Constitutional Law 1 Notes
Constitutional Law 1 Notes...
Preamble: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. • • •
Sets down origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution Useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of the Constitution Not a source of rights and obligations
Article 1. National Territory The national territory comprises • • • • •
the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Elements of archipelagic principle: •
Waters around, between, and connecting are internal waters – no right of innocent passage
Internal waters are delineated from territorial sea by straight baseline method – drawing straight lines connecting appropriate points on the coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. •
Under UNCLOS, “waters around, between...” are considered archipelagic waters which are subject to the right of innocent passage = that’s why the Philippines signed the UNCLOS with reservations
Rationale for having a national territory provision in the Constitution:
Preservation of national wealth Preservation of national security Manifestation of own solidarity as a people EDUCATION VALUE
Why treaties are not mentioned in the Constitution:
To erase every possible trace of our colonial history
U.S. Military Base:
Still part of Philippine territory, precisely why the Philippines had the power to cede part of its
authority to the U.S. Maritime boundaries •
Internal waters – within baseline
Territorial sea – 12 nm. from baseline. Part of sovereign; all laws apply; right of innocent passage.
Contiguous zone – 24 nm. from baseline. Limited jurisdiction relating to fiscal, customs, immigration and sanitary matters.
Exclusive Economic Zone – 200 nm. from end territorial sea. State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources.
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES Principles: binding rules which must be observed in the conduct of government Policies: guidelines for the orientation of the state •
These principles in Article are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. [Tañada v. Angara]
Basic ideological principle and policies that underlie the Constitution Shed lights or serve as guide for all departments of the government in the implementation of the Constitution
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
4 ELEMENTS OF A STATE: 1. 2. 3. 4.
PEOPLE TERRITORY SOVEREIGNTY GOVERNMENT
State: a community of PERSONS, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of TERRITORY, INDEPENDENT of external control, and possessing an organized GOVERNMENT to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience People: a community of persons, sufficient in number and capable of maintaining the continued existence of the community and held together by a common bond of law Government: that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which
are imposed upon the people forming the society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT: 1. Ministrant/Proprietary: optional functions of government intended for achieving a better life for the community The principles for determining whether gov't will exercise these functions: a) that a gov't should do for the public welfare those things that private capital would not naturally undertake; b) that a gov't should do those things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than any private entity.
2. Constituent/Governmental: the functions which constitute the very bonds of society (Pres. Wilson’s enumeration is Bacani v. NACOCO): a) The keeping of order and providing the protection of persons and property form violence and robbery b) The fixing of legal relations between husband and wife and between parents and children c) The regulation of the holding, transmission and interchange of determination of its debt or for crime
property, and the
d) The determination of contract rights between individuals e) The definition and punishment of crime f) The administration of justice in civil cases g) The determination of political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens h) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of the national interest Importance of distinction: It is useful to distinguish between governmental and proprietary functions when an unincorporated agency of government claims privileges which flow from sovereignty, e.g., immunity from suit. If the agency performs governmental functions, it may claim the privileges; otherwise, it cannot. ACCFA v. CUGCO: Agrarian reform, though not strictly “governmental” under Bacani, was considered to be governmental because of the social justice mandate of the Constitution. The Court said that the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of functions quite unrealistic. (e.g., housing is considered governmental; supply of water for a price is proprietary) PVTA v. CIR: The Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, which was established to promote the tobacco industry and improve living conditions of tobacco farmers was considered to perform governmental functions. REPUBLIC V. CFI: The Rice and Corn Administration, which was established to stabilize prices of rice and corn, was considered to perform governmental functions.
WHAT IS A REPUBLICAN STATE?
A state wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representative chosen by the people.
WHY IS THE PHILIPPINES CALLED A DEMOCRATIC STATE?
Due to the direct democracy given by the Constitution to the people, such as “initiative and referendum.” It is also a monument to the EDSA I Revolution which re-won freedom through direct action of the people
DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS: De Jure: established by authority of the legitimate sovereign De Facto: established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign Three kinds of De Facto governments: 1.
In a proper and legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful and legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter (e.g., Cromwell as protectorate of the people)
Established as an independent gov’t by inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state (e.g., Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union)
That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated by a government of paramount force (e.g., Castine in Maine reduced to a British possession in 1812 war; Tampico, Mexico occupied by U.S. forces in U.S.-Mexican war) Characteristics of a government of paramount force: •
The belligerent occupant generally respects municipal laws (Civil Code, Insurance Code, etc.), or those that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, unless they are incompatible with new order of things.
Laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied are considered suspended during the military occupation.
Judicial acts and proceedings which are not of a political complexion (defamation as opposed to treason) remain valid even beyond the occupation.
CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ: The government during the Japanese occupation was a de facto government. Judicial acts and proceedings which were not of a political nature initiated under that regime could continue despite liberation. Under the principle of postliminy, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader. LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO: The government established right after EDSA1 de jure; it was established by authority of the legitimate sovereign: the people. It was revolutionary; it saw the complete overthrow of the established government by those
previously subject to it. Hence, the existing legal system was abolished. The appointments made to the old courts have no relation to appointments made to the newly established courts and rank/seniority may be disregarded in making new appointments. SOVEREIGNTY Sovereignty (two kinds): • •
Legal: supreme power to make law; lodged in the people Political: sum total of all the influences in a state, legal and non-legal, which determine the course of law
PEOPLE V. GOZO: The Philippine government did not abdicate its sovereignty over the territory occupied by the US bases; it merely gave the US government preferential jurisdiction in the areas. Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights and restrain what is otherwise plenary – this is known as auto-limitation.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Only offensive war is renounced. The power to wage defensive war is the essence of sovereignty.
International law • •
The law of nations is adopted under the doctrine of transformation. Other jurisdictions apply the doctrine of transformation, whereby international law is transformed into municipal law by some constitutional machinery, e.g., a law. Only customary international law and treaties which have become part of customary law are made part of the law of the land.
Amity with all nations does not mean automatic diplomatic recognition with all nations. It is an ideal to be aimed at. Diplomatic recognition, however, remains a matter of executive discretion
TAÑADA V. ANGARA: In upholding the validity of the WTO Agreement, the Court said that the Philippines, by treaty, voluntarily surrendered some aspects of its sovereignty in exchange for greater benefits. Under the treaty, the Philippines has certain obligation which it must comply with in accordance with one of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law: pacta sunt servanda - international agreements must be performed in good faith. BAYAN V. ZAMORA: The SC held that the Visiting Forces Agreement was valid. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by the generally accepted rules for the conduct of
its international relations. We cannot plead our municipal law, including the Constitution, as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with out obligations, duties, and responsibilities under international law. LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY: Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation. Though from an international law perspective, a treaty may be favored over municipal law, our Constitution espouses the opposing view. The SC is given the power to judge the validity of a treaty and treaties are always subject to qualification by subsequent laws.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
The armed forces can be a legitimate instrument for the overthrow of a civilian government which has ceased to serve the people.
IBP V. ZAMORA: The deployment of marines by Estrada to address peace and order issues did not violate the civilian supremacy clause because their participation is limited. Authority over the patrols was with the civilian police who were merely assisted by the soldiers. What we have here is mutual support and cooperation, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
Conditions for military or civil service must be established by law. Not involuntary servitude. It is the supreme and noble duty of a citizen to contribute to the defense of the nation.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO: A lotto gaming contract was not invalidated under the peace and order provision. This principle is not self-executing. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Enunciated in Article III Section 5, “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY: There is an antipathy towards foreign influence in general. Foreign troops may be allowed in the country only by way of direct exception.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Only weapons are banned. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are allowed. Nuclear capable vessels are also allowed provided they are not armed.
The ban on nuclear weapons is not absolute; there may be deviation if national interest requires.
BAYAN V. ZAMORA: The SC did not discuss whether the VFA violated the nuclear weapons ban, although the issue was raised.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
When the law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be followed.
Social justice is the equalization of economic, political, and social (EPS) opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the State to tilt the balance of social forces in favor of the disadvantaged in life. Justice for the common tao; those who have less in life shall have more in law
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
The family is anterior to the State and is not a creature of the State. It protects the family from the instrumentalization by the State
This provisions will not prohibit the legislature from enacting a law on divorce
Family – heterosexual relationship, whether formalized by marriage or not
Presumptions are resolved in favor of marriage
Abortion is not allowed although the unborn may be sacrificed to save the mother.
With regard to manner of education, the primary and natural right belongs to the parents. The government has the secondary and supportive role based on parens patria to protect persons who, because of age or other incapacity, are at a disadvantage
ROE V. WADE: In the US, abortion may be done during the first six months of pregnancy at the mother’s discretion. This is not allowed in the Philippines. The right of the parents to rear their children is superior to the right of the state. MEYER V. NEBRASKA: A law prohibiting the teaching of the German language to students was declared invalid. PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS: A law which required children from 8 to 16 to be sent to public schools only was declared to be an unreasonable interference with the liberty of the parents to rear their children. Standing: the private corporations (schools) were allowed to assert the rights of the parents because their business was threatened by unconstitutional compulsion upon the parents. WISCONSIN V. YODER: The right of the Amish community to educate their own was upheld against a law requiring formal public or private schooling. The community was able to prove that their mode of education adequately met the purpose of the law. A claim of parens patriae cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim where the interest of the state is not substantially injured. The right of the children was not discussed by the majority but Justice Douglas, in his dissent said that the children’s rights should be respected because it is their future that is at stake. GINSBERG V. NEW YORK: A law prohibiting the sale of girlie magazines to minors was upheld. The well-being of children is within the State’s power to regulate. Though upbringing of children is the primary right of the parents, this law merely assists or supports parents in exercising that right by recognizing that parental supervision is not always present. The legislature makes a valid presumption
that parents would not want these materials readily available to their children. If parents want their children to have access to the magazines, they are free to make the purchase for their children.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the before the law of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Article 14 (women) doesn’t automatically repeal the Civil Code provisions law jurisprudence on the matter, what it does is to give a mandate to legislature to remove, when they make laws, existing inequalities. The general idea is for the law to ignore sex where sex is not a relevant factor in determining rights and duties. Nor is the provision meant to ignore customs and traditions.
This article does not add anything more to what the equal protection clause already guarantees
OPOSA V. FACTORAN: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is self-executing and if violated, gives rise to a cause of action. It does not even have to be included in the Constitution because it is grounded on the most primary right of self-preservation. The petitioners were allowed to sue on their own behalf and on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. LLDA V. CA: The LLDA’s right to issue a cease and desist order against Caloocan City was upheld based on its broad power to regulate projects around the lake and the Constitutional right of the lakeside dwellers to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21. reform.
The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community- based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nationbuilding.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Labor is called a “primary social economic force” meaning the human factor has primacy over
the nonhuman factors in production.
Any doubt in interpretation as regards national economy and patrimony must be resolved in favor of Filipinos
This includes not only agrarian reform, but also encompasses a broad spectrum of social, economic, human, cultural, political, and even industrial development
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Legislative power: the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them (MAR) Scope of Legislative power: Plenary Consequences of Legislative power:
Non-delegable: power is vested only in Congress; due to Separation of Powers and the doctrine “potestas delegate delegari non potest”
No irrepealable laws: such will in effect reduce future legislative power; only the Constitution can limit legislative power
Substantive: as regards contents of law, must be lawful Procedural: as regards manner of passage of law
Advantages of bicameralism: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Allows for a body with a national perspective to check the parochial tendency of district representatives Allows for a more careful study of legislation Makes legislature less susceptible to control by the executive Serves as a training ground for national leaders
Advantages of unicameralism 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Simplicity of organization resulting in: Economy Efficiency Facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation Avoidance of duplicate legislation
Two kinds of legislative power in republican systems:
Original: possessed by the sovereign people Derivative: delegated by the sovereign people to the legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people
Legislative power may also be classified into: 1. 2.
Constituent: power to amend or revise the constitution Ordinary: power to pass ordinary laws
Two limits on legislative power: 1. 2.
Substantive: limits the intrinsic validity of the law Procedural: limits the manner of passing laws
Delegation of Powers Delegata potestas non potest delegari - What has been delegated cannot be delegated: Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. Exceptions/Permissible Delegation: P E T A L
Delegation Delegation President Delegation Delegation Delegation
to the people at large of emergency powers
of tariff powers to the President to administrative bodies to local governments
Delegation to the people at large:
Initiative: power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose **after registration of a petition signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof Referendum: method of submitting an important legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people Plebiscite: device to obtain a direct popular vote on a matter of political importance in order to create some more or less permanent political condition e.g. Constitutional amendments
Delegation of emergency powers to the President (art. vi, § 23(2)): Conditions: 1. 2. 3. 4. •
There must be war or other national emergency The delegation must be for a limited period The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress Unless such emergency powers are withdrawn by resolution, they continue until the next adjournment of the legislature (the session called after the adjournment of the first session when the emergency powers were delegated).
Delegation of tariff powers to the President (art. vi, § 28(2)): •
The reason for this delegation is the necessity of giving the President authority to act immediately on certain matters affecting the national economy because delay could result in the hardship of the people.
It is recognized that the legislative process is too slow for the quick solutions needed for economic problems.
Delegation to administrative bodies: Power of Subordinate Legislation: authority entrusted to administrative agencies to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute •
Based on the recognition that the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems has made it necessary to entrust to administrative bodies the power of subordinate legislation
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid out in a statute by “filling in the details” which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
They can determine the effectivity of laws which depend on certain conditions. Such laws must be complete when they leave the hands of the Legislature. They merely provide a contingency.
• Delegation to local governments • •
Based on the recognition that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than Congress on matters of purely local concern and are therefore in a better position to enact the necessary and appropriate legislation Subject to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity
Tests of Delegation 1. The Completeness Test: • The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except enforce it. 2.
The Sufficient Standard Test: • Even if the law does not spell out in detail the limits of the delegate’s authority, it may still be sustained if the delegation of legislative power is made subject to a sufficient standard. • Vague standards such as “for the public welfare” or “national security” have been held to be sufficient. GRANT OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER; IN GENERAL; LGUS AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO: The Provincial Governor was authorized to decide whether to move non-Christians to a reservation and to choose the reservation site. The delegation or legislative powers to local authorities is sanctioned by immemorial practice. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORP. V. NHA: The National Housing Authority was authorized to perform quasi-judicial functions. The need for special competence and experience justifies delegation to administrative agencies.
PITC V. ANGELES: The Philippine International Trading Corporation was authorized by law to regulate trade between the Philippines and China and make rules for that purpose. The delegation was valid. Delegation to administrative agencies is justified because of the growing complexity of modern society and the functions of government, the need for fast response to issues, and the fact that the rules which need to be made are too detailed for the legislature. VALID DELEGATION PEOPLE V. ROSENTHAL: The Blue Sky Law delegated to the Insular Treasurer the power to cancel certificates for sale of securities. Public interest is a sufficient standard. ARANETA V. GATMAITAN: The Fisheries Act prohibited the use of devices which could cause depletion of fish fry and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate rules and regulations. The President issued Executive Orders prohibiting trawl fishing. The President may exercise power delegated to a cabinet secretary under his power of control and supervision and because a cabinet member is his alter ego. AGUSTIN V. EDU: An LOI (then valid as law) requiring vehicles to carry EWDs authorized the LTO to promulgate implementing rules. The standard to be followed may be implied form the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In this case, it was apparent from the LOI that public safety was the standard. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA: The law creating the POEA mandated it to ensure “fair and equitable employment practices.” It issued a memorandum circular prescribing a standard contract for seamen complete with benefits. The following were held to be sufficient standards: to ensure fair and equitable employment practices, public interest, just and equitable, simplicity, economy, efficiency. CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES V. POEA: Same facts as Eastern Shipping case above. Test for a valid exercise of delegated power to make rules: (1) the regulation should be germane to the purposes of the law; and (2) it should not be in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ: The Medical Act created the Board of Medical Education and gave it power to issue rules to carry out the following purposes: (1) the standardization of medical education; (2) the regulation of the medical profession; (3) to determine requirements for admission to medical schools. The purpose of the law may provide the standard. OSMEÑA V. ORBOS: P.D. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund and authorized the Energy Regulatory Board to augment the fund by imposing additional amounts on petroleum products. The amount to be imposed is determined by the standard: “to augment the resources of the Fund.” GUINGONA V. CARAGUE: P.D. 1177 provided for automatic appropriation of funds for the payment of foreign loans. (To whom was power delegated here? The Secretary of Budget?) The standard is that the amounts appropriated shall be enough to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury. VIOLA V. ALUNAN: The Local Government Code provides for the officers and board in each chapter of the Liga ng Mga Barangay and allows the creation of additional positions by the board as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. “For the management of the chapter” is a sufficient standard. UNITES STATES V. BARRIAS: A law was passed giving the Collector of Customs the authority to regulate harbor and river craft and to make rules to carry the law into effect. The law made punishable a violation of any rule made by the Collector pursuant to the law. The Collector made a
rule barring certain underpowered vessels from plying the Pasig River. Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. MARCOS V. COURT OF APPEALS: The Central Bank Act provides that a willful violation of the Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board shall be punished by a fine and imprisonment. Marcos was charged for a violation of a Central Bank circular issued by the Monetary Board which prohibited foreign exchange accounts abroad without CB authority. Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS: A Civil Service Commission was issued to reorganize some structural aspects of the Commission. The Revised Administrative Code authorized the Civil Service Commission to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. It recognized the purpose of the CSC to promote efficiency and responsiveness in the civil service and required it to be decentralized. The SC said that by ruling that there was valid delegation, it was not saying that the power had to be granted to the CSC for the power to exist. CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS: R.A. 6734 created the ARMM and authorized the president to merge remaining regions. The President issued an Administrative Order reorganizing the administrative regions in the regions which did not vote in favor of joining the ARMM. There was no standard for reorganization in R.A. 6734. Another law, R.A. 5435, authorized the President to organize the Executive Department to promote simplicity, efficiency, and economy in government. A legislative standard need not be found in the law challenged. It may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. RODRIGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN: R.A. 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act, directed the DBM to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule and several factor, e.g., education required by the job, nature of work, etc. The DBM classified the position of Municipal Mayor as Salary Grade 27. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by officers with Salary Grade 27 and higher but the law defining its jurisdiction did not include municipal mayors. The standard for classifying was “equal work for equal pay.” The DBM merely classifies positions; that by such classification, an official comes under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is only an incidental consequence to the exercise of the DBM’s functions. UNDUE DELEGATION PEOPLE V. MACEREN: The Fisheries Law prohibits the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing. The Secretary of Agriculture issued an Administrative Order banning the use of electrofishing and imposing a penalty for violation. The AO The law does not expressly prohibit/punish electro-fishing. The power to declare what constitutes a criminal offense cannot be delegated. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must be clear that the order is within the scope of the law and that the penalty is provided for in the law itself. PEOPLE V. VERA: The Probation Law stated that it “shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer.” By making the application of the law in a particular province dependent of the provincial board, what is granted is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. UNITED STATES V. PANLILIO: The law authorized the Director of Agriculture order a quarantine of animals but did not state that a violation of such orders would be punishable. The law merely stated that a violation of “any of the provisions of this Act” shall incur criminal liability.
Where the law granting the power to make rules does not state that a violation of the rules is punishable, a person violating the rules cannot be proceeded against criminally. PEOPLE V. DACUYCUY: R.A. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers contained a penal provision punishing any person who violates the rights of teachers under the act. The penalty was set at “a fine of not less that one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” The penalty of imprisonment is unconstitutional for giving the courts an unduly wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without the benefit of a sufficient standard. CEBU OXYGEN V. DRILON: R.A. 6640 raised the minimum wage. The Secretary of Labor issued an implementing rule which prohibited an employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against wage increases mandated by R.A. 6640. Since the law did not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary increases, the implementing rules cannot provide such a prohibition. Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. The law itself cannot be expanded by regulations. YNOT V. IAC: E.O. 626-A mandated the confiscation of illegally transported carabaos/carabeef and allowed certain government officers to dispose of the confiscated animals/beef as they “may see fit.” The phrase “may see fit” is extremely dangerous; it is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. The discretion of the officers is boundless. There is here a “roving commission,” a wide and sweeping authority that is not “canalized within the banks that keep it from overflowing.” EXECUTIVE MISAPPLICATION TATAD V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: The Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act authorized the DOE, upon approval of the President, to implement the full deregulation of the oil industry not later than March 1997. The DOE was directed to time the full deregulation when prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. The President issued E.O. 372 to fully implement deregulation. The E.O. stated that the conditions set by Congress have been met: depletion of the buffer fund; stable prices of crude oil; and stable exchange rate. While the law contained a valid delegation of power, the E.O. implementing it failed to faithfully follow the standards set down by the law. The Executive misappreciated the extra factor of depletion of the buffer fund. It is not harmless error, even if the standards required by Congress were present. It may be that the presence of the two standards required by Congress wouldn’t have been sufficient to the Executive were it not for the presence of the improperly considered standard. Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twentyfive years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. QUALIFICATIONS SENATORS Number: Qualifications:
• • • • • •
Natural born 25 years old Read and write Registered voter 2 year residency 6 years 2 term limit
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Number: • Not more than 250 (may be increased by law) Qualifications:
• • • • •
Natural born 25 years old Read and write Registered voter (IN DISTRICT) 1 year residency (IN DISTRICT) 3 years 3 term limit
CITIZENSHIP BENGSON V. HRET: Bengson was a natural-born Filipino who lost his citizenship by his naturalization in the United States in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. He subsequently reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under a law which allowed those who served in the U.S. Military to reacquire Philippine citizenship. He ran for and won a seat in the House. Natural born? A natural born Filipino is one who is a Philippine citizen from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his citizenship. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by: naturalization, repatriation, or a direct act of Congress. Repatriation simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance and registering it in the Local Civil Registry. It results in the recovery of the original nationality. A natural born Filipino who has lost his citizenship, if repatriated, will recover his natural born status. Moreover, under the 1987 Constitution, there are only two classes of citizens: natural born and naturalized. A citizen who did not have to go through the process of naturalization is, necessarily,
natural born. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE AQUINO V. COMELEC: Aquino, a candidate for congressman in Makati, was born in Tarlac and had his domicile of origin there. To show that he fulfilled the one-year residency requirement, he presented a one-year residential lease in Makati. The Constitution, when it says “residence” actually means “domicile.” It is clear that Aquino’s domicile of origin is Tarlac. Thus to establish his domicile in Makati, he should be able to prove an (1) actual change of domicile, a (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of domicile and establishing a new one and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. The one-year lease was insufficient to prove change of domicile. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC: Imelda was a candidate for congressman in her domicile of origin, Leyte. Although she was born in Manila, she followed the domicile of her parents. She was raised and educated in Leyte, after college, she went to Manila and married ex-President Marcos. They lived in Malacañang and, after EDSA1, moved to Hawaii. Imelda never lost her domicile of origin. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. She did not lose her domicile by marriage; the Civil Code allows the husband to fix the residence of the family. When the Civil Code uses the word residence, it actually means residence and not domicile. Dissent: the one year residence requirement is crucial regardless of whether or not the term residence is to be synonymous with domicile – the candidate’s intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. The candidate must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent. PROBLEM: Can a person who has been naturalized in a foreign country be deemed to have abandoned his domicile in the Philippines? Assuming he does not live abroad? Probably not. The three requisites for a change of domicile must first be shown before one can be said to have abandoned his domicile. The mere act of naturalizing is insufficient. DOMINO V. COMELEC: Domino filed a certificate of candidacy for congressman in Sarangani. His domicile of origin was Ilocos. He successfully changed domicile to QC, where he ran for congressman. To establish a change of domicile from QC to Sarangani, he presented a lease contract. Domino is still domiciled in QC. He has not shown the three requirements for change of domicile. In the consideration of these circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind: (1) a man must have a domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it continues until a new one is acquired; (3) there can only be one domicile at a time. The lease contract will show, at most, residence. Also, Domino’s lack of intention to change domicile is shown by his registering as a voter in QC. This is true even if the MTC declared Domino to be a resident of Sarangani in an exclusion proceeding in QC. The only authority of the MTC is to determine whether or not the voter is entitled to vote in that locality. PEREZ V. COMELEC: Aguinaldo’s qualification to run for representative of Tuguegarao were challenged. He was able to prove his qualifications by presenting: an affidavit from his lessor which affirmed residence; a marriage certificate; birth certificates of his children; letters addressed to him in Tuguegarao. The fact that he registered as a voter in another district is not proof that his domicile is in that other district. TERM DIMAPORO V. MITRA: Rep. Dimaporo filed his certificate of candidacy for governor of ARMM. The Speaker and the Secretary of the House excluded his name from the Roll, considering him to have
voluntarily renounce his office. The grounds for shortening of term enumerated in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are: forefeiture by holding another office in the government; expulsion; disqualification by the electoral tribunal; voluntary renunciation. There are other grounds: death, resignation; conviction with disqualification. The mere act of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office is forfeiture of the elective position held. It is considered forfeiture under the Omnibus Election Code. [N.B. This provision has been repealed by the Fair Elections Act. Now, only acceptance of an appointive office is considered forfeiture.] Term v. Tenure: The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. PARTY LIST VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMELEC: In the 1998 elections, the COMELEC issued a resolution proclaiming parties which did not garner at least 2% of votes cast under the party list system in order to fill-up the 20% requirement. The SC cleared up the rules: 1. 20% of the total number of representatives is a ceiling; it is not mandatory. To compute: a. (# of district representatives/.80) X .20 = maximum number of party list representatives 2. Allocation of seats: a. All with at least 2% of the vote get one seat b. Determine number of seats top ranked party is entitled to; this is the basis c. Determine number of seats other parties are entitled to. To compute: i. (# of votes of party/# of votes of 1st party) X # of additional seats of 1st party. The rationale is it would be unfair for parties with many votes to have the same number of seats as those which are barely over 6%. The Niemeyer Formula used in the German Bundestag cannot be applied here because there are fundamental differences between our party-list systems. In Germany, one-half of the Parliament is filled by party-list representatives; also, there is no three-seat limit. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY V. COMELEC: Petitions for party-list registration were filed with the COMELEC. Some were granted; some weren’t. The SC set down guidelines for the COMELEC to follow in evaluating applications for registration. 1. must represent marginalized or underrepresented sectors enumerated in the law; 2. political parties are allowed but they must comply with #1; 3. the religious sector may not be represented; 4. the party must not be disqualified under the law; 5. it must not be related to government; 6. nominees must be from the marginalized or underrepresented sectors; 7. nominees must also comply with the law (same qualifications as congressmen except for residency requirement plus must have been members of party-list for at least 90 days preceding election; for youth sector, must be 25-30 on election day;
nominees must be able to contribute to the enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the country as a whole.
Section 5. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reappointment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES TOBIAS V. ABALOS: Mandaluyong and San Juan used to belong to only one legislative district. A law was passed converting Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City; it now formed a separate legislative district. The law need not include a census to show that Mandaluyong already has 250k residents thus making it into a highly urbanized city. It is presumed that Congress did its job. Its creation into a separate legislative district is valid even if the number of Congressmen goes over 250. The number in the Constitution is subject to law. Though the Constitution directs Congress to make reapportionments three years after each census; there may still be reapportionment via special law. MARIANO V. COMELEC: Makati was converted into a city. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be done through a special law. The law stated that the area of the Municipality of Makati would be the area of the City of Makati. It is not necessary that there be a delimitation by metes and bounds. The law provided that Makati shall have two legislative districts. The Constitution merely requires a city with at least 250k population to have at least one representative. There is no requirement for additional representatives. SAMSON V. AGUIRRE: A law was passed creating Novaliches City from 15 QC barangays. The law was held valid despite allegations that there were certifications as to income, population, and land area. Every law is presumed valid. Petitioners failed to show overcome the presumption of validity. The seat of government was not provided for in the law; this may be established after creation. MONTEJO V. COMELEC: Biliran was made into a province and the COMELEC transferred some municipalities to other legislative districts purportedly to adhere to the equality of vote principle Redistricting and reapportionment are legislative prerogatives which the COMELEC may not exercise. The power of the COMELEC under the Ordinance attached to the Constitution is limited to minor adjustment or corrections. Reapportionment is substantial. HERRERA V. COMELEC: A COMELEC resolution divided the province of Guimaras into two provincial districts. The COMELEC has the power to divide provinces with only one legislative district into two districts for the purpose of electing members of the provincial board. The apportionment was done in accordance with law. The districts are contiguous and/or adjacent, meaning “adjoining, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances.” Distinguish this from Montejo, where apportionment of legislative districts was done. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. LUCERO V. COMELEC: There was a failure of elections in Samar. The special election could be held close to the next election date because the one-year rule in the special elections for vacancies in Congress did not apply to special elections held because of failure of elections. The requisites for a special election to fill a vacancy in Congress
1. 2. 3.
Permanent vacancy occurs in the Senate of House At least one year before expiration of term Election must be held: between 60 and 90 days after the vacancy if House; simultaneously with next regular election, if Senate.
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES • • •
Increase in salaries shall not take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Senators and Representatives approving such increase Reduction of salaries is permitted No prohibition on receipt of allowances but subject to audit by the COA
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 1) Privilege from Arrest Conditions: Only from arrests for criminal offenses punishable by not more that six years (prision correccional max.) Only while Congress is in session, whether regular or special ⇒
Purpose is to protect legislator against harassment which would keep him away from legislative sessions
2) Privilege of Speech and Debate Condition: Remarks must be made in the discharge of official functions such as speeches delivered, statements made and votes cast; utterance must constitute legislative action It must relate to an act generally done in Congress and in relation to the business before it ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
Only protection from other forums other that Congress itself; may be disciplined by Congress Purpose is to leave the legislator unimpeded in the performance of his duties Extends to agents as long as the agency consists of assisting legislator in his official functions
PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS: Jalosjos was convicted for rape and acts of lasciviousness; he was sent to prison. He filed a petition to be allowed to attend sessions, committee meetings, etc. The immunity is only for offenses punishable by not more than six years. Congress has the power to compel attendance unless absence is for a legitimate reason. JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG: Rep. Cabangbang wrote an open letter addressed to the President which was allegedly libelous; he had it published. The communication is not privileged. It is not considered “speech and debate in Congress” so as to be privileged. In causing publication of the communication, he was not performing an official duty. Moreover, the letter was dated on a date that Congress was not in session. Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. •
Failure to make the disclosure may be sanctioned under the House’s power to discipline its members, e.g., 60 day maximum suspension or expulsion, both with 2/3 concurrence.
Section 13. No Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES Incompatible: Representatives may not hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat Forbidden: May not under any circumstances be appointed to offices which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected Exception: if it can be shown that the second office is an extension of the legislative position or is in aid of legislative duties, the holding thereof will not result in the loss of the legislator’s seat in Congress, e.g., Chairman of Senate Blue Ribbon Committee or member of the JBC. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear AS COUNSEL before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Prohibitions: 1. Appear as counsel 2. Direct or indirect interest in any contract, etc. with the government and GOCCs (including subsidiaries) 3. Intervene in any matter before any government office for his direct/indirect pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN: An assemblyman appeared as counsel for a corporation before the SEC. Because the other party objected, he acquired nominal shares in the corporation so that his appearance would be in his own behalf. The appearance was an indirect appearance as counsel. The SC will not be fooled by the ruse. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. If the appearance is genuinely in one’s own behalf, then it is permissible. Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. SESSION 1. Regular session: fourth Monday of July until 30 days before opening of next regular session
Special session: may be called by President at any time
RECESS 1. Compulsory recess: the 30 day period between regular sessions OR the period between the beginning of a new term (noon of June 30) until the beginning of the regular session 2. Voluntary recess: Each house may adjourn voluntarily; if for more than three days, must obtain consent of other House. Pimentel v. Joint Committee: Did the term of Congress expire when it adjourned sine die upon the termination of its regular session, making any actions by the Joint Canvassing Committee beyond such termination void? No. Upon adjournment, what was terminated was the regular session. The current Congress continued in existence until the proclamation of the replacements. The legislative functions cease upon adjournment; this does not affect non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session convened by directive of the Constitution to canvass the votes and proclaim the P/VP cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its tasks. This is true even it the newly proclaimed members of Congress have to take over the functions. Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty for suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. (5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. OFFICERS Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona: During the election of officers in the Senate, (Majority – LAMP, 10; Minority – Lakas, 7), all but Miriam and Tatad voted for Fernan to be Senate President. Miriam and Tatad claim that they are now the “minority” and manifested that Tatad be the minority leader. Lakas’ choice was Guingona. All the Constitution requires is that the Senate President be elected by more than half of all of the Senators. It does not define who comprise the majority/minority. The rules of the Senate do not provide for election of majority/minority leaders. QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS/COMPULSION TO ATTEND; MEANING AVELINO V. CUENCO: To prevent Tañada from giving a privilege speech, 10 Senators, including Senate President Avelino, walked out. The remaining 12 declared the office of the Senate President vacant and elected Cuenco. The election was valid. There was a quorum. One senator was in the US and a 12 is a majority of 23. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, “House” does not mean “all” the members. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House. The senator abroad was not considered to be part of the House because
he was beyond the coercive power of the body. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS: The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. INTERNAL RULES AND DISCIPLINE ARROYO V. DE VENECIA: A motion was brought to ratify a bicameral conference committee report; Arroyo attempted to object but he was not recognized. He brought this petition to challenge the validity of the law which developed from the report on the ground that it was passed in violation of the rules of the House. The SC has no jurisdiction. As a general rule, internal rules may be revoked at will by the Legislature. If a House violates its own rules, it is considered a waiver and will not be questioned by the courts. The exception is where a violation of the rules affects private rights. OSMEÑA V. PENDATUN: Disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the House against Osmeña for a speech he delivered on the floor. Osmeña filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that his speech did not constitute disorderly behavior. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior not only because the Constitution conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because it depends on factual circumstances known best to the House. The courts cannot interfere as long as the disciplinary sanction is imposed with the required vote. PAREDES V. SANDIGANBAYAN: Congressman was suspended by Sandiganbayan for acts committed while still governor. SC upheld suspension but was powerless to implement it without cooperation from the House. Lopez v. Senate: The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress creating a Joint Committee to canvass the votes for P/VP cannot be reviewed unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. There is none here because the decisions of the Committee are subject to the approval of the joint session of both houses voting separately. DUTY TO KEEP JOURNALS AND RECORDS • •
Journal: abbreviated account of daily proceedings Record: word for word transcript of the deliberations of Congress
U.S. V. PONS: To determine whether a law was passed while Congress was still in session, the journal was referred to. It showed that the law was passed on the last day, when Congress adjourned sine die, but defendant claimed that the clock was merely stopped and in reality, the law was passed beyond the last day. The could not inquire into the veracity of the journal under the principle of separation of powers. CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. V. GIMENEZ: The law exempted foreign exchange transactions for the importation of “urea formaldehyde” from margin fees. Importer of “urea” and “formaldehyde” claims that Congress intended the exemption to apply to his situation. Though the deliberations and the bill may have supported the importer’s positions, they cannot overcome the final letter of the law, as approved and enacted. The courts cannot second guess congressional intent when the law is clear. MORALES V. SUBIDO: In a discrepancy between the bill as it appears in the journal and the enrolled bill, the enrolled bill will prevail because it has been attested to by the Speaker and the Senate President. With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered in the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy. ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS: A law was passed but several approved amendments, as indicated in the
journal, were omitted in the enrolled bill, which was passed into law. The Senate president and the President withdrew their signatures. In light of the special circumstances, by the withdrawal of the Senate President’s signature, the document was stripped of its character and probative value as an enrolled bill and must yield to he journal. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be it Chairman. JURISDICTION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION: The Electoral Commission took cognizance of a protest filed against Angara despite his having been confirmed by the National Assembly. The NA confirmed Angara on December 3; the EC set the last day for filing protests on December 9. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. VERA V. AVELINO: On reports of election irregularities, the Senate approved the Pendatun resolution, which suspended the swearing in of Vera et al as senators. This was within the Senate’s power to do. It was not an election contest over which the Electoral Commission was the sole judge. An election contest relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but to have himself inducted into office. In this case, nobody is asserting a better right to the offices of petitioners. The power of the Senate to suspend the swearing in is inherent in its right of self-preservation. CHAVEZ V. COMELEC: Frank Chavez filed a petition with the COMELEC to suspend the proclamation of the Senators on the ground that there was a failure to remove from the official list of candidates a disqualified candidate with the surname “Chavez.” Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Congressmen; all the COMELEC may do is correct manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns. Chavez may file an election protest with the Senate Electoral Tribunal. AQUINO V. COMELEC: The Electoral Tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving their “respective members.” This means that for the ETs to have jurisdiction, the candidate must have been proclaimed. In this case, there is no such proclamation. A disqualification case against a candidate may continue after the election and the COMELEC may suspend his proclamation where evidence of guilt is strong. PEREZ V. COMELEC: Remedy before proclamation: COMELEC may suspend proclamation where evidence of guilt in a disqualification case is strong. Remedy after proclamation: file election protest / quo warranto with the ET. GARCIA V. HRET: Quo warranto was filed before the HRET questioning Ang Ping’s eligibility to hold the office of representative. HRET dismissed for failure to make the P5,000 deposit. The SC has jurisdiction because there was an allegation of GADALEJ. But there was no GADALEJ because the rule require payment of deposit. Difference between quo warranto and protest. Quo warranto: to disqualify on grounds of ineligibility;
the protestant will not be seated. Election protest: based on fraud/irregularities and it may be shown that protestant received more votes; protestant may be seated. RASUL V. COMELEC: A petition for certiorari was filed to set aside the COMELEC proclamation allegedly issued with GADALEJ. The SC has no jurisdiction. SET is sole judge of elections, returns and qualifications. Elections: refers to conduct of polls, including the listing of voters, and the casting and counting of votes. Returns: refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners. Qualifications: refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceedings such as ineligibility. GUERRERO V. COMELEC: Fariñas substituted his daughter in the certificate of candidacy as a candidate for a house seat. The problem is that his daughter filed as an independent candidate and there can be no substitution of independents. Guerrero claims that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case because what is involved is not a Constitutional qualification but merely a statutory one. The SC ruled that the HRET has jurisdiction and that a distinction between statutory and Constitutional qualifications should not be made. Father Bernas says that this is not a qualifications issue but rather an election issue, over which the HRET has jurisdiction. VILLAROSA V. HRET: The HRET declared as stray ballots those which had the initials JTV on them and were being claimed by Girlie Villarosa. JTV are the initials of her incumbent husband. No GADALEJ. Nicknames are allowed but they must be names by which the candidate is popularly known before the candidate files his certificate of candidacy. COMPOSITION ABBAS V. SET: An election contest was filed against 22 senatorial candidates; a motion for disqualification was filed against the Senator-members of the SET because they were all interested parties to the case. The Electoral Tribunals were intended to have judicial and legislative components, which would commonly share in the duty of deciding election contests. The proportion of Senators to Justices is 2 to 1, an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit intent of the Constitution. The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three JusticesMembers alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. PIMENTEL V. HRET: A petition was filed with the SC to compel the HRET/CA to reconstitute itself on the basis of proportional representation in order to represent the party-list organizations. Even if the party-list have agreed to field a common representative to the HRET/CA and are sufficient in number to deserve a seat, under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, their primary recourse is with the HRET/CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the rule on proportional representation can recourse to the SC be had. The HRET/CA cannot reconstitute itself. Their composition is determined by the House. Independence Bondoc v. Pineda: A political party revoked the nomination of Camasura, its representative to the HRET because the latter did not vote for his party-mate in an election contest before the tribunal. His nomination was revoked because he was expelled from the party for “party disloyalty.” The House may not remove Camasura. The Electoral Tribunals must be independent and non-partisan; they are non-political bodies in a sea of politicians. Disloyalty, short of joining another party, is not a ground for removal from the HRET. His removal also violates his security of tenure. ACTION/DECISION
The SC has the power to determine whether the ETs have acted with GADALEJ. The following are cases where the SC reviewed the ETs’ actions or decisions.
ROBLES V. HRET: Santos filed a protest with the HRET. He filed an urgent motion to withdraw his protest; he then filed a motion to disregard the withdrawal. The HRET considered the motions together, noting the motion to withdraw and granting the motion to disregard the withdrawal. No GADALEJ. The HRET did not lose jurisdiction by the filing of the motion to withdraw the protest. It did not grant the motion. Jurisdiction lawfully acquired continues until termination of the case. ARROYO V. HRET: Arroyo was proclaimed over Syjuco. A protest was filed praying for revision and recounting. Syjuco filed a memorandum amending his protest and prayed for a non-traditional examination of precinct level documents. HRET set aside Arroyo’s proclamation and declared Syjuco winner. GADALEJ. Syjuco should not have been allowed to amend his protest at the memorandum stage. The evidence relied on by the HRET was unreliable (precinct level documents). HRET nullified the election results in violation of its 50% rule (requisites to annul election results based on fraud, irregularities, or terrorism: (1) more than 50% of the total number of votes were affected (2) by the fraud, terrorism, or irregularities.) LERIAS V. HRET: The HRET ruled in favor of Mercado, giving more weight to a Xerox copy of a certificate of canvass in the disputed municipality than it did to original copies of the election returns. GADALEJ. The vote tally by the HRET was unsupported by evidence. The best evidence are the ballots and, in their absence, the election returns. SANDOVAL V. HRET: Oreta filed an election protest against Sandoval. Summons was served on a freelance maintenance man found at Sandoval’s office. For failure to answer, a general denial was entered on Sandoval’s behalf. GADALEJ. The Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the HRET rules. Service of summons should be personal; substituted service should be used only under certain conditions which were not present in this case. Moreover, even if substituted service were available, the maintenance man is not the person upon whom it should be served. Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. DAZA V. SINGSON: The House has the authority to change the composition of the CA to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. Such changes must be permanent shifts of party allegiance and not mere factional divisions or temporary alliances. In this case, 24 LP members resigned and joined the LDP; this was considered a permanent shift. COSETENG V. MITRA: Coseteng was the sole member of the KAIBA party. She was held to be not entitled to a seat on the CA. The formula is: total number of representatives/12 seats on CA = number members required to be entitled to one seat. GUINGONA V. GONZALES: Using the formula in Coseteng, some parties were entitled to half a seat, e.g., LDP was entitled to 7.5 seats. SC ruled that there could be no rounding up as this would result in rounding down of the other parties’ fraction of a seat and result in the strengthening of one party’s voting strength to the prejudice of the other parties’ voting strength in violation of the rule on proportional representation. There is no need to have a full complement of 12 on the CA. It is more important that proportional representation be achieved. As long as there is a quorum, the CA can function.
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION Conditions: 1. Must be in aid of legislation 2. Must be in accordance with duly published rules of procedure 3. Must respect rights of persons appearing or affected by such inquiries, including the right against self-incrimination
Failure to attend or contumacy may be punished Imprisonment by Senate may be indefinite Imprisonment by House can last only as long session when offense was committed May be reviewed by SC for GADALEJ
NEGROS ORIENTAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE V. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE:The Legislature’s power to subpoena and punish for contempt is sui generis. It attaches not because of its legislative functions but because it is an independent and coordinate branch of government. LGU’s are mere creations of law and it cannot be inferred that they possess the awesome power despite their exercise of legislative power. BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE: Enrile gave a privilege speech where he disclosed alleged anomalous transactions and called for the SBRC to investigate into the possibility that the Anti-Graft Act was violated. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent their being subpoenaed a second time on due process grounds – that the inquiry will prejudice a case pending with the Sandiganbayan. Not in aid of legislation. The purpose was to determine whether the AGCPA was violated. This encroaches into the realm of the judiciary. The power of inquiry must be exercised in furtherance of a valid function of Congress, whether to legislate, discipline a member, etc. Bernas: A valid ground to stop the investigation would have been the violation of the rights of third persons. By ruling that it was not in aid of legislation, the SC second-guessed the intention of the SBRC. ARANULT V. NAZARENO: The Senate was investigating a suspicious transaction entered into by the government. Arnault, a witness, when asked who received the money paid by the government, kept giving evasive or obviously false answers. He was punished for contempt and ordered imprisoned indefinitely, or until he decides to cooperate. An obviously false or evasive answer is equivalent to a refusal to testify, which is punishable by contempt. The materiality of the question is determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not its indirect relation to the potential legislation. Section 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. • • •
This is known as the question hour Congress should keep in mind that there are better ways to obtain information than compulsion Department heads should also be aware that material information required by Congress should not be withheld
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. DECLARATION OF EXISTENCE OF STATE OF WAR • •
Actual power to wage war is lodged in Executive Even if Congress doesn’t declare existence of war, Executive may wage war under his broad powers: commander in chief, residual powers, practical reasons
Requisites: 1. 2/3 vote 2. joint session 3. voting separately DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS Requisites: 1. War or national emergency 2. Law is passed 3. Limitations: a. restrictions set by congress b. declared national policy c. limited period i. may be withdrawn by resolution (majority vote) ii. powers cease upon adjournment of congress •
Example of national emergency: brownouts during Ramos’ term
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. ORIGIN OF BILLS 1. 2. 3.
Appropriation Bill: primary purpose of which is to authorize the release of funds from the public treasury Revenue Bill: levies taxes and raises funds for the government Tariff Bill: specifies the rates or duties to be imposed on imported articles
4. 5. 6.
Bill Increasing Public Debt: illustrated by one floating funds for public subscription redeemable after a certain period Bill of Local Application: one involving purely local matters, like the charter of a city Private Bills: illustrated by a bill granting honorary citizenship to a foreigner The above bills must originate in the House because they are more numerous in membership and also more representative of the people. Its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country. The Senate has much leeway in amending the bills, what is important is that the bill originates in the House.
GUINGONA V. CARAGUE: The law which provided for automatic appropriations was a PD issued by Marcos. It did not originate in the House. The Constitution must be given a reasonable construction and made to apply prospectively. Existing appropriation, revenue, etc. laws cannot be deemed to have been reduced to the status of bill and made to pass the legislative mill anew. TOLENTINO V. SOF/ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA: 1. The bill, not the law, must originate in the lower house; 2. The upper house, upon receipt of the bill, may overhaul it and even substitute it with its own 3. The substitute bill may be filed in the Senate in anticipation of the receipt of the House bill as long as no action is taken on it (hearings?) 4. A third version of the bill may result from the conference committee. Though BCCs are not expected to make substantial changes, their version will be accepted as long it is germane to the subject of the Senate and House bills APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC REVENUE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE PASCUAL V. SEC. OF PUB. WORKS: Money was appropriated to build roads on property which was donated to the municipality. However, at the time of the appropriation, a condition for the effectivity of the donation had not yet occurred. The appropriation was not for a public purpose. What is important is the essential character of the direct object of the appropriation, which must be public. Incidental advantage to the State does not make an appropriation one for a “public purpose.” Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments or agencies. (4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions may, BY LAW, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. LIMITS ON POWER TO APPROPRIATE: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Must originate in lower house; Congress may not increase appropriations recommended by the President in the budget; Prohibition on riders; Appropriations for Congress must follow procedure for all others; Special appropriations must specify purpose and must be supported by funds certified as available or must provide corresponding revenue proposals; 6. Generally may not authorize transfers of funds; 7. Discretionary funds may be used only for public purposes and must be supported by proper documentation; 8. Automatic reappropriation; 9. Public purpose; 10. Must be based on budget prepared by President. RIDERS: Garcia v. Mata: A provision in the appropriations bill which dealt with active/non-active status of military officers was considered a rider. TRANSFER OF FUNDS: DEMETRIA V. ALBA: A law which authorized the Executive to transfer funds within the executive department without qualifying that the funds shall be taken from savings and shall augment the item to which the transfer is made was declared void. LIGA V. COMELEC: The COMELEC allegedly intended to use its savings in order to fund the barangay elections. The Court did not rule on the validity of the plan because the issue was not ripe. PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ: The General Appropriations Bill contained a provision authorizing the AFP Chief to use savings to augment pensions fund. This was declared void because the AFP Chief is not one those authorized by the Constitution to make such transfers. CONCEPCION V. COMELEC: The COMELEC, by conducting an unofficial quick-count usurps the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for P/VP. The quick-count is unconstitutional because it is no appropriation for it. What the Congress authorized was modernization of the electoral system. Neither can money for the quick-count be transferred from savings of the COMELEC because the power to transfer is dormant until authorized by law. Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. PROCEDURE IN APPROVAL OF BILLS 1.
Bill is submitted to the House Secretary or Senate Secretary who calendars it for the first reading
3. 4. 5.
First Reading: The number and title of the measure are read and it is referred by the Senate President or the Speaker to the appropriate committee for study. The committee may “kill” the bill or recommend it for approval, with or without amendments. It is then calendared for the second reading. Second Reading: The bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon, and amended if so desired. The bill as approved is printed in its final form and copies are distributed at least three days before final reading. This is the most important stage. Third Reading: The bill is voted upon and members may explain their votes if allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed. The yeas and nays are recorded in the journal. Once the bill passes the third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will undergo the same process. If approved by the second House, it will be submitted to the President. The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by Congress and authenticated by the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, the Secretaries of both Chambers, and approved by the President. Generally, bills may originate from either house but all appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills, bills increasing the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must originate in the House of Representatives. Three reading requirement may be set aside where the president certifies the urgency of its enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
RIDERS: The purposes of this rule are: 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log rolling legislation defined as an act containing several unrelated subjects representing diverse interests. The object of the combination is to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one subject to vote for the whole act. 2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature. 3. To fairly apprise the people of the subject of legislation. PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ: A law amending the GSIS charter provided for retirement benefits to members of Congress. This was held to be a rider. CORDERO V. CABATUANDO: A law amended the Agricultural Tenancy Act and provided for representation of tenants by attorneys of the Tenancy Mediation Commission of the DOJ. This was held to be germane to the purpose of the law. ALALAYAN V. NPC: An amendatory law need not state its purpose as long as reference is made to the law being amended, e.g., An Act to Amend C.A. No. 120. INSULAR LUMBER V. CTA: A law increasing the Highway Special Fund by imposing taxes on fuel contained a provision exempting forest concessionaires from its coverage. A provision in a law containing an exemption from its general coverage is germane. TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD: A law was passed creating the VRB. It included a provision imposing a tax on the sale of videos. The provision is germane; the tax is merely one of the regulatory mechanisms which may be imposed by the VRB. An act may contain provisions which are not inconsistent with its purpose and may be considered to be in its furtherance. PHILIPPINE JUDGES’ ASSOCIATION V. PRADO: A law which contains a provision repealing inconsistent laws is undoubtedly germane to the purpose of the law. In this case, however, the substantive validity of the repeal was questionable. TOLENTINO V. SOF: An Act Restructuring the VAT System could validly include among its provisions a provision removing exemptions formerly granted under special laws. Certification by the President does away with all requirements, not just the printing and distribution. TOBIAS V. ABALOS: A law converting a municipality into a highly urbanized city may include a provision making the newly converted city into a separate legislative district. The creation of a
separate district is the natural and logical consequence of the conversion into a highly urbanized city. TATAD V. SEC. DEPT. OF ENERGY: A provision imposing tariff differentials is germane to a law deregulating the oil industry. DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC: The Voter’s Registration Act contained a provision directing the reassignment of election officers every four years. This was held to be germane to the purpose of the law because it ensures the integrity of the registration process by preventing the formation of illicit relationships between election officers and elements in their particular areas of assignment. CAWALING V. COMELEC: A law merging two municipalities to create one city may contain a provision abolishing the two municipalities. The abolition is a natural consequence of the merger. Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the day of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. THREE METHODS BY WHICH A BILL BECOMES LAW: 1. 2. 3.
When the President signs it When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by two-thirds vote of all the members of each House When the President does not act on the measure within thirty days after his receipt of it When vetoing a bill, the President must include his objections in a ‘veto message’ The general rule is that the bill must be approved or vetoed as a whole however partial or line vetoes are allowed for appropriation, revenue and tariff bills
ARROYO V. DE VENECIA: Yeas and nays are required only in three instances: (1) last reading of the bill; (2) at the request of 1/5 of the members present; (3) overriding a presidential veto. PRESIDENTIAL VETO CIR V. CTA: The President’s veto exempted from application of the caterer’s tax hotels, motels and resthouses. The other establishments in the section were left subject to the tax. The CTA claims that the veto was improper because it did not veto an entire item (the CTA understood item to mean the entire section). An ITEM in a revenue bill does not refer to the entire section imposing a particular tax, but rather to the SUBJECT OF THE TAX AND THE TAX RATE. GONZALES V. MACARAIG: The GAB included a provision prohibiting the President from augmenting disapproved appropriations with transfers from savings. The President may veto both items and severable provisions in an appropriations bill. The President cannot veto a provision without vetoing the item to which it relates, e.g., he cannot veto a condition on the use of the appropriation but approve the appropriation.
Even assuming the President has no power to veto provisions, the provisions in this case were “inappropriate provisions” because they did not relate to a specific appropriation in the bill. They were general statements of policy which should be in a separate piece of legislation. BENGZON V. DRILON: The GAB appropriated P500m for “general fund adjustment” covering several purposes, including the adjustment of the pension of the Justices. The President vetoed only the use of the fund to adjust the pensions. The veto was invalid. It was not an item veto because it did not include the appropriation of P500m. PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ: The provision requiring prior approval of Congress before the funds appropriated for AFP modernization could be released was an inappropriate provision which could be vetoed by the President. Any provision requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be in a separate bill. The appropriation for compensation of the CAFGUs was accompanied by a provision which required the payment of separation benefits, implying deactivation. Such a provision should be in a separate law. Though the president did not veto this provision, he stated that its implementation would be subject to his discretion. He impounded the funds allocated for deactivation. The president’s power to refuse to spend allocated funds is sourced from (1) implied or express authority from Congress; (2) Commander in chief clause; (3) faithful execution clause. Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or covenants appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. • • •
Uniform: operates with the same force wherever the subject may be found / equal protection requirements are met (valid classification, germane, present and future, applies equally to all in class) Progressive: rate increases as base increases Equitable: just reiterates uniform and equitable
Tan v. Del Rosario: Uniformity does not prohibit classification as long as equal protection requirements are met. CIR v. CA: A Revenue Memorandum Circular imposed higher taxes only on certain brands owned by Fortune Tobacco. This was declared void for being violative of the mandate that taxation be uniform. Abra Valley College v. Aquino: A school rented out a portion of its building to a commercial establishment. That portion is not exempt from tax. The portion used by the school’s owner as his residence is exempt for being incidental to the running of the school. PROBLEM: What if the funds earned by the portion rented out are applied exclusively to school use? Probably not exempt. Law is clear. Strict construction of exemptions. Bayan v. Zamora: The Senate concurred in the VFA, which granted the US Military exemption from duties for equipment brought in the country for joint exercises. Did majority of all the members of Congress have to approve this exemption? Open question. In international law, binding. How about immunity of a sovereign from tax?
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim: The BCD Act gave the President the power to create Special Economic Zones from former bases. However, the law granted tax incentives only to Subic. The President had no authority to extend tax exemptions to the John Hay Zone. Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. FISCAL POWERS OF CONGRESS PASCUAL V. SEC. PUB. WORKS: Money was appropriated to build roads on property which was donated to the municipality. However, at the time of the appropriation, a condition for the effectivity of the donation had not yet occurred. The appropriation was not for a public purpose. What is important is the essential character of the direct object of the appropriation, which must be public. Incidental advantage to the State does not make an appropriation one for a “public purpose.” MIAA V. MABUNAY: A security agency cited the GAA to support its contention that security contracts could be awarded either by negotiated contracts or public bidding. An appropriations act is primarily a special type of legislation whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Section 31 on the General Provisions of the GAA of 1993 merely authorizes the heads of departments, bureaus, offices or agencies of the national government to hire, through public bidding or negotiated contracts, contractual personnel to perform specific activities or services related or incidental to their functions. This law specifically authorizes expenditures for the hiring of these personnel. It is not the governing law on the award of the service contracts by government agencies nor does it do away with the general requirement of public bidding. GUINGONA V. CARAGUE: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. COMELEC V. QUIJANO: Photokina won the bid to supply the system for voters’ registration – it bid 6B. The contract was not yet formalized. Only 1B was appropriated for the purpose. Photokina filed a petition for mandamus to compel the performance. As a general rule, acceptance perfects the contract. An exception is where acceptance has yet to meet certain conditions. In this case, there was no money for the contract. The Administrative Code provides that there can be no contract unless there is a sufficient appropriation as certified by the National Treasurer. SPECIAL FUNDS GASTON V. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK: Taxes were levied on sugar production for the purpose of creating the Sugar Stabilization Fund administered by Philsucom. Proceeds from the fund were used to capitalize Republic Planters Bank. Sugar producers petitioned the court to compel RPB and Philsucom to transfer the shares to the names of the producers, who are allegedly the true owners of the shares.
The fees collected were in the nature of a tax with a special regulatory purpose. Hence, they may be used only for a public purpose and the shares cannot be considered to be owned by private individuals. OSMEÑA V. ORBOS: The money collected to fund the OPSF is collected under the Police Power of the State. It is not a tax. Hence, it may be placed in a trust account rather than the special fund required by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the trust account is actually in the nature of a special fund. Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. FIRST LEPANTO V. CA: The Omnibus Investments Code provided for direct appeals to the SC from decisions of the BOI. This was done without the advice and concurrence of the SC and thus never became effective. The CA retains jurisdiction. DIAZ V. CA: The law creating the Energy Regulatory Board made its decisions appealable to the SC. This was done without the advice and concurrence of the SC and thus never became effective. The CA retains jurisdiction. FABIAN V. OMB DESIERTO: Appeals or special civil actions from a decision of the Ombudsman filed with the SC after 15 March 1999 shall no longer be referred to the CA and will be denied or dismissed. VILLAVERT V. DESIERTO: This was filed prior to 15 March 1999, it was referred to the CA. Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted. Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. SBMA V. COMELEC: Initiative: begun by the people; process of law-making without participation of Congress; process is more complex Referendum: begun by lawmakers; mere approval of what is proposed; simple (yes/no) Initiative, special requirements: 1. closely supervised by the COMELEC; 2. The ballots must be in proper form and language 3. A petition should not embrace more than one subject; but two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative 4. COMELEC cannot change substance or content of the proposed legislation 5. COMELEC should issue guidelines for proper exercise SANTIAGO V. COMELEC: Congress has not provided for the implementation of initiative and referendum to amend the Constitution. The Initiative and Referendum Law applies only to statutes.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
JUDICIAL POWER SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA: Courts could not take cognizance of a case involving the failure to grant honors to a student. The committee which granted honors did not exercise judicial or quasi judicial functions. There was nothing to review. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. PASAY TRANSIT: SC cannot be appointed as arbitrators. Problems: If judicial function, who can review their decision? If administrative function, they cannot lawfully perform. SC can exercise only judicial power. NOBLEJAS V. TEEHANKEE: SC has no power/jurisdiction to discipline officer belonging to another branch of government (Commissioner of Land Registration) even if the officer is being paid a salary equivalent to that of a judge. RADIOWEALTH V. AGREGADO: SC may also exercise powers that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice, such as acquisition of books and equipment. The expenses incurred may be questioned only if they are irregular, unnecessary, or extravagant. IN RE LAURETA: The Court’s authority to punish for contempt is linked to its right of selfpreservation. It must preserve its honor and dignity and protect itself against attacks as well as safeguard the ethics of the legal profession. IN RE BORROMEO: Borromeo is guilty of contempt for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS V. ANG CHO KIO: When it denied the petition for habeas corpus, the CA recommended that the petitioner be deported immediately. The CA had no power to give an advisory opinion or recommend executive action. ECHEGARAY V. SOJ: The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. The powers of the Executive (clemency), the Legislative (repeal), and the Judiciary (suspension of sentence) to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. The convict still possesses collateral rights which can be claimed in courts (i.e., if convict goes insane, he cannot be executed.) JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY •
Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
ADVISORY OPINION Velarde v. Social Justice Society: A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS petition does not allege a justiciable controversy; it merely poses the theoretical question of whether religious leaders may endorse candidates. DISTINGUISHED FROM DECLARATORY RELIEF Petitions for declaratory relief must be predicated on the following requisites: 1. There must be a justiciable controversy; 2. Between persons whose interests are adverse;
3. 4. •
Party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; The issue must be ripe. SC does not exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief (Tano v. Socrates)
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. MALAGA V. PENACHOS: A law prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions in cases of government infrastructure projects is valid. However, the injunctions will be unavailable only for discretionary acts or technical matters. Where non-compliance with bidding rules is alleged, injunction may be granted. Due process is a constitutional right. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) CASES or MATTERS heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the CASE shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. MUST BE HEARD EN BANC: 1. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law 2. Cases involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of PDs, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations; 3. Cases heard in a division where the required majority is not obtained; 4. Cases where the SC modifies or reverses a doctrine laid down en banc or in division; 5. Administrative cases where the vote is for dismissal of a judge or to discipline; 6. Election contests for P/VP. FORTICH V. CORONA: Only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. The rule does not apply where the required three votes are not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration, in which case, the decision is affirmed. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, modify , or affirm on appeal on certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW: 1. 2. 3. 4.
The existence of an actual and appropriate case; A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. RIPENESS
PACU V. SEC. OF EDUC.: Where the petitioning private schools are actually operating by virtue of permits issued to them by the Secretary of Education under Act No. 2706, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act. TAN V. MACAPAGAL: Petitioners questioned authority of the Constitutional Convention to revise the Constitution (instead of just amending). Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. STANDING LEGISLATORS: GONZALES V. MACARAIG: Constitutionality of veto. A member of the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit where a constitutional issue is raised. TAXPAYERS: PASCUAL V. SEC. PUBLIC WORKS: In cases involving the expenditure of public funds, a taxpayer has standing to sue if it can be shown that:
1. 2. •
He has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds; He will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Liberalized: Theory that the expenditure of public funds for an unconstitutional act is a misapplication of the funds which may be enjoined.
TWO THINGS TO CONSIDER IN TAXPAYERS’ SUIT: 1. SC has open discretion whether to entertain or not; 2. The action challenged must be the exercise of the spending or taxing power of congress. CITIZENS: •
Must be real party in interest – must show that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment.
JOYA V. PCGG: No standing to enjoin the sale; they are not the owners. The paintings belong to the Metropolitan Museum Foundation – the owners are thus the members of the corporation. The silverware is owned by the Marcoses, being personal gifts. KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO (strict rule which is no longer applicable): No standing. Kilos is composed of civic-minded citizens, etc. There are also senators who are suing. Though they had standing in the Guingona case, this is different. Guingona was a question of standing – a concern in constitutional law. In the present case, there is no allegation of mis-spending of public funds so as to make the action a public one and justify relaxation of the “real party in interest rule.” So who can prosecute this – the obmudsman. TELECOM V. COMELEC: Attorneys working in broadcast industry had no standing to question a law requiring free airtime from TV stations. TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: The SC may brush aside the rules on standing and take cognizance of the case where the issue to be decided is one of transcendental importance. [Oposa v. Factoran; Cruz v. Sec. DENR; Piatco v. Agan] EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY PEOPLE V. VERA (exception to the rule): In criminal cases, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below. POLITICAL QUESTION BAKER V. CARR: Guidelines to determine whether the question is political: 1. Textual – the question is clearly political from the text 2. Functional a. There is no judicially discoverable standard to resolve the issue b. Impossible to decide without an initial policy determination 3. Prudential a. Impossible to resolve without disrespecting b. Need for adherence to political decision c. Potentiality of embarassment ICMC V. CALLEJA: ICMC’s immunity was clearly established. It was granted the status of specialized agency by law and is entitled to diplomatic immunity under the U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies. IRRI’s immunity was also established. It was granted the status of an international organization by law. LIANG V. PEOPLE: Immunity was denied. It is not enough that immunity is asserted. The court can
look into the facts to determine whether the act is within the scope of immunity. Under the VCDR, no immunity if outside of official functions. EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY DE AGBAYANI V. PNB: Prior to declaration of unconstitutionality, a law is an operative fact with consequences which cannot be ignored. It gives rise to rights and obligations. In this case, the unconstitutional moratorium stayed the prescriptive period. QUESTION OF LAW CEBU WOMAN’S CLUB V. DE LA VICTORIA: An appeal to the SC by petition for review will be dismissed if it involves questions of fact. It cannot be treated as a special civil action under Rule 65 because alternative appeals are not allowed and the hierarchy of courts must be followed. CHANGE OF VENUE PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ: The lower court should’ve order the change of venue where it was shown that the safety of the witnesses would be better assured by the change. POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES IN RE CUNANAN: A law passed by Congress lowering the passing grade for the Bar and admitting flunkers is an unconstitutional usurpation of the powers of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. There is a distinction between the authority to promulgate rules concerning admission and the actual admission to practice. The first is legislative or quasi-legislative and in it the legislature had been given a revisory role subordinate to that of the SC. The application of the rules is traditionally a judicial function. Admission to the bar is a judicial function of the highest degree. It involves applying rules to a set of facts and making a decision. SANTERO V. CFI CAVITE: A law cannot be impaired by rules promulgated by the SC. PNB V. JUDGE ASUNCION: If Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. PEOPLE V. MATEO: Automatic review cases are often difficult to decide because there is sometimes a need for a factual determination. Thus, the SC laid down the rule that before going to the SC, the CA shall conduct an intermediate review of automatic review cases in order to clarify factual ambiguities. If affirmed, the SC will review. If reversed, the accused is acquitted. Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have the administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. MACEDA V. VASQUEZ: Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Court for a determination of whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. If the SC finds that it was administrative, then it shall have jurisdiction. If not, then the Ombudsman may prosecute. Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age and, must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. NITAFAN V. CIR: The present Constitution, has no express prohibition on income tax of members of the judiciary and simply prohibits a decrease in salary. An examination of the deliberations reveals a clear intent to subject the judiciary to income tax – just like the other co-equal branches. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. VARGAS V. RILLORAZA: Security of tenure is not limited to a guarantee against removal. The justice must be able to continue his tenure without interruption and that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities of said office. PEOPLE V. GACOTT: The power to discipline must be exercised en banc only in the following cases:
dismissal, suspension for one year, fine exceeding P10K. Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. AIRFRANCE V. CARRASCOSO: A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". FRANCISCO V. PERMSKUL: Memorandum decisions are valid under certain conditions. The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. This kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it. Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. DIZON V. JUDGE LOPEZ: A judgment must, according to the Rules of Court, contain the facts, a mere reading of the dispositive portion is insufficient. What Lopez rendered was a sin perjuicio judgment - a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary. ARTICLE XI Accountability of Public Officers Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Section 2 The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Who may be impeached?
Members of the Supreme Court
Members of the Constitutional Commissions
What are the grounds for impeachment? (1) Culpable violation of the Constitution – wrongful intentional disregard of the constitution; deliberate and motivated by bad faith (2) Treason – committed by any person owing allegiance to the Philippines who levies war against it or supports its enemies (3) Bribery – committed by a public officer who performs an act or omission in connection with his official functions in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, etc. (4) Other high crimes – like trason and bribery; so serious as to disrupt the order of government (5) Graft and corruption – prohibited acts enumerated in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (6) Betrayal of public trust – catch-all, dragnet clause; may include malfeasance, cronyism, negligence, etc.
Know the impeachment process: (1) Always initiated from the House of Representatives (2)Who files the verified complaint: (a) any Member of the House of Representatives or (b) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof. *A verified complaint is filed by the party with personal knowledge of the act complained of. (3) One-third of the House may affirm the articles of impeachment or override its contrary resolution. Votes shall be recorded. (4) If the impeachment is filed by 1/3 of the House, then #3 may be skipped. (5) The Senate shall try all impeachment cases. If the President is on trial, the Chief Justice shall preside but not vote. A conviction requires 2/3 vote of the senators. (6) Judgment of conviction results in removal from office and disqualification to hold office, without prejudice to prosecution, trial, and punishment after the impeachment (no double jeopardy). (7) The Congress shall promulgate rules to carry out impeachment. (8) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Francisco v. House June 2, 2003 – Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Davide and seven other justices for culpable violation of the constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It was endorsed by three congressmen and referred to the House Committee on August 5. It was dismissed on October 22 for being insufficient in substance. October 23, 2003 – an impeachment complaint, accompanied by a resolution of 1/3 of the House, was
filed with the Secretary General by Fuentebella, et al against Davide. The issue is whether the second complaint is barred by the one impeachment per year rule. The rules on impeachment of the 12th Congress state when impeachment is deemed initiated. Where it is a citizen or an individual member of the house who files a complaint, the proceedings are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the complaint is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn the Committee’s finding that it is not sufficient. Where the complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of the Members of the House, the proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of filing of the complaint with the Secretary General. HELD: Rules are unconstitutional – second complaint unconstitutional. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the SecretaryGeneral of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.” That the sponsor of the provision – Regalado – explained that the act of “initiating” included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word “initiate” as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. Also relied on were the ordinary meaning of the word “initiate” as well as the records of the deliberations – where initiation starts with the filing of the complaint – what the body does is only approval or disapproval. Father B makes the distinction between impeachment case and impeachment proceeding. Case is the legal controversy to be decided by the senate. Before a case goes to the senate, however, it must be initiated by the house – and this decision to initiate is arrived at by a proceeding. So it goes like this – the impeachment proceeding is initiated in three ways: citizen, congressman, 1/3 resolution; the impeachment case is initiated by a 1/3 vote of the house in favor of transmitting the articles of impeachment to the senate. What the constitution proscribes is the initiation of a proceeding twice in a year.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT Reasons for non-suability: (1) Based on the principle of the juridical and practical notion that the state can do no wrong (2) There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law upon which the right depends (3) To allow suit will impair its sovereign charter (4) To allow suit would waste the gov’t time and resources defending against actions How does the state give consent? (1)
Expressly a) When there is a law expressly granting authority to sue the state or any of its agencies
a) When the state enters into a private contract, unless the contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function b) When the state enters into an operation that is essentially a business operation, unless the business operation is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function c)
When the state sues a private party, unless the suit is entered only to resist a claim
Only duly authorized officer may give consent
When is a suit one against the state? (1) When the republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against ant unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government State immunity also applies to foreign states There have been several cases involving U.S. bases: Where case involved commercial contracts, immunity was not recognized. Where case involved acts in the performance of official duties, immunity was recognized. Paramount is the determination of what function was being exercised – governmental or proprietary. Unincorporated v. Incorporated
Unincorporated gov’t agencies (DOH, DPWH, DSWD, etc.) may not be sued unless they give express/implied consent
When an unincorporated gov’t agency enters into a contract which is proprietary, it disrobes itself of its sovereign mantle, descends to the level of private individuals, and subjects itself to suit
If the gov’t agency is incorporated (Makati City, DBP, PNB, etc.), its charter allows it to sue and be sued, but …
Suability is separate from liability An incorporated government agency may be sued pursuant to its charter but being made liable is something else:
An incorporated government agency cannot be made liable when performing its governmental function. It can only be made liable when performing a proprietary function.
An unincorporated agency is generally not liable.
Suits against state officers When sued in his private capacity – not suit against state, no consent needed When sued in his official capacity – generally a suit against the state but … A public officer may be sued without the state’s consent:
To require him to do a duty required by law
To restrain him from doing an act alleged to be unconstitutional or illegal
To recover from him taxes unlawfully assessed or collected
To recover from him only title or possession of property claimed to be held by him in his official capacity
It is a suit against the state and its consent is necessary if the state is required to perform an affirmative act, such as the appropriation to satisfy judgment. It is not a suit against the state and its consent is not needed if the officer, by himself alone, may comply with the court’s decision without the necessity of involving the state. What happens when state consents to be sued? Consent does not admit liability. It merely affords an individual the opportunity to ventilate his claim or allegation. If the state is found liable, government funds may not be foreclosed. Public funds or assets may be spent only for public purposes and only in accordance with an appropriation by law. Money claims against the state must be filed with the COA, which must act on the claim within 60 days of receipt. Special Agent Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Steps: (1) Who is the defendant? What is the nature of the agency? If incorporated, can sue and be sued; no consent is needed. If unincorporated, consent is needed (express/implied). If officer sued in official capacity, usually suit against state, unless officer along is capable of performing without positive act by the state. If officer sued in private capacity, not a suit against the state – no consent needed. (2) Now that you know if it can be sued or not, what is the extent of its liability if the suit is successful? If it is an incorporated agency, determine which function it was performing. If governmental, no liability is incurred; if proprietary, may be held liable. If unincorporated, generally not liable.
CASES: IMMUNITY FROM SUIT Liang v. People ADB Economist Charged in MTC with two counts of grave oral defamation against co-worker – Arrested MTC received “office of protocol” from DFA asserting Liang’s immunity under the agreement between the government and ADB MTC dismissed without notice to prosecution – MR denied Certiorari with RTC – ordered enforcement of warrant Certiorari with SC HELD: Court should not blindly adhere to DFA communication, which is only a preliminary determination Due process violated by dismissal without notice to prosecution Invocation of immunity does not ipso facto result in dropping of charges Must determine in what capacity Liang was acting He was not acting in official capacity – immunity does not cover acts not done in official capacity VCDR – immunity extends only to acts done within official functions
UNINCORPORATED AGENCIES Mobil v. Customs Arrastre Four cases of drills consigned to Mobil arrived in Manila Discharged into custody of Customs Arrastre Service Only three cases delivered Action for recovery of value filed by Mobil against the CAS and Bureau of Customs MTD – no juridical personality – cannot be sued TC held – cannot be sued Mobil contends that Customs is discharging a proprietary function by operating arrastre and is thus suable HELD: Not suable Suable are – natural persons, juridical persons, entities authorized by law to be sued – BoC is neither BoC is unit under DoF; CAS is unit under BoC Though non-governmental, the function is incident to a governmental function Primary function is assessing and collection – arrastre is a necessary incident because it enables agents to physically check whether declaration tallies with actual shipment Del Mar v. PVA Del Mar served as judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command during WWII After honorable discharge on disability, the PVB, PVA’s predecessor, granted him monthly life pension of P50 PVB discontinued payment four years later on the ground that Del Mar was receiving a similar pension from the US PVA raised the same defenses and asserted immunity from suit on the ground of its being an agency of the government performing governmental functions TC ruled in favor of Del Mar HELD: Suable GR – agencies of government performing governmental functions are not suable where suit would have adverse consequences on public treasury Exception – where claimant institutes action against functionary who fails to comply with statutory duty to release amount already appropriated by statute for claimant’s benefit – this is the case of Del Mar GOVERNMENT OFFICERS Ministerio v. CFI In 1927, the government took possession of ministerio’s property for the widening of a - no agreement was made, no compensation was paid In 1966, a complaint was filed for the payment of just compensation or recovery of property against the Public Highway Commissioner and Auditor General Respondents raise defense of immunity TC upheld immunity – stating that respondents were sued in their official capacities Certiorari to SC HELD: Must pay just compensation State is immune from suit, even if against officers, when litigation would result in burden to the government. But it is different where public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff – this is not a suit against the state Immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen Syquia v. Almeda-Lopez / Moore/Tillman
Syquias were co-owners of apartments in Manila 1945 - Three lease contracts were executed in favor of the USA for the duration of the war and 6 months after for billeting of US officers 1946 – 6 months after Japan surrendered, Syquias requested the return of the apartments but US wanted to keep them – Syquias requested renegotiation but US refused and said it would vacate by Feb 1947 Feb 1947 – US did not vacate – Syquias filed case for unlawful detainer after US failed to comply with demands TC held that the war had not terminated and the suit was against the US, which had not given its consent – suggested that diplomatic route be availed of CFI affirmed Mandamus to compel TC to assume jurisdiction Though moot because of vacation and payment, case still decided as a guide HELD: No jurisdiction Though against the officer, it is actually against the US gov’t, which would have to pay in the end The officers named in the complaint weren’t even the ones who executed the contract It has been held that though an action recovery of property unlawfully taken or kept may be brought against the state, where the suit involves the payment of money, the doctrine of immunity from suit comes into play Dissent. Perfecto, J. Suable – contract with private citizens Shauf v. CA Loida Shauf, a Filipina married to a US serviceman, applied for the position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office of CAB – she is eminently qualified – Rejected Shauf availed herself of administrative remedies, writing the US Civil Service (which found the person selected to be unqualified) and the Base Commander – a hearing was scheduled Before the base hearing was concluded, She filed an equal opportunity complaint against the officials of the BEO in Angeles RTC MTD – as officers of the USARMY performing official functions – immunity RTC ruled in favor of Shauf, ordering payment of $40k and P100k CA Reversed HELD: Suable. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. Respondent showed arbitrariness in selecting a person to fill the position. He did not follow procedure – preference should be given to locally available applicants. Person chosen from abroad did not even meet the US CSC minimum educational requirement. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT Baer v. Tizon Gener filed a complaint with the CFI to enjoin Baer, Commander of Subic Base, from preventing him from continuing with his logging operations. It appears that Gener was cutting trees within the naval base. TRO was issued. MTD – lack of jurisdiction – official act of Baer. Gener claims that a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government. MTD denier/MR denied.
Certiorari with SC. HELD: Immunity. It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. What was sought by private respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any government - the defense of the state - is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act. Baer does not possess immunity – he may be proceeded against in his personal capacity. US v. Ruiz Subic Base invited bidders for work to be done in the base Eligio de Guzman and Co. submitted bids. They received two telegrams requesting confirmation of price proposal and name of bonding company. EGC later received a letter informing that they did not qualify and that the project had been awarded to a third party. EGC sued members of the Engineering Command of the USN to allow it to perform the work or, if no longer possible, to pay damages. MTD – immunity. TC issued injunction to prevent contracts with third parties. It held that immunity does not exist where the state enters into a contract with a private person. Certiorari to SC. HELD: Immunity. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International, Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been, necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an Integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. Sanders v. Veridiano Rossi and Wyer were gameroom attendants in Subic. Their employment status was changed from fulltime to part-time. They protested this change and the hearing officer recommended reinstatement to full-time status. Their immediate superior, Sanders, wrote Moreau, the CO, disagreeing with the hearing officer’s recommendation and giving reasons such as the difficulty of the two attendants. Moreau then wrote the Chief of Naval Personnel to explain the change of status and requesting concurrence. The attendants filed a complaint for damages alleging that the letters were libelous and that they were prejudged. MTD – immunity. MTD denied. CPM with SC.
HELD: Immunity. The letters were sent in their official capacities. Sanders wrote the letter upon request by Moreau for more information. Moreau wrote his letter as immediate superior of Sanders and the letter included other matters – budgetary, etc. Where it is clear from the pleadings that immunity lies, then the TC should dismiss the case. It would be unfair to conduct a trial. Minucher v. CA Minucher was a refugee from the Iranian government. He was befriended by Scalzo. They met several times – Scalzo bought caviar and carpets from him. One day, when Scalzo was at Minucher’s house, Scalzo invited Minucher outside to meet his “cousin.” When Minucher stepped out, he was accosted by police. It turns out Scalzo was an agent of the US DEA. Minucher filed a civil case for damages against Scalzo for trumped up charges of drug trafficking. Scalzo moved for an extension of time to file an answer. He then filed a motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction (must’ve been out of the Philippines). TC held that filing of a motion for extension was voluntary appearance. MR denied. CA affirmed. At TC level, two years after the case was filed, Scalzo filed a MTD on the ground that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. TC denied. CA sustained diplomatic immunity and ordered dismissal. SC reversed on the ground that the authenticity of the diplomatic note was not established and there were sufficient allegations that Scalzo acted in his personal capacity. TC ruled in favor of Minucher – damages. Though diplomatic immunity was recognized – Scalzo’s acts were beyond. CA reversed – Scalzo was immune from civil and criminal jurisdiction VCDR. Certiorari to SC. HELD: Immune. Not diplo but state. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. The documents presented by Scalzo (claiming to be assistant attaché of diplomatic mission) were issued ante litem motam and are not given credence. But the suit is against him in his official capacity and it is thus a suit against the US without its consent. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. CONSENT BY LAW Carabao Inc. v. Agricultural Productivity Commission Carabao filed an action for P238k representing the unpaid price of 300 fire extinguishers it sold to the APC. It alleged that it had presented a claim for payment with the AG, who failed to act on it within two months, and, pursuant to Act 3038, he now had the consent of the state to be sued. The AG actually denied the claim, but four months after it was filed, on the ground that there was no instrument and the extinguishers were overpriced.
"Sec. 1. Subject to die provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. "Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has prosecuted his claim to the Auditor General and the latter did not decide the same within two months front the date of its presentation. The TC dismissed on the ground that Act 3038 was no longer good law. HELD: Pursuant to CA327, the current rule is that if the AG fails to act on the claim within 60 days, mandamus is the remedy. And a party aggrieved by a decision has the remedy of appeal by petition for review with the SC. Act 3038 remains the general consent to be sued and provides the bar on execution. Arcega v. CA Arcega filed a complaint against PNB for the recovery of P18k of unauthorized payments made in the concept of special excise tax of foreign exchange which she purchased in connection with her icecream business. She imported ingredients, packaging, spoons, and machinery. MTD – suit against the government – financial charge TC dismissed. MR denied. CA affirmed. Certiorari to SC. HELD: The suability of the CB is manifested in the consent to be sued in its charter, which directs that refund of taxes be made by the CB. This is true even if the amounts involved have already been turned over to the National Treasury. Remanded to determine whether Arcega is entitled to refund. Rayo v. CFI/NAPOCOR During the onslaught of typhoon Kading, NPC opened all three floodgates of Angat dam, which resulted in sudden flooding of Bulacan towns, especially Norzagaray. Eleven complaints for damages were filed in the CFI. NPC’s answer argues that it performs a purely governmental function and thus cannot be sued without its consent. CFI dismissed. MR denied. CFI held that the provision in the charter allowing NPC to sue and be sued pertains only to corporate functions and not to tort. HELD: May be sued. NPC is a private corporation, which under its charter may be sued – without qualification on the cause of action. AGENCY PROPRIETY US v. Guinto This is consolidated petition involving cases filed against US officers. Barbershop – Private respondents were bidders for a contract for barbershop services to be rendered on base. In fact, some of them had already been rendering said services for several years. The concessionaires paid the US gov’t commission on earnings. Suable. The RPUS agreement does not cover commercial services such as this one. This was proprietary. Urine soup – A cook at the recreation center in John Hay was dismissed for urinating in soup. The decision to dismiss him was done in accordance with procedure in the CBA. Suable but dismissed because action was justified. The activity is proprietary – it is even open to the public. Buybust – A barracks boy was arrested following a buybust operation in CAB. A complaint was filed against him in the RTC and the arresting officers testified at his trial. He filed a complaint for
damages. They were in the exercise of their official functions, discharging their duties as agents of the US. 2180 of the Civil Code applies only to liability once suability is determined. Answer filed by counsel is not a waiver of immunity, which can only be effected by statute. Dog – A complaint for damages was filed alleging that servicemen beat complainant up and let their dogs loose on him. Servicemen say he was arrested for theft and was bitten while resisting arrest. Insufficient facts on record. Lower court must first determine facts. WAIVER Republic v. Purisima Yellow Ball Freight filed an action for collection against the Rice and Corn Administration alleging breach of contract. MTD – immunity citing Mobil. HELD: Immune. Rationale – smooth function of government. Not unjust - parties may file money claims with the AG. Apparently, the TC judge was misled by the terms of the contract, which he thought anticipated breach and thus consented to suit. The consent. to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. Santiago v. Republic Santiago filed an action in the CFI against the Republic, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. He demanded revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse with the bureau as donee, alleging that certain conditions were not fulfilled (installation of lights, water, building, parking lot). CFI – granted MTD on non-suability Certiorari with SC. HELD: Suability. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to have violated the conditions under which it received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put as a barrier the concept of nonsuitability. That would be a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's sense of justice. Fortunately, the constitutional provision itself allows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. In Ministerio – suability was allowed to prevent injustice. There is an analogy here. Where the government originally benefited from the transaction (taking of land/donation), its failure to comply with what the law or an agreement requires should not be a bar to an action. This decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. Philrock v. Board of Liquidators: Even when the government has been adjudged liable in a suit to which it has consented, it does not necessarily follow that the judgment can be enforced by execution against its funds for every disbursement of public funds must be covered by a corresponding appropriation passed by the Legislature. A judgment against the State, in a case where it consents to be sued, simply implies that the Legislature will recognize the judgment as final and make provision for its satisfaction.
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
Distinguish constituent power from legislative power: Constituent power: Power to formulate a Constitution or to propose amendment or revisions and to ratify such proposal Exercised by: o
Congress by constitutional conferment
Ultimately by the sovereign people
Legislative power: Power to pass, repeal or amend ordinary laws Exercised by: o
The sovereign people through initiative and referendum
Distinguish between amendment and revision: Amendment – alteration of one or a few specific and isolated provisions of the constitution; improve or add provisions or suppress existing ones Revision – fundamental alteration; re-examination of the entire document or of an important cluster of provisions with the end result affecting several provisions of the constitution Constitutional Convention
Members elected from representative districts to propose amendments Nature of the Constitutional Conventions: a) 4th branch of gov’t b) supreme over other branches of gov’t (the people themselves in their sovereign capacity) c)
Inferior to Congress (creation of Congress) – MOST ACCEPTABLE
Procedure: Amendment: a) Proposed by Congress upon a ¾ vote of all of its members b) A constitutional convention c)
The people upon petition of at least 12% of the electorate with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters
Revision: a) Proposed by Congress upon a ¾ vote of all of its members b) A constitutional convention Constitutional Convention: a) Called by Congress by a 2/3 vote of all its members b) Congress may submit the decision to the people by a majority vote of all its members Ratification: Proposal for amendment/revision by Congress/constitutional commission Valid when ratified by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held 60-90 days after approval of the amendment or revision. Proposal for amendment by initiative Valid when ratified by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held 60-90 days after certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition. IMBONG V. COMELEC (CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY) In 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 2, which called for a concon to propose amendments. There were to be two delegates from each representative district who must have the same qualifications as congressmen. Congress, as a legislative body, then enacted RA4914, implementing Resolution No. 2. In 1969, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4, which amended Resolution No. 2 by providing that there shall be a total of 320 delegates apportioned among the districts in accordance with the number of inhabitants. It also provided that any detail left to be filled shall be done so by implementing legislation. RA6132 was then enacted, repealing RA4914 and implementing Resolutions 2 and 4. Gonzales and Imbong assail the constitutionality of RA6132. HELD: Congress validly enacted the implementing legislation pursuant to a delegation by itself acting as a Constituent Assembly. 1.Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments or call a convention for the purpose. Resolutions 2 and 4, which called for a concon, were passed with the required 3/4 vote. 2.The power to call a concon includes by implication all other powers essential to its exercise such as powers to fix qualification, number, apportionment, and other details.
3.Though it is Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly which has the power to call a concon, the power to enact implementing details is not restricted to the Constituent Assembly – this may be done by Congress acting as a legislative body. Legislative power encompasses all matters not withdrawn by the Constitution. 4.Where there are detail left to fill, Congress as a legislative body may fill them up. This was expressly recognized by Resolutions 2 and 4. 5.That the president can veto the implementing details is inconsequential because the veto may be overridden or the Constituent Assembly may reconvene and fill the details itself. A. Representation: There are to b 320 delegates, apportioned among districts in proportion to their population with each district having at least two delegates. This is constitutional. Though it is not exact, and some small districts may be in theory overrepresented, does not make the representation unproportional, because absolute proportional representation is not required. The constitution does not even require that representation to a concon be proportional. What cannot be done, however, is apportionment which is inversely proportional, as was ruled in Macias. B. Deprivation of liberty without due process / denial of equal protection: Delegates are disqualified from running for office or assuming appointive positions until the adjournment of the concon. Constitutional exercise of police power. The overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people, otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. Plus, it is only temporary. The equal protection clause is not violated because the discrimination is based on substantial conditions. C. Prohibition on any candidate or delegate from representing a party; prohibition on organizations from supporting candidates. Constitutional exercise of police power. The objective is to have delegates who are independent and thus representative of the people and not of his organization or party. The right of affiliation is very narrowly restricted and the candidate may still seek support of his relatives within the 4th degree.
Ratification and date of effectivity Gonzales v. COMELEC (nature of power to amend the Constitution) Assailed here on the grounds of unconstitutionality are RA 4913 (submitting to the people for approval amendments proposed by Congress) and House Resolutions 1 and 3 pursuant to which the RA was passed (the amendments are for an increase in seats in the House, the removal of the rule on apportionment every three years, and the removal of the rule stating that delegates to a concon forfeit their House seats). Gonzales filed an action for prohibition to restrain the COMELEC, the Director of Printing, and the Auditor General from complying with the RA. Philconsa simply seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality. Gonzales asserts that: (1) ratification should be at a special, not a general election; (2) the RA was not passed with 3/4 vote required to propose amendments to the constitution; (3) the ballots should show the current provisions and the proposed amendments. HELD: Constitutional. Justiciability: Though in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, the question of whether a 3/4 vote was obtained to submit the proposed amendment for ratification was held to be a political question, the doctrine has since then shifted. The nature of the power to propose amendments is not legislative – it is inherent power of the sovereign people exerciseable only by Congress because the Constitution allows it. Authority emanating from the Constitution, it must be exercised in accordance with the same, and this may be inquired into by the court. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. Merits: (1) Special election – All the constitution requires is that ratification be at an election. It does not qualify. Though it may be better if such an important matter had the undivided attention of the people, such an issue concerns the wisdom of the law. (2) 3/4 vote to pass the RA – A 3/4 vote is needed to propose amendments. Congress, as a Constituent Assembly, complied with this requirement when it passed the resolutions. The RA deals only with submitting the amendments to the people. The Constitution is silent on this matter and it is deemed to be within the residual powers of Congress. It being a law, majority vote is sufficient. (3) Due process – There is no need to indicate the present wording of the Constitution. The people are conclusively presumed to know it. Though it might be better, this again refers to the wisdom of the law.
Tolentino v. COMELEC (Single election) The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions by Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly. The delegates were elected by virtue of the law enacted to fill in the details of the two resolutions (see Imbong). The concon passed Organic Resolution No. 1, which proposed an amendment to lower the voting age to 18. It was stated in the resolution that this was a partial amendment and without prejudice to other amendments to be proposed in the future by the concon. President Macapagal asked the COMELEC to support this plebiscite and the COMELEC complied. This petition for prohibition was filed to restrain the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite on the ground that the concon’s resolution is void. HELD: Void. Justiciability: The justiciability of this controversy was upheld on the same reasoning used in Gonzales v. COMELEC. The concon owes its existence to the Constitution and its acts must be in accordance with the fundamental law. Merits: The language of the constitutional provision is clear. It says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purposes may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt. as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocally says "an election" which means only one. The wisdom behind having only one election is so that the people may see the whole of what they are being asked to ratify. Piecemeal amendments do not allow the people to see the big picture because an earlier amendment may completely change in meaning and effect by the ratification of a subsequent one. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS Foreign Military Bases, Troop, or Facilities Bayan v. Zamora 1947 – Military Bases Agreement between RP and US formalized the use of Philippine territory by US personnel. 1951 – Mutual Defense Treaty – Parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, etc. 1991 – Senate rejected the extension of the MBA. 1998 – Ramos approved the VFA; Estrada ratified
1999 – Senate concurred with VFA The VFA provides for the mechanism of regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Sec. 21 of Art. VII provides: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” Sec. 25 of Art. XVIII states that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” Petitioners brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Standing – though no injury; not a taxpayers suit – transcendental importance Merits – The VFA is valid. Art. XVIII applies. The VFA deals with foreign military troops being allowed in the Philippines. Hence, the requirements must be met: (1) treaty; (2) concurred in by 2/3 of the Senate [applying the general provision on treaty concurrence]; (3) if Congress requires, ratified by the people; (4) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. The existence of a treaty and its ratification by the Senate by a 2/3 vote are not disputed. A referendum is unnecessary because the Congress did not require it. The last requirement is that the agreement be recognized as a treaty by the United States. Petitioners contend that the VFA must have passed the constitutional processes for treaty making in the US and should not be considered merely an executive agreement. But as long as the agreement possesses the elements of an agreement in under international law, it can be treated as a treaty. Under the VCLT, a treaty is an international written instrument between states, governed by international law, embodied in one or more instruments, whatever its designation. There are many other names used for a treaty, such as agreement, convention, declaration, exchange of notes (which was what happened here, I think). Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned. In the Philippines, the Executive, and not the Congress, has the power to enter into agreements and even ratify treaties. Congress’ role is merely to give or withhold concurrence. And even if concurrence is withheld, the treaty will be binding, according to generally accepted principles of international law.
Sequestration orders Republic v. Sandiganbayan (powers of the PCGG) On the basis of prima facie evidence, PCGG issued an order sequestering the Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation (PIMECO). The Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against the Marcoses, respondent herein Sabido, and other individuals for reconveyance, restitution, accounting, etc. involving PIMECO, alleging that PIMECO was illegally acquired by the defendants. Sabido denied the charges. Sabido, upon hearing that PIMECO’s management, control and possession would be transferred by the PCGG to the Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines, a subsidiary of the PCGG, filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan to determine whether the rumors were true. Without waiting for PCGG’s response, because of a news article stating that the transfer had been made, Sabido petitioned the Sandiganbayan to declare the transfer void for being without authority – a TRO was issued, and Sabido’s application for injunction was granted on MR. PCGG filed this petition. HELD: The projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP is unwarranted and was effected or done by petitioner beyond the scope of the powers vested upon it by law. Such turnover made by the PCGG
is equivalent to the performance of an act of ownership which PCGG cannot exercise. The PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker and can exercise only powers of administration over sequestered properties. Thus, it can only do acts necessary to fulfill its mission to conserve sequestered assets. In certain cases, such as business enterprises which were taken over by the Marcoses and their cronies, the take-over by the PCGG connotes more than mere physical custody; it may exercise some measure of control in the operation of the business. But in his special situation, the intrusion into management should be restricted to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish the legislative will, which is 'to prevent the disposal or dissipation' of the business enterprise. There should be no hasty, indiscriminate, unreasoned replacement or substitution of management officials or change of policies, particularly in respect of viable establishments. In fact, such a replacement or substitution should be avoided if at all possible, and undertaken only when justified by demonstrably tenable grounds and in line with the stated objectives of the PCGG. And it goes without saying that where replacement of management officers may be called for, the greatest prudence, circumspection, care and attention should accompany that undertaking to the end that truly competent, experienced and honest managers may be recruited. There is no need to replace PIMECO’s management to prevent wastage or dissipation. In fact, the current management has steered the company from inoperation to a top 1000 corporation. PIMECO was even awarded the best managed PCGG sequestered firm.