constitutional law 2 case digest

CASE # 1 Mañosca vs. CA, 252 SCRA 412 (1997)

Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the SolicitorGeneral, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied. Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes “public use.” Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive

contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

CASE # 2 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila GR14355, 31 October 1919 Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue within Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila Chinese Community of Manila alleged in its answer that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the City's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the Chinese Community for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the Chinese Community and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the City was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants (Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed. Issue: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be expropriated for the construction of a public improvement.

Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that the city (Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the city of Manila, however, contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect. Act 190 provides for how right of eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said Act provides that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed by Section 242 to 246. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in question is public (a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church) and seems to have been established under governmental authority, as the Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.

CASE # 3 Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. GR L-18841, 27 January 1969 Facts: The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract. Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. On 5 March 1958, the Republic, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls

received by RCA's station to and from local residents. PLDT complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. The Republic commenced suit against PLDT, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI, Civil Case 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against PLDT to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. Issue: Whether the proposed interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation, i.e. the exercise of eminent domain. Held: Yes. Although parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract -- the freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions being of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence -- and thus the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interconnection service between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefore. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. CASE # 4 Comm. Of Public Highways vs Burgos 96 SCRA 831 Facts:

On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-right-of-way purpose. Then Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines). Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover the value of said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of the government was invoked. In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775. The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees. Issue: Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken. Held: No, it is not applicable. Article 1250 of the New Civil Code seems to be the only provision in our statutes which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from what has been agreed upon by the parties because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation. Thus, the Article provides: ART. 1250. In case extra-ordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. It is clear that the foregoing provision applies only to cases where a contract or agreement is involved. It does not apply where the obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract. The taking of private property by the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. Moreover, the law as quoted, clearly provides that the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment which, in cases of expropriation, would be the value of the peso at the time of the taking of the property when the obligation of the Government to pay arises. It is only when there is an "agreement to the contrary" that the extraordinary inflation will make the value of the currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment of the obligation, the basis for payment. In other words, an agreement is needed for the effects of an extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation which, as a rule, is always the determinative element, to be varied by agreement that would find reason only in the supervention of extraordinary inflation or deflation. Under the law, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, even assuming that there has been an extraordinary inflation within the meaning of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code, a fact We decline to declare categorically, the value of the peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation, which in the instant case is when the property was taken possession of by the Government, must be considered for the purpose of determining just compensation. Obviously, there can be no "agreement to the contrary" to speak of because the obligation of the Government sought to be enforced in the present action does not originate from contract, but

from law which, generally is not subject to the will of the parties. And there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof in expropriation by the Government, the value of the property as it is when the Government took possession of the land in question, not the increased value resulting from the passage of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation for the property taken. CASE # 5 City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta GR L-34915 June 24, 1983 Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation. Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The

expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners. CASE # 6 Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay GR L-59603, 29 April 1987 Facts: The President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66. The judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing. The respondent judge also issued a second order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values given by provincial assessors be the value of just compensation. Held: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In determining just

compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly, Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitute impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. CASE # 7 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGON vs.VDA. DE VILLAROYA G.R. No. L-64037 August 27, 1987 Facts: The subject matter of Civil Case No. 50 was a 16,500 square meter lot occupied by the Gubat High School and developed as its athletic ground. The lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real property case in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors. The decision became final and executory. Shortly afterwards, the petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to the private respondents the value of the subject parcels of land as mandated in the court's decisionhe lower court through then Presiding Judge Aquilino Bonto ordered the private respondents to comply with the requirements set up by the COA. The lower court stated that the requirements were made purely in consonance with auditing rules and regulations and were not a whim or caprice designed to cause a protracted delay in the actual payment. Moreover, the lower court stated that the requirements were not beyond compliance considering that some of the required documents were available in the records of the case. When the petitioner tried to disturb the respondents' possession of the land they had re-entered, the latter, filed a "MOTION TO RESTRAIN INTERFERENCE BY DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFFS" before the lower court. In their Comment to the Motion, the

private respondents-intervenors manifested that the status quo in this case should be observed, namely, that the parcel of land remains in the possession of the petitioner but conditioned on the payment by the petitioner of the value of the land; provided however, that in the event that the petitioner fails to pay, the definite shares in the property of each heir should first be determined before the possession is delivered to the plaintiffs and intervenors. Issue: Whether or not the additional requirement charging the private respondents with the duty to have the corresponding title issued in the name of the municipality free from all liens and encumbrances as a condition before the release of the payment for the value of the land is reasonable Held: No. The dispositive portion of the decision explicitly states that in case the petitioner favors payment of the value of the land, the private respondents are ordered to execute a conveyance in favor of the petitioner. The respondents have complied with all the requirements originally imposed by COA. The petitioner cannot, therefore, deny payment to the private respondents. This case is a classic example of a common problem besetting hapless citizens in varying degrees. Because of insistent but distorted application of administrative rules and regulations, persons dealing with government are often placed in unfair predicaments which require needless expenditure of their time, money, and patience. The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. In cases where land is taken for public use, public interest however, must, be considered. The children of Gubat, Sorsogon have been using the disputed land as their high school athletic grounds for thirty years. In the execution of this decision, the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any further delays be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any of the patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount necessary to implement this decision. CASE # 8 COSCULLUELA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77765 August 15, 1988 Facts: The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project. In this instant petition, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court as being violative of his right to just compensation and due process of law. He maintains that these constitutional guarantees transcend all administrative and procedural laws and jurisprudence for as between these said laws and the constitutional rights of private citizens, the latter must prevail. As admitted by the respondent Republic, the NIA took possession of the expropriated property in 1975 and for around ten (10) years already, it has been servicing the farmers on both sides of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project in Iloilo Province and has been collecting fees therefor by way of taxes at the expense of the petitioner. On the

other hand, the petitioner, who is already more than eighty years old and sickly, is undergoing frequent hospitalization, and is made to suffer further by the unconscionable delay in the payment of just compensation based on a final and executory judgment. The respondent Republic, on the other hand, argues that while it has no intention of keeping the land and dishonoring the judgment, the manner by which the same will have to be satisfied must not be inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence, and that is, that public funds such as those of the respondent NIA cannot be disbursed without the proper appropriation. Issue: Whether or not the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking is a correct determination for just compensation Held: Yes. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause. (Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects for rent or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems and sells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominwq.,y for the agencies to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of just compensation to the former owners. CASE # 9 MERALCO v. Pineda 206 SCRA 196 FACTS: MERALCO filed a complaint for expropriation of the lots of the private respondents. While the case was going on and before the appointment of the Board of Commissioners to value the land, the private respondents filed a motion to withdraw a portion of the deposit of MERALCO. This was granted by Judge Pineda; MERALCO objected, contending that this cannot be done since the Board of Commissioners was not yet constituted, and allowing such is a deprivation of its property without due process of law. Judge Pineda maintained that he can dispense with the Board and adopt the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or he could exercise himself the right to decide the just compensation to be paid to the owners of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court can disperse, with the assistance of Board of Commissioners, in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation HELD: : In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. Hence, the judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

CASE # 10 Province of Camarines Sur vs CA May 17, 1993 FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Resolution No. 129 authorizing

the

provincial

governor

to

purchase/expropriate

property

contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for nonfood and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No 129 is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain HELD: Yes, the expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would ensure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the province. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fisherman and craftsman would be enhanced. The housing project, on the other hand, satisfies the requirement of public purpose of the constitution. CASE # 11 PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

FACTS: Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The COMELEC space shall also be used by the Commissionfor dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information operations of print media

enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether or not compelling the petitioner to donate “COMELEC space” amount to “taking” of private property for public use Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “COMELEC space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent COMELEC, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

CASE # 12 Landbank vs CA 249 SCRA 149 (1995) FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose holdings were acquired by DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses by DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed a petition questioning the validity of DAR AO Nos. 6 and 9. They sought to compel DAR to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively, “carmarked”, “reserved” and “deposited in trust accounts” for private respondents and allow them to withdraw the same. ISSUE: Whether or not DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9

HELD: Yes, DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowners as compensation for his property because Sec 16 (c) of RA 6657 is specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular No 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. The respondent court there, did not commit ay error in striking down AO No. 9 for being null and void.

CASE # 13 Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998 FACTS: Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept. The trial court issued an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable. The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed. ISSUES: Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action HELD: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the

purpose of bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.

An ordinance is a law, but a

resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. CASE # 14 ESLABAN VS. ONORIO G.R. NO. 146062, 28 JUN 2001 FACTS: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of

the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the value of the just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision HELD: The only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum

of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."

CASE # 15 Republic vs Ker & Co GR NO 136.171, July 2, 2002 FACTS: the petitioner filed before RTC a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by the respondent for road widening. The provisional value of the properties was fixed at 1,000 per sq meter but the private respondent claimed that it was more than 4,000 per sq m. When estimate for just compensation was given, the petitioner argued that it is unreasonable as the tax declaration of the property indicated that its assessed value is only at P425 per sq m., while the market value was only P849 per sq m. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation can be measured by the assessment value of the property as stated in its tax declaration and schedule of market values

HELD: As declared in Manotok v NHA, the statements made in tax documents made by the assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered but they cannot exclude or prevail over the court determination after expert commissioners have examined the property an all the pertinent circumstances are taken into account and after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully leas their case before a competent and unbiased tribunal.

CASE # 16 CIR vs Central Luzon Drug Corp 456 SCRA 414 (2005) FACTS: Respondent Central Luzon Drug Corp (“Central”) is a retailer of medicines and pharmaceutical products. It’s operates franchises under the name Mercury Drug. In 1995, Central granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens, in conformity with RA No. 7432. The discount amounted to P219,779. CIR issued a revenue regulation which implemented RA 7432. It states that the discount given to the senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales. So, Central deducted the amount P219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. Central reported a NET LOSS in its income tax return so as a consequence, Central did not pay income tax for 1995. Thereafter, respondent filed a claim for tax refund in te amount of P904, 769.00 allegedly arising from the 20% sales discount granted by the respondent to qualified senior citizens in compliance with RA 7432. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent’s claim will prosper Whether or not respondent is entitled to just compensation HELD: The plain wording of the law discounts given under R.A. No. 7432 should be treated as tax credits, not deductions from income. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. Sec. 229 of the Tax Code does not apply to the case

because such section governs only those kinds of refund and credit of taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. CASE # 17 De La Paz Masikip vs. The City of Pasig, et. al., GR. No. 136349, Jan. 23, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner, Masikip, is the registered owner of a parcel of land Pasig City. In January 1994, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan pursuant to Ordinance No. 42 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. In March 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." In May 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. In December 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents." In February 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. Respondent prayed that the trial court issue an order for the condemnation of the property.

In April 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent failed to show a genuine necessity for the taking of the property. Subsequently, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of eminent domain was properly exercised.

RULING: No. The respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, it was held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.

Further, upon scrutiny of the records, it showed that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

CASE # 18 Heirs of Pidacan, et. al. vs. ATO GR No 162779 June 15, 2007

FACTS: Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo had acquired parcel of land about 22 hectares in San Jose Mindoro Occidental with original title certificate and issuance of land TCT No. 2204, patent No. 3383.

The ATO (Air Transportation Office) used a portion of land and constructed an air base new terminal building property upon the death of the Pidacan spouses.

The heirs of the late Pidacan spouses as represented by Pacita Pidacan de Zubiri filed a petition for issuance of owners duplicate because the old copy (original) was lost and later executed a judicial settlement for them, unfortunately it was cancelled and TCT was issued in favor of heirs.

The heirs presented the death certificate of their parents to the ATO but the latter still refuses to pay; the former allege that the respondents must pay the rentals plus the value of property to them. However, ATO insisted that the title was still under their parents name and it was formerly sold to its predecessor, although they failed to claim the property because it was just for taxation purposes.

The heirs filed a subsequent complaint for payment of rentals and property to the respondent on the other hand respondents filed a complaint for expropriation.

The trial court dismissed the respondents petition and promulgated a decision that respondents should pay the amount of 6, 249, 645.40 php per month with 12 % interest per annum until same is fully paid, and 10 % amount must need for expenses of attorney’s fees and litigation.

The heirs moved for reconsideration and were denied; afterwards the former filed an instant petition alleging the honorable Court of Appeals grave error and abuse of discretion, disregarding the law in reversing the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: WON the heirs shall successfully claim the said payment of rentals and property value from the assailed respondents ATO.

RULING:

The CA set aside or reversed the trial court’s decision knowing that there was no contract of lease to allege competent evidence among both parties.

Director of Department of transportation and Communication had a letter that endorse a person named Parales for immediate payment rentals but it was a considered a hearsay and still doesn’t have any proof of lease of contract between each parties negotiation.

The petition was GRANTED, the assailed decision was set aside. However, the RTC’s decision was AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with regards to the actual area of occupation by the respondent to the heir petitioner that reckons 304.39 php per square meter of area expropriated plus the appropriate interest rate of 6% per annum from this total of 65, 668, 183. 43 until fully paid.

The court decision was deemed pursuant to Article VIII of Sec. 13 of the constitution.

CASE # 19 Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Trinidad S. vda. De Arieta GR No. 161834 Aug. 11, 2010 FACTS: Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an approximate area of 37.1010 hectares 14.999 hectares of which was covered by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Private respondent offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the price of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said portion of the land covered by CARP.

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP as just compensation for said 14.999 hectares the amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The offer was rejected by private respondent.

In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as provisional compensation for the acquisition of the property.

Thereafter, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the Regional Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary administrative proceedings to fix the just compensation.

On June 26, 2002, the DARAB rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on September 4, 2002.

Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), Regional Trial Court, which is the subject of this petition.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court, to which petitioner LBP filed its answer and moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial Valuation praying that petitioner LBP be ordered to deposit the DARAB determined amount of P10,294,721.00

Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the deposit should only be the initial valuation of the DAR/LBP in the amount of P1,145,806.06 and not P10,294,721.00 as determined by the DARAB.

On December 12, 2002, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution ordering petitioner LBP to deposit for release to the private respondent the DARAB determined just compensation of P10,294,721.00.

On December 13, 2002, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order to deposit.

On December 17, 2002, private respondent filed a motion to cite, for contempt for failure to comply with the order to deposit.

Public respondent rendered the assailed resolution dated February 17, 2003, denying petitioner LBP’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SAC order to deposit had no legal basis, considering that the requirement for the prompt payment of just compensation was satisfied buy the deposit of the provisional compensation of P1, 145,806.06 required under Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657.

RULING: Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.[12] Once an expropriation proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. EO No. 405, provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP can disagree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as SAC for final determination of just compensation.

The objective of the procedures on land valuation provided by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) as amplified by the issuances of the DAR/DARAB is to enforce the constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking of private agricultural lands placed under the CARP. It must be stressed that the DAR’s authority to determine just compensation is merely preliminary. On the other hand, under Section 1 of EO No. 405, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the just compensation to be paid for their taking.

In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP’s valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations.

As the Court had previously declared, the LBP is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the CA or to this Court, if appropriate.

CASE # 20 Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. PARC, et. Al., GR no. 171101, (2011) FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

RULING: NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

CASE # 21 MORFE vs. MUTUC 22 SCRA 424 (1968)

FACTS: The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019) Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause ISSUE: Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is an oppressive exercise of police power. FACTS: NO. Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed. Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty. The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.”

CASE # 22 Vda. De Genuino vs. Court of Agrarian Relations 22 SCRA 792 (1968) FACTS: Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino is the judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased Jacinto Genuino, Jr., part of which were lands in Mandili and Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga, all devoted to rice production. On May 25, 1964, the share tenants of said lands filed the following complaints against Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino before the Court of Agrarian Relations of Angeles City, Pampanga: The purpose of these complaints was the conversion of the tenancy relationship from share 1 tenancy to leasehold tenancy pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act 3844, in relation to Section 14 of 2 Republic Act 1199, as amended. The nominal average produce for the past three agricultural years, less expenses, was alleged in the complaints. Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino, in separate answers, on September 22, 1964, denied the alleged normal average produce and as an affirmative defense, questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of Republic Act 3844. On January 23, 1965, after the parties had filed their memoranda, the Court of Agrarian Relations denied defendant's prayer for dismissal on the ground that the issue of constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) will not directly affect the tenants' rights in the case because even if said sections were declared unconstitutional, Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, providing also for change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy, which was already held constitutional by the Supreme Court, would still apply. As to the limitation in Section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of the maximum rental, it ruled that the limitation was not really burdensome, for the decrease of 4 5% of the owner's share, is offset by the advantages he gets under the law. A reconsideration was denied the defendant and the Court of Agrarian Relations subsequently, on August 31, 1965, promulgated its decision granting and authorizing the leasehold system starting from agricultural year 1965-1966 on the ground that the issue had become moot since the Supreme Court had upheld the legality of the change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy at the tenant's option pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, as amended. And hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of POLICE POWER was valid. RULING: YES. The abolition of the share tenancy and the compulsion on the landowner and/or tenant to enter into the leasehold system is questioned as unconstitutional on the ground that the freedom of contract is violated and that it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. Said legislation is justified by the right of the state to exercise its police powers. Here, individual rights to contract and to property, had to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. In the case at bar, the exercise of such a power was the result of the intention of Congress to do away with the share tenancy completely. And besides, as the Court of Agrarian Relations correctly held then that even if the challenged provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code be declared unconstitutional, the effect would be the

same for the Code provides that while the National Land Reform Council has not declared the Code operative in the region, the provisions of Republic Act 1199, as amended, would apply. Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, which grants this option to choose the leasehold relationship to the tenant and binding to the landowner, is as earlier pointed out, constitutional. Consequently, regardless of the Land Reform Code, petitioner Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino must give in to the desired change of system.

CASE # 23

Alalayan vs. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172 (1968)

FACTS:

This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an amendatory act, empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision, could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of the Act could be given effect. This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of the subject act, which further amends Commonwealth Act No. 121 infringes the right to due process and impairs contracts.

HELD: This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, this Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a figure as against the contention that it was rather too generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory then is to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in the absence any evidence to demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-known

presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor. In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the legislation assailed contravenes the due process clause. Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already, existence established and in operation.

CASE # 24

Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is Letter of Instruction is valid exercise of POLICE POWER.

RULING: YES. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions

thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.

In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and adequately argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that. Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.

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CASE # 25 Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)

FACTS The petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila which prohibits any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person. The petitioners argued that said ordinance violates their right to property and due process of law. The lower court dismissed their petition, hence this appeal.

ISSUE Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, violating the petitioner’s right to property in their means of livelihood without due process of law

HELD There is no showing of the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila. The enactment of said ordinance is a valid exercise of the municipality’s police power mainly for the purpose of imposing payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767,

and in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers. The delegation of police power in municipality has been given wide application

by

municipal authorities and the Court has been liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.

CASE # 26 Melchor, Jr. vs. Moya, 121 SCRA 1 (1983)

FACTS

Respondent, retired Judge Jose Moya declared Republic Act 6359, the Rent Control Law as unconstitutional

on the ground that it is not a valid police power

measure, that there was lack of substantive due process and a violation of equal protection safeguard. Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 20 as part of the law of the land based on

the

Article on the Transitory Provisions of the present

Constitution which states that : Presidential Decrees promulgated or issued, or acts done by President Ferdinand E. Marcos "shall be part of the law of the land [to] remain valid, legal, binding, and effective" except when "modified, revoked, or suspended" by him as "incumbent President or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the [now Batasang Pambansa]. PD 20 amended RA No. 6359. The petitioner, Alejandro Melchor, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary filed a petition for certiorari and pleaded for the reversal of the decision of the Respondent Judge.

ISSUE Whether or not Republic Act 6359 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid police power measure, there was lack of substantive due process and a violation of the equal protection safeguard

HELD No, Republic Act 6359 is constitutional.

RA 6359 was enacted to promote public

interest and general welfare. RA 6359 cannot be considered as oppressive and arbitrary

because it

was specifically designed to ease economic distress due to

housing

shortage, as shelter is one of the basic social and economic rights. Enacted by Congress, there was a clear manifestation that RA

6359 have been thoroughly

discussed with all aspects of the question accorded due consideration. All questions relating to the determination of the matters of the facts are for the legislature and are not subject for judicial review. Presidential Decree No. 20 have the force and effect of the law of the land as stated in the Article on Transitory Provisions of the present Constitution

and as ruled in Aquino, Jr. vs Commission

on Elections. Therefore,

Presidential Decree 20 as an amendment of RA 6359, it is extremely illogical if an amendatory act is given full force and effect and yet the statute it sought to amend would be declared as being tainted by an unconstitutional infirmity. That clearly is an affront to reason. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision declaring unconstitutional Republic Act No. 6359 is reversed

CASE # 27 Philippine Ports Authority vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 496 (1985) FACTS

Prior to the declaration of martial law in the Philippines, the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in the country's various domestic ports was in great disarray. The "cabo system" of exploiting labor and the lack of rationality in the handling of cargoes prevailed in the port. The Bureau of Customs issued a policy for the integration of all existing cargo handling contractors, in two stages, first into ten corporations, then to one. Only eleven corporations were authorized to do business in the port of Cebu City. Neither respondent Pernito Arrastre Services nor any of the other respondents in this case were issued permits by the Bureau of Customs to operate arrastre services. Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created thru PD 857 amending PD 505 to carry out all duties and functions of the Bureau of Customs. PPA adopted Bureau of Custom’s integration policy. The eleven port service contractors formed the United South Dockhandlers Inc (USDI) and was authorized to handle exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a management contract. Private respondents Pernito, et al. (numbering 18 in all) instituted

an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages against petitioner PPA and USDI. The respondents alleged that the interest of the small contractors were not protected in the integration policy where the big contractors refuse to assimilate them. Respondents further alleged that the controlling interests in USDI reneged on their commitments to the small stockholders; that as a result, respondent Pernito, et al., left USDI and applied with PPA for separate permits to operate their services, but their (Pernito, et al.) applications were denied. Respondent judge issued an injunction order enjoining PPA from enforcing its policy of integration in the port of Cebu City and directing it to allow respondent Pernito, et al., to operate individually and independently as arrastre and stevedoring contractors. Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE Whether or not PPA’s policy of integration

through compulsory merger is

unconstitutional and void for being violative of legal provisions on monopolies

HELD No, PPA’s policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provisions on monopolies.The operations of arrastre and stevedoring

affected the maritime

transportation in the port of Cebu which is the principal port in the South. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the public good and welfare. The discretion in choosing the stevedoring contractor for the South Harbor, Port of Manila belongs by law to PPA. As long as standards are set in determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related for the purpose for which they are used, the courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA's choice. The policy of integration does not promote monopoly because USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted. Whether the monopoly has been created, the overriding and

more significant consideration is public interest, therefore PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision on monopolies.

CASE # 28 Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)

FACTS

A petition to quash the charges against the petitioners for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) was filed before the Court on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense because BP 22 is unconstitutional. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case, hence this petition for relief.

ISSUE Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State

HELD Yes, BP 22 is constitutional as

a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The

enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. The effects of the issuance of a

worthless check , creates not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can

pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking

system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

CASE # 29 Pernito Arratre Services, Inc. vs. Mendoza, 146 SCRA 431 (1986)

FACTS

The Bureau of Customs due to the proliferation of the oppressive "cabo system" and the increase in the incidence of violence and thefts in the ports, issued a policy for the integration of all existing cargo handling contractors, requiring the merger of the thirtysix (36) existing labor contractors into four corporations, and then to just one. Presidential Decree No. 857 transferred and vested the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs with regard to arrastre and stevedoring operations to the respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Pursuant to said decree, respondent PPA imposed a ten percent (10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of arrastre and stevedoring services.PPA adopted the existing integration policy to the port of Tacloban where the four authorized arrastre/stevedoring operators, agreed to merge and form one of the petitioners herein, the Leyte Integrated Port Services, Inc. (LIPSI). PPA issued Special Order No. 114-79 creating the Philippine Ports Authority-Tacloban Arrastre Ports Services (PPA-TAPS) within its worn Tacloban port unit and ordering a take-over by PPA-TAPS of the entire arrastre and stevedoring services in the Port of Tacloban. Petitioner LIPSI, as well all port users were duly informed of the take-over by PPA-TAPS PPA-TAPS took over the actual management and operations of arrastre and stevedoring services in the port of Tacloban. According to PPA, the take-over protected the rights of the dockworkers. Several petitions from the various operators were filed, so the Court consolidated these petitions which seek to permanently restrain the Philippine Ports Authority from taking over the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of

Tacloban, Leyte. The petitioners invoke the constitutional right to due process of law and to non-impairment of contract.

ISSUE Whether or not the respondent PPA's take-over through PPA-TAPS of arrastre operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate the constitutional right of the petitioners to non-impairment of contracts

HELD Yes, PPA’s take-over is a valid exercise of police power. The State in the exercise of its police power through its agency, the PPA, has the power to revoke the temporary permits of petitioners, assuming the existence of valid temporary permits, and take over the operations of the port of Tacloban whenever the need to promote the public interest and welfare of both stevedoring industry and the workers therein justifies such take over. Rights of the petitioners from the temporary permits as well as their right to nonimpairment of contract must yield to the valid exercise of police power of the State. The take-over of PPA-TAPS absorbed the entire labor force that existed at the time of the cancellation of LIPSI's permit, composed of all the labor contractors and the workers under them which have been integrated to develop and improve the planning, growth, financing, construction, maintenance and operation of ports throughout the country and make them responsive to the needs of their individual localities.

CASE # 30 Philippine Asssociation of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drillon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

FACTS

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a recruitment firm for Filipino Workers for overseas placement filed a petition for certiorari

and prohibition challenging the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". The petitioner contends that the Department Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes

the

police power of the State for the validity of Department Order No. 1, s.1998.

ISSUE Whether or not Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid in the constitution

HELD Yes, Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid in the constitution. It is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, which imposes restraint on liberty and property to foster the common good. Official acts such as Department Order No.1, is presumed to be valid and there is no clear showing why it should be nullified. Applying only to female workers, it does not discriminate sexes" and equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class, where the classification in this case rests on substantial distinctions. The said DO is part of the Government’s efforts to protect victims of exploitation which is more rampant in female workers than male workers. The Court agrees that due to the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

The deployment ban does not impair the right to travel as this right is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, of its basic policy to "afford protection to labor”. "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. The Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority, in fact , it removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

CASE # 31 Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157 (1992)

FACTS

Residents of Sta. Elena, Virac , Catanduanes

filed a complaint regarding the

disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine in the warehouse of the petitioner Celestino Tatel. The appointed committee of the municipal council in its investigation found that the inflammable materials stored in the warehouse pose a danger to the crowded neighborhood. Thus, the committee passed Resolution No. 29 declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance under Article 694 of the New Civil Code and directed the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, hence he instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on the co. Respondents

contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, which requires warehouses to maintain a distance of 200 meters from block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional contrary to the due process and

equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUES 1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. HELD

1. No, Ordinance No. 13 is within the scope of the Constitution as an exercise of the Municipal Council’s police power to provide for health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Said ordinance was also validly enacted and is in consonance with the basic principles of a substantive nature which requires that municipal ordinance : (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.

CASE # 32 People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 727 (1992)

FACTS

Private respondent Lim issued a check payable to Sasaki which was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds and still failed to make arrangements for the payment of the full amount in the check after receipt of the notice of dishonor, thus was charged of violation of BP 22 or “Bouncing Check Law”. Respondent moved to quash the information alleging that BP 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check in the nature of a promissory note. Supreme Court

in previous cases ruled that BP 22 is constitutional. Hence, the respondent’s remaining contention is that the memorandum check that he issued is not covered by BP 22, being only a memorandum of indebtedness and should be sued upon only in civil action.

ISSUE Whether or not a memorandum check is within the coverage of BP 22

HELD Yes, a memorandum check is within the coverage of BP 22. A memorandum check signifies the intent to absolutely pay the debt and has the same effect as an ordinary check, which upon presentment by a third person is generally accepted by the bank. Sec 185 of the Negotiable Instruments include memorandum check in its definition which includes any bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Therefore a memorandum check is still covered by BP 22 which does not distinguish but only states that any person who issues any check knowing at the time that he does not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank.. which check is subsequently dishonored .. shall be punished by imprisonment. BP 22 does not look into the nature of the check but merely punishes the act of circulating worthless checks.

CASE # 33 JMM Promotion and Management Inc. vs Court of Appeals 260 SCRA 314 (1996) Facts: In 1994, the Secretary of Labor issued a Department Order (no.3) containing there in

various

procedures, requirements for screening performing artists under a system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former performing artists who will pass such test were to be issued an Artist Record Book (ARB), a necessary pre-requisite in processing any contract of employment. Petitioner contended that such was a property right and vigorously aver that deprivation thereof violates the due process clause and constitute an invalid exercise of police power. Issue: Whether or not Police power was validly exercise in the P.D.?

Ruling: Yes. Clearly, the welfare of the Filipino performing artists, particularly the women, was paramount in its issuance short of a total and absolute ban against the development of deployment of performing artists to high risk destination, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalize the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and certificate skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared from the unpredictable demands of employment of artists abroad. Such facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of assailed order compels the court to rule that the ARB requirement and PD no.3 were issued pursuant to valid police power. CASE # 34 National Development Company vs Philippine Veterans Bank 192 SCRA 257 (1990) Facts: Petitioner with New Agrix Corporation executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land.Agrix then went bankrupt.President Marcos issued PD 1717 in order to rehabilitate the company, which mandated among others the extinguishing of all the mortgages and liens attaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process claims against the company to be administered mainly by NDC. Respondent thereon filed a claim against the company before the Committee. Petitioners however filed a petition with the RTC invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage, liens against it. Respondent took measures to extrajudicially foreclose, which the petitioners opposed by filing another case on the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC held in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree, mainly violation of separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause. Hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not PD (1717) is valid? Ruling: No.PD 1717 was held Unconstitutional on the grounds that it was an invalid exercise of police power, it had no lawful subject and no lawful method, it violated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection clause by lumping together all secured and unsecured creditors; it also impaired the obligation of contracts, even though it only

involved purely private interests.

CASE # 35 Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs Board of Transportation 119 SCRA 592 Facts: A Memorandum Order no.77-42 was issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) which phases out old and dilapidated taxis and refusing registration to taxi units within the NCR having models over 6 years old.Pursuant to such order the Director of Bureau of Land Transportation issued implementing Circular 52 for the purpose of information and implementation of M.O 77-42. Issue: Whether or not the Memorandum Circular is a valid administrative issuance? Ruling: Yes. The State, in the exercise of its police power can prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things harmful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. Here in, PD 101 grants the BOT the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification and regulation to be followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding consideration is the issuance of M.C 77-42 for the safety and comfort of the riding public from the danger passed by old and dilapidated taxis.

CASE # 36 Bautista vs Jumio 125 SCRA 239 Facts: In 1979, an LOI 869 was issued to in response to the continued oil crisis dating back 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with "H and EH" plates on weekends and holidays from 12:00 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday but with certain exceptions. Pursuant thereto, Jumio and Edu issued Memorandum Cicular 39 which imposes the penalty of fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration on owners found violating such LOI. The Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding for the third offense. Issue: Whether or not the LOI (869) and MC (39) valid?

Ruling: A Regulatory measure enjoys the presumption of Constitutionality. Herein, as to LOI (869) the determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation are left to the discretion of the branches. The question before the court is limited to Memorandum Circular (39) while the imposition of the fine and suspension of registration is valid under the Land transportation and traffic code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 ultravires, it must likewise be imposed in accordance with the procedures required by law. CASE # 37 DECS vs San Diego 180 SCRA 533 Facts: Private respondent was a graduate of University of the East with BS Zoology as a degree. He took the National Medical Examination Test (NMAT) and flunk for three times. When he applied to take it again, Petitioner rejected his application on the contention that under its rule, the student shall be allowed only three chances in taking the NMAT, after three consecutive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. Issue: Whether or not the regulation is valid? Ruling: Yes. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwearing entrust their lives and health. The Court upheld the Constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have preparation for a medical education.

initially proved their competence and

CASE # 38 Tablarin vs Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 Facts: Petitioner Tablarin and other persons sought admission into Colleges of Medicine for

the

school year 1987-1988.However, they either did not make it or did not successfully take the

National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and Administration by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). In 1987 Tablarin and others filed a petition questioning the NMAT. Issue: Whether or not the NMAT requirement is valid? Ruling: Yes, it is valid. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate the admission to the ranks of those qualified/authorized to practice medicine to take and pass Medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as a valid exercise of governmental requirement for admission for the medical profession has also long been sustained as a legitimate exercise of regulatory authority of the State. CASE # 39 Philippine National Bank vs Office of the President 252 SCRA 106 Facts: The Private respondents were buyer on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreement it executed over such lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lot in favor of the petitioner PNB. Unaware of the mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their house on the lots in question.Subsequently, the developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed the mortgaged. PNB account the owner of the lots acting on suits brought about by private respondents to the HLURB. Authority ruled that PNB may collect from respondents only the remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreement with the Marikina Village , Inc. and cannot compel respondent to pay all over again. The Office of the Preside concurred with the HLURB, invoking PD 957. Issue: Whether or not PD (957) be applied in the case? Ruling: Normally pursuant to Art.4 of the Civil code, law shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. However it is obvious and indubtible that PD 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like in the present case, executed prior to its enactment and such

intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developer deals with, it is obvious that the law was an instrument of social justice-must favor the weak.

Case # 40 Republic Planters Bank vs. Ogano 269 SCRA 1 (1997) NO DIGEST

Case # 41 Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil. Vs. COMELEC 189 SCRA 337 (1998) NO DIGEST

Case # 42 James Mirasol, et. al. vs. DPWH, et. al. GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycle at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

Issue: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional

Held:

No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

Case # 43 United BF Homeowners’ Asso., Inc., et. al. (UBFHAI) vs. The City Mayor of Paranaque GR No. 141010, Feb. 7, 2007 Facts: The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 entitled, "An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws." UBFHAI, several homeowners’ associations, and residents of BF Homes Parañaque filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. They questioned the constitutionality of Sections 11.5, 11.6, 15, 17, and 19.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 9708. They alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. Public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer. However, EL ACTO, intervened as respondent claiming that their members will be affected if the ordinance will be declared unconstitutional. It also asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. It further alleged that the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of courts. Issue: Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power Held: The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause.28 The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Case # 44 The MMDA, et. al. vs. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. et. al. GR Nos. 170656-170652, Aug. 15, 2007

Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents’ terminals. Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an express delegation by the LGC of 1991. Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. On Constitutional Law, “The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.” Case # 45 Social Justice Society vs. Atienza G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

Facts: Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil companies are located in this area- this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or operators of industries and other businesses, of the Pandacan terminals are given a period of 6 months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are disallowed. Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option and not total removal of the Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance 8027. Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. The said MOU was adopted by a resolution of the Sanggunian

Panglunsod of Manila. Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to enforce the said ordinance and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce it. Issue: Whether or not respondent can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027. Whether or not the MOU superseded Ordinance 8027. Ruling: Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.' One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. The Court ratiocinated, "these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it." As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

Case # 46 CIR vs. YMCA Facts: YMCA – a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs beneficial to the public pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives – leases out a portion of premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, deriving substantial income for such. Seeing this, the commissioner of the internal revenue (CIR) issues an assessment to private respondent for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA opposed arguing that its rental income is not subject to tax, mainly because of the provisions of Section 27 of NICR which provides that civic league or organizations not organized for profit but operate exclusively for promotion of social welfare and those organized exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other non-profitable businesses shall not be taxed. Issue:

Is the contention of YMCA tenable? Held: No, because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions. Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption “must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.”

Case # 47 Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 14 SCRA 292 (1965) Fact: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated 10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality as intended. In 1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal therof. Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt Held: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguised from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise tax.

CASE # 48 Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211 (1970) Facts: The petitioner filed a complaint that sought to invalidate the payment by the respondent bus firm for the registration fees of its motor vehicles in the form of negotiable backpay certificates of indebtedness. It has long been held that it is the right of a holder of a backpay certificate to use the same in the payment of taxes, as evidenced by the fact that the said certificates were accepted by the Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio and by collecting officer of the Bureau of Public Highways. The petition argued that the provision did not apply to the present circumstance, but the petition was denied by the lower court. Issues: 1. Whether or not a registration fee is a tax, allowing for payment through backpay certificates; 2. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from pursuing the petition because of the acceptance and issuance of official receipts by the Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office and the collecting officer of the Bureau of Public Highways in favor of the respondent bus firm. Ruling: 1. No, it is not. The purpose of a tax is to raise revenue and is neither a penalty that must be satisfied or a liability arising from contract. A registration fee, however, is a license or fee manifesting a regulatory exercise of police power. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern private parties and the government. Hence, the payment by use of backpay certificates cannot be entertained. 2. No, it is not. The government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. Thus, the appealed decision is reversed and the respondent is ordered to pay for the registration fee.

CASE # 49 Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981) Facts: The petitioner through its provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the respondent, the Roman Catholic Bishop, who then claimed exemption from real estate tax through an action of declaratory relief. The exemption was granted by summary judgment but the side of the petitioner was not heard, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not all properties belonging to a religious entity recognized by the state are exempt from property taxes as contemplated in the Constitution Ruling: No, not all are exempt. The grant of exemption from property tax given by the Constitution does not only be a property exclusively for the use of a religious group, but that it must be actually and directly used for religious purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and never presumed, so that if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In the present case, the judge granted the action for declaratory relief without requiring the respondent Bishop to provide proof of actual and

direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes. The Court ruled that the case be remanded to the lower court to hear the case on merit.

CASE # 50 Sison, Jr., vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654 (1984) Facts: The petitioner alleges that with the passing of Batas Pambansa Blg 135 amending the Tax Code, he would be unduly discriminated against by the higher rates of tax upon his professional income as compared to those imposed on fixed income or salaried employees. He contended that the provision is arbitrary, oppressive and capricious in character, violating the constitutional rights on equal protection and due cause, and the rule on uniformity in taxation. Issue: Whether or not Section 1 of BP Blg 135 amending the Tax Code violates equal protection and the rule on taxation requiring uniformity and equitability in as far as it provides for differing effects on professionals compared to those with fixed incomes or are salaried Ruling: No, it does not. There is no violation of the Constitutional right on equal protection as long as the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, both in privileges given and liabilities imposed. Nor is there a violation against the rule on taxation that it shall be uniform or equitable. Such rule does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, but that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed the same rate. The power of taxation vests upon the government the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purpose of taxation. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Inequalities that may result from the singling out of a particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

CASE # 51 Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988) Facts: The petitioners sought to nullify EO 273 that adopted the Value-Added Tax (VAT), for being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not within the powers of the President, and that it is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The respondents through the Solicitor General objected that there was lack of sufficient personality to sue and that the petitioners are merely asking for an advisory opinion for the Court. Issues: 1. Whether or not objections to taxpayers' lack of legal standing may be disregarded in determining the validity of the VAT law; 2. Whether or not EO 273 violates the rule on taxation of uniformity and equitability

Ruling: 1. Yes, they may be disregarded. Due to the importance to the public of the issues concerned, and the Court's duty to determine whether there are violations to the Constitution or that other branches of government committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court has brushed aside technicalities and has taken cognizance of the case. 2. No, the sales tax adopted is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 10%. It is also equally imposed on businesses with an aggregate gross annual sale of over P200,000., exempting small corner sari-sari stores and products within the reach of the general public - like farm and marine products. Petition was dismissed.

CASE # 52 Tan vs. Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (1994) Facts: The petitioners filed two consolidated civil actions for prohibition against RA 7496 Simplified Net Income Taxation (SNIT) as it amends National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, claiming to be taxpayers adversely affected by such. They assert that the law attempts to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposed tax on corporations and partnerships, and is a violation of the constitutional requirement that tax laws must be uniform and equitable. Issue: Whether or not SNIT violates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable when it distinguishes between the tax rates imposed on professionals who practice individually and those who do so through general professional partnership Ruling: No, it does not. The due process clause may be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of tax power. There is no evident transgression in the case, nor was there evident intention by the framers of the law to place in unequal footing the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their professions individually and of those who do it through general professional partnership. In fact, the income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, as it is not itself an income taxpayer, but in the partners themselves in their individual capacity - no different from those who practice individually. Also, there is uniformity in classification if: (1) the standards used are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose, (4) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class. Petition denied.

CASE # 53 Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667 Facts: The petitioner, a creation of RA 6958, is mandated to principally undertake the control, management and supervision of the Cebu airport. Its charter provided that the authority shall be

exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. Petitioner then objected when the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on properties owned by the authority. The respondent contended that the petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation performing proprietary functions aside from its governmental functions, and is not tax exempt by virtue of Section 193 and 194 of the Local Government Code (LGC). The RTC denied the declaratory relief filed by the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the local government of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on the petitioner Ruling: Yes, it has. The general rule on the power to tax is that it is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes taxes on the people. Exemptions are frowned upon and must be construed strictly against the taxpayer. Although there was indeed an exemption granted to the petitioner when it was created, that exemption was granted gratuitously and may be revoked at will. Thus, upon the withdrawal of the tax exemptions by the LGC, that grant was revoked. Petition denied.

CASE # 54 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, G.R. No. 124043, 14 October 1998 Facts: The petitioner issued an assessment to private respondent YMCA for deficiency taxes from income earned through the latter's leasing of portions of its premises to shop owners and for parking. The private respondent protested the assessment, stating that it is a non-stock, non-profit organization whose programs and activities pursue religious, educational and charitable objectives, especially for the youth, and cannot be made subject to taxation on real property. Issue: Whether or not income from rentals of real property owned by non-stock, non-profit organizations such as YMCA is subject to income tax Ruling: Yes, it is. The general rule is that income derived from the rental of properties or any other activity conducted for the purpose of profit is taxable, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. The tax exemption provided in Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution lies only the payment of property tax and not on income tax. Also, what is exempted is not the institution itself, but the lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. For YMCA to be exempted, it must prove with substantial evidence that: (1) it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. The Court does not find YMCA to be an educational institution, which refers to schools, and is merely a civic-spirited organization. Petition is granted.

CASE # 55 National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, 9 April 2003 Facts: The petitioner is a GOCC created by Commonwealth Act No. 120 to develop and maintain power-generation sources and transmission. For many years now, it has sold electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City. It then refuses to pay the tax assessment made by the city, arguing that the respondent has no authority to impose tax on government entities, and that the petitioner is a nonprofit organization exempt from taxation. The respondent contended that the exemption of the petitioner from local taxes has been repealed by Section 193 of the Local Government Code (LGC). Issues: 1. Whether or not a GOCC with a charter characterizing it as a non-profit organization is exempted from coverage of franchise tax 2. Whether or not the exemption of the petitioner from all forms of taxes was repealed by the provisions of Section 193 of the LGC Ruling: 1. No, it is not. Franchise tax is imposed not on the ownership but on the exercise by the corporation to do business. Even if it is owned by the National Government, it is a separate and distinct entity and has the privileges and liabilities of a corporation enjoying a "franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise, exercising rights under it within the territory of the respondent city. 2. Yes, it was. Although LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges on the National Government, it may now do so on its agencies and instrumentalities. Petition is denied.

CASE # 56 British American Tabacco vs. Camacho, et. al., GR No. 163583, Apr. 15, 2009 NO DIGEST

CASE # 57 City of manila vs. laguio, jr. GR no: 118127, April 12,2005

Facts: there was City Ordinance No. 7738, entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITAMALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. That was enacted by the petitioner city of manila. The petitioner argued that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to protect the

social and moral welfare of the community. While the Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) argued that the said ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power on the grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them. The respondent prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Issue: whether or not the City Ordinance no. 7738 is unconstitutional for it violates constitutional

guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws

Rulling: Yes, the City Ordinance no. 7738 is unconstitutional for it violates constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws. The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. The enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws.

CASE # 58 Salazar vs. people G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice through Mr. Jerson Yao. As

payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant a check, Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioner’s assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (“Account Closed”). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the check and drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). The petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a

second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for “DAUD,” which in banking parlance means “drawn against uncollected deposit.” According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase.

Issue: whether or not the right to due process was denied to the petitioner

Rulling: Yes, the right to due process was denied to the petitioner, because the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon

CASE # 59

People vs. bodoso G.R. Nos. 149382-149383

March 5, 2003

Facts: There was a complaint-affidavit filed by Jenny Rose Bausa Bodoso accusing her father Ricardo Bodoso of qualified rape committed on July 1999 and repeated sometime the following September. Accused was arrested and detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malilipot and Bacacay, Albay. He was subjected by the same court to preliminary investigation where he failed to submit counter affidavit/rebuttal evidence against his daughter’s complaint-affidavit. The trial court called the parties to a pre-trial conference. The prosecution and the defense stipulated that Jenny Rose was the daughter of accused-appellant and that she was fourteen (14) years old during the alleged incidents of rape. The admitted facts were stated in the pre-trial order that was signed by accused-appellant and his counsel de oficio from the Public Attorney’s Office and by the public prosecutor. The prosecution presented only two (2) witnesses, the defense counsel cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. Incidentally, Jenny Rose did not substantiate the allegation that she was only fourteen (14) years old when the crimes of rape were supposedly perpetrated, after offering

its documentary evidence and the admission thereof by the trial court for whatever it may be worth, the prosecution rested its case against accused-appellant. However, upon the manifestation of the counsel de oficio, reception of the evidence for the defense was deferred to 2. the defense was summoned to present its evidence. Lamentably, unlike in the previous settings of the trial court, the consolidated records of Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-3286 do not indicate whether accused-appellant was present on the scheduled trial date. There were also no transcript of stenographic notes nor minutes of the proceedings on that date that would have elucidated on the cryptic order of the trial judge of even date tersely. The accused-appellant was convicted of two (2) counts of qualified rape against his fourteen (14)-year old daughter; hence, this automatic review.

Issued: Whether or not the accused was denied of due process since no valid waiver of rights has been made

Rulling: the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is preserved and the State makes no mistake in taking life and liberty except that of the guilty. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration that such a different or extraordinary approach has been undertaken voluntarily and intelligently. To protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client’s right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, CASE # 60 Saya-Ang vs. comelec, GR no. 155087, November 29, 2003

Facts: Petitioners herein, were candidates for the Office of Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan, Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate of candidacy in Barangay Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec which stated that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in. In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) submitted its study to the Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En Banc Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners herein. Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed Resolution and were never given the chance to present their evidence

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was been denied of due process when they were not given the chance to present evidence

Ruling: Yes, the petitioner was been denied of due process when they were not given the chance to present evidence, because the right to due process is a cardinal and primary right which must be respected in all proceedings. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play, the cornerstone of every democratic society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Petitioners certainly cannot read the minds of those tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a proceeding had already been instituted against them and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf. Petitioners certainly cannot read the minds of those tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a proceeding had already been instituted against them and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf.

CASE # 61

Casimiro vs. CA G.R. No. 136911

February 11, 2003

Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land situated in Pamplona, Las Piñas City. Adjoining their property on the northern side was petitioners’ land. During a relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Emilio Paz at the instance of respondents, it was discovered that the Casimiro Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners, encroached by 3,110 square meters into respondents’ land. Respondents notified petitioners and demanded that they desist from making further development in the area. Subsequently, respondents demanded that petitioners remove all constructions in the area. Failing in their efforts to regain possession of the disputed premises, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Pasay City an action for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners and the latter’s lot buyers. Respondents alleged that 3,110 square meters of their property, which has a market value of P640,000.00, computed at the then prevailing price of P200.00 per square meter, have been encroached upon and fenced in by petitioners as part of the Casimiro Village Subdivision, and subdivided and sold to lot buyers. In support of their contention, respondents presented the geodetic engineer who conducted the actual ground relocation survey. In their defense, petitioners denied that there was an encroachment in respondents’ land. They presented Geodetic Engineers Lino C. Reyes and Felipe Venezuela from the Bureau of Lands. Meanwhile, defendant-lot buyers interposed a cross-claim against petitioners spouses Casimiro, averring that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their respective lots. The Court of First Instance of Pasay City, rendered a decision in favor of respondents,

Issue: Whether or not there were violations of right of due process, when the petitioner and the respondents were not notified of and thus failed to participate in the survey

Ruling: Yes, there were violations of right of due process, when the petitioner and the respondents were not notified of and thus failed to participate in the survey, because failure of Engr. Cortez, as chairman of the resurvey team, to notify Engr. Bernardo of the actual field work to enable him to participate therein constituted as serious violation of petitioners’ right to due process, especially considering that it resulted in a deprivation of their property to the extent of 3,235 square meters. The actual survey proceedings must, therefore, be conducted anew, ensuring this time that the interests of both parties are adequately protected. Hence, this case must be remanded to the Court of Appeals for the retaking of the survey of the boundaries on the parties’ respective properties.

CASE # 62

Miranda vs. Carreon G.R. No. 143540

April 11, 2003

Facts: Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed the respondents to various positions in the city government. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments. When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his position after his suspension, he considered the composition of the PSPB irregular since the majority party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented. He then formed a three-man special performance audit team, to conduct a personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those on probation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted to him a report stating that the respondents were found "wanting in (their) performance." three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued an order terminating respondents’ services because they "performed poorly" during the probationary period. Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on probation,5 they can be dismissed from the service on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of six months, not after three (3)

months. They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the service violated their right to due process. Issue: whether or not the dismissal of the respondent by the petitioner, violated their right to due process

Ruling: Yes, the dismissal of the respondent by the petitioner, violated their right to due process, Respondents vehemently assert that they were never notified in writing regarding the status of their performance, neither were they warned that they will be dismissed from the service should they fail to improve their performance. Significantly, petitioner did not refute respondents’ assertion. The records show that what respondents received was only the termination order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously, respondents’ right to due process was violated.

CASE # 63 Gov’t. of the U.S.A. vs. Purganan, GR no. 148571, September 21, 2002 Facts: There was an existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through

diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, the Court issued it’s a Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. The Resolution has become final and executory. Issue: whether or not the detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings violates

of his right to due process Ruling: No, the detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings violates of his right

to due process, the court reiterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court

hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

CASE # 64 Soriano vs. Angeles, GR no. 109920, august 31, 2000

Facts: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight, they barged into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" ("You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were four barangay tanods in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital. Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He testified that he went to the barangay hall in the evening, because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys, who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a checkup.) As private respondent saw petitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the latter’s arrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told private respondent to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis dito" ("Your being a policeman doesn’t pull strings here"). When private respondent insisted on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Private respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure himself. All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent’s uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home. In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence Issue: Whether or not the respondent decide with bias which encroached the due process

Ruling: No, It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case CASE # 65 G.R. 144464 November 27, 2001 CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CSC FACTS: During the examinations for non-professional in the career civil service, given by the Civil Service Commission, on July 30, 1989 in Quezon City, the CSC found the petitioner Zenaida C. Paitim, a Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, guilty of falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the said office, who took the examinations for the latter. The CSC recommends the dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of respondents Zenaida Paitim and Gilda Cruz for the offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that the petitioners’ constitutional right to due process was not violated in the administrative case no. D3-95-052 where respondent Commission acted as the investigator, the complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge, all at the same time, against the petitioners.

RULING: No, they were not denied the due process. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987. It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case. We do not find reversible error with the decision of the Court of Appeals in upholding the CSC Resolution.

CASE # 66 People v. De Leon

FACTS: This is an appeal of the 2000 Decision of the RTC of Malabon convicting Conrado de Leon of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. Appellant was arrested but his co-accused, Andring de Leon and one John Doe, remained at large. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty after the Information had been read and interpreted to him in a language that he fully understood. After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued against him alone. Thereafter, the lower court promulgated its assailed Decision. The Public Attorney’s Office, counsel for appellant, filed directly with this Court, the Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it directly participated in the active cross-examination of defense witness Armando Roque

RULING: No. They are not prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary. In fact, this Court has repeatedly ruled that judges "must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking [witnesses] questions x x x as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth.” This means that “questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time.” In the exercise of sound discretion, they may cross-examine these witnesses or ask them such questions as will enable the former to formulate sound opinions on the ability of the latter to tell the truth, and to draw out relevant and material testimonies that may support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. Even if the clarificatory questions they propound happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one of the parties, bias is not necessarily implied. In the present case, the only purpose of the trial judge was to arrive at the truth and do justice to both parties. An accusation of unfairness cannot be supported when his intention was merely to elicit the truth. As this Court has already ruled, judges may ask questions that would elicit the facts of the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that may have been overlooked by counsel.

CASE # 67 Camacho v. Gloria 409 SCRA 174 (2003) or [G.R. No. 138862. August 15, 2003] DR. MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA, DR. EDMUNDO PRANTILLA, DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, As members of the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines; HON. RENO CAPINPIN, CESAR LIMBAGA, LEOVIGILDOARELLANO, As members of the Special Investigation Committee; DR. THELMA LEDESMA, and HON. WENCESLAO IBABAO, in hiscapacity as Presiding Judge of Davao City, respondents. FACTS: Dr. Thelma S. Ledesma, Secretary of the BOR of USP, filed a complaint against Camacho before the Office of the USP President for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a dean and falsification of public documents for having rigged the results of the performance evaluation test taken by her students such that she was not given any teaching assignment by Camacho. Camacho moved for the inhibition of the committee members on the ground that the ones who formed the committee, namely DECS Secretary Gloria and the committee chairman, Atty. Capinpin, were both respondents in the Ombudsman case he filed (gross incompetence and insubordination). ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated by the Special Investigation Committee of the university. RULING: No. Petitioner’s allegations that Secretary Gloria and the Special Investigation Committee members were biased and partial are merely speculative. There is no showing that the Education Secretary and the Committee members had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case against petitioner. Absent persuasive proof of bias and partiality, Secretary Gloria and the committee could not be presumed to be incapable of acting regularly in the performance of official functions. They must be accorded the benefit of the presumption that they would act in a manner befitting their sworn duties, particularly, with “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” implicit in the guarantee of due process.

CASE # 68 Lozada vs. Arranz A.M. RTJ-O2-1741 November 27, 2003 SPO4 NORBERTO LOZADA & SPO1 CHARLIE CO SAM, complainants, vs. LUIS J. ARRANZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 11, respondent.

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against the Honorable Luis J. Arranz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11, for gross partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law. SPO4 Norberto Lozada and SPO1 Charlie Co Sam of the PNP were among the arresting officers of accused Ruben Dy in a Criminal Case for violation of Section 15, Republic Act No. 6425, charged with illegally selling and delivering shabu to SPO1 Charlie Co Sam in a buybust operation. During the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, SPO4 Lozada was asked to identify the original unmarked envelope containing the marked money handed by the poseur buyer to the accused. Judge Arranz himself proceeded to interrogate the witness. He confused the witness by ordering his clerk to get another unmarked legal-size envelope in substitution of the original unmarked legal-size envelope containing the buy-bust money thus, the witness could no longer identify which of the two envelopes was the original. During that same hearing, complainants allege that the counsel for the accused shouted derogatory remarks against Prosecutor Apolo, degrading her stature as officer of the court. The remarks were ignored by respondent judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge Arranz is guilty of gross partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

RULING: Yes, he is found GUILTY of gross misconduct. The over-intrusive questioning of the prosecution witnesses by the respondent judge was improper. Judges should avoid abruptly interrupting the direct examination of witnesses. In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses have not even completed their direct testimony when the respondent judge abruptly butted in, bombarded them with tricky questions and in the process threw their testimonies in haywire. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of the truth”. It ought to be self evident that the questions that may be propounded by a judge to witnesses are limited, in scope and in shape for they should have no other purpose but to clarify, to promote justice, or prevent waste of time.

CASE # 69 People vs. Tee 395 SCRA 419 (2003) [G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003] FACTS:

A raid conducted by operatives of the NBI and PNP - Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by Tee and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana. Tee contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally obtained, being the products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. He insisted that the search warrant was too general and the process by which said warrant was acquired did not satisfy the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover, the prosecution witness’ testimony, which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was hearsay. The trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the 336.93 kilograms of marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence was more than ample to prove appellant’s guilt and duly convicted him of illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced him to death. ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted at the appellant’s residence was valid RULING: Yes. A search warrant is issued if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. The description “an undetermined amount of marijuana” must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, “undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp,” in our view, has satisfied the Constitution’s requirements on particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact – not of law – by which the peace officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.

CASE # 70 DOH v. Camposano G.R. 157684 April 27, 2005

FACTS: Some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996. The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents. The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. Then, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government service. RULING: No, due process was not observed because of non-compliance of the 6th requisite in the Secretary’s order in dismissing the respondents. Noting that the Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC. Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively charged. CASE # 71 Velasquez v. Hernandez

G.R. 150732 August 31, 2004

FACTS: The CSC found Hernandez guilty of the charges against her such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers, and ordered her dismissal from the service. CA reversed the resolutions of the CSC because it is not enough that the twin requisites of notice and hearing be present, there must also be a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal. It also ruled that Velasquez failed to discharge the burden of proving by substantial evidence the averments of the complaint because it appears that some affiants who executed sworn statements to support the charges against respondent later retracted their statements and executed new statements, alleging that they were merely induced to testify against respondent. It also noted that some of the complaining teachers even failed to appear in the investigation to confirm their respective sworn statements. CA therefore, annulled and set aside the Resolutions of the CSC and ordered the payment of backwages to respondent.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED.

RULING: No, due process was not violated because Hernandez was given the chance to answer the charges, to submit countervailing evidence, and to cross-examine the witnesses against her. The mere fact that respondent questioned the impartiality of the fact finding committee will not automatically result in a denial of due process because what matters is that respondent had actively participated in the proceedings against her. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably than oral argument, through pleadings. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not even strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. Further, a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him – he is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearing of the investigation committee. It is the administrative resolution, not the investigation report, which should be the basis of any further remedies that the losing party in an administrative case might wish to pursue. Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule.” A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Case # 72

People v. Morato

G.R. Nos. 95358-59 July 5, 1993

FACTS: Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian were charged with the crime of murder in an Information dated February 8,1989. In a separate Information also dated February 8, 1989, Ernesto Morato was charged for illegal possession of firearms. ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1866 is vague and therefore, violative of accused-appellant’s due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

RULING: No. The supposed vagueness arises from the fact that the law does not allegedly specifically define what constitutes the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Upon a perusal of Presidential Decree No. 1866, we find no vagueness in the wording of said law. The first two paragraphs of Section 1 of the decree are specific enough. It is plain from a reading of said decree and general orders that the crime of illegal possession of firearms is committed by a person who has in his possession a firearm without a license or permit to do so from the proper authorities, or by a person, although authorized to possess such firearm, nevertheless carries it outside of his residence without permit to do so from the proper authorities. The pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms are clear and unambiguous. Said laws, not being contrary to any provision of the Constitution, are constitutional.

CASE # 73 PEOPLE vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO FACTS: The case is all about due process of implementing the Municipal ordinances covering tax payments The prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for three consecutive years as per Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by ordinance no. 15, series of 1965, and as further amended by Ordinance No. 12, Series of 1966, of the municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon. The accuse by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and there is no low empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. The defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinance is a valid adherence to due process? RULING: Yes, the privilege taxes on the business of fishpond Maintenance are not charged against sales but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves. CASE #74 Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977) FACTS: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On July 8, 1974, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On Nov 8, 1974, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for Nov. 18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on Dec 5, 1974, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On Dec 12, 1974, the University applied with the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner’s employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for reinstatement and back wages. Judgment was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. ISSUE: Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal from AUF.

HELD: No, the guarantee of security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of Labor during which petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case. CASE #75 CHR vs CSC 227 SCRA 42 (1993) FACTS: Atty. Elias Pacete, a permanent appointee to the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) based in, filed an application for optional retirement pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1616 because of failing eyesight. On July 17, 1989 he was informed by the Chairman of the CHR through a telegram of the acceptance and approval of his application for optional retirement effective July 31, 1989 and the appointment of Atty. Rodrigo Roy as his successor effective August 1, 1989.On August 25, 1989 (GSIS) informed private respondent that his application for optional retirement cannot be favorably considered due to his failure to meet the condition provided for in Section 12 (c) of Rep. Act No. 1616 requiring three (3) years of

continuous service preceding retirement. Consequently, the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the service to complete the said requirement. Accordingly, Pacete requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with back wages and allowances and the recall of the appointment of his successor, Atty. Roy. On October 18, 1989, the CHR through a resolution, denied his request and instead formally charged him with incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of official duty and failure to account for public funds. On May 27, 1990, Pacete, after being informed of the action taken by the CHR elevated his case to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On August 31, 1990, the MSPB ordered the immediate reinstatement of private respondent his former position with payment of back wages and other benefits, allowed by law without prejudice to the outcome of the formal charges against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Pacete was illegal due to the fact that the resolution denying reinstatement was issued without conforming to the requirements of due notice and hearing. HELD: Yes, it constituted a blatant violation of Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 36 of Pres. Decree No. 807 which provides that “No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process,”. If petitioner wishes to dismiss private respondent for cause, the latter must be allowed to return to his previous position so that he may avail himself of the opportunity to refute the charges imputed to him. Moreover, if petitioner were sincere in its denial of reinstatement to private respondent, it should have filed the administrative charges beforehand, not after it had allowed private respondent to undergo the process leading to his retirement from the service. Granted that an employee is guilty of incompetence and inefficiency, an employer should seasonably file administrative charges against him and marshal the needed evidence instead of springing these, on him as he is about to retire. Such a treatment is, to put it mildly, unfair and certainly, totally unexpected and uncalled for from a government agency whose avowed mission is to protect and promote human rights.

CASE # 76 U.P. vs Ligot – Telan (227 SCRA 342) FACTS: U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, etc. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. Ramon P. Nadal, applied for STFAP benefits, a student of the College of Law. A team composed of Dona and Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. In compliance with the

said Committee's directive, Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed discrepancies. Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. In executive session, the BOR found Nadal"guilty" and imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%interest per annum from March 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. HELD: NO, University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an e x c e p t i o n o f t h e M a r c h 2 9 , 1 9 9 3 m e e t i n g f o r i t w a s supposed reconsider the decision made on March 28,1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a c o n c l u s i o n , e v e n i f o t h e r m i n d s equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due process. CASE # 77 OPLE vs. TORRES FACTS: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308, entitled "Adoptionof a National Computerized Identification Reference System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation on 22 and 23 January 1997. On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee are charged with the implementation of Administrative Order 308. ISSUE:

Whether or not AO 308 is a law and not a mere administrative order, the enactment of the former being beyond the President’s power. HELD: 1. Yes, administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Such a system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies: the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. The authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the President to issue.

CASE # 78 TUNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85) FACTS: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered. ISSUE: Whether or not the provision under Act No. 1147 a valid exercise of Police Power. HELD: Yes, beyond the power of Police Power, , the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the

purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. CASE #79 Smith Kline & French Laboratories vs Court of Appeals FACTS: In August 1989, Danlex Research Laboratories petitioned before Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) that it may be granted a compulsory license for the use and manufacture of the pharmaceutical product Cimetidine. Cimetidine is useful as an antihistamine and in the treatment of ulcers. Cimetidine is originally patented to Smith Kline and French Laboratories in 1978, and the said patent is still in force at the time of application by Danlex Research. The BPTTT granted the application of Danlex Research together with a provision that Danlex Research should be paying 2.5% of the net wholesale price as royalty payment to Smith Kline. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Smith Kline assailed the grant as it argued, among others, that the same is an invalid exercise of police power because there is no overwhelming public necessity for such grant considering that Smith Kline is able to provide an adequate supply of it to satisfy the needs of the Philippine market; that a provision in the Philippine Patent Laws is violative of the Paris Convention to which the Philippines is a signatory. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: Yes, the granting is a valid exercise of police power. Cimetidine is medicinal in nature, and therefore necessary for the promotion of public health and safety. Section A(2) of Article 5 [of the Paris Convention] unequivocally and explicitly respects the right of member countries to adopt legislative measures to provide for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent. An example provided of possible abuses is “failure to work;” however, as such, is merely supplied by way of an example, it is plain that the treaty does not preclude the inclusion of other forms of categories of abuses. The legislative intent in the grant of a compulsory license was not only to afford others an opportunity to provide the public with the quantity of the patented product, but also to prevent the growth of monopolies. Certainly, the growth of monopolies was among the abuses which Section A, Article 5 of the Convention foresaw, and which our Congress likewise wished to prevent in enacting. CASE # 80 Pilipinas Kao v. CA [GR 105014, 18 December 2001] FACTS: Pilipinas Kao, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in multiple areas of registered activity, or has a number of projects registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). Batas Pambansa 391 (Investment Policy Act of 1983) was enacted in 1983, providing, among others, for tax incentives for new and expanding export producer. To avail itself of these tax

incentives, the company applied with BOI for registration of its expanded production capacity, which BOI approved on 8 January 1987. These tax incentives apply only to the company’s Certificate of Registration 87-1476 (Project 4) as new export producer, and Certificate of Registration 87- 1247 (Project 3) as an expanding export producer (an expansion of the company's existing projects registered under RA +6135). The initial application by company for tax credit incentives for the year 1987 was approved by BOI substantially as applied for. But those applied for in 1988 and onwards were drastically reduced by BOI with the adoption and application of a deductible "base figure" provided in its Tax Credit on Net Local Content (NLC) and Net Value Earned (NVE) Manual of Operations. On 31 March 1989, company filed applications for its 1988 tax credits on the NVE for P8,583,328.00 and on the NLC for P25,928,673.00 for a grand total of P34,512,000.00. On 10 May 1990, the BOI Issued Board Resolution 188, series of 1990, granting company's application for tax credit but only in the reduced amounts of P1,512,758 for NVE and P2,631,018 for NLC for a grand total of P4,223,776. Notified of the BOI s decision, company requested for a reconsideration. But before the BOI could act thereon, company again filed on 3 July 1990 its applications for 1989 tax credits on the NVE in the amount of P9,649,459 and on the NLC, P25,648,401, for a grand total of P35,297,860. On 27 July 1990, the BOI denied company's request for reconsideration anent its 1988 tax credit, the denial being communicated to company in a letter dated 1 August 1990 and received by the latter on 15 August 1990.On 17 December 1990, company again moved for reconsideration of the BOI s letter dated 1 August 1990, but the same was denied by the BOI in a letter dated 11 March 1991. On 11 March 1991, the BOI also advised company of the approval of its application for the year 1989 tax credit but only in the reduced amounts of P3,441,473 (NVE) and P649,471 (NLC) for a grand total of P4,090,944. ISSUE: Whether the Board of Investment’s Manual of Operation, especially as to the NLC and NVE, binds Pilipinas Kao, or the public as a whole. HELD: The Manual of Operations is not exempted from publication as it is not merely internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, nor is it a letter of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. The Manual of Operations affected the public in a substantial way. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The Manual of Operations was meant to enforce or implement B.P. Blg. 391, a law of general application. The absence of publication is a fatal omission that renders the Manual of Operations void and of no effect. Further, Section 17 of PD 1789, as amended by BP 391, explicitly provides that the rules and regulations implementing the Investments Code take effect only after due publication. Thus, the ''Tax Credit on NLC and NVE Manual of Operations" (Manual of Operations) of BOI has no legal effect insofar as it adopts as a "base figure" for net value earned (NVE) the "highest attained production volume" in the period preceding the registration of petitioner's additional or expanded capacity; and (2) only the expanded or additional capacity of petitioner registered under BP 1789, as amended by BP 391, is entitled to the tax credit provided therein, and not the pre-existing registered capacity.

CASES 81 – 88 : NO DIGEST RECEIVED 81. Montesclaros vs. COMELEC, GR No. 152295, July 7, 2002

82. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, GR No, 46496, February 27, 1940 83. Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., et. Al., vs. Albayda Jr., GR No. 172724, August 23, 2010 84. Puse vs. Puse, GR No. 183678, March 15, 2010 85. Atienza, Jr. et. al. vs. COMELEC, et. al., GR No 188920, February 16, 2010 86. Flores vs. Pacasio, AM No. P-06-2130, June 13, 2011 87. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) 88. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)

CASE # 89 CHUA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. NO. 88979 FEBRUARY 7, 1992

FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec.2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s status as a co-terminous employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: No. Petitioner is not excluded. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain respondent’s

submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. CASE # 90 Tiu vs CA G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999 FACTS: Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'" ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution HELD: No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Supreme Court believed it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries.

CASE # 91 DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC G.R. No. 129118 July 19, 2000 FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the act violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution HELD: No. The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

CASE # 92 CRUZ vs COA GR NO. 134740 October 23, 2001 FACTS: The Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) is a government-owned corporation granting the payment of social amelioration benefits (SAB) to its employees. In July 1, 1989, RA 6758 was enacted and pursuant to Sec. 23 thereof, the DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 as the IRR of the law. In May 1994, the resident auditor of COA in the SRA examined the corporation's accounts and questioned the legality of the payment of the SAB to all employees of the SRA. DBM further ruled that the grant of SAB had no legal basis and was in violation of RA 6758. Accordingly, the resident auditor suspended the payment of SAB to SRA employees. The SRA administrator requested the lifting of such suspension and the SRA employees appealed to the Office of the President for the continued grant of SAB. In 1996, COA denied the request and claimed that upon the effectivity of RA 6758, the grant of SAB was no longer allowed unless there was a prior authority from the DBM or Office of the President or a legislative issuance. However, on May 1996, the Office of the President, thru an indorsement, granted the post facto approval/ratification of the SAB to SRA employees.

Pursuant to such indorsement, COA allowed the payment of SAB to SRA employees BUT ONLY TO THOSE HIRED BEFORE October 31, 1989. All the other employees remained untitled to said benefits and were informed that the SAB granted to them in 1994 shall be deducted thru monthly payroll. SRA then filed a motion for partial reconsideration claiming that the authority granted by the office of the President covered ALL employees of the SRA regardless of the date of hiring. COA denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the classification of the COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and as to who were excluded is valid HELD: No. The classification of COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and excluding therefrom those employees hired after October 31, 1989, has no legal basis. The date of hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a substantial distinction. The employees, based on the title or position they were holding, were exposed to the same type of work, regardless of the date they were hired. The date of hiring is not among the factors that shall be taken into consideration in fixing compensation or granting of benefits. R. A. No. 6758, Section 2 provides, thus: “Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. xxx” Evidently, any distinction among employees must be based on substantial differences, that is, level or rank, degree of difficulty and amount of work. To discriminate against some employees on the basis solely of date of hiring is to run against the progressive and social policy of the law. CASE # 93 LOPEZ VS CA GR NO. 144573 SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Liggayu, Resident Ombudsman of PCSO, was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest Of The Service for issuing a subpoena in relation to OMB-0-990571 entitled, "FACT- FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU versus Manuel Morato, et al.," in excess of his authority as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman imposed upon him the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Liggayu's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a petition for review before the CA and prayed for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.

On March 8, 2000, the petitioners implemented the suspension of Liggayu in compliance with the directive of the Office of Ombudsman. The CA issued a TRO enjoining the Office of the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order against private respondent. However, on May 2000, a resolution was issued granting Liggayu's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the execution. Petitioners claimed that the stay of execution pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to government employees charged under the Civil Service Law, where the decisions in disciplinary cases are immediately executory. ISSUE: Whether or not the stay of execution pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause HELD: No. The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied notwithstanding that later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the execution of private respondent’s suspension pending appeal. The penalty imposed on private respondent for Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest of The Service was six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Considering that private respondent appealed from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty of suspension should therefore issue as a matter of right. CASE # 94 PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION INC. (PHILRECA), ET. AL. VS. SECRETARY OF DILG GR 143076 10 JUNE 2003 FACTS: Under Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration Decree, it is the declared policy of the State to provide “the total electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis” the same “being vital to the people and the sound development of the nation.” Pursuant to this policy, PD 269 aims to “promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives” by “giving every tenable support and assistance” to the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law. From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic Council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA (National Electrification

Administration), entered into 6 loan agreements with the government of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives, including Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I), as beneficiaries. The 6 loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are existing until today. The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan. On 23 May 2000, a class suit was filed by the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA); ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I; in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Secretary of the Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition, contending that pursuant to the provisions of PD 269, as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause and impairing the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United States Government. ISSUE: Whether the Local Government Code unduly discriminated against electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, in violation of the equal protection clause, by providing a different tax treatment between the former and cooperatives created under RA 6938. HELD: The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines). First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than P2,000.00. Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this principle, the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not possess the capability nor the resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives. In contrast, PD 269, as amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon the happening of certain events, the power to control and take over the management and operations of cooperatives registered under it. The extent of government control over electric cooperatives

covered by PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of the electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments to PD 269 were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. Lastly, the transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the recognition by Congress of the fundamental distinctions between electric cooperatives organized under PD 269, as amended, and cooperatives under the new Cooperative Code. Article 128 of the Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall be deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within one year. However, cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three years within which to qualify and register with the CDA, after which, provisions of PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over electric cooperatives, would no longer apply.

CASE # 95 FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003 Facts: Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66.Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Issue: Whether or not the repeal of Section 67 is violative of the equal protection clause Held: No. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

CASE # 96 CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC VS. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act). Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levelsin the BSP. Petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653", violates the equal protection clause as protected by the Constitution. Held: Yes. It violates the equal protection clause. The challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.

CASE # 97 Quinto & Tolentino, Jr. vs. COMELEC Gr No. 189698, February 22, 2010 Facts: The Commission on Elections questioned an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, which declared the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, unconstitutional. Both provide that any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Issue: Whether or not the given provisions violate the equal protection clause. Held: No. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The assailed decision deemed that the above provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. However, there was doubt that the different treatment of appointive officials in comparison with elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law. Such distinction is justified, or germane to the purposes of the law, by considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, while there is no such expectation for appointed official. Thus, elected officials can be said to be excluded from the deemed-resigned provisions out of respect for the sovereign will of the electorate. CASE # 98 NPC vs. Pinatubo Commercial GR No. 176006, March 26, 2010 Facts: The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being violative of substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce. Issue: Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Held: No. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause,

therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction. CASE # 99 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 Facts: COMELEC refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), as a party-list based on moral grounds. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list under RA No. 7941. Held: Yes. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors in RA No. 7941 is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA No. 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. CASE # 100 Louis “Barok” Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010/ Lagman vs. Ochoa, et. al. GR Nos. 192935/193036, December 7, 2010 Facts: E. O. No. 1 was signed by Pres. Aquino, establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). It is an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration (Arroyo Administration), and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. Held: Yes. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. However, the equal protection clause permits classification, if it passes the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all

members of the same class. Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause, since the Truth Commission’s clear mandate is to investigate the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not including past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

CASE # 101 Savage vs. Taypin G.R. No. 134217. May 11, 2000 Facts: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. The issuance was based upon the allegations by the private respondent, that Savage’s products are the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Issue: Whether or not unfair competition involving design patents are punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, justifying the issuance of the search and seizure of the properties. Held: No. The issue of the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article, by the Intellectual Property Code on January 1, 1998. In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant is therefore defective on its face. CASE # 102 Gov’t of the USA vs. Puruganan GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002 Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held by the respondent judge to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. During which, the lower court issued its questioned Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for Jimenez’s arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. Issue: Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued. Held: No. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which was invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination,

under oath or affirmation, of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous.

CASE # 103 People vs. Libnao G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003 Facts: Appellant Agpanga Libnao was convicted of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659. She and her co-accused were apprehended at a checkpoint, while they were riding in a tricycle with a bag of marijuana. This occurred after the PNP had conducted surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area, and acted on a tip that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. Issue: Whether or not the search and consequent arrest of the appellant was lawful in the absence of the proper warrants. Held: Yes. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee operates only against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The warrantless search in this case is not without a probable cause, based on the surveillance and information gathered by the PNP. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense, delivery or transporting prohibited drugs. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto. CASE # 104 Chu vs. Tamin, 410 SCRA 53 (2003)

FACTS:

Complainant alleged CENRO Dela Cruz of the DENR Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that complainant was in possession of “forest products of dubious origin” in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainant’s fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value of P183, 790. Complainant obtained a copy of the complete records of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 364. Complainant again obtained, for the second time, a copy of the complete records of the case; these certified copies did not contain any transcript of respondent judge’s examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this administrative complaint. Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record of the “deposition” was “misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence. In response to the directive of the OCA, respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement denied complainant’s allegations. Respondent judge asserted that he personally examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma, allegedly a witness of CENRO dela Cruz, before issuing the warrant in question. In his Report, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas stated that he verified the records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch 23. He found on page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by respondent judge on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He attached in his report the explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas. In his explanation, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of the examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant failed, through “pure inadvertence,” to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the pages of the records were not yet “physically paged.” He claimed that the pages were numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following week. He further asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24, however, refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent judge as their proper custodian.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law

HELD/RULING: Yes. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. A Judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious of and conversant with basic legal principles. He owes it to the dignity of the court he sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who depends on him, to know the law which he is called upon to apply. Not only that, there would be on the part of the litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of justice if there

be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

CASE # 105 Kho vs. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70 (1999) FACTS: NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential information they received. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho. The respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrants. Armed with Search Warrant, agents searched subject premises and they recovered various highpowered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was conducted by another team of NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefore. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicant’s personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

ISSUE: Whether or not the probable cause was fully determined before the issuance of Search Warrant

HELD/RULING: Yes. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

CASE # 106 Uy vs. BIR, GR No. 129651, October 20, 2000 FACTS:

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct st

1 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD/RULING: Yes. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. The SC noted that there has been an inconsistency in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.

CASE # 107

People vs. Francisco, GR No. 129035, April 22, 2002 FACTS: Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed under surveillance after the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling shabu. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan applied for a

search warrant before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting inside the second floor master’s bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front door. Eight policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they refused to answer. It was only at the police station where she found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along with Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City and enforced the warrant. Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the search conducted was illegal and violative of accused’ constitutional rights.

HELD/RULING: No. For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement. Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.

CASE # 108

People vs. Lim, Gr No. 141699, August 7, 2002 FACTS: On or about March 27, 1999, in Caloocan City, Wilson D. Lim, Danilo S. Sy, Jackilyn O. Santos and Antonio U. Sio without having been authorized by law, conspiring, confederating

and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and deliver to a buyer(1,994.60) grams of Shabu . Upon their arraignment, accused-appellants Wilson Lim, Jackilyn Santos and Antonio Sio, duly assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty. Appellant Danilo Sy, represented by counsel, refused to enter a plea, thus, pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. Trial thereafter ensued. Appellant Jackilyn Santos testified that she and Danilo Sy were lovers and they had checked in at the Apollo motel, that while they were taking their nap, somebody knocked at the door and when she slightly opened the door, about 5 to 6 men in civilian clothes entered the room and a raid was announced she was only wrapped in a blanket and she was ordered to dress up while accused Danilo argued with the men on why they were being arrested; that she and Danilo were brought downstairs and then to PAOCTF at Camp Crame. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the appellants is lawful and valid HELD/RULING: No. the raid conducted on the premises by the police without any search warrant or warrant of arrest was illegal. Since the warrantless arrests were invalid, the search conducted on the premises was not one which is incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. Thus, the search in the motel, without the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly illegal and the shabu allegedly seized thereat are inadmissible in evidence against appellants. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce the quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the accused. Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused-appellants have not been proven with moral certainty, as in this case against appellants, it is our policy of long standing that their presumption of innocence must be favoured and their exoneration be granted as a matter of right.

CASE # 109 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003) FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos” In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

Respondents filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement took precedence over the motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment. HELD/RULING: No. Respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right. Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic.

CASE # 110

People vs. Tuan, GR No. 176066, Aug. 11, 2010 FACTS: ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA, was charged with two criminal cases namely: Illegal Possession of Marijuana and Illegal Possession of Firearms Upon her arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel de parte, pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to both charges. Pre-trial and trial proper then ensued. During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses. At around nine o’clock in the morning on

January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong and Frank Lad-in reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain “Estela Tuan” had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. He gave Tudlong and Lading P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellant’s house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellant’s house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellant’s house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accusedappellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s house. SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV. Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause. Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, the immediately implemented the it. Before going to the accused-appellant’s house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellant’s neighbor, to come along. The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellant’s house. Even though accusedappellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellant’s father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside. They continued the search and found on the appellant’s room a brick of marijuana and a firearm. They issued a receipt for the items confiscated and recovered from the house of Tuan. The bricks of Marijuana were brought to the NBI for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering as void the search warrant issued against Tuan.

HELD/RULING: No. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to be searched and things to be seized. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.

CASE # 111

People vs. Abriol, GR No. 123137, Oct. 7, 2001 FACTS: PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), MacarioA stellero, Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with and convicted, of murder for having shot one Alejandro Flores, and of Illegal Possession of Firearms for the handguns that they were armed with. On appeal, one of their contentions against their conviction for murder is that the PNP cannot be presumed to have done their work regularly due to the errors and blunders they committed in transferring the possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They further contend, as against their conviction for Illegal Possess ion of Firearms, that the handguns and ammunition taken from them by the police officers were illegally seized in theabsence of a warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the handguns and ammunitions used in the killing were illegallyseized from appellants in the absence of a warrant. HELD/RULING:

No. There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is valid. They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles;(5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting, and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and amore than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually violating P.D. No.1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules.

CASE # 112 G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY TING UY FACTS: Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was arrested in a buy-bust operation. Marked money bills were retrieved from him, and three plastic bags of shabu were confiscated found underneath the driver’s seat. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However, he contended that he was a victim of frame-up and that the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible. HELD: No. Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that “a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.” Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delictoas a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers. The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the

following instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]). A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping (People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

CASE # 113 G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA FACTS: Appellant was sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut when police officers showed the search warrant and explained the contents to him. The team searched the hut and found a plastic container under the kitchen dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions and arrested the appellant. He was held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein. Appellant contended that the hut was not his, hence the search and seizure was illegal. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid. HELD: No. With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken — during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered – it is held that the search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso factoinadmissible. “SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a

warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112.”

CASE # 114 PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001 FACTS: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence of accusedappellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accusedappellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. ISSUES: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.” HELD: Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the

things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. CASE # 115 G.R. No. 132371 April 9, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO SIMBAHON y QUIATZON FACTS: Police operatives, together with the chairman of the barangay which had jurisdiction over the place, and a member of media, served Search Warrant No. 95-100 upon appellant Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito Mangulabnan at their residence. Thereafter, the team began conducting a search of all the rooms in accordance with the search warrant, and found under the bed a brick of dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana wrapped in a newspaper, a black bullet pouch containing six (6) live ammunitions, and sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. After the search, an inventory receipt of the items seized from the house of the suspects was prepared and, together with an affidavit of orderly search was signed by Danilo Simbahon. Appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon was charged for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, penalizing the illegal possession of firearms. The Court found him guilty of the crime charged against him in Criminal Case No. 95142514 thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and to pay the cost. However, appellant contended that the court erred in convicting him because the search warrant served was invalid. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was invalid. HELD: Yes. The record shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which render the same null and void. The caption as well as the body of Search Warrant No. 95-100 show that it was issued for more than one offense — for violation of RA 6425 and for violation of PD 1866. In Tambasen v. People, et al., it was held: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversive Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a “scattershot warrant” and totally null and void.

Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. The constitutional requirement is a description which particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place, so as to exclude all others. In the case at bar, only the application for search warrant contained the address of the place to be searched. The search warrant issued by the court merely referred to appellant’s residence as “premises”, without specifying its address. The Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. The absence of a particular description in the search warrant renders the same void. Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant issued for the search of appellant’s house. The seizure by the police officers conducting the search of articles not described in the search warrant was beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.20 Neither can the admissibility of such seized items be justified under the plain view doctrine, for the bricks of marijuana in this case were found not inadvertently or in plain view. Rather, they were found after a meticulous search under the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and inside a plastic bag.

CASE # 116 G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY GO Facts: The police officers conducted a test buy operation at the residence of the accused where they bought P1,500.00 worth of shabu but they did not arrest the accused at that time. Instead, they applied for a search warrant based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of illegal drugs in his house. When they arrived at the residence of the accused, they “sideswept a car of the accused parked outside his house. When the son opened their gate and went out, the police officers introduced themselves, informed him that they had a search warrant entered the house and handcuffed the son of the accused to a chair. They summoned two (2) barangay kagawads to witness the search. They were able to seize the following: (a) “one plastic bag containing yellowish substance”, (b) a weighing scale, (c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp

pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine Currency and and appellant’s (l) Toyota Corolla car. An inventory was made signed by the police officers the kagawads and the son of the accused. There was likewise an affidavit of orderly search but not under oath. Accused was charged with illegal possession of shabu. One of the kagawads testified that shabu was not even one of the items seized and inventoried. What originally appeared was merely “Chinese Medicine”, but replaced with shabu. After trial, accused was convicted. He questioned the validity of the search. ISSUE: Whether or not there was the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty in implementing the search warrant by the police officers. HELD: No. The raiding team’s departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellant’s residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Court’s solemn duty to be ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. In the oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand: As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question determinable from a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing search and seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because: x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several irregularities in the manner by which the search of appellant’s residence was conducted.

Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellant’s car was unreasonable and unjustified. There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen entered appellant’s residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint. Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. After the inventory had been prepared, it was presented to appellant for his signature without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. In People v. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain silent. The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellant’s custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant’s residence. The “Affidavit of Orderly Search” is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not having been executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which the raiding team brought with them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1 Fernandez who then instructed appellant to sign it as he did instruct Jack Go, KagawadManalo and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses. More importantly, since the “Affidavit of Orderly Search” purports to have been executed by appellant, the same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his residence for he was admittedly not present when the search took place, he having arrived only when it was “almost through.” In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged “Affidavit of Orderly Search,” prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who

searched his residence and eventually arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the search in question. On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellant’s residence failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz: SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring supplied) As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law: As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law. That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by “two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality” only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of appellant’s residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law. CASE # 117 NO DIGEST CASE # 118

People vs. Chua Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful. (2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner. Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for

this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the case at bar, accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. The accused was acquitted.

CASE # 119 NO DIGEST

CASE # 120 People vs. Canton, GR No. 148825, Dec. 27, 2002 Facts: Canton was charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. She was caught in possession of metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) without prescription or license. Susan was bound to Saigon, Vietnam. Prior to her flight, she passed through the metal detector and beeped. A civilian inspector of the airport searched her and upon frisking, she felt something that is bulging in the abdomen of Susan. They were able to recover packets that were wrapped with packing tape.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights

Ruling: No, warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not violative of her constitutional rights. What was done to Susan was a stop and frisk search. “stop and frisk” situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. The search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 which states that “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances xxx”. This is another exemption in warrantless arrest and seizure. After the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

CASE # 121 People vs. Valdez, GR No. 129296, Sep. 25, 2000 Facts:

De La Cruz unlawfully cultivated seven fully grown marijuana plants from which dangerous drugs may be manufactured. The police officers received a tip that the said marijuana plants were grown by De La Cruz. They then went to De La Cruz’s place and saw 7 5 ft tall marijuana plants. The police uprooted the plants and were then confiscated and escheated in favor of the government. A laboratory test was made and confirmed that the plants were marijuana. A case was brought against dela cruz and the marijuana plants were used as an evidence against him.

Issues: Whether or not the seizure of marijuana plants is lawful Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the 7 marijuana plants despite their inadmissibility being products of an illegal search Ruling: No, the seizure of marijuana plants is unlawful. The OSG may have contended that the seizure is lawful since it can be treated as part of the plain view doctrine, however, the police have declared that they have one day to obtain a warrant to search the appellant’s farm. They could have convinced the judge that there is probable cause to justify the issuance of warrant. The doctrine of plain view cannot be applied in this case. The following are required for the plain view doctrine to be applied: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c)

the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d)

plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[35]

In the instant case, PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Their discovery of Cannabis plant was not inadvertent. II. Yes, the trial court the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the 7 marijuana plants despite their inadmissibility being products of an illegal search. The 7 marijuana plants were obtained being products of an illegal search.

CASE # 122 Sr. Inspector Valeroso vs. CA and People GR No. 164815, Sep. 3, 2009 FACTS: Senior Inspector Jerry C. Valeroso was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. He was arrested at the boarding house of his children, where the arresting officers also found the subject firearm and ammunition after ransacking the locked cabinet. With that discovery, petitioner was charged with Illegal Possession of firearm and ammunition. The RTC found Valeroso guilty. A petition for review has been filed by Valeroso stating that his constitutional rights have been breached ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition infringes the Constitutional rights of Valeroso

RULING: Yes, the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition infringes the constitutional rights of Valeroso. The search made was illegal in violation of Valeroso's right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of the said right is inadmissible in evidence against him. A warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right; peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.

CASE # 123 Ronires vs. People ,Gr No. 182010, Aug. 25, 2010 Facts: Romines was caught possessing 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Romines admitted to the genuiness of the said item. Through a tip, police enforcers conducted surveillance on activities of a notorious snatcher. As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the direction of Romines who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case. PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can question the warrantless arrest before the appellate court for the first time Ruling: No, the petitioner cannot question the warrantless arrest before the appellate court for the first time. The petitioner should have questioned her warrantless arrent early, at least before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest – as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof– for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court. By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.

CASE # 124 Fajardo vs People GR no. 190889 10 January 2011 Facts: Fajardo and Valerio were charged of violation of PD 1866 for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation. Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the adiscovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers. Issue: Whether or not the receivers are admissible as evidence in court

Ruling: Yes, the receivers are admissible as evidence in court. The receivers were seized in plain view which is an exception to the rule that an evidence that has been obtained through warrantless arrest and seizure is inadmissible. Prior to the seizure, the law enforcement officer lawfully made an intrusion and was in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of lawful intrusion, he inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating to the accused. The evidence was also open to the eye and hand and its discovery was inadvertent.

CASE # 125 Amarga v. Abbas 98 Phil. 739 (1956) Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged.

Ruling: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon

the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. CASE # 126 Burgos vs Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Facts: Two warrants were issued against Burgos for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held: No, the two warrants were not valid to justify seizure of items. The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrants. As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits

submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

CASE # 127 Salonga vs. Cruz-Pane G.R. No. L-59524 Feb. 18, 1985 Gutierrez, Jr., J.: FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a contact point ; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos. ISSUE: Whether or not Salonga’s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech. HELD: Yes. The petition is dismissed. The petitioner’s opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat against the government. In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in subversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case, there is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was not against the government, but directed against a particular family. Such a statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment. OBITER DICTUM: To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it would be to transgress constitutional due process. However, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted to satisfy the due process clause. There must be sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case or that probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused

CASE # 128

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLERAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995 FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28,1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide 2. Whether or not respondent Judges deLeon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them 3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminaryinvestigation4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as anaccused. HELD: 1. NO. 2. NO. 3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. 4. NO. REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent Judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them. 3. The DOJ Panel precisely led the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. 4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9of Rule 119 for legal basis).With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. CASE # 129 ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 5, 2001] FACTS: Complainant alleged that sometime in April 2000 elements of the PNP stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client, Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 of the RTC-Br.20, Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of libel. Surprised that such a case existed against him and his client as they had not been previously charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutor's Office to Conduct Preliminary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking that

the Warrant of Arrest be set aside for being premature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutor's office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was not specified therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Respondent Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000 admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been conducted and information already filed in court. Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case. ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge failed to follow the required procedure and was negligent in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. HELD: YES, Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized." Interpreting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require this would be to unduly laden those with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor’s bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required byte constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the required procedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not even a prosecutor’s certification to rely upon since no information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim.Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint filed byte private complainant Leonia Dalin Sr. himself. Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arrest against complainant and the latter's client simply because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that the mistake was entirely attributable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her "duty" of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that information had already been filed in court before preparing the warrant of arrest. A judge fails in his

bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of the investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause making him administratively liable. CASE # 130 Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 (1968) NO DIGEST CASE # 131 Samulde vs. Salvani, Jr., 165 SCRA 734 (1988) Facts: Municipal Judge Gelacio Samulde of Patnoñgon, Antique, conducted a preliminary investigation of Pelayo Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed on October 29, 1985 by Maria Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale's land (Crim. Case No. 2046-B, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Pelayo Arangale"). After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and his witnesses, as provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Judge Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Ramon Salvani with his finding that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint". The fiscal returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records to his office was "premature" because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest against the accused as provided in Section 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under Section 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied "that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, " implying thereby that, although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be immediately placed under custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of arrest. On October 9, 1986, a special civil action of mandamus was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Antique by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against Judge Samulde to compel the latter to issue a warrant for the arrest of Arangale. Issue: Whether or not there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Held:

To determine whether a warrant of arrest should issue against the accused, the investigating judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses "in writing and under oath ... in the form of searching questions and answers." When he is "satisfied that a probable cause exists, and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice," he may issue the warrant as provided in Section 6, par. b, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. SEC. 6 When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a)

By the Regional Court.....

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. -If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. As correctly argued by the petitioner Judge Samulde, three (3) conditions must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b)

be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and

(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediatecustody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is an entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the accused absconding before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to place him under immediate custody.

CASE # 132 Uy vs. Mercado, 154 SCRA 567 (1987) NO DIGEST CASE # 133 Lim vs Felix 194 SCRA 292 ( 1991)

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused.. On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

CASE # 134 People vs Chua-Uy The evidence on record shows that at around 5:00 o ‘clock in the afternoon of September 11, 1995, a female confidential informant personally informed the members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station, which was then holding office at Barangay Concepcion, Malabon, Metro-Manila, that accused Ramon Chua Uy "alias Chekwa" had asked her to look for a buyer of shabu at a price of P1,000.00 per gram. Acting on the given information, the members of the unit subsequently planned a buy-bust operation against the accused. SPO4 Eddie Regalado instructed the confidential informant to consum[m]ate a deal with the accused by telling him that a prospective buyer is willing to purchase five (5) grams of the illicit drug to be delivered in front of the Justice Hall of Malabon located along Sanciangco Street, Barangay Catmon. At 6:30 p.m., the confidential informant called up and informed the police officers that accused Chua Uy already agreed on the transaction as well as to the place of delivery. P/Insp. Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the Narcotics Unit, at once formed the buy-bust team composed of SPO4 Federico Ortiz and PO1 Joel Borda. After securing five (5) P1,000.00-peso bills to be used in the operation from P/Inp. Aquino, SPO4 Regalado have (sic) them photocopied, after which, [he] affixed his signatures (sic) on each of the xerox copies although the serial number of the bills were previously recorded. The group then proceeded to Barangay Catmon at about 7:00 p.m., with SPO1 Nepomuceno designated to act as the poseur buyer. When they reached the place, SPO1 Nepomuceno first went to a store near the tennis court while the rest of the team positioned themselves in strategic locations. At 8:20 of the same evening, SPO1 Nepomuceno saw a white Toyota car came to a stop. Their confidential informant immediately stepped out of the car and approached SPO1 Nepomuceno and ordered him to board the vehicle. Once inside, SPO1 Nepomuceno caught sight of the driver and the other male companion of accused Chua Uy through the back seat where he and the accused together with the confidential informant were seated. After a few minutes conversation, accused Chua Uy opened up his brown attaché case and ensuingly handed over to SPO1 Nepomuceno five (5) grams of ‘shabu’ placed in a transparent plastic packet. In exchange for the substance, SPO1 Nepomuceno delivered the five (5) P1,000-peso bills which accused Chua Uy put in his right front pocket. SPO1 Nepomuceno then simply opened the rear right door of the car and lighted a cigarette as pre-arranged signal. SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz consequently closed in on the vehicle. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed the accused of his constitutional rights before placing him under arrest. He later turned over to SPO1 Regalado the five (5) grams of ‘shabu’ Thereafter, SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz seized the brown attaché case from accused Chua Uy which yielded five (5) more plastic packets of "shabu," along with several drug paraphernalia. SPO4 Regalado likewise recovered the buy-bust money from the accused after the consumated (sic) transactionThe one packet of suspected "shabu" which was the subject of the sale including the five (5) packets of the same substance, taken from the brown attaché case, bearing the respective initials of SPO4 Regalado and SPO1 Nepomuceno were brought to the NBI Forensic Division. Laboratory examination of the pieces of evidence shows positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

The team brought accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2 Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that there were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the residence of the accused at No. 402 Gen. Vicente St., San Rafael Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant before this Court to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride. During the search and in the presence of Bgy. Kagawad George So and Rodolfo Salvador including Maritess Puno, the alleged owner of the house and live-in partner of accused Chua Uy, the team was able to confiscate assorted articles intended for the repacking of the regulated drug ,SPO1 Nepomuceno identified them as follows: one (1) white plastic scoop; one (1) blue plastic scoop; one (1) tangerine plastic scoop; one (1) Selecta ice cream cup; and one (1) white plastic container All the items were marked by SPO1 Nepomuceno with his initials "AGN." Along with the aforesaid articles were three (3) pieces of plastic scoops and two (2) plastic glasses (sic) with traces of "shabu." Laboratory examination made on them gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (These antecedent facts which lead to the filing of the present cases against accused Chua Uy are embodied in the sworn affidavit of SPO1 Nepomuceno marked and offered in evidence as Exh. "J." SPO4 Eddie Regalado corroborated the testimony of SPO Nepomuceno, claiming that he was positioned fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away when he saw SPO1 Nepomuceno entered the white Toyota car at the time of the operation. He further went to say that a caliber 9mm pistol was also recovered from accused Chua Uy but considering that up to now they have not received any certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit, showing whether accused is authorized to carry firearm, no case has yet been filed against the latter. Further, SPO4 Regalado said that accused Chua Uy has admitted to him that he is just a neophyte in the illegal trade. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid buy-bust operation. Held: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit.[18] As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.

We, of course, are aware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians.[20] But the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties.[21] Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

CASES # 135 PP VS BERIARMENTE GR NO. 137612 FACTS: This is a case of -buybust operation wherein the judgment rendered that the accused is found guilty on the basis of the weight of the dried marijuana which is 1500 grams. Based from the given facts, SPO2 Caballero was informed by a police informant that he identified the accused who was looking for buyers of a sack of marijuana plants. And this informant's story was overheard by SPO2 Sinarlo, so they pretended to be as buyer so they could arrest the prospective seller . As soon as they saw the sack change hands, they arrested the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the buy - bust operation conducted in this case is valid warrantless arrest HELD: Yes, it is well - established that in the prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs, what is important is the fact that the poseur - buyer received that gooda from the accused - appellant and the same was presented as evidence in court neither is there a rule of law which requires that there must be so simultaneous exchange of the marked - money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the same of the illegal drugs is adequately established and the substance itself is presented before the court. It is provided in the rules of court which provides that a peace officer or private person may make an arrest, without a warrant, when a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense, in his presence. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy - bust operation conducted by the police on the basis of information received from a police asset that the accused - appellant was looking for a buyer. His arrest, therefore was lawful and the sack of marijuana plants confiscated from him were admissible un evidences, being the fruits of the crime.

CASE # 136– 137 NO DIGEST

CASE # 138 G.R. No. 113218 November 22, 2001 ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

FACTS The petitioner was charged with illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollars. Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, had a buy bust operation in a restaurant where the three members of the Investigation staff of the Central Bank stayed outside the restaurant and only Labita, a confidential assistant of the Central Bank of the Philippines and Marqueta, a representative of the US Secret Service went inside. The informer introduced Labita and Marqueta to the petitioner as buyers of the US dollar notes. The petitioner drew ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his wallet, where at that moment, upon a pre-arranged signal from the informer, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended the petitioner Alejandro Tecson . The petitioner affixed his initial on the dorsal portion of each of the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes and signed the corresponding receipt for the said US dollar notes seized from him. He also executed a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the proper conduct of the investigation by the Central Bank operatives on the petitioner. Petitioner claimed that no buy-bust operation took place, inasmuch as there was no haggling as to the price between him and the poseur buyers, and that no money changed hands. Tecson averred that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta had no personal knowledge as to petitioner's alleged possession of counterfeit US dollar notes as they merely relied on the predetermined signal of the civilian informer before making the arrest. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes allegedly confiscated from him incidental to his arrest are inadmissible in evidence.. The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner filed an appeal but the trial court’s decision was reaffirmed and the petition for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner’s warrantless arrest and seizure of evidences was valid

HELD Yes, this is a case of a legally valid warrantless arrest and seizure of the evidence of the crime. The civilian informer did not have to convince the petitioner to sell fake US dollar notes during the buy-bust operation because he arranged with the informer a meeting with possible buyers. What the informer

did was merely to convince him that prosecution witnesses were actually buyers. The absence of haggling as to the price of the subject fake US dollar notes between the petitioner and the poseur buyers did not negate the fact of the buy-bust operation.The petitioner cannot validly impugn the admissibility of the subject ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes confiscated from him in his arrest. It is clear from the testimony of Labita, that he saw the petitioner drew several pieces of fake US dollar notes from his wallet and did not have to rely on the prearranged signal of the informer inasmuch as he had unhindered view and appreciation of what was happening before him. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes are admissible in evidence for the reason that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto by the prosecution witnesses during the said buy-bust operation. There is a legal presumption that public officers, including arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties. That legal presumption was not overcome by any credible evidence to the contrary. In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject Decision of the Court of Appeals.

CASE # 139 People vs Sanus G.R No.135952 September 17, 2002

Facts: Case arose from the death of a grandmother and her 6 year-old grandson. Police officers of Canlubang,Laguna received information that appellant was the principal suspect and that he was seen inside the residence of the Spouses Vallejo.The team composed of peace officers and local barangay officials,asked permission from the spouses and right there and then arrested the accused after a sudden jump on the roof. The trial court found enough circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond beyond reasonable doubt. Hence for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was lawful?

Ruling: No. Jumping from a roof is not a crime that would satisfy the warrantless arrest of the appellant.The appellant was not in flagrante delicto. Considering the arrest of the appellant was unlawful the apprehending officers alleged that he had voluntary surrendered to them. It was only upon being pressed that police officers admitted that they have indeed made the arrest.

CASE # 140 People vs. Tudtud Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry a carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the two and Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened the box, beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained what seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly obtained. Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such “search and seizure” becomes reasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of a moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances. The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

CASE # 141 Lopez vs. People GR 184037 Facts O n April 23, 2003, PO2 Atienza, a member of Task Force o f t h e Mandaluyong City Police Station, while conducting a routinary foot patrol saw petitioner at a distance of seven meters walking in his direction. He saw petitioner, walking with head bowed, looking at his hand, which held a plastic sachet containing a crystalline

substance. Thereafter, PO2 Atienza introduced himself to petitioner as a member of the Mandaluyong police, arrested him, and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. He then brought petitioner to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the plastic sachet and brought it to the police station. He prepared a request and then placed the markings “APA” –his initials on the plastic sachet. Issues: 1) What is the chain of custody rule on search and seizure? 2) Does the presumption of regularity rule apply to chain of custody rule? Ruling: 1) As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. 2) No. The presumption of regularity does not apply to the chain custody rule. In case at bar, the courts heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza and, in the same way, banked on the presumption of regularity. It bears stressing that this presumption only arises in the absence of contradicting details that would raise doubts on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedure prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption of regularity

CASE # 142 NO DIGEST

CASE # 143 People vs. Mariacos, GR No. 188611, Jun. 16, 2010 FACTS: PO2 Pallayoc was informed by a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them

asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one knew. Upon reaching the destination, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers but he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but the women got away. ISSUE: Whether or not PO2 Pallayoc can arrest the women without securing a warrant RULING: Yes. The IRR of R.A. No. 9165, Section 21, provides for the Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for noncompliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter. Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.

CASE # 144-146 NO DIGEST CASE # 147 HARVEY VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

FACTS: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been

under

his

care

and

subjects

confirmed

being

live-in

for

sometime

now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photonegatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown inscandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. (2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. (3)

Whether

or

Not

the

writ

of

Habeas Corpus may

be

granted

to

petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a validwarrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner ofImmigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the PhilippineImmigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon

warrant of the Commissioner ofImmigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Courtproceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

CASE # 148 LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA vs.HON. RAMON J. LIWAG G.R. No. 78596 July 13, 1989 Facts: Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national turned immigrant in the Philippines. He was later forcibly taken to the CID Intelligence Office by CID agents assisted by the police, upon the order of the respondent CID Commissioner, which was based on a complaint accusing the petitioner of being an undesirable alien. A warrant of arrest was then issued by respondent but there is no proof showing that said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension. Petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to question the validity of his arrest and detention by respondent Commissioner. Issue: Whether or not the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner, preparatory to deportation proceedings, was legal. Held: Yes. In the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, it was held that the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge does not extend to deportation proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Assuming, however, that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning due to lack of probable cause; certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement. Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal.

CASE # 149 Jackson vs. Macalino, GR No. 139255, Nov. 24, 2003 FACTS:

Ann information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved. The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold departure order in one of the criminal cases. Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the respondents. In their return, the respondents alleged inter alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and the hold departure order of the Makati RTC. ISSUES: Whether or not the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so, Whether or not such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of deportation HELD/RULING: Yes. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term “court” includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered Yes. Prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

CASE # 150 People of the Philippines vs Uy G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005 Facts: Uy, Gamus and Ochoa are public officers employed by N A P O C O R , was charged for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the amount of P183, 805,291.25 was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents for conspiring, confederating with the private co-

accused where they falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for the managers check with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sandigan Bayan rendered a decision acquitting Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty for the said crime and is orderedto pay the equal amount malversed solidarily with Uy. Ochoa then appealed, He claimst h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n w a s b a s e d o n t h e a l l e g e d s w o r n s t a t e m e n t a n d t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the reportof the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed thesworn statement while confined at the Heart Center and upon assurance it would not beu s e d a g a i n s t h i m . H e w a s n o t a s s i s t e d b y c o u n s e l n o r w a s h e a p p r i s e d o f h i s constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated Held: No, the constitutional rights of the accused were not violated. Considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot claim that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. Therefore, no counsel was required for such Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter