESS, FOR COMPELLING REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS CRIMES, THE CONGRESS HEREAFTER PROVIDES FOR IT. ANY DEATH PENALTY ALREADY IMPOSED SHALL BE REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. Employment of physical, psychological or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.  To be cruel and unusual or excessive within the meaning of the constitution, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be committed  Excessive fines are fines that are disproportionate to the circumstance of the offense and the offender as provide by Article 26 of the RPC.  Article 66 provides that in imposing fines, the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law, in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstance, nit more particularly to the weal and means of the culprit. LEGARDA vs. VALDEZ The phrase “cruel and unusual” embodied an inseparable pair: to be prohibited by this provision the punishment must not only be unusual but it must also be cruel. A law which changes the penalty so as to make it less severe would be unconstitutional if the new penalty were an unusual one. PEOPLE vs. PUDA Guideline in determining if a punishment is cruel and unusual:

1) punishment must no be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings 2) It must not be applied arbitrarily 3) It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society 4) It must not be excessive e.g. it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment would. Factors to consider if a penalty is “cruel” 1) the nature of the penalty 2) the nature of the penalty as against penalties of other crimes of the same nature 3) the act itself. PEOPLE vs. ESTOISTA A punishment is degrading or inhuman when it is barbarous and shocking to the conscience and moral sense of the community. PEOPLE vs. DAPITAN (Robbery with homicide for killing Amil’s (the owner of the house) adopted son) The penalty of reclusion perpetua was not harsh and it is sanctioned by law. The penalty to be cruel, degrading and human must take more than merely being harsh, excessive and out of proportion or severe. It must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community or when they involve torture and lingering death. BAYLOSIS vs. CHAVEZ (reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of rebellion which in turn is just punished with prison mayor) A penalty through harsh is not cruel. Mere severity does not constitute cruel punishment. PADILLA vs. CA (Robin Padilla convicted with the crime of illegal possession of firearm) As far as constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of the

punishment that determines whether it is or is not cruel and unusual. Sentences of imprisonment though perceived to be harsh are not cruel and unusual if within the “statutory limits”. The fact that the punishment is authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. PEOPLE vs. MUNOZ (defendants committed murder qualified by treachery that was punished by death) Constitution did not abolish death penalty but merely prohibited its imposition. While the imposition of death penalty may lead to certain inequalities, such is a question of wisdom/legislation and not judicial construction. PEOPLE vs. AMIGO (in heat of argument due to a car accident, Amigo stabbed the driver of the other car; reclusion perpetua) A reading of Section 19(1) of the constitution will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the congress provides for. Article III section 19 does not change the penalty prescribed for murder except only insofar as it prohibited the imposition of death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The remedy for harsh penalties is lodged not on the courts – clemency is to be given by the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative. PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY The congress has the power to restore the death penalty which merely requires that (1) the congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that congress specify and penalize by death only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill (3) the congress should be singularly motivated by compelling reason involving heinous crimes.

We must take into consideration the irreparable injury to both the victim and society and the threat that repetition of those heinous acts would bring about. PEOPLE V. ALICANTE (rape as barbaric excessive, cruel and unusual punishment) To say that the crime of incestuous rape is not heinous simply because the victim did not die is to ignore the lifelong trauma and stigma of the victim brought about by rape. LIM V. PEOPLE (bouncing checks; PD 818 increasing the penalty for estafa) When punishment authorized by statute it is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the constitution. The increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. DEATH PENALTY PEOPLE V. GABIANA (rape; death penalty as anti-poor) The court did not touch upon the anti-poor allegations of the death penalty law, as it found that the relationship between the accused and the victim was not established, because the victim was not the daughter of the accused, the penalty imposed was modified to reclusion perpetua.

PAGDAYAWON V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (reexamination of RA 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law and RA 8177 or the Lethal Injection Law) The constitutionality of the said ACTS had been passed upon by the court in People v. Echegaray and sustained in People v. Mercado, wherein the ff. rulings were made: 1. The death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment. It is an exercise of the state’s power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. 2. The offenses for which RA 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy the element of heinousness by specifying circumstances which generally qualify a crime to be punishable by death 3. RA 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguard to insure its correct application The constitution does not require that a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven before the death penalty may be prescribed. Congress is authorized under the constitution to determine when the element of heinousness and compelling reason are present, and the court would exceed its authority if it questioned the exercise of such discretion. SECTION 20 NO PERSON SHALL BE IMPRISONED FOR DEBT OR NONPAYMENT OF A POLL TAX.  Person may be imprisoned as a penalty for a crime arising from a contractual debt and imposed in a proper criminal proceeding  Debt is the obligation to pay money arising from a contract express or implied  A person may be imprisoned for fraudulent debt only: (1) if the fraudulent debt consists of a crime (estafa) (2) the accused has been convicted.

LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ (bouncing check law assailed as unconstitutional) The graveman of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation that is penalized. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks (also held in RECUERDO vs. PEOPLE) CARAM RESOURCES vs. CONTRERAS (judge faces administrative charges; Php 5,000 loan from CARAM, Dizon executed promissory note; BP 22 assailed as unconstitutional) BP 22 is constitutionally valid, it being a legitimate exercise of police power. The clear intent if the Legislature was to make the offense malum prohibitum. Malice and intent in issuing a worthless check is immaterial. It is commuted by mere act of issuing a worthless check that is punished. TIOMICO V. COURT OF APPEALS (PD 115 or Trust receipts Law which punishes non-payment of credit loan as unconstitutional for violating Section 20) Said law does not violate the proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debts. It is a declaration by the legislative authority that as a matter of public policy, the failure of a person to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods if not sold is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The trust receipts law punished the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling or money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment of a loan. Thus, there can be no violation of the right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. SECTION 21 NO PERSON SHALL BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY OR PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.

IF AN ACT IS PUNISHED BY LAW AND AN ORDINANCE, CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL UNDER EITHER SHALL CONSTITUTE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACT.  Jeopardy means danger  Requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy: 1) FIRST JEOPARDY MUST ATTACHED PRIOR TO THE SECOND a) upon a valid information or indictment (1) complaint (2) information Note: both substance and form must be valid: (1) substance – when the complain adequately informed the accused of the nature and cause of the accusations which means that: 1.1 the essential facts are alleged 1.2 the legal description of the offense is alleged 1.3 in ordinary and concise language (2) form Note: if defective, the remedy is to quash the information b) there must be a competent court with jurisdiction to hear and decide the case (geographical – proper place; and jurisdictional – has jurisdiction over the crime aspects) Note: if filed in improper court, remedy is dismissal c) After arraignment – without this, the court has no jurisdiction over the body of the accused d) After a valid plea – there must be no withdrawal of original plea. (1) the accused must know enough about the cause and nature of the offense charged against him/her (2) if the guilty plea is entered, the court cannot summarily convict the accused on the basis of evidence to

prove mitigating circumstance, to do so would deprive the state of due process –first jeopardy does not attach. 2) FIRST JEOPARDY MUST HAVE TERMINATED a) upon acquittal (1) failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt (2) erroneous judgment that has attained finality (3) dismissed on prescription (4) dismissal was due to violation o the defendant’s right to speedy trial Note: Acquittal, the case was decided based on merits but the prosecution was not able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal is based on the allegation of the court’s jurisdiction, or any other ground that does not decide the merits of the issue. b) Final Conviction (1) appeal period expires (2) service of sentence has been totally or partially served (3) express waiver in writting (4) applied for probation c) dismissal of the case based on the merits – lack of evidence 3) SECOND JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE a) identical b) when it is an attempt or frustration of the other c) when it is necessarily included in the first offense or when it includes the first offense d) subject to the doctrine of supervening fact/event  One may be charged for the same act if it constitutes at least two different offenses under two statutes or two ordinances as provided by the elements of committing the crime. Conviction or acquittal in one will serve as a bar to prosecution under the other. This does not apply to continuing crimes.  DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING FACT – where after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes, for which the defendant is

responsible, which together with the existing facts, changes the character of the offense, such constitutes a new and distinct offense – and the accused cannot be said to be in double jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. RATIONALE: the rule of identity of offense does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution –for the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility of convicting the accused during the first prosecution for yet inexistent second offense. I.

ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY

PEOPL vs. YLAGAN Arraignment and plea constitute the final step in the commencement of jeopardy. It is at the arraignment and plea that issues are joined. Jeopardy attaches (a) upon a good indictment, (b) before competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) after plea. PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN The nature of Balicasacan’s evidence amounted to withdrawal of his plea of guilty, and since no new plea was entered, there was no jeopardy, which the acquittal could terminate. CINCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Petitioners apprehension that they might be put in JEOPARDY of being charged with informations or crimes other than the crime imputed is baseless. No DOUBLE JEOPARDY as they have not yet pleaded to the offense. A preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double jeopardy attaches. It is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. NAVALLO vs. SANDIGAN BAYAN P.D. 1606 is explicit and clear. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of petitioner.

When all elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in the first offense charged, can rightly be barred. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused, which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. CUNANAN vs. ARCEO (murder; transfer to Sandiganbayan before RTC made a decision) The dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The “dismissal” (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had not jurisdiction to try the case at all. No double jeopardy when case transferred to Sandiganbayan after trial but before decision was rendered at the RTC. RTC had no jurisdiction, therefore accused was not in jeopardy. PEOPLE vs. MONTESA Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition (dismissal or conviction), rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor after a reinvestigation should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. The decision of the judge based on his belief that arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever be foreclosed, on the ground of

double jeopardy, any reopening of the case, is void. DELA ROSA vs. CA Double jeopardy cannot apply in the instant case. The requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking. The dismissal of the case was upon the motion of the petitioner as shown by the records. PEOPLE vs. CAWALINGA Appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate General’s Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered. Therefore, first jeopardy never attached. CUDIA vs. CA (cure for defective jurisdiction and filing of info; valid complaint) There is no breach of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy for the reason that the absence of the authority of the city prosecutor. PEOPLE vs. MAQUILING An appeal or a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal is barred by the rule on double jeopardy. II.

TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY

BULALONG vs. PEOPLE It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. BUSTAMANTE vs. MACEREN

As a general rule, where the defendant has executed or entered upon the execution of a valid sentence, the court cannot, even during the 15-day period, set aside and render a new sentence. A judgment of conviction may only be modified or set aside before it has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment becomes final when no appeal is filed or the defendant has totally or partially satisfied the sentence. PEOPLE vs. OBSTANSIA The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines, which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. Hence, the accused cannot plead double jeopardy. RIVERA vs. PEOPLE Verbal dismissal is not final until written and signed by the judge PEOPLE vs. BELLAFLOR Protection against double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. MERCIALES vs. CA The acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without due regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there is no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. POSO vs. MEJIARES Lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the authorization for temporary liberty on recognizance and finally the grant of probation, the orders of the respondent judge arising from these

proceedings do not constitute res judicata or even double jeopardy. PEOPLE vs. ALBERTO No double jeopardy has attached when order made by the trial court was not valid. CONRADA vs. PEOPLE General rule: following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: 1) a valid indictment 2) before a court of competent jurisdiction 3) the arraignment of the accused 4) a valid plea entered by him The acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent Two exceptions to the foregoing rule: a) insufficiency of charge against the accused b) unreasonable delay in the proceedings (violation of rt. To speedy disposition of trial) PEOPLE vs. ROMERO There can be no double jeopardy where dismissal was granted on the ground of denial of the right to a speedy trial. The dismissal in this case was with the consent of the accused. PEOPLE vs. PABLO When dismissal constitutes abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal is invalid and is therefore no bat to reinstatement of the case. III. RULE ON SUPERVENING ACTS MELO vs. PEOPLE The rule for the identity if offenses do not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. Where after the fist prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and together with the facts existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct offense, the accused

cannot be said to be in double jeopardy of indicted for the new offense. PEOPLE vs. BULING Where the exact nature of the injury could have been discovered, but was not, because of the incompetence of the physician, the subsequent discovery of the real extent of the injury would not be supervening fact which could warrant the Melo doctrine. IV.

SAME OFFENSES

PEOPLE vs. TIOZON Double jeopardy can be invoked only if the offenses committed are the same and identical. Offenses committed arising from the same set of facts but defined in 2 different laws or provisions of the same law, where the elements of one of the offenses are not essential elements of the other, prior jeopardy as to one of them does not bar the prosecution. GONZALEZ vs. CA Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element, i.e. carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects. PEOPLE vs. MANUGAS A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [RPC, Art 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction. PEOPLE vs. QUIJADA In the present case, they are separate offenses, the first punished under the RPC and the second under a special law. When the offenses charged are penalized by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry

relates to the identity of offenses charged. The elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or murder; these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former is malum prohibitum while the latter are mala in se. No violation of the constitutional bar against double jeopardy PEOPLE vs. BALLABARE Homicide/murder committed through use of unlicensed firearm is punished in the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866 but People v. Quijada states that the person can be guilty of 2 separate offenses (under RPC and PD 1866 sec.1 par.2) PEOPLE vs. SALEY Conviction for various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa in RPC. V.

NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL

SAN VICENTE vs. PEOPLE The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter will be respected absent any grave abuse of discretion. A grant of demurrer is effectively an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the Constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. This is an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. They call this the “Finality of Acquittal Rule”. VI.

PARTIES

METROBANK vs. MERIDIANO That there is no indication that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of TC’s decision amounts to double jeopardy VII.

ORDINANCE AND STATUTE

PEOPLE vs. RELOVA  the penal burden is imposed directly by When the offenses charged are penalized law without judicial trial either by different section of the same statue or by different statutes the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses ARTICLE IV - CITIZENSHIP charged. When the offense is charged under SECTION 1. THE FOLLOWING ARE a municipal ordinance while the other is CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES: penalized by a statute. The critical inquiry is 1. THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE to the identity f the acts which the accused is PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF THE said to have committed. If the acts are the ADOPTION OF THIS CONSTITUTION; same. 2. THOSE WHOSE FATHERS OR MOTHERS ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES; SECTION 22 NO EX POST FACTO LAW OR 3. THOSE BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, BILL OF ATTAINDER SHALL BE ENACTED 1973, OF FILIPINO MOTHERS, WHO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UPON IN RE KAY VILLEGAS KAMI REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY; AND An ex post facto is one: 4. THOSE WHO ARE NATURALIZED IN 1. which makes an action done ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and SECTION 2. NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS ARE THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE punishes such an action. 2. Aggravates the crime than when PHILIPPINES FROM BIRTH WITHOUT HAVING TO PERFORM ANY ACT TO it was committed OR PERFECT THEIR 3. Changes the punishment and ACQUIRE inflicts a greater one than when it was PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. THOSE WHO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN committed 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH (3), and receives a different testimony than SECTION 1 HEREOF SHALL BE DEEMED the law required at the rime of the NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS. SECTION 3. PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP commission of the crime. 5. Assumes to regulate civil rights MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED IN THE but in effect imposes a penalty or MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW. SECTION 4. CITIZENS OF THE deprivation of a right PHILIPPINES WHO MARRY ALIENS 6. Deprives a person accused of a SHALL RETAIN THEIR CITIZENSHIP, crime of some lawful protection. UNLESS BY THEIR ACT OR OMISSION THEY ARE DEEMED, UNDER THE LAW, TO CALDER vs. BULL A law on criminal procedure which alters HAVE RENOUNCED IT. SECTION 5. DUAL ALLEGIANCE OF legal rules is an ex post facto law. CITIZENS IS INIMICAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND SHALL BE CUMMINGS vs. MISSOURI A bill of attainder is a legislative act which DEALT WITH BY LAW. inflicts punishment without judicial trial. ARTICLE V - SUFFRAGE ELEMENTS OF A BILL OF ATTAINDER SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE  there must be a law EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE  the law imposes a penal burden on a PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE named individual or easily ascertainable DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT members of a group

LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION.NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE. SECTION 2. THE CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE A SYSTEM FOR SECURING THE SECRECY AND SANCTITY OF THE BALLOT AS WELL AS A SYSTEM FOR ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD. THE CONGRESS SHALL ALSO DESIGN A PROCEDURE FOR THE DISABLED AND THE ILLITERATES TO VOTE WITHOUT

THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHER PERSONS. UNTIL THEN, THEY SHALL BE ALLOWED TO VOTE UNDER EXISTING LAWS AND SUCH RULES AS THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MAY PROMULGATE TO PROTECT THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT. Note: the following persons are not qualified to vote under the election code:  Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer an imprisonment of not less than one year such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon  Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court of having violated his allegiance to the RP.  Insane and feeble minded persons