Constitutional Law 1 (Case Digest 2) - Power of Judicial Review

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Constitutional Law 1 (case digest 2) - power of judicial review The following case digests are not mine, I got it from different sites (sources are linked: I haven't found the full text of some of the cases compiled here). *please correct me if I included wrong cases. I might have mislooked because it's too many! (whew) haha. "The law is reason free from passion" -Aristotle Keep our passion burning JD1A :) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Power of Judicial Review -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) Facts On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.” Issues Does Madbury has the right to commission? Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall) Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate

jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction. Disposition Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.]

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents. Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition (2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the

subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be

entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least onethird of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of

Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Political vs. Justiciable Question -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Summary of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). Facts Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Baker’s complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question and would therefore not be heard by the court. Issues Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment? What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question? Holding and Rule (Brennan) Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question are: Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)? Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue? The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.

Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made? Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question? The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the case. The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches. See Brown v. Board of Education for a constitutional law case brief featuring an interpretation and application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in an opinion involving segregation in public schools.

Sources: http://www.lawnix.com/cases/baker-carr.html *I wasn't able to find the full text of this case -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nixon v. United States 506 U.S.224, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Author: Lindsey Relevant Law Art. I § 3 cl. 6: “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments”. Facts P, a former federal judge, was convicted of a crime and sent to jail. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, the Senate appointed a committee to hear evidence for the impeachment hearing. The committee then presented the evidence to the entire Senate. Senate voted to impeach. Procedural History

P appealed to the SC on the ground that Rule XI is unconstitutional because it violates Art. I § 3 cl. 6, which gives the Senate the authority to “try” all impeachments. P argues that the framers meant “try” to imply that the Senate was to conduct the hearing in the nature of a judicial trial, and this didn’t happen because Rule XI prohibits the whole Senate from taking part in the evidentiary hearings. Issue Is Rule XI in conflict with Art. I § 3 cl. 6 of the Constitution, which requires Senate impeachment hearings to be conducted in the nature of a judicial trial? Can the SC review such a case or is in nonjudiciable because it is a political question? Holding No. Reasoning Reason why the word “try” doesn’t have the meaning P claims: The word “try” has a very broad set of meanings. The word lacks the precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review Further, there are three very specific limitations on the impeachment trials set forth in the constitution (members must be under oath, 2/3rds majority vote, chief justice must preside when president is on trial). Since these limitations are precise, the Framers probably didn’t intend additional limitations by inserting “try”. Additional reasons why the Court shouldn’t review impeachment proceedings: The word “sole” as found in Art. I § 3 cl. 6 is meant to emphasize the fact that the Senate alone should have the power to decide whether a person should be impeached. Reasons why the framers didn’t give the Court the power to review: Framers doubted if SC would possess the degree of authority needed (vs. the legislature which is appointed by the people) The SC is too small in number

The Framers realized that there would probably be two trials (criminal trial and impeachment trial) and didn’t want to vest all the power in the judiciary Judicial review would be inconsistent with Framer’s insistence on checks and balances Lack of finality that would result if the Senate’s impeachment decision was reviewable by the judiciary (months of additional litigation) Reasons why there is no risk that the Senate will abuse their power: The impeachment power is divided between the House and the Senate A 2/3rds majority vote is required Why the Powell case doesn’t apply: P claimed that a holding of nonjusticiability cannot be reconciled with the opinion in Powell. But, in Powell there was a specific limit on the Houses’ determination of “qualification” (the three qualifications). In the Nixon case, the majority contends that there is no specific meaning on the word “try” that can be judicially reviewable. Judgment Affirmed. Stevens/White concurring: Agrees that the impeachment was valid but doesn’t think the problem is nonjusticiable. Yes, the word “try” means to conduct proceedings in the nature of a judicial trial, but the Senate fulfilled this requirement so the impeachment is valid. Also, relying on the word “sole” is not a good reason for giving up the right to review impeachment hearings. In a system of checks and balances, the Framers would not have given Congress this powerful tool of impeachment but at the same time rendered it one of the few areas in which it is not subject to judicial review. (In fact, “sole” is meant to refer to interference from the House). Finally, the word “try” is not as vague as the majority would have. Indeed, it does provide an identifiable and judicially manageable standard. Further, in the Commerce clause (Art. I § 8 cl.3) there’s similarly vague language but we still find it judicially reviewable. He doesn’t actually decide the question of justiciability, he puts it off for a case in which they actually have to decide whether its justiciable.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Goldwater v. Carter 444 U.S. 996, 100 S.Cr. 533 (1979) Facts: Senator Barry Goldwater and other senators filed suit against President Carter because they questioned the constitutionality of Carter’s decision to terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan without approval from the Senate. No congressional action was ever taken after the Senate considered a resolution which would require the President to get the Senate’s approval. Question: Did the President’s action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan, deprive Congress their constitutional role of changing the law? Yes. Is this issue a non-justiciable political question? Yes.

Opinion of the Court: By Justice Powell The court decided that this issue is not “ripe” for Judicial Review until all branches of government takes action asserting its constitutional authority. Judicial branch should not decide on political issues between the President and Congress because it is not a legal consideration. Although Senate considered a resolution, no final vote has been taken on the resolution (it can’t be said that either the Senate or House has rejected the President’s claim) Dissent by Justice Rehnquist: The issue presented in the case is a “nonjusticiable political question.” Reliance on the political question doctrine is inconsistent with the court’s precedents. Even though the Court can’t review political questions, the court has power to review whether a branch has decision making power over an issue.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. Facts On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a nationalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martiallaw, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous PresidentialDecree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting andcanvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the peoplein the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that thepeople's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire tohave such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interimlegislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National Referendum-Plebiscite.Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition withPreliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend thatunder the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise theconstituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was institutedby Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power topropose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of theConstitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a

majority vote of all its Members, submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of suchamendment or revision. "In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of allits Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shallinitially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace andorder in the country.When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they wereaware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when hecould convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of theinterim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution wassubmitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold theconvening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, becausesome of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemedautomatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment toa Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged inthe amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for

theinterim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for thenation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approvalof the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approveor disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do withproposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” ISSUE: Is Arroyo's administration legitimate? HELD: FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the

scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .” The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President. a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. “If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. “The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) “I just want to clear my name, then I will go.” The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation. c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of

reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES” Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. petitioner, vs. J OSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ, TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, petitioners-in-intervention, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS: Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation the results of national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila. Petitioners in this case questioned, among others, the Constitutionality of the quickcount as being pre-emptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and VicePresident under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Can the COMELEC conduct “unofficial” tabulation of presidential election results based on

a copy of the election returns? RULING: No. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is “unofficial,” is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Presumption of Constitutionality -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995 FACTS: The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by theFirst Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based ona finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much lesslack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. JudgePacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTCof Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which wereassailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S.Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044: a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC). b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim toexplain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994. c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC). -The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment renderedon 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.

-On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executivesecretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Gamesand Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. tohold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to AssociatedDevelopment Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the Cityof Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved:1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by localgovernments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional. 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise toAssociated Development Corporation, whether thefranchise granted is valied considering that thefranchise has no duration, and appears to be grantedin perpetuity.3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issuea Jai-Alai franchise to Associated DevelopmentCorporation on 7 September 1971 in view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 whichtransferred from local governments to the Gamesand Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai. -The national government contends that ManilaOrdinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADCa franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No. 954 , approved on20 June 1953, or very much earlier than saidOrdinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7 September1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for theoperation of jai-alai. Additionally, the nationalgovernment argues that even assuming, arguendo, that the above mentioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise wasnonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No.771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate allforms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued bylocal governments. -On the other hand, ADC's position is that OrdinanceNo. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manilapursuant to its delegated powers under it charter,Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails theconstitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equalprotection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.In this connection, counsel for ADC contends that this Courtshould really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able todetermine whether ADC continues to possess a validfranchise. ISSUE: WON the Associated Development Corporation has a validfranchise to maintain and operate jaialai. HELD -NO. Respondent ADC does not possess the requiredcongressional franchise to operate and conduct the jai-alai under RA 954 and PD 771. -Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power"to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, butretained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, withrespect to wagers or

betting, was the power to "license,permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license orpermit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager orbetting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets areaccepted, would not amount to something meaningfulUNLESS the holder of the permit or license was alsoFRANCHISED by the national government to so operate.Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulatewagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from localgovernments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises forthe operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while theregulatory function is vested in the GAB. Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license orpermit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the Cityof Manila. Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislativepowers under Section 18. A perusal of the powersenumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers arebasically regulatory in nature. The regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of theenumerations under Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56). In Vera , this Court declared that a law which gives theProvincial Board the discretion to determine whether or nota law of general application (such as, the Probation law-ActNo. 4221) would or would not be operative within theprovince, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegationof legislative power. The relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 andOrdinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it shouldthen be clear that the legislative powers of the MunicipalBoard should be understood to be regulatory in nature andthat Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises , as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Requisites of Judicial Review -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. Actual case or controversy -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. Colet G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996 Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who granted the writof preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the herein petitioners in enforcing and implementing the Revised Optometry Law or anyregulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.

Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled “ An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes"otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995.”Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; 2. that RA No. 8050violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and 4. that it is violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press.Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770,merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession andhome addresses.As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents have no legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that the implementation of thequestioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the questioned law. The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The court was inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thus, herein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050. Ruling: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personalityseparate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP,COA, ACMO, and SMOAP.

For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses.Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that factsshowing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations."For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to bedevoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition.Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Thus, petitioners’ prayer is granted. The questioned order rendered by the Regional Trial Court granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulled and set aside. Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the lawgrants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYANOF MAKATI, respondents. FACTS: A petition for prohibition and declaratory relief against R.A. No. 7854, "An ActConverting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known asthe City of Makati," was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of thepetitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail asunconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854. ISSUES:

Whether sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are unconstitutional. RULING: The court finds no merit in the petition.Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 clearly stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Hence, the territorial bounds need not be made in metes and bounds with technical description and does not violate sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code. Also, at the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. The contention on the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 was not entertained by the court since it did not comply the requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law which are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events which this Court has no jurisdiction and nor are they proper parties to raise this abstract issue.On the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. 7854, which declares the addition of another legislative district in Makati, the court refers to the case of Tobias vs.Abalos. In said case, the court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). There isalso no merit in the contention of the title of the bill that it should expressly state the addition of a legislative district. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its detailsso as not to impede legislation. Hence, the court ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. Sources:

Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* I wasn't able to find Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GR NO. 127872 JANUARY 27, 2004 LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSN., vs. DENR FACTS: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical orfinancial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreignproponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources."Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as thePHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulationsissued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc.(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws. ISSUE:Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, andutilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limit ed to “technical” or “financial” assistance only? RULING:Accordingly, following the literal text of the Constitution provided by Section 2, ArticleXII, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to"technical" or "financial" assistance only. Thus, R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical agreements" in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. Sources: Full text of case Case digest

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 US 95, 75 L.Ed.2d 675

Brief information about the case: 461 U.S. 95 (1983) was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the plaintiff, Adolph Lyons, lacked standing to challenge the city police department's alleged chokehold policy. Lyons, an African American, had been subjected to a chokehold after being stopped for a traffic violation. He sought both compensatory damages for the chokehold, and declaratory and injunctive relief against the department's chokehold policy (he introduced evidence that from 1975 to 1983, sixteen people, including twelve African Americans, had been killed by police chokeholds). In an opinion authored by Justice White, the Court held, 5-4, that Lyons had failed to allege a sufficiently plausible threat of future injury to have standing for an injunction; Lyons did, however, have standing for his damages action, since this was retrospective and the injury--being subjected to the chokehold--was concrete and particular. The decision helps establish the principle that a plaintiff must meet a standing requirement for each form of relief sought. Justice Marshall's dissent argued that the majority's test would immunize from review any widespread policy that deprives constitutional rights when individuals cannot show with certainty that they would be subject to a repeat violation. He also argued that the Court's traditional rule did not distinguish different forms of relief for standing purposes. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_Los_Angeles_v._Lyons -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RANDOLF DAVID, et al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al.G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424,3 May 2006, Facts: Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA PeoplePower I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow thegovernment, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of nationalemergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group andtheir audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in thePhilippine Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, sheissued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the

suppression andprevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual bases forthe issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites inBulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers;and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs andactivities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies.Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David,Akbayan party-list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories,documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya , and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante . The PNP warned that it would take overany media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.”On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the present petitions moot and academic; 2.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing; 3.) Whether or not there were factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017; 4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration of Martial Law 5.) Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates unto the President the power to legislate; 6.) Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the President to take over privately-owned publicutility or business affected with public interest; and 7.) Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional HELD: The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic because all the exceptions to the “moot and academic” principle are present. The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuadethe courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)thereis a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)the exceptional character of the situation and theparamount public interest is involved; (3)the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All these exceptions are present here. It is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raisedaffect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to the freedoms of expression,of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench andthe bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection givenby constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, thepresent petitions are subject to judicial review. All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental importance of the issue involved. It has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (a)the cases involve constitutional issues; (b)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (d)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. The question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. In view of thetranscendental importance of this issue, all the petitioners are declared to have locus standi . There were sufficient factual bases for the President’s exercise of her calling-out power,which petitioners did not refute.

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (338 SCRA 81 [2000]), the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.Nonetheless, the Court stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” Under the expanded power of judicial review, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of the power, Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971]) adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners did not refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely an invocation of the President’scalling-out power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a“sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus , and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,”the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to takeover privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.It is plain in the wordings of PP 1017 that what President Arroyo invoked was her callingout power. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts

that can be done only under a valid declaration of Martial Law. Specifically, arrests and seizures without RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW judicial warrants, ban on public assemblies, take-over of news media and agencies and presscensorship, and issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the Presidentas Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." The operative clause of PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which gave former President Marcos legislative power. The ordinance power granted to President Arroyo under the Administrative Code of 1987 is limited to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders,memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.She cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws. She can only order the military,under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise itspowers, the framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (a)there must be a war or otheremergency; (b)the delegation must be for a limited period only; (c)the delegation must be subject tosuch restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (d)the emergency powers must be exercised tocarry out a national policy declared by Congress. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to her

pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of national emergency and her authority to exercise emergency powers. Her authority to declare a state of national emergency is granted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW The illegal implementation of PP 1017, through G.O. No. 5, does not render these issuance unconstitutional. The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essentialbasis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. PP 1017 islimited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence,invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issuePP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conductillegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights. But when in implementing itsprovisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate thecitizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.David, et al. were arrested without a warrant while they were exercising their right topeaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear andpresent danger that warranted the limitation of that right. Likewise, the dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al. were unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basisof Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits to hold rallies. The wholesale cancellation of allpermits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited,much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the Statehas a right to prevent.” Furthermore, the search of the Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only that,the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. It cannot be denied that the CIDG operativesexceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” The phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism.Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into

offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Summary of DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1974). Facts Petitioner DeFunis, a white applicant to the University of Washington law school, sued the Board of Regents of the University of Washington in state court after he was denied admission. DeFunis alleged that the law school discriminated against applicants of certain races and ethnicities, including whites, by admitting minority applicants with significantly lower undergraduate grades and LSAT scores. DeFunis maintained that his rejection was predicated on racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted DeFunis injunctive relief and ordered the law school to admit him. When DeFunis was in his second year of law school, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that the admissions policy was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States granted DeFunis’ petition for a writ of certiorari and stayed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington pending final disposition of the case. The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States for a full hearing when DeFunis was in his final year of law school. Although the law school assured that it would allow DeFunis to graduate regardless of the Court’s decision, both parties contended that mootness did not exist to block formal adjudication of the matter. Issue Can a case be adjudicated when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking due to mootness, if adjudication of the suit would resolve an important social issue? Holding and Rule No. When a federal court’s determination of a legal issue is no longer necessary to compel the result originally sought, the case is moot and federal courts lack the power to hear it. The constitutional basis of the mootness doctrine is found in Article III of the Constitution which requires the existence of a case or controversy. Thus, a real and live controversy must exist at every stage of review. The court held that when the original controversy has disappeared prior to development of the suit, it is deemed moot and a trial must not proceed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That a

matter deemed moot leaves an important social issue unresolved is of no consequence. Dissent (Douglas) Due to the social significance of the issue involved in this case, this matter should be adjudicated despite its apparent mootness. Dissent (Brennan) Because of the social significance of the issue involved in this case, failure to adjudicate this matter now will only result in a future duplication of the court effort. See Brown v. Board of Education for a constitutional law case brief involving an issue of race based discrimination in which the Supreme Court held that segregation is unconstitutional for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Source: http://www.lawnix.com/cases/defunis-odegaard.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. Proper party ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Warth v. Seldin Citation. 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 1975 U.S. Brief Fact Summary: Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certain community. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff must generally allege a specific “case or controversy” between herself and the defendant in order to have standing. Facts: The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought suit against the town of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of Penfield’s Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs contended that Penfield’s zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of constitutional and statutory rights. The lower federal courts held that none of the Plaintiff’s had standing. Issue: Have the Plaintiff’s established that a “case or controversy” exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to have standing?

Held: Yes. Judgment affirmed. In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff himself must have suffered “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively legal action.” Additionally, standing will generally not be found when: a “generalized grievance” is shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens a plaintiff attempts to claim relief on the legal rights of third parties. Congress may create standing for individuals through statutes who would otherwise lack standing, so long as the plaintiff alleges a distinct and palpable injury to himself. In the present case, the Plaintiffs claimed the enforcement of zoning ordinances against third parties had the effect of precluding the construction of housing suitable to their needs. For standing, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged practices affect him specifically and that court intervention would personally benefit the plaintiff. In order for an organization to have standing, it must claim that all or any one of its members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action. Plaintiffs in this case fail to do so. Dissent. The Plaintiffs have submitted a sufficient pleading to avoid a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The majority’s opinion is based instead on the merits of the claim. Discussion. The purpose of the standing requirement is to prevent the courts from being forced to adjudicate abstract questions of wide public significance, which could better be determined in other forums. Source: http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-sullivan/the-natureand-sources-of-the-supreme-courts-authority/warth-v-seldin-2/ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190, 50 L.Ed.2d. 397 429 U.S. 190 (1976), argued 5 Oct. 1976, decided 20 Dec. 1976 by vote of 7 to 2; Brennan for the Court, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and Stewart (as to result) concurring, Burger and Rehnquist in dissent. The Court announced for the first time that sex‐based classifications were subjected to stricter scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than was provided by the rational basis or “ordinary scrutiny” test. As stated by Justice William J. Brennan, the constitutional standard that would have to be met for a statute classifying by gender is that it “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives” (p. 197). This standard appeared to be somewhat less rigorous than the strict scrutiny test applied to “suspect” classifications such as race. Brennan claimed that (although the Court had never before mentioned it) this was the test that had applied to gender discrimination ever since Reed v. Reed (1971). (The period 1971–1976 coincided with a nearly successful effort at the

congressional and state level to add an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution.) The Oklahoma law at issue in Craig allowed females aged 18–20 to purchase beer of 3.2 % alcohol. Males could not purchase beer until age 21. The law was challenged by two underage men, Mark Walker and Curtis Craig, joined by a female beer vendor, Carolyn Whitener. By the time the case was argued at the Supreme Court, both men had turned 21, so the woman's standing proved decisive (see Standing to Sue). Oklahoma defended the statute as a prophylactic against drunk driving, offering statistics showing that arrests of males 18–20 outnumbered those of females of similar age by a factor of nine for “drunk” driving (2 percent vs. 18 percent), by a factor of eighteen for “driving under the influence,” and by a factor of ten for public drunkenness. Brennan ruled for the Court that, while enhancing traffic safety did demonstrate an important government interest, the statistical evidence offered by Oklahoma did not meet the other half of the test: the gender line drawn by the state did not “substantially” further the government's goal. Also, explaining that the Twenty‐first Amendment did not alter otherwise applicable equal protection standards, he rejected the state's argument that the extra legislative power secured by that amendment should cause this statute to be sustained. Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in the result and in all of the opinion except the discussion of the Twenty‐first Amendment. Justice Lewis Powell concurred but stated that he would have preferred a rule that said gender classifications must bear a “fair and substantial relation” to the object of legislation. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred but suggested that rather than three differing degrees of equal protection scrutiny the Court should apply the rule that states must govern impartially. For him the requirement of impartiality entailed measuring the importance of the government interest, the degree to which any classification furthers that interest, and the degree of obnoxiousness of the classification. While this law did further traffic safety somewhat, and while that was an important goal, he felt that the offensiveness of a gender‐based law outweighed these two considerations here. Justice Potter Stewart argued that the rationality test employed in Reed v. Reed still was the appropriate test for gender discrimination, but that this statute did not satisfy even that minimum standard and thus was unconstitutional. Justice William Rehnquist dissented, objecting both to the introduction of a new level of scrutiny and to its application to male plaintiffs, since males were not in need of special solicitude from the Court. He argued that rationality was the correct test and that the statistical evidence easily satisfied that standard. Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed general agreement with Rehnquist's dissent but argued that the Court should not have taken the case, because, he said, it should never have extended standing to Whitener, a mere saloon‐keeper.

Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/craig-v-boren

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, and REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President; RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Presidential review Committee on the Lotto, Office of the President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunctionwith a prayer for a TRO & preliminary injunction against theimplementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO &PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners aresuing in their capacity as members of Congress and astaxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease wasexecuted and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20,1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount toa lack of authority by entering into the contract, because:1.Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits thePCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with anyentity2.RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresionalfranchise before a telecom system (public utility) can beestablished3.Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibitscompanies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership fromoperating a public system4.PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042(Foreign Investment Act) to install an online Lotto system. The contract shows that PGMC is the actualoperatior while it is a 75% foreign-ownedcompany. RA 7042 puts all forms of gamblingon the negative listRespondents answered the allegations by contending: 1.PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise. 2.PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecomsystem is an indispensable requirement of an onlinelottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow. 3.There are no violations of laws 4.The issue of morality is a political one and should not beresolved in a legal forum 5.Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated inValmonte vs. PCSOa.The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives.Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility,it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846,where legislative franchisees are notnecessary for radio stations Issues: 1.Whether or not petitioners have standing2.Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169

Held: 1.Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only aprocedural technicality that can be set aside dependingon the importance of an issue. As taxpayers andcitizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system,petitioners have standing. 2.No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in thenegative arguing that “whatever is not unequivocallygranted is withheld.” PCSO cannot share the franchisein any way. The contract’s nature can be understood toform the intent of the parties as evident in the provisionsof the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides that theintent of contracting parties are determined in partthrough their acts. The only contribution PCSO will begiving is the authority to operate. All risks are to betaken by the lessor; operation will be taken by thePCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are: a.Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension / breach b.Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reducedgiven that all risks are borne by the lessor c.Prohibition against PGMC involvement incompetitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC;business d.Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years,which is unreasonable for a lease contract. Itindicates that PGMC is the operator and thecondition an attempt to increase public benefitthrough public involvement. e.Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond. f.PGMC operation evident in personnelmanagement, procedural and coordinatingrules set by the lessor. g.PCSO authority to terminate contact uponPGMC insolvencyThe contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the indivisible communitybetween them.Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA

Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Francisco v. Fernando EN BANC ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,G.R. No. 166501 Petitioner, - versus - HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, and METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents.November 16, 2006 x--------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION CARPIO,J.: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (“petitioner”), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (“respondents”) from further implementing its “wet flag scheme” (“Flag Scheme”). The Mandamus writ is to compel respondents to “respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x.” Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.

In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioner’s lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking. Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises issues of “paramount and transcendental importance.” Petitioner also contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the issues raised in the petition deserve the “directx x x intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x x x.” We dismiss the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the “transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises.As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation. On the Flag Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note thatall the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic managementcodes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance instyle="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 28px; "Valenzuelastyle="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 28px; "Citydoes not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city. Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments.This Court is not a trier of facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme.This Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations. Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of

Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances. This is not the case here. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.

Sources: Full text of case http://ulandi.blogspot.com/2012/04/francisco-v-fernando.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------235 SCRA 506 Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner vs. Enriquez, respondent Facts: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? Held: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o

vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. 72 Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE 235 SCRA 506 Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner vs. Enriquez, respondent Facts: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.

Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? Held: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. Source: Case digest *I wasn't able to find the full text of this case -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------REPRESENTATIVE AMADO S. BAGATSING, petitioner, vs. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY and THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents. G.R. No. 115994

July 14, 1995

*case digest of this will posted tomorrow because I wasn't able to find a case digest of this in the net (or probably I was tired of finding what wasn't on the first page of google! haha). I am going to make one/feel free to share your own digest and ask me to post it here. thanks!

Source: Full text of case -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the prohibition on the appointment of the members of the Armed Forces who are in active service to civilian positions. ISSUE: Is there a violation on the prohibition of appointment of the members of the Armed Forces? HELD: The SC held that there was actually no appointment of the members of the Armed Forces to civilian positions. The members of the Philippine Marines were not integrated as members of the PNP. The participation of the Chief of Staff in civilian law enforcement does not mean that he was appointed to a civilian post, since the head of the PNP is the one actually vested with authority in these operations. Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION Petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, Respondents. Political Law – Delegation of Powers FACTS Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. Sources: Full text of case Case Digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case Digest on Bayan v. Zamora G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000 It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is “an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.” There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d’ arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State.” Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we said:”. . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection,

postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.” Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Case Digest on Gonzales v. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000) Facts:On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through amandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officialsholding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang. Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer. Ratio Decidendi:The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner didnot in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does notpresent to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted fromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCR’s creation. Thepetitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest.With regards to the petitioner’s request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceedinginvolves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by themere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent ExecutiveSecretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested

Sources: Full text of case Case digest -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. Question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. Constitutional question must the very "lis mota" of the case -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Drilon v. Lim

G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994Cruz, J. Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the LocalGovernment Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and ataxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certainprovisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.) Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC Held: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in whichthe subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmostcircumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionalityupon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is alsoemphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposefulhesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was firstcarefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by themto be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is tosustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showingthat there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.