Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.

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Table of Contents

United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912] … 1 United States vs. Ong Siu Hong [GR 12778, 3 August 1917] … 2 People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950] … 2 Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920] … 3 Bermudez vs. Castillo [Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July 1937] … 3 Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] … 4 People vs. Tranca [GR 110357, 17 August 1994] … 5 South Dakota vs. Neville [459 US 553, 22 February 1983] … 6 Schmerber vs. California [384 US 757, 20 June 1966] … 7 People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] ... 8 People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000] … 9 Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] … 10 Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-09, 30 August 1985] … 11 Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591, 23 March 1896] … 14 Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] … 15

This collection contains fifteen (15) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

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Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

333 United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912] First Division, Johnson (J): 5 concur Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed. Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against selfincrimination. Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )

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clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. 334 United States vs. Ong Siu Hong [GR 12778, 3 August 1917] En Banc, Malcolm (J): 5 concur Facts: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu Hong appears to have been convicted by the lower court, based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. Issue: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the morphine was forced from his mouth. Held: By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]), following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. 335 People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950] First Division, Bengzon (J): 6 concur Facts: Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia Carreon (sister of Hilaria) filed in August 1946, a criminal complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos. These were arrested and had to file a bond. The case was later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators. In December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for partition of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing on 24 June 1947. Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April 1947, through Amando Garbo. Thereafter they conversed on several occasions. In the early part of May 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and then she told him that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better conditions being offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) Hilario supplied the gun, procured from one Benigno Baltonado. Hilaria also gave Otadora a bolo, a pair of trousers of her husband Francisco Galos, a hat and a flashlight. Early in the morning of 16 June 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of 21 June 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to escape to Camotes Islands, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-judicial statement wherein he implicated Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the crime. On 25 June 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against Otadora and Carreon in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first instance, where on 3 September 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the first witness for the prosecution. Hilaria Carreon's criminal connection with the bloody affair was collaborated, among others, by Otodora’s possession of the pants of Francisco Galos and the latter's hat. When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. Hilaria Carreon was found guilty and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

sentenced to death and other accessory penalties. Otadora, who confessed, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Hilaria Carreon appealed. Issue: Whether Galos’ fitting of the pants is contrary to the constitutional protection against selfincrimination. Held: When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on, and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly; this gave the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded. No timely objection was made, however, upon that specific ground. It is doubted whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any. Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. 336 Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920] En Banc, Malcolm (J): 5 concur Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. 337

Bermudez vs. Castillo [Per. Rec. 714-A, 26 July 1937] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 )

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First Division, Diaz (J): 4 concur Facts: In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor-General against Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection with this administrative case, Castillo filed, in addition to other evidence in support of his defense, the six letters. He contended that said six letters are Maria Bermudez's. Bermudez denied that the letters were hers. Bermudez, however, admitted that three others were in her own handwriting. As Castillo believed that the three letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with the six letters questioned in the case and as he was determined to show that the letters were Bermudez's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. Bermudez, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that the three other letters and the other letters already in Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying Castillo's petition. As Castillo did not agree to the decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to require and compel Bermudez to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying the 6 letters for that purpose. Issue: Whether Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillo’s possession which were allegedly in her handwriting. Held: The reason for the privilege is evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. Thus, Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her. 338 Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] First Division, Romualdez (J): 6 concur Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."). Held: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 )

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petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels, which is not so serious as present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court ordered the judge and the fiscal and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. 339 People vs. Tranca [GR 110357, 17 August 1994] First Division, Davide Jr. (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave Facts: On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer went to the office of the National Capital Region NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) and proceeded to the desk of their superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano. Sgt. Jose Latumbo, SPO3 Oliver Tugade, SPO2 Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco Matundan, and PO3 Lilia Ochia were summoned by Capt. Miano to a briefing. The latter told them that the informer had revealed that a certain "Jon-Jon" (later identified as Carlos Tranca y Arellano) was selling shabu along Kalayaan Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then former a buy-bust team with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and the rest, including the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 and which had been dusted with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust operation. The team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the target area. At the corner of Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer spotted Tranca, who was standing in front of the house, and pointed him out to the team members. The team then circled back and alighted from their vehicles. As planned, Sgt. Latumbo and the informer approached Tranca while the rest of the team took vantage points so as to observe the operation and close in at the opportune time. The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to Tranca and told the latter that his companion was interested in buying shabu. The informer then asked Tranca if he had any for sale. Tranca answered in the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought. Sgt. Latumbo replied, "Pare, tapatan mo na lang itong piso ko." (In illegal drug parlance, "piso" means one hundred pesos) Tranca emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to Tranca the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then closed in on Tranca. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested Tranca. Upon interrogation by Capt. Miano, Tranca voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100 marked money . Tranca was handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters. On 7 May 1991, SPO1 Matundan requested Teresita Alberto, the Chief Chemist of the Physical Identification Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of Tranca and a P100 bill with serial number Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )

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SN886097. She exposed the P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation and found the presence of fluorescent powder thereon. She likewise exposed the person of Tranca to ultraviolet radiation and discovered flourescent power on his hands, face and on the opening of the left-side pocket of the white shorts that he was then wearing. In an information filed on 10 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Tranca was charged with the violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Criminal Case 2574). The case was assigned to Branch 136 of the said court. Tranca pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 25 October 1991. Tranca denied the allegations against him and contended that he was framed by the police officers. On 23 March 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision finding Tranca guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Tranca appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The defense contends that the rights of Tranca against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination. Issue: Whether the subjection of Tranca’s body to ultraviolet powder violates Tranca’s right against selfincrimination. Held: What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of Tranca's body to ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel. 340 South Dakota vs. Neville [459 US 553, 22 February 1983] O'Connor (J): 6 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion to which 1 joined Facts: Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped Neville's car after they saw him fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers asked Neville for his driver's license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left the car, Neville staggered and fell against the car to support himself. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath. Neville did not have a driver's license, and informed the officers that it was revoked after a previous drivingwhile-intoxicated conviction. The officers asked Neville to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight line. When Neville failed these field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights. Neville acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without a lawyer present. Reading from a printed card, the officers then asked Neville to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could lose his license if he refused. Neville refused to take the test, stating "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." The officers again read the request to submit to a test, and then took Neville to the police station, where they read the request to submit a third time. Neville continued to refuse to take the test, again saying he was too drunk to pass it. Neville was thereafter charged. South Dakota law specifically declares that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test "may be admissible into evidence at the trial." Nevertheless, respondent sought to suppress all evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The Circuit Court granted the suppression motion for three reasons: the South Dakota statute allowing evidence of refusal violated Neville's federal constitutional rights; the officers failed to advise Neville that the refusal could be used against him at trial; and the refusal was irrelevant to the issues before the court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds that 32-23-10.1, which allows the introduction of this evidence, violated the federal and state privilege against self-incrimination. The court reasoned that the refusal was a communicative act involving Neville's testimonial capacities and that the State compelled this communication by forcing Neville "to choose between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant examination and producing testimonial evidence against himself." Issue: Whether the the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to such a test likewise offend the right against self-incrimination.

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 )

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Held: As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving, South Dakota has enacted an "implied consent" law. This statute declares that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated. In Schmerber v. California (384 U.S. 757 [1966]), the Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the "inviolability of the human personality" and the "requirement that the State procure the evidence against an accused `by its own independent labors,'" but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by the values it helps to protect. The Court therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling "communications" or "testimony." Since a blood test was "physical or real" evidence rather than testimonial evidence, the Court found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. South Dakota further discourages the choice of refusal by allowing the refusal to be used against the defendant at trial. As the Court recognized in Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many cases. The situations arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation from a person who indicates refusal by complete inaction, to one who nods his head negatively, to one who states "I refuse to take the test," to Neville here, who stated "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." Since no impermissible coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal, the Court prefer to rest its decision on this ground, and draw possible distinctions when necessary for decision in other circumstances. The values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the State offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, that Neville concedes, as he must, that the State could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced Neville into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary, the State wants Neville to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test. Therefore, a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 341 Schmerber vs. California [384 US 757, 20 June 1966] Brennan (J) Facts: Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries suffered in an accident involving the automobile that he had apparently been driving. At the direction of a police officer, a blood sample was then withdrawn from Schmerber's body by a physician at the hospital. Schmerber was charged in Los Angeles Municipal Court of the criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The chemical analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication, and the report of this analysis was admitted in evidence at the trial. Schmerber objected to receipt of this evidence of the analysis on the ground that the blood had been withdrawn despite his refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. He contended that in that circumstance the withdrawal of the blood and the admission of the analysis in evidence denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights secured against the States by that Amendment: his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Appellate Department of the California Superior Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the conviction. Issue: Whether Schmerber was thus compelled "to be a witness against himself." Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )

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Held: In requiring Schmerber to submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be used to prosecute him for a criminal offense. He submitted only after the police officer rejected his objection and directed the physician to proceed. The officer's direction to the physician to administer the test over Schmerber's objection constituted compulsion for the purposes of the privilege. If the scope of the privilege coincided with the complex of values it helps to protect, the Court might be obliged to conclude that the privilege was violated. However, as the passage in Miranda implicitly recognizes, the privilege has never been given the full scope which the values it helps to protect suggest. History and a long line of authorities in lower courts have consistently limited its protection to situations in which the State seeks to submerge those values by obtaining the evidence against an accused through "the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers. On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it. Schmerber's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither Schmerber's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by Schmerber, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds. 342 People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999] En Banc, Per curiam: 15 concur Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5 policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero earlier washing his Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )

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hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero. Some policemen took the newly washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife, Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30 March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its earlier decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed. Issue: Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are admissible as evidence. Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from Rondero and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. 343 People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000] First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 )

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"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pretrial conference. On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against selfincrimination. Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. 344 Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2 on official leave Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )

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an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed. Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself. Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand—with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. 345-346

Galman vs. Pamaran [GRs 71208-09, 30 August 1985], also People vs. Sandiganbayan [GRs 71212-13] En Banc, Cuevas (J): 1 concur, 1 on leave, 8 filed separate concurring opinions, 3 filed separate dissenting opinion, 1 voted to dismiss (thus concur) before leaving for abroad Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )

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one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder — one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On 3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board. Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )

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they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law. Issue (2): Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked before the board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Held (2): Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, the right against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. Said provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine, in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by PD 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 )

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347 Brown vs. Walker [161 US 591, 23 March 1896] Brown (J) Facts: Brown had been subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury, at a term of the district court for the Western district of Pennsylvania, to testify in relation to a charge then under investigation by that body against certain officers and agents of the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, for an alleged violation of the interstate commerce act. Brown appeared for examination, in response to the subpoena, and was sworn. After testifying that he was auditor of the railway company, and that it was his duty to audit the accounts of the various officers of the company, as well as the accounts of the freight department of such company during the years 1894 and 1895, he was asked the question: "Do you know whether or not the Alleghany Valley Railway Company transported, for the Union Coal Company, during the months of Jul , August, and September, 1894, coal, from any point on the Low Grade Division of said railroad company to Buffalo, at a less rate than the established rates in force between the terminal points at the time of such transportation?" To this question he answered: "That question, with all respect to the grand jury and yourself, I must decline to answer, for the reason that my answer would tend to accuse and incriminate myself" He was then asked: "Do you know whether the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, during the year 1894, paid to the Union Coal Company any rebate, refund, or commission on coal transported by said railroad company, from points on its Low Grade Division, to Buffalo, whereby the Union Coal Company obtained a transportation of such coal between the said terminal points at a less rate than the open tariff rate, or the rate established by said company? If you have such knowledge, state the amount of such rebates or drawbacks or commissions paid, to whom paid, the date of the same, and on what shipments, and state fully all the particulars within your knowledge relating to such transaction or transactions." He answered "That question I must also decline to answer, for the reason already given." The grand jury reported these questions and answers to the court, and prayed for such order as to the court might seem meet and proper. Upon the presentation of this report, Brown was ordered to appear and show cause why he should not answer the said questions or be adjudged in contempt, and, upon the hearing of the rule to show cause, it was found that his excuses were insufficient, and he was directed to appear and answer the questions, which he declined to do. Whereupon he was adjudged to be in contempt and ordered to pay a fine of 5 dollars, and to be taken into custody until he should have answered the questions. He thereupon petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued, Brown was produced in court, the hearing was had, and on 11 September 1895, it was ordered that the petition be dismissed, the writ of habeas corpus discharged, and Brown remanded to the custody of the marshal. Brown appealed. Issue: Whether the Brown, as a witness and not an accused, can refuse to answer the questions about the anomalies in the Alleghany Valley Railway Company, in light of the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination. Held: The Act of Congress of 1 February 1893 is supposed to have been passed in view of the opinion of the US Supreme court in Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 US 547), to the effect that section 860 of the Revised Statutes, providing that no evidence given by a witness shall be used against him, his property or estate, in any manner, in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, did not afford that complete protection to the witness which the a endment was intended to guaranty. The inference from the language of said decision is that, if the statute does afford such immunity against future prosecution, the witness will be compellable to testify. So also in Emery's Case (107 Mass. 172, 185) and in Cullen v. Com. (24 Grat. 624), upon which much reliance was placed in Counselman v. Hitchcock, it was intimated that the witness might be required to forego an appeal to the protection of the fundamental law, if he were first secured from future liability and exposure to be prejudiced, in any criminal proceeding against him, as fully and extensively as he would be secured by availing himself of the privilege accorded by the constitution. To meet this construction of the constitutional provision, the act in question was passed, exempting the witness from any prosecution on account of any transaction to which he may testify. The danger of extending the principle announced in Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )

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Counselman v. Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason, or for a purely fanciful protection of the witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of securing immunity to some third person, who is interested in concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name, to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his privilege. The act of congress in question, securing to witnesses immunity from prosecution, is virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to a class of legislation which is not uncommon either in England or in this county. Although the constitution vests in the president "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment," this power has never been held to take from congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty, and is ordinarily exercised only in cases of individuals after conviction, although "it extends to every offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment." It is entirely true that the statute does not purport, nor is it possible for any statute, to shield the witness from the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime; but the authorities are numerous, and very nearly uniform, to the effect that, if the proposed testimony is material to the issue on trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge. If he secure legal immunity from prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty which it is reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the common good. If it be once conceded that the fact that his testimony may tend to bring the witness into disrepute, though not to incriminate him, does not entitle him to the privilege of silence, it necessarily follows that, if it also tends to incriminate, but at the same time operates as a pardon for the offense, the fact that the disgrace remains no more entitles him to immunity in this case than in the other. Herein, the grand jury was engaged in investigating certain alleged violations of the interstate commerce act. Brown, the witness, was the auditor of the road, whose duty it was to audit the accounts of the officers, and the money paid out by them. Having audited the accounts of the freight department during the time in question, he was asked whether he knew of any such discrimination in favor of the Union Coal Company, and declined to answer upon the ground that he would thereby incriminate himself. As he had not apparent authority to make the forbidden contracts, to receive the money earned upon such contracts, or to allow or pay any rebates, drawbacks, or commissions thereon, and was concerned only in auditing accounts, and passing vouchers for money paid by others, it is difficult to see how, under any construction of section 10 of the interstate commerce act, he could be said to have willfully done anything, or aided or abetted others in doing anything, or in omitting to do anything, in violation of the act, his duty being merely to see that others had done what they purported to have done, and that the vouchers rendered by them were genuine. But, however this may be, it is entirely clear that he was not the chief, or even a substantial, offender against the law, and that his privilege was claimed for the purpose of shielding the railway or its officers from answering a charge of having violated its provisions. To say that, notwithstanding his immunity from punishment, he would incur personal odium and disgrace from answering these questions, seems too much like an abuse of language to be worthy of serious consideration. But, even if this were true, he would still be compelled to answer, if the facts sought to be elucidated were material to the issue. If witnesses standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity from testifying, the enforcement of the interstate commerce law, or other analogous acts, wherein it is for the interest of both parties to conceal their misdoings, would become impossible, since it is only from the mouths of those having knowledge of the inhibited contracts that the facts can be ascertained. While the constitutional provision is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, that the witness was compellable to answer. 348 Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )

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Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21,000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On November 14, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird car (Motor H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together with its accessories worth P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. When trial opened, the prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial proceeded, with "Fiscal Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February 1965, the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car. The sentence was promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June 1968, the Court of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 )

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Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in the alternative, prayed for grant of the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for the court’s disregard of Chavez’ constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." Further, a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.

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