Constitutional Law I Digests

Constitutional Law 1 Compiled Darvin’s Digests DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN – “Miriam’s preventive suspension case” preventively suspended (90 days) by Sandiganbayan upon pendency of consolidated Criminal Cases against her for violation of Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act filed by employees of Com. on Immigration & Deportation for approving application for legalization of alleged disqualified aliens. Assailed through Certiorari. Sec. 13 theoreof makes it ministerial upon courts to preventively suspend from any office being held. – does not exclude members of Congress. Guilt need not be established for preventive suspension to issue. Does not violate Consti on power of Congress to suspend/expel – it is disctinct from said suspension, imposed upon her not based on her status as legislator. Separation of powers does not exclude members of Congress from said Act. Supervening event: acquitted by Sandiannbayan. Moot & Academic. Certiorari DISMISSED. ROCES vs. HRET – “Mrs. Harry Ang-Ping case” Miles Roces & Harry Ang-Ping competitors for 3 rd Leg. Dist. of Manila, registered voter Alejandro Gomez challenged Ang-Ping’s qualification (being not a natural-born citizen), responded by withdrawing candidacy, substituted by wife Zenaida. COMELEC denied due course, votes in favor not counted. Case was pending before 1st Div. when COMELEC en banc (motu proprio) issued assailed Res. striking out Ang-Ping’s name & denying Mrs. Ang-Ping’s substitution before the expiration of the reglementary period. Filed case before HRET w/c gave due course & permitted substitution. Roces files Certiorari. HRET exercises sole jurisdiction & has power to determine jurisdiction, procedure, etc. COMELEC Res. was void for violating due process (opportunity to be heard was systematically denied). Did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari DISMISSED. PIMENTEL vs. HRET – “Partylists at HRET case” Sen. Aquilino Pimentel assailed composition of the HRET & argued that it must contain partylist representatives on the basis of proportional representation. Petition is not ripe for adjudication bec. it should 1st be brought before the HRET & not w/ the SC – separation of powers. HR has the power to decide the composition of the HRET unless there is evident grave abuse of discretion. Supervening event: HRET composition later changed to include partylist representation. Moot & academic. Petition DENIED. BARBERS vs. COMELEC – “Barbers vs. Biazon case” Biazon proclaimed by the COMELEC by Resolution as the 12th Placed Senator despite the fact that not all COC’s have been tallied & counted. Biazon has substantial lead over Barbers & the subsequent tallying of all votes will no longer affect the result of the election. COMELEC resolution proclaiming Biazon AFFIRMED. BONDOC vs. PINEDA – “politics in the HRET case” election contest filed against Rep. Marciano Pineda (LDP) by Emigdio Bondoc (NP). Upon re-appreciation of votes, pending decision: Bondoc wins by 23 votes. After another re-count & re-appreciation, Bondoc wins by 107 votes. Rep. Camasura, out of zeal, informs his Party Leader Rep. Cojuanco of his conscience vote in favor of Bondoc (w/c will lead to 5-4 vote). To influence decision of HRET, HR issues Res. to disqualify Camasura for party (LDP) disloyalty & remove him from HRET so that they can win upon motion for reconsideration. It violates the independence of the HRET to be sole judge of election contests. Should be free from partisanship. No valid cause for termination of Camasura from HRET & violates security of tenure. Certiorari GRANTED. ROBLES vs. HRET – “withdrawal case” Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st Dist. of Caloocan, Romeo Santos filed elec. contest w/ HRET (electoral fraud & irregularities) & called for re-counting / reappreciation of votes. Filed Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent MMotion to Recall/Disregard his Previous Motion. 1st Motion not acted upon, 2nd Motion granted. Robles claimed that the 1st motion divested HRET of jurisdiction. SC cannot interfere unless there is grave abuse of discretion. Jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be lost at the mere instance of the parties, but continues until case is terminated. HRET must be allowed to function w/o being impaired by mere technicalities of procedure. Elec. protest is vested w/ public interest. Certiorari DENIED. ARROYO vs. HRET – “innovative precinct-level document-based evidence case” Rep. Joker Arroyo proclaimed Rep. for lone Dist. of Makati, elec. protest filed before HRET by Augusto Syjuco. Justice Gancayco made investigation & found that employees of the HRET engaged in pilfering, tampering, & dumping of ballots – resulted to reduction of Arroyo votes. Syjuco filed for Withdrawal of protest upon

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presumption that he already leads & introduced his brainchild sys. of evidence consisting of 200,000 photocopied pages of various local elec. documents & admitted by HRET (in violation of the best evidence rule) by 6-3 vote (all Justices dissenting) & later proclaimed Syjuco as winner by same vote. Grave abuse of discretion. Standard revision of ballots procedure must be followed, brainchild system unauthorized by law. Syjuco cannot unjustly broaden the scope of his original cause of action. Syjuco fined for indirect contempt for derogatory remarks against the Justices. Petition for review GRANTED. LERIAS vs. SANDOVAL – “dag-dag bawas case” Rosette Lerias files elec. protes vs Rep. Roger Mercado (proclaimed) for Lone Dist. of So. Leyte. Returns from town of Libangon questioned but presumed to produce more votes for Lerias. Board of Canvassers copy of COC’s inconsistent w/ COMELEC copy – indicated dagdag-bawas. Lerias votes reduced by 100 votes per precinct (#6, 10, 18, 19). School teachers testified. Majority rules in favor of Mercado (party-mate) who only presented photocopies for evidence. HRET performs judicial functions & must not be influenced by politics. In the absence of actual ballots, election returns from Mun. Board of Canvassers presented by Lerias constitutes best evidence. Prima facie evidence. Best evidence rule must apply. HRET decision is SET ASIDE. SANDOVAL II vs. HRET – “substituted summons case” Aurora Oreta files elec. protest vs Federico Sandoval (proclaimed) for Lone Dist. Of Malabon-Navotas for electoral fraud & anomalies. HRET process server serves substitute summons to Gene Maga (maintenance man). Sandoval fails to file answer on time – prayed for admission of his answer. Sol. Gen. agrees w/ his contention. A matter of due process. Violates Rules of Civil Procedure – must be left w/ competent person (relation of confidence). Failed to establish that personal service was not attempted. SC assumes jurisdiction. Certiorari GRANTED DAZA vs. SINGSON – “change of party composition case” apportionment of Com. on Appointments. Raul Daza (LP) removed from Com. on Appointments bec. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined LDP, only 17 members left – hence he was relaced by Luis Singson (LDP). LDP not yet registered w/ COMELEC. SC assumes jurisdiction (expanded jurisdiction) & transcendental importance. Supervening event: COMELEC grants registration to LDP – thus entitled to rights/privileges granted by law to pol. parties. HR has authority to change representation in Com. on Appointments at any time accdg. to political alignments. Petition DISMISSED. COSETENG vs. MITRA Jr. – “Niki Coseteng case” lone member of KAIBA Party prayed for seat in Com. on Appointments (COA) based on indorsements from 9 congressmen, assailed COA composition. Creation of LDP – obtained 160 members (80%) entitled to 10 seats. LP as next largest party entitled to 1 seat (Verano-Yap) & KBL as principal opposition (Ablan) w/ 1 seat. KAIBA as part of coalesced majority is bound by majority decision. Even if not, it has only 1 member (Coseteng) & consists 0.4% of membership in the HR. DISMISSED. GUINGONA Jr. vs. GONZALES – “Fractional Representation case” Sen. composition: LDP 15 (7.5 seats) , NPC 5 (2.5), Lakas 3 (1.5) , LP-PDP-Laban 1 (0.5). Sen Tolentino proposes compromise w/c was adopted by Senate. LDP gets 8 seats (Sen. Romulo), LP (0.5) gets 1 seat (Sen. W. Tañada). All parties entitled to fractional representation in COA. Justiciable question. Violative of the Consti – proportional rep. The number of 12 seats not mandatory to be all filled up, what is important is that COA has quorum to transact business. Guidelines: 1. party must have at least 2 members to be entitled to seat, 2. w/ more than 2 parties in Senate, a party w/ only 1 member cannot claim seat in COA. Only 10 seats filled. Grave abuse of discretion, Sen. Romulo & Tañada NOT entitled to seats in COA. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELEC. COOP vs. SP of DUMAGUETE – “subpoena/contempt power case” Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete issued sub-poena & required Chairman Paterio Torres & Gen. Mngr. Arturo Umbac to explain why they must not be cited for contempt for failure to appear in investigation. Alleged use of inefficient power lines. The contempt power of the nat’l legislature is sui generis as a co-equal branch & not vested in local legislative bodies as mere creatures of law. Not vested by the Local Govt. Code – no implied grant of power w/o statutory basis. Such power is vested by law in Nat’l Electrification Admin, therefore proper recourse is to file complaint in said admin. body. Prohibition GRANTED. BENGZON Jr. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE – “Romualdez Corporations case” investigated by Senate re sale of 36 or 39 corporations to Ricardo “Baby” Lopa relative of Cory

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Aquino, alleged violation of Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act from privileged speech of Sen. Enrile. Civil Case pending in Sandiganbayan. Alleged employment of devious financial schemes & maneuvers to make it appear that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez already divested himself of said corps. Refused to testify & sought to enjoin Senate. SC assumes jurisdiction (expanded jurisdiction). No suggestion of contemplated legislation; investigative powers not unlimited. Cannot impair Bill of Rights (due process & self-incrimination). No inquiry must be an end in itself – it falls w/in the province of the Judiciary (pending case in Sandganbayan). Prohibition GRANTED. ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO – “to whom did you give the money to? case" Phil. Gov’t purchased Buenavista & Tambobong estates from Ernest H. Burt for P 5 million collectively – who purchased such for only P 20,000 & later forfeited his deposits to its former owners. Payment made through attyin-fact Jean L. Arnault, received, deposited, & withdrew sums. Senate created commity to investigate the sale. Withdrew P 440,000 & gave it to someone – claimed he forgot the name, then later invoked self-incrimination. Committed to custody of Sgt.-at-arms, detained at Bilibid. Filed Habeas Corpus. Such power is incidental to legislative function & implied in its existence. Materiality of question determined by its direct relation to subj. of inquiry, not in relation w/ proposed legislation. Questions asked were pertinent. Testimony is obviously false. He asserts a right founded on shaky ground but refuses to perform a clear & imperative duty. Habeas Corpus DENIED. SANLAKAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY – “Oakwood Mutiny case” Pres. issues Proc. No. 427 (Declaring State of Rebellion) & Gen. Order No. 4 (Directing AFP & PNP to suppress rebellion). Petitioners argue that Consti. does not authorize such declaration, possible abuse of rights, undue exercise of emergency & martial law powers w/o grant by Congress. Mootness due to lifting overlooked by SC, ruled upon merits. People’s Orgs don’t have locus standi. Declaration of State of Rebellion is a mere superfluity & legally insignificant – not necessary & merely a declaration of state of events (accdg. to Revised Admin. Code). Power to call on AFP & PNP to suppress lawlessness & rebellion inherent in Presidency as Chief Exec. & Commander-in-Chief. Exercised so-called Calling-Out Power. Warrantless arrests are valid as long as requisites are present. Petition DISMISSED. GUINGONA Jr. vs. CARAGUE – “Auto Debt-Service case” Gen. Appropriations Act of 1990 allocated P 86.6 Billion to debt service, only P 27 Billion to Educ. by virtue of PD No. 81 & other pertinent laws providing for auto-allocation to debt service. Consti. provision on highest budgetary alloc. to Educ. not self-executing. Such laws survive Marcos, repeal by implication (by virtue of Consti.) is frowned upon. That all appropriations & bills authorizing public debt, etc. must be passed again by Congress is untenable. Such bills referred to by Consti. only refer to bills yet to be enacted, not those already in force by virtue of Presidential Decree. No undue delegation bec. sufficient standards are set. Petition for review is DISMISSED. TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE – “VAT case” imposes 10% VAT on sale, barter, & exchange of goods & services. Exemption of publications & sale of religious materials, and other basic goods & services removed. As a house bill transmitted to Senate, it was not passed by Senate but merely consolidated w/ Senate Version. Consti: All appropriation, revenue, tariff bills, etc. shall originate at the HR, Senate may propose/concur w/ amendments. Not the law but the BILL must originate exclusively from HR, Senate may propose changes. Senate prepared bill but waited for House Bill before considering it. Consolidation in Conferrence Committee where differences may be reconciled, amendments may still be made even if not originally proposed provided they are germane to the intent of the law; it is still subj. to approval of both Senate & HR. Certiorari & Prohibitons DISMISSED. ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA – “City of Santiago Substitute Bill case” House Bill No. 8817 filed in HR to convert Mun. of Santiago, Isabella into an Independent Component City. In anticipation, Sen. Sotto files counterpart Senate Bill, w/c was approved by the HR, duly signed into law, & ratified through plebiscite. So long as action is withheld pending the House Bill, Consti does not prohibit filing substitute bill. Challenged also on basis of inclusion of Internal Revenue Allotment to compute minimum income, SC ruled that it is included. Petition DENIED. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. vs. PHIL. CEMENT MANUF. CORP. – “Safeguard Measures Act case” after GATT & WTO membership, Phils. enacts said Act along w/ Anti-dumping Act & imposition of countervailing duties to protect local industries. Procedure of enactment questioned. Both corp. although being local, have primarily foreign stockholders. Philcemcor called for imposition of safeguard measures against importation of Portland Cement due to import surges but denied by DTI

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& CA but later implemented by DTI Secretary. Congress has the power to delegate such powers to the Tariff Commission & DTI pursuant to its power of taxation, exclusively vested in the Congress. When the Exec. through the Pres. & her alter egos enforce them, they merely act as agents of Congress to perform acts inherent in the legislature – particularly the taxing power. Must have the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission before it can be imposed. In the absence of such and for other causes, DTI is enjoined from enforcing. Must follow guidelines laid down by the legislature in its enforcement. Petition to enjoin GRANTED. PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS – “Build roads on my private subdivision case” Sen. Jose Zulueta owned Antonio Subd. RA No. 920 appropriated funds for public roads, claimed that he will donate parcels of his subd. to Go’v’t. subj. to the condition that they will be used as roads in effect increasing their value. Gov. Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal objected & sought to enjoin Sec. of Public Works from enforcing. Violates Consti. prohibition of Members of Congress being directly/indirectly interested in any grant/contract of gov’t. Contract guised as a donation. Legislature cannot allocate public funds for private purpose – even if there are incidental advantages to the public. Incidental interest will not justify such use of public money for private interests. Petition GRANTED. BRILLANTES Jr. vs. COMELEC – “Unofficial Quick-Count case” Automation of 2004 Elections signed into law, funds appropriated therefore, but COMELEC award of contract for Phase 2 of Automated Elec. to Mega Pacific Consortium voided by SC, Phase 3 (Electronic Transmission) scrapped but COMELEC proceeded to implement it to conduct “unofficial count” of Pres. & VP results & hence a re-alignment of funds w/ the COMELEC; thus this petition. Involves expenditure of public funds. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Said resolution lacks constitutional & statutory basis & usurps the Congress exclusive authority to act as Nat’l. Board of Canvassers for Pres. & VP. Also may amount to Malversation of Public Funds. Failure to notify all political parties. GARCIA vs. MATA – “AFP Provision in Appropriations Bill case” Ernesto Mata was reserve officer of AFP, held position of Captain, reverted to inactive status by virtue of RA No. 2332. During that time, he served 9 yrs, 4 mos, 12 days. Relied upon Par. 11 of Special Provision for Armed Forces on the Gen. Appropriations Act w/c provides that reserve officers w/ at least 10 yrs service shall not be reverted to inactive status. Such provision is a rider, a non-appropriation item in an appropriation measure. Also violates one subject embraced in the title rule. It is not germane to the subj. matter of the law – it confers no right & affords no protection. Petition DENIED. ATITIW vs. ZAMORA – “Cordillera Admin. Region case” assail provision in Gen. Appropriations Act of 2000 allocating only around P 18 million for the dev’t. of CAR as opposed to P 36 million annually in previous years. Moot but ruled upon the merits. CAR created by EO No. 220, Organic Act enacted by Congress but lost through Plebiscite. Special Provision No. 1 – directing for the use of fund for winding up of activities & payment of benefits. Not a rider. Even if it is a non-appropriation provision, it specifies certain conditions/restrictions in the manner by w/c said funds are to be spent. It relates specifically to some appropriation therein. Question of policy, SC cannot interfere. Prohibition DENIED. DEMETRIA vs. ALBA – “President’s unlimited fund transfer powers case” PD No. 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977) provides that the Pres. shall have authority to transfer any fund appropriated to any dept., office, etc of the Exec. Dept. included in the Appropriations Act to any program, proj., activity, etc also included or approved after its enactment. No longer consistent w/ Consti. No law shall be passed authorizing transfer of appropriations. The Pres., Speaker, & Chief Justice & heads of Consti. Commissions may only augment items for their offices from savings in other items. Constitutes undue delegation. Petition for review GRANTED. LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY vs. COMELEC – “Barangay Poll Funds case” represented by its President Alex David, sought prohibition due to alleged fears of illegal transfer, disbursement of public funds for Bgy. Elections based on Manila Bulletin article. Gen. Appropriations Act allocated only P 137 million. Consti: Heads of Consti. Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in Gen. Appropriations Law from savings in other items. Omnibus Elec. Code: Local Gov’ts shall appropriate funds to defray expenses for barangay elec. Well founded in law. Mere unsubstantiated & speculative allegations by petitioners. Prohibition DISMISSED. PHIL. CONSTITUTION ASSOC. vs. ENRIQUEZ – “Senator’s Power to Augment case” RA No. 7663 Gen. Appropriatios Act of 1994 passed but partially vetoed by FVR. Members of Congress allowed to

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re-align allocations for operational expenses, provided said allocation is not exceeded. While members of Congress are in best position to determine their needs, it is the Sen. Pres or Speaker who shall approve such re-alignment. FVR vetoes power granted to AFP Chief of Staff to use savings in the appropriations to augment Retirement & Separation Benefits Sys. Such right can only be exercised by the Pres. pursuant to law. Petition GRANTED. CORDERO vs. CABATUANDO – “Representation of Poor Tenants case” RA No. 2263 (Agri. Tenancy Act), sections 19 & 20 thereof provide for the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Constitutionality assailed on the rule that “no bill may be enacted into law w/c shall embrace more than 1 subj. in its title.” That requirement is satisfied if all parts of the law are at least related to subj. matter of the title. Agricultural Tenancy Act embraces it & it is not inconsistent thereto, mere details need not be set forth. Said law transfers duty of representation to Dept. of Justice. PHIL. CONSTITUTION ASSOC. vs. GIMENEZ – “retirement gratuity for legislators case” Congress enacts RA No. 3836 (An Act Amending Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by RA No. 396) w/c provides for retirement for Senators & Reps. Regardless of age after service of 12 years & grants gratuities & commutation of unused leave benefits. Said provision providing for such is a rider bec. the laws to be amended only apply to GSIS members, and do not cover legislators. Also it violated one-subject per title rule & authorizes increase in salaries of members of Congress (immediately) & also violates the eual protection clause bec. it was made to apply exclusively to members of Congress. Declared NULL & VOID. ALALAYAN vs. NATIONAL POWER CORP. – “power providers case” independent power franchise holder Santiago P. Alalayan, in behalf of persons w/ common interest assails validity of RA No. 3043 (Amending Commonwealth Act No. 120 as amended by RA No. 2641) empowering the NAPOCOR to “require as a condition that such franchise holder receiving at least 50% of its electric power from NAPOCOR shall not realize a net profit more than 12% per annum of its investment plus 2 mos. operating expenses.” Does not violate property rights, welfare is paramaount consideration in exercise of police power of the state. Not a rider. Title comprehensive enough to reasonably include such object w/o necessity to express each & every end & means in it. If statute amends another, it suffices if reference be made to the amended legislation. Constitutionality AFFIRMED. INSULAR LUMBER CO. vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS – “tax exemption on oils used for forest concessions case” Insular Lumber Co. is a NY based corp. w/ license to operate in Phils. & a licensed forest concessionaire. Tax paid on use of oil & fuel used in its operations, calimed refund on the basis of RA No. 1435 (An Act to Provide Means for Increasing the Highway Special Fund) Sec. 5 thereof providing exemption to miners & loggers. Said provision not a rider. Contains only one policy, w/c is necessity for increasing said Fund, merely grants certain exemptions. It does not deviate from the gen. subj. of the law. However, the operation of a sawmill (subj. to exemption) is diff. from a forest concessionaire, hence Insular is still not subj. to full exemption. CTA ruling AFFIRMED. TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD – “VRB case” PD No. 1987 (An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board) w/ powers to regulate the Videogram industry, Sec.10 thereof imposes 30% tax on gross receipts. It is not a rider. Title is comprehensive enough to include the gen. purpose. All parts of the statute are germane to the subj. matter expressed in the title. May contain diverse provisions so long as they are not inconsistent w/ subj. expressed in the title. Practical rather than technical construction so as not to cripple the legislature. 30% tax not oppressive & similar to amusement tax, no undue delegation. Petition DENIED. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. vs. PRADO – “franking privilege case” RA No. 7354 (An Act Creating the Phil. Postal Corp. Defining its Powers, Functions & Responsibilities, etc.) Sec. 35 thereof is a repealing clause & deprives the Judiciary of the franking privilege. Not a rider. A repealing clause in a new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the matter. It need not be expressed in the title thereof. Did not violate the legislative process bec. SC cannot look behind the enrolled bill. Unconstitutional for violating equal protection, granting privilege to Exec.. Legislative, & other less important entities but denying it from the Judiciary w/c needs it most. Discriminatory. GRANTED. TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE – “VAT case” imposes 10% VAT on sale, barter, & exchange of goods & services. Exemption of publications & sale of religious materials, and other basic goods & services removed. Included amendments to the Nat’l. Internal Revenue Code by withdrawing certain

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exemptions. Such was not mentioned in the title thereof. To mention it in the title would be to insist that title must be a complete index of its contents. Such would interfere w/ the enactment of legislation. As long as it is germane to the subj. embraced generally in the title (w/c is to broaden the tax base & generate further income), it cannot be considered to be a rider. TOBIAS vs ABALOS – “Mandaluyong City case” caused the creation of separate legislative district exclusively for City of Mandaluyong. Title only provides: An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly-Urbanized City of Mandaluyong. Does not provide for such creation of Leg. Dist. Creation of separate legislative dist. is not a subj. separate & distinct from its conversion to a highly-urbanized city. It is germane to the subj. matter. Liberal construction applied in order not to impede cripple legislature. Petition DENIED. DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC – “election officers re-assignment case” passage of RA No. 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act) Sec. 44 thereof provided that elec. officers who served for certain municipality for more than 4 yrs. shall be re-assigned to other station. COMELEC issued Res. to implement. Election officers protest. Not a rider. Re-assignment of elec. officers is relevant to the subj. matter of registration to insure the integrity of the reg. process. Title is comprehensive enough to embrace it. Germane to the subj. matter of the law. No violation of security of tenure or equal protection as well. Petition DENIED. CAWALING Jr. vs. COMELEC – “2 municipalities merged to 1 city case” RA No. 8806 – An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon & Sorsogon in the Prov. of Sorsogon, & appropriating funds therefore. Plebiscite held, approved. Benjamin Cawaling, as citizen & taxpayer assails that law contains 2 subjs. 1. creation of City of Sorsogon, & 2. Abolition of Muns. of Bacon & Sorsogon. Consti allows merger of local gov’t units. There is only 1 subj. embraced in the title of the law. The abolition/cessation of corporate existence of Muns. of Bacon & Sorsogondue to merger is not a subj. separate & distinct from creation of Sorsogon City. Title is comprehensive enough to include the gen. obj. w/ statute seeks to effect, Liberal interpretation adopted so as not to cripple/impede legislation. Petition DENIED. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs. ERMITA – “E-VAT case” EVAT law assailed on the basis, among others, of the inclusion of certain provisions by the Bicameral Conf. Committee not present in Senate & House Bills. It is w/in the power of the Committee to introduce entirely new provisions. It is still subj. to approval by both Houses. Senate introduced several substantial amendments affecting corp. income taxes, franchises, & excise taxes. It is w/in the purview of Consti. allowing Senate to propose/concur w/ amendments. Included amendments to the Nat’l. Internal Revenue Code, need not be embraced in the title thereof but is embraced generally & is germane to the subj. matter of the law. Consttutionality AFFIRMED. ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA – “Parliamentary Procedures case” Conf. Committee Report on the Sin Taxes Bill submitted before the HR for approval. Re. Exequiel Javier delivered sponsorship speech, interpellations followed. Important: in the motion for the approval of Committee Report, the presiding officer does not call for a vote based on yeas/nays but simply asks if there is no objection, there being none (he did not recognize the objection of Rep. Arroyo – not the proper motion) proceeded to approve the Report. Assailed on that basis among others. SC ruled that Consti. does not require that the yeas/nays of members be taken everytime the house has to vote. It is only required upon the third/last reading of the bill at the request of 1/5 of the members present and in repassing a vetoed bill. Constitutionality AFFIRMED. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS – “caterer’s tax case” RA No. 6110 took effect imposing certain caterer’s taxes for foods & percentage tax for liquors sold in golf links, restaurants, etc. Pres. Marcos vetoed phrases hotels. motels, & rest houses from said Bill. Manila Golf Club asserts that it is an invalid veto & that the entire section (including golf links) must be vetoed altogether. Sol. Gen. argued that “hotels, motels, & rest houses” are an item in itself w/c the Pres. has the right to veto. SC agrees. To rule otherwise would tie the hands of the Pres. in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of approving a provision he deems unacceptable, or veto the entire section including acceptable provisions. Veto is VALID. GONZALES vs. MACARAIG Jr. – “item vs provision case” Gen. Approp. Act. 0f 1989 enacted into law, but Sec. 55 thereof vetoed by Pres. Aquino. It provides that if Congress disapproves of or reduces and item or approp. the Exec. may not augment the same by the use of approp. for other items. Said vetoed clause is not a provision but an item, w/in the veto power of the Pres. It is an

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inappropriate provision; hence treated as mere item. Provisions in an Approp. Law must relate to specific approp. therein. It is merely an expression of Congressional policy. It is likewise a nonappropriation item inserted in an approp. law. Note: power to augment lies dormant unless otherwise authorized by law, in this case it was granted. It is, however, ideally embodied in separate legislation. Proper remedy of Congress is to override the veto, not this court. Veto AFFIRMED. BENGZON vs. DRILON – “retired justices’ pensions case” RA No. 1797 enacted to grant benefits & pensions to retired Justices of SC & CA (amending RA No. 910). Criteria: at least 20 yrs service, retirement due to age (70 yrs) or disability. SC issues Resolution pursuant thereto. PD No. 644 enacted to repeal said law but did not take effect due to lack of publication. Congress, upon the impression that PD No. 644 is valid, enacts Gen. Approp. Act of 1992 containing provisons reviving the benefits granted under RA No. 1797, vetoed by the Pres. Since PD No. 644 never took effect, what the Pres. actually vetoed was an existing law (RA No. 1797) as well as the SC Resolution pursuant thereto. Pres. cannot exercise veto to repeal existing laws, neither can veto power overturn a SC Resolution or judgment w/o violating the principle of separation of powers & fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary. Veto is SET ASIDE. PHILCONSA vs. ENRIQUEZ – “So many vetoed provisions! case” Gen. Appropriatons Bill passed & signed into law by the President w/ various vetoed items. Although the standard procedure would be simply to override the veto, Congressmen may question the validity of the veto if it is alleged to be ultra vires.

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Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire approp. for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.

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Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

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Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.

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Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.

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Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. Accdg. to the Consti. only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

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Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

TAN vs. DEL ROSARIO Jr. – “Net Income Tax on Self-Employed & Professionals case” RA No. 7496 imposes said tax. Said tax does not impose gross taxation but net taxation due to allowable deductable items – though significantly reduced. Legislature determines the nature, object, extent, coverage, & situs of taxation. Complied w/ the ff. Rules on Uniformity of Taxation: • standards used are substantial not arbitrary • categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose • law applies to all things equal, to both present & future conditions

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classification applies equally to members of the same class

COMMISSIONER OR INTERNAL REVENUE vs. CA – “Fortune Tobacco Case” Fortune Tobacco Corp. granted by Patent Office licensed trademarks for Hope, Champion, & More cigarettes classified as locally manufactured brands. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed upon the said products accdg. to NIRC & RA No. 7654. BIR issues assailed Memo Circular No. 37-93 classifying the said products to be locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands – originally owned by foreign manufacturer & thus imposes a greater 55% tax as opposed to the previous 45% tax. Said memo not published. CTA found said classification to be defective. Violates uniformity of taxation. Must be uniform & equitable. All subjects/objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike & put on equal footing both in privileges & liabilities. Other cigarettes bearing seemingly foreign brands & similarly situated not included in the circular. Also a violation of due process for lack of notice. CTA ruling AFFIRMED. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE INC. vs. AQUINO – “School building’s 1st floor for lease case” Abra Valley Jr. College is a corp. w/c had its building & lot subjected to public auction for failure to pay real property taxes. Highest bidder was Mayor Paterno Millare, cert. of sale issued upon him. Assailed sale on the basis of supposed tax exemption. 2nd Floor of said bldg. used as residence of Director Pedro Borgonia & his extended family; 1st Floor leased to Northern Marketing Corp. All lands, buildings, & improvements used EXCLUSIVELY for religious, scientific, charitable, & educational purposes are exempt from real property tax. Liberal interpretation allowed & considers incidental use also. However, although use of 2nd Flr as residence may be classified as incidental & justified, use of 1st Floor for commercial activities cannot be considered as incidental to educational purpose. CFI ruling AFFIRMED. BAYAN vs. ZAMORA – “Visiting Forces Agreement case” entered into by the Phils. under Pres. Estrada (through a treaty) & the US. Ratified by the Senate through 2/3 vote, concluded by exchage of notes. Article VII thereof (Importation & Exportation) grants tax exemption to all materials, equipment, supplies, & other properties imported into or acquired in the Phils. by or on behalf of the USAF in connection w/ such activities. They shall be free from all import duties, taxes, & other similar charges. Personal baggage, effects & other properties likewise may be imported free of said duties. Not assailed on the basis of this matter but upon other grounds. Merely illustrates an example. JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERANTIVE COALITION vs. LIM – “Camp John Hay case” RA No. 7227 (Bases Conversion & Dev’t Act) enacted for the acceleration & dev’t of Subic & John Hay Camps into hubs of commerce. Bases Conversion Dev’t Authority (BCDA) created & enters into joint venture w/ Tuntex Co. Ltd. & AsiaWorld Inc. to develop John Hay area. Sanggunian passed Resolution establishing certain guidelines including possible payment of local taxes. Supervening event: Proc. No. 420 by FVR grants applicable incentives of Special Econ. Zones to John Hay w/c includes tax exemptions. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed w/o concurrence of majority of members of the Congress. RA No. 7227 grants ONLY Subic SEZ w/ tax exemptions & other incentives. Such exemptions cannot be established by the assailed Proclamation. The power of Congress to exempt is as broad as the power to tax. Local gov’ts may also exempt but only from local taxes. Tax exemption cannot be implied, must be expressly granted. Provision NULL & VOID. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. vs. PHIL. CEMENT MANUF. CORP. – “Safeguard Measures Act case” after GATT & WTO membership, Phils. enacts said Act along w/ Anti-dumping Act & imposition of countervailing duties to protect local industries. he power of the Exec. to impose safeguard measures is actually just delegated by the legislature in its exercise of taxing power. The Congress may impose limitations & guidelines to the exercise of these measures (in this case the safeguard measures) w/c must be complied w/ by the Exec. in its implementation. In this case, it must have the positive factual determination of the Tariff Commission before it can be imposed. In the absence of such and for other causes, DTI is enjoined from enforcing. Must follow guidelines laid down by the legislature in its enforcement, otherwise the same would be violative of the Constitution. For failure to comply w/ such procedures, petition to enjoin GRANTED. LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILS. vs. QUEZON CITY – “Lung Center Case” a non-stock/non-profit entity established by PD No. 1823. 60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients. Big portion of Ground Floor leased (canteen, stores, clinics, etc.) & big portion of right side leased to Elliptical Orchids. Assesed for real property tax; claim for exemption denied. To determine if it is a charitable institution, the charter (PD No. 1823) , purpose, by-laws, administration, work and services, and the beneficiaries must be considered. The charitable character (and exemption) is not lost simply

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because it derives incomes so long as such incomes are used for charity. However leased properties are NOT exempt - charter does not expressly provide so, they are not used EXCLUSIVELY for the exempted purposes. Sec. 28 (3) of the Consti provides for REAL property tax exemption only. PARTIALLY GRANTED. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs. ERMITA – “E-VAT case” imposition of an indirect tax on consumption of goods/services. Assailed on the basis of uniformity & equitableness (equal protection). It must be established w/ clear & persuasive evidence in order to overcome the presumption of validity. The limitation of creditable input taxes on certain entities – such as those frequently transacting w/ gov’t, or those w/ high ratio of input tax – is not violative of equal protection. Absolute universal application is not required, merely equal application among equally situated entities. It is likewise uniform in its application of the said tax on all goods/services as well as the 5-year amortization on tax on purchase of capital goods, as well as the 5% final withholding tax. The E-VAT is likewise equitable as the basic agricultural food & marine products in their grassroots state are not subject to the tax. Although the E-VAT is more regressive than progressive, the Consti only establishes a preference for progressive rather than regressive taxation, but does not prohibit the latter. E-VAT law is VALID. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO vs. CUISIA – “debt-relief agreements case” Pursuant to the Phil. Comprehensive Financing Prog. the Sec. of Finance & Debt-Negotating Chairman enter into the debtrelief agreements w/c include buy-back of loans (re-purchase of loans w/ discount). Consti: No money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance w/ an appropriation made by law. Although the power to tax & to spend lies w/ Congress, by virtue of PD No. 1177, w/c has the force of law, the President is empowered to execute debt-payment automatically w/o further appropriation. Furthermore RA No. 240 grants specific legal authority to the Sec. of Finance for the buy-back loans. The Consti further allows President to contract/guarantee foreign loans w/c include bonds. There is no substantial distinction between loan and bonds. Certiorari & Prohibition DISMISSED. REPUBLIC vs. CITY OF KIDAPAWAN – “MAGRA case” PD No. 1442 allowed the gov’t to enter into service contract for the exploration/utilization of geothermal resources. Gov’t enters into contract w/ PNOC-EDC for operation in the MAGRA (Mt. Apo Geo. Reservation Area) w/ resulted to the construction of a 104-megawatt power plant. Assessed for tax delinquency by Local Treasurer w/c sought public auction of land & improvements. No tax exemptions granted by Charter. Under Local Gov’t Code, tax exemptions granted to real property owned by the Rep. of the Phils. unless beneficial use is granted to a taxable person – PNOC-EDC (the beneficial user) is a taxable person. Tax exemption in contract cannot be given effect bec. DOE does not have power to exempt; only Congress has the power. Improvements, however, cannot be auctioned bec. they are not the property subj. to the tax; the land is public land & cannot be auctioned as well. Remedy for the payment of tax delinquency is through Civil Action. Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS – “Build roads on my private subdivision case” Sen. Jose Zulueta owned Antonio Subd. RA No. 920 appropriated funds for public roads, claimed that he will donate parcels of his subd. to Gov’t. subj. to the condition that they will be used as roads in effect increasing their value. Gov. Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal objected & sought to enjoin Sec. of Public Works from enforcing. Congress is w/o power to appropriate public funds (& levy taxes) for anything but a public purpose. Incidental interest to the public will not justify such use of public money for private interests. Also violates prohibition against direct/indirect interest of legislators in any grant/contract of the gov’t. Petition GRANTED. MANILA INT’L AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. MABUNAY – “Security Services Bidding case” MIAA terminates security service contract w/ Lanting Security & enters into a new contract w/ PASSCOR through negotiated contract w/o public bidding. Lanting challenges. MIAA invokes Sec. 68 of the GAA of 1995, w/c allows gov’t to enter into service contracts through public bidding or negotiated contract. Nothing in the said provision allows the gov’t to do away w/ public bidding requirement. It is a mechanism that allows gov’t to avoid anomalies in the execution of contracts & the disbursement of funds such as favoritism or over-pricing. Admin. agencies may not transcend the law in implementation. Petition DENIED. GUINGONA Jr. vs. CARAGUE – “Auto Debt-Service case” Gen. Appropriations Act of 1990 allocated P 86.6 Billion to debt service, only P 27 Billion to Educ. by virtue of PD No. 81 & other pertinent laws providing for auto-allocation to debt service. Consti. provision on highest budgetary alloc. to Educ. not self-executing. Such laws survive Marcos, repeal by implication (by virtue of Consti.) is frowned upon.

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That all appropriations & bills authorizing public debt, etc. must be passed again by Congress is untenable. Such bills referred to by Consti. only refer to bills yet to be enacted, not those already in force by virtue of Presidential Decree w/c have the force of law. Petition for review is DISMISSED. COMELEC vs. QUIJANO-PADILLA – “Voter’s Registration w/o Funds case” RA No. 8189 (Voters’ Registration Act) provided for modernization of registration & appropriated funds (P 1 billion) therefor. COMELEC undertakes the Voters Reg. & Identification Sys. Proj. Winning bidder was Photokina Marketing Corp. w/ a bid of P 6.5 billion, COMELEC issues Notice of Award but refuses to execute contract for lack of funds. New Chairman Benipayo scrapped the program. Photokina sues to compel the execution of the contract. RTC rules in favor of Photokina, Sol. Gen. intervenes. Agencies are required to limit their expenditures w/in appropriations made by law in accordance w/ Consti., Admin. Code, & Auditing Code of the Phils. Availability of funds is an indispensable requisite for the execution of gov’t contracts, otherwise it is null & void. Proposed phasing of execution is likewise violative of the law & dangerous to the interest of the gov’t. Photokina has recourse though EO No. 292, w/c binds erring officers in their own capacity if they transcend their legitimate powers. Certiorari GRANTED. GASTON vs. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK – “Sugar Special Fund vs Trust Fund case” The Phil. Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) levied fees upon sugar farmers & millers pursuant to PD No. 388 & proceeded to purchase shares of stock w/ the Repulic Planters Bank (w/c replenished its capital). Trust agreement did not materialize, sugar farmers & millers prayed for the transfer of the shares of stock in their favor. The fees collected are in the nature of a tax w/c accrued to a Special Fund – the Dev’t & Stabilization Fund – in the exercise of the power to regulate, the police power of the State. The purpose is to promote the growth & dev’t of the sugar industry. It is not a trust fund. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance shall be transferred to the general funds of the Gov’t. Hence, mandamus is DENIED. OSMEÑA vs. ORBOS – “Oil Price Stabilization Fund case” PD No. 1956 created the OPSF designed to reimburse oil companies resulting from world oil price adjustments. Funds acquired from ad valorem taxes & duties on imported petroleum, & other increases in tax collections. They are taxes collected in the exercise of the police power of the State. Coverted into a “trust liability account” by virtue of EO No. 1024 & was released from the Treasury to the Ministry of Eergy. The OPSF is not a trust fund but is actually a special fund, & was established to protect the consumers from frequent oil price fluctuations. Payments for inventory losses & underrecovery from sales sustained by the courts but not reimbursements w/c were not specifically authorized by law. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS vs. COURT OF APPEALS – “SC jurisdiction over BOI case” EO NO. 226, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 repealed BP. No. 129 w/c vested appellate jurisdiction over BOI orders to the IAC (now the CA) & now provided that all appeals from the decisions of said board shall be filed directly w/ the SC. Supervening event: The 1987 Consti. was already effective w/c prohibits Congress from increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC w/o its advice & concurrence. Hence, EO No. 226 never became effective, & BP No. 129 remains in effect, as well as implementing Circular No. 1-91 pursuant thereto w/c prescribes the procedures therefor. DIAZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS – “SC jurisdiction over ERB case” Davao Light & Power Co. appealed the decision of the ERB (deducting assessments from their property) directly to the SC. SC remands the case to the CA for disposition, w/c dismissed it for failure to comply w/ Circular Nos. 1-88 & 2-90 (providing for dismissal of erroneous appeals). EO No. 172, creating the ERB was enacted when the 1987 Consti was already in effect, hence its vesting upon the SC of jurisdicrion over ERB w/o its advice & concurrence is inoperative. Judicial Reorganization Act remains in effect, as well as said Resolutions enacted pursuant thereto. Petition DISMISSED. FABIAN vs. DESIERTO – “SC jurisdiction over Ombudsman case – love affair” Teresita Fabian, chairman of PROMAT Consruction & Nestor Agustin, incumbent dist. engr. of the 1st Metro Mla. Engineering Dist. had amorous relations – w/ advantage to PROMAT. When the relationship soured, Fabian sought to end relationship, but Agustin oppressed her. Fabian files admin case before Ombudsman; found him guilty of misconduct – suspension w/o pay for 1 year. Upon motion for reconsideration, Desierto inhibited himself, Deputy Ombudsman exonerated respondent. Pursuant to RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act) Fabian appeals to SC. SC found out that Ombudsman & CSC have concurrent jurisdiction, but CSC decisions appealable to the CA. RA No. 6770 enacted during the effectivity of the 1987 Consti & violates the prohibition on Congress’ increase of the appellate jurisdiction of the SC w/o its advice & concurrence. Not alleged in the appeal, not the lis mota of

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the case, but SC brushed them aside. CA has jurisdiction in accordance w/ 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. VILLAVERT vs. DESIERTO – “SC jurisdiction over Ombudsman case – Sweepstakes” Douglas Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor who incurred P 900k + worth of unpaid PCSO tickets. Compromised w/ the PCSO & approved by the PCSO Board of Directors. However, DeputyOmbudsman for Visayas pursued admin. case against him & found him guilty of Grave Misconduct & Dishonesty – recommended his dismissal. He appealed to the SC. RA No. 6770 enacted during the effectivity of the 1987 Consti & violates the prohibition on Congress’ increase of the appellate jurisdiction of the SC w/o its advice & concurrence. Case was referred to the CA for final disposition citing Fabian vs. Desierto. TIROL Jr. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT – SC jurisdiction over Ombudsman case – public school” Victoriano Tirol was Regional Director of DECS for Region 8; entered into a contract w/ Fairchild Marketing & Const. w/c was grossly disadvantageous to the gov’t as per COA audit, recommended to the Ombudsman for criminal & admin. charges w/c approved & filed charges w/ Sandiganayan. Petitioned on certiorari to the SC. Fabian vs. Desierto ruling applies. RA No. 6770 enacted during the effectivity of the 1987 Consti & violates the prohibition on Congress’ increase of the appellate jurisdiction of the SC w/o its advice & concurrence. Certiorari DISMISSED. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC – “Inclusion of Morong in SEZ case” RA No. 7227 (Bases Conversion & Dev’t Act) w/c provided for the creation of the Subic Special Econ. Zone. Sanggunian Bayan of Morong issued Resolution indicating approval, but residents therein interposed reservations, w/c the SB later agreed to. They submitted request for certain amendments to Congress w/c did not act upon it; hence they resorted to initiative. COMELEC initialted referendum (not initiative) calendar of activities & promulgated guidelines. SBMA filed for certiorari. Definitions:

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Initiative – power of the people to propose amendments to the Consti, or to propose and enact legislation; entirely the work of the electorate

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Referendum – the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation or local laws; begun & consented to by the law-making body

Accdg. to the LGC, local initiative shall cover only matters w/in the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact (subject to decision by COMELEC). Case is REMANDED to COMELEC w/c must make preparations for Initiative, and NOT referendum. Corrective measures must be made. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC – “Consti amendment through Initiative case” Atty. Jesus Delfin filed w/ COMELEC a petition to amend the Consti through Initiative – calling for elimination of term limits of elective officials. COMELEC gives due course to petition pursuant to RA No. 6735. Miriam, IBP, & other parties challenge on certiorari. Provision on Constitutial Amendments in not self-executing. Requires activation by Congress. The implementing law RA No. 6735 intended to include Constitutional Amendments, however, it is inadequate to cover that system. It failed to provide a subtitle for Consti amendments, failed to provide contents of the petition, & failed to provide the detailed procedures but provided such for amendment of statutes and local legislation. COMELEC acted w/ grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to petition bec. it did not even contain the signatures. Certiorari GRANTED.

Constitutional Law Executive Branch of Government EXECUTIVE POWER PHILCONSA vs. ENRIQUEZ – “Guidelines in implementation case” Pres. imposed conditions & administrative guidelines upon the expenditure of funds for the COA, Ombudsman, SC, DPWH, & NHA in accordance w/ his program for Gov’t. The issuance of said guidelines is only an exercise of the President of his duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. The Pres. is authorized, as Chief Executive, to take necessary steps to carry the laws into execution.

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WEBB vs. DE LEON – “Vizconde Massacre case” Hubert Webb & 8 other persons charged w/ the crime of rape w/ homicide of Carmela Vizconde, her mother & sister. The principal witness was Jessica Alfaro. The DOJ issued the assailed Resolution finding probable cause. Information was filed against petitioners through DOJ Order No. 223; warrants of arrest issued by Judge Amelita Tolentino. Jessica Alfaro was not included in the information based on RA No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security, & Benefit Program) w/c mandates non-inclusion of state witness in the criminal complaint & grants immunity from prosecution. It grants the DOJ the power to determine who can qualify to said program & become immune from suit. Not an intrusion of the judicial prerogative to discharge an accused as a state witness. The power to prosecute crimes is vested in the Executive Branch in its power to implement & execute the laws. The power to execute the law includes the power to prosecute; hence RA No. 6981 w/ its affirmation of executive discretion is VALID. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS – “Marcos’ return to the Phils. case” After being deposed & exiled to Hawaii, Pres. Marcos, in his deathbed, signified his desire to return to the Phils & die in his country. Circumstances during the time include frequent coup d’ etats, economic problems, etc. Pres. Aquino deemed such return to be dangerous to the safety of the nation. Right to return to one’s country not expressly granted by the Bill of Rights but recognized in Int’l Law. Powers of the Pres. are not restricted to those expressly granted by the Consti such as appointing power, commander-inchief powers, pardoning power, treaty-making power, etc. but include such inherent & residual unstated powers necessary to the exercise of executive power & implicit to the paramount duty to protect the people. In this case, the residual power of the Pres. to serve & protect the general welfare of the people is exercised as mandated by the Constitution. LAUREL vs. GARCIA – “Roppongi Properties case” acquired through reparations from Japan after WW2 under the Reparations Agreement, listed under “Government Sector.” It was originally dedicated to embassy, but the latter was transferred and the Roppongi property became dormant. Pres. Aquino created committee to study the disposition of said estates; EO No. 296 authorized the sale of said estates to non-Filipino citizens/entities. Said property is of public domain – outside the commerce of man. It is dedicated for the public use & cannot be appropriated or alienated w/o a formal declaration from the gov’t to convert it to patrimonial property. EO No. 296 does not have force of law bec. Pres. Aquino has already lost her revolutionary powers by then. There must be a law authorizing its conveyance; the concurrence of Executive & Legislative is necessary. DJUMANTAN vs. DOMINGO – “Muslim wife case” Bernard Bañez was OCW to Indonesia, married to Marina Cabael. Married Djumantan in Indonesia & had 2 children. Brought them to Phils. pretended to be friends only & passed through immigration through such misrepresentation. Lived at Bañez’s house, discovered by Cabel who filed for concubinage but was dismissed. His son Leonardo filed complaint before the Ombudsman, detained at Commission on Immigration & Deportation – deportation proceedings ensued. The President’s power to deport is as absolute & unqualified as the power to prohibit entry into the country. Alien’s admission is a matter of pure permission, not as a matter of right. Likewise, an alien does not possess right to an indefinite stay. However, the deportation of Djumantan is barred by prescription (5 yrs +) accdg. to Immigration Act of 1940. CHAVEZ vs. PCGG – “Seriously Flawed Marcos Compromise case” PCGG enters into compromise agreement w/ the Marcos Family for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth w/c contained several serious constitutional infirmities as follows:

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It compromises BOTH civil & criminal liability. EO No. 14 allows the grant of immunity for witnesses only, but not for the principals of the crime. The Marcoses are principal defendants before the Sandiganbayan.

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It exempts from all forms of taxes the properties retained by the Marcos heirs. The power to tax & to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress.

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It binds the Gov’t to dismiss the cases before the Sandiganbayan. This is a clear encroachment upon the judiciary. Dismissal of the case is at the discretion of the court.

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The Gov’t waives any claims, whether past, present, or future, mature or inchoate, against the Marcoses. This violates the Civil Code – an action for future fraud cannot be waived. It is a license to perpetuate future fraud and crime w/ immunity.

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It does not provide for a period w/in w/c the Marcoses must satisfy their prestations & lays no standards as to what assets are to be retained by them and those forfeited to the Gov’t.

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It lacks the approval of the President FVR.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. DIRECTOR GEN. OF NEDA – “Unified ID System case” Pres. Arroyo, through EO No. 420 mandated the NEDA to facilitate the implementation of the Uniform ID Sys. for various Departments of the Gov’t under the Executive for cost-efficiency, convenience, etc. Does not usurp the power of the legislature. It is not the Nat’l ID System. There are 2 ways for admin. agencies to effect such ID system: 1. By memorandum of agreement bet. agencies, or 2. upon order of the President. Under the Consti, the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus, & offices. Such power of the Pres. is self-executing & is limited to Exec. Branch. There are several laws mandating Gov’t entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, improve services, etc. In issuing said EO, the Pres. is only performing the duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed; it is only an executive issuance, not an act of legislation. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE UNITED STATES vs. RICHARD NIXON – “Exec. Privilege vs. Criminal Justice case” Pres. Nixon was charged for conspiracy to defraud the United States & obstruction of justice. Pursuant thereto, the court issues sub poena duces tecum for the production of taped conversations bet. Nixon & other exec. officials. Nixon invokes the General Executive Privilege; protection of communications bet. high Gov’t officials & those who advise & assist them in the performance of their duties. Also invokes separation of powers. Both cannot sustain absolute, unqualified Presidential Immunity. He must allege it on the basis of military or diplomatic secrets. Generalized interest in confidentiality will not hold against the demands of due process & fair admin. of criminal justice. ALMONTE vs. VASQUEZ – “Econ. Intel. & Investigation Bureau privilege case” Ombudsman received anonymous letter, presumed to be from employee of EIIB alleging corruption w/in such as ghost employees, anomalous disbursement of public funds, etc. Ombudsman investigates & issues sub poena ducs tecum to Acctng. Division & Records Section of EIIB requiring production of documents relating to Personal Service Funds. Exec. privilege will not hold unless it is alleged that the privileged info partakes of the nature of military or diplomatic secrets or similar matters. No express statutory grant of privilege; only purchase of info & rewards are privileged under COA Circular No. 88-293. EIIB has duty to account for use of public funds. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR – “It’s my prerogative! case” Luis Beltran & other petitioners were charged w/ libel by Pres. Aquino. Beltran argues that the presidential immunity from suit imposes a correlative disability to file suit bec. she may have to be a witness for the prosecution & subjected to pain of perjury – hence circumventing the said principle. It may only be invoked by the President, not by anyone else in her behalf. Should she so desire, she may shed the immunity, but it is her prerogative to do so. Privilege works to protect the Pres. from being hampered in the performance of duties & functions by lawsuits & allows the Pres. to give governance her undivided attention. HARLOW vs. FITZGERALD – “Aides of Nixon case” Bryce Harlow & Alexander Butterfield are aides of Pres. Nixon who conspired to have Earnest Fitzgerald removed from his employment in the White House, allegedly violating his constitutional rights. Fitzgerald files suit for damages. Presidential aide does not enjoy the same degree of immunity. He must establish that his office performs such sensitive functions that would require immunity & that the act alleged was in the performance of said functions. Objective test: must have reasonable knowledge & respect for basic rights. Subjective test: must not demonstrate malicious intent. Both must be present. Case was remanded for further proceedings based on the standards laid down. CLINTON vs. JONES – “Another of Clinton’s sexual adventures case” Paula Corbin Jones was working w/ Arkansas Industrial Dev’t Comm. State Police Officer Danny Ferguson orders her to leave desk to visit then Gov. Bill Clinton in his hotel suite where the latter made “abhorrent” sexual advances upon

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her w/c she rejected. She was later treated in a hostile manner at work. Filed suit for damages. Federal Trial Court deferred trial until expiration of term of Clinton as President of the US. The President’s immunity from suit does not extend to acts committed outside of official duties. The rationale of the rule is to allow the Pres. to perform his DUTIES w/o being hampered. The protected action must be related to the immunity’s purpose. Unofficial acts do not fall w/in the privilege of immunity from suit. The Federal Court erred in deferring due course & must assume jurisdiction to try the case. Does not violate separation of powers. REMANDED. GLORIA vs. CA – “DECS reassignment case” DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria recommended to the Pres. the re-assignment of Bienvenido Icasiano from being Schools Div. Superintendent of QC to Superintendent of Marikina Inst. of Science & Technology (MIST) to fill up a temporary vacancy. Approved by FVR. Icasiano sues for violation of security of tenure due to indefinite duration of assignment. Presidential immunity from suit is not violated bec. it is directed against Sec. Gloria & not FVR. Even so, presidential decisions may be assailed in court if there is grave abuse of discretion. Clearly violated security of tenure. ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO – “The Impeachment Drama case” Impeachment of Pres. Estrada disintegrates. The EDSA Dos drama ensues, the mass resignation of his Cabinet follows & he leaves Malacañang. SC considers him to be resigned on the basis of the totality of his acts and the attending circumstances present during the volatile period. Pres. Arroyo sworn into office – SC holds that she is not just acting president but is actually incumbent president; the confirmation of Congress as a co-equal branch was given great weight. Pres. Estrada prosecuted by the Ombudsman based on the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 15 thereof provides that separation or cessation of a public official from office is not a bar to prosecution under this Act. The exact nature of Impeachment is debatable, but when impeachment proceedings become moot due to resignation of the Pres. the proper criminal (plunder, bribery, graft & corruption) & civil actions may proceed against him in ordinary courts. Conviction in Impeachment is not a requisite to criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman. Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State; hence they stand on the same footing as any other trespasser. They are not protected by Executive Immunity from suit. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT / VICE PRESIDENT ANSON-ROA vs. ARROYO – “Incumbent Arroyo runs for President case” Senatorial candidates Elisa Anson-Roa & Amina Rasul-Bernardo challenge her candidacy & allege use of public funds for campaign. Consti: The President shall not be eligible for RE-ELECTION. No person who has succeeded the Pres. & has served for more than 4 yrs shall be qualified for election to the same office anytime. Arroyo was not elected as President & has not served for more than 4 yrs. Does not have to resign & can run w/ all the concomitant powers & duties of the Presidency. COMELEC has jurisdiction. Alleged use of funds is question of fact, not of law. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROVERSIES DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. RAMOS – “I still want the Presidency case” as the election protest for the presidency was pending, Miriam files her Cert. of Candidacy for the Senate. It is tantamount to withdrawal/abandonment of her claim to the Presidency. It is a political contract w/ the electorate to serve her constituency for the term for w/c she was elected. Only 3 yrs left in the Presidency, 6 yrs to serve as Senator. The action becomes moot upon the expiration of the contested term. She also waived the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots – signifies intent to abandon her claim.

PROHIBITION AGAINST HOLDING OTHER OFFICE / EMPLOYMENT RAFAEL vs. EACIB – “appointments to the Embroidery Board case” RA No. 3137 created the Embroidery & Apparel Control & Inspection Board, Sec. 2 thereof defines membership: representatives from Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Dept. of Commerce & Industry, Nat’l Econ. Council as ex-officio members, & member from the private sector from Assoc. of Embroidery &

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Apparel Exporters of the Phils. The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the Pres. upon w/c no limitations may be imposed except by the Com. on Appointments. No new appointments were made, they were merely designated new duties as ex-officio members in addition to their original duties. Hence, it does not infringe upon the appointing power of the President. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXEC. SECRETARY – “stricter prohibition on appointments case” EO No. 284 promulgated by Pres. Aquino (revolutionary legislative powers) stating that “members of the Cabinet, under-secretary, asst. secretary, other appointive officials of the Exec. Branch may not hold more than 2 other positions in the Gov’t.” Consti: Art. 7 unless provided in the Consti, Pres, VP, Cabinet, deputies & assistants may not hold ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT during tenure. However, under Art. 9 states “Unless otherwise allowed BY LAW or the primary functions of his position xxx” Intent of the Consti was to impose stricter prohibition on the Pres, his official family, in so far as holding public position. Art. 9 applies to appointive officials in the Civil Service (Asst. Secretary & below) as a general rule, but as for Cabinet Members, Pres, & VP, they may only hold other office when the Constitution itself so provides. It does not include positions held in an ex-officio capacity & w/o additional compensation for services rendered in such ex-officio capacity – they are not other offices but merely other duties part of their principal office. EC No. 284 is declared NULL & VOID. OTHER PROHIBITIONS DOROMAL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN – “Indirect interest in family corp. case” Quintin Doromal, as Commissioner of the PCGG & at the same time, president / shareholder of the Doromal Int’l Trading Corp. enterd into the bidding process for supply of equipment for the DECS & Nat’l Manpower & Youth Council. Preventively suspended pending litigation by the Sandiganbayan (ordered lifed bec. it exceeded the 90 day duration under Civil Service Law). As an incorporator / director of family business, he was at least, INDIRECTLY INTERESTED in the transaction. Art. 7 Sec. 13 of the Consti: “The Pres, VP, members of the Cabinet, deputies or assistants xxx shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly xxx participate in business w/ or be interested in in any contract or franchise granted by the Gov’t. Remanded to Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS IN RE: VALENZUELA & VALLARTA – “midnight appointments case” Mateo Valenzuela appointed to the RTC of Bago City, while Placido Vallarta to RTC Cabanatuan City w/in the period of ban on appointments 2 months before elections accdg. to Art. 7 Sec. 15 of the Consti. Exception: appointments to vacant EXECUTIVE positions when the public safety so demands. Pres. also demanded the nominations of the JBC for the vacancy on the SC resulting from the retirement of Assoc. Justice Ricardo Francisco, but the Chief Justice (Chair of the JBC) refused on the basis of said prohibitory period. Note: Under Art. 8 Sec. 4 & 9, vacancies in the Judiciary must be filled w/in 90 days from occurrence upon recommendation of the JBC. Conflict is resolved as follows: General Rule: vacancies must be filled (Appointment of judicial officials falls here) Exception: the ban on appointments upon 2 months prior to date of election. Exception to the exception: appointment of EXECUTIVE officials when public safety requires The intent of the Consti is to prevent “midnight appointments” as well as influence of appointments upon elections. 2 months prior to election, the Pres is deprived of appointing power subject to the only exception. Hence the appointments of Valenzuela & Vallarda are NULL & VOID. NATURE OF APPOINTING POWER GOV’T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS vs. SPRINGER – “appointment for GOCC’s case” The Nat’l Coal Co. became Gov’t-owned (more than 99% of shares of stock); it was created under Act. NO. 2705 as amended by Act No. 2822 w/c created a Voting Committee composed of Senate Pres, Speaker of the HR, & the Gov. Gen. w/c proceeded to vote in favor of 5 persons as directors of said company in absence of the Gov. Gen. who challenges constitutionality of voting committee. Organic Acts vest supreme executive power on the Gov. Gen. & appointment is an executive function.

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Legislature has power to create the office, define it powers, & annex compensation but has nothing to do w/ the man to fill the office. Such vestige of power in Voting Committee is a violation of separation of powers. Administration of GOCC’s is not germane to legislative function. BERMUDEZ vs. TORRES – “Recommendation of DOJ case” Vacancy for the office of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac emerged. Oscar Bermudez was recommended by DOJ Sec. Teofisto Guingona, while Conrado Quiaoit was recommended by Rep. Jose Yap of 2nd Leg. Dist. of Tarlac. Quiaoit prevailed; Bermudez challenges citing Revised Admin. Code of 1987 w/c provides that “Provincial & city prosecutors & their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres upon recommendation of the Secretary. Lack of recommendation is not fatal to the appointment & is merely persuasive & discretionary but NOT mandatory. Appointment entails DISCRETION on the part of the appointing power. Personality of the Sec. of Justice is merely extension to that of the President. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS SARMIENTO III vs. MISON – “1st Sentence case” Appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague as Sec. of the Dept. of Budget assailed on the basis of lack of approval of the Commission on Appointments. Consti provides as follows: 1st Sentence: The Pres shall nominate & with the consent of the Com. on Appointments, appoint heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution. 2nd Sentence: He shall appoint all other offices of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, & those he may be authorized by law to appoint. 3rd Sentence: Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other lower officers in the Pres alone, in the courts, heads of depts., agencies, commissions, or boards. Only those in the 1st Sentence require consent of the Commission on Appointments. Word “alone” in 3rd Sentence is a mere lapsus in draftsmanship. Intent of the Const is to strike a middle ground bet. the 1935 (very restrictive) and 1973 (very permissive) Constitutions. Appointment of Mison & Carague fall under 2nd Sentence, hence no approval is necessary from Com. on Appointments. BAUTISTA vs. SALONGA – “CHR 1st Sentence case” Mary Concepcion Bautista appointed to the CHR w/o approval of Com. on Appointments (COA). COA summons her to present credentials for review, but refuses to submit to its jurisdiction. Pres. Aquino appoints Hesiquito R. Malilin as ad interim Chair of CHR pending MaryCon’s dispute w/ COA. Position of Chair of CHR falls under 2nd Sentence (xxx those he [Pres] may be authorized by law to appoint xxx), just as in Sarmiento vs. Mison, hence, no approval of the COA is necessary. CHR is a constitutionally created body, w/c the Pres appoints the Chair w/o express condition of prior COA approval. Bautista cannot be removed from office w/o just cause & is affirmed as the true appointed Chairman of CHR. DE LA CRUZ vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT – “compensation of alternates case” Pursuant to CLU vs. Exec. Secretary, COA issues Memo No. 97-038 ordering Gov’t officials who, in violation of rule on multiple positions, to effect refund of remunerations & ordering the disallowance of add’l compensation. NHA orders Notice of Disallowance covering the ex officio members of the NHA Board of Directors who are mere representatives of ex officio members mandated by PD No. 757 creating the NHA. Such offcials are Sec. of Public Works, Transpo & Communications, Dir. Gen. of NEDA, Sec. of Finance, Labor, Industry, Exec. Secretary, & GM of NHA. Prohibiton in Sec. 13 of Art. 7 of Consti does not include positions held W/O COMPENSATION & in an ex officio capacity. Since the Exec. Dept. Secreatries functioning in an ex officio capacity are not entitled to compensation, so are their alternates not entitled thereto. Their positions are merely derivative. QUINTOS-DELES vs. COMMISSION ON CONSTI. COMMISSIONS – “Sectoral reps. confirmation case” The following. are apoointed by Pres. Aquino as Sectoral Reps. for the HR during recess: Teresita Quintos-Deles (Women), Al Ignatius Lopez (Youth), Bartolome Arteche (Peasant), & Rey Magno Teves (Urban Poor). Pres. submitted their appointement to the Commission on Appointments for

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confirmation, but they refused to submit themselves to its jurisdiction. Oath taking was suspended by Speaker Mitra. Appointment of Sectoral Reps is vested in the Pres. by virtue of the Consti & falls under 1st Sentence w/c requires COA approval. Sarmiento vs. Mison doctrine was reiterated. Moot due to COA approval. POBRE vs. MENDIETA – “PRC Chairman appointment case” PRC Chairmanship becomes vacant upon expiration of term of Julio Francia. Assoc. Commissioner Hermogenes Pobre appointed by Pres. Senior Assoc. Commissioner Mariano Mendieta challenges such appointment – argues succession by operation of law citing PD No. 223 & also argues for required COA approval. It falls under 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 (He shall appoint all other offices of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, & those he may be authorized by law to appoint) w/c requires no prior approval of the COA. The argument of succession by operation of law is untenable as the Pres. could not have enacted said PD to curtail his own powers of appointment. History of the PRC reflects that filling up of such vacancies upon expiration of term are filled up by appointment. FLORES vs. DRILON – “Olongapo Mayor as SBMA Chair case” RA No. 7227 (Bases Conversion & Dev’t Act) w/c provides that for the 1st year of effectivity, the Pres. shall appoint the Mayor of Olongapo (Gordon) as Chairman & CEO of SBMA. Art 9-B Sec. 7 of Consti: No ELECTIVE official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Only appointive officials may be authorized to hold other offices in an exofficio capacity when allowed by law or the primary functions of his office. Congress stipulated APPOINTMENT, not ex officio capacity – hence it violates the Consti. It falls w/in the 2 nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 (those whom the President may be authorized to appoint by law) however, the power of whom to appoint is the prerogative of the appointing power – Congress deprived the Pres. of discretion bec. only 1 person qualifies for said office. He must 1st resign his post before he can be appointed to other office. Public policy: his previous acts as SBMA Chair are not necessarily null & void as he acted as a de facto officer whose acts redounded to the benefit of community. APPOINTMENT OF LOWER RANKING OFFICERS CALDERON vs. CARALE – “COA approval of NLRC appointments case” RA No. 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) amended Labor Code & provides that the Pres. shall appoint the Chairman & other Commissioners of the NLRC SUBJ. TO CONFIRMATION BY COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Labor Sec. Drilon issues Admin Order No. 161 s. 1989 pursuant thereto designating assignments. Said law is unconstitutional bec. it expands the powers of the COA. It falls w/in the 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 – such other officers that he (Pres.) may be authorized by law to appoint. Only those in the 1st Sentence (Heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution) exclusively require COA approval. It attempts to amend by legislation the Constitution, hence said provision is NULL & VOID. U-SING BUTTON & BUCKLE INDUSTRY vs. NLRC – “another NLRC appointment case” Fortunato Naya worked as maintenance man for U-Sing, who stopped working & died of illness. His wife Cecilia Naya sues for separation pay & incentive leave & alleges underpayment. U-Sing alleges indebtedness of Naya as well as contributions for sickness & death. NLRC dismisses underpayment but grants separation pay. U-Sing challenges jurisdiction of NLRC alleging that the appointment of Commissioners was not approved by the Commission on Appointments. Appointment of NLRC Commissioners falls under 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 of the Consti (those whom the President may be authorized to appoint by law) w/c does not require approval by the COA. Hence, their acts are valid. Estoppel applies for they already subitted to jurisdiction of NLRC. Termination pay due to illness granted by the SC. TARROSA vs. SINGSON – “Banko Sentral appointment case” Gabriel Singson was appointed as Gov. of the Banko Sentral by FVR w/o confirmation by the COA as required by RA No. 7653. As Jesus Tarrosa does not claim entitlement to the said office, he has no locus standi. Congree cannot, by law, expand the confirmation powers of the COA as provided in Art. 7 Sec. 16 of the Consti. Only those in the 1st Sentence (Heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution) require COA approval.

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MANALO vs. SISTOZA – “PNP appointments case” RA No. 6975 was enacted creating the DILG w/c provides that the Pres. shall appoint the PNP Chief from among the senior officers down to the rank of chief superintendent, as well as Senior Superintendent & Deputy Director Gen. subject to approval by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Exec. Sec. Drilon promoted 15 police officersto the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director in a permanent capacity but w/o approval of the COA. Only appointees falling w/in the 1st Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 require approval of the COA, hence said provisions extending the scope of appointing power of the COA are VOID. The PNP cannot fall under the classification of Armed Forces under the 1st Sentence bec. the PNP is an entity entirely separate & distinct from the AFP. Hence it falls under the 2nd Sentence & does not require COA approval. Under RA No. 6975, no element of the police force shall be military, nor shall any position thereof be occupied by members of the AFP. SORIANO III vs. LISTA – “Phil. Coast Guard appointments case” PGMA appoints 8 persons to diff. positions in the Coast Guard w/o approval of the Commission on Appointments. History of PCG: under PD No. 601, PCG was placed under DND, by EO No. 292, palced under Phil. Navy, by EO No. 475 placed under DND, then later to the DOTC. It is no longer part of the Armed Forces – hence no longer subj. to the 1st Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 of the Consti (xxx officers of the armed forces w/ rank of colonel or naval captain xxx) w/c requires approval by the COA. It refers to military officers alone – the PCG is now under the Office of the President. Petitioner likewise has no standing to sue. BITONIO Jr. vs. COA – “DOLE ex-officio representatives case” Ernesto Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Realtions of the DOLE. Pursuant to RA No. 7916 (Spec. Econ. Zone Act) he was designated as DOLE Rep. to the PEZA Board of Directors & received a per diem for every board meeting. Pursuant to CLU vs. Exec. Secretary, the COA issued Notice of Disallowance pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 509 urging the COA to do so. His appearance in PEZA Board Meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as rep. of the DOLE & since the Sec. of Labor is not entitled to compensation therefrom, he is likewise disallowed. He cannot be allowed to have an even better right than his principal. NAT’L AMNESTY COMMISSION vs. COA – “NAC ex-officio representatives case” FVR, through Proc. No. 347 created the NAC to process & revew amnesty applications. It is composed of a Chair & 3 appointed members by the Pres. and reps. from the DOJ, DND, & DILG as ex-officio members. The ex-officio members appointed representatives who were paid honoraria. NAC issued Admin. Order No. 2 allowing said reps. to receive per diems, allowances, & other benefits, but the COA issued Memo No. 97-038 disallowing such grants. Ex-officio office is not another office but only that w/c the member holds by virtue of his title – hence no additional compensation is allowed. The same likewise applies to mere reps. of the said ex-officio members. There is no law authorizing add’l. compensation or creating a new office. It is also violative of the Salary Standardization Law. PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA – “Acting Secretaries case” PGMA appointed acting-secretaries: Arthur Yap (DA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DECS), Avelino Cruz (DND), Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (Tourism), Mike Defensor (DENR) w/o approval by the Cmmission on Appointments. It is error to claim standing as members of Congress bec. the COA is independent of Congress. The Pres. cannot be compelled to appoint the Under Sec. automatically as her alter ego in case of vacancy. As distinguished from ad interim appointments w/c would be subj. to COA approval, acting appointments made while Congress is in session do not require COA approval. That power is granted by EO No. 292. POWER OF CONTROL LACSON-MAGALLANES CO. vs. PAÑO – “Exec. Secretrary = Pres. decision” Jose Magallanes was actual occupant of pastural land & ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co. w/c was released from froest zone & declared agri. land. Jose Paño & 19 others filed their own sales applications as actual occupants & farmers but the Director of Lands & Sec. of Agriculture & Natural Resources ruled in favor of the Corp. Paño appealed to the Pres. & the Exec. Secretary reversed the decision in their favor w/o Corp’s right to reimbursement. The Pres. has the power to control & thus to go over, confirm, modify, or reverse the decisions of dept. secretaries. The Executive Secretary acts by authority of th Pres – hence his decisions are the decisions of the President.

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ANG-ANGCO vs. CASTILLO – “removal of classified service official case” Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco, pursuant to verbal order of Finance Sec. Hernandez, while still doubtful of its propriety, ordered the release of concentrates from the custom house as per request of Pepsi Cola Co. The Central Bank failed to act upon such request although the Import-Export Board expressed its approval. He was suspended by Customs Commissioner Manuel Manahan for grave neglect of duty as well as conduct prejudicial to the customs service. Appealed to Pres. Magsaysay & upon the latter’s death, to Pres. Carlos P. Garcia, but was deemed resigned by Exec. Sec. Natalio Castillo. The power of control of the Pres. does not include the power to just remove officers w/o complying w/ Civil Service Law. Since Ang-Angco belongs to the classified service, he must be removed only in accordance w/ civil service law and for just cause w/ due process. VILLALUZ vs. ZALDIVAR – “removal of unclassified service official case” Ruben Villaluz was Adminstrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, charged w/ malpractice resulting to losses, failure to effect adequate controls, & negligence in the performance of his duties. Investigating committee was created, & by virtue of Admin. Order No. 332, he was removed from office. He does not belong to the classified service & was appointed by the Pres. hence the CSC has no jurisdiction to hear & decide his case. The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. No procedural infirmities were present in his investigation and disciplinary action. The admin. complaint filed against him was at the instance of the Chief Executive as his administrative head. NAMARCO vs. ARCA – “control over GOCC’s case” Juan Arive was Manager of Traffic Storage Dept. of the NAMARCO, investigated & found guilty (by Investigating Committee, GM, & Board of Directors) for causing the improper release of shipments intended for the Fed. United NAMARCO Distributors against Management Order directing such deliveries to be stopped unless upon full payment. He appealed to the Pres. who, through the Exec. Secretary, set aside the said resolutions dismissing him from office & ordering him to be reinstated. Arive acted properly in ordering the release of said shipments as the said Mgt. Order was illegal for being violative of the contract of sale as well as the Pasig River Bodegas containing such articles were beyond his supervision much less control. GOCC’s partake of the nature of Gov’t bureaus or offices w/c are administratively supervised by & are responsible to the President. The Pres. through power of control, has the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside the actions & decisions of subordinate officers & substitute his judgement for the latter. DRILON vs. LIM – “Manila Revenue Code case” DOJ Sec. Drilon declared null & void the Manila Revenue Code for failure to comply w/ procedural requirements accdg. to the LGC – Sec. 187 thereof provides that questions of constitutionality or legality of any tax ordinance may be appealed to the DOJ. The RTC reversed the DOJ ruling & declared such Section unconstitutional. Distinction: The power of control is the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside the actions & decisions of subordinate officers & substitute his judgement; the power of supervision merely allows the superior officer to see to it that subordinates act in accordance with the law. Sec. Drilon did not attempt to substitute his decision or rule upon the wisdom of the tax ordinance; he simply found that it was illegal – hence, he exercised the power to supervise only. The SC however, found that the procedural requirements have indeed been met such as through publication in newspapers of gen. circulation, hence, the decision of DOJ is reversed – but Sec. 187 of the LGC is constitutional. PASEI vs. TORRES – “LOI vs. EO case” Pres. Marcos, during the time when he was vested w/ legislative power, enacted LOI No. 1190, withholding the grant of new licenses to operate overseas employment agencies except as he may otherwise direct. Pres. Aquino, during the time when she has already lost her legislative powers, enacted EO No. 450, repealing the said LOI & lifting the said ban pursuant to the Labor Code, Sec. 25 thereof encourages private sector involvement. The Labor Sec. enacted Dept. Order No. 9 implementing the same. The said LOI was directed to the Labor Sec. & merely imposes a presidential review in the grant of licenses – it is hence, merely an administrative action, not a law & may be effectively repealed by EO No. 450 in the exercise of the President’s power of control w/o the necessity of legislative action or delegation of power. DE LEON vs. CARPIO – “DOJ over NBI case” Agent III Francisco Estavillo & Head Agent Cesar de Leon of the NBI were terminated by Justice Sec. Neptali Gonzales. They sought relief from & were sustained by the CSC w/c ordered their reinstatement. DOJ Sec. Sedfrey Ordoñez likewise ordered them reinstated – but NBI Chief Antonio Carpio refused. When Justice Sec. Ordoñez directed them to be reinstated, he functioned as an alter ego of the President – hence, it is as if they are the oders of the President herself in the exercise of control power. As a subordinate, the NBI Director is obliged to obey the directives of his superior.

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JOSON vs. TORRES – “Invasion of the Sanggunian case” Gov. Eduardo Joson of Nueva Ecija was suspended for barging into the Sanggunian Hall w/ his private army, kicking the chairs & the door & uttering belligerent remarks at the members apparently to coerce or threaten them to approve of his proposed loan of P 150 million from the PNB. Fortunately, there was lack of quorum. Said members complained to the Office of the Pres. DILG Sec. Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija to effect a compromise but the complaint & trial nevertheless proceeded. Exec. Secretary Ruben Torres declared Joson preventively suspended. Under Admin. Order No. 23, the disciplining authority lies w/ the President through the Exec. Secretary, while the investigating authority lies w/ the DILG. The power to discipline is inherent in the power of general supervision over the local gov’t units to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. It necessariy includes the power to investigate, both of w/c may be delegated to the Cabinet as alter egos. The fact that it was the DILG that ordered Joson to file his answer (it must have been the Office of the Pres.) is not fatal to the case. The fact that the Pres. found the complaint to be sufficient in form & substance to warrant suspension & due course to the case deserves respect – as exercise of control power & discretion. His right to a formal investigation, however, was denied, hence the case is remanded. HUTCHINSON PORTS vs. SBMA – “Pres. overturns grant of bid” Hutchinson Ports Phils. Ltd. (HPPL) was the winning bidder among 3 qualified bidders (the others were ICTSI & RPSI) for the opportunity to develop & operate a modern marine terminal w/in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. ICTSI was disqualified due to conflict of interest, for already operating the Manila Int’l Conainer Port; w/c then appealed to the Office of the Pres. Upon recommendation of Pres. Legal Council Rene Cayetano, FVR through the Exec. Secretary orders a re-evaluation of bids; HPPL contends & sues for specific performance. The SBMA (being a chartered organization) & its Board of Directors are always subj. to the direct control & supervision of the Pres. As per LOI No. 620, approval of the Pres. is required for all contracts of the Nat’l Gov’t including its agencies & instrumentalities as well as the GOCC’s. The Pres. has the power to overturn any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors as a valid exercise of his prerogative & control power. CRUZ vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT – “Indigenous People’s Rights Act” Said Act contained provisions for the grant of certain rights to such peoples over ancestral lands & domains among other rights & likewise creates the Nat’l Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NICP) w/c although under the Office of the President, exercises other functions independent from the absolute control thereof. It has been designated as the primary agency responsible for the formulation & implementation of policies, plans & programs for the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples. It is an independent agency, not a subordinate agency. It is not subj. to administrative review or revision. It was imbued w/ quasi-legislative & quasi-judicial powers appealable to the Court of Appeals not to the Office of the President, much like the NLRC or the SEC. There are still ways by w/c the President may exercise control over the NICP such as the requirement for his approval for contracting loans for financing its projects, negotioation & acceptance of funds, submission of annual reports and rendering of advice when sought, and that it may exercise such other powers as the Pres. may designate. Voting was deadlocked 7-7, hence, petition was dismissed. PHIL. RETIREMENT AUTHORITY vs. BUNAG – “DMB supervises PRA” Jesusito Bunag (former deputy GM) & Erlinda Lozada (Incument Dept. Mgr.) received benefits such as Cost of Living Allowance, amelioration allowance, additional COLA, rice subsidy, meal subsidy, children allowance, representation & transpo allowance in addition to regular salary from the PRA (a GOCC). Found by Exec. Secretary to be unauthorized allowances & were ordered cancelled. Bunag & Lozada appealed to the DBM w/c upheld the decision of the Exec. Sec. w/c was then reversed upon further appeal to the Office of the Pres. w/c ordered the award of such allowances & benefits. It is the function of the DBM to supervise & ensure that proposed compensation is consistent w/ the law. Even if the PRA Charter grants certain exemptions from the Office of Compensation & Position Classification (under DBM) the PRA is still subject to the review of the DBM. Since the said compensation was found to be unauthorized, they cannot be cured by the transitory provisions of the Salary Standardization Act – w/c upolds compensation in excess of incumbents. DOMINGO vs. ZAMORA – “DECS / PSC case” Pres. Estrada issued EO No. 81 transferring the sports dev’t programs from the DECS to the PSC. The DECS, pursuant thereto, issued Memo Nos. 01592 & 01594 re-assigining all Bureau of Physical Educ & School Sports (BPESS) to other divisions & bureaus of the DECS. The DECS is indisputably a part of the Exec. Branch even if it is not part of the

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Office of the Pres. EO No. 292 (The Administratie Code of 1987) authorizes the Pres. to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President – hence it is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Note: The Pres. may re-organize the Office of the Pres. PROPER by abolishing, consolidating, merging, & transferring functions from 1 unit to another; while to Offices OUTSIDE the Office of the Pres. Proper, the power is limited to transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to the Departments and vice versa. Rendered moot by the enactment of RA 9155 officially transferring such functions. DENR vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES – “Transfer of DENR office” DENR Region 12 Exec. Dir. Israel Gaddi issued the assailed Memo directing the immediate transfer of the DENR Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, to w/c the said employes object. Doctrine of qualified political agency applies – the power of the Pres. to re-organize the Nat’l Gov’t may be validly delegated to Cabinet members exercising control over their respective departments. RA No. 6734 likewise expressly allows the said re-organization as cited in Chongbian vs. Orbos w/c stresses the power to determine the regional centers to ensure the efficiency & effectiveness of service. ROMUALDEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN – “Derivative immunity case” Alberto Romualdez, brother-in-law of Ferdinand Marcos, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act for havig been directly/indirectly interested in the sale of Nat’l Steel & Shipyard Corp. (NASCO), a GOCC, to the Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. (BASECO) ownerd by Marcos. Romualdez invokes derivative immunity from suit as he was “naval aide-de-camp” of former Pres. Marcos. Said constitutional amendement took effect on 1981, while his act was done 1975, hence he is not covered by the said immunity. Exec. immunity applies only during the incumbency of the Pres. & cannot shield a non-sitting Pres. from prosecution for acts done while in office. Hence, petitioner derives his immunity from one no longer sitting in office. Note: The felonious acts of officials are not acts of the State – hence they stand on equal footing w/ any other trespasser. CHAVEZ vs. ROMULO – “License to Carry Firearms” PGMA verbally directed PNP Chief Edbane to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), who responded by implementing the same & revoking previously issued licences to carry subj. to re-issuance. History: Congress delegated the power to regulate, approve, & revoke license to firearm possession to the Gov. Gen. who then delegated the same to the Chief of the Constabulary. PD No. 1866, enacted by Pres. Marcos through his legislative powers govern the possession of firearms; & by virtue of RA No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Constabulary – both laws authorize the PNP Chief to issue said guidelines. The Pres. is the head of the entire Exec. Branch, & her verbal order to Edbane was just an expresson of her policy to be carried out by her subordinate. It was not law enacted through mere speech. Whatever policy she determines, it is up to her subordinates to implement them. The privilege to carry firearms is neither a constitutional right nor a vested property right, w/c thus may be revoked by executive action in the exercise of the police power of the State.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Judicial Branch of Government JUDICIAL POWER MARBURY vs. MADISON – A commission for William Marbury as justice of the peace for the County of Washington was signed by Pres. John Adams, but it was never delivered to him. The signature of the Pres. is the last act necessary to complete the appointment & it is but ministerial on the part of the Sec. of State to affix the seal & deliver the same to the appointee. The rights vested thereupon are protected by law; and where a right is violated, so should there be a remedy – in this case mandamus. Where an exec. official is directed by law to perform a certain act, as opposed to a mere discretionary action, and he reuses or fails to perform such, mandamus can issue to compel the performance thereof. Although the Act vesting the SC power to issue mandamus can be considered to extend the powers granted by the Consti, it is emphatically the province of the Judiciary to determine what the law is & to determine whether to rule upon a case conformably to the law, or to the Constitution.

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SANTIAGO Jr. vs. BAUTISTA – “third honor only” Teodoro Santiago Jr. was ranked 3rd Honor by the School Committee on the Rating of Students for Honors. Represented by his parents, he sues & seeks the invalidation of the said rankings caliming bias among other grounds. Judcial Function is the practice of determining what the law is & the rights of the parties w/ respect to a matter subj. of controversy. It does not include hearing & determining a matter not in the form of a suit or action. The school board did not exercise judicial functions & it is a rule that such rulings upon contests and other merits are final & unappelable & no rights vest until after a winner has been proclaimed by the body. It is comparable to finality of referee’s verdict. MANILA ELEC. CO. vs. PASAY TRANSPORT CO. – “SC as arbiter” Petitioner invokes the power granted by Act No. 1446 empowering the SC to act as arbitrator to subsequent franchses and rights of way to be granted under the franchise awarded to Charles M. Swift or the operation of an electric railway. The SC can exercise judicial powers only & will abstain from exercising powers that partake of a non-judicial nature – such as the power to facilitate arbitration. NOBLEJAS vs. TEEHANKEE – “SC power to discipline only w/in Judiciary” Antonio Noblejas was appointed as Commissioner of Land Registration & was investigated & suspended by Justice Sec. Claudio Teehankee for approving subdivision plans in exces of te original titles. He invokes RA No. 1151 w/c grants his position the same compensation, emoluments & privileges as a judge of the CFI to justify his theory that only the SC may discipline, uspend, or remove him from office. Such interpretation would violate separation of powers & make many other Presidential appointees accountable only to the SC – such as the Sol. Gen. The SC will engage only is judicial functions & will not assume any other duty not pertaining to the administration of justice. RADIOWEALTH vs. AGREGADO – “purchase of radio equipment” the clerk of court certified the purchase of certain radio apparatus for the use of the SC but such was disapproved by the Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee as being purchased not inaccordance w/ EO No. 302. The SC is independent of the Exec. Branch & Legislative Branch not only regarding the adjudication of cases but also w/ regard to all matters necessary for the administration of justice. The SC is not contemplated under the Revised Admin. Code as well in so far as procedural requirements are concerned. IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA – “we will bring the case to the other forum” Eva Maravilla & her counsel Atty. Laureta sent letters to the SC alleging falsities & hurling several poignant insults for having dismissed her case though a minute resolution. The petitioners likewise fied cases before the Tanodbayan & went to the media to air their allegations against the court. The SC possesses the power to preserve its integrity as well as that of the legal profession; hence Laureta is found guilty of grave misconduct & is suspended from the practice of law, while Maravilla is held in contempt & is fined accordingly.

IN RE: BORROMEO – “fake lawyer” Joaquin Borromeo is not a lawyer but has gained some legal knowledge & practiced law for 16 years, representing clients and performing other acts tantamount to the practice of law. He went about preaching about perceived errors of law & of the courts & filed cases left & right against creditors, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, & circulated flyers & other effects containing derogatory statements against the Supreme Court & insisted upon his own interpretations of the laws. He likewise entered into loans with banks but failed to comply with his obliations & resorted to lawsuits to get his way around. The SC possesses the power to cite a person in contempt; and such is necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the admin. of justice. It may be instituted even w/o the intervention of the prosecutor. The said statements cannot likewise fall w/in the ambit of free expression because they are malicious utterances & are intended to degrade & insult the authority of the Judiciary. Borromeo is cited for contempt of court. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS vs. ANG CHO KIO – “he shouldn’t have come back” Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses committed in the Phils. but was pardoned upon the condition that he is to leave the country never to return again. He left for Taipei but returned almost 6 years later on a stop-over; he was convinced by his friends to stay longer. He was identified by the Immigrations investgator, and recommitted to prison under the Revised Admin. Code. He files for habeas corpus but was denied by the trial court. The CA likewise denied it but the decision contained a recommendation that the executive facilitate his departure instead. The only task of the CA was to determine the legality of the petitioner’s imprisonment. Only recommendations expressly

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allowed by law (Art. 5 RPC) may be allowed. Others would constitute interference w/ the prerogatives of the Exec. Branch. Only relevant opinions must be contained in the decision. ECHEGARAY vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE – “suspension of execution” Leo Echegaray was convicted for the rape of his own daughter & was sentenced to death. The SC, however, suspended the execution of his sentence based on the circumstance that there is a pending move in Congress to repeal the death penalty, w/c the majority of the court believe to be unconstitutioal. The SC held that the courts possess the power to control the enforcement of their decisions even upon finality and that the the convict is still possessed of collateral rights. Such suspension is an exercise of judicial power. PCGG vs. DESIERTO – “Bataan Nuclear Power Plant commissions” Ombudsman Aniano Desierto dismissed the criminal case against Herminio Disini regarding his alleged interest in the award of the Bataan Power Plant construction to the various constructing & consultancy companies for alleged lack of a prima facie case agaist him. The Ombudsman is granted wide latitude regarding prosecutory prerogatives in ites exercise to pass upon criminal complaints. However, it may be subj. to the review of the SC if it is found that there is grave abuse of discretion. In this case it is apparent that there exists ample & sufficient evidence against Disini such as the Affidavits & Telexes indicating his agreements & compromises with the contractors, such that suffices to constitute probable cause - & the dismissal of his complaint is tainted w/ grave abuse of discretion. DOMINGO vs. SCHEER – “detained & deported w/o cause” Herbert Scheer is a German who was granted permanent resident status. The German Embassy sent a nota verbale stating that Scheer is wanted in Germany & that a warrant for his arrest was already issued. The Board of Commissioners cancelled his visa & ordered him deported & put into the Bureau Blacklist. He was, however acquitted of his charges of physical injuries & his passport was subsequently re-issued to him. The new commissioner however, inquired & had him arrested anyway, detained, & deported. Even thought the power to deport is vested in the Exec. Branch, the SC may still inquire if it was exercised w/ grave abuse of discretion. Scheer was not even afforded due process such that his deportation was summary & he was not afforded the chance to be heard & to rebut the allegations against him. JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY ANGARA vs. ELECTORAL COMMISSION – “National Assembly vs Elec. Commission” The National Assembly enacted a Resolution confirming the election of Jose Angara. On the other hand the Electoral Commission fixed the deadline for the filing of election contests giving rise to conlflict as to whether or not the Elec. Commission has the exclusive power to implement rules for arrying out its mandate to settle election contests. The judiciary possesses the duty to delineate the constitutional boundaries bet. two constitutionally created bodies & held in favor of the Electoral Commission bec. to rule otherwise would undermine its authority to be sole judge of elec. contests. UNITED STATES vs. NIXON – “Watergate case” US Pres. Richard Nixon was charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States & obstruction of justice. Actual controversy arises when at issue is the production or non-production of evidence deemed by the prosecution to be relevant to the particular case as opposed to the resistance of the Chief Executive. A constitutional question arises wit regard to the admissibility of evidence as opposed to executive privilege invoked by the President; and it is upon the SC to exercise its duty to resolve the matter in accordance with the law & the Constitution. The SC held against Nixon for failure to justify his invocation of executive privilege. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS – “Marcos’ banned homecoming” Pres. Aquino, exercising executive residual powers, bars the re-entry of the Marcoses in the country. Question arises as to whether or not it is withinthe powers of the president to bar the entry of the Marcoses & whether or not it was an exercise of grave abuse of discretion. Given the expanded jurisdiction of the SC, it no longer cowers behind the political question doctrine save for certain undeniable situations such as recognition of states or the grant of pardons. The SC, in the face of the present controversy, has the duty of ascertaining whether or not the Executive goes beyond the power vested by the Consti. There exists a conflict bet. the rights asserted by the Mrcoses as opposed to the exercise of executive power by the President for the preservation of national interest & security.

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DAZA vs. SINGSON – “party re-alignment affecting Com. on Appointments” Raul Daza was a representative of the Liberal Party to the Commission on Appointments. As a result of the reduction of the membership of their party to ony 17 members, he lost his seat in the said Commission to Luis Singson of the LDP. There is a justiciable controversy bec. what is involved is the legality of the act of removing Daza from the Com. on Appointments. Question arises as to whether the HR acted w/ grave abuse of discretion in causing the rmoval of Daza therefrom & falls w/in the amit of the SC’s expanded jurisdiction. The transcendental importance of the case is likewise considered. GARCIA vs. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS “Bataan Petro-Chem Plant” The DTI Board of Investments allows for the ttransfer of the Bataan Petro Chem. Plant to Batangas & the use of LPG as fuel or power source therefor w/c would be prejudicial to the economic interests of the country. The SC stepped in and ruled that the BOI committed grave abuse of dircretion in allowing the transfer. No cogent avantage to the Gov’t can be deduced & it is contrary to the principle of promoting a relfreliant & independent economy. There is strong dissent in this case. DJUMANTAN vs. DOMINGO – “Muslim wife” Djumantan entered the Phils as a mere friend of Bernard Bañez but was actually married to him. His original wife finds out and his son instituted deportation proceedings. Although deportation power is lodged in the Executive, the Judiciary may take cognizance thereof if it is said to be violative of certain laws regulating such exercise. In this case, there is a law that provides for a precriptive period of 5 years for initiating said proceedings – the lapse thereof entitles Djumantan not to be deported anymore. MARIANO vs. COMELEC – “Makati City Law” RA No. 7854 converted the Mun. of Makati into a highly urbanized city. It was assailed by the petitioners on the ground that it will have the city acquire a new corporate existence & thus disregards the terms preivoulsly served by the elective officials. He thus alleges that Mayor Binay might run and be re-elected in excess of the allowable consecutive terms among others. These are merely hypothetical & speculative issues w/c have not yet ripened into an actual case or controversy. PHIL. PRESS INSTITUTE vs. COMELEC – “free ad space” COMELEC enacts a Resolution requiring publishers to provide for free ad-space. Upon disapproval of petitioners, the said Res. was amended to make it voluntary, hence the issue has become moot. There is, however, Sec. 8 thereof w/c prohibits reference to any candidate that may either favor or disfavor the same. Given the doubtful legality or utility of the said provision, it cannot be ruled upon in the absence of an actual case or controversy. Hence, it is not ripe for adjudication. SBMA vs. COMELEC – “Special Econ. Zone” Residents of the Morong Town of Olongapo oppose to withdraw the town’s consent to its cession into the Spec. Econ. Zone. Under the LGC, local initiative shall cover only subj.s w/in the power of the Sanggunian to enact – w/c does not include undoing its inclusion therein as well as the incorporation of conditionalities proposed. However, since the resolution is still a proposal & has yet to be approved into law, prohibition still cannot lie. It is not ripe for adjudication in the absence of an actual case or controversy. It is still premised on hypothetical questions, hence it cannot yet be adjudicated. TAÑADA vs. ANGARA – “GATT-WTO” The Phils. entered into the WTO w/c was concurred with by the Senate for the purpose of promoting globalization. It was assailed on the basis of the state principles & policies w/c the court held to be non-self executing, as well as on the basis of an undue limitation upon the national sovereignty. Still, where acts of the Senate are assailed on the ground that it contravenes the Consti, no doubt an justiciable case or controvery arises & it is the duty of the courts to settle the dispute. However, the court cannot look into the wisdom of the acts but merely to its legality to safeguard that they do not contravene the Constitution. There is, of course, still a strong presumption of constitutionality as a law is the enactment of a co-equal branch of government. The courts must be careful but vigilant in the exercise of judicial review. ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA – “parliamentary procedures” The Sin Taxes Law report of the Bicameral Conf. Committee was passed w/o voting upon the yeas & nays & allegedly in violation of the House Rules. The SC cannot encroach upon the Congress to look into its internal proceedings for as long as no apparent consitutioal violations are committed. It is pursuant to the respect due to a co-equal branch of government. The HR can enact, follow, or forego compliance w/ its own rules w/o interference from the Judiciary.

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CIR vs. SANTOS – “RTC declares law unconstitutional” The RTC declared Sec. 104 of the Tariff & Customs Code (imposing 3-10% duty on natural & cultured pearls & precious stones) as well as Sec. 150 of the Nat’l Internal Revenue Code (imposing 20% excise tax on jewelries & precious stones) inoperative based on a comparative study of tax rates of other countries & on the ground that it kills the local industry – hence they are confiscatory & oppressive. Such is an encroachment upon the legislative prerogatives and is an assault upon the wisdom and not the legality of the said law. The power of the trial courts to decide questions of constitutionality is affirmed, but it does not extend to questions of legislative policy. GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO – “ping-pong” Florencio Rueda underwent surgery at the UST Hospital for removal of stone blocking the ureter. He dies as a result of the malpractice of the doctors accdg. to the NBI and so the wife Leonila files a case for hominicide through reckless imprudence against the doctors. Unfortuantely, her case was raffled and re-raffled and was tossed from one prosecuting officer to another until she decided to file graft charges against said prosecutors before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, however, finds no probabe cause. The SC will not interfere w/ the decision of the Ombudsman who is granted discretion regarding the prosecution of the offenders. The proper remedy would be to bring the appeal before the DOJ who may reverse or modify the decision of the Ombudsman in the exercise of executive control powers. TATAD vs. SEC. OF ENERGY – “Oil Deregulation Law” Said law was passed causing the downstream deregulation of the oil industry, delegating certain powers to the Exec. Branch for the implementation of the said law and providing standards for the implementation thereof. Certain provisions have been assailed – and subsequently declared as – unconstitutional such as provisions on tariff differential, inventory, and predatory pricing w/c despite the Separability Clause, are entirely inseparable fom the statute. When the constitutionality of a statute is put to question, a justiciable controversy arises especially given the fact that the said law has national interest concerns and could affect the entire nation. It is the duty of the SC to determine if the law transcends the constitution. The implications of the said law was to tolerate a local oligopoly of the major oil distributors. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC – “free air time” Petitioners Telecom & Broadcast Attys of the Phils & GMA Network assail the validity of Sec. 92 of the Omnibus Elec Code w/c requires that the radio & TV stations give free time to the COMELEC. TELEBAP has no standing to sue, either as taxpayers, citizens, or registered voters but GMA has standing. A justiciable controversy has undoubtedly arisen as GMA alleges that the said law violates its rights against deprivation of property w/o just compensation & that it has sustained millions of pesos in damages resulting therefrom. The SC ruled that the franchise, being a mere privilege, may be burdened by certain conditions for the promotion of the public interest – such as the granting of free air time to the COMELEC. MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE – “downgrade of city / plebiscite” RA No. 8258 was passed by Congress downgrading the City of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city w/o a plebiscite. The mayor of the city as well as residents therein assail its validity. There is indeed a justiciable controversy as the conversion would affect the powers of the mayor & the political & economic rights of the LGU. It thus has far reaching implications towards citizens therein. The SC held that a plebiscite indeed is required by the constitution as it invoves material changes in the politico-economic conditions of the LGU. The law is declared unconstitutional. CUTARAN vs. DENR – “application still pending…” Petitioner Patricio Cutaran et al, filed applications for Cert. of Ancestral Land Claim for the lands they occupy w/in Camp John Hay. The heirs of Apeng Carantes, on the basis of Special Order No. 25 (creating a task force for the processing of such claims) likewise files claims upon lands overlapping upon the lands of the petitioner. As the claims were still pending, petitioner brought the matter to the court to declare as null & void the said issuances authorizing the same for lack of legislative authority & to enjoin the DENR from processing the claims of the heirs of Carantes. There is no justiciable controversy bec. the applications are still pending – hence there is no government act to speak of & rule upon based on legality. It is thus not yet ripe for adjudication. The petitioners merely speculate that the DENR might grant such claims; but no rights have yet vested & are to be settled. ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO – “impeachment case” question arises as to the constitutionality of the assumption to the presidency of PGMA during the EDSA Dos revolution. It involves interpretation of the constituton, particularly that of succession of authority, in order to settle the matter and legality of her assumption & thus presents a justiciable controversy of the most paramount nature – such that the SC must resolve as a matter of duty.

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