constitutional law 2 case digests.doc

Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

1R 2011-2012 CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Justice Francisco P. Acosta I.NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Santiago vs. Commission on Elections Facts: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may

Issue: R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative? Held: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the

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be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." Article XV of the Constitution provides: . . .The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

Issue: Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution.

Facts:

Held:

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his

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“whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. Issue: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.

Held: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly

Lambino, et.al. vs. Commission on Elections Facts: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not

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give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling

the proposed amendments before – not after – signing. Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

Issues: In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be” directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

(1) Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision (2) Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people Held: Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people Sec.2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevantbAmerican jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. 1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. 2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In

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contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. II. The Constitution and the Courts Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections Facts: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits there from. He filed for re-election to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Issue: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged

Held:

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65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

PACU vs. Secretary of Education

of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.

Facts:

Issue:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706 “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,”

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Held: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706.And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right

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sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.

And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy Facts:

Facts:

Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO’s charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 8555-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners’ standing to bring this suit.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

Issue:

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

Whether or not the Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.

Held:

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit.

Yes. SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

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unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

In re Cunanan

An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional

Issues: Whether or not the Republic Act. 972 is constitutional. Held:

Facts: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 194870% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953. Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates

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and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

III. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE A. POLICE POWER JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA Facts: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

Lutz vs. Araneta Facts:

Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court.

Held:

Issue:

The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property

Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional.

Issue:

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Held:

Issue:

The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.

Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of DAR Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. Lozano vs. Martinez Facts: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he

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does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions. Issues: (1) Whether or not BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. (2) Whether or not BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract. (3) Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

HELD: (1) No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefore, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of

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penal sanctions.

1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright 2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court. 3. Measure should have not been presumed 4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.

(2) No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

(3) No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

Held: Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications: 1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as there’s no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President 2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction 3. Case involved ‘roving commission’ and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power 4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immediately condemned and punish

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court Facts: Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00.

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta Facts: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF” The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to

Petitioner raised the issue of EO’s constitutionality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decision to IAC with the following contentions:

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be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.

Issue:

Issue:

Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

Held:

Held: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

B. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Facts:

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beer houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

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The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Issue:

Held:

Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

People vs. Fajardo Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.

Republic vs. Castelvi Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-

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year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract.

Issue: Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Facts:

Held:

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free “Comelec Space” and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a

On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for noncompliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space,” the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate’s utilization of the “Comelec space” procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same

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would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners'' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.

Issue:

Held:

Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.

Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives.

Issue: Whether or not it is a valid exercise of eminent domain.

Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to “donate” free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy. Sumulong vs. Guerrero

EPZA vs. Dulay Facts: Facts: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to

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be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain. Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail

National Power Corporation vs. Benjamin Ong Co Facts: The petitioner herein, NPC, is a government corporation created under R.A. No.6395 to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear,

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geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Its charter grants to petitioner, among others, the power to exercise the right to eminent domain. Sometime in June 27, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of right-ofway over three (3)lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga belonging to respondent herein for purposes of construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project. On March 25, 2002, NPC obtained a writ of possession and on April 15, 2002 theytook possession of the property.On hearing the RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the fair market value of theproperty as of 15 April 2002. The first two commissioners appraised the property atP1,900.00 per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00. While the third commissionerpeg the value of the property at P875.00 per square meter. The RTC rendered its Partial Decision, wherein it declared the validity of theexpropriation and ordered petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at6% per annum beginning April 15, 2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment.Not satisfied with the ruling of lower court NPC elevate the case to CA, which theappellate court also rendered Decision holding petitioner liable to pay the full fair marketvalue at the time of actual taking, with interest at 6% per annum from 15 April 2002.Aggrieved with the order NPC appealed to SC hence this case.

upon proper determination by the courts. The presence of transmission lines undoubtedly restricts respondent’s use of hisproperty. Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market value of theproperty.UPON THE DATE OF FILING. Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of justcompensation shall “be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or thefiling of the complaint, whichever came first.”It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of thetaking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriationproceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. There are exceptions— (1) grave injustice to the property owner, (2) the taking did not have color of legal authority, (3) the taking of the property was not initially for expropriation and the owner will begiven undue increment advantages because of the expropriation. However, none of these exceptions are present in the instant case.Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001, the date when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint. C. Power of Taxation

Issue: Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works Whether or not petitioner herein should pay the subject property in its full marketvalue?Is the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation is upon position or uponthe date of filing?

Facts: Pascual, in his official capacity as the Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioned for a writ of certiorari against the dismissal of the case and dissolving of the preliminary injunction held by the Court of the First Instance. Petitioner prayed for that RA #920 be declared null and void, that the alleged Deed of Donation made by Zulueta be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner also prayed for an injunction enjoining Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Director of Public Works and Highways and the disbursing officers of the latter department from making and securing any further release of funds for the said road project. RA# 920 contained an item appropriating

Held: YES. As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantiallyprovides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only beconsidered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shallnot exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value

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P85,000.00 which the petitioner alleged that it was for the construction of roads improving the private property of Jose Zuleta, a member of the Senate.

Held:

1. RA #920 is unconstitutional because the Congress is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. 2. Pascual has the personality to sue as a taxpayer recognizing the right of the taxpayer to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating public funds.

The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.

Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila

Llandoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:

Facts:

Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

Issues: 1. Whether or not RA # 920 is unconstitutional. 2. Whether or not Pascual has the legal capacity or to sue. Held:

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest. Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation.

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Held:

Issue:

Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos.

Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes. Held: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino Facts: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the director).

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation Facts: Philippine Planters Products (PPI) and Fertiphil Corp. are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, which are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the

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imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the aformentioned LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depository bank of PPI. After the 1986 EDSA revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy, for which Fertiphil demanded PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465. But then, PPI refused to give in to the demand. With that, Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust and unreasonable, and favoring one privately owned corporation, which is the PPI. RTC's decision on November 20, 1991 favored Fertiphil and ordered the latter to pay a certain sum of the previously collected amount with an interest, and some other fees.

IV. ARTICLE III - THE BILL OF RIGHTS Section 1 -- Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of the Laws Due Process of Law ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.

Issue: Whether or not the P10 assessment on fertilizer sale a valid exercise of taxation?

Issue:

Held:

Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

No. An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted on for a public purpose and cannot be used for purely private purposes or for exclusive benefit of private persons. The LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company. Thus, this already exceeded the limitation which taxes are supposed to be limited to, inherently and naturally. Even if the levy was acted for the enforcement of police powers, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote public interest. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." The petition was denied.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES

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Facts:

and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. MediatorArbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process. Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter

Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming

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the private respondent the winner in the election.

the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.

Held: Issue: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process. Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Alonte v. Savellano Facts: Pending before the court are two separate petitioners, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.r. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of the respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitioners were consolidated. On December 5, 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan. The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and as signed by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Biñan Laguna presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco. On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State

YNOT VS. IAC Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in

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Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a petitione for a change of venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant’s affidavit of desistance. On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss. On September 17, 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal case No. 97-159935 by the Clerk of Courts of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding. On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Atty. Balbin, submitted to the Manila court, a compliance where she reiterated her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance. In an order, dated October 9, 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this Court’s separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the private complainant’s desistance in the lights of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab.

case once it is filed in court. *Whether or not the proceedings did conform with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. *Whether or not an opportunity to cross-examine was afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they can be deemed to have waived said right by inaction. *Whether or not an evidence which a party desires to submits for the consideration of the court must formally be offered be offered by him. Held: The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefore been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused hiss full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a private complainant is also frowned upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a second look at the case, there is hardly an instance when this court upheld it in private crimes and dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed where there exist special circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of the affidavit.

Issue/s: *Whether or not there can be short-cut to the legal process, and there can be an excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. *Whether or not a case can be dismissed upon a mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant. *Whether or not any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, can extinguish criminal liability. *Whether or not the death of the offended party can extinguish the

Article 344 also provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly and timely made, result in the total extinction of criminal liability of the offender. The pardon in private crimes must be made before the institution of the criminal action. In adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be express or implied while in

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seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express. In all cases, the pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability. The only act that extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender and the offended party.

clearly and expressly provide that “the court shall consider no evidence which has not formally offered.” Evidence not formally offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected.

The death of the offended party cannot extinguish the case once it is filed in court. If the offended party dies immediately after filing the complaint but before the institution of the criminal action, his death is not a ground to dismiss the case. Clearly, the will and participation of the offended party is necessary only to determine whether to file the complaint or not. Thereafter, the will of the State prevails.

(a) The submission of the “Affidavit of Desistance” executed by Juvie-lyn Y.Punongbayan on June 25, 1997, having been filed after the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, does not warrant the dismissal of said criminal case;

The Court hereby RULES that-

(b) For failure of due process, the assailed judgement, dated December 12, 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL and VOID and thereby Set Aside; accordingly, the case is Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings; and

The proceedings did not conform with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioners were never instructed to present evidence to prove their defenses. The parties were never given the opportunity to present their respective evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There was no admission by petitioners of the charge in the information as to justify a change in the order of trial.

(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano Jr., presiding judge of Branch 53 of RTC of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.

Following respondent judge’s finding and assuming that the November 7, 1997 hearing was already a trial on the merits, petitioners were never afforded their right to confront and crossexamine the witness. The court did not, at the very least, inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine private complainant with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-examine was afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they cannot be deemed to have waived said right by inaction.

Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec “Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. – petitioner charged in violation of Omnibus Election Code (gun ban)– invokes deprivation of Constitutional right on due process of law.” Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress. On his way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police search the

The admission of private complainant’s affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in response to respondent judge’s questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it formally offered before the court. The Revised Rules on Evidence

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car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence this petition contending that the search on his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due process was violated.

unreasonable intrusion of the petitioner’s privacy and security of his property in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared the warrantless search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.

Issue:

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.

Facts:

Held:

There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and (4) Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Because there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted, such action constitutes an

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically

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stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

Facts: As a result of the initiation rights held by the Aquila Legis Fraternity on February 8-10, 1991, Leonardo Lennie Villa died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital. A Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee was tasked to investigate the circumstances resulting in Villas death within 72 hours. Respondent students Mendoza, Abas, et al, were also required to submit written statements within 24 hours from receipt. Said respondents failed to give a reply, while being placed on preventive suspension. On February 14, 1991, after receiving the written statements and testimonies of several witnesses, the Committee found prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue (Discipline). The students were required to file answers on or before February 18, otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defense. On February 20, Dean del Castillo created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against said respondent students. On the same day, the students were

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the

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informed of their violation, giving them until the 22nd of February to respond. After several postponements and a letter from petitioner Bernas, a resolution dated March 9 found respondents guilty of violation of Rule 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules of Discipline, for having participated in the initiation as auxiliaries, heightened by the fact that they made no effect to prevent the infliction of further injury. The board, however, left the imposition of the penalty to the Administration. Petitioner Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. On March 10, respondent students filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and TRO with preliminary injunction, alleging lack of due process. After the issuance of a TRO on April 7, a special civil action for certiorari was filed with the SC.

which became the basis of the February 14 order. Granting without admitting that they were denied such, disciplinary cases involving students do not necessarily need or include the right to cross examination. It may be summary in nature. Ruling: RESPONDENT STUDENTS, DISMISSED Equal Protection of the Laws Quinto and Tolentino v. Commission on Elections FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

Issue: Were respondent students denied due process? NO. Held:

ISSUE: Contrary to respondents argument of denial of procedural due process, the Court finds no indication that such right has been violated. Petitioners have meticulously respected respondents rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as stated in Guzman vs. NU, Alcuaz vs. PSBA-QC, etc. Further, the Guzman case, and not the ANG TIBAY case asserted by respondents, provides the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary actions in academic institutions: 1.Students must be informed in writing of the nature or cause of the accusations against them. 2.They shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel. 3.They shall be informed of the evidence against them. 4.They shall have the right to address evidence in their own behalf 5.The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by school authorities to hear and decide the case. The requisites as stated have been met adequately. Respondents cannot hide behind the argument that they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid. HELD: NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.

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The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional. HELD: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that:1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FACTS

Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission : This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive

Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

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The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Decision The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

Issues: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and Held: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (86 SCRA 270 [1978]) FACTS: Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear

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registration and that it fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for re-election to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537. HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power. Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

Dumlao v. Comelec FACTS:

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The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Measure is assailed for being discriminatory against female domestic workers/helpers and that it is violative of the right to travel. Further, the company contended that the measure is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, being that police power is legislative and not executive in character. Issue: Whether or not the Department Order is a valid regulation. Held: The Labor Code has vested the Department of Labor and Employment with the rule-making powers in order to effectively promote the welfare and interests of Filipino workers. Protection to labor does not only signify the promotion of employment alone, more important is that such be decent, just and humane. The preference for female workers being covered by the said regulation has been motivated by a growing incidence of Filipina abuses overseas. Official acts enjoy a presumed validity. Himagan v. People FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon Facts: PASEI is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas employment. It challenged the validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment in the character of Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.

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contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive

Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treas. of Ormoc City FACTS: Ormoc city passed an ordinance which provides: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Ormoc Sugar Company filed a complaint against the city of Ormoc, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution) ISSUE: W/N the ordinance violates the equal protection clause and the uniformity of taxation/ HELD: YES. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the

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classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon

contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

League Of Cities Of The Philippines v. Commission On Elections; Municipality Of Baybay, Etc. FACTS:

ISSUES: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. HELD: 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. 2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood

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bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

1.No. ³The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in aprivate capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise,may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.´ 2. No. ³The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.´ 3.No. ³Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.´

Section 2 -- Searches and Seizures People v. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) FACTS: Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents. He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards,the NBI took custody of said packages. The contents, after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be marijuana flowering tops.The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized. 2.Whether or not custodial investigation was not properly applied. 3.Whether or not the trial court did not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages came to his possession.

Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967) FACTS: Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and

HELD:

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Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).” The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.” Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid. HELD:

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aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Soliven v. Makasiar UNAVAILABLE

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Silva v. Presiding Judge UNAVAILABLE Morano v. Vivo UNAVAILABLE

Issues: Harvey v. Santiago (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3

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warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.

On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

Issues: 1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as contemplated in the law? 2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant?

Alvarez v. Court of First Instance 3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit? Facts: 4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night?

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5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional?

the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).

6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees? Held: A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).

Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613). Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which

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Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

and that the documents should be returned to him. The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

Mata v. Bayona Facts:

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal

Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has

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made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. People v. Del Rosario Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Issue:

Held:

Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. Umil v. Ramos Facts:

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On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.

Issue:

Issues:

Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

Held:

(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Held:

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of

People v. Sucro Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported

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their duties. On July 2 1991, Eldon Maguan was allegedly shot to death by accused Rolito Go due to a traffic altercation when petitioners car and the victims car nearly bumped each other. The Security Guard of the Cravings Bake Shop saw the whole incident and point herein petitioner as the gunman, which he positively identified when questioned by the authorities. Being convinced of the suspects identity, the police launched a manhunt operation that caused petitioner to present himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify the said issue; he was then detained by the police.

People v. Rodrigueza Facts: An informer of the Narcotics Division reported activity on illegal drug trafficking to the authorities and a buy-bust operation was conducted where the informer successfully bought 100 grams of marijuana for P10.00 from the accused. The authorities immediately conducted a raid and apprehended the accused while confiscating marijuana leaves and syringes. The raid however was not authorized by a search warrant. Accused now contends that the court erred in admitting the evidence seized without any search warrant and in violation of his constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not herein petitioners arrest valid?

Issue:

RULING:

Whether or not evidence obtained without a valid search warrant may be used to prosecute the accused.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v.Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime." ..... none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting  one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."

Held: The court held that a buy bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. The Narcom agents should have secured a valid search warrant prior the raid since they have already been conducting surveillance against the accused for quite sometime already and the urgency of their cause of action cannot be justified in court. Hence the accused was acquitted.

Posadas v. Court of Appeals Facts:

Go v. Court of Appeals Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were

FACTS:

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conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St., Davao City. While they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was brought to the police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto. Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a commission of an offense, w/o a SW.

They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant. However, there are many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of w/c is the ''stop & search'' w/o a SW at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa. As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. People v. Mengote

ISSUE: FACTS: WoN a person may be arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons, etc.

-the Western Police District received a telephone c a l l from an informer that there were three suspicious -looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and NorthBay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila, shortly before noonof August 8, 1987, a surveillance team of plainclothesmen was dispatched to the place. - Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, s a i d that they saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. Theyapproached these persons and identified themselvesas policemen, whereupon the two tried to run awaybut were unable to escape because the otherlawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, whoturned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with

HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense has in fact, just been committed, & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense.

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sixl i v e b u l l e t s i n t h e c h a m b e r . H i s c o m p a n i o n , l a t e r i dentified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knifesecreted in his front right pants pocket. The weaponswere taken from them. Mengote and Morellos werethen turned over to police headquarters forinvestigation by the Intelligence Division.- I n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d w i t h R T C c h a r g i n g a c c u s e d i n violation of Violation of PD 1866 illegal possession of firearms.- Besides the police officers, one other witnesspresented by the prosecution was RigobertoD a n g a n a n , w h o i d e n t i f i e d t h e s u b j e c t w e a p o n a s among the articles stolen from him during therobbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. Hepointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.

Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) afterhe has committed or while he is actually committingor is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) inthe presence of the arresting officer. o These requirements have not beenestablished in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen." There wasa p p a r e n t l y n o o f f e n s e t h a t h a d j u s t b e e n committed or was being actually committedor at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its n o l e s s stringent requirements have also not been satisfied.The prosecution has not shown that at the time of M e n g o t e ' s a r r e s t a n o f f e n s e h a d i n f a c t j u s t b e e n committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengotehad committed it. All they had was hearsayinformation from the telephone caller, and about acrime that had yet to be committed. The truth is that they did not know thenwhat offense, if at all, had been c o m m i t t e d a n d neither were they aware of the participation thereino f t h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t . I t w a s o n l y l a t e r , a f t e r Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters,that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein.

Issue: W/N there was the warrantless arrest made w a s legal? No. Ratio: Rules of Court Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. Apeace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arresta person;( a ) W h e n , i n h i s p r e s e n c e , t h e p e r s o n t o b e a r r e s t e d h a s committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commitan offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and hehas personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person tobe arrested has committed it; and( c ) W h e n t h e person to be arrested is a prisoner who hasescaped from a penal establishment or place where he i s serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his caseis pending, or has escaped while being transferred from oneconfinement to another. Clearly circumstances of the case doesn’t comeunder Par. (c). -

People v. Aruta FACTS: In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as

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the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed themarijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his businesswas selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

People v. Aminnudin Facts:

Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a

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Issue:

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal. Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The saidmarijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.

People v. Musa Facts:

People v. Malmstedt A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa's house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

FACTS: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a 'cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.' They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant. HELD: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport. A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:

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opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political dev''t of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their sarety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence. Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the 'plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the 'plain view' of the object.

Issue: Whether or not the concerns of the petitioners are sufficient to declare the checkpoints illegal Held:

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the 'plain view' of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the 'plain view' of said object.

Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.

Therefore, the 'plain view' does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Valmonte v. De Villa

Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp Inc. (Sept. 13, 2004) UNAVAILABLE

Facts: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral

People v. Maribel Lagman and Zeng Wa Shui

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Facts:

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

On appeal is the CA Decision affirming that of the RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 59 convicting Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng) alias “Alex Chan,” and Maribel Lagman (Maribel) of violation of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. 7659. 1996 January - from the surveillance conducted by NBI agents of a piggery farm in Porac, it was gathered that three Chinese nationals, namely Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng), Li Wien Shien (Li) and Jojo Gan (Gan) occupied the farm, and Maribel frequented the place while Zeng and Liu would go over to her rented house in Balibago, Angeles City. 1996 March 14 – in the early morning, two NBI teams, armed with search warrants, simultaneously raided the Porac farm and the Balibago residence. The search of the farm, covered by Search Warrant No. 96-102, yielded no person therein or any tell-tale evidence that it was being used as a shabu laboratory. Only pigs in their pens, and two (2) containers or drums the contents of which when field-tested on-the-spot by NBI chemist Januario Bautista turned out to be acetone and ethyl, were found. The leader and members of the raiding team thereupon brought their vehicles inside the farm and closed its gates, expecting that the suspected operators would arrive.

The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. Search Warrant No. 96-102 named Zeng, a.k.a. "Alex Chan," as one of the subjects thereof. When he arrived in his L-300 van at the piggery during the NBI’s stakeout, he came within the area of the search. The drum alleged to have contained the methamphetamine was placed in the open back of the van, hence, open to the eye and hand of the NBI agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the plain view of the NBI agents, hence, a product of a legal search.

At around 12:00 noon, Zeng arrived at the farm on board an L-300 Mitsubishi van bearing a blue drum containing liquid which, when field-tested on the spot also by NBI Chemist Bautista, was found positive for shabu.

Secretary Of National Defense V. Manalo

Issue:

Facts:

Whether or not the search and seizure made on the van driven by Zeng is valid.

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Held: YES, the search and seizure made on the van driven by Zeng is valid. It falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the

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Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals and Garcia UNAVAILABLE Zulueta v. CA

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct Held: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.

Issue: Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence; Held: No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a]

Section 3 -- Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

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court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. Navarro v. Court of Appeals (313 SCRA 153 [August 26, 1999])

Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional. Held:

Section 4 -- Freedom of Expression and Assembly and Petition Freedom of Expression

Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — ie, "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such

National Press Club v. Comelec Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.

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act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Issue: Whether or Not the COMELEC's prohibition unconstitutional. Held:

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. Adiong v. Comelec

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

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candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.

Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.

Iglesia ni. Cristo v. CA

Held:

Facts:

Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC's ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom

Issue:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,

53 1R 2011-2012 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASE DIGESTS

may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants. Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. vs. CA Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

US v. Bustos Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the

Issue:

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Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Held:

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.

Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. v. Capulong Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright

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and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.

Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. Reyes v. Bagatsing Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated. Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,

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and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.

Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak FACTS:

Held: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.

Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom of expression was violated in the case at bar HELD:

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians.

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear

Chavez v. Gonzales and NTC Facts:

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The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.

Primicias v. Fugoso Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1

Issue: Is the warning to media in not airing the “hello Garci” tapes a case of prior restraint? Ruling: Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated. Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide

Assembly and Petition

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adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.

The Mayor's first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated. Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.

Reyes v. Bagatsing Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.

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A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

Hence this petition. Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

Malabanan v. Ramento Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 AM to 12:00 PM, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. Luzviminda de la Cruz vs. CA, et al.

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Facts:

upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with the administrative complaints filed before its office by their respective principals for participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of their constitutional right and insist their assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of classes.

PBM Employees Association v. PBM Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. CS de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 AM to 2 PM on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners’ exercise of their right to freedom to assembly and petition were valid. Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the exercise of their right to ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for redress should be done within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly prejudicial to the best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects

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employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated. Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KMP v. Ermita UNAVAILABLE Section 5 -- Freedom of Religion Aglipay v. Ruiz Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

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Education (Allen) from removing appellant's members from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant). Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Facts: New York's Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of

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veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

Issue:

Iglesia ni. Cristo v. CA

Held:

Facts:

Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC's ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the

Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)

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threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Soriano V. Laguardia

Section 6 -- Liberty of Abode and of Travel

Facts:

Marcos v. Manglapus

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Facts:

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue: Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the

Issue:

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Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Held: Silverio v. Court of Appeals "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner's passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court. Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court. Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]).

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without

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Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,SJ, Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

Section 7 -- Right to Information Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. UNAVAILABLE

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that

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Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

Chavez v. PCGG

The power to control the execution of the SC's decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice.

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. ISSUE:

The Court also rejected public respondent's contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is

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Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMA’s and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were:

HELD: 1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project. 2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it. 3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.

Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUES: Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege; Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

Romulo L. Neri V. Senate Committee On Accountability Of Public Officers And Investigations FACTS:

RULING: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and

The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide “the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.” Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to

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answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.

salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Section 8 -- Right to Form Associations

Held:

Social Security System Employees Asso. v. CA

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing nonstriking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same

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shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association but instead reinforces it.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with their employer that all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions.

In Re: Edillon (84 SCRA 554 [1978]) Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association. Held:

Issue: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed

Whether or not the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? Held: No. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege

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moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that: 1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller. 2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal. Issue:

Section 10 -- Non-Impairment Clause Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated. Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank (94 SCRA 533 [1979]) Held: Facts: No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in

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the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.

credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Lozano vs. Martinez FACTS:

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions. ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract RULING:

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

No. Article III, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that: "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." However, the freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or

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Section 12 -- Custodial Investigation

People v. Judge Ayson

Gamboa v. Cruz

Facts:

Facts:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conductand Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a lineup of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated. Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused.

On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

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This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, oradministrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond reasonable ground and WON his rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated. Held: The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven in the case.The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was within the requirement of Miranda rights and within lawful means where his confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

People v. Maqueda Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, TeresitaMendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions.

People v. Mahinay Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions contending that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights on custodial interrogation.

Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to

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SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed suchdocument. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.

Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa. Issue:

Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC: Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence. Held:

Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.

People v. Deniega (251 SCRA 626, 637 [1995]) Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and the basis of the lower court’s conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions.

The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense."

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on their extrajudicial confession.

Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extrajudicial admission is inadmissible as evidence.

Held:

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The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing. The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. “Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.” Thus, because of these defects in observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.

accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. Issue: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process of custodial investigation. Held: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since the authorities failed to provide him counsel during the interrogation and he was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel.When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counselpresent. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include:

People v. Bandula Facts: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano, security guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay,counsel of plantation. They ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accusedappellant is charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted.

1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them. 2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance. Reason for Accused Sedigo’s "black eye" which even Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandula’s fractured rib.

During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was provided with one in the person of Atty. Zerna, a municipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement admitting the shooting of the victim. Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and

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3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel,public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.

started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged. Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers.

Furthermore, the counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused cannot afford to have his own counsel then he will be provided by the authorities with one. Providing the accused with municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty of said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure to meet the requisites of due process for conducting custodial investigation.

The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time. Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation. After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

People v. Lucero Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The prosecution: Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pagasa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA. Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.When the investigator

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accusedappellant. Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the

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commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible.

that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiaño escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established, hence this appeal.

The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession.

Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence to warrant conviction.

Issue:

Held: No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in court. Despite asking for his uncle to represent him he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the private prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement made by the accused were not signed by him. By making his statements the accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent but that was not put in writing either. It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the statement of the accused when the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard requirements of the due process that should be accorded to the accused in custodial investigation, hence he should be acquitted.

Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed. People v. Agustin Facts: Quiaño, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quiaño. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint atKennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise

People v. Pinlac Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel. Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

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informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.

Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. People v. Andan

People v. Bolanos (211 SCRA 262 [1992])

FACTS:

Facts:

Instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, versus Anicia RamosAndan and Potenciana Nieto, accused, Anicia Ramos Andan, accused-appellant." On February 4, 1991, Anicia Ramos-Andan, herein petitioner, and Potenciana Nieto approached Elizabeth E. Calderon and offered to buy the latter’s 18-carat heart-shaped diamond ring. Elizabeth agreed to sell her ring. In turn, Potenciana tendered her three (3) postdated checks.

Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.

Inasmuch as the three checks (PDB Check Nos. 14173188, 14173189, and 14173190) were all payable to cash, Elizabeth required petitioner to endorse them. The latter complied. When Elizabeth deposited the checks upon maturity with the drawee bank, they bounced for the reason "Account Closed." She then sent Potenciana a demand letter to pay, but she refused.

Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

On July 10, 1997, Elizabeth filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan a Complaint for Estafa against petitioner and Potenciana. Finding a probable cause for Estafa against them, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan. Subsequently, petitioner was arrested but Potenciana has remained

Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been

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at large. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.

not proven in Court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence a petition to the Supreme Court.

During the hearing, petitioner denied buying a diamond ring from Elizabeth, maintaining that she signed the receipt and the checks merely as a witness to the transaction between Elizabeth and Potenciana. Thus, she could not be held liable for the bounced checks she did not issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty under Art.315 HELD:

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing upon her an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day ofpri si on mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Elizabeth E. Calderon in the amount of P73,000.00 representing the purchase price of the diamond ring.

The elements of the offense as defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not know that the offender had no funds or insufficient funds.

The trial court held that while it was Potenciana who issued the checks, nonetheless, it was petitioner who induced Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same. Accordingly, petitioner cannot escape liability. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. The maximum penalty imposed was increased to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal and the indemnity was reduced to P23,000.00 considering the RTC’s finding that: Complainant, however, was able to present in Court only Planters Development Bank (Check) No. 14173188, dated June 30, 1991, in the amount of P23,000.00 and the fact of its being dishonored. The other two checks were neither presented nor the fact of being dishonored proven. Likewise, the two checks were not mentioned in the demand letter marked as Exhibit ‘C.’ Although, therefore, it is clear from the records, in fact admitted by the accused, that the total amount of P23,000.00 as purchase price of the diamond ring has not been paid, the accused should only be held liable for the dishonor of the check above- stated as the dishonor of the two other checks was

All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution proved that the checks were issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation, i.e., the checks were issued in payment for the ring. The checks bounced when Elizabeth deposited them for the reason "Account Closed." There is no showing whatsoever that before petitioner handed and endorsed the checks to Elizabeth, she took steps to ascertain that Potenciana has sufficient funds in her account. Upon being informed that the checks bounced, she failed to give an adequate explanation why Potenciana’s account was closed. In Echaus v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that "the fact that the postdated checks…were not covered by sufficient funds, when they fell due, in the absence of any explanation or justification by petitioner, satisfied the element of deceit in the crime of estafa, as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code." People v. Macam Facts:

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Prosecution’s version: On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.

contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case. Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible. Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the incourt identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.

Defense’s version: Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things.

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial. The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the house served as a looked out. Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as coconspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua. Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore

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People v. Herson Tan y Verzo

Held:

Facts:

No.It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads: As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing. In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice. Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

Issue: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be

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made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel."

Held:

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."

In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

People v. Dy

People v Alicando (G.R. No. 117487, December 2, 1995)

Facts:

Facts:

Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things like clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review. Issue:

Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.

Held:

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discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995 was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration.

Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the lower for further proceeding. Juanita A. Aquino v. Teresita B. Paiste UNAVAILABLE Section 13 -- Right to Bail Basco v. Rapatalo FACTS:

Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August 141995, in a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M.Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant

ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVINGEVIDENCE? HELD:

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NO. If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution.

must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process. The cited cases (w/c I didn’t include kse madami) are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. Corollary, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the Tucay v Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the state' s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the

In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release. It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person" charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,

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prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense. An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing. The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the case of Herras Teehankee v Director of Prisons. It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided 50 years ago under a completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments

introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court .It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 crucial sentence “The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.” is not found in the counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel dutybound to grant the bail application. The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused. However, the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits. In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, SC reiterated the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion(Sections 7 and 8, supra);(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied. The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications.

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People v. Judge Donato

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.

Facts: This however was denied. Hence the appeal. Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and afterFebruary 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoringto full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearingthe prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition forhabeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPPNPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false;

People v. Fortes Facts:

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Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.

Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pretrial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional libertyand a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition forhabeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

Comendador v. De Villa (200 SCRA 80 [1991]) Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial

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petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

Issue:

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception tothe general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused. Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion. Note: A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the precharge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Baylon v. Judge Sison Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of

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Manotoc v. Court of Appeals

Section 14 -- Criminal Due Process Criminal Due Process

Facts: Tatad v. Sandiganbayan This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pretrial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail. Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

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alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

Galman v. Sandiganbayan But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio inreverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people

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are entitled to due process.

participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hallwaiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the AquinoGalman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardyclause. Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle,

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except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

Alonte v. Savellano Facts: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal

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due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

Hence the appeal Issue: Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt. Held:

Issue: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process. Held: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.

Presumption of Innocence People v. Dramayo Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder.

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office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

Dumlao v. Comelec FACTS:

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE:

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public

Marquez v. Comelec Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate ofcandidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of

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insurance fraud or grandtheft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of LosAngeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet tobe served on private respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificateof candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s disqualification was filed by petitioner,but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner institutedquo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but thelatter dismissed the petition.

Corpuz v. People

Issue:

Issue:

Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate ofcandidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading awarrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice.”

Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge against him

Held:

It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.

Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower court’s decision finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurer’s office. He denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: “Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: “(a)xxxx “(e)Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here orabroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convictedby final judgment.” It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not privaterespondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quowarranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceedwith the case.

Antonio F. Trillanes IV v. Hon. Pimentel, Sr. Facts: At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order

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No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

- Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the courtof First Instance of Romblon with slight illegaldetention because according to the information,being a private person, he did "feloniously andwithout justifiable motive, kidnap and detain oneArtemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado forabout eight hours thereby depriving said ArtemiaFabreag of her personal liberty - During the trial, he plead guilty as he was without alawyer, and that a certain Numeriano Ocampo toldHolgado to plead guilty. The Court reserved thesentence for a two days despite the fiscal’sassurances that the certain Numeriano Ocampo hasbeen investigated and found without evidence to linkhim to the crime- It must be noticed that in the caption of the case asit appears in the judgment above quoted, the offensecharged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION whilein the body of the judgment if is said that theaccused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In theformation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said thathe "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slightillegal detention." The facts alleged in saidinformation are not clear as to whether the offense isnamed therein or capital offense of "kidnapping andserious illegal detention" as found by the trial judgein his judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleadedguilty and no evidence appears to have beenpresented by either party, the trial judge must havededuced the capital offense from the facts pleaded inthe information.

Held: WH E RE FO RE, the petition is DIS MIS S E D. Ratio/Doctrine: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

ISSUE: WON the conviction of the lower court is valid HELD:

Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law

NO. It is invalid.- Under the circumstances, particularly the qualifiedplea given by the accused who was unaided bycounsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for thetrial court to render such a serious judgment findingthe accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposingupon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and oneday of prision mayor to twenty years, withoutabsolute any evidence to determine and clarify thetrue facts of the case.- rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that –If the defendant appears without attorney, he mustbe informed

Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel People v. Holgado FACTS:

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by the court that it is his right to haveattorney being arraigned., and must be asked if hedesires the aid of attorney, the Court must assignattorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonabletime must be allowed for procuring attorney.- the court has four important duties to comply with:1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right tohave attorney before being arraigned; 2 — Aftergiving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desiresand is unable to employ attorney, the court mustassign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — I the accused desires to procure an attorney of hisown the court must grant him a reasonable timetherefor.

uneducated.- It is for this reason that the right to be assisted bycounsel is deemed so important that it has become aconstitutional right and it is so implemented thatunder our rules of procedure it is not enough for theCourt to apprise an accused of his right to have anattorney, it is not enough to ask him whether hedesires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential thatthe court should assign one de oficio if he so desiresand he is poor grant him a reasonable time toprocure an attorney of his own.- in the instant case, that the accused who wasunaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with thefollowing qualification: "but I was instructed by oneMr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as tothe true import of this qualification. the record doesnot show whether the supposed instructions was real. and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. Noinvestigation was opened by the court on this matterin the presence of the accused and there is now noway of determining whether the supposed instructionis a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court becamesatisfied with the fiscal's information that he hadinvestigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the samehad nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of thecourt was wrong for the simple reason that a merestatement of the fiscal was not sufficient toovercome a qualified plea of the accused. But aboveall, the court should have seen to it that the accusedbe assisted by counsel specially because of thequalified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

- IN THE CASE, Not one of these duties had beencomplied with by the trial court. The record disclosesthat said court did not inform the accused of his rightto have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desiredthe aid of one. The trial court failed to inquirewhether or not the accused was to employ anattorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure orassign an attorney de oficio .- The question asked by the court to the accusedwas "Do you have an attorney or are you going toplead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail toinform the accused that it was his right to have anattorney before arraignment, but, what is worse,the question was so framed that it could have beenconstrued by the accused as a suggestion from thecourt that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. Andthis is a denial of fair hearing in violation of thedue process clause contained in our Constitution.- One of the great principles of justice guaranteed byour Constitution is that "no person shall be held toanswer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to beheard by himself and counsel." In criminal casesthere can be no fair hearing unless the accused begiven the opportunity to be heard by counsel. Theright to be heard would be of little avail if it does notinclude the right to be heard by counsel. Even themost intelligent or educated man may have no skillin the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may beconvicted not because he is guilty but because hedoes not know how to establish his innocence. Andthis can happen more easily to persons who areignorant or

Dispositive The judgment appealed from isreversed and the case is remanded to the Courtbelow for a new arraignment and a new trial after theaccused is apprised of his right to have and to beassisted by counsel. So ordered People v. Agbayani Facts: T

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he appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial.

represent the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement of the hearing.

Issue:

Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.

Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice.

Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. Amion v. Chiongson

Ferdinand A. Cruz v. Judge Mijares UNAVAILABLE

Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellant’s opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to

Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation Pecho vs. People Facts:

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The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.

against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.

Issue:

Soriano v. Sandiganbayan

Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted

Facts:

However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.

Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows: 1.To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; 2.To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; 3.To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

Issue:

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation

Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019. Held:

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without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.

R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned. Held:

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b). The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.

Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC. Borja v. Mendoza Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The

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case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

Held: It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this case, the Court finds no violation of petitioner’s rights. The recital of facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of qualified theft.

Sheala P. Matrido v. People of the Philippines Facts: Sheala Matrido (petitioner) assails the May 31, 2007 Decision and August 1, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s Decision of December 13, 2004 convicting her of qualified theft. As a credit and collection assistant of private complainant Empire East Land Holdings, Inc., petitioner was tasked to collect payments from buyers of real estate properties such as Laguna Bel-Air developed by private complainant, issue receipts therefor, and remit the payments to private complainant in Makati City. On June 10, 1999, petitioner received amortization payment from one Amante dela Torre in the amount of P22,470.66 as evidenced by the owner’s copy of Official Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted only P4,470.66 to private complainant as reflected in the treasury department’s copy of Official Receipt No. 36547 submitted to private complainant, both copies of which bear the signature of petitioner and reflect a difference of P18,000. On private complainant’s investigation, petitioner was found to have failed to remit payments received from its clients, prompting it to file various complaints, one of which is a Complaint-Affidavit of September 21, 2000 for estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2000-I-32381 in the Makati Prosecutor’s Office.

As alleged in the Information, petitioner took, intending to gain therefrom and without the use of force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons, a personal property consisting of money in the amount P18,000 belonging to private complainant, without its knowledge and consent, thereby gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as credit and collection assistant who had access to payments from private complainant’s clients, specifically from one Amante Dela Torre. The penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than the applicable penalty for simple theft. The amount stolen in this case was P18,000.00. In cases of theft, if the value of the personal property stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Two degrees higher than this penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary

Issue: Whether the appellate court “gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial [court] convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft despite the fact that the prosecution tried to prove during the trial the crime of estafa thus denying the petitioner the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against her?

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surrender being present, the maximum penalty shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or within the range of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 20 days.

case tried. It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial People vs. Tee Facts: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.

Flores v. People Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.

Issue: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case? Held: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated? Held:

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the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz (50 SCRA 18 [1972]) Facts: Petitioners were charged with robbery in band with homicide. They filed motions to dismiss the criminal cases which were not immediately resolved by the respondent Judge. In the meantime, another suspect, one Rolando Reyes was arrested. He executed an extra-judicial statement and signed and swore to its truth before the respondent Judge wherein he implicated the petitioners. On this basis, the respondent Judge deferred action on the petitioner’s motion to dismiss until after the prosecution had presented and rested its case against Reyes. Reyes was tried separately and in the absence of petitioners. During the petitioner’s trial, Reyes was called as an additional witness where he repudiated his extra-judicial statement contending that the same was procured through threats by a government agent. As a consequence, he petitioners filed a motion to disqualify the respondent Judge on the ground that Reyes had repudiated the extra-judicial statement which the latter sworn to before the former and that the latter would have to pass upon the repudiation. The motion to disqualify was denied by the respondent Judge.

Conde v. Rivera Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial?

Issue:

Held:

Whether the respondent Judge should disqualify was denied by the respondent Judge.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down

Held: Petition is granted. The restraining order issued is made permanent.

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It is beyond that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Petitioners can assert then that this court has the power to set aside the order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs to the respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to this court’s corrective authority. There can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse disqualification is to cast valid doubts as to court’s impartiality. In this case, the respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such extra-judicial statement. It is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant’s turn about which his later declaration that there was intimidation by considering that the respondent Judge would have to pass judgment on a question that by implication had already been answered by him (having already given his opinion on the matter).

Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases. The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia. During all the 14days of trial, spanning a period of several months, the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day (April 20) when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. But at the insistence of Carbonnel, the trial proceeded and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14page memorandum in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; theme memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases.- The promulgation of judgment scheduled on Sep23, 1968 was postponed to Sep 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Consengco, , and again to Oct 1,1968. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings.However, on October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge Felix Domingo issued a restraining order thuscausing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial, noting 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and notin the court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge Garcia, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated

Garcia v. Domingo FACTS: On January 16, 1968, in the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge Gregorio Garcia, 8informations were filed against respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Francisco Lorenzana, for slight physical injuries, maltreatment, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and for slander. The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, 30, 1968; April 17, & 20, 1968, May4 & 11, 1968, June 1, 15, 22 & 29, 1968, August 3 &10, 1968. All the 14 trial dates except March 4 and18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and

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the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.”- The MR was denied. Hence, on January 28, 1969, the matter was elevated to the SC by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition.

state constitution in 1776. Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public.- The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. Accdg to J. Laurel, the importance of this right is its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the holding of the trial of the accused inside the chambers of petitioner ,city court Judge Gregorio Garcia, as violative of the constitutional right to public trial HELD: YES. The procedure had been agreed to beforehand by accused. The hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy.- The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from Justice Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely are iteration what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States.Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, in the leading case of In re Oliver: This nation’s accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in the English common law heritage, but it likely evolved long before thesettlement of the US as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial.The guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a

Trial in Absentia People v. Salas FACTS: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the

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victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one RamilTalens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide

(1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. (2) Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with homicide. HELD: There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court. The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect,

ISSUES:

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a fact known to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.

Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.

Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak when her son, RamilTalens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes.

While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found.

Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive.

The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant.So ordered.

The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit.

Carredo v. People FACTS: Accused after arraignment waives his right to appear in court during the trial while under a bond. At the presentation of the principal witness the court issued a subpoena to the accused to appear on trial for the purpose of meeting the witness face to face, however he did not appear with the justification of his waiver. Subsequently the municipal judge issued order of arrest of the accused with confiscation of his cash bond and ordering the bondsman to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered against him.

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not an accused may be compelled by the court to appear before the court despite waiver in favor of trail by absentia.

were then apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

HELD: The court held that such waiver only constitutes a waiver of the right of the accused to meet the witness face to face. It does not in effect deprive the prosecution of its right to require the presence of the accused for the purpose of identification by its witnesses which is vital in the conviction of the accused. It does not further release the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused is accorded with the right to waive his own personal right but not his duty and obligation to the court. “Trial in absentia not allowed when it is necessary to establish the identity of accused by the witness”

ISSUE: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to push through on the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang. HELD: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites of trial in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction over Magumnang.

People v. Mapalao FACTS: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar HadjiEdris, GumanakOmpa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.

In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The prosecution had strong evidence against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was not violated.

After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate. While the car was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other passengers and divested them of their properties.

People vs. Valeriano, et al. Facts:

On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). When the car was near the precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out of the car and went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left inside the car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped. Quiambao, who owned the car, helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers

The accusatory portion in the information for murder. Facts are as follows: "That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

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accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos and 'pinuti', did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on the person of one RizalinaApatanSilvano while the latter was about to leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked behind the knee; abdomen hacked with visceraeevacerated,' and did then and there set the house on fire while the aforementioned RizalinaApatanSilvano was inside said house trying to escape therefrom, and allowing her to be burned inside said house which was burned to the ground, thereby causing upon said RizalinaApatanSilvano her death and burning her beyond recognition.

attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of victim RizalinaApatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse of superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetuataking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court believes that simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused EngracioValeriano only. But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano, accused EngracioValeriano only is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large, no penalty could be imposed on him since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from frustrated homicide.

But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the records of these two cases were burned. The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it could commence, accused EngracioValeriano jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16 November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. An alias warrant for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, but he remains at large up to the present.

The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: JuanitoRismundo, MacarioAcabal and AbundioNahid are hereby ordered cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate confinement."

After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial court, then presided over by Judge Pacifico S. Bulado.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the judgment complied with the Rules of Court.

The decision of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31 October 1991 but promulgated on 20 December 1991, contained no specific dispositive portion. Its rulings are found in the last two paragraphs which read as follows:

(2) Whether or not the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused is valid.

"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the killing of RizalinaApatan-Silvano having been proved by the prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the

(4) Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder.

(3) Whether or not the accused may be tried in absentia.

Held:

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We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.

III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel. In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him.

It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently filed their written notice of appeal. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal.

Right of Confrontation U.S. v. Javier UNAVAILABLE Talino v. Sandiganbayan UNAVAILABLE

The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants.

Section 15 -- Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971])

The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused EngracioValeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article

Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups.

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Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

made to numerous documents. At the close of his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously scheduled hearing of December 12, 1973 was cancelled, and Padua's crossexamination was reset on December 17, 1973. However, the hearing of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again at the instance of defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning." After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on March 1, 1974, Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac and that the cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion. Apart from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiff’s counsel took the additional step of sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed the case. Padua moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional. HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUE :

Section 16 -- Right to a Speedy Disposition of Cases

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in dismissing the case on the ground that it violates the right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Padua v. Ericta RULING: FACTS : Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of

Domingo Padua, petitioner sought to recover damages for the injuries suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G. Ramos. Padua was litigating in forma pauperis. Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct examination in the course of which reference was

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the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment. Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.

Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners. Section 17 -- Right Against Self-Incrimination U. S. v. Tan Teng

Flores v. People Facts: Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.

Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Philippines against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

Issue: The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against selfincrimination.

Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated. Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination.

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Held:

Beltran v. Samson

The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. Issue:

Villaflor v. Summers Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physicalexamination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in thepresent case that if permission

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

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to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him. > prosecution version of what happened: Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird(car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee answered yes. Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to Dy Sunk which is the registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. >sumilang’s verson (one of the accused):

Chavez v. Court of Appeals FACTS: >this is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that he is entitled to be freed from imprisonment upon ground that trial which resulted his conviction, HE WAS DENIED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF. >judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car together with accessories) >an information was filed against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. >all the accused plead not guilty. >during the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there

Sumilang saw Chavez at gas station and told about the

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Thunderbird. They raised the money. Chavez went to Sumilang house and asked if he was ready for the rest of money. He affirmed. At Eugene’s Sumilang saw Pascual and warned Chavez was a smart agent and advised that Sumilang should be careful. Then the deed of sale was executed. Two or three days after, Asistio offered to buy the car of Sumilang and tendered the down payment.

himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. >There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence

>trial court gave credence to the testimony of Sumilang. As to Chavez, his testimony established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and branded him “Self – confessed culprit”. >trial court decision: freed all other accused except Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

>The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless.

>chavez appealed to the Court of appeals but it was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been violated? HELD:

>Supreme Court decision: Petition granted. Accused must be discharge.

>Petitioner claims that there was a violation of right against self – incrimation.

Section 19 -- Prohibited Punishment People v. Estoista UNAVAILABLE

>Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient

People v. Esparas and Libed UNAVAILABLE Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

>During the trial, the petitioner declined to be a witness but the judge had impliedly forced him by saying that the prosecution has the right and that his testimony will not be used against him.

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality

>Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate

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of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But theexercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Theimportant part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possessescollateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. Thesuspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspensionof the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death

Section 20 -- Non-Imprisonment for Debt Serafin v. Lindayag (67 SCRA 166 [1975]) Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife CorazonMendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.) Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt? Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no

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collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.

punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

Lozano v. Martinez

Section 21 -- Double Jeopardy

Facts:

People v. Obsania (23 SCRA 1249 [1968])

A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed. Issue:

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when

The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law

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the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207. Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.

Paulin v. Gimenez Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case atbar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.

Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.

The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right tocomplete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied. Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan

A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.

Facts: Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987 with the Supreme court against then acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, herein petitioner Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence. 1

Issues:

The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders of detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 issued by the said acting judge against complainant (Magbago) for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution. The

(1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.

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Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988. Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, complainant Magbago also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter-complaint earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Sandiganbayan. People v. Balisacan Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. Ruling: It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature. When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted incomplete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 6 All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention that said administrative case against him before the Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the

People v. City Court of Silay Facts: Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Ernesto de la

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Paz, overseer of Hda. Malisbog belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, and the other three accused, scalers of Hawaiian-Philippine Company, with intent of gain and to cause damage by conniving, cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane weight report card or "tarjeta", a private document showing the weight of sugarcane belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, particularly those loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686, 1743 and 1022 by increasing the total actual weight of 22.005 tons to 27.160 tons for said three cane cars, thereby causing damage to the central and other cane planters of about 8.68 piculs of sugar valued in the total amount of P618.19, to the damage and prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other sugarcane planters adhered thereto in the aforestated amount of P618.19. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged.

As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party, the HawaiianPhilippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter. Esmena v. Pogoy Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether the plea of double jeopardy is available in this situation? Ruling: We disagree with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. that the plea of double jeopardy is not available in the instant situation. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

Issue:

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Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent, was separately accused of having committed the crime of estafa and of falsification both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. She sought the quashal of the latter charge on the supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the same felony. Her first attempt was unsuccessful but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of committing estafa.

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.

The accused filed an Application for Registration of her parcel of land, which was already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano. She then sold the said parcel again to several other people, which sales were registered and annotated with the Register of Deeds. Despite several demands from Ilano, Naval refuses to return the payment of the former. Issues: 1) Whether or not the court below correctly quashed the information for falsification. 2) Whether or not the court below correctly shared the notion that private respondent was in danger of double jeopardy. Held: 1) Assuming that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa, which ordinarily constitutes a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and thus susceptible to challenge via a motion to quash, still, it was serious error of the defendant to have appreciated this discourse in favor of private respondent since this matter was not specifically raised in the motion to quash but only in the motion for reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this additional ground after her motion to quash was denied. The theory of a single crime advanced by private respondent in her belated, nay, "second" motion to quash couched as motion for reconsideration is not synonymous with "pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy". In effect, therefore, respondent judge accommodated another basis for

People v. Judge Pineda Facts:

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the quashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated in the motion therefor. 2) It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the notion that private respondent is in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act, a circumstance recognized under Section 2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as suggested in the motion to quash, because this plea is understood to presuppose that the other case against private respondent has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. In the Asuncion case, Justice Nocon said that: . . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused.

due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases. (2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case. Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case. The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

People v. Tampal Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large. The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement

Melo v. People UNAVAILABLE

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days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent.

People v. Adil FACTS: The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was as follows: That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto attached.

People v. Judge Relova FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiringdevices have been installed without authority from the citygovernment and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease thereadings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electricalinstallations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electricaldevices without the approval and necessary authority from the CityGovernment which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which

Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a lettercomplaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo (Case No. 5241) against Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same incidents. Issue: Whether of not there has been a case of double jeopardy on the part of the respondent. Held: The plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January, the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance from 5 to 9

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is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke doublejeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code. Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of doublejeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of doublejeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Section 22 -- Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder Issues: People v. Ferrer (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Facts:

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Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished.Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some otheremployees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter.

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other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.

People v. Sandiganbayan Facts:

On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes thecrime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as amongcrimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.

Issue:

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted. Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the

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accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.

overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975). ISSUE:

Lacson v. Executive Secretary et al. UNAVAILABLE

Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.

“Equal Protection” – KBG – Cases Before the Sandiganbayan HELD: FACTS: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class

On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to

The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,

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which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.

The controversy in the case at bar centers on the citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr. as to whether or not he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. RULING:

Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth stressing that since private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was born on August 20, 1939, the applicable law then controlling was the 1935 constitution. The issue on private respondent’s citizenship is so essential in view of the constitutional provision that, “No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.” Natural-borncitizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter is governed by the provisions of the 1935 Constitution which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

V. ARTICLE IV -- CITIZENSHIP Tecson, et al. v. Commission on Elections FACTS: The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by petitioners questioning the certificate of candidacy of herein private respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) party. He represented himself in said certificate as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, which reason that petitioners filed a petition before the Comelec to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter made amaterial misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipinowhen in truth his parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate child. The Comelec dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:

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Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Facts:

have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements.

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

Yu v. Defensor-Santiago FACTS: Petitioner Yu, originally a Portuguese national, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen on 10February 1978. However, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed PortuguesePassport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.The CID detained the petitioner pending his deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition forhabeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc.

The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held:

ISSUE: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent,Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship HELD: Yes. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed whenrequired and suppressed when convenient. Petitioner, while still a citizen of the Philippines who hadrenounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreignprince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents hesigned, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime inApril 1980. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly andexplicitly and not left to

On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should

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inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed orreacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport andrepresented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippinecitizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with hismaintenance of Philippine citizenship.WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediatelyexecutory.While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely andforever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality asPortuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Frivaldo v. Comelec Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a

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qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

Republic of the Philippines v. Judge de la Rosa FACTS: This case is a consolidation of 3 petitions that primarily aims to declare the naturalized citizenship of Juan Frivaldo as invalid and consequently, nullify his proclamation as governor of Sorsogon.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It appears that Frivaldo had served as governor of Sorsogon for six terms already and was only compelled to renounce his citizenship when he sought political asylum in US due to the precarious political atmosphere here in the country during the Marcos regime. As he wasn’t able to reacquire his citizenship through repatriation or through act of Congress, he was forced to file a petition for naturalization on September 1991. The judge set the hearing on March 16 1992 and ordered the publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation---for three consecutive weeks, at least once every week, the last publication to be made six months before the scheduled hearing. However, Frivaldo asked the court if the hearing could be moved to an earlier date as he intends to participate in the May 1992 elections, the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy being March 15 1992, a day ahead of the scheduled hearing. The court granted his request and set the hearing on Feb 21 1991. Of this advancement of hearing, neither publication nor posting

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and

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of notice was made. Six days after said hearing, Judge Dela Rosa rendered a decision granting Frivaldo’s application and allowed him to take his oath of allegiance on that same day. To this, petitioner Quiterio Hermo, Frivaldo’s rival for governorship in Sorsogon, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging jurisdictional defects in the proceedings.

period. Thus, as qualifications for public office is a continuing requirement, once lost (citizenship), title may be seasonably challenged. 3. Hermo cannot be proclaimed as winner. Well settled is the rule that upon disqualification of the winner in an election, the second placer cannot be proclaimed as winner having failed to obtain the mandate of the majority of the electorate.

Subsequently, two petitions were filed mainly alleging that Frivaldo is an American citizen and is therefore ineligible to run, and that the court’s decision is null and void for being fraught with legal infirmities. In one of the petitions, petitioner Hermo prayed that the votes casted in favor Frivaldo be declared as stray votes and that he be declared winner instead. These petitions were all dismissed by Comelec on the ground that such petitions were filed out of time, as it should have been filed within three days.

Labo v. Comelec FACTS: Ramon Labo Jr. is a person granted Australian citizenship in 1976 although this fact is still questionable since no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance2 as a naturalized Australian citizen. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980 and in 1988, Labo ran and won as mayor of Baguio City but was protested against by Luis Lardizabal, alleging that Labo is an alienand therefore, disqualified to run for office. Lardizabal asked for Labo’s proclamation as mayor beannulled and as the person who got the second highest number of votes in the previously held election,he be declared as the new mayor of Baguio City.

ISSUES: 1. W/N Comelec was correct in dismissing the petitions for being filed out of time? 2. W/N the proceedings were invalid making Frivaldo not a Filipino citizen and thus ineligible for public office? 3. W/N Hermo may be proclaimed winner upon nullification of Frivaldo’s proclamation?

ISSUE:

RULING

Whether or not a runner up in the elections can replace an ousted official.

1.Comelec erred in dismissing the petitions on the ground that they were filed out of time. The petitions, by their nature, are quo warranto. As such, they are not covered by the 10-day appeal period provided in Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2. The proceedings were invalid and Comelec should have cancelled Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy. The Court never acquired jurisdiction over the case due to the following irregularities: (1) there was no order published advancing the date of the hearing, (2) the petition was heard within 6 months from last publication of the petition, (3) Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance when there was still a pending appeal , and (4) Frivaldo did not observe the 2-year waiting

HELD: Negative. Lardizabal can not assume the position of mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio. Labo’s disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office.Instead, the vice mayor shall replace Labo. Aznar v. Comelec Facts:

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1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

HELD: SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegia nceto support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied"

2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. 3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1") 4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65. 5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

Mercado vs. Manzano & Comelec

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?

Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. In the results of the elections,

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Manzano obtained the highest number of votes, however his was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the BOC, Manzano as vice mayor of the City of Makati. Hence, this petition.

Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

ISSUE: 1. 2. 3.

WON Mercado has the right to bring suit? WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification? WON there was a valid election of citizenship?

HELD: I.

Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3044, the BOC tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner. On May 19, 1998, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification (case filed by Mamaril) it was however opposed by Manzano. Aug. 31, 1998, COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, it declared Manzano qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Marcado since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a

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candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. III. Election of Philippine Citizenship Mercado argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

II. Dual citizenship as ground for disqualification The disqualification of Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 “those with dual citizenship.” It is contended that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."

COMELEC, pursuant to §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:…(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Manzano’s certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURALBORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN

The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike

xxx xxx xxx

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By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

time allowed by present jurisprudence. - Two conditions of an effective election of Phil. Citizenship (from OSG): 1st – the mother of the person making the election must be a phil citizen 2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable time interpreted by the SOJ as 3 years from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted that this pd not inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 years not reasonable time) - Ching to support his cause invokes these special circumstances: continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, being a CP, a registered voter, and elected public official.

Petition is DISMISSED. In re Ching

ISSUE: FACTS: WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time and if so WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.

Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar - April 1964: Vicente Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils - During this time, the governing charter is the 1935Constitution.Father’s citizenship is followed, with a right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the’98 Bar Examinations. - Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship - Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC. - April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required to submit more proof of citizenship. - July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance. - OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable

WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to citizenship. HELD: No. Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1965, he was already 35 years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 in June 1999. He was already more than 14 years over the age of majority. Although the court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statutes and jurisprudence compel the court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Phil. Citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. No. The abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

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simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as anatural-born Filipino.

Bengzon III vs. HRET and Cruz Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, ofFilipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the UnitedStates. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen ofthe Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.” Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation

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APPENDICES

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Appendix A SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR

respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaintaffidavit.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioner's contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceeding Closed", in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation completed. All that is required is that the

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basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaintaffidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintainstatus quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

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Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow. I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.

Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:

There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line.

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves the three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.

As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common good.

Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Paño (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in s seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom. We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated: xxx xxx xxx ". . . No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. 'In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)

I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and prosecution service and appoints

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In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.

Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.

This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.

xxx xxx xxx "Those who won our independence believed .. that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument of force in its worst form. . . .

Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).

"Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. . . " (at pp. 700701)

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit: "In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct 328.

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Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which have not been considered.

extremely difficult is involving government power and freedom of expression. However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said. "If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression." In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied. Appendix B Silva vs. Presiding Judge

I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1 issued by respondentJudge as well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00 seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva. The antecedent facts are as follows:

The Court has decided to deter the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of possible consequences to their careers stand in the way of public duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more important areas of concern, the

On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2

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On the same day, Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Pertinent portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows: prLL

In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 4

"It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr.and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is probable cause to believe that possession and control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's Room (Rgt. side 1st Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:

Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court "holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant." 5 On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6

"X (Subject of the offense stated above (Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;

On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had replaced retired JudgeOntal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. 7

"X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.

A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated October 19, 1987.

"You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the room of TamaSilva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open (sic) aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs." 3

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari. Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality and that respondent Judge should be viewed to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed grave

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abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the Order dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1.

he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "SECTION 4.Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted."

We rule for petitioners. Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section provides: LLpr "SECTION 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers. In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this Court defined "probable cause" as follows: "The 'probable cause' for a valid search warrant, has been defined 'as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched'. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay."

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. 8 Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit: "SECTION 3.Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses

In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and

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his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:

In the case of Nolasco vs. Paño, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1986, 139 SCRA 152, 163, this Court held: "The 'probable cause' required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause upon which a warrant may issue."

"QDo you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search warrant?" AYes, sir. "QDo you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated above, and other proceeds of fruit of the offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as means of committing an offense?"

Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the search warrant issued as invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:

A Yes, sir. LexLib "QDo you know personally who is/are the person who has have the property in his/their possession and control?"

"Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him 'in the form of searching questions and answers'. On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, 'the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant." 10

AYes, sir. "QHow did you know all this (sic) things?" AThrough discreet surveillance." 9 The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

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Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 667, "the capricious disregard by thejudge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".

was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted entry into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00. On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.

The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of AntonietaSilva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.

To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond. Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioner's Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case. 1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void. Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to order the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount of P1,231.40 which had earlier been seized from her by virtue of the illegal search warrant. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. LexLib Appendix C Morano vs. Vivo

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai. With her

(a)Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the

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Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent admission, prohibiting the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

Placed to the fore is paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 [Revised Naturalization Act], which reads:

(b)Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) a valid marriage of an alien woman to a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized.

(c)Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00; and

But can the same be said of the second requisite? This question by all means is not new. In a series of cases, this court has declared that the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must satisfactorily show that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law. 3 Ly Giok Ha alias Wy Giok Ha, et al. vs. Emilio Galang, L-21332, March 18, 1966, clearly writes down the philosophy behind the rule in the following expressive language, viz:

'Sec. 15.Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."

We may concede that the first requisite has been properly met. The validity of the marriage is presumed.

(d)Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 unconstitutional Without pronouncement as to costs."

"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well he that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualified only —

Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed. We will deal with the claims of both appellants in their proper sequence. 1.The Solicitor General's brief assails the trial court's declaration that Chan Sau Wah is a citizen of the Philippines. The court a quo took the position that "Chan Sau Wah became, by virtue of, and upon, her marriage to Esteban Morano, a natural-born Filipino, a Filipino citizen." 2

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(c)Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

Because of all these, we are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan Sau Wah did not become a Filipino citizen.

(d)Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', 2.Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, which reads:

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral character'.

"Sec. 37.(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commission of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not 'opposed to organized government', nor affiliated to groups 'upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments', nor 'defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas'. Et sic de caeteris."

xxx xxx xxx (7)Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant." Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Right] of the Constitution, to wit: "(3)The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shell not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Upon the principle of selective citizenship, we cannot afford to depart from the wise precept affirmed and reaffirmed in the cases heretofore noted. In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.

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They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.

purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent."

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power 4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. 6

The following from American Jurisprudence, 5 is illuminating:

Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions." 8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were admitted as nonimmigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a), subsection (7) C.A. 613, as amended)" 9

The view, we, here express funds support in the discussions during the constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order of a competent court. 7

"It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after A fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive." xxx xxx xxx

And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution", this Court declared —

"The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of congress is

"This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulations as

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contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State." 10

"Sec. 13.Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted into the Philippines immigrants, termed 'quota immigrants' not in excess of fifty (50) of any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that the following immigrants, termed 'nonquota immigrants, may be admitted without regard to such numerical limitations. The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate and certify the eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his admission into the Philippines. Qualified and desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under temporary stay may be admitted within the quota, subject to the provision of the last paragraph of section 9 of this Act.

It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is not constitutionally proscribed. 3.A sequel to the question just discussed is the second error set forth in the government's brief. The Solicitor General balks at the lower court's ruling that petitioner Chan Sau Wah is entitled to permanent residence in the Philippines without first complying with the requirements of Sections 9 and 13 of the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503.

(a)The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty- one years of age of a Philippine citizen, if accompanying or following to join such citizen:

We first go to the law, viz: (b)A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the mother, the mother having been previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence, if the child is accompanying or coming to join a parent and applies for admission within five years from the date of its birth;"

"SEC. 9 [last paragraph] An alien who is admitted as a nonimmigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act."

Concededly, Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 15 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country;second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at

xxx xxx xxx

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the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Immigration Act.

The ruling of the trial court on this score should be reversed. 4.It is petitioner's turn to point as error the dismissal of the petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner Fu Yan Fun. Petitioner's line of thought is this: Fu Yan Fun follows the citizenship of his mother. They cite Section 15, paragraph 3, Commonwealth Act 473, which says that:

This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. 11 The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.

"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shell automatically be come a Philippine citizen. . . ." Petitioner's position is based on the assumption that Chan Sau Wah, the mother, is a Filipino citizen. We have held that she is not. At best, Fu Yan Fun is a step-son of Esteban Morano, husband of Chan Sau Wah. A step-son is not a foreign-born child of the step-father. The word child, we are certain, means legitimate child, not a step- child. We are not wanting in precedents. Thus, when the Constitution provides that "[t]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" are citizens thereof, 13 the fundamental charter intends "those" to apply to legitimate children. 14 In another case, the term "minor children" or "minor child" in Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law refers only to legitimate children of Filipino citizens. This Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, there said: 15

Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in this country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed us. We cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation. Really, it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.

"It is claimed that the phrases 'minor children' and 'minor child', used in these provisions, include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word 'children' or 'child' is used in statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides that 'those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines', and 'those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines' who shall elect

Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. 12

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Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are citizens of the Philippines Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions [3] and (4]), our fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiongbian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952)."

of the bond." 16 The reason for the rule is found in 9 C.J., p. 26 (footnote), which reads: "(a)Reason for rule. — 'Statutes requiring bonds to be approved by certain officials are not for the purpose of protecting the obligors in the bond, but are aimed to protect the public, to insure their solvency, and to create evidence of an unimpeachable character of the fact of their execution. When they are executed for a legal purpose, before a proper tribunal, and are in fact accepted and approved by the officer or body, whose duty it was to approve them, it could serve no useful purpose of the law to hold them invalid, to release all the obligation thereon, and to defeat every purpose of its execution, simply because the fact of approval was not indorsed precisely as had been directed by the Legislature.' American Book Co., vs. Wells, 83 SW 622, 627, 26 Kyl 1159." (emphasis supplied)

At any rate, Fu Yan Fun entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor. The status of a temporary visitor cannot be converted into that of a permanent resident, as we have heretofore held, without first complying with Section 9 of the Immigration Law. 5.Petitioners finally aver that the lower court erred in authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by petitioners Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun in the amount of P4,000.00. Here is petitioner's posture. They enjoyed their stay in the Philippines upon a bond. Now they come to court and say that as the prescribed form of this bond was not expressly approved by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Section 3 of Commonwealth Act 613, which reads —

And another. This bond was accepted by the government. It has been there. The form of the bond here used is of long continued usage. If the government did not question the form of the bond at all, then we must assume that it counted with the Secretary's approval. For the presumption is that official duty has been legally performed.

"Sec. 3.. . . He [Commissioner of Immigration] shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, such rules and regulations and prescribe such forms of bond, reports, and other papers, and shall issue from time to time such instruction, not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated to carry out the provisions of the immigration laws . . ." that bond is void.

Surely enough, equitable considerations will stop petitioners from pleading invalidity of the bond. They offered that bond to enable them to enter and stay in this country. They enjoyed benefits therefrom. They cannot, "in law and good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits" of that bond, and then jettison the same. They are "precluded from attacking the validity" of such bond. 17

Reasons there are which prevent us from giving our imprimatur to this argument.

Actually, to petitioners the bond was good while they sought entry into the Philippines; they offered it as security for the undertaking that they "will actually depart from the Philippines" when their term of stay expires. Now that the bond is being confiscated because they overstayed, they make an about-face and say that such bond is null

The provision requiring official approval of a bond is merely directory. "Irregularity or entire failure in this respect does not affect the validity

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and void. They shall not profit from this inconsistent position. Their bond should be confiscated.

DIZON, J ., concurring: I concur (in the result) with the majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, for the reason that, as stated therein, — "In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law".

Conformably to the foregoing, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: (1)The portion thereof which reads:

Appendix D Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxicorp Inc.

"(a)Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;"

This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC"), denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.'s ("Maxicorp") motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD 49") 4 and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC"). 5

is hereby reversed; and, in consequence — The petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and the judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside; and

Antecedent Facts On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.

(2)In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered. Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ ., concur.

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorp's premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.

Separate Opinions

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On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC denied Maxicorp's motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorp's motion for reconsideration.

2.WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners' products.

4.WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS." IaECcH

3.WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;

The Ruling of the Court The petition has merit. On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law

On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC's order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order denying Maxicorp's motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion on 29 November 1999.

Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact, which this Court should not consider in a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented in this petition involve questions of law. Petitioners point out that the facts are not in dispute.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of law. 6 Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal, 7 subject to exceptions as when the findings of the appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court. 8

Hence, this petition.

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.

The Issues Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution: 1.WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;

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There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. 9 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 10 If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. 11 Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno 12 is illustrative on this point:

cause to issue the search warrants is a question of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 13 Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments requiring an examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented during the search warrant proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. 14 When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances. 15

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are issues of fact.

Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of the RTC. 16 Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction. On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition

It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.

Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this case. 17 We ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 18 that the petitionercomplainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave

Of the three main issues raised in this petition — the legal personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause — only the first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable

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error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.

sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. 20 The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." 21 The applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient. 22 Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses. 23

On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was defective.

The Court of Appeals' reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to prove conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a connection between the offense charged and the place searched.

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners' other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.

The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.

We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's findings. Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper." 19 Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects

During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged within Maxicorp's premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its

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customers without giving the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity.

the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners' software. 27 Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit. 28 Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners' software on the same computer unit. 29 There was a comparison between petitioners' genuine software and Maxicorp's software preinstalled in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased. 30 Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of "Joel Diaz," which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.

Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp installed petitioners' software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners' software withinMaxicorp's premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software. The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe thatMaxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold withinMaxicorp's premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

This also applies to the Court of Appeals' ruling on Sacriz's testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners' witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. LibLex

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, 24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. 25 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. 26 Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC's findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano's purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. 31 For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. 32 Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners' software occurred. During

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the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase "used or intended to be used," were previously held void by this Court. 36 The disputed text of the search warrants in this case states:

On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants

a)Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft software bearing the Microsoftcopyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION contain ed in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;

A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed. 33

b)Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft instruction manuals and/or literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection with one specific offense." The articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued. 34 Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific offense.

c)Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor ofMaxicorp and reversed the RTC's Order thus:

d)Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in the recording of the reproduction and/or assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions in connection with fake or counterfeit products bearing the Microsoftcopyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioner's store can be seized on the ground that it is "used or intended to be used" in the illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private respondents' software and their manuals. 35

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warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners . . ." were found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. 41 The mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the defendant's store does not mean that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is different. Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they authorized the seizure of records pertaining to "all business transactions" of the defendant. 42 And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally connected with the legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes." 43

e)Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CDROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFTCORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights; and

However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c) states:

f)Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all computer hard drives, data bases and other information storage devices containing unauthorized Microsoft software. 37 (Emp hasis supplied)

c)Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. 38 The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern. 39 Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners' software. This language meets the test of specificity. 40

The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair competition.

The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase "used or intended to be used." InColumbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically

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described in the warrant. 44 A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. 45 The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good afternoon Ma'am. Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa iyo.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned toMaxicorp, Inc. immediately.

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon. ESG

Appendix E Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia

Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) CHUCHI

A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

Hindi ma'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon. ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang, 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aapply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

CHUCHI

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Hindi Ma'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo.

ESG ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

Kukunin ka kasi ako. CHUCHI Eh, di sana — ESG

CHUCHI

Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

Itutuloy ko na Ma'am sana ang duty ko. ESG

CHUCHI

Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG

ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka pumarito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

CHUCHI

ESG

Kukuha kami ng exam noon.

Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

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CHUCHI

private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

Kasi M'am, binabalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

INFORMATION ESG The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accuses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the abovenamed accused, Socorro D. Ramireznot being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko ma'am na utang na loob. ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastanganan mo ako. CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan? ESG

Contrary to Law. Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988. MARIANO M. CUNETA

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of

Asst. City Fiscal

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Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trialcourt granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a personother than a participant to the communication. 4

merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989. cdtai

We disagree. prLL First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurd or would lead to an injustice. 12

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court'sorder of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

"[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari." 5

SECTION 1.It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court ofAppeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision

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distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any." Consequently, as respondent Court ofAppeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside? Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor. Senator Padilla:

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:

Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings? Senator Tañada:

xxx xxx xxx

That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Tañada: The qualified only 'overhear.'

Senator Padilla:

Senator Padilla:

Now, would that be reasonable, Your Honor?

So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under Section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention.

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.

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Senator Padilla:

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

This might reduce the utility of recorders. Senator Diokno: Senator Tañada: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that these are being recorded.

Senator Tañada:

Senator Padilla:

Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.

Now, I can understand. Senator Tañada:

xxx xxx xxx

That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more.But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III. No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964) xxx xxx xxx The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. cdlex Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,intercepting or

xxx xxx xxx

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recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means." 17

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)." 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those devises enumerated in Section 1 of the law nor was it similar to those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein," 19following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable. cdtai

"It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well as the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Appendix F

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Bayan, Karapatan, KMP vs. Ermita

dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. 4 Three other rallyists were arrested.

Petitioners come in three groups.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. CTEaDc

The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, 1 allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:

The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, 2 who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT [AND] FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, 3 allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.

SECTION 1. Title . — This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985." SEC. 2.Declaration of policy. — The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly

SEC. 3.Definition of terms. — For purposes of this Act:

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(a)"Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes. SEC. 4.Permit when required and when not required. — A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed. The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

SEC. 5.Application requirements. — All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(b)"Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(a)The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used. HECaTD

(c)"Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(b)The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. (c)The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at

(d)"Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march,

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least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(e)If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(d)Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

(f)In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

SEC. 6.Action to be taken on the application. — (a)It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(g)All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(b)The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(h)In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (i)Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

(c)If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

SEC. 7.Use of Public throroughfare. — Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so

(d)The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

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that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade. TAcDHS

law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

SEC. 8.Responsibility of applicant. — It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

SEC. 10.Police assistance when requested. — It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a)To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(a)Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b)To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly; (c)To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(b)The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(d)To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and (e)To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

(c)Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

SEC. 9.Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. — Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a

Sec. 11.Dispersal of public assembly with permit. — No public assembly with a permit shall be

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dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

SEC. 12.Dispersal of public assembly without permit. — When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

(a)At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

SEC. 13.Prohibited acts. — The following shall constitute violations of the Act: (a)The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b)If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed; CSHcDT

(b)Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;

(c)If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(c)The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf; (d)Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(d)No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

(e)The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(e)Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

(f)Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

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(g)Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:

(c)violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

1.the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

(d)violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

2.the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

SEC. 15.Freedom parks. — Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

3.the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares; 4.the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit; 5.the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

SEC. 14.Penalties. — Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:

SEC. 16.Constitutionality. — Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

(a)violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months; ECDaTI

SEC. 17.Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

(b)violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

SEC. 18.Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

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Approved, October 22, 1985.

Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government.

CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex "A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus: MalacañangOfficial

We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. EcHTCD

Manila, PhilippinesNEWS

The President's call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.

Release No. 2September 21, 2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. 5

On Unlawful Mass Actions In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and

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allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all other public officers and private individuals acting under their control, supervision and instruction.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.

Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director General Arturo Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong. CAcEaS

Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

Respondents argue that:

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.

1.Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses." 2.Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information. 6

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

3.B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assembly's time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rally's program content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v. Comelec. 7

Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong. Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary

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4.Adiong v. Comelec 8 held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them.

The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the submission of all the Comments, the Court set the cases for oral arguments on April 4, 2006, 14 stating the principal issues, as follows: 1.On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:

5.Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court 9 held that a local chief executive has the authority to exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15 of the law.

(a)Are these content-neutral or contentbased regulations?

6.The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test."10

(b)Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? (c)Do they constitute prior restraint? ATCaDE (d)Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?

7.CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws and ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.

(e)Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 2.On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):

Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 11 Primicias v. Fugoso, 12 and Jacinto v. CA, 13 have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

(a)Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? (b)Is it void for lack of publication?

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(c)Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?

Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: SEC. 4.No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments took place and were approved and/or noted by the Court: 1.Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, 15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado, 16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:

2.The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch as, according to respondents, it was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in the affidavit executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law.

There is no question as to the petitioners' rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people's exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:

The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking into account the foregoing developments. Petitioners' standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation's streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.

"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement,

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and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising."

rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose. 18 Reyes v. Bagatsing 19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows: 1.It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of

Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, 17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks. cIDHSC Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of wellordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the

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matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the

2.Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force

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feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values. ICHAaT

outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiffmunicipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of respondents, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are

4.Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee,' was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that 'a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of

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assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, . . . . "Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."

the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption — especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place — is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." xxx xxx xxx 8.By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a

xxx xxx xxx 6.. . . The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of

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substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. . . . .

persons to organize and were a private place, only the consent of the ownerhold a public assembly in a public or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.place. However, no permit shall be Such application should be filed well ahead in timerequired if the public assembly shall to enable the public official concerned to appraisebe done or made in a freedom park whether there may be valid objections to the grantduly established by law or ordinance of the permit or to its grant but at another publicduly established by law or ordinance place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusalor in private property, in which case or modification that the clear and present danger testonly the consent of the owner or the be the standard for the decision reached. If he is ofone entitled to its legal possession is the view that there is such an imminent and graverequired, or in the campus of a danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must begovernment-owned and operated heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whethereducational institution which shall favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them atbe subject to the rules and the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they canregulations of said educational have recourse to the proper judicial authority.institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes: Reyes v. BagatsingB.P. No. 880 (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569) 8. By way of a summary. The applicantsSEC. 4. Permit when required and for a permit to hold an assembly should inform thewhen not required. — A written licensing authority of the date, the public placepermit shall be required for any where and the time when it will take place. If itperson or

SEC. 5. Application requirements. — All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

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(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof. (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application. —

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that

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A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies 22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus:

(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 20 1.Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

xxx xxx xxx

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Article 29 1.Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, 20 where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. 21

2.In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of

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securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. "Public" does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster's Dictionary defines it, thus: 23

3.These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

public, n, . . . 2a: an organized body of people . . . 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests or characteristics . . . .

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.

Article 19.

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.

1.Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. DSEIcT 2.Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard — the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 24 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

3.The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:

(a)For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b)For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Sec. 15.Freedom parks. — Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or

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designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

14.The truth of the matter is the policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance with the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the "highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same." Unfortunately, however, the phrase "maximum tolerance" has acquired a different meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so, other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular connotation of "maximum tolerance" has departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.

This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision. The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park — Fuente Osmeña. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he added. If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880's mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986. AaCTcI

15.It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. This could only mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict with a "no permit, no rally policy" or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the

Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law's system of regulation of the people's exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.

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circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence.

xxx xxx xxx (c)"Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. AEIHaS

16.Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said, "we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be dispersed." None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my corespondents to violate any law. 25

xxx xxx xxx SEC. 9.Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. — Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. SEC. 10.Police assistance when requested. — It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the following:

(a)Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

SEC. 3.Definition of terms. — For purposes of this Act:

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(b)The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse; (d)No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

(c)Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

(d)Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

SEC. 11.Dispersal of public assembly with permit. — No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

xxx xxx xxx SEC. 12.Dispersal of public assembly without permit. — When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. CHcTIA

(a)At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

SEC. 13.Prohibited acts. — The following shall constitute violations of the Act:

(b)If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(e)Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly; (f)The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(c)If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly,

(g)Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:

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xxx xxx xxx

darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

4.the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit; 5.the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor's office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the CONSTITUTIONALITY of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED. THcaDA

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny." 26 For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a

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No costs.

Sir:

SO ORDERED.

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.

Appendix G Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a)to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them? We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present regime.

(b)to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

(c)to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. [Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.] The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:

We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the matter.

June 4, 1986 Hon. Feliciano Belmonte

Very truly yours,

GSIS General Manager Arroceros, Manila.

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(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMO NTE

As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.

[Rollo, p. 7.]

Very truly yours,

To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:

(Sgd.) MEYNARD O A. TIRO

June 17, 1986

Deputy General Counsel

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte 108 E. Benin Street [Rollo, p. 40.]

Caloocan City

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]

Dear Companero: Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of "the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos."

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit. On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.].

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and

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the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case ofLegaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

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The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:

end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure ** and honesty in the public service. *** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.].

Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As observed in Legaspi: prcd In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like

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"public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541.]

that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant `clean loans'." [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.

In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. InLegaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.].

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons

Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy

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issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444445.]

Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information. llcd

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.

There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated: . . . The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual —has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of technological age —industrialization, urbanization, and organization —operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of

Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).].

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Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records. llcd

MR. OPLE.Very gladly.

Commissioner Suarez is recognized. MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?

MR. SUAREZ.Thank you.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

When we declare "a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" —referring to the transactions of the State —and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the various agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the government. . . .

First of all, the "constituent —ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.

MR. OPLE.Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. SUAREZ.Including government-owned and controlled corporations. MR. OPLE.That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

MR. SUAREZ.And when we say "transactions which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?

Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include governmentowned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:

MR. OPLE.The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can

xxx xxx xxx

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cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

MR. SUAREZ.This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. cdrep

MR. OPLE.Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.) Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

SO ORDERED.

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Fernan C .J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ ., concur.

After respondent was shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it was genuine. However, she told the three that she had no money.

Separate Opinions

Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of respondent the following day. The two convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar. They reached Angeles City around 2:30 p.m. and met Arnold who showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth PhP60,000. After respondent informed them again she had no money, petitioner continued to press her that buying the gold bar would be good investment. The three left and went home.

CRUZ, J ., concurring: Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my concurrence, I write this separate opinion simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent celebration of the right to information on matters of public concern.

On March 16, 1991, petitioner, Garganta, and Adeling returned to the house of respondent. Again, they failed to convince her to buy the gold bar.

Appendix H Juanita Aquino vs. Teresita Paiste

On the next day, the three returned, this time they told respondent that the price was reduced to PhP10,000. She agreed to go with them to Angeles City to meet Arnold once more. Arnold pretended to refuse the PhP10,000 offer and insisted on PhP50,000.

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetuated, or inferred from the acts of the accused persons themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. In this case before us, a series of overt acts of a co-conspirator and her earlier admission of participation documented in an amicable settlement she signed in the presence of counsel, all lead to the conclusion that the co-accused conspired to commit estafa.

On petitioner's insistence, on March 18, 1991, the two went to Angeles City and bought the gold bar for PhP50,000. 1 On March 19, 1991, respondent had the gold bar tested and she was informed that it was fake. 2 Respondent then proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the transaction. 3

The Court of Appeals (CA) culled the facts this way, as established by the prosecution: At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1991, petitioner Juanita Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and another woman identified only as "Adeling", went to the house of respondent Teresita Paiste at 611 Peñalosa St., Tondo, Manila. The children of respondent and petitioner were grade school classmates. After the usual pleasantries, petitioner started to convince respondent to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot.

On March 27, 1991, respondent brought petitioner to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the document they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta. The amicable settlement reads:

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In view of the acceptance of fault by MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO of the case/complaint filed by MRS.TERESITA PAISTE before the NBI-National Capital Region for Swindling, Mrs. J. Aquino agreed to pay the complainant half the amount swindled from the latter. Said P25,000.00 offered by Mrs. J. Aquino as settlement for the case of Estafa will be paid by her through installment scheme in the amount of P1,000.00 per month beginning from the month of March, 1991 until fully paid.

Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy. (Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO (Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE 4 On April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In the presence of Barangay Chairperson Pablo Atayde and a police officer, respondent pointed to Garganta as the person who sold the fake gold bar. Garganta was brought to the police station where there was a demand against Garganta alone.

In witness whereof, the parties hereunto set their hands this 27th day of March 1991 at NBI-NCR, Taft Avenue, Manila.

Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal complaint from which an Information against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-99911 was filed before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Information reads:

(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO

That on or about March 18, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together with three others, whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Teresita B.Paiste in the following manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the said Teresita B. Paiste to the effect that a certain Arnold, an Igorot is selling a gold bar for P50,000.00, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said Teresita B. Paiste to buy the said gold bar and to give and deliver to said accused the total amount of P50,000.00, the herein accused well knowing that their manifestations and representations were all false and untrue and were made only for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact

Respondent (Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE Complainant Witnesses: 1.Signed (Illegible) 2. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL The undersigned accused/respondent hereby waives her right to counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI agent Ely

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they did obtain the said amount of P50,000.00, which once in their possession, they thereafter willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Teresita B. Paiste in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00, Philippine Currency. 5

SO ORDERED. 6 The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and Arnold in committing the crime of estafa. The trial court likewise gave credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of petitioner's guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Accused Garganta and the others remained at large; only petitioner was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.

Aggrieved, petitioner brought on appeal the above RTC decision before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 22511.

Trial ensued with the prosecution presenting the testimonial evidence of private complainant, herein respondent, Yolanda Pomer, and Ely Tolentino. For her defense, petitioner testified along with Barangay Chairperson Atayde, JoseAquino, and SPO1 Roberto Cailan. The prosecution presented as documentary evidence three (3) documents, one of which is the amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the defense relied solely on its testimonial evidence.

After the parties filed their respective briefs, on November 10, 2000, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto 7 the July 16, 1998 RTC Decision. In affirming the trial court's findings and conclusions of law, the CA found that from the tenor of the amicable settlement, the investigation before the NBI did not push through as both parties came to settle the matter amicably. Nonetheless, the CA pointed out that petitioner was assisted, although unnecessarily, by an independent counsel, a certain Atty. Gordon S. Uy, during the proceedings. The CA held that petitioner's mere bare allegation that she signed it under threat was insufficient for she presented no convincing evidence to bolster her claim. Consequently, the amicable settlement was admitted and appreciated as evidence against petitioner.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On July 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juanita Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FIVE (5) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant,Teresita B. Paiste the sum of P50,000.00 with 12% interest per annum counted from the filing of the Information until fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit.

Nevertheless, the CA ruled that even if the amicable settlement was not admissible or was totally disregarded, the RTC still did not err in convicting petitioner as it was indubitably shown by the prosecution through convincing evidence replete in the records that respondent conspired with the other accused through active participation in the commission of the crime of estafa. In fine, the CA found that the prosecution had indeed established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

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Through the assailed April 6, 2001 Resolution, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

IMPUTED TO HER AND IN DECLARING HER GUILTY THEREFOR BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

The Issues Hence, we have the instant petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, ascribing the following errors, which are essentially the same ones raised before the CA:

IV THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HER COACCUSED, ELIZABETH GARGANTA DELA CRUZ. 8

I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND LACKING IN CERTAIN PRESCRIBED REQUIREMENTS THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INVESTIGATOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND COROLLARY THERETO, TO CONSIDER ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE PROCURED THEREBY TO BE INADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.

The Court's Ruling In gist, the instant petition proffers the twin issues on (1) whether the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence, and (2) whether conspiracy has indeed been proven to convict petitioner of the crime of estafa. The instant petition hinges on the issue of the assessment of evidence and their admissibility. As consistently ruled in innumerable cases, this Court is not a trier of facts. The trial court is best equipped to make the assessment on said issues and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless the courts a quo are perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly considered, would affect the result of the case and warrant a reversal of the decision involved. We do not find in the instant case any such reason to depart from this general principle. However, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall deal with the issues raised by petitioner.

II THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND LACKING IN CERTAIN POSITIVE PARTICULARS AND STRICT COMPLIANCE THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL HAD BEEN ASKED TO BE EXECUTED AND SUBSCRIBED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT. III

First Core Issue: Admissibility of amicable instrument THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK AN ACTIVE PART IN THE COMMISSION OF THE FELONY

Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of right to

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counsel that she signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation. She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation of Sec. 12 (1) 9 of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.

Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she signed the document under duress falls flat for the following reasons: First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy. The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be an independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such claim, it cannot be entertained.

We are not convinced. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate. 10 Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 11 has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 12 Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed . . . ."

Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as witness by the prosecution and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about was likewise not presented. Basic is the principle that consultation and information between counsel and client is privileged communication and the counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in a case has full discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to bolster its case. We cannot second guess the reason of the prosecution in not presenting Atty. Uy's testimony, more so on account of the counsel-client privileged communication. Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right "to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses", 13 for which she could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify. She did not.

It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.

Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy's appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in People v. Jerez, when "the accused never raised any objection against the lawyer's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer" 14 the accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer. Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioner's counsel

However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.

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in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.

truth or that it would be better for him to tell the truth. Stated elsewise, telling the accused that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth does not furnish any inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied. These threats or promises which the accused must successfully prove in order to make his confession inadmissible, must take the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of reward or leniency. 19

Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." 15 An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the custodial investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.

In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the amicable settlement is not admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven by other pieces of evidence.

Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioner's Miranda rights were not violated, still we will not be remiss to reiterate what we held in People v. Malimit that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible "only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation." 16 An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, 17 while confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein. 18

Second Core Issue: Conspiracy duly proven It is petitioner's strong contention in her last two assigned errors that conspiracy has not been proven to convict her ofestafa. She asserts that there was no strong showing of any convincing and solidly conclusive proof that she took an active part in any phase of the transaction concerning the overt acts constituting estafa that has been imputed to her. She argues that whatever act that might have been imputed to her has always been through the request or insistence of either Garganta or respondent as the transcript of stenographic notes reveals. She points out that after she introduced Garganta to respondent in the morning of March 14, 1991, she almost immediately left them and she did not accompany Garganta when the latter went back to respondent's house in the afternoon of March 14, 1991. And she avers that significantly, she did not remain in Pampanga after the completion of the transaction on March 18, 1991, but came to Manila with respondent. According to her, her non-participation in these two crucial meetings shows she was not part of any conspiracy to defraud respondent.

Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional rights were violated. Petitioner's allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare allegations. Allegations are not proof. Pertinently, this Court ruled in People v. Calvo: A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because defendant was told that he should tell the

We are not persuaded.

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Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. 20 In criminal law, where the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. 21

First, petitioner was with her co-accused Garganta and Adeling when they went to respondent's house on March 14, 1991 to tell her of the existence of a gold bar, showed her a sample, tried to convince respondent to buy one, and went to a pawnshop in Tondo to have the sample gold bar tested. Second, the following day, March 15, petitioner was again with her co-accused when they went to Angeles City to view the gold bar in the residence of Arnold, and participated in convincing respondent to raise PhP50,000 for the purchase of the gold bar, and if respondent did not have money, to find a buyer. Third, on March 16, petitioner was again with her co-accused when they returned to the house of respondent to ask if she had found a buyer. Since she had not, they again pressed her to look for one.

It is common design which is the essence of conspiracy — conspirators may act separately or together, in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole — acts done to give effect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts. 22 Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation.

Fourth, on March 17, she with her co-accused again accompanied respondent to Angeles City and met with Arnold to convince him to accept PhP10,000 as deposit, but were refused. Fifth, on March 18, respondent again pressed respondent to buy the gold bar until the latter finally succumbed and paid PhP50,000. Petitioner even re-counted the cash payment, wrapped it in newspaper, and handed the money herself to Arnold.

To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Mere presence when the transaction was made does not necessarily lead to an inference of concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime of estafa. Even knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. 23

It is unquestionable that petitioner was not a passive observer in the five days from March 14 to 18, 1991; she was an active participant in inducing respondent to buy the gold bar. We find no cogent reason to alter the conclusions of the CA. Indeed, the records bear out that conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of petitioner and her companions. Clearly, petitioner's contention that all she did was at the behest of either Garganta or respondent is belied by the fact that she took part in all the phases of the inducement right up to the purchase by respondent of the fake gold. If it was true that she had no part in the transaction, why would she still accompany Garganta to visit respondent on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of March 1991?

In the instant case, the courts a quo unanimously held that conspiracy was duly proven. As aptly observed by the CA, the records are replete with instances to show that petitioner actively participated to defraud respondent. The following instances all point to the conclusion that petitioner conspired with others to commit the crime:

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Moreover, with trips to Pampanga made on the 15th, 17th, and 18th that take several hours, it is unfathomable that petitioner was only doing a favor to either Garganta or respondent, or to both.

65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002 1and July 31, 2002 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge PriscillaMijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

Ineluctably, after having been introduced to respondent, Garganta could have made the visits to respondent without tagging along petitioner. Yet, the facts clearly show that respondent could not have been thereby induced without petitioner's active participation in encouraging respondent to buy the gold bar. Petitioner is the lynchpin upon whom respondent's interest was stoked, and ultimately to succumb to the lure of gaining a fat profit by buying the gold bar.

The antecedents: On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner went back on the 18th with respondent to Manila instead of staying in Pampanga does not preclude her active participation in the conspiracy as shown by the foregoing narration. It would have been strange to respondent if petitioner stayed in Pampanga after the transaction. Thus, petitioner indeed took active part in the perpetration of estafa. And, petitioner has not shown any convincing proof that she was not part of the transaction given the undisputed factual milieu of the instant case.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked,"Hay naku, masama 'yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002. DTIcSH

Finally, it bears stressing that petitioner was the one who knows respondent. She introduced respondent to the other accused. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The CA's November 10, 2000 Decision and April 6, 2001 Resolution in CAG.R. CR No. 22511 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, 4 praying for the voluntary inhibition ofJudge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. 5

Appendix I Ferdinand Cruz vs. Judge Mijares

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule

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In an Order 6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pretrial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the said order. aSCHcA

NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE'S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS. HcACST The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamusunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. 8 In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied. In a motion for reconsideration, 9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order 10 dated July 31, 2002.

This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. 11 A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals. 12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 13 aAHTDS

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors: I. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER'S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NONLAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

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Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

RULE 138-A Sec. 34.By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Section 1.Conditions for Student Practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. aDcEIH

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A. From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. 14 Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, 15 petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself. cSTHAC

Sec. 2.Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school's clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school. SaITHC

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

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The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A. aCHcIE

that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama 'yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner's and his co-plaintiff's loss of faith and confidence in the respondent's impartiality. DACIHc We do not agree.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. 17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, 18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence".

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case 19 against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court's findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part ofJudge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case. In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, 20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. 21 Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. AEDCHc

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer's assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision. EHTADa In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant. No pronouncement as to costs.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling

SO ORDERED.

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Appendix J U.S. vs. Javier

tax assessed in his province under the provisions of Act No. 1652. Applying the reasoning of our decision in the case of U. S. vs. Melecio Estavillo et al., No. 6133, 1 just decided, to the facts satisfactorily established at the trial of this case, the judgment of conviction in the court below must be affirmed, but the sentence must be modified by striking out therefrom so much thereof as imposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of failure to pay the costs, and by fixing the rate at which the subsidiary imprisonment in the event of nonpayment of the fine is to be estimated at P2.50, instead of P2 per diem.

The appellant was charged in the court below with a violation of the Election Law in that he falsely swore that he was not delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since August 13, 1898, when, in truth and in fact, he was delinquent in the payment of the "road and bridge fund" cedula tax assessed in his province under the provisions of Act No. 1652. The appellant admits and the proof establishes that at the time when he took said oath, he had not paid the "road and bridge fund" cedula tax assessed in his province under the provisions of Act No. 1652. He contends, however, that having once paid a cedula tax in Manila, which included the special additional "road and bridge fund" tax, the imposition of which is authorized under Act No. 1652, he was not required to pay the special additional "road and bridge fund" tax levied in the province wherein he resided at the time of taking the oath. But the law is so clear and explicit upon this point that there can be no room for discussion, Act. No. 1652, amending Act No. 83 and Act No. 1189, expressly providing that:

Thus modified, the sentence imposed by the trial court is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Appendix K Talino vs. Sandiganbayan

It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the coaccused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction. prLL

". . . All residents of a province subject to the payment of a cedula tax wherein the increase herein provided is in effect shall pay the same within that province, and payment thereof in any province other than that of their residence shall not exempt such residents from paying also in the province in which, they reside the additional cedula tax for which provision may be made by resolution of the provincial board in accordance with this section . . ."

The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments 2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and

It is quite clear, therefore, that at the time when the defendant made oath that he was not "delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since August 13, 1898," he was in fact delinquent in the payment of the "road and bridge fund" cedula

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petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed. 3They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal evidence. Had this been done, there would have been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused." 5 The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against all the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8

In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the following remarks about the separate trial: "The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed, upon their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for the prosecution as well as their own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused can not be taken up.

The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.

"It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said three accused.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11

"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid story related by Ulat on the stand,

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In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:

defraud, he would have questioned this obvious irregularity. He would have asked whoever was following up the vouchers why two biddings were conducted, why the awards to `D'Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.

". . . With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it `intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of crossexamination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of crossexamination.' In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S. v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) . . . ."

"The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino. While his duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may have been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his complicity in the conspiracy. "Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers (including three made out in favor of `D'Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to him for his certificate as regards the availability of funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers were also presented to him for certification as to funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits `A', `B' and `C' which he had earlier signed but which, according to Talino, were disallowed and cancelled. Talino claims that he had examined the supporting documents of the last three vouchers — the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at least the abstract of bids submitted in the morning, where `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder, must have been different from the ones submitted together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would have raised his suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively) when it was only that morning that the abstracts containing the name of `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily approved the substitute vouchers

We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Thus: LexLib "If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor participation in the conspiracy to

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with the substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was facilitating an irregular transaction.

Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising factual, legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty — from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines — provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.

"It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond doubt the participation of both AgustinTalino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in the informations." 13 The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat," and was not even required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused." As this was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner' s part in the offenses.

As to the facts. The firearm with which the appellant was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose presence was not perceived by the accused. The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the time of the accidental killing.

The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.

Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the accident, February 10, 1949, his son told him that there were wild chickens on the plantation "scratching palay and corn" plants and asked if he might shoot them; that Bruno told his son to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it over to Alberto who is a "sharp- shooter" and "shoots better," and walked about 20 meters behind the young man; that Bruno was that far from Alberto when the latter fired and accidentally wounded their servant.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. LLphil Appendix L People vs. Estoista

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The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild rooster crowing I told my father about the said wild rooster crowing near our house and he told me to shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it."

admission, he had been in the habit of going out hunting in other places and for target practices, and because by Bruno's unwitting admission, his son, who had no gun of his own, is a sharpshooter and shoots better.

Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to his and his son's statements at the Constabulary headquarters on the same morning of the shooting, and sworn to by them before the justice of the peace soon after.

It being established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the plantation with his father's gun, the next question that presents itself is: Does this evidence support conviction as a matter of law? In United States vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited by defense counsel, it was held that carrying a gun by order of the owner does not constitute illegal possession of firearm. The facts in that case were that a shotgun and nine cartridges which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper permit to possess them, were seized by the police from Samson while walking in the town of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. Padilla was to use the shotgun in hunting that day and, as he was coming along on horseback, sent Samson on ahead.

Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went to hunt for wild roosters;" that "later on my son Alberto came to inform me that he had accidentally hit our laborer;" that thereupon he "went with my son to see what happened." Queried "who was with Alberto when he went out hunting," Bruno replied, "He was alone." On his part, the defendant declared on the same occasion that Diragon Dima, after being shot, requested to be taken to his (Dima's) house; that as the accused was able to carry the wounded man on]y about 50 meters, Dima asked the defendant to call Bruno "who was in the house" — which Alberto did. To the question who his companion was when he shot at a rooster, Alberto said, "I was alone."

Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, in its pertinent provision is directed against any person who possesses any firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. A point to consider in this connection is the meaning of the word "possesses. "It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad sense so as to include "carries" and "holds." This has to be so if the manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatever. "Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend to establish the guilt or intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in the United States, where the right to bear arms for defense is ensured by the federal and many state

There is not the slightest ground to believe that these affidavits contained anything but the truth, especially that part regarding Bruno's whereabouts when the defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are very intelligent, the affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary headquarters, there is no hint of any undue pressure brought to bear upon either of them, and, above all, they stood to gain nothing from the statement that the accused was unaccompanied. In contrast, Bruno's testimony in court was interested, given with his son's acquittal in view. And especially is the father's veracity in court to be distrusted because by Alberto's unsolicited

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constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted severely restricting the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of state legislatures to do so has been upheld.

Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference between the case at bar and the Samson case. Although Samson had physical control of his employer's shotgun and cartridges, his possession thereof was undoubtedly harmless and innocent, as evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore them in full view of the people he met and of the authorities. Unlike the appellant herein, Samson carried the gun solely in obedience to its owners order or request without any inferable intention to use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that even in the United States where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a means of defense is guaranteed, possession such as that by Samson is by the weight of authority considered a violation of similar statutes.

In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to United States vs. Samson, supra, as authority for the appellant's plea for acquittal. The implied holding in that case that the intention to possess is an essential element of a violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to the weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only intention to own but also intention to use. From the very nature of the subject matter of the prohibition control or dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential factor.

Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 6 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5, Revised Penal Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906.)

The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down by United States courts — rule which we here adopt — is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W., 138; 68 C.J., 22) Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or carrying of his father's gun was not incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his father's sight and control, he carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal consequences.

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The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years. However, considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. The appellant will pay the costs of both instances.

the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."(Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction to the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur. RESOLUTION December 3, 1953 TUASON, J.:

The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's conviction under Republic Act No. 4 likewise had received close attention and study. There is no need on our part to add anything to what has been said, except to point out for clarification that the references to defendant's previous uses of his father's gun and the fatal consequences of his last use of it, were made simply to emphasize that his possession of the prohibited weapon was not casual, incidental, or harmless. His previous conduct was relevant in determining his motive and intention, and to disprove the claim that his father followed his son so as not to lose control of the firearm. It was far from the thought of the court to condemn the appellant for acts with which he had not been charged or of which he had been pronounced innocent.

The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4, with reference to the penalty therein provided, was carefully considered. In branding imprisonment for five years too harsh and out of proportion in this case, we had in mind that six months was commensurate and just for the appellant's offense, taking into consideration his intention and the degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C. J. S., 1187- 1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,

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The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in accordance with section 1 of Republic Act No. 4, which reads:

carry with it the forfeiture of the prohibited article or articles to the Philippine Government.

"SECTION 1.Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act Numbered fifty-six, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"The possession of any instrument or implement which is directly useful in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition on the part of any person whose business or employment does not deal with such instrument or implement shall be prima facie proof that such article is intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition."

"SEC. 2692.Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — Any person who manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses, any firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition in violation of any provision of sections eight hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the court. If the article illegally possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun, submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb, artillery of any kind or ammunition exclusively intended for such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall be not less than five years nor more than ten years. A conviction under this section shall

This provision does not say that firearms unlawfully possessed or carried are to be confiscated only if they belong to the defendant, nor is such intention deducible from the language of the act. We are inclined to, and do, believe that, except perhaps where the lawful owner was innocent of, or without fault in, the use of his property by another, confiscation accords with the legislative intent. We can foresee the objection that such legislation deprives one of his property without due process of law. The answer to this is that ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural right protected by the Constitution. Above the right to own property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty - the police power of the state to protect its citizens and to provide for the safety and good order of society. (16 C. J. S., 539, 540.) Pursuant to the exercise of police power, the right to private property may be limited, restricted, and impaired so as to promote the general welfare, public order and safety. (Id., 611.) The power of the legislature to prohibit the possession of deadly weapon carries with it the power to provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons unlawfully used or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.

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Appendix M People vs. Esparas and Libed

upon by the Supreme Court, it has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence. It is a mere recommendation to the Supreme Court, based upon the facts on the record which are presented with it. This is meant in no sense to detract from the dignity and power of Courts of First Instance. It means simply that the portion of Spanish procedure which related to cases where capital punishment was imposed still survives.

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged, with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114. After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.

"xxx xxx xxx "The requirement that the Supreme Court pass on a case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection of the accused. Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions." (Emphasis supplied)

As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. The issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et al., 1 we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts, viz.: "xxx xxx xxx "It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction and sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the trial of the accused. Such trial is not terminated until the Supreme Court has reviewed the facts and the law as applied thereto by the court below. The judgment of conviction entered on the trial is not final, can not be executed, and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. In a sense the trial court acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports thereon to the Supreme Court with his recommendation. While in practice he enters a judgment of conviction and sentences the prisoner thereunder, in reality, until passed

The Laguna case interpreted section 50 of General Orders No. 58 as amended, which provides: "xxx xxx xxx "It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the record, or any part thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an acquittal, or in which the sentence imposed is not

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death, unless such case shall have been duly appealed; but such sentence shall be executed upon the order of the court in which the trial was had. The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, and of all cases in which appeals shall have been taken shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for investigation and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen days after the rendition of sentence."

withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as was said by this court through Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this court of a decision imposing the death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade."

The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Its section 2(4) of Article VIII provided for review by this Court of death penalty cases. Both our Rules of Court of 1940 2 and 1964 3 require the transmission to this Court of the records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by the trial court, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment as the law and justice shall dictate. It will be noted that these rules were taken from the second part of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Section 4, Act No. 194. 4

The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al., 6 involves the escape of a death convict. In no uncertain terms, we held that the escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case ofPeople vs. Daban, et al., 7 the ponencia of former Chief Justice Fernando further stressed, to wit:

Necessarily, our case law under the 1935 Constitution reiterated the Laguna ruling. Thus, in the 1953 case of People vs. Villanueva, 5 we held that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to review his conviction, viz.:

"xxx xxx xxx" "Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is unaware of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: 'The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court fore review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days but not

"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the jurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and called upon to review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the

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earlier than fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in the form prescribed by section 11 of Rule 41. The transcript shall also be forwarded as provided in section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days after the filing thereof by the stenographer.' The penalty imposed on appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of death, the case was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached to the lower court decision. As explained in former Chief Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: 'In this connection, it must be emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; and that until is has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and this automatic review by the Supreme Court is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.' The mere fact of escape of appellant, therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant’s brief."

of People vs. Saliling, et al., 9 we held, thru former Chief Justice Aquino, that this Court is not precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In the 1984 case of People vs. Buynay, et al., 10 we reiterated the rule that theescape of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal. Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides. 11 On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option. 12 With due respect to the dissenting opinions of our esteemed colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and tone ofsection 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule, viz.:

"Section 10.Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. — In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by he trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."

Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the death penalty. 8 Section 9, Rule 122 continued to provide the procedure for review of death penalty cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of review. Significantly, it expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court. Our case law continued its fealty to the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case

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Similarly, the reliance in People vs. Codilla, 13 by our dissenting colleagues is misplaced. Codilla is not a death penalty case. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on appellant. Consequently, we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.

We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however, elusive it may be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.

Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between ". . . a death convict, i. e. one convicted to death by a trial court who remains in the custody of the law, and who voluntarily withdraws his appeal and a death convict, i.e., one convicted to death by the trial court but who escapes from the custody of the law during the pendency of the appeal." They rationalize the distinction by holding: "It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial court's judgment convicting him to death, the appellate court may still and nonetheless review the judgment of conviction for the convictappellant has at least remained in the custody of the law to await final verdict in his case. In the second case, however, the accused no longer recognizes and respects the authority of law and the duly-constituted authorities in general and this Court in particular. Such supercilious conduct of an escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by the Court. Respect for and recognition of the authority of the Court is an essential and implicit element in an effective and credible judicial system.

The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as discussed above, we have alwaysreviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last; effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal concern that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public in the multiplication of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, even if he belongs to a minority of one

"No, one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of the justice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even vindication via an automatic review of a death sentence and, in another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from justice and repudiating the very authority of the system whose protection he seeks and invokes."

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has the right to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court (People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196; People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79). A contrary view would encourage the accused to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide means for guilty parties to escape punishment (People v. Ang Gioc, 73 Phil. 366). In this case, the accused escaped from confinement and heretofore refuses to surrender to the proper authorities, thus she must be deemed to have abandoned the appeal (See People v. Quiritan, 197 SCRA 32; People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406; People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104).

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new period of thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to file the Brief of the accused Josefina A. Esparas. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, JJ ., concur.

In criminal cases, appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court via the following steps: by filing a notice of appeal in those cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed, by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where the penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua and the appeal would involve only questions of law (People v. Pagsanjan, 221 SCRA 735), and by automatic review where the penalty imposed is death (R.A. No. 7659, Sec. 22; Rule 122, Sec. 10, Revised Rules of Court). An appeal has "for its object simply and solely the protection of the accused." 1Appeal by way of automatic review is plainly another mode of appeal and has an objective similar to any other modes of appeal, i.e., the protection of the accused. If the accused has escaped, then he refuses to avail of the protection of the Court. Why then should the Court insist in protecting him. In the same vein, "the law providing for automatic review of a death sentence seeks to favor the [accused]." 2 If the accused has absconded or escaped from confinement then who is to be favored by the automatic review — a fugitive from justice? Hence, if the escape of the accused may be deemed waiver of the right to appeal in any other mode of appeal, then the same must apply to an appeal by way of automatic review. I fail to see, in this connection, any cogent reason why an automatic review should be given a status different from the other modes of appeal. I thus find, and with due respect to my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Puno, unacceptable the proposition that an appeal by way of automatic review is not subject to waiver. If the constitutional rights of the accused enshrined under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, such as right against unreasonable searches and seizures, right against self-incrimination,

Vitug, J ., concurs in the result. Separate Opinions FRANCISCO, J ., dissenting: I fully agree with Mr. Justice Padilla's opinion that if the accused fails to surrender to the proper authorities and remain in the custody of the law then her right to appeal is deemed waived and forfeited. I wish to express, nonetheless, my observations on this issue. An appeal is a statutory remedy for the correction of errors which might have been committed. With the accused lies the power and option to avail of the remedy, and with the appellate court belongs the power to affirm or reverse the accused's conviction. Appeal, however, presupposes jurisdiction over the person of the accused. And since appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right nor part of the due process, it may only be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law (Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135, citing Aguila v. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898, and Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397; Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 537; Borre v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 560; Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 254; U.S. v. Yu Ten, 33 Phil. 122). Thus, an accused who escapes from prison or confinement loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or

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right to remain silent, among others, can be waived, then with more reason with the right to appeal which is merely statutory origin.

exercise of the said tribunal's power of review. 3 An escapee mocks the law and puts himself outside the protection of the judiciary.

I am not unaware of the cases cited by my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Puno establishing the rule that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. But in the words of a known author, "[e]ven those Justices most opposed to overruling constitutional decisions have acknowledged that the 'law may grow to meet changing conditions' and that the doctrine of stare decisis should not required a 'slavish adherence to authority where new conditions require new rules of "conduct." 3 Considering the manifest intent of the legislature in enacting the death penalty law to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes and to serve as effective deterrence, it is high time for the Court to depart from the old doctrine which, to my mind, promotes nothing except disobedience to and repudiation of our judicial system.

Without repeating the legal arguments pro and con, as these were already eloquently presented by Mr. Justice Puno, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Francisco, I hold that the judicial taking of life cannot be left to mere legal logic. Life is too precious to be settled by legalisms, however exalted. I believe that this Court cannot abandon its sacred duty to God and country to see to it that a lower court judgment that takes away life is ERROR FREE and can stand THE MOST SEARCHING SCRUTINY . 4 And at the same time, this Court must not enable an escaped convict to make a mockery of the foundations of human justice. Consequently, I believe we must combine the sacred with the human. After prayer, study, reflection and discernment, I am thoroughly convinced that this Court has the inescapable duty to review this and similar life-taking decisions, but only after the accused is re-arrested and taken back into the custody of the law.

PANGANIBAN, J ., separate opinion: This normally run-off-the-mill matter of granting an extension of time to file brief for the accused has merited vigorous and in-depth discussion in the Court because two monumental and hallowed doctrines appear to collide in its disposition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the accused's motion for extension to file brief and in view of the delay in the disposition of such motion due to the lengthy court deliberation thereon, to give her a new period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to file her Brief. PADILLA, J ., dissenting:

On the one hand, there is historically entrenched principle that impels this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty. 1 Such historicity is reinforced by the pro-life provisions of our 1987 Constitution, one of which 2 had in fact prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, "unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it."

After a careful study of the issue submitted for resolution, I am constrained, based on considerations of justice and fairness not only for the accused but for society in general as well, to register my dissent from the majority opinion. The factual antecedents upon which this Court is called to decide whether or not to dismiss the appeal of the accused in this case, are as follows:

Upon the other, there is the legal, equitable and logical tenet that a person convicted by the lower courts must first submit himself to the jurisdiction of the appellate court before he/she can plead for the

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Accused Josefina A. Esparas was convicted on 13 March 1995 by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 in Criminal Case No. 94-5897, for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, more specifically, for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu." She was sentenced to death. Prior to conviction by the trial court, but after arraignment, accused escaped from confinement. The records of the case (Criminal Case No. 94-5897) were nonetheless elevated to this Court for automatic review, involving as it does the imposition of the death penalty.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is also required by the Rules of Court during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment of conviction in the trial court so that, in the event of an accused's escape from detention during his appeal, the appeal may be dismissed outright by the appellate court.

On 14 November 1955, the Court required counsel for accused to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed given the fact that she had escaped from confinement even prior to judgment by the trial court and remains at-large since her escape from detention.

"Sec. 8.Dismissal of appeal for abandonment for failure to prosecute. — The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court gives the appellate court the authority to dismiss an appeal when the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. It provides:

Counsel for accused has failed to show cause, as required. Instead, he has filed motions for extension of time to file appellant's brief, which the Court has not acted upon, as there has been failure to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal."

The Solicitor General was required by this Court to comment on the effect of accused's escape from confinement on the present appeal. The Solicitor General, in his comment dated 9 January 1996, recommends that the Court proceed with the appeal and review the judgment of conviction despite the accused's escape, as the penalty involved is the death penalty.

In People v. Codilla(G.R. Nos. 100720-23, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA 104), the Court reiterated the sound doctrine that the escape of the accused-appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.

It is basic in procedural law that one who seeks positive relief from a court of law should submit to its jurisdiction. In criminal law and procedure, it is likewise settled that the trial court has to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused before it can proceed to try the case and render judgment against him. Thus, in the present case, trial proceeded only as to accused Josefina A. Esparas, who earlier entered a plea of not guilty, while her co-accused Rodrigo O. Libed has remained at large and has not been arraigned or tried.

We are not unaware of the ruling of the Court in People v. Cornelio (G.R. No. L-1289, 10 June 1971 SCRA 435) stating that: "The escape of the accused does not relieve the Court of the burden of automatically reviewing the case, in the same manner that a withdrawal of appeal by a death convict would not remove the case from jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, the

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court will no longer permit the case to remain further in its docket and will proceed to discharge its task of passing upon the case en consulta and reviewing the facts and the law as applied thereto by the trial court, and determining the propriety of its imposition of the death penalty." (reference to footnotes omitted)

for an escape since, in any case, such escape will not be taken as admission of guilt and the Supreme Court will have, in any event, to review his conviction. If the accused, upon review by the Supreme Court, is acquitted or meted out a penalty lower than death, then he can re-surface. If his death sentence is affirmed by the Supreme Court, then he will most likely remain a fugitive from justice.

It is my considered view however that a distinction should be made between a death convict, i.e. one sentenced to death by a trial court, who remains in the custody of the law, but who voluntarily withdraws his appeal and a death convict, i.e. one sentenced to death by the trial court but who escapes from the custody of the law during the pendency of the appeal. It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial court's judgment sentencing him to death, the appellate court may still and nonetheless review the judgment of conviction for the convictappellant has at least remained in the custody of the law to await final verdict in his case. In the second case, however, the accused no longer recognizes and respects the authority of law and the dulyconstituted authorities in general and this Court in particular. Such supercilious conduct of an escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by the Court. Respect for and recognition of the authority of the Court are essential and implicit elements in an effective and credible judicial system.

I do not believe that this is the wish or intention of the general public now outraged by the still-rising incidence of heinous crimes punishable with death. To infuse sense, nay, sanity into the system, I submit that "mandatory jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court to review death penalty cases and "automatic review" of death penalty cases have to assume implicitly that the accused in his person is subject to the processes and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court if it is to review his conviction to death by the trial court. It is therefore my considered opinion that accused Josefina A. Esparas should be given a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt by her counsel of record of the Court's resolution. to surrender to the proper authorities and remain in the custody of the law, failing in which, this appeal should be deemed and stand dismissed and, thereupon, the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing her to death should be final ordered remanded to the court of origin for appropriate execution, after re-arrest of the accused.

No one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of the justice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even vindication via an automatic review of a death sentence and, in another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from justice and repudiating the very authority of the system whose protection he seeks and invokes.

Appendix N Melo vs. People

Petitioners Francisca Alimagno and Jovita Melo were convicted, as principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime of corruption of minor, as defined in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code, by the City Court of San Pablo, and sentenced as follows: LLpr

A soft, bended approach whereby an sentenced to death by a trial court for a heinous crime may escape from confinement and, still require the Supreme Court just the same to review his conviction, will shatter to pieces the present drive against heinous crimes punishable with death. All that the accused in such cases has to do — after being sentenced to death by the trial court — is to arrange

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". . . The accused Francisca Alimagno, to suffer the penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days as maximum, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not be more than one-third of the principal penalty herein imposed and to pay the proportionate costs; the accused Jovita Melo, to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not be more than onethird of the principal penalty herein imposed and to pay the proportionate costs."

"Complainant Filomena de la Cruz, who was undisputedly born on August 10, 1946 at Calamba, Laguna (Exh. B), was employed in the house of Pita Alvero at San Pablo City as a domestic helper for a period of only nine (9) days from November 20, 1964 to November 29, 1964. On November 27, 1964, she came to know defendant Francisca Alimagno who was bringing money to her employer Pita Alvero. On said date, defendant Alimagno tried to convince her to leave the house of Pita Alvero, promising her a better job. Defendant Alimagno, having gained her confidence, succeeded in thus persuading her to leave the house of Pita Alvero. Hence, on November 29, 1964, after leaving a selfexplanatory note, Exh. A, which was admittedly written by accused Francisca Alimagno herself, which reads:

The Court of Appeals modified the decision with respect to the subsidiary penalty, thus:

'Ako ho ay nagtanan kasama ko ay lalake.

"However, the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency of the defendants to pay the respective indemnities imposed upon them should be eliminated from the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision. (Rep. Act No. 5465). Moreover, it should be ordained therein that in the event of insolvency of one of them, the other should be subsidiarily liable thereto, with right of reimbursement, pursuant to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.

Y our Utus an' complainant abandoned the house of her mistress and went with defendants Francisca Alimagno and Jovita Melo in a jeep, together with a man and a driver. They then proceeded to Barrio Putol, San Pablo City, where she was brought to a hut thereat and there allowed to be ravished by a man, whom she saw for the first time, after the latter had covered her month with a rag and tied her hands, so that she was rendered speechless and helpless from offering any resistance, so much so that he was able to

"WHEREFORE, with the modification indicated above, the decision appealed from, being in keeping with the evidence and the law, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants." The main facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:

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satiate his lust with her until 12:00 o'clock midnight. Thereafter, she was brought by the man to the house of defendant Jovita Melo only to be transferred later to the house of defendant Francisca Alimagno, where she stayed for more or less three days until she was found there and taken back by Leovigildo Perez and Pita Alvero. The two thereafter brought her to the Police Department for the corresponding investigation."

Code in view of the fact that from her own statement, Exh. 1, she admitted that she had sexual intercourse with other men. "This argument is clearly untenable. Complainant, who does not know how to read and write vehemently denied the contents of Exh. 1, saying that it was not the statement she gave to the police. Indeed, she testified that previous to the incident, she did not have any coition with any man and the trial court so believed her. In any event, even assuming it to be true, Article 340 does not prescribe that the persons corrupted be of good reputation, as in the case of simple seduction under Article 338, much less that they be virgins, as in qualified seduction under Article 337, both of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that the above-mentioned traits are of no consequence. . .

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in convicting them of the crime of corruption of minor upon wholly unsubstantial and inherently conflicting evidence; (2) in not holding that the facts, as found by it and the trial court, do not constitute the crime of corruption of minors as defined and penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) in not holding that the minor referred to in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code should be below 18 years of age; (4) in not holding that a person who is already corrupted can no longer be the victim of corruption of minors committed through abuse of authority or confidence; (5) in not acquitting the petitioners of the crime of corruption of minors; and, (6) in not holding that the penalty imposed upon petitioner Melo is incorrect. cdrep

xxx xxx xxx "With regard to the letter (Exh. A), appellant Francisca Alimagno admitted having written the same out of pity to the complainant Filomena de la Cruz (tsn., p. 70, April 22, 1966). But, if she had nothing to do with complainant's sexual adventure, it is strange why she wrote said letter, containing false averments, and then took the complainant away from the house of Pita Alvero, without the knowledge and consent of the latter. She, being a friend of Pita Alvero should have known that her actuation in writing the letter was ill-advised and morally wrong. Her admission that she wrote the same clearly indicates her plan to facilitate or promote the prostitution or corruption of the complainant.

Petitioners argue that they were convicted upon unsubstantial and inherently conflicting evidence. This contention is devoid of factual basis considering the findings of the Court of Appeals which are hereunder reproduced if only to demonstrate that the same were made after a thorough analysis of the evidence, and hence are beyond this Court's power of review: "Appellants (herein petitioners) further contend that the lower court erred in not finding that even before November 29, 1964, the complainant Filomena de la Cruz was already a corrupted person and therefore she could no longer be the victim of the crime of "Corruption of Minors" penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal

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"Appellant Francisca Alimagno testified that the witness for the prosecution Leovigildo Perez was demanding P5,000.00 from her and later was reduced to P2,000.00 (tsn. p. 83, April 22, 1966) to quash the case against her. On crossexamination, she (Francisca Alimagno) said that Perez was asking the aforesaid amount on the ground floor of the Secret Service Division. The pertinent portion of her testimony read, thus:

ABecause we called up Atty. Alvero and asked him to assist us. QAnd you told Atty. Alvero that Leovigildo Perez was asking you P5,000.00? ANo, sir, he just told me go home. QIn other words when Atty. Alvero arrived he just told you to go home?

"QYou stated that Leovigildo Perez asked P5,000.00 from you, can you tell where Leovigildo Perez asked P5,000.00 from you?

AYes, sir.' (tsn., pp. 100-101, ibid.)

AAt the ground floor, sir.

"If there is truth on the matter that Leovigildo Perez was extorting money from her (Francisca Alimagno) for the purpose of quashing the case, appellant Alimagno should have reported or denounced immediately to the police such attitude of Perez, inasmuch as they were near the office of the Secret Service Division or told the matter to Atty. Alvero, but she allegedly kept the matter to herself. The truth, however, is that it was appellant Alimagno who made an offer of P50.00 to Leovigildo Perez to drop the case against her. Thus, the pertinent portion of his (Perez) testimony reads:

QAre you referring to the Office of the Secret Service Division? AAt the ground floor but not within the office of the Secret Service Division. QWas that when you were called by the Secret Service men? AYes, sir. QDid you immediately denounce Perez to the police what he was asking from you?

'AThe truth is that the spouses went to our residence and asked me to accept the amount of P50.00 and drop the case. I told them to ask the complainant, but the complainant refused and said that let the court decide the case.

ANo, sir. QWhy did you not tell or report the matter to the police?

xxx xxx xxx

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QIn your answer you refer to the spouses, will you please specify whom you are referring to?

jurisdiction that an offer of compromise is an evidence of guilt. (People vs. Manzano, CA-G.R. No. 00204-R, Nov. 29, 1962.)"

AThe spouses, Alimagno, Sir.' (tsn., pp. 145-146, June 1, 1966)

We find no reason in this case to depart from the rule which limits this Court's appellate jurisdiction to review only errors of law "accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence." (Evangelista vs. Abad Santos, 51 SCRA 416.)

"The above-quoted testimony of Leovigildo Perez was strengthened by the testimony of Detective Sergeant Francisco Escondo, a disinterested witness for the prosecution who testified, thus:

On the question raised that petitioners could not be guilty of the crime of corruption because the offended party is more than eighteen years of age at the time the alleged offense is committed, the point to consider is whether "under age" means below eighteen or twentyone years old. Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

'QWill you please tell the conversation between you and the accused for the second time?

"Any person who shall habitually or with abuse of authority or confidence, promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of persons under age to satisfy the lust of another, shall be punished by . . ."

AThey seek our service to help them in settling the case. QWhat was your answer? AI told them, 'its up to you.' (tsn., pp. 14-15, June 7, 1965.)

Petitioners contend that in "crimes against chastity, like seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and consented abduction, the age of the victim is pegged at below 18 years of age; . . . that the phrase 'person under age' (in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code) was meant by the lawmakers to refer to persons below 18 years of age." (p. 61, Petitioner's Brief.) cdrep

"On cross-examination, the same witness further testified, thus: 'AAfter Francisca Alimagno had talked with the complainant she requested us to help them to settle this case. (tsn., p. 22, Ibid.)

We cannot subscribe to this view. Article 402 of the Civil Code provides that "majority commences upon the attainment of the age of twenty-one years." When the lawmakers specifically provide "persons under age", instead of "below eighteen years of age", they could mean no other than that the offended party must be below 21 years old, and not below 18 years of age. The same is true in Acts of Lasciviousness in Article 336. White Slave Trade in Article 341, and Forcible Abduction in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, where the age limit is not set at eighteen. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his

"It is clear from the foregoing testimony of both witnesses for the prosecution that the appellants made an offer of compromise for the settlement of the case. These overtures made by the appellants to have the case settled out of court are indicative of a guilty conscience and it is well-settled in this

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commentary on the Revised Penal Code, page 1623, Book II, states that "Art. 340 was taken from art. 444 of the old Penal Code. The requisites of the crime of corruption of minors are that the accused acted habitually or with the abuse of authority or confidence; that he promoted or facilitated the prostitution or corruption of persons below 21 years of age and that he so acted in order to satisfy the lust of another." (emphasis supplied). However, We take note of the recommendation of the Solicitor General that with respect to petitioner Jovita Melo who was found guilty as accomplice in a consummated crime where the penalty is arresto mayor, medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), and where there is no modifying circumstances present, the penalty in its medium period should be imposed, or not less than 3 months and 11 days nor more than 4 months and 20 days. Otherwise stated, the petitioner Jovita Melo should suffer the penalty of 4 months and 20 days, instead of 6 months of arresto mayor. llcd WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. With costs. SO ORDERED.

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