Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 3

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 Singson v. NLRC GR No. 122389 19 June 1997 d


  aiguel Singson, an employee of PAL, was dismissed from his job as Traffic Representative Passenger when after an investigation, it was found that he solicited money from a passenger without issuing a receipt. Upon appeal to the NLRC, labor arbiter Raul Aquino declared Singson¶s dismissal illegal. On appeal by PAL, the division assigned to the case included the same Raul Aquino, but this time as Commissioner. The division ruled in favor of PAL. When Singson filed a motion for reconsideration, it was denied by the two members of the division, without the participation of Aquino.


 W/N the subsequent NLRC decision is valid even if the same labor arbiter who previously decided on the case actively participated during the proceedings of PAL¶s appeal.

   NO. The officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of review. Singson was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL¶s appeal. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that Singson¶s aR was denied by 2 commissioners and without participation of Aquino. Singson¶s right to an impartial review of his appeal started from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his aR²his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of Singson¶s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous (harmless) error; it negated his right to due process.

à 
 Requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings: (a) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one¶s case and submit evidence in support thereof; (b) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (c) the decision must have something to support itself; (d) the evidence must be substantial; (e) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (f) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and (g) the board of body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. Administrative due process includes: (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person¶s legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and

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to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.

Parada v. Veneracion Aa No. RTJ-96-1353 11 aarch 1997 { 

Parada was being tried for 4 counts of estafa. He was on bail, and bonded with Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. (EASCO) When he changed his residence, he informed EASCO and the court formally through counsel. When his case was re-raffled to the sala of Judge Veneracion, a notice of hearing was sent to his old address. When Parada was unable to appear on the date of the hearing, Judge Veneracion ordered his arrest, issuing a warrant ³with no bail recommended.´ His bond was also confiscated, and a trial in absentia ensued. When Parada¶s counsel moved that they be allowed to present evidence, it was denied because his failure to appear was taken as a waiver of his right to adduce evidence.

W/N Parada was denied due process.

YES. It is worthy to stress that due process of law in judicial proceedings requires that the accused must be given an opportunity to e heard. He has the right to be present and defend in person at every stage of the proceedings. Incidentally, the right to a hearing carries with it the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings in court. Notice to a party is essential to enable him to adduce his own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence submitted by the other party. Parada was not duly notified of the trial date as the notice of hearing was sent to his former address. It is thus an invalid service and cannot in any way bind him. The circumstantial setting of the instant case as weighed by the basic standards of fair play impels us to so hold that the trial in absentia of Parada and his subsequent

The reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review. No less than the Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. A violation therefore of any of the rights accorded the accused constitutes a denial of due process of law. Unless charged with offenses punishable by   
    and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested, or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right.

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conviction are tainted with the vice of nullity, for evidently Parada was denied due process of law.

Subsequently, Parada was convicted and the decision was promulgated despite his absence. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision, declaring it to be null and void for not affording Parada the right to rebut the prosecution¶s evidence against him, and to adduce evidence in his own favor.

People v. de Guzman GR No. 134844-45 17 January 2001 a

Parada then filed a complaint for Judge Veneracion¶s dismissal for being ignorant of the law, leading to Parada¶s conviction and premature incarceration. The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Veneracion did indeed deny Parada due process. Ricardo de Guzman was accused of having raped 13-year-old aarlyn Perlas, the daughter of his live-in partner. He was then sentenced to suffer 2 death penalties.

W/N de Guzman should be made to suffer the death penalty.

In the automatic review, de Guzman stressed that he could not have been sentenced to 2 death penalties when the information did not allege that he was the common-law spouse of the victim¶s mother.

People v. Hon. Laguio

Lawrence Wang was accused of

W/N an appeal by the People

NO. The factual recitals in the two Informations as to how the crime of rape was committed in the case at bar, failed to specifically allege the qualifying circumstances which would elevate rape to a heinous crime, warranting the imposition of the death penalty. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. YES. Although a judgment of

It has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances, since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. The death penalty may be imposed only if the information for rape has alleged and the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the offender.

The right to appeal is neither a

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GR No. 128587 16 aarch 2007 J 

illegal possession of firearms, as well as the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and the Comelec Gun Ban. During his arraignment, he interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of evidence obtained by the police operatives. He then filed a demurrer of evidence, which was subsequently granted by the court. It was declared that the confiscation of evidence was illegal, and Wang was acquitted.

from a judgment of acquittal would deny Wang of due process.

acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the judgment void), what the petitioner did was to file an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law. For being the wrong remedy taken, the petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating Wang¶s right against double jeopardy.

natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law. Appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. An order granting an accused¶s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. The exceptions are: (a)V when the prosecution is denied due process of law; and (b)V when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused¶s demurrer to evidence. Where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction.



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Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a)V upon valid indictment (b)V before a competent court (c)V after arraignment (d)V a valid plea having been entered (e)V the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused Rationale behind double jeopardy: to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 148560 19 November 2001  

Erap Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), assails the constitutionality of the said law. He avers that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as

W/N RA 7080 violates the rights of the accused to due process.

NO. 1. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. In fact, the Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Erap is alleged

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   A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects: it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice

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the said law (a) suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) dispenses with the ³reasonable doubt´ standard in criminal prosecutions; and (c) abolishes the element of 
  in crimes already punishable under the RPC.

to have committed. Thus, Erap is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, he must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. 2. The thesis that Sec. 4 of the law does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. The legislature did not refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime²a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50a. 3. Plunder is a  
  which requires proof of criminal intent. With regard to the charge of conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it

of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be ³saved´ by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing ³on their faces´ statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. Procedural measures do not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.

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proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite 
  must be shown.

Adiong v. COaELEC GR No. 103956 31 aarch 1992 J  

Blo Umpar Adiong assails COaELEC Resolution No. 2347 regarding the prohibition of posting of decals and stickers in ³mobile´ places like cars and other moving vehicles. He avers that such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of RA 6466. In addition, he believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate. Finally, he states that as of the date of the petition, he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed ³Comelec Poster Areas.´

W/N COaELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on ³mobile´ places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Thus, RA 7080¶s constitutionality is upheld. NO. The COaELEC¶s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on ³mobile´ places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COaELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. 1. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen¶s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution. 2. The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth²it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 3. The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on

When faced with borderline situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials, and COaELEC should lean in favor of freedom. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person¶s acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. è  {
  



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cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in granting freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. W/N this prohibition infringes on the people¶s right to due process.

YES. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen¶s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information. Concurring:   Instead of limiting the dissemination of information on the election issues and the qualifications of those vying for public office, what the COaELEC should concentrate

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Sales v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 143802 16 November 2001 
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Reynolan Sales, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud, shot down the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged shootout after a heated altercation between them in 1999. Sales thereafter surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal office then asked to be brought to the Provincial PNP Headquarters. The following day, a criminal Information for murder was filed against him.

W/N the Ombudsman followed the proper procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation. W/N Sales was given an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence.

on is the education of the voters on the proper exercise of their suffrages. This function is part of its constitutional duty to supervise and regulate elections and to prevent them from deteriorating into popularity contests where the victors are chosen on the basis not of their platforms and competence but on their ability to sing or dance (Bokal?), or play a musical instrument, or shoot a basketball, or crack a toilet joke (Kap?), or exhibit some such dubious talent irrelevant to their ability to discharge a public office. NO. 1. The supposed preliminary investigation was conducted in installments by at least 3 different investigating officers, none of whom completed the preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to Sandiganbayan. 2. The charge against Sales is murder, a non-bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected municipal executive, should have merited a deeper, and more thorough preliminary investigation. The

      
   
   
   
 
  
 
 
      



   
   
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Due process requires hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal so that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. The purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a

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Ombudsman instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer Vivar.

preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right, it is a substantive right. To deny the accused¶s claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a judge by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasijudicial officer because a

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preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously (thoroughly) conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. aore important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the birthrights of all who live in our country. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.

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