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D2013 Consti1 Reviewer Prof. Jardeleza SY 2009-2010 SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION A. Fundamental law as overriding standard of validity in case of repugnancy
controversies between real conflicting parties thrugh the applications of a law. It involves the duty of the court of pronouncing void any such act which does not square with its own reading of the Constitution. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it the by the Constitution. Angara vs. Electoral Commission
If two laws – one being a law or a statute and the other one a constitutional precept – are irreconcilably in conflict with each other, the court, by means of judicial review, must choose between the two. But since the Constitution is superior to any act of legislature, it being an enactment of the sovereign people, the Constitution must prevail. Marbury vs. Madison Facts: William Marbury, in a petition, challenged James Madison, then Secretary of State of the United States to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding the latter to deliver the commission of the former as justice of the peace in the district of Columbia. Madison contended that Marbury’s designation as justice of the peace was made in a form of a “midnight appointment” and is therefore unconstitutional. Ruling: This case declared, for the first time, an act of Congress unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review. The Supreme Court held that a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the court to issue a writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional and thus invalid. Chief Justice Marshall declared that in any conflict between the Constitution and a law passed by Congress, the Constitution must always take precedence. B. Supremacy of the Constitution enforced through judicial review One of the ways of enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution is through judicial review. Judicial review is the power of a court to settle actual
Facts: Angara was elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon and was already proclaimed a member of the National Assembly when Ynsua protested to the ELECOM. Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest but since his motion was denied by the ELECOM, he filed an original action in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM to hear the protest of Ynsua, provided that ELECOM was under the National Assembly which already proclaimed him as its member as the elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon. Ruling: [1] When there’s an actual case or controversy, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral constituent units thereof. [2]The judiciary has judicial power, and included in this power is judicial review. The Court has the discretion whether or not to exercise this power. Hence, it produced standards for justiciability. Tañada vs. Cuenco Facts: There were only two parties in the Senate, namely Nacionalista Party and Citizens Party and the minority party (Citizens Party) has only one seat in it, filled in by Tañada. The Constitution provides that the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of three members nominated by the party with the largest number of votes in the Senate and another three members nominated by the party with the second largest number. Tañada, after !"
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nominating himself, refused to nominate two more Senators so the said slots were filled in by two more members of the Nacionalista Party.
conflict with or outside the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.
Ruling: To those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
Osmeña vs. COMELEC
C. Acts of government must conform to the norms of the Constitution
Ruling: RA 7056 was declared unconstitutional because it violated several provisions of the Constitution, especially the provision on synchronization of elections. The mere absence of a provision in the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the holding of separate elections does not mean that the Constitution did not intend the holding of simultaneous or synchronized elections. Moreover, the legislature cannot extend the term of officers since it is clearly not mandated by the Constitution.
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. The three branches of government, in the discharge of their functions, have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the highest law of the land. Sovereignty belongs to the people and the Constitution is a written instrument through which the people entrust to government a measure of its own sovereignty and no more. What is thus entrusted to the government is limited power. Hence every act of government must conform to the terms of empowerment set by the Constitution. Mutuc vs. COMELEC Facts: Mutuc is a candidate for the Constitutional Convention called during the second Marcos term. COMELEC approved his candidacy but prohibited him from using jingles in his campaign. Mutuc contended that the prohibition was a violation of his right to free speech. Ruling: As a branch of the executive department, although independent of the President, to which the Constitution has given the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the power of decision of the COMELEC is limited to purely administrative questions. The COMELEC cannot exercise any authority in
Facts: Osmeña assails the constitutionality of RA 7056, “An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections on 1992, Pave Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995”.
D. Constitutional Construction The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Facts: Judges seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that any tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease of diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec.10 of the 1987 Constitution. Ruling: #"
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The court accorded due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income tax equitably. The framers of the Constitution, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Art. VIII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, which says that members of the judiciary are NOT exempt from paying income taxes.
the judge. The Aquino government is not merely a de facto but it is in fact and law a de jure government
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
Ruling: Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons.
II. The 1987 Constitution A. The Provisional Constitution In virtue of Proclamation No. 1 of the Batasang Pambansa issued on February 25, 1986, Mr. Marcos was sworn in by Chief Justice Ramon Aquino at Malacañang. However, in defiance of the 1973 Constitution and without the sanction of the Batasang Pambansa, Corazon Aquino was proclaimed first woman President of the Republic of the Philippines. Aquino turned her back from the 1973 Constitution whose officials (members of the Batasan), had denied her the presidency and chose instead to govern under a provisional constitution by virtue of Proclamation No. 3, also known as the “Freedom Constitution”. Article 4 of the Freedom Constitution provided for the adoption of a new constitution, which paved way for the creation of the 1987 Constitution. Lawyers’ League for a Better Philippines vs. Pres. Aquino Facts: Petitioners alleged that the Aquino gov’t is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
In Re: Saturnino Bermudez Facts: A lawyer questions Article 18 of proposed 1986 Constitution regarding who the provision refers to when it says President and Vice President. The court dismisses it outright for lack of jurisdiction and a cause of action.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of BP Blg. 883 which calls for a snap election for the positions of President and Vice President. They filed a petition to prohibit the enforcement of the BP on the basis of its unconstitutionality. Ruling: Petition was dismissed since there are less than the required ten (10) votes to declare BP Blg. 883 unconstitutional. The issue of whether or not incumbent President Marcos should be allowed to run has turned into a political question, which can be truly decided by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. Since it is a political question, it is outside the ambit of the courts. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president. B. Adoption and Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter since it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
Provisional Constitution, Art. V: ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION $"
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S1. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50) natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society. S2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people. S3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to ensure that the people will have adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution. S4. The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and fully recorded. S5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days following its submission to the President. 1987 Const., Art. XVIII, S27: This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. Proclamation No. 58 (Proclaiming the ratification of the 1987 Constitution): “xxx that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect.”
Facts: During 1982 Barangay elections, petitioners were elected Brgy Capt and Brgy Councilmen respectively under BP 222 (Brgy Election Act of 1982). Memoranda signed Feb 8, 1987 by respondent OIC Gov Esguerra designated other people for said positions. Petitioners wanted these Memos nullified as S3/BP222 states that their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. Also, petitioners contend that with CON87 ratification, respondent OIC Gov. no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. A3/S2/PROVCON, promulgated Mar 25, 1986: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986. (NOTE: this ends Feb. 25, 1987). Ruling: Was the designation of respondents validly made (during the oneyear period which ended on February 25, 1987 pursuant toA3/S2/PROVCON)? NO. While Feb. 8, 1987 is still within the one-year deadline pursuant to PROVCON, PROVCON must be deemed overtaken by A18/S27/CON87. CON87 overtook PROVCON when former was ratified in a plebiscite Feb. 2, 1987. Dissent (J. Sarmiento): For him, CON87 is made effective Feb. 11, 1987 and not Feb. 2, 1987. Quoting that A18/S27/CON87 says that CON87 “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification xxx” he argues CON87 “takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained [as in Proclamation 58], and not at the time the people cast their votes… the will of the people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined.XXX”. III. Popular Sovereignty and Constituent Power A. Popular sovereignty and its collective powers 1. Constituent power 2. Electoral power
De Leon v. Esguerra (1987) %" "
ARTICLE V: SUFFRAGE (A5 has only two sections) Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. Bernas notes on A5/CON87 Suffrage as right and duty • Concept of suffrage (right to vote) started as a statutory right and evolved into a CON right. In the CON73, it took the form of an obligation. The obligation has been removed by the CON87. 3. Legislative power through Initiative and referendum A6 (The Legislative Department)/S1/CON87: Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. A6/S32/CON87: Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. Bernas notes on A6 (The Legislative Department)/S32/CON87: Initiative and Referendum • Current implementing law is RA6735, some of the details of which are: Sec. 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. xxx (c) The petition shall state the following: c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. the proposition; c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. xxx Sec. 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum. Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. II National Initiative and Referendum
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Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. xxx (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. 4. Power of Recall A9C(Constitutional Commissions; The COMELEC)/S2(1)/CON87: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Bernas notes on COMELEC: Nature of the powers of the COMELEC • Like the CSC, COMELEC is an administrative agency. As such, its powers are executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. • Extensive administrative powers must be deemed possessed also by the COMELEC under the CON87 because of the broad language of S2(1) and S2(3). S2(3) grants power to “decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.” B. Amending of Revisionary Process 1. In general Del Rosario v. COMELEC (1970) (http://www.scribd.com/doc/4664395/Judicial-ReviewPop-SovereigntyConstituent-Pow) Facts: Simeon G. Del Rosario assails the constitutionality of RA 6132 (CONCON Act of 1970). He is temporary staff writer of Weekly Nation Magazine, and a permanent int’l Research Officer of SEA Treaty Organization. He is on home leave and is waiting to be reinstated to his post in Bangkok by DFA. '"
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He assails S5 and 8 of said law because they are oppressive. S5/RA6132 disqualifies a person elected as CONCON delegate from running for any public office in any election or to assume any appointive office or position in Govt until after final adjournment of CONCON. S8(a): “No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization xxx shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election xxx”. He assails S21/RA6132 which involves appropriation of P29M for CONCON as such amount is a waste of money because CONCON has no time limit for its duration. His petition is recognized by virtue of his claim that he is a taxpayer and as such, he has an interest in the appropriation. Ruling: Is RA 6132 constitutional? Yes. One, Del Rosario failed to prove that he has rights which will be impaired if the law is enacted. Another, Congress can sit as a constituent body to propose amendments to the CON. Whether to amend it or not and the means for amending it are issues beyond Court jurisdiction. People will ratify CON and decide if only parts of it will be changed or it will be entirely overhauled. Thirdly, validity of questioned provisions has been upheld in previous Court decisions. Imbong v. COMELEC (1970) (4664395) Facts: Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both members of the Bar, assail the constitutionality of S19/RA 6132 because it prejudices their rights as interested candidates for delegates to CONCON. S2: Apportionment of delegates. CONCON should be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants. Provided, each district is entitled to at least two delegates. S4: All public officers and employees are considered resigned upon filing certificates of candidacy. S5: Any elected delegate is disqualified from running for any public office while CONCON is ongoing.
S8: Political parties or other organizations prohibited from helping CONCON delegates during campaign period. Ruling: Is RA 6132 valid? Yes. 1. S4 is valid in accordance with CON prohibition on public employees/officials running for election. It does not deny them of due process or equal protection. 2. RA 6132 was enacted in Congress’ capacity as a legislative body exercising its broad lawmaking authority. They can grant powers and fix the qualifications and other requirements needed such as in the case of the CONCON delegates. 3. Congress has right to apportion the number of delegates per district. They can limit it if there are economic restraints. In this case, they were correct in using the preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census & Statistics. This method is fair. Though only provisional, it is still credible. We can’t really effect an absolutely proportional representation. 4. S5 does not deprive petitioners of their rights to due process and equal protection as provision merely protects institution by making sure that delegate will not take advantage of his position. This is similar to Consti prohibition. All people in the same class are subjected to the same law thus there is equal protection of law. 5. S8 prohibits material, moral, emotional assistance/support from political parties or civic associations. Created to prevent clear and present danger of debasement of electoral process. Process has to be cleaned. This provides everyone an equal opportunity to take part in the electoral process. Although support of candidate is not a wrong in itself, law can make it mala prohibita. Santiago v. COMELEC (1997) Facts: 1. In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend CON, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative (PI). Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said PI the signature-gathering all over the country. 2. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ("
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and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. 3. COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. 4. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. a. CON provision on PI to amend CON can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. b. RA 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of PI was left to some future law. c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of PI. Only Congress is authorized by CON to pass the implementing law. d. PI is limited to amendments to CON, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision. e. Congress nor any govt agency has not yet appropriated funds for PI. 5. Respondents argue that 1. RA 6735 is the enabling law implementing PI. S9(b)/RA 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite. 2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 pursuant to RA 6735 was upheld by the SC 3. The lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 1987 Constitution is not a “revision” of the Constitution, it is only an amendment. 4. The claim that COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, ART IX-C of the Constitution and (b) Section 20 of RA 6735 which empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. Ruling: 1. RA6735 was intended to include or cover PI on amendments to CON but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. A17/S2/CON87 providing for amendments to CON, is not selfexecutory. While CON has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to CON via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. a. 1st, contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Sec 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution. b. 2nd, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. c. 3rd, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, )"
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provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasijudicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. RA 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under RA6735. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. RA 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Law) as worded did not apply to constitutional amendment. 2. Proposals a. By Congress and Constituent Assembly Almario v. Alba (1984) (Source: Diane Sayo digest) Facts: BP 643 provides for a plebiscite on 27 Jan 1984 to either approve or reject CON amendments proposed by BP Res. 104, 105, 1120, 112 and 113. There are four separate questions answerable by YES or NO. Question No. 3 proposed by BP 105, provides that grant shall be an additional mode for the acquisition of lands, as part of A14/S11/CON73. Q4 proposed by BP 113 provides that a paragraph will be included in A14/S12/CON73 saying the state will undertake an urban land reform and social housing program *"
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wherein reasonable opportunities to acquire land and decent housing will be made available, consistent with A14/S2/CON73. Petitioners: there has been no fair and proper submission to the people prior plebiscite. They ask for more time for the people to study meaning and implications of Res. 105 and 113.
Relova, J.: The people, especially those from the provinces, are not yet fully informed of the implications of Qs 3 and 4. In fact, the proposed amendments have been translated only in Tagalog and Cebuano. The voter needs ample basis for an intelligent appraisal on the matter. (Note: the decision was given only two days before the plebiscite.)
Ruling: Petition dismissed for lack of enough grounds to postpone plebiscite. On the issue of voter’s awareness of the wisdom, desirability or danger of an abuse that may come about with Res. 105 and 113, though the “grant” as a form of acquiring land may mean either “homestead” or “free patents” or just plain giving away of land, petitioners failed to show voter’s lack of discretion. Also, the Filipino people have long been aware of urban land reform and social housing, anyway. The wisdom of the proposed amendment is beyond court jurisdiction.
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (1947) -Adapt
COMELEC and civic organizations including the IBP have been doing infodissemination, that the petitioner’s request for 67 days (for Res. 105) and 42 days (for Res. 113) before ratification is too much. Also given, CON35 was ratified only after 36 days upon approval of Act No. 4200. Dissents: Teehankee, J.: Qs 3 and 4 do present a problem. They are unnecessary and redundant to the CON, since these are already encompassed in the “social justice and equity” responsibility of the government as provided by the CON. Also, there has been no ample time for the info-dissemination on the implications of Q3; this is proven by the fact that even the judiciary is doubting its significance and consider it as unnecessary. Abad Santos, J.: Populace is not yet fully prepared to decide on Qs 3 and 4. Best that plebiscite for these questions be held on a separate date. Melencio-Herrera, J.: Number of days to which a proposed CON amendment is to be submitted in a plebiscite is within the power of the Batasan, and will depend on the date of publication of the Batas Pambansa on the Official Gazette.
Facts: A Resolution was passed Sep 18, 1946 proposing CON amendment. At the time this resolution was adopted, Senate was composed of 24 Senators. House of Reps, 98 members, minus two who resigned (Note: This is the petitioners claim). Sixteen (16) Sens. voted in favor of Reso and 5 against it; 68 Reps in favor, 18 against. Thereafter, Congress passed RA 73 calling a plebiscite to submit to the people the proposed amendment. Petitioners assailed constitutionality of RA 73. They argue Congress may not by said act submit to the people proposed CON amendment embodied in the resolution, as Congress did not comply with CON provision requiring affirmative votes of ! members of Senate and of HOR, voting separately (18 in Senate and 72 in HOR). Respondents denied Senate is composed of 24 Senators by excluding Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero since the three suspended on account of alleged irregularities in their election. They also alleged HOR is composed of only 90 and not 96. There was also a Reso for the suspension of the eight Reps for the same reason. Ruling: Question involving a proposal which leads to ratification of a CON amendment shall be a political question. In Coleman v. Miller: the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal CON is a political question and hence not justiciable. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question as well. Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion in Coleman v. Miller: “Whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a political department of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated as political”. !+"
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A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts (Enrolled Bill Rule). In the case of Acts of the Phil Commission of the Phil Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof (S313/old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210). Note from Source: facts stated here are from the dissenting opinion, the majority opinion did not state all the facts. Occena v. Commission (1981) – Source: The other aside from Berne Guerrero digest Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occeña and Ramon Gonzales, lawyers and former delegates to 1971 CONCON sue as taxpayers. The suit against validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing CON amendments was filed on March 6, 1981. Petitions assert that CON73 is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Ruling: Petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. Has the CON73 force and applicability when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions were promulgated? YES. In Javellana v. Exec. Sec., dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid CON73 ratification, the SC concluded, “This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.” It made manifest that as of January 17, 1983, the 1973 Constitution came into force and effect. With the cardinal postulate that what the SC says is entitled to respect and obedience, a factor for instability was removed. CON73 is the time’s fundamental law. Is the Interim Batasang Pambansa authorized to meet as a constituent body and propose CON amendments? CON73 Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of
such competence. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It is to be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occeña is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Dissent: Teehankee, J. The CON has withheld from the President the power to propose CON amendments. Such power must come from the Interim National Assembly. Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967) Facts: 1. NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction: a. to restrain (a) the COMELEC from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, (b) the Director of Printing from printing the ballots pursuant to said Act and Resolutions, and (c) the Auditor General form passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in the said Act; and b. to declare said the Act as unconstitutional and void. 2. On 16 March 1967, Senate and HOR passed the following resolutions: a. R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No.1, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines, so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province was to have at least one member; b. R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, the convention to be composed of two delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;and c. R.B.H. No. 3, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 16 of the same Constitution as to authorize Senators and the members !!"
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3.
4.
5.
6.
of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. On 17 June 1967, the Congress passed a bill, which upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3, be submitted for approval by the people, at the General Elections which shall be held on 14 November 1967. On 21 October 1967, Petition L-28196 was filed; Petitioner Gonzales, citizen, taxpayer and voter, claims to have instituted the aforementioned case as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated. On October 31 1967, PHILCONSA filed a petition for review by certiorari for a resolution by COMELEC in a substantially identical case. It is a duly organized corporation and a civic and non-profit organization which aims to uphold the constitution of the Philippines. Senator Arturo Tolentino who opposed the earlier petition of PHILCONSA before the COMELEC was allowed to appear before the Court and objected on the following grounds: a. The court has no jurisdiction over the case. b. The petition, if granted, would render Congress inoperational. c. The failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law does not render it illegal and its subsequent acts null and void.
Ruling: 1. The issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is essentially a justiciable and not a political question. a. The power to amend or propose amendments to the constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress, but is a part of the inherent powers of the people to make and amend their fundamental law. b. Congress may therefore propose amendments merely because the constitution grants it the power to do so. When
exercising this power, Senators and members of the House do not act as members of Congress, but as elements of a constituent assembly that derive their authority from the constitution. c. Since Congress derives its authority from the constitution when sitting as a constituent assembly, it does not have a final say on whether or not it is acting within or beyond its constitutional limits. d. Therefore, the acts of Congress, when sitting as a constituent assembly, are subject to judicial review. In so far as this ruling is inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs Lopez Vito, the latter is deemed modified. 2. WON the Congress of the Philippines was a de facto Congress, and consequently, WON Congress did not have the authority to pass Resolution Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and RA 4913. NO. The failure of Congress to make a valid reapportionment does not render it illegal and its acts unconstitutional. a. Congress actually passed a reapportionment bill within three years after the 1960 census but the same was declared unconstitutional because the apportionment taken therein was not made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the country. b. The fact that Congress failed to enact a valid reapportionment bill, however, does not render it illegal because the constitution provides that “until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that by fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly districts”. c. Since the constitution itself provides for the continuance of the existing districts in case Congress fails to make a valid reapportionment, , the status quo is therefore rendered legal and de jure. 3. WON amendments to the constitution can be submitted to the people for ratification in a general election instead of a special election. YES. The term “election” in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution refers to a “general” and not a “special” election. !#"
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a. Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution reads: “The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” There is nothing in the said provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a “special”, not a “general”, election. b. The circumstance that the previous amendments were ratified in special elections merely indicate that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining, but does not negate its authority to propose amendments for ratification in a general election. 4. WON the submission of the proposed amendments to the people violates the due process clause in the Constitution. NO. The term “due process” in Article I refers only to the provision of fair opportunity but does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, the due process clause is not infringed. a. Article 1 Section 1 (1) of the 1935 Constitution reads: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” “Due process” in this provision refers only to providing fair opportunity. It does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, the due process clause is not infringed. b. The following provisions of the assailed RA 4913 provide for a reasonable and fair opportunity for voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposed amendments of Congress: i. the publication of the proposed amendments in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election;
ii. the posting of notices in public buildings not later than 14 October 1967, to remain posted until after the elections; iii. the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places; iv. the provision by the COMELEC of copies of the same in English, Spanish, and whenever practicable, in the native languages, for free distribution; and v. the printing of the proposed amendments at the back of the ballots. c. The above provisions of RA 4913 also satisfy the constitutional requirement in Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments be “submitted to the people for ratification”. DISPOSITION: Six (6) members of the court believed that Resolution Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were constitutional and valid while only three (3) members believed that they violate the spirit of the constitution. With the number of votes in favor of declaring the assailed resolutions and republic act as unconstitutional being short of the required eight (8) votes, the petition is dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are denied. b. By Constitutional Convention Tan v. Macapagal (1972) Facts: October 6, 1971: Eugene Tan (Roxas City), Silvestre Acejas (Romblon), and Rogelio Fernandez (Davao City) as taxpayers submitted petition assailing validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution (Res. 2127 of the Constitutional Convention). They claim that 1971 CONCON is without power under A15/S1/CON35 and RA 6132 to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise CON35 through the adoption of another form of government. SC dismissed petition after which an MR is submitted. Ruling: Do the petitioners have the requisite standing to seek declaration of nullity of a resolution of the CONCON (Justiciability of the case)? NO. MR is denied. The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only when the petitioners have requisite standing and the issue is ripe for adjudication. !$"
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The person who assails validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule has been relaxed though where many decisions nullified, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. This nullification is based upon the theory that expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined by the taxpayers. Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered to possess of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Petitioners in the present case do not assert that they qualify under such categories. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. It is a prerequisite that something had been accomplished or performed by the executive or legislative branch before a court may come into the picture. As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after the 1971 CONCON has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. c. By People’s Initiative Lambino v. COMELEC (2006) Facts: 1. Feb 15, 2006: Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local authorities of the Phils (ULAP) embarked on a nationwide drive to gather the signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country through CHACHA. They proposed these changes: a) S1,2,3,4,5,6,7/A6 b) S 1,2,3 and 4/A7 c) For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral- presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government there shall be a new article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”
2. Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed amendments. Signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated NGOs and volunteers and to local officials. Drafts of petition for initiative containing the propositions were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups. 3. Alleged Sigaw ng Bayan held Barangay assemblies prior to inform people and explain the proposed amendments – then circulated signature sheets. Sig sheets were then submitted to local election officers for verification based on voter’s registration records. The respective local election officers issued certifications to attest the signature sheets have been verified. Verified signature sheets were then transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for counting of signatures. 4. Aug 25, 2006: herein petitioners Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado filed with COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled “In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through people’s initiative: A shift from bicameral presidential to unicameral parliamentary government…” They filed an amended petition to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people. 5. Petitioners prayed that Comelec issue an order: a) Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to A17/S4/CON87 b) Directing the publication of the petition c) Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than 60 and not later than 90 days after certification of the sufficiency of the petition 6. Several groups filed with COMELEC respective oppositions to the petition for initiative. ONE VOICE, Inc. alleged that COMELEC denied due course to the petition for initiative, citing Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling which permanently enjoined COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on CON amendments until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. 7. COMELEC denied the Lambino petition.
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8. Petitioners filed petitioned that SC set aside the August resolution of the COMELEC, direct COMLEC to comply with A17/S4/CON87 and set the date of the plebiscite. 9. Other oppositors-intervenors like IBP and the Senate submitted COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino petition for initiative as it merely followed the Santiago ruling by virtue of stare decisis. The oppositors also argued that: a. Proposed changes are actually revisions, not mere amendments. b. Petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories under A17/S2/CON87. c. It was not shown the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to petition for initiative. If indeed there was, the verification process was done ex parte rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition. d. Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative. 10. SOLGEN filed comment affirming position of petitioners, praying inter alia for declaration of adequacy and sufficiency of RA 6735. 11. COMELEC claims the permanent injunction issued by SC against COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments until a valid law is passed (Santiago ruling) covers not only the Delfin petition but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives. Ruling: Resolution of COMELEC reversed and set aside. Petition remanded to COMELEC for further proceedings. 1. Have the petitions for initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with A17/S2/CON87? Oppositors and intervenors claim lack of number of signatures and no proper verification of signatures. The sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its Compliance with requirements of RA 6735 should be resolved by the COMELEC as it is the body that is mandated by the constitution to administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. 2. Does the Santiago ruling bar the present petitions? NO. Stare decisis should not bar the re-examination of Santiago declaring RA 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can construe laws but not construct them. The 6 justices who ruled that RA 6735 is insufficient—cannot waylay the will of 6.3 M people (signatories) who are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates. 3. Do the proposed changes constitute an amendment of revision of the CON? Oppositors-intervenors submit that the proposed changes effect major changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of government, the political tights of people and the modes by which political rights may be exercised, substantial amendments that cannot be done through PI. Only simple and not substantial amendments can be done through PI. The quantitative test will say that PI will only affect 2 out of the 18 articles of the CON. Garner gave three major parts of CON: 1) constitution of liberty; 2) constitution of government and 3) constitution of sovereignty. Proposed changes will basically affect only the constitution of government. The proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature of the state as democratic and republican. a. Amendment defined: a formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution pleading, order or other instrument, specifically a change made by addition, deletion or correction. Revision defined: re-examination or careful review for correction or improvement; general and thorough rewriting of a governing document in which the entire document is open to amendment. b. According to Vicente Singco: Amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added or to be altered in a CON. Revision refers to a consideration of the entire CON and the procedure for effecting such change. c. Makasiar: Amending envisages a change of specific provisions only. Revision is the rewriting of the whole CON. !&"
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4. Under the foregoing views, substantial amendments are still amendments and thus can be proposed by the people via initiative. Cardinal rule in interpreting CON: construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. Unlimited power to make laws (legal sovereignty) is possessor is the legal sovereign. Separate Opinion: Ynares-Santiago, J: On QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE TEST, qualitatively, the initiative petition if successful, will undoubtedly alter not only our basic governmental plan but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to the government. It will strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan and is thus an impermissible CON revision that may not be effected through a PI. Dissenting Opinion: Puno, J: Puno cites Santiago case stated that CON provision granting the people the power to directly amend the CON via PI is not self-executory and that enabling law is necessary to implement this right. RA 6735 was examined (majority of 8 members of court) said law was incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions in so far as initiative on CON amendments is concerned. Santiago v. COMELEC (supra) d. By the President during Emergency Sanidad v. COMELEC (1976) Facts: Sep 2, 1976, Pres. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of Martial Law, the National Assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for exercise by the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, FM issued PD 1031, amending PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. (Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991.) Same date of September 22, 1976, FM issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evince their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. September 27, 1976, PABLO SANIDAD and PABLITO SANIDAD sought to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PDs 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the CON, as well as PDs 1031, insofar as it directs COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled October 16. Petitioners contend that under CON35 and CON73, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new CON, thus the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no CON basis. Another action was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, 1971 CONCON delegate, asserting that the power to propose amendments to or revision of the CON during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under A17/S16/CON73. Ruling: Petitions dismissed. The President possesses the power to propose CON amendments. The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the CON lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of !'"
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the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the CON for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-à-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose CON amendments which is but an adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. With the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose CON amendments. Otherwise the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times" will be impeded. 3. Submission of Proposed Amendments Planas v. COMELEC (1973) Facts: Mar 16, 1967, Congress passed a Resolution calling a convention to propose CON amendments. Pursuant thereto, the election of delegates to the convention was held on Nov. 10, 1970. The convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While convention was in session, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On Nov. 29, 1972 the convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Philippines. On Nov. 30, 1972 the President issued PD 73 submitting the proposed constitution to the people for ratification or rejection, setting the plebiscite on Jan. 15, 1973. The instant petitions were filed seeking to nullify PD 73 on the grounds that the powers exercised therein are lodged exclusively in Congress and that there was no proper submission of the proposed CON to the people for lack of time and lack of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Jan. 7, 1973 the President issued General Order 20 postponing scheduled plebiscite until further notice and suspending his previous order of Dec. 17,
1972 temporarily suspending the effects of Proc. No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed constitution. Ruling: Cases dismissed. In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Furthermore, Congress is scheduled to meet in the regular session on Jan. 22, 1973 pursuant to CON35, and since the main objection to PD 73 is that the President does not have the authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefore, which Congress unquestionably could do, the court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of PD 73. On the validity of the decree itself, six: issue has become moot and academic, two: valid. On authority of the convention to pass proposed CON or to incorporate therein specific provisions, four: issue moot and academic, five: valid. Four: convention had authority to continue its function despite proclamation of martial law. On the question whether the proclamation of martial law affected the proper submission of the proposed constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the essential freedom is concerned, a justice is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under A15/CON35 and the existence of martial law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Three: issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and martial law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. Tolentino v. COMELEC (1981) Facts: The 1971 CONCON came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the CON. After election of delegates held on Nov. 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of Sept. 28, 1970, the !("
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Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, reading thus: "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ART. V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On Sept. 30, 1971, COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on Nov. 8, 1971 . Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Act 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under A15/S1/CON35, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the CON. Ruling: Does Organic Act No. 1 of the CONCON constitutional? NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite (Cannot submit amendments to the people piecemeal). In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a CON amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the CON with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing CON, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. UNIDO v. COMELEC (1981) Source: Berne Guerrero summary Facts: UNIDO is a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to amendments to CON73 proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. COMELEC issued 3 resolutions:
Res 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for "equal opportunity" on public discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on 7 April 1981. • Res 1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media [radio and television] in the plebiscite campaign". • Res 1469 providing for "equal space on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite of 7 April 1981". UNIDO addressed a letter to COMELEC to grant it the same opportunity as given President Marcos, who was campaigning for “YES”. It also requested radio and television coverage for its Plaza Miranda meeting. In denying this request, COMELEC said that Marcos conducts his pulong-pulong in light of the official government thrust to amend the constitution and in his capacity as President/Prime Minister and not as head of any political party. UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives as those vested in the President/Prime Minister. Thus, UNIDO has no right to "demand" equal media coverage accorded President Marcos. UNIDO a sort of an MR. This the COMELEC denied so UNIDO brought case to SC. •
Ruling: Is UNIDO entitled to equal time, equal space and equal quality of exposure? NO. UNIDO has failed to persuade that grant of its petition is compelled by the provisions of the CON, the Election Code of 1978 and the general resolutions and regulations of COMELEC regarding equal opportunity among contending political parties, groups, aggrupations or individuals. The COMELEC has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media in such respect, but such authority arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to which it or he is entitled. 4. Ratification Javellana v. Exec. Sec. (1973) Facts: On January 20, 1973, just two days before SC decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed CON not found in the present CON35. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino !)"
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citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that: • Pres. had announced the immediate implementation of the New CON, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. • Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed CON upon ground that the Pres., as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is : o without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies o without power to approve proposed CON o without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed CON o Lastly, the election held to ratify the proposed CON was not a free election, hence null and void.
Justices
1st Issue
2nd Issue
Concepcio n
J
NVR
Makalintal
DNV
NVR
Castro
DNV
NVR
Barredo
Q
Q
Makasiar
P
VR
Antonio
P
VR
Esguerra
P
VR
Zaldivar
J
NVR
Fernando
J
NVR
Similar actions followed. Petitioners prayed for Teehankee J NVR nullification of Proc. 1102 and any order, decree, proclamation having the same import and objective. After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, Court discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon. Key issues are: 1) Justiciability of issue of validity of Proclamation 1102. 2) WON the CON proposed by the 1971 CONCON has been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3rd Issue Can be no free expression, there has even been no expression Lack of knowledge/competence to rule on the question Lack of knowledge/competence to rule on the question People have already accepted People have already accepted People have already accepted People have already accepted Can be no free expression, there has even been no expression Not prepared to state Lack of knowledge/competence to rule on the question
4th Issue
5th Issue
G
NIF
D
DNV
D
DNV
D
IF
D
IF
D
IF
D
IF
G
NIF
G
DNV
G
DNV
3) WON proposed CON has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people. 4) WON the petitioners are entitled to relief. 5) WON the aforementioned proposed CON is in force. Legend: (1) J – justiciable, P – political, DNV – did not vote, Q – qualified vote (comment) (2) NVR – not validly ratified, VR – validly ratified, Qqualified vote (comment) (4) D – dismiss, G – grant (5) IF – in force, NIF – not in force, DNV – did not cast vote on the premise stated that in their votes on the 3rd question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not the Constitution
Ruling: Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. !*"
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1. WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political, and therefore non-justiciable, question. Concepcion, CJ: (justiciable) • To determine whether or not the new CON is in force depends upon whether or not the said new CON has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the CON35. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the CON should be settled applying the provisions of the CON in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old CON. • The issue whether the new CON proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of A15/CON35 is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our CON35) shall show. 2. WON the CON proposed by the 1971 CONCON has been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Concepcion, CJ: • CON does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. • The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizens assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in A5/S1/CON35 were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies must be considered null and void. • Viva voce voting for the ratification of the CON is void. A15/CON35 envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping
records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. • The plebiscite on the CON not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of PD 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of A10/CON3 which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the CON35, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens' Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised CON. 3. WON the aforementioned proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people. Concepcion, CJ: • Proclamation 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. A10/CON35 places under the "exclusive" charge of the COMELEC "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizens' assemblies relied upon in Proclamation 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Dep of LGs had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed CON. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. 4. WON the petitioners are entitled to relief. Concepcion, CJ:
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• I am not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Exec Dept, in line with Proc 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed CON. • A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. • Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. • The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed CON. Neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proc 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proc 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. • As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the CON by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed CON, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government. • In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case (he mentions some more cases)… petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935
Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite. 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution by the 1971 CONCON in force? YES. • Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. IV. Judicial Review A. Definition, Nature and Principles Judicial Review - is the Supreme Court’s power to declare a treaty, international executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation unconstitutional. - invention of the American system. - this power is not political but judicial - it is the power of the Court to settle controversies between real conflicting parties through the application of law - it is the obligation to assigned by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. Angara vs Electoral Commission, supra
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Background: Angara was elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon and was already proclaimed a member of the National Assembly when Ynsua protested to the ELECOM. Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest but since his motion was denied by the ELECOM, he filed an original action in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM to hear the protest of Ynsua, provided that ELECOM was under the National Assembly which already proclaimed him as its member as the elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon. Ruling: [1] When there’s an actual case or controversy, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral constituent units thereof. [2]The judiciary has judicial power, and included in this power is judicial review. The Court has the discretion whether or not to exercise this power. Hence, it produced standards for justiciability. Standards: [1] actual controversy [2] lis mota of the case [3] legal standing of the parties [4] moot and academic [5] not a political question [6] ripeness: right to adjudication Marbury vs Madison, supra - see above Kilosbayan, Inc. vs Guingona This case is about the “contract of lease” between PCSO and PGMC in connection of their establishment of an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing the revenue base of PCSO and diversifying its funds. A Malaysian group became interested to offer its services to PCSO and organized PGMC. Petitioner claims that PCSO cannot enter into a contract of lease with PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein PCSO would conduct an online lottery system in collaboration or in association with PGMC which is prohibited by
1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. Respondents claim that it is merely an independent contractor and not a co-operator of the franchise of PCSO. Issue: WON the petitioners have locus standi. Ratio: The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez Ruling: [1] A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. [2] The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law, but it is still the executive that implements the project or activity specified to be funded. [3] The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory. Codal – Art 14 Sec 5(5) "The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education ..." [4] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately from an item. Codal – Article 6 Sec 27(2) “Pres. shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.” ##"
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Notes: [a] This ratio was imported from Gonzales v Macaraig regarding the President’s item veto-power [b] The present Constitution only states itemveto but nothing specifies provision veto. However, jurisprudence (Gonzales v Macaraig and PHILCONSA v Enriquez) tackles the question on provision veto, which actually was expressly provided in the 1935 Constitution, hence the doctrine of inappropriate probision [c] In this case SC also stated that a provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. B. -
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Justiciable vs Political Question justiciable: question on the legality of the law political: question on the wisdom of the law when the question is the legality of a political act of government, the Court derives its power to adjudicate from the constitutional grant of judicial power and from the explicit grant of power of judicial review found in Art. VIII Sec. 5 (2) (a). the political question doctrine is a limitation on the power of judicial review political questions are those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch [Tanada v Cuenco] various kinds of political questions: o textual – where there is found a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political department o functional – where there is a lock of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. o Prudential – where there is an impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.
Avelino vs Cuenco During a Senate session, Senate President Avelino walked out with his 9 supporters, leaving behind 12 senators, as one senator was abroad and the other was in a local hospital. The remaining group
continued to do business as a quorum, declared the Senate President position vacant and elected Senator Cuenco as Acting Senate President. Avelino brought the case to Court to determine if twelve members constituted a quorum to replace the Senate President. At first the Court declined to decide on the matter, ruling that it was a political question and that the judiciary did not have the authority to take over the Senate’s power to elect its president, but after a motion for reconsideration the court assumed jurisdiction and ruled that 12 members constituted a quorum, as the calculation of the majority was based on the total membership of 23 and not 24. One senator was not counted in the calculation as he was out of the country and therefore out of the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate. Miranda vs Aguirre Petitioners are the mayor and the residents of Santiago city. Respondents are the local government officials of the province of Isabela. Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 8528 –AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.) which deletes the word “independent” and treats Santiago city just as a component city. Petitioners believe that this amounts to a conversion of Santiago City and must therefore be decided by the city’s citizens in a plebiscite, of which the RA has no provisions provided for. Respondents, on the other hand, deem that this is a mere reclassification. Issue: WON the issue is justiciable. Decision: Yes. Ruling: The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution shall include any material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit(s) directly affected. Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the powers of the mayor and the voting exercise of residents. #$"
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Not a political question. Petitioners claim that under Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. The Court has the duty to ensure that Congress complies with the Constitution in law-making. C. Requisites of Judicial Review David, et al. vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo [1] Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. [2] The requirement of locus standi which is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case is of transcendental importance. [3] Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the sufficiency factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally permissible limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise. Codal – Art 8 Sec. 1 on Judicial power [4] Facial invalidation of laws (Overbreadth Doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3) the Court has no other alternative remedies available. [4.a] The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Codal – Art. 7, Sec. 18
[4.b] The take care power of the President, which includes the power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. Codal – Art. 6, Sec 17 Note: The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make “decrees” with the same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos. [4.c] In the absence of delegated authority from Congress the authority of the President to declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Codal – Art. 6, Sec. 23 (2) Note: Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor. [4.d] The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to implement them. Note: The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions against specific abuses committed by authorities Notes: [a] In this case, the extent of judicial review is not concerned with correctness, but with arbitrariness of the invocation of such power. Arbitrariness would mean WON there is a sufficient factual basis. [b] Art 12 Sec 17 should be read in relation to other provisions, like Art 6 Sec. 23. 1. Actual Case or Controversy - for the court to be able to exercise judicial review there must be an actual case
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the Court has no authority to pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory opinions and it has no authority to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. a. Prematurity - the court will not rule on a case if the issue raised before it is premature b. Mootness vs Ripeness the Court will normally not entertain a petition touching on an issue that has already become moot because there would no longer be a “flesh and blood” case for the Court to resolve. The question must be “ripe” for adjudication. This means that the governmental act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
David, et al. vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, supra - see above Gonzales vs Narvasa - This case is about the PCCR created by the Office of the President to conduct study to possible amendments to the Constitution primarily the economic provisions Ratio Decidendi: A case is considered moot and academic when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy (PCCR already adjourned when the petition was filed). Notes: Q: What’s the President’s power of studying the Constitution, as to propose amendments? What’s the legal or constitutional basis for this? (This is precisely what Gonzales argues in this case except that the timing is off since it was rendered moot and academic) A: Art 7 Sec. 1 and Sec 5. When he President orders to study the Constitution in concern for the development of the country without even changing any provision of the Consti, he is doing his duty to “preserve and defend the Constitution, execute its laws…” (Art 7 Sec 5). It is the Pres. through its departments who engages in the day to day execution of laws and the efficiency of the government. This is part of his discretion from the power vested upon him by the Constitution. (Art 7 Sec. 1)
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c. Exceptions to the Mootness rule the Court may tolerate exceptions to the mootness rule such as when a lack of clarity about a law may be creating confusion.
David, et al. vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, supra - see above 2. Earliest Opportunity - the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal - this rule admits of exceptions 3. Standing of a Party - locus standi - the Court will not exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite “standing” to challenge it. - A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” o Elements of standing: ! Petitioner must have suffered injury in fact ! The injury must be traceable to the environmental act challenged ! The injury must be redressable by the remedy sought by the petitioner. David, et al. vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, supra - see above Pascual vs Secretary Facts: Pascual, provincial governor of Rizal prays an injunction upon RA 920 AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS which #&"
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appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension & improvement of Pasig feeder road terminal. According to Pascual, this area along with Antonio Subd. belong to Sen. Jose Zulueta. During the time that the law was enacted, the land was still a private property.
- have a clear standing as citizen in petitions on right to information and cases questioning the declaration of martial law Kilosbayan vs Morato Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has already been settled
Issue: WON Pascual has standing in this case. Ruling: 1. Yes. a. Taxpayers can file a suit if a public official uses public funds in an unconstitutional act and it involves misapplication of the funds. They have sufficient interest in preventing such acts. b. RP-citizen relationship similar to a state-taxpayer relationship. c. US SC in Crampton v. Zabriskie, recognized right of taxpayers to assail constitutionality of legislation appropriating local or state funds. d. Governor is not just a taxpayer but a representative of one of the most populated political subdivisions in the country which bears a substantial part of the burden of taxation. Thus he has every right to assail the validity of the legislation. Standing vs Real-Party-in-Interest - the rule of real-party-in-interest is subordinated to the doctrine of locus standi. - In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. - Real-party-in-interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit
Issue: WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional grounds, given that the Constitution guarantees to people’s organizations “effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16). Ruling: - NO. Petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise. - Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. - These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5 - Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case does not involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators. b. Associational
1. Types of Standing a. Citizen
IBP vs Zamora
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- In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. Ruling: 1. On Judicial Review: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the requisites are complied with. - When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. > Definition of locus standi + a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged + “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest + gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions > The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case > IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. It has not shown any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned government act. c. Taxpayers ! have standing to sue if he has shown that: • he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation • he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute
ITF vs Comelec Facts: Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections (ARMM). Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. On 29 October 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System. Issue: Whether ITF, et. al. have the locus standi to file the case questioning the validity of the election computerization bidding. Held: Yes. As alleged, Comelec’s flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Further, the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds are in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of the case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of the Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society." ITF, et. al.’s legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld. Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioner(s) seek to restrain respondent(s) from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." Jumamil vs Café #("
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Facts: Petition for declaratory relief filed by Jumamil questioning the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. He alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents, some of which were close friends and/or relative of the mayor and the sanggunian.
! Legislators: There must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo) Philconsa vs Enriquez, supra - see above f.
Governmental
People vs Vera Issue: Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief Ruling: Jumamil brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the the mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
d. Voters - There must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo) e. Legislative ! members of Congress, as a body, have standing to challenge an unconstitutional act ! even when members of Congress do not act as a body, the Court has recognized their standing to challenge a presidential veto or other acts of the Executive which “injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong.”
People of the Philippines and HSBC are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the CFI Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the CFI, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case #)"
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such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. 4. Constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case - tbe Court will not touch on the issue of unconstitutionality unless it really is unavoidable or is the very lis mota. Arceta vs Mangrobang - consolidated cases Case 1 The City Prosecutor of Navotas charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law in an information that on or about September 16, 1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated December 21, 1998) to Oscar R. Castro, payable in cash. At the time of issue, Arceta did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank and her check was subsequently dishonored by drawee bank for reason “drawn against insufficient funds”. Case 2 The City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of Bouncing Checks Law in an alleged information that on the month of January 2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check in the amount of P2,500,000 dated January 19, 2000 in favour of Anita Chua but it was denied due to insufficient funds. Issue: Whether or not the court should render BP Blg. 22 unconstitutional due to (1) the present economic and financial crisis and (2) the undue burden made upon the MeTCs to try bouncing check cases. Ratio:
When the issue of constitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is an established doctrine that the court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present [see requisites of judicial review]. In the case at bar, the court agreed that the requisites were adequately met by the petitioners. The court did not find the constitutional question raised by the petitioners to be the very lis mota of the case. In the nullification of a certain law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. A. Police Power Definition • The most essential, insistent and least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It enables the state to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. • It is one of the three power of the states, but is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution. It rests upon public necessity and the right of the state and public to self protection. Its scope then expands and contracts with changing needs. • Power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of subjects of the same. • Police power regulates the exercise of life, liberty, and property. The bill of rights says we have rights to those three, even though police power is not mentioned, police power limits these. Since our constitution is one of limitations, the constitution says whenever it impinges, it is tested against the safeguards of due process of law and equal protection before the law. • Due process of law only kicks in when there is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. It applies however to government, not individuals. • Writ of Amparo: remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. #*"
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Due Process Procedural Due Process Definitions, Requisites: Daniel Webster in Dartmouth College – due process of law is law that hears before it condemns, proceeds upon enquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. Banco Espanol Filipino v Palanca – requisites of due process (1) court with judicial power (2) with jurisdiction over the case (3) defendant must be given a chance to be heard and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. Ang Tibay v Court of Industrial Relations – cardinal primary requirements in administrative cases include (1) right to a hearing and present one’s case (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence (3) decision must have something to support itself (4) evidence must be substantial (5) decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing (6) tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts (7) the board should render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues and reason for the decision rendered. Purpose (a) Contributes to accuracy of the proceedings (b) it gives the accused/petitioner a sense of rational participation in a decision that can affect his destiny, enhancing his dignity as a thinking person. Bernas: Other Notes on Procedural Due Process The hearing officer does not have to be the one who decides the case, but the officer who reviews a case cannot be the same person whose decision is on appeal.
Notice and hearing are not prerequisites in the promulgation of rules though they are in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Fixing rates as a quasi-judicial process requires a hearing. Guzman v National University – proceedings in disciplinary cases involving students are different from those in courts of justice. The minimum standards are (1) the student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusation (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with assistance of counsel if desired. (3) They shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf (5) The evidence must be duly considered by those in charge of hearing the case Substantive Due Process: Content, laws must have a reasonable basis. Lawton v Steel – The state may interfere wherever the public interest demands it… it must appear first that the interests of the public and second that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not undult oppressive upon individuals. Determination as to what is proper exercise of police power by the legislature is not final but subject to the supervision of the courts. The legislative rarely met judicial disapproval. Requirement of Publication For clarity, to prevent vagueness and overbreadth. Anything vague is defective because it fails to give notice of its commands, although there is a presumption of constitutionality that any potential challenger will have to get past (such as what happened with the Plunder Law that was not successfully challenged by President Estrada). Overbreadth generally involves vagueness in reference to freedom of speech; it has a chilling effect. Equal protection Before the Law
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Tolentino v Board of Accountancy – no person or class shall be deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons in similar circumstances People v Cayat – classification must (1) rest on substantial distinction (2) be germane to the purpose of the law (3) not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class Strict Scrutiny Test – prove compelling state interest and necessity of classification, race, national origin, alienage, denying right to vote, etc. Intermediate Scrutiny Test – important state interest, classification is substantially related, gender, legitimacy Rational basis Scrutiny Test – classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest International School Alliance of Educators v Quisimbing – foreign and Filipino teachers deserve the same compensation. British American Tobacco - New and old brands can be taxed differently to avert prize wars. Sison Jr v Ancheta – Classification is rational in character is allowable. Central Bank Employees v Bangko Sentral – relative unconstitutionality as the classification only applied according to the third standard. The classification was only applicable to present conditions. Smith Bell and Co. v Natividad – alienage is a rational classification. Equal protection before the law has been taken into account additionally in adjustments resulting from war, the political process, land reform, the crinminal process, women, etc. Hierarchy of Rights Right to life and liberty are of higher than order than property. Life and liberty impingement uses strict scrutiny. Police power will usually win over property. Freedom to contract bows to police power. Police power can be used to enforce taxation. Caroline Products Footnote: Narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality, if it collides with specific provisions. Freedom of speech and of the press is specific. Liberty arguably includes freedom of speech, but there are special specific rights mentioned by the bill of rights. If it affects discrete and insular minorities and their access to the political system, it also requires strict scrutiny. 1. In General
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Rubi v Provincial Board (Substantive Due Process) A law creating reservations for the Mangyan tribes and penalizing them for noncompliance was challenged as a deprivation of liberty without due process. Justice Malcolm responded defending the act as justified according to general welfare and public interest. Roxas & Co., v Court of Appeals (Procedural Due Process) Petitioner’s property was undergoing compulsory acquisition according to CARP but there were several procedural problems, such as problematic notification. The acquisition proceedings were deemed invalid and remanded to the DAR. National Security Lao Ichong v Hernandez The retail industry was nationalized. Lao Ichong challenged the act. Equal protection refers to the same treatment across classes of people, not absolute equality. The dominance of the alien retailer poses as a threat to national security, as alien retailers hold a great deal of power, more than many Filipino retailers, but do not have the loyalty to the country and as such will not invest in industries that need supporting. The alien’s interest in the country is transient. It was reasonable. Public Order US v Pompeya Mandatory patrol duty is a reasonable exercise of police power as it serves the public interest of preserves public order. Public Safety Agustin v Edu An act requiring early warning devices was questioned as not having gone through due process. The court ruled it had as the president had examined various studies and was a valid way of promoting public safety. Public Health US v Gomez Jesus The court can penalize those who practice medicine without proper licenses in the protection of public health. Public Morals Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. V City Mayor Regulation: guests were required to fill out comprehensive information sheets. (allowed) White Light $!"
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Regulation: prohibited short time stays. (allowed) Manila v Laguio Ban: All motels, inns etc had to convert into more reputable establishments. (not allowed) The preceding cases all involved the legislature trying to manage public morals, regulating motels which were often cites for prostitution etc. The motels however were not conclusively proved as always used illicitly. There were many legitimate purposes for motels, and thus the legislature could not simply remove them. 7. Public Welfare and advancement Buck v Bell The sterilization of the mentally ill was not considered a deprivation of the right to life (although now, sterilization of the mentally ill is no longer enforced. Virginia repealed this law in the 1970s). It was considered a legitimate use of police power for public welfare. The court said although they could not solve the whole problem, they could at least try to solve part of it. 8. The National Economy Rutter v Esteban RA 342 allowed war veterans a certain amount of time before any debt could be collected. The court struck this down as unconstitutional as creditors would have to wait too long a time before they could collect and further cited that the Philippines was no longer struggling to recover from the war. It would be unreasonable and oppressive to creditors to make them wait that long when there was no longer any pressing cause. US v Toribio Regulating the slaughter of carabaos is a valid exercise of police power and reasonably necessary to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals, by their owners, tempted either by greed of monetary gain or to enjoy the luxury of animal food, despite damaging the productive power of the community. C. Taxation Definition • an inherent power of government • Art. VI sec 28 of the constitution doesn’t give the government the power of taxation, rather it limits this otherwise almost unlimited power.
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It is given to the government with the primary purpose of raising revenue, in order to pay for debts and for the general welfare. Taxation as: Power to destroy – taxation used as an instrument for the extermination of undesirable activities. Power to keep alive – the foundation for the imposition of tariffs to protect locally produces goods against competition from imports. Limitations Must be used only for a public purpose Taxation is legislative in nature, although it can be delegated to the president. It is the only exception to the rule of non-delegability of legislative power Uniformity – pertains to the uniformity of taxation Equitability – related to the progressive system of taxation, in which the rate increases as the tax base increases. Tax Exemptions Must be for a public purpose, uniform and equitable and in conformity with the equal protection clause. o Examples: Sec 28(3) – Charitable institutions, churches … non-profit cemeteries and all lands, buildings … used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Fiscal Powers of Congress: The power of the purse – Only congress can generate money from the government through taxation and the power to spend it. Before money can be paid out from the Treasury, the amount and the purpose must first be specified. After congress has made the appropriation, it is the executive that actually spends the fund. Special Funds: Tax levied for a special purpose, to be used only for a specific and legitimate object of the government Any balance left after the purpose had been fulfilled or cancelled, will be returned to the general funds of the government. Cases: Taxation in General: $#"
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COMISSIONER v. BOTELHO SHIPPING CORP (1967) Facts: two ships were sold by the government to private respondents. Registration of the vessels to the name of private respondent was stalled because of the non payment of compensation taxes. While the case was pending, the law requiring the payment of compensation taxes was repealed. Issue: Whether or not the current law applies retroactively, thus exempting the respondent from paying the required tax. Held: YES, There is no constitutional prohibition against granting tax exemptions to specific people so long as a denial of equal protection does not arise through unreasonable discrimination. • LUTZ v. ARANETA (1955) Facts: The constitutionality of a commonwealth act is being questioned. It is alleged that the act only benefits the sugar industry and not the public. Held: A tax law is not purely for taxation or revenue generating purposes only; it can also be an exercise of police power. In this case, the tax was levied with the stabilization of the sugar industry in mind, which falls under the expansive definition of the “general welfare” phrase in the constitution. •
Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (1966) Facts: Philippine Sugar Institute was established with the purpose of advancing the sugar industry, its funds comes from a tax levied from sugar milling companies. After a series of losses by the PSI, the milling companies refused to pay the tax, stating that the continued operation of the PSI is inimical to their interest. Issue: Whether the milling companies may refuse to pay the tax, which is a special fund tax distinct from an ordinary tax. Held: NO, as with Lutz vs. Araneta, Taxation sometimes comes under the police power of the state. The respondents should pay the tax. VI. Three Great Departments of Government A. Judicial Department 1. Judicial Power – Art. VIII, section 1
Definition: Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies between adverse litigants duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. It is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights. In addition the constitution also includes the authority to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any branch or instrumentality of government. Nature: The exercise of judicial power requires real parties to come to court to settle an actual controversy. In addition the power to control the execution of the decision of the court is part of its jurisdiction. Art. VIII, §1 however is not meant to be an exhaustive list of what judicial power is. It is not the function of the court to give advisory opinions because it is beyond judicial power. Grave Abuse of Discretion: When an act is done contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence or when an act is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. To qualify as grave abuse of discretion the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. a. All Courts can exercise judicial power Ynot vs. IAC (1987)] Facts Six carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of theEO. Trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. The IAC affirmed the trial court’s decision. $$"
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Ruling The grant to the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments of lower courts in all cases involving the constitutionality of statues or acts of other branches of government also gives lower courts authority to pass upon the validity of a statue in first instance. Thus the trial court and the IAC are wrong in their presumption of constitutionality when the validity of the law itself was put into question. Finally, on the matter of the confiscation of carabaos, the law was found unconstitutional due to the lack of guidelines or limitations it granted authority to the chair of the national meat inspection commission or the director of animal industry to disperse such confiscated carabaos. 2. Supreme Court a. Jurisdiction – Article 8, §5(2)(d) Original Jurisdiction (Art. VIII, §5, (1)) - Cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls - Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Habeas Corpus Review/Revise/Reverse/Modify/Affirm on Appeal or Certiorari (Art. VIII, §5(2)) - When Constitutionality, Validity of International Agreements, Law, PD, Proclamation, Order, Instruction, Ordinance or Regulation is in question. - Legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, penalty is an issue - Jurisdiction of any lower court is an issue - Criminal Cases where Reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed - Cases involving question/error of law
The enumeration in Art. VIII §5 (1)(2) represent the irreducible jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. b. Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court – Art. VIII, §2, par. 1, Art. VI, § 30 The exercise of judicial power by lower courts requires prior legislative action (1) defining enforceable and demandable rights and prescribing remedies for violations of such rights (2) Determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from legal rights Without any applicable law, courts cannot settle controversies. Congress may creat courts of varying jurisdiction provided it does not reduce the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as per Art. VIII §5(1)(2) c. En Banc vs. Division – Art. VIII, §4 The Supreme Court has the discretion to sit en banc or in divisions of three (3), five (5), seven (7). En Banc Cases are decided by concurrence of majority of members who took part in the deliberation on the issues and voted thereon. Quorum is 8. The Supreme Court En Banc has no appellate jurisdiction over the divisions. - All cases involving constitutionality of a treaty, international/executive agreement or law - Cases involving Constitutionality, application or operation of PDs, Proclamations, Orders, Instructions, Ordinances and other regulations - Cases heard in a division but required majority is not obtained - When the Supreme Court modifies or reverses doctrine or principle of law laid down either en banc or division - Administrative cases where vote is for dismissal of a judge of a lower court or otherwise to disciple such $%"
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Division Can be in divisions of 3, 5, 7 and cases shall be decided with concurrence of majority of members who took part, and in no case without concurrence of at least three of such members. The division cannot modify or reverse any doctrine laid down in a decision rendered en banc or in division. The decision of a division is a decision of the Supreme Court itself, and is not inferior to decisions rendered en banc. Cases are decided and Matters are resolved. Thus when a division fails to muster the required number of votes it is elevated to the court en banc. But when a motion for reconsideration is filed in the division, it is matter not a case and thus when it fails to muster the required number of votes the decision is not reconsidered and therefore deemed affirmed. d. Composition – Art. VIII § 4 One Chief Justice and Fourteen Assoicate justices and any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the time the vacancy started. The composition of the Supreme Court cannot be changed by ordinary legislation. Vargas v. Rilloraza (1948) Facts The People’s Court act provided that in certain cases Supreme Court justices who held any office during the Japanese occupation are to be disqualified to take part in the deliberations and lieu of their presence would be any judge of first instance as may be designated by the President. Ruling The people’s court act is unconstitutional because it prohibits members of the Supreme Court to exercise the
power and duty granted to them by the constitution. The constitution contemplates an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of SC justices with prejudice to the proper cases of disqualification. The present case involves the disqualification of a majority of the court which is also repugnant to the constitution since this is tantamount to depriving the present court with jurisdiction. However temporary the participation of the replacement judges designated by the President under the People’s Court Act, his/her vote is considered as a justice of the court, which violates the contemplation of the constitution which provides for the composition of the Supreme Court and definitely admits of no exceptions such as the so called temporary member in the contested law. Any person to sit as member of the Supreme Court is required by the constitution to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (this is different now of course)the designation by the President of temporary justices also violates such requirement. Judicial and Bar Council: Appointments and Qualification – Art. VIII, §7(1), §8, § The Judicial and Bar Council recommends to the President appointees to the judiciary. From a list of at least 3 nominees for every vacancy the President appoints a judge without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Composition Regular Members are appointed by the President for a term of 4 years. Clerk of the Supreme Court serves as the Secretary Ex-officio of the council. The Supreme Court determines the emoluments, budget and can also assign other functions and duties to the council. -
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Representative of Congress (Ex-officio member/ there is one representative from Senate and another from the House but each only has " vote) A representative of Integrated Bar (Regular member) A Professor of Law (Regular member) A Retired Member of the Supreme Court (Regular member) A Representative of the Private Sector (Regular member)
Qualifications Supreme Court - Natural-born Citizen of the Philippines - At least 40 years old - Must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines - Proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence Lower Courts - Citizen of the Philippines (except in Collegiate Courts should be Natural-Born Citizen) - Member of Philippine Bar - Requirements prescribed by congress - Proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence e. Salary – Art. VIII §10; Art. XVIII § 17 Salary of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of lower courts is fixed by law. There shall be no diminution of salary during their stay in office. As per Nitafan v. CIR taxes are not to be considered a diminution of salary. f.
Security of Tenure – Art. VIII §2, par. 2 and §11 Members of the judiciary shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 or become incapacitated to discharge their office. Security of Tenure guarantees against actual removal and interruption of continuity in tenure as ruled in Vargas v. Rilloraza.
De la Llana v. Alba (1982) Facts De la Llana, sought to enjoin the implementation of BP 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act which abolished most of the courts under the existing judicial system on the grounds that it contravened the constitution granting security of tenure to members of the judiciary. Ruling The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme Court. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the Supreme Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could $'"
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do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable
them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul BP 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. g. Removal – Art. VIII, §11; Art. XI, §2 Members of the Supreme Court can only be removed through impeachment or if found incapacitated to discharge office. In cases of impeachment if they are found guilty on the grounds of impeachment it follows that they failed to satisfy the requirement of good behavior. Incapacity to discharge office is not defined in the constitution nor does it specify who determines such incapacity, however it is part of the administrative powers of the Supreme Court and to determine such incapacity the Supreme Court should create a panel of doctors to assist them in making such decision. $("
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Only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts and congress cannot pass any law to declare otherwise. The constitution requires they Supreme Court to sit En banc in matters regarding discipline of judges, a majority of those who took part is required for imposing sanctions or a dismissal. h. Requirements as to Decisions – Art. VIII, §§13-14 - Conclusions should be reached through consultation before a member is assigned to write the opinion of the court - The Chief Justice must certify the ruling that such consultation took place - Members who took no part, dissented, or abstained must state their reason for doing so - Express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law which it is based - No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating legal basis These requirements also apply to lower collegiate courts such as the Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan. Absence of certification does not make the decision invalid but makes the official responsible for certification liable. Bernas doesn’t specify who from the lower collegiate courts shall certify, it is reasonable to assume that it is the presiding justice however Bernas also mentions that “ in cases of intermediate appellate courts, certification also applies to attest such consultation occurred, to protect the independence of the justice assigned his name is not identified in the certification. “ Since there’s no IAC anymore this seems to apply to the CA which used to be the IAC. (Not totally sure on this one sorry…) Oil & Gas Nature Corporation v. CA (1999) Facts
A Philippine Company agreed to supply an Indian Corporation with oil well cement, however due to a dispute with the cargo vessel it did not reach its point of destination. After negotiations to settle the matter it was finally referred to an arbitrator as per their contract. Eventually it reached Indian courts which adopted by reference the ruling of the arbitrator. The Indian Company eventually filed a petition to the RTC of Surigao for the enforcement of the ruling by the Indian court. The Philippine Company alleges that such decision is not enforceable in the Philippines because it failed to contain a statement of facts and the law upon which the award in favor of petitioner was based. Ruling The ruling of the foreign court is considered a memorandum decision which adopt by the findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals. Such do not transgress the constitutional requirement of stating the facts and law where the ruling is based although it is more prudent if a memorandum decision does not just provide a dispositive portion but also state the nature of the case; summarize the facts, and state applicable laws and jurisprudence as well as its assessment and conclusion. Providing for these mentioned parts of the ruling allows the court to make an appropriate consideration and its consistency with the dispositive portion. Nonetheless, the procedural requirement in the constitution on a decision of the court should be read with substantial justice such that in certain cases it can be set aside. i.
Mandatory period for deciding cases – Art. VIII, §15; Art. VII, §18 par. 3; Art. XVIII, §12-14 Upon the filing of the last pleading/brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court, the case/matter is deemed submitted for decision. Once deemed submitted for decision the Supreme Court is given 24 months, Lower Collegiate Courts have 12 months, and all other lower courts are given three months unless the Supreme Court reduces such $)"
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periods. The mandatory periods are prospective in application. If upon expiration of the period no decision is rendered a certification by the Chief Justice or the Presiding Judge shall sate why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within that period. j.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal Art. VII §4 provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident. In addition the Supreme Court is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations to serve its purpose as the PET.
k. Administrative powers – Art. VIII, §§5 (3)(4)(6) and 11 1. Supervision of lower courts Art. VIII §6 provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision of all courts and its personnel. It involves the exclusive power of the Supreme Court sitting en banc to discipline or dismiss judges for cause. It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnel’s compliance with all laws and take proper administrative action against them. Even the Ombudsman cannot conduct an investigation independent of any administrative action taken by the Supreme Court nor can the Ombudsman’s findings be binding to it. Maceda v. Vasquez (1993) Facts A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman regarding the falsification of Judge Maceda of his certificate of service that he has decided on all cases submitted for decision when he was not able to render such.
Ruling In the absence of any administrative action taken against Judge Maceda by the court, the Ombudsman’s investigation on the matter is an encroachment of the power of administrative supervision of the SC. The constitutional grant of administrative authority to the SC includes its power to oversee the compliance of judges and court personnel with all laws and take proper action against them. Whenever a criminal complaint against a member of the court arises from their administrative duties, the ombudsman must defer action and refer it to the Supreme Court. In re Demetria (2001) Facts CA Justice Demetria was rumored/reported intercession in behalf of a known Drug Queen with the prosecutor to withdraw or settle the case. The Supreme Court then assigned a SC justice to investigate the said incident and appointed the Court Administrator as prosecutor. Ruling The conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice carries with it the responsibility to keep his actions proper and above suspicion. He must be free from even a whiff of impropriety not just in the performance of judicial duties but behavior as a private individual. The indiscretion of justice Demetria did not meet up to this expectation and undermined the integrity of the entire judiciary. $*"
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A position in the judiciary exacts great demand for moral righteousness and uprightness. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained in order to preserve the faith of the people in the judicial system. There is no place for the judiciary for those who cannot meet the standards of judicial conduct and integrity. The court sustained the findings of the investigating justice and dismissed justice Demetria. 2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest Only the Supreme Court can temporarily transfer judges but such transfer could only last for six months without consent of the judge concerned. In terms of permanent transfer the constitution is silent as to who can effectuate such. However, transfer imports removal from one office and because of security of tenure a permanent transfer cannot be affected without consent of the affected judge. The power to determine the residence of judges lies with the legislature as part of its power to provide additional qualification of judges of lower courts. 3. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice In People v. Gutierrez, the Supreme Court ruled that judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonable necessary for an effective administration of justice. Courts can do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.
To order a change of venue to another court of equal rank in a neighboring site is part of these incidental or inherent powers of courts whenever there is an imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial or to prevent a miscarriage of justice. It is not only the Supreme Court which has power to effect a change of venue as per the Gutierrez ruling. Mondiguing v. Abad (1975) Facts Petitioners seeks for a transfer of venue of their case to Baguio City or Quezon City because they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Abad is a protégé’ of the governor, and that the witnesses would be afraid to testify due to harassment. They further place that their lives as well as their lawyers and witnesses are in danger due to the rising tensions brought about by the case and their political rivalry with the governor. Ruling It is in the interest of the public to prosecute and punish the crime in the very place or as near as where it was committed. However the constitution grants the Supreme Court the prerogative to change the place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice. A change of venue is justified in the interest of justice and truth, and that there are sufficient reasons to believe that the trial would not result in a fair and impartial trial. People v. Sola (1981) Facts %+"
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Mayor Sola of Kabankalan was charged with murder. The trial was set at Himamaylan, 10 km. away from Kabankalan, the court granted them bail. Private Prosecutors then sought to effect a change of venue due to the influence of the accused in the area as well as reports of witness intimidation. Ruling Only the Solicitor General can file to the Supreme Court any petition in behalf of the People of the Philippines and not the fiscal or private prosecutors. The court evoked the People v. Gutierrez ruling that “to compel the prosecution to procced to trial in a locality where witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is a mockery of the purpose of the courts. The Supreme Court’s constitutional power to order a change of venue is appropriate in this case considering that witnesses are fearful for their lives if the trial was held at Himamaylan. The court must always consider the effect such fear has on the witnesses and in case of doubt then it should be construed in favor of a change in venue. A plea for change in venue can be done administratively. 4. Appointment of officials and employees of the entire judiciary The authority of the Supreme Court to appoint its own officials and employees is meant to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. However this authority is subject to the Civil Service Law. In addition Congress may give authority to the courts
“to appoint officers lower in rank” as per art. VII §6. a. Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights The power to promulgate rules on the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights is granted to the Supreme Court as part of its broad judicial power. The power to promulgate rules includes the power to suspend them in particular cases in order to do justice. One recent result of this power is the Writ of Amparo. 5. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure The power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure is part of the traditional powers of the Supreme Court. The summation of all powers granted to the Supreme Court in effect places into the hands of the Supreme Court the totality of the administration of justice making it a more independent judiciary. The Supreme Court also has the authority to disapprove rules promulgated by quasi-judicial bodies. The power to promulgate rules has the following limitations and guidelines ! Simplified and inexpensive procedure for speedy disposition of cases ! Uniform for all courts of the same grade ! Shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights Although the constitution no longer provides for congress to have the power to legislate on matters of procedure it is deemed to have retained such power under the principle of checks and balances. However in an obiter dictum in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice Justice Puno said without discussion that %!"
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! Enable Bar to discharge public responsibility effectively
Congress no longer has the power to amend rules of court (take note Obiter ito). 6. Admission to the practice of law The power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is not to be exercised at the pleasure of the court but must be done so with sound and judicial discretion.
As a body, the Integrated Bar is expected to strengthen the justice system by providing effective assistance, protection, improvement, of the public, its members and the judiciary itself.
The authority to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law is quasi-legislative and Congress has a revisory role subordinate to the Supreme Court. On the matter of the actual admission to the practice through application of these rules is a judicial function and Congress has no role in it.
8. Legal assistance to the underprivileged The totality of powers granted to the Supreme Court laid on it much of the justice system, through these powers the Supreme Court is mandated to provide for legal assistance to the underprivileged. It is logical to note that this is inherent to judicial power especially that if justice is to reign supreme the underprivileged must be offered the protection and assistance they could not normally afford.
7. Integration of the bar Integration of the Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as conditions to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Purposes of an Integrated Bar ! Assist in Administration of Justice ! Foster and maintain high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct among members ! Safeguard professional interest of members ! Cultivate a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood ! Provide a forum for discussion of law, jurisprudence, reform, pleading, practice and procedure and the relations of bar to the bench and to the public, and publish information on this ! Encourage and foster legal education ! Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law
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No quasi-judicial and administrative work for judges – Art. VIII, §12 All that is given to the judiciary is judicial power, courts cannot attempt to assume or be compelled to perform non-judicial functions. Art. VIII §12 prohibits their designation to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans Co. (1932) Facts: A statute was enacted, granting a franchise to an electric company that whenever a right-of-way is granted to any other entity over portions of franchise of the grantee, the compensation to be paid to the latter shall be fixed by the members of the SC, sitting as board of arbitrators. Ruling/Doctrine: The statute is unconstitutional. The functions performed are administrative and quasi-judicial in nature, which would result in the performance of duties the SC could not lawfully perform. The Court is asked to determine if the members of the Court may be constituted as a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all. In re Judge Rodolfo Manzano (1988) Facts: Judge Manzano is appointed by provincial governor to sit as a member of the Provincial Committee of Justice pursuant to Presidentail EO no. 856. %#"
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Petitioner asks Court if he can accept such designation without prejudice to his position as an RTC judge of Ilocos Norte. Ruling/Doctrine: No, he cannot. The Committee performs administrative functions and as such membership of the said judge is deemed unconstitutional. n. Fiscal autonomy • The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. • Appropriations may no be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year • Automatically and regularly released. • The basic aim is to assure judicial independence • Judiciary should not be exempt form the budgetary process of submitting and justifying its budget, except upon approval, it shall be automatically and regularly released. o. Report on the Judiciary • The SC shall within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress, an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary. • The purpose of this provision is not to subject the SC to the President and the Congress but simply to enable the judiciary to inform the government about its needs • This can also be the basis o appropriate legislation and government policies intended to improve the administration of justice and strengthen the judiciary. p. Automatic release of an appropriation for the Judiciary • Upon approval of the budget, it shall be automatically and regularly released. B. Congress 1. Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office a. Senate • 24 Senators elected at large (entire national electorate) by qualified voters of the Philippines
The number of Senators and the manner of electing them can only be changed by constitutional amendment o Senate looks on problems from a national, not parochial perspective Natural-born citizen of the Philippines At least 35 years old on the day of election. Able to read and write A registered voter Resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 year immediately preceding the day of election. o Domicile; physical presence not necessary Term of 6 years; commences at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election o 6 years: for the purpose of synchronizing elections No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms o Voluntary renunciation is not considered as an interruption o Can run again 3 years after the expiration of 2nd term o senatorial elections take place every 3 years and all are elected for a 6-year term o
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b. House of Representatives • Composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. o total membership may be raised from time to time by statute. • Kinds of representatives 1. District • Directly elected from the various legislative districts 2. Party-list • Chosen indirectly form a party elected by voters 3. Sectoral • Reserved seats intended to give meaningful representation to disadvantaged sectors. • This will last only for 3 consecutive terms following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution • Appointment by the President needs confirmation by the Commission on Appointments • Qualifications o District 1. natural-born citizen of the Philippines %$"
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2. 3. 4. 5.
at least 25 yrs old on the day of election able to read and write registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected resident of that district for not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. • Party-list 1. natural-born citizen of the Philippines 2. at least 25 yrs old on the day of elections 3. able to read and write 4. must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors • Term o 3 years, beginning at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election (starting date may be changed by law) o 3 years – for the purpose of synchronization of elections o Not more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation is not an interruption in the continuity of service. o If one is elected to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. o term vs. tenure – term is the period of time allotted to the office by law, while tenure is the period during which the official actually holds office. Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991) Facts: In section 67 of BP 881, members of the legislature are included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from public office from the moment of filing of their certificate of candidacy for another office. The President and the VP are exceptions. Dimaporo, after filing his candidacy for Governor of ARMM, was excluded from the Roll of Members of the HR. He challenged the law as an unconstitutional shortening of his term. Ruling/Doctrine: The law is constitutional. The law did not shorten his term; it merely shortened his tenure. The statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle
with the mandate, which they have received from their constituents. (However, this rule has been repealed by Farinas v. Executive Secretary. It was stated that a national elective official does not terminate his tenure by the mere fact of having filed for candidacy to a position different from what he is holding.) i. •
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Reapportionment Legislative districts shall be apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. o Gerrymandering – creation of representative districts out of separate portions of territory in order to favor a candidate. Each city with a population of at least 250k will have one district. If less than 250k, it will be represented as a part of one of the districts within the province. A province is entitled to 1 representative no matter what its population size. Creation of new districts must be done by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census in order to ensure that proportional representation is preserved. Basic principle behind the rule of apportionment is the concept of equality of representation, which is a basic principle of republicanism. Congress cannot be compelled to make a reapportionment.
Mariano v. COMELEC (1995) Facts: Section 52 of RA 7854, which provided for the conversion of the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city, was assailed as unconstitutional for its improper appropriation of legislative districts. Ruling/Doctrine: Court upheld that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. Also, the Constitution provides that a city with a population of at least 250k can have at least one representative . Therefore, said law is unconstitutional Aquino v. COMELEC (1995) %%"
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Facts: : Petitioner Aquino ran – and won – as congressman in the new district of Makati. To meet the residence requirement he transferred from Tarlac and leased a condominium in Makati. Respondents assail his eligibility for failure to comply with the residency requirement. Petitioner contends inter alia that it is legally impossible to impose the one-year residency requirement in newly created political district. Ruling/Doctrine: It is not legally impossible. A new political district is not created out of thin air. it is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic are, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. Candidates cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves to such new districts, prejudicing the genuine residents in the process. ii. • • •
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Party-List Representation Seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members if the sectors Those qualified are registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. PL representatives will constitute 20 per centum of the total number of representatives including the PL. (i.e. 250 representatives: 200 district representatives and 50 PL representatives.) Maximum number will be prescribed by law and the nominees will be arranged by the party or organization according to an order of priorities. RA 7941 requires parties, organizations, and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least 2 percent of the total votes cast for the PL system in order to be entitled to a PL seat. Those garnering more then 2% may have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. No party may have more than 3 seats. PL system limits participation to parties or organizations representing the “marginalized and underprivileged.” Court sees PL system not as a proportional system of representation designed to strengthen democracy but as a “sectoral representation” meant to promote social justice.
Requisites laid down by LG code: (a) 20% allocation; (b) 2% threshold (meaningful representation; prevent proliferation of small parties); (c) 3-seat
maximum (to ensure entry of various parties; no single-group dominance); (d) proportional representation (additional seat in proportion to number of votes) Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (2000) Facts: In May 1998, the first PL election was held simultaneously with the general elections. In June the Comelec en banc proclaimed 12 parties. In July PL PAG-ASA filed a petition to proclaim the full number of PL representatives as provided in the constitution. The issues raised were: 1) whether the 20% constitutional allocation is mandatory; 2) whtehr the 2% threshold requirement and the 3-seat limit is constitutional; and 3) how the additional seats of a qualified party should be determined. Ruling/Doctrine: 20% is a mere ceiling. It need not be filled. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the PL system of representation. 2% threshold and 3 seat limit set a mandatory number that must be filled or just a ceiling – Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituent deserving of representation were actually represented in Congress Panganiban’s Formula: may be replaced by the legislature via a statute a. (No. of district representatives/0.80) x 0.20 = No. of Party-list representatives b. (No. of votes of concerned party/No. of votes for first party) x No. of additional seats allocated to first party = Additional seats Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (2001) Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint calling for the disqualification of several party-list groups from the 2001 party-list election. Ruling/Doctrine: Seats reserved for party-list groups in Congress are to be reserved for the marginalized sectors, and that party-list nominees must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Partido ng Manggagawa and Butil Farmers Party v. COMELEC (2006) Facts: This case involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-list elections. Petitioners are claiming that they are entitled to additional seats in Congress. %&"
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Ruling/Doctrine: The prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans. Using the said formula, petitioners are not entitled to additional seats. (The product derived from the formula is less then 1, i.e. 0,7 for PM and 0.71 for Butil. Court did not round up these numbers.) 2. Election a. Regular Election • Elections shall be held on the 2nd Monday of May, unless otherwise provided by law. b. Special Election • In case of vacancy in the Senate or HR • The Senator or HR Member elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. • Service for the unexpired tem shall be counted as one term for the purpose of counting the successive allowable terms. • Not mandatory; and if held, no set prescribed date. • Candidates need not indicate whether they are running under a special or regular election. The right and duty to hold special election emanates form the statute and not from a call for the election by some authority like the COMELEC. • An election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by the law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. 3. Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications a. Salaries • The annual salary of members of the Congress has been initially fixed by Art XVIII, Sec 17 at Php204k, and the President of the Senate and the Speaker at Php240k, subject to change by the law. • No increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. • Retirement benefits of a legislator must be based in the salary in effect during his term and not on the increased salary of the subsequent term.
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1935 Consti: annual compensation included per diems and other emoluments or allowances. 1987 Consti: refers only to “salaries,” the fixed annual amount. 1971: set a limit to allowable travel, office and personnel expenses but was eventually withdrew for being an internal matter. There is no legal limit as to how much the Congress can appropriate, only a moral limit.
PHILCONSA v. Mathay (1966) Facts: RA 4134 authorized salary increases of the Speaker and Members of the HR. The petition seeks to enjoin the officials from allowing the payment of these increases because the said increase is unconstitutional. Respondents maintain that the expiration of term of members of the HR who approved should be enough to allow the remaining members of he HR to merit the increase, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate who approved, since the increase would not affect the Senate. Ruling/Doctrine: The salary increase should not be allowed. The provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term.” The intendment of the law also requires expiration of the fill term of all members of the Legislature who approved the salary increase. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. " Ligot v. Mathay (1974) Facts: Rep. Ligot’s term in Congress will expire December 30, 1969. He is entitled to retirement gratuity under Commonwealth Act 186, Sec 12(c) as amended by RA 4968. The incoming Members of Congress will have a salary increase from P7,200 to P32,000 as provided for under RA 4134. Petitioner argues that his retirement pay must be computed based on that salary increase, and not on his actual salary as Congressman. Auditor General denied his petition, as well as Rep. Singson’s who had a similar case. Ruling/Doctrine: His retirement pay should not be computed based on the new increased salary, which he never received as an incumbent. As held in Philconsa, any salary increase should not take effect until retirement of all legislators who approved it. To grant the petitioner’s claim is a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and thus allow what the Constitution prohibits. %'"
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b. Freedom from arrest • Immunity from all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment • Immunity applies for as long as Congress is in session, whether or not the legislator involved is actually attending it. • Privilege did not include immunity from arrest arising from an act or omission punishable by law. It only covers immunity from civil arrest, because a legislator/delegate can perform his functions effectively well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. • One who is convicted does not enjoy immunity from arrest. Martinez v. Morfe (1972) Facts: Petitioner Martinez was charged with falsification of a public document. For the purposes of qualifying in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, he said that he was born on June 20, 1945 when in fact he was born on June 20, 1946. Petitioner Bautista was proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He was later charged with electioneering. Petitioners, as delegates of the Constitutional Convention invoke immunity under the Constitutional Convention Act, which entitles delegates parliamentary immunities of a senator or representative. Ruling/Doctrine:The privilege of immunity under Sec. 15, Article 6 of the Consti does not cover prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace. The Martinez and Bautista cases fall under breach of peace. A breach of peace is any act that is defined by the RPC or any special statute. Further, the immunity extends only to CIVIL cases not CRIMINAL. Granting immunity when it comes to arrest is tantamount to creating a privileged class. c. Speech and Debate Clause • Members are guaranteed immunity from answerability before an outside forum but nit from an answerability to the disciplinary authority of the Congress itself. • To come under the guarantee the “speech or debate” must be one made in the Congress or in any committee thereof (not only the locale of the speech but the nature.) • Said expression refers to the utterances made by the Congressmen in the performance of their official function
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Essential requirement for its applicability has always been that the action involved must be legislative action.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang Facts: Cabangbang, a member of the House of Representatives, published in newspapers a letter to the President (while Congress is not in session) regarding a planned coup d’etat. Planners were unnamed bit the alleged instruments were identified. He was sued for libel. The issue is WON the publication in question is a privileged communication. Ruling/Doctrine: Such letter to the President when Congress is not in session, and the Congressman-writer is not performing his official duty, is not covered by the privilege under Sec 15 of Art VI. However, the letter is not libelous. Osmena v. Pendatun Facts: Rep. Sergio Osmeña attacked Pres. Garcia in a speech given in the House, charging – albeit without any evidence – the latter of selling pardons and other Presidential duties to those who can afford it (i.e. that the President was accepting bribery). A few weeks after, before the House finished its session, the President’s allies in the lower house suspended Rep. Osmeña for fifteen months for seriously imputing the President of bribery without evidence to substantiate it Ruling/Doctrine: It is true that the Constitution provided that for any speech or debate made in Congress a member thereof shall not be questioned in any other place. However, one should observe the word “other”: shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution guarantees the independence and free of a legislator to express himself w/o fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before any court or forum outside the Congressional Hall, but he is still made responsible before the legislative body itself. d. Disqualifications and other prohibitions • A member of the Congress may not hold, during his tenure as member, any other office in the government or in any of its instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. • Since the prohibition is only during his tenure, a legislator is not prevented from accepting an appointment. %("
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If he chooses to accept another office, he automatically forfeits his seat in Congress. No member shall be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Members of the Congress are not allowed to personally appear as counsel before any court o may not be circumvented under the guise of appearing “ in intervention” in one’s behalf. o Legislator may appear in person if in fact he is a genuine party in the case. o A firm where a Member is a partner is allowed to appear as counsel. They are not allowed to have any interest in a contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government during his term. o Thus, they cannot be member of the board of corporations with contracts with the government Neither may a legislator “intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. These prohibitions are intended to prevent members from taking advantage of their position in their dealings with courts, any govt agency, or in their business operations.
Flores v. Drilon Facts: RA 7227 provided that for the first year of operations of SBMA from the effectivity of the said law, mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the SBMA. Petitioners filed a taxpayer’s suit, assailing the constitutionality of the provision. Said provision violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. Ruling/Doctrine: Provision is unconstitutional. Elected officials cannot hold more than one government position, unless that position is automatically attached to that particular office. e. Duty to disclose
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Members of Congress shall, upon assumption of office, make full disclosure of their financial and business interest. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. However, this does not prevent the legislator from filing the proposed legislation. This merely enables the house to examine the arguments he might present in the context of his personal interest. Records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law. Such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit, which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to, and expenses incurred for each member.
4. Internal Government of Congress A. Election of Officers Officers: 1. Senate President 2. Speaker of the House 3. Such officers as deemed by each house to be necessary. Election of officers: by a majority vote of all its respective Members Santiago vs. Guingona (1998) Facts: • Miriam and Tatad (who belong to the People Reform’s Party) instituted a petition for quo warranto against the election of Guingona as minority leader of the Senate. They sought for the declaration of Tatad as the rightful minority leader. In the election of officers, Fernan and Tatad were nominated for the position of president. Fernan won. • Tatad manifested that being the only other member of the minority who ran for that position, he was assuming the position of minority leader. The votes cast for Fernan comprised the ‘majority’, and the votes cast for him were the ‘minority’. • During the discussion on who should constitute the ‘minority’, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP chose Guingona as minority leader, as manifested by Flavier. No concensus on the question was arrived at for 3 days. Majority Leader Drilon informed the HR on 30 July %)"
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1998 that Lakas-NUCD-UMDP chose Guingona as the minority leader, and was then recognized as such by Fernan. The following day, Miriam and Tatad filed this petition before the SC. Ruling/Doctrine: • Petitioners held that majority is the group who voted for winning Senate President and accepted committee chairmanships. Whereas, the minority is the group who voted for the losing candidate for Senate President and accepted no such chairmanships. • However, the Supreme Court held that the majority is the political party to which most number of lawmakers belonged (concept of plurality). • The Constitution is silent as regards the manner of electing officers other than the Senate President and the House Speaker. Hence, it is within the province of the Legislative, not the Supreme Court, as conferred by the Constitution. • As Guingona belonged to Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, one of the minority parties of the Senate, Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader. Avelino vs. Cuenco (1949) Facts: • During the Senate session on February 21, 1949, Senate President Avelino walked out of the session hall followed by nine other senators. This left only twelve senators in the session hall. (Of the twenty four senators, one was in the United States and another in a local hospital.) The Senate President Pro-Tempore then took over and, by a resolution approved by the twelve remaining senators, the position of Senate President was declared vacant, and Senator Cuenco was designated Acting Senate President. Avelino brought the case to court asking whether the twelve senators who had designated Cuenco as Senate President constituted a quorum. Ruling/Doctrine: • By a vote of 6-4, the Court refused to assume jurisdiction. It declared that the controversy was political in nature and that the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president should not be taken over by the judiciary. • In addition, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators (10 walked out and 1 is out of the country).
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When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House.” The 12 senators ratified their actions placing them beyond a shadow of doubt, especially since at most, only 11 Senators can vote for Avelino.
C. Rules of Proceedings Each house shall determine its own procedural rules. Corollary to Congress’ power to make rules is the power to ignore them when circumstances require. Issues may either be: Political - on matters affecting only internal operation of the legislature, the legislature’s formulation and implementation of its rules. Justiciable - when the legislative rule affects private rights. Pacete vs. Sec. of Commission on Appointments (1971) Facts: • Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received. Ruling/Doctrine: • The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: “Resolution of the Commission on any %*"
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appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case, Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission. o In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever. o What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved. “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.” o A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia (1997) Facts: • Petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. • The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading and transmitted to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. • The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. • Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. • On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. • Petitioners’ principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art. VI, §16(3) that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious. • Respondents’ defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. Ruling/Doctine: &+"
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D. Power over members and right to sit
Facts: • Petitioners (Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romera – Nacionalista party) were elected among the top 16 senators in the April 1946 elections. However, due to the rampant terrorism and violence in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac; the senate approved the Pendatun resolution ordering petitioners not be sworn, nor seated as members of the Senate pending the investigation. If the votes cast for the petitioners in the said regions were to be nullified, they would not get enough votes to claim their seats in Senate. It was alleged that the voting in the mentioned provinces did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. Ruling/Doctrine: • The Senate has not exceeded its powers. The senate did not usurp the powers of the Electoral Tribunal. Independent of a constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter’s rights to participate in its deliberations. The constitution provides limits upon the plenary rights of the legislative. The Electoral Tribunal on the other hand, is given jurisdiction over all contests relating to elections. • The Senate as a branch of the legislative department had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by legislature practice, it can create orders in preserving its prestige and dignity. The Senate made no error in putting into probability the Electoral Tribunal annulling the election returns in the provinces mentioned earlier where there was widespread violence. It was an exercise of the authority, discretion, and inherent power of selfpreservation (initiated by dictates of precaution or public policy). • The Senate was avoiding undesirable results from the participation of disqualified members in its deliberations. Pendatun Resolution entry: In order to maintain alive the respect for democratic institutions among our people, no man or group of men should be permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which should underline all elections under the Constitution.
Vera vs. Avelino (1946)
E. Discipline of Members
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What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Therefore, it cannot be subject to judicial review. The case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of the Court’s power. Petitioners were not prevented from seeking reconsideration. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
Osmeña vs Pendatun, supra Ruling/Doctrine: • The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. - "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
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Each House may punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members: • Suspension (not exceeding sixty days). • Expulsion. Other disciplinary measures: 1. Deletion of unparliamentary remarks from the record. 2. Fine 3. Imprisonment 4. Censure Alejandrino vs. Quezon (1924) Facts: • A resolution was adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924 for disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District. • Petitioner contends that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. • By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point. • This is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. Ruling/Doctrine: • Because of the separation of powers, the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.
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Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
Osmeña vs Pendatun, supra Ruling/Doctrine: • Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. • For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan (2001) Facts: • Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan to preventively suspend petitioner in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). Ruling/Doctrine: • Sandiganbayan had authority to order the petitioner’s preventive suspension. o It is a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon the determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course. o Preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Section 13 does not state that the public officer must be suspended only in &#"
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the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. o The requirement of valid information does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before a trial on the merits proceeds. o It does not contemplate a proceeding to determine the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, the gravity of the offense charged, or whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is the adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him. RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
De Venecia va. Sandiganbayan (2002) Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as SecretaryGeneral of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari. Ruling/Doctrine: • As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., it was held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. F. Journal and Congressional Records • An enrolled bill is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the certifications of the presiding officers of each House. • Where the certifications are valid and not withdrawn, the contents of the enrolled bill are conclusive upon the courts. • Respect due to a co-equal department requires the courts to accept the certification of the presiding officer of the legislative body. Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, supra Ruling/Doctrine: • A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts (Enrolled Bill Rule). Casco (Phil.) Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez (1963) Facts: &$"
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Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement Circular No. 95, the bank disseminated a memorandum on the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in RA No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, CASCO bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde. They paid the margin fee of PHP 33 765.42. In May 1960, CASCO purchased foreign exchange again and paid the margin fee of PHP 6 345.72. • Previously, CASCO sought the refund of their earlier payment, relying on the Resolution No. 1529 (which declares that the importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee) of the bank’s Monetary Board. After the last importation, CASCO again sought a refund for the PHP 6 345.72 they paid. The Central Bank issued the vouchers for refund, but the Auditor of the bank refused to pass and approve said vouchers, because the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for CASCO’s separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is not in accordance with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of RA No. 2609. on appeal, the Auditor General affirmed the action of Central Bank’s Auditor. Ruling/Doctrine: • The urea formaldehyde referred to is the finished product, different from urea and formaldehyde. • CASCO says that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and—thus, Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately, not as a finished product. To back its claim, CASCO cited the statements made on the Senate’s floor by its members during the consideration of the bill. But said individual statements do not reflect the view of the Senate. • Further, the enrolled bill—which states urea formaldehyde—is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the members of the Congress and approved by the Executive—the remedy is by amendment—not by judicial decree. •
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The Journal is conclusive upon the courts. But when the contents of the journal conflicts with that of an enrolled bill, the enrolled bill prevails over the contents of the journal. The duty to keep a journal has a dual purpose: o To insure publicity of the proceedings of the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective constituents; and o To provide proof of what actually transpired in the legislature.
United States vs. Pons (1916) Facts: • Juan Pons et al, charged with illegal importation of opium. Each were found guilty of the crime and were charged – thus, the appeal of Juan Pons. • In the motion, counsel of Pons alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that act no. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed nor approved on or before the said date. But on March 1; (the journal stated that the session ended 12:00 midnight sine die, however, it is maintained with corroboration by witnesses that the clock was stopped and the session actually ended on the early hours of the day after) thus null and void. Ruling/Doctrine: • The court held that if the clock was stopped, “the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery and memory.” This led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. To take this rule away for one purpose is to take it away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters.
2. Probative value of the Journal &%" "
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Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time by facts resting only in the memory of the individuals.
3. Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory Astorga vs Villegas (1974) Facts: • March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. The bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, Senator Arturo Tolentino introduced substantial amendments. The Senate approved those amendments. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. • On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. • The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of
the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065. • Upon knowing about this, Senator Tolentino, issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, addressed a letter to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. The president also officially withdrew his signature on House Bill No. 9266 adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress." • Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065. • Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then ViceMayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065. Ruling/Doctrine: • RA4095 is not valid. It was NOT duly enacted and thus it never became law to begin with. Journal entry doctrine was followed here. It was held that it was the approval by congress which was essential &&"
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to the validity of the law and not the signatures of the presiding officers. In examining the journals (a requirement found in the constitution) of the legislative chambers, it was seen how Tolentino’s amendments were approved but were not incorporated in the law. (In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065… is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent.) Morales vs. Subido (1969) Facts: • HB was amended with Sen. Rodrigo’s suggestion, but somewhere in the legislative process caused part of the bill to be dropped, changing the whole spirit. The phrase ‘who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher’ was changed to ‘has served the police department of a city or has served as officer in the Armed Forces…’. From the evidence presented, the omission of the phrase was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. Ruling/Doctrine: • The Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. • US v Pons does not apply because it did not involve a discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the Journal. 4. Congressional Record Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. 5. Sessions A. Regular Sessions • Convenes once every year on the 4th Monday of July.
Continues to be in session until 30 days before the start of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. B. Special Sessions • Called by the President at any time when Congress is not is session. C. Adjournments Neither House can adjourn for more than three days during the time Congress is in session without the consent of the other House. Neither House can they adjourn to any other place that that where the two houses are sitting, without the consent of the other. •
D. Joint Sessions i. Voting Separately - Choosing the President (Art VII, Sec.4) Determining President’s temporary disability (Art VII, Sec.11, Par. 4) -Declaring a State of War [Art. VI, Sec. 23(1)] -Amending the Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec.1(1)] ii. Voting Jointly - To revoke or extend martial law or suspension of privilege of habeas corpus (Art VII, Sec. 18) 5. Electoral Tribunals A. Composition 1. Three Supreme Court justices to be designated by the Chief Justice (the senior justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.) 2 Six members of the Senate or House, as the case may be, chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and party-list organizations. -The Electoral Tribunal shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and House shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. -Members chosen enjoy security of tenure and cannot be removed by mere change of party affiliation. Tañada vs. Cuenco (1957) Facts: • The majority party filled the two seats intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are not enough &'"
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minority members in the Senate. Only Senator Tañada was a member of the minority in the Senate. Ruling/Doctrine: • The question was governed by a specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.” • The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate a situation in which they were only one Senator from the minority. As such, scrutinizing the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, the insertion of such provision was equal representation between the majority and minority in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Hence, the substitute appointment of the two majority Senators is null and void. Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (1988) Facts: • On October 9, 1987 the petitioiners filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in May 11, 1987 congressional elections by COMELEC. • SET was composed of 3 Justices of the SC and 6 Senators. (Justices Yap, Narvasa and Gutierrez; Senator Estrada, Gonzales, Guingona, Lina Jr., Tamano and Ziga). • Senator Joseph Estrada resigned from the SET, and was replaced by Senator Enrile. • On November 17, 1987 petitioners filed with the SET a motion for disqualification or inhibation of the Senator-members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the election contest on the ground that they are all interested parties to the case. • Some members of the SET voluntarily inhibited themselves from participating in the hearing and deliberations of the tribunal in the cases against them.
After the filing of respective memorandas and oral arguments, the motion for disqualification or inhibition and motion for consideration of the petitioners were denied. Hence, the present case. • Petitioners contend that consideration of public policy, fair play and due process require the mass disqualification of the SET’s Senatormembers. • And that the SET’s rules of procedure should be amended in order to permit the contest to be decided only by the 3 Justice-members. Ruling/Doctrine: • By providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating ti the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. • The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justice-Members alone the power of valid jurisdiction of a senatorial election contest. •
B. Nature and Function Jurisdiction: be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction only when there is an election contest. Election contest – one where a defeated candidate challenges the qualification and claims for himself the seat of a proclaimed winner. Angara vs. Electoral Commission (1936) • The new constitution for the Independent Philippine Commonwealth was just promulgated. The petitioner, Angara, ran for the position of representative of the First District of the Province of Tayabas to the NA September 17, 1935 against Ynsua (one of the respondents) and others. On October 7, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the candidate who won the most votes and thus the winner. He took his oath of office on November 15 (the start of the Commonwealth) and was confirmed by the NA on December 3 as an uncontested member of the NA. Also on this day, Res#8 was passed by the NA, confirming the membership of non-protested elections of members of the NA and, in effect, limiting the time for presentation &("
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of protests. However, there was the ELECOM, which was a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide “all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the NA”, was just being formed on December 4 and 6 and just met for the first time on December 9, fixing that day as the last day for the filing of election protests. Ynsua filed his “Motion of Protest” to the ELECOM on December 8, a day before the said body ended the period for filing of election protest. • After that, Angara filed a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest” to the ELECOM on the grounds that he was already confirmed a member of the NA through the Res#8 and through that resolution, the prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest because he filed the protest after December 3. • Ynsua filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” arguing that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested after confirmation of the NA. Angara replied to this “Answer” but the ELECOM promulgated a resolution denying the petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”. Ruling/Doctrine: • ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM. C. Independence of Electoral Tribunals The tribunal was created to function as a non-partisan court although twothirds of its members are politicians Valid grounds / just cause for termination of membership to the tribunal: • Expiration of Congressional term of office
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Death or permanent disability Resignation from political party which represents the tribunal Removal from office for other valid reasons.
Bondoc v Pineda (1991) Facts: • This case involved a blatant attempt of a political party to manipulate the decision of the Tribunal by manipulating its membership. On the eve of the promulgation of a decision against a member of LDP, said party expelled Camasura from the party, and thus as LDP representative in the HRET, on the ground of disloyalty. Ruling/Doctrine: • The HRET, the sole judge of all contests, returns and qualifications of members of the House, shall be independent and shall not be interfered with by the House of Representatives • Expulsion from a party, and hence from HRET is void if there is a clear showing of impairment of the Tribunals prerogative to be the sole judge of election contests. Angara v Electoral Commission FACTS: - The 1935 National Assembly passed on December 3, 1935 a Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of those representatives whose respective wins have not been challenged. - Subsequently, the Electoral commission adopted a resolution on December 9, 1935 setting such a date (December 9) as the last day for filing election protests. - Conformably, Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against herein petitioner Jose Angara seeking the latter’s proclamation be rescinded or that the results of the elections in the first district of the Province of Tayabas be nullified. - Petitioner filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest” on the grounds that Resolution No. 8 had validly prescribed the period during which protests against the election of its member should be presented. Therefore, the protest by private respondent Ynsua was filed out of time. &)"
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- The Electoral Commission denied herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest” - Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition be issued against the Electoral Commission to restrain and prohibit it from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua. HELD: - SC said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers did not intend for the different branches of government to be absolutely unrestrained and completely independent of each other and the Constitution had provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances. The Judiciary by virtue of section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution is the only organ which can be called upon to determine the proper definition of such limits and allocation of such powers so it is clear that the SC has jurisdiction over the EC. - SC recognizing that the Electoral Commission is the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election,” found that Resolution No 8 of the National Assembly had no binding power on the EC. As such the EC acted completely within its jurisdiction in entertaining the election protest filed by private respondent Ynsua. # In relation to POWER of the Electoral Commission: Supreme Court >Electoral Commission > National Assembly
e. Judicial review of decisions of Electoral Tribunals Co v Electoral Tribunal FACTS: - On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. - Among the candidates who vied for the position was Antonio Co and Jose Ong, Jr. - Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. - But Co filed an election protests saying Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
- The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found Ong as a Filipino. HELD: - The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution) - The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. So any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court # In relation to Judicial Review of ET: Courts as much as possible don’t interfere since the sole jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals are constitutionally mandated BUT by virtue of the check and balance system, the courts can (and they do) settle constitutional questions, SO they COULD interfere IF there is clear abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. 6. Commission on Appointments (Art 6, 18-19) Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. BERNAS NOTES: COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS &*"
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- Total composition including chairman is 25 - 1935 ET: preferential representation only to the two largest political parties in each house - 1987 ET: proportional representation of all parties and party lists. Sectors will be represented only if they have a party list. - Coseteng v Mitra Jr.: Coseteng didn’t deserve a seat in COA because the number of party membership didn’t qualify since the party must have at least 16.8 members to be represented but she was the only member so no seat even if she had the support of other members not part of her party. - Guingona v Gonzales: didn’t count the fractional seats because to round them off would go against the idea of proportional representation so even if the total was only 11 members it was allowed since SC said the 12 person membership was not mandatory. - Daza v Singson: the composition of COA must be proportional to the size of the political parties so periodic reorganization may be necessary to reflect the changes. These changes have to be permanent and not temporary in character (so shifting votes of members, even if the shift was arranged, doesn’t qualify a reorganization since it is not a permanent change). - Footnote: In the case where Tanada was given a seat in COA even if he was only one member, was not considered precedent by the SC for reconsidering the ruling on Guingona v Gonzales because the Tanada action was not questioned in court. - COA tenure has a certain measure of stability so they can properly discharge their duties. - The commission itself, once formed, is independent of Congress even if their members are from the houses. - It is not an agent since the COA’s power is not from Congress but from the Constitution. - By virtue of its independence, it can promulgate its own rules and the SC can not pass upon the correctness of the interpretation placed by the Commission of its own rules. - ET and COA have to be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the HoR have elected a president and a speaker. - Though the 2 commissions are not coetaneous with Congress, COA may only meet when Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman and majority of all its members. The frequency and duration of the meetings shall be up to the Commission.
- It is because of this that art 7 sec 16 makes provisions for appointments made when the congress is not in session (since COA can not meet) - COA is intended as an administrative check to the appointing powers of the president. - On the other hand, to check COA, it shall act on appointments within 30 session days from submission AND they rule by majority vote. Daza v Singson FACTS: - Daza was chosen as 1 of the representatives of the LP in the Commission on Appointments. Almost a year after his election, the LDP was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the HR. 24 LP members resigned and joined LDP. LDP membership increased to 159, with LP to 17. Hence, the representation in the COA had to be revised, resulting to the withdrawing of Daza’s seat in favor of Singson from LDP. Daza contended that he cannot be removed from COA because his election to COA was permanent. The reorganization of the HR is not based on permanent political realignment because LDP was not a duly registered political party. Singson contended that the issue was political in nature, and the Constitution did not provide for political parties to be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the COA. HELD: - SC has jurisdiction since the issue at hand does not involve a discretionary act of the HR but the legality of removing Daza from COA. - Cunanan ruling: HR can reorganize membership of the Commission at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided that such changes are permanent. The transfer to LDP was a permanent change. COMELEC granted LDP’s petition for registration as a political party. - If petitioner’s claim that even if registered, LDP must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence were followed, then even LP would be at a loss. LP was created in 1945, yet it was allowed to represent in the COA and the ET in 1946. The independents would then be not represented because they do not belong to any political party. Coseteng v Mitra FACTS: - After the congressional elections of May 1987, the HOR, elected 11 out of 12 Congressmen into the Commission on Appointments. Upon nomination '+"
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of the Minority Floor Leader, the House added Roque Ablan as the 12th member of the Commission (representing coalesced minority in the House). - A year later, the LDP was organized as the new majority party (w/158 out 202 members from the House). Thus, the House reorganized the Commission on Appointments in order to ensure party representation. - Petitioner Coseteng requested Speaker Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission of Appointments and HRET. Said request was endorsed by 9 other Congressmen. - The reorganization of the Commission took place as scheduled (the only change being the replacement of Daza w/ Singson). As a result, Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed this petition for extraordinary legal writs (w/c is considered a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court declare null and void the election of several Congressmen into the Commission. Her action is based on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because of the ff. reasons: 1) The LDP is only entitled to 9 seats out of 12 (they were given 10) 2) The members representing the political parties had to be nominated by their respective parties 3) Nomination and election of Verano-Yap and Ablan as representatives of the minority are invalid because they were neither nominated nor elected by such party. HELD: - Pertinent in this case is Article 6, Sec. 18 of the Constitution - The ruling LDP comprises 80% of the House. 80% of 12 members of the Commission would equal to 9.6 members (rounded off to 10). The remaining 2 seats are apportioned to 1) LP, the next highest party in the Coalesced Minority, and 2) KBL, as the principal opposition party. Such apportionment was done on the basis of political representation. - The other political parties like KAIBA are bound by the majority’s choices. Even if it were considered as an opposition party, it certainly isn’t the PRINCIPAL as it only represents .4% of House membership (Coseteng is the sole member of KAIBA). - It should be noted that to be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission, the political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership.
- Additionally: all the Commission members were properly nominated and elected under Article 6, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Guingona v Gonzales FACTS: - The Senate’s composition after the 1992 Elections were as such: LDP(15) NPC(5) LAKAS-NUCD (3) LP-PDP-LABAN(1) - The Senate promulgated this formula to distribute the seats amongst themselves: # of senators of a political party x 12 seats total # of senators elected - Following this formula, the distribution resulted to fractional seats. LDP(7.5) NPC(2.5) LAKAS-NUCD(1.5) LP-PDP-LABAN (.5) - LDP submitted 8 names and this was protested. To resolve this a compromise was agreed LDP was given 8 seats, both NPC and LAKAS each have 2, and LP coalition have 1. - Sen. Guingona filed a petition to the COA for prohibiting the membership of Sen. Romulo as the 8th senator of LDP and Sen. Tañada as the sole senator of LP, on the grounds that the compromise was in violation of the rule of proportional representation accorded by the Constitution (not mentioned how COA resolved this). - The compromise gave an additional fraction of seat (and thus vote) to both LDP and LP and took away a fraction of seat/vote from both NPC and LAKAS. HELD: - The seat held by Sen. Romulo and Tañada are unconstitutional. - The formula provided by the Senate is the best manner of application in implementing sec 18, Art VI of the Constitution. The problem though is what can be done of the fractional seat. The compromise seems to violate the Constitution since it therefore doesn’t make the representation of the Senate in COA proportional. A party gains a seat while another loses one. - In Philippine jurisprudence, a party/coalition must have two or more Senators to automatically have at least one seat in the representatives of the Senate in the Commission of Appointments. This has been established in Coseteng v. Mitra. This thereby automatically disqualifies Tañada. The LP need not worry since LP is still represented in the COA because Enrile, an LP member of the House has been appointed to the Commission. The '!"
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LP also has the option to form a coalition w/ other Senate parties to gain a seat in the COA. - The Senate need not appoint exactly 12 Senators to the COA. What is required is that the COA has at least 13 members (including the ex officio chairperson, so minus the chairperson, only 12 is needed) for it to function. This is because sec. 19, Art VI of the Constitution states that the COA may be called into session by 13 of its members. Now, the Rules of the COA states that there must be at least 4 members from each House for the Commission to work. - Thus, insofar as the parties are proportionally represented, it doesn’t matter if the Senate only appoints 8 members as long as the House can appoint (following the same proportional rule) 4 members; or that the Senate only appoints 6 members so long as the House can appoint 6 also. 7. Powers of Congress a. General Plenary Powers (Art 6, 1) Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. BERNAS NOTES: - Vote on 1986 Unicam v Bicam Debate: 23-22 - Philippines has a plenary grant of legislative power meaning, any power that is deemed to be legislative is necessarily possessed by the Congress UNLESS the constitution has vested it elsewhere. (ex. Legislative power was also given to the people through exercise of initiative and referendum) - PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: Congress alone can make laws and it may not delegate its law making power to anyone else. - Can’t pass irrepealable laws since to allow it would in effect bind a subsequent one and therefore reduce the legislative power that that Congress can wield. Imagine if this process is repeated, it may come that all the congress is doing is to enact the laws passed by their predecessors since there is no more room for new legislation having all avenues been barred by the irrepealable laws.
- Ours is a limited legislative power. Limited by the constitution and each department can only exercise a power that is expressly given and the ones necessarily implied to give effect to that power. - It is subject to substantive limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power and the allowable subjects of legislation which are chiefly found in art 3 (Bill of Rights). - Procedural limitations: prescribe the manner of passing bills and the form they should take. - The ‘87 grant of legislative power is not exclusive since some are reserved for the people exercised through initiative and referendum since past experience tell us that the legislative assemblies cannot always be trusted to do what is best for the people (bitter much? :p ) - The 10% requirement (of registered voters) for national and 3% for every legislative district SHOULD BOTH be satisfied - Whereas the legislative powers of congress is plenary the scope of the power of the people is subject to exceptions congress may impose. - The president can veto the outcome of “initiative and referendum” only if he was allowed by law (explicitly allowed by Congress in the law that would make operational how the initiative system will work), to do so. - Exercise of legislative power of president (Marcos and Aquino) page 681 685 - 3 distinct ideas that lead to non delegation of power of legislative o Separation of power – why bother separating if you can merge anyway o Due process of law – precludes transfer of regulatory functions to private persons o Delegata potestas non potest delegari – it’s a breach of law if legislature gives legislative powers to the executive or the judiciary and vice versa - Justification of the delegated legislative power of administrative agencies: o They merely fill up the details of the statute o Congress may pass a contingent legislation – legislation which leaves to another body the duty of ascertaining facts that are necessary to bring the law into actual operation. - Guidelines to ensure that the power delegated to administrative agencies is not law - making but merely law – execution: o Must be complete in itself: must give the policy to be carried our o Must fix a standard: the limits must be determinable '#"
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! In short, there has to be a way to determine with reasonable certainty if the delegate has acted within or beyond his scope - Violating rules by admin agencies that have the force of the law may be punished as a penal offense - BUT for admin regulation to have force of penal law it is necessary o That the delegating statute itself considers the violation a crime o That the orig statute provides the penalty o That the regulation should be published - The one recognized exception to the non-delegability is the legislative powers exercised by the LGUs on purely local matters. - On the local level, the principle of separation of powers don’t strictly apply between the exec and law-making body. Hence, a local law-making body may be given executive functions. In this case, the rules binding administrative agencies also apply to the local law-making body. - The constitution itself may create other exceptions to the non-delegability rule. - Ex. o Art 6 sec 23(2) where the congress can give the president powers necessary to carry out national policies during times of war and other national emergencies o Art 6 sec 28(2) authorizes congress to delegate power to fix tariff rates etc. Arnault v Nazareno FACTS - On 1950, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8, creating a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates Deal, involving transactions of the Government with a certain Ernest Burt with funds amounting to 5M pesos. - The committee called and examined various witnesses, including petitioner, who was a representative of Burt. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of the sum of P440, 000 in a transaction involving Arnault. - Petitioner has continually refused to name the recipient in different Q&A sessions in the Senate, claiming that he does not remember the name of the person, and he was merely verbally instructed by Burt to deliver the said amount.
- In subsequent sessions, Arnault claims that he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. This implied that if he named the recipient of the P440, 000, he would possibly be charged and that his answer might be incriminating. Arnault begged the Senate not to make him answer the questions. - The senate then deliberated and adopted a resolution holding Arnault in contempt, where he was put in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms (respondent) and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the senate or to the committee the name of the person. HELD: - Yes the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt. The name of the person Arnault is refusing to give is very pertinent and is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. - The Court said that the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry. The matter at hand is of public concern, since P5M in Govt funds is involved, it is not disputed that this issue is well within the jurisdiction of the Senate as a legislative body. - The Court held that it is difficult to decide if the Senate can commit the petitioner for contempt beyond the duration of the session. However, the Court maintained that if they were to hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. And it would be an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure. b. Limitations on the Legislative Power (1) substantive limitations (a) express substantive limitations (Art 3; art 6, 25 and 28; art 14, 4(3); art 6, 29-31) Article 3 Bill of Rights. Article 6 Section 25. 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. '$"
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2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. 3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. 4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. 5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. 6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Section 28. 1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. 2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. 4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. Article 14, sec 4 (3) 3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. - The provision that no money shall be paid out except those according to the appropriations bill is a limit not on the congress but on the executive. - However, this doesn’t mean congress is completely free to appropriate money. Art 6 sec 24, 25 and 29 and art 7 sec 22 contains the explicit restrictions on the power of congress not to mention the blanket prohibition that public funds may only be used for public purpose. - Provisions unrelated to the appropriation bill are considered prohibited “riders” and is unconstitutional. - President has an all powerful “item-veto”, s/he can veto anything in the Appropriations Bill. Article 6 sec 29-31 Section 29. 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. '%"
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3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted. - Power to appropriate carries the power of not only to specify the amount but also the purpose for which it may be spent. - After Congress appropriates, it is actually the executive who will spend - Special funds: if the purpose the fund was created is fulfilled or abandoned then it will be transferred to the general funds. This is to prevent abuse in its disposition. - Art 8 sec 2 gives the congress power to apportion the jurisdiction of courts except those fixed by the consti. - Art 30 doesn’t prohibit the congress from increasing the jurisdiction of the SC but simply prescribes that any increase should be with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court - Sec 31 was traditionally part of BoR but the ‘86 Con Com decided to transfer it to Art 6 (b) implied substantive limitations 1. prohibition against delegation of legislative powers i. criterion of valid deligation ABAKADA Guro Party list FACTS: - Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). - RA 9337 imposes 10% VAT and has provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006—under certain conditions.
CONTENTIONS: o Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. o that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% that is contingent on any of two conditions being satisfied (1. VAT collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent; 2. National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent), violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people. o Petitioners’ argument is premised on the constitutional right of nondeprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. HELD: RA 9337 is constitutional. - Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that “the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law— complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable—and to determine the expediency of its enactment. - The rule is that in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation. - The general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or exceptions: o Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; o Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; o Delegation to the people at large; o Delegation to local governments; and '&"
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o Delegation to administrative bodies. - In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. - While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. -The case is not a delegation of legislative power. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into. US v Ang Tang Ho FACTS: - In 1919 the Philippine Legislature passed Act 2826 which penalized holding a monopoly on palay, rice and corn; regulated the distribution; and authorized Gov Gen (with consent of Council of State) to issue rules and regulations for the distribution. - When the Gov Gen feels like the situation is an emergency he (with Council of State approval) can regulate distribution, sale of palay, rice and corn. He shall declare laws which are inconsistent to this unlawful. People who don’t follow will be penalized. - Aug 1, 1919 Gov Gen fixed price of rice but on Aug 8, 1919 Ang Tang Ho was charged with excessive pricing. Ho was found guilty, and appealed. HELD - Legislature can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things which decide whether a law should be enacted or not
- BUT the law should be complete, in all its term and provisions, nothing substantial must be left to the judgment of appointees. - If Act is a law unto itself then it simply authorizes the Gov Gen to carry that law into effect. There is no delegation. On the other hand, if the Act isn’t a law or a crime and it needs the Governor General to do a legislative act to make it a crime or a law—that is delegation of legislative power and is unconstitutional. In the present case: - The Gov Gen’s proclamation fixes the price of rice differently in different provinces and also instructs provincial treasurers to follow instructions from the Director of Commerce and Industry. (the power delegated to the Gov Gen was delegated again) - Legislature left an undefined law to the discretion of the Gov Gen which therefore makes the delegation not valid. a. No specific cause that would signify justification for act b. No conditions of fixing the price (regarding quality and grade) c. No specific definition on what to do (how much to raise prices etc) Decision - Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional and void. By the terms of the Organic Act, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. - Ang Tang Ho was released since all he basically did was violate the proclamation of the Governor General but since it doesn’t have the power of a law, he can’t be imprisoned. Committing a non-crime can’t be punished. Solicitor General v MMA FACTS - In MMA, West Traffic District vs. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of driver’s license is prohibited under PD 1605 except under LOI 43 when there are stalled vehicles causing obstruction to traffic. Judgment became final and executory. - Several complaints were presented and submitted to the Court when their license got confiscated. - Dir.Gen. Nazareno of PNP assured the court that is had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and directed full compliance with the decision in a memorandum called “Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates” - Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver’s license. ''"
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- Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991: authorized MMA to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila - MMA contends that Ordinance No. 11 was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It was authorized to promulgate rules and other issuances. The confiscation and removal were valid because of the presence of Ordinance No. 11. Also, the validity of the Ordinance cannot be assailed collaterally. - SolGen contends that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It also violated PD 1605. HELD: - There was a valid delegation of legislative power to MMA to promulgate measures. - When the requisites of delegation are present, namely the completeness of the statute making the delegation and presence of a sufficient standard, there is a valid delegation of legislative power. O Completeness of the statue: when the statute reaches the delegate, it will only implement it. What only can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced and NOT to determine what law shall be enforced. O Presence of sufficient standard: determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority. - BUT there was no valid exercise of the power delegated to MMA and Municipality of Mandaluyong in promulgating Ordinance No. 11 and Ordinance No. 7 since the acts of the local government must reflect and conform to the will of the national legislature. - Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except for revenues and taxes). LGU cannot contravene but must obey the will of their principal. - The enactments in question cannot prevail against the decree which has the force and effect of a statute. The ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. - Ordinances No. 11 and 7 do not conform to PD 1605 and as such are null and void. - E lliot’s test of validity of municipal ordinance: O Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
O Must not be unfair or oppressive O Must not be partial or discriminatory O Must not prohibit but may regulate trade O Must not be unreasonable O Must be general and consistent with public policy ii. undue delegation of legislative power Pelaez v Auditor general FACTS: The then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal created 33 new municipalities. He purportedly acted in accordance to Section 8 of Revised Administrative Code. Vice President questioned the power of the President, contending that creation of municipality is within the power of the Legislature. HELD: - Creation of municipalities is a purely a legislative act. Only the Legislature can create concepts. - The President can only execute an existing law. - There was undue delegation of legislative power in this case because the law wherein the President based his action was not complete. It didn’t provide for standard and policy. iii. proper delegation a. By express authority of the constitution Garcia v Executive Secretary FACTS: - Congressman Garcia assails the constitutionality and legality of Executive Orders No. 475 and 478, and seeks to restrain their implementation. - EO 475 – reduces rate of additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% except in crude oil and other oil products - EO 478 – levied a special duty of P0.95/liter of crude oil and P1/liter of other oil products - Petitioner’s main contention: Only Congress can enact revenue bills, according to Art 6 Sec 24. The president cannot assume such power by issuing the Executive Orders. HELD: - Yes the president increase tariff rates and other duties. - Congress can authorize the president to increase tariff rates, subject to limitations Congress may impose, by virtue of Art 6 Sec 28, an explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President. b. Delegation to the president (Art 6, 23(2) ) '("
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Art 6 Sec 23 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. - Precondition for the grant of emergency powers has been preserved from the ’35 consti but the nature of the power has been altered - ‘35 Power: merely to execute laws but not to legislate - ’86 Power: follows phraseology of ’73 consti, a more expansive grant of power since there is a looser separation of executive and legislative power - Because the nature of the power wasn’t specified in ’73 and ’86 we are led to believe the grant of “real” legislative power was intended. - 2 LIMITS TO EMERGENCY POWERS: o Given only in a limited period ! Power may be withdrawn by congress through a resolution not a statute because a statue needs presidential approval to be effective while a resolution is based solely on the congress ! Automatic cessation takes place upon next ADJOURNMENT meaning ironically that in the event that the congress can’t convene in session like during emergency situations, the president himself is stripped of emergency powers –no one has the power. o Subject to restrictions that congress may provide -- meaning it can be as broad or as narrow as the congress may make it. c. Delegation to the local governments (Art 10, 2-3) Article 10 Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. - Local autonomy means more than decentralization. There is decentralization of administration (administrative powers) and decentralization of power (abdication of political power in favor of the LGU) - BUT keep in mind that the delegate can not be superior to the principal so in a conflict between a local ordinance and a statute that can’t be harmonized, the statute will ALWAYS prevail. - And though the expanded autonomy is given by the consti, the congress may still impose limits on this autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. - LGUs must be responsive to the needs of the locality, accountable to the electorate and freed from central government interference. - PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES FOR STRUCTURING LGU o Structure must be responsive and accountable o Instituted through a system of decentralization - INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM on the local level - legal process where registered voters may directly propose, enact or amend any ordinance AND resolutions (any act passed by the local legislative body) - RECALL – instrument of immediate accountability where the public official’s tenure may be terminated by popular vote and may be applied to both elected and appointed officials. d. Delegation of power to carry out defined policy according to prescribed standards Edu v Ericta FACTS: - Teddy Galo had assailed the constitutionality of the Reflector Law before Judge Ericta of the CFI. He contended that the Reflector Law was an invalid exercise of police power as it violates the due process clause, and that Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, Romeo Edu, was an undue exercise of legislative power. Judge Ericta thus restrained enforcement of the Administrative Order. - Edu now wants the SC to rule on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and for the SC to set aside the preliminary injunction directed against his Administrative Order. HELD - The Reflector Law and the Administrative Order issued pursuant to it is constitutional
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- The Reflector Law was enacted under the police power to promote public safety. It is neither arbitrary nor oppressive, and is a legitimate response to a felt public need. - Under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. - “What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.” Rafael v Embroidery Board FACTS: , Petitioner is in the export business and operates a manufacturing bonded warehouse. He is affiliated with Philippine Chamber of Embroidery and Apparel Producers, Inc. , RA 3137 was enacted, creating an Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board. , The Board was later constituted with representatives from different departments and bureaus. , Petitioner’s contentions: 1. RA 3137 is null and void because Congress cannot specify who shall be appointed, only the President can. He invokes Art 7 Sec 10 of the Constitution re President’s appointive power. 2. There is undue delegation of legislative power because RA 3137 does not provide sufficient standards under which the Board may base its assessment. HELD: , RA 3137 did not deprive the President of appointing power because it merely designated representatives, who will perform duties in addition to their duties in the departments they represent They are merely on detail, subject to recall by their respective chiefs.
, RA 3137 sets a reasonable basis under which special assessment may be imposed so the law sets sufficient standards under which the special assessment maybe imposed. • Par 1: “Special assessment shall be levied upon… engaged in the embroidery and apparel manufacturing industry…” • Par 2: “Every manufacturer… request to the Board for the exportation of the articles intended for removal…” e. Promulgation of rules and regulations Vda. de pineda v Pena FACTS: , The case is about a mining claim. Petitioners filed a case to regain their mining claim from a certain company but in the subsequent proceedings to determine the overlapping mining claims, the Director of Mines found that the petitioners haven’t been following procedures that PD 463 laid down. , Under the said law, non compliance would forfeit the owner’s claim to the land and would in effect declare it to be abandoned. , The director declared their land abandoned just because they didn’t comply with certain procedures. , Petitioners are questioning if the Director has the jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the land since it wasn’t a disputed issue on the original case they filed anyway and if the Director can declare their land abandoned. HELD: , The director has jurisdiction to check the validity of mining claims even if that question wasn’t an issue in the original case by virtue of sec 128 of PD 463. , It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies but in order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes and must relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law. With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. , Supreme Court held that Minister of Natural Resources had the authority to ascertain the validity of the "Ped" claim even if it was just incidental to the original case. But he committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines '*"
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declaring petitioners to have "abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" claim because he refused to recognize the rebuttal evidence that was presented. 2. prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws Legislature can’t pass irrepealable laws since to allow so would in effect bind a subsequent legislative body to the wishes of a defunct Congress. It would reduce the legislative power that that current Congress can wield. Imagine if this process is repeated, there may come a time that all the congress is doing is to enact the laws passed by their predecessors. Since there is no more room for new legislation, having all avenues been barred by the irrepealable laws, the laws will become stagnant and will not cater to the needs of that generation thereby defeating the purpose of the legislature.
C. Question Hour Article VI, Sec. 21 “The heads of departments may upon their own initiative with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.” Congress and Heads of Departments o Section 22 deals with the delicate relationship of Congress with the Office of the President. o Before the 1935 Constitution, this rule was found in the Administrative Code o Its purpose was to enable department heads to be heard by the legislature and achieve cooperation o In drafting the 1935 Constitution, this statute was elevated to a constitutional provision o Opposed on the ground that it could be used by the Cabinet to lobby for pet items
Adopted nonetheless to obviate any constitutional challenge concerning the communing of Congress and department heads o It was also thought that info by Secretaries would improve the quality of legislation The provision is permissive o Legislature is not obliged to entertain department heads who appear o President could object to appearance The 1973 Constitution adopted a parliamentary form of government and with it, the parliamentary devise of question hour o Question hour- Prime Minister, the real executive and Cabinet Members could be required to appear and answer questions ! Instead of an aid to legislation, it became a way of keeping administration in line The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission called for the adoption of the question hour o Unanimously approved. Reverted back to the permissive tone of its 1935 counterpart. ! President may or may not consent to appearance, may require that appearance be in executive session ! Congress may refuse initiative by department secretary Section 22 establishes the rule for exercise of oversight function o Oversight Function- enables Congress to determine how passed laws are implemented Exemption from summons applies only to Department Heads and not to everyone in Cabinet o
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D. Legislative Investigations Article VI Sec. 21 “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected” Legislative investigations (+"
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Legislative investigation is the power to make investigations and exact testimony to exercise legislative functions advisedly and effectively The foundation of the power of Legislative investigation can be found in Arnault vs Nazareno o Although not provided for in the 1935 Constitution, the power to investigate is incidental to legislative function as to be implied This implicit power under the 1935 Constitution became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution For the protection of rights, Section 21 places the limits on the power of legislative investigation: o Must be “in aid of legislation” ! Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee: Court ruled that investigation did not “aid legislation” and merely tried to determine whether the relatives of Pres. Aquino violated the law. Case was dismissed. o Must be “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” ! There must be published rules and they must be followed o Rights of persons affected by inquiry shall be respected ! Inquiry is subject to the Bill of Rights (i.e. right against self-incrimination, unreasonable searches, etc.) The power of investigation extends not just to Congress but also to any of its committees (subject to the limits provided by Section 21) The power to commit a witness for contempt terminates when the legislative body ceases to exist upon final adjournment
Case: ARNAULT V. BALAGTAS Ponente: Labrador Issue: • Did the Senate Special Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he gave the P440,00 was Jess Dantos?
• If the Senate did not believe that statement, is the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner valid? Facts: • Antecedent facts same as in Arnault v. Nazareno o The Philippine government bought two estates, Buenavista and Tambobong, through the Rural Progress Administration from Ernest Burt. Payments were made through his attorney, Jean Arnault. Burt failed to complete his payment of the estates. So the Philippine Trust Company, sold the Tambobong estate to the Rural Progress Administration worth 5 million pesos.CFI of Rizal ordered cancellation of Burt’s certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the RPA. Thus, he appealed to the SC. ! Senate adopted Resolution No. 8: Creation of a special committee to determine whether the purchase of the Tambobong estate was honest, valid and proper and whether the deal was fair and just. o The said committee then questioned the petitioner Jean Arnault. The committee’s interrogation mainly revolved around finding out who was involved in the payment to Burt. o Arnault testified that he was ordered to withdraw two checks from Burt’s account. With one check being payable to cash worth P440,000. The committee wanted to know who the P440,000 was for. Throughout the proceedings, the committee attempted to determine who the P440,000 was for, but Arnault never said who it was for. He just denied and said that he did not remember anyone. He also mentioned that if he would speak he would incriminate himself. o Due to Arnault’s refusal to mention a name, the senate sent him to the sergeant-at-arms in the bilibid prison. • On December 1951, the petitioner executed an affidavit where he gave the history and events surrounding the acquisition of the estates in question. He also mentioned that he met with Jess Santos, to whom he gave the Php440,00. • The Senate Special Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 (p. 362) (!"
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Still puts the petitioner under contempt, thus he shall be continued to be held in the New Bilibid Prison despite giving the name Jess Santos to the Committee. • The lower ruled on the case at bar and granted the petitioner bail. The court contends that the Senate abused its power and that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt. Thus this petition for writ of habeas corpus. o
Ruling: Petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Bail given by petitioner is null and void. Custody back to Bilibid Prison. Ratio: o The lower court erred in assuming that the courts had power to review the findings of the legislative body while exercising their legislative functions. o The courts must avoid encroachment on the exercise of powers of the legislative branch. The legislature is final except when power is arbitrarily executed. o The only instances where the judicial department can be lawfully invoked is when there is a violation of a constitutional inhibition. o All the courts can do is check the due process: for the case at bar, due process was allotted (hearing and counsel was provided) o The Senate has the power to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry; by reason of its coercive power. o Jurney v. Macracken ! Power to punish for contempt may never be exerted on a private citizen..unless as a means for legislative body to remove an existing obstruction to its performance of duty. (p. 368) o the legistlature’s authority to deal with defiant witnesses reign supreme unless there is an exercise of arbitrary power o The Senate committee believe that he did not disclose of the real person, therefore, he is still held for contempt.
Case: Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Facts: Background. Civil Case 35 filed in the Sandiganbayan. Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez were accused of using their connection with Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to gain control of some of the biggest companies in the Philippines, such as MERALCO and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation, Shell, and PCI Bank. With the help of lawyers from the Bengzon Law offices, specifically defendants Jose Bengzon, Jose Jimenez, Amando Faustino, and Edilberto Narciso, they tried to conceal and place the Romualdez’s funds, properties and assets to put it beyond the reach of inquiry of the Philippine Commission on Good Government, hiding behind the veil of a corporate entity. Newsreports were conflicting in information. One paper stated that the Romualdez firms were not sequestered because of the opposition of PCGG officials who had previously worked as lawyers of Marcos crony firms. Another said that they were sold, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President’s brother-in-law, had taken over the firms. Case at Bar Enrile delivered a speech on a matter of personal privilege on the alleged take-over of SOLOIL Inc, and called the Senate to look into the possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was passed to the Blue Ribbon committee, who started an investigation. The Senate subpoenaed the petitioners and Lopa to testify on what they knew in regards to the sale of the 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking the constitutional right to due process and that the publicity generated by the SBRC inquiry would affect his and fellow petitioners rights in Civil Case 35. SBRC suspended inquiry, and directed petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised. Petitioners plea to be excused was rejected. Petitioners thus filed in the SC that the SBRC was in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights. Issues: 1. WON the court had jurisdiction. Yes, according to the power of judicial review. The Court could determine the extent of power of the SBRC to conduct inquiries. (#"
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2. WON the SBRC had no valid legislative purpose. YES. They had no valid purpose in the investigation because it had no legislative purpose. Enrile didn’t indicate a legislative purpose nor did he indict PCGG. Additionally the petitioners are not private citizens. Besides, the Sandiganbayan was already trying the case, and the issues had already been joined. 3. WON the inquiry violated due process. The congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to the bill of rights and the right against self-incrimination. The denial of this petition though is because the court has determined it was not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the separation of powers. Held: Petition granted. The SBRC has no jurisdiction to try the case. Gutierrez’ dissent: 1. The SBRC could have a valid legislative purpose, such as using the results to determine how to stop get-rich-quick schemes through government connections. Further, ther is a presumption of validity of the acts of a coequal branch of government. 2. Congress was no encroaching on judicial territory. SBRC cannot sentence a prisoner, but it can submit recommendations to Congress to curb the practice in the future. 3. Invoking the right against self-incrimination should not mean a blanket refusal to testify. Witnesses and accused may refuse some questions if necessary. Cruz’ dissent: It would be an overstep of the Court to presume that a Congressional action was not legitimate. Super Digest: SBRC wanted to try and subpoena petitioners to testify in a case against Romualdez. The Court ruled that the SBRC had no jurisdiction to inquire in a case that had no valid legislative purpose. E. Act as board of canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Article VII, Section 4 par. 4 “The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in join public session, and the Congress upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.” The Congress as national board of canvassers • Congress is the national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections • 1935 Constitution gave Congress merely ministerial and executive duty to make declaration based on returns from provincial and city board of canvassers • 1987 Constitution gave more powers to Congress as a canvassing body o They now have the authority to determine authenticity and due execution of returns from provincial and city boards of canvassers ! Must only be “in the manner provided by law” • Responsibility of canvassing votes in presidential and vicepresidential elections and proclaiming winners is given by the Constitution to both houses of Congress in joint session and not to the COMELEC F. Call Special election for President and Vice President Article VII, Section 10 “The Congress shall, at ten o’ clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under Paragraph 2, Section 26 Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of Paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The Convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election ($"
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shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.”
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Vacancy in both the presidency and vice-presidency • Section 10 is a new rule that deals with the rather rare probability of having a vacancy in both the presidency and vice-presidency
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
G. Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law Article VII, Section 18 “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.”
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the Civil Courts or Legislative Assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
The new martial law doctrine: role of Congress and Court • The 1987 Constitution has placed the power to determine the duration of the suspension of the privilege and of the effectivity of martial law in the hands of Congress o The original draft committee was very much influenced by the martial law experience under Marcos and proposed that these powers may not be exercised without the concurrence of Congress o After intense debate, the concurrence was voted on and dispensed with o But, President must, within 48 hours submit a report to Congress either in person or in writing. Congress, voting jointly, by a majority vote, can revoke such proclamation or suspension o Such revocation cannot be set aside by the President o Congress, if not in session is duty bound to convene within 24 hours without the need for a call for special session by the President • Martial law and suspension of the privilege may not only be cut short, but also extended by Congress, for a period to be determined by Congress, by a joint vote of both Houses. o The initiative for extension may only come from the President H. Approve presidential amnesties Article VII Section 19 (%"
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“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
Article VII Section 21 “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate”
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty of the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress” Amnesty • Amnesty may only be given with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. o It is a public executive proclamation which must be concurred in by the legislature o It is also a grant of general pardon to a class of political offenders either after conviction or even before the charges are filed • Since amnesty is vested by the legislature, it is considered a public law. As such, it is as if the general law punishing the offense has been repealed. The person released by amnesty stands before the law as though he had committed no offense • Amnesty can be availed by one who confesses guilt to a crime
Senate Concurrence in international agreements • 1987 Constitution requires Senate concurrence in both treaties and “international agreements” o Executive agreements however do not require Senate concurrence • Treaty making has two distinct phases: negotiation and actual making of treaty o Senate and Acts of Congress cannot intrude upon the negotiation phase of a treaty o The resulting treaty as negotiated cannot bind as law unless the Senate concurs ! However, if the President does not submit a treaty to the Senate, there will be nothing for the Senate to concur in
I. Confirm certain appointments The Commission of Appointments • The Commission on Appointments consists of the Senate President, the ex-officio Chairman, 12 Senators and 12 Members of the House of Representatives • The function of the Commission of Appointments is to consent to or confirm nominations or appointments submitted to it by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16 which enumerates the appointments which need action by the Commission of Appointments o They act as an administrative check on the appointing power of the President • To control abuse of powers, the Commission must act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of Congress and must rule by majority vote J. Concur in treaties
K. Declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers Article VI Section 23 “(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.” Declaration of the existence of a state of war • War is defined as “armed hostilities between two states” • The Constitution gives to the legislature the power to declare the existence if a state of war and to enact all measures to support the war o However, the actual power to make war is lodged in the executive (&"
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The executive power can make war in the absence of a declaration of war
Declaration of emergency powers • Emergency powers may be given by the legislative to the executive only under the conditions of war or other national emergency o Under the present provision, the emergency powers delegated is real legislative power ! But, since the President cannot supplant the legislature under any circumstance, the authority given is limited and cannot amount to the legislature’s abdication of power • There are two limits to emergency powers: o Only for a “limited period” ! If Congress fails to provide a limit, powers will cease upon the next adjournment o Subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide ! Powers are as narrow or as broad as Congress makes them L. Be judge of the President’s physical fitness Article VII, Section 11, paragraph. 4 “If the Congress, within ten days after the receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.” Incapacity of the President • Article VII Section 11 deals with deciding whether the President is still able to perform his functions or not o However, if the President is able to make the decision and declare himself disabled, he has the power to declare so M. Power of impeachment Nature and Initiation of impeachment
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The House of Representatives have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment o Complaint may be filed by any member of the House or by any citizen supported by a resolution of endorsement by any Member o Complaint is hereafter referred to the proper Committee which prepares a report for the House • Report can either be favorable or unfavorable to the complaint o Whether report is favorable or unfavorable, the House, by a vote of one-third will decide whether complaint will be given due course o Report by the Committee and decision by the House can be dispensed with if complaint is filed by at least one-third of all members of the House o No impeachment complaint may be initiated against the same individual more than once within a period of one year
Trial and Penalties • Favorable recommendation or filing by one-third of the House sends the complaint to the Senate for trial o Senate tries impeachment case and can convict only by a vote of two-thirds of all its members o The penalty which the Senate may impose shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines • Beyond the reach of executive clemency • Does not place officer beyond criminal persecution for same offense (i.e. when criminally persecuted for the same grounds which warranted impeachment, can’t invoke double jeopardy) Case: Romulo v. Yniguez Petitioners: Alberto G. Romulo, Ramon Mitra et. al. (more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan) Respondents: Hon. Nicanor E. Yniguez, Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Environment, and 15 others Date: February 4, 1986 ('"
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Ponente: J. Patajo Nature: Petition for Prohibition to review the judgment of the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government Facts: • Petitioners, representing more than 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan, filed Resolution no. 644, which calls for the impeachment of President Marcos. • The Speaker referred the resolution and complaint to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights, and Good Government. • Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance. It disapproved of the resolution and dismissed all charges contained in the complaint. It then submitted its report, which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives. • Ramon Mitra filed a motion praying that Resolution no. 644 be recalled from the archives. Batasan disapproved the motion. • PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION o Constitution only requires cuncurrence from 1/5 of total membership. Petitioners represent more than a fifth of the membership of the Batasan. o Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. ! Said provisions provide that a majority vote is necessary for an impeachment trial to commence. This is not required by the Constitution o Said provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs to the Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body. • RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION o Speaker Yniguez and the Committee (see p. 272, paragraph 1) o Renato L. Cayetano and Salacnib P. Baterina (see p. 272, paragraph 2) *Essentially, they contend that the question is political, over which the court has no jurisdiction Issues:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment? 2. Are sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings unconstitutional? Held: 1. Does the court have jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment? NO • When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra, it had the effect of confirming the action of the Committee of dismissing the resolution and complaint. The dismissal by the majority of the Batasan members is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution. Therefore, it is beyond the power of this court to review. • The fact that the petitioners are asking that it is the Committee, not the Batasan itself, which shall be commanded by the court is irrelevant because such an order to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. o The objective is to have the Batasan as a body proceed with the impeachment trial. Recall of the resolution and complaint would be meaningless unless the Batasan can also be compelled to conduct the impeachment trial. 2. Are sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings unconstitutional? NO • Batasan has the power to adopt rules of its proceedings. • The provisions in the Constitution requiring concurrence of at least 2/3 votes from all its members is not violated by the provision in the Rules which authorizes dismissal of a petition by a majority vote of the Batasan, since 2/3 votes to convict cannot be obtained if majority vote for dismissal. • The constitutional provision that requires 1/5 vote to initiate impeachment is not violated. Initiation of impeachment merely belongs to the “trial phase.” Such actions is taken by this court in determining whether a petition should be given due course of dismissed outright.
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• Pursuant to the said provisions, Committee is required to submit a report to the Batasan. The latter has the ultimate decision whether to approve or disapprove said report. ** Acts of the Committee sought to be restrained have already been consummated. Disposition: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Teehankee, J., reserved vote The issue is moot and academic. Term of the incumbent President has expired upon holding of the Presidential elections scheduled on February 7, 1986. Case: Lecaroz v. SANDIGANBAYAN Petitioner: Mayor Francisco Lecaroz Respondent: SANDIGANBAYAN Ponente: Relova, J. 22 Mar 1984 Issue: Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the case Facts: On Oct. 21, 1980, the petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion Using his authority and his position as mayor, he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took over the control of a gas station belonging to Pedro Par, ordering the policemen who were with him to sell gasoline, issuing invoices and some pieces of yellow pad paper, and to padlock a dispensing pump effectively depriving Pedro Par of the exercise of his occupation. Used threat force and/or violence to prevent him from doing something that was not against the law. Petitioner’s contentions: 1) respondent court lacks jurisdiction. Should be filed with the ordinary court in Marinduque where the alleged crime took place. 2) the offense he was charged with is not related to his office as mayor 3) assuming the respondent has jurisdiction, it committed
grave abuse of discretion by denying the transfer to the Court of First Instance in Marinduque ( all witnesses are from that island) Court’s response : 1) JET ANG CUTE MO. The respondent has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. The rule is that once a court acquires jurisdiction, it must continue exercising it. (mar 23 1983, PD 1861 transfers juridisdiction of cases of the same penalty grade to the regular courts, however, sec 2 of the same PD states that pending cases will remain under the jurisdiction of the courts they are already in) 2) if petitioner was not the mayor he would not have been able to compel the policemen to do the said acts because they would not obey him in the first place. 3) same response as number 1 ***IN RELATION TO THE SYLLABUS- POWER OF IMPEACHMENT*** Some officials can only be removed by impeachment ( President, VP, members of the consti commission under sec 2, art XIII 1973 Consti ). It would follow that charging such people with crimes that carry the penalty of removal from office would be going against the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Judgement in cases of impeachment will only entail removal from office of the accused, he/she will still be liable for any other criminal charges. ( the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of criminal action “in accordance with the law” will not prosper. ) PETITION DISMISSED N. Power with regard to utilization of natural resources Article XII Section 2 “All lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. ()"
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With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.” •
A special provision is made in favor of subsistence fishermen and fish workers o The Congress may, by law allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
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fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. ! Harmonizes this provision with the article on Social Justice ! “small-scale” should refer to single proprietorships A limitation on service contracts is imposed o Any agreement must be “according to the general terms and conditions prescribed by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country” o The President must report to Congress every contract he enters into ! Allows Congress to keep the law abreast of the need of the country o Agreements can only be in relation to “technical and financial assistance” and only in relation to “large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils”
O. Amendment of the Constitution Article XVII Section 1-2 “Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) A constitutional convention Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.” Proposal of amendments • Proposal of amendments can be done either by Congress acting as a constituent assembly, or by a constitutional convention called by Congress, or directly by the electorate. (*"
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Nothing is mentioned about a joint session. ! Each House may separately formulate amendments by a vote of three-fourths of all its members and then pass it on to the other house for a similar process. ! Disagreements can be settled through a conference committee ! Alternatively, Congress may come together in joint session ! It is essential however, that both Houses vote separately because the power to propose amendments is given to a bicameral and not unicameral body Another way of proposing amendments to the Constitution is through “initiative” o The Constitutional Commission chose to pass off the problem of carrying out the amendment by initiative to Congress ! “The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” • Without implementing legislation, Section 2 cannot operate • Even though it by-passes congressional action, it is still dependent on congressional action • Congress may not alter a proposed amendment through initiative As of this writing, Congress enacted RA 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Law but the Supreme Court ruled in Defensor-Santiago vs. Comelec that the law did not apply to constitutional amendment o
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8. Legislative process A. Requirement as to bills (1) As to title of bills Article VI, Section 26, Paragraph 1 “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
Subject and title of bills: general prohibition of “riders.” • One-subject one-title is mandatory and not directory o To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature o To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation o To fairly appraise the people • Although the requirement is mandatory, it should not be so construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation o Ever since Sumulong vs. Comelec, trend has been towards a liberal interpretation of the rule ! Ruling in Sumulong: • “should be given a practical rather than technical construction” • “sufficient compliance with such requirement if title expresses general subject and provisions are germane to the general subject” o Such liberality however, has not prevented the Court from invalidating obvious violations CASE: CRUZ V. PARAS || 07.25.1983 FERNANDO FACTS: - Ordinance No. 84 Section 1.— Title of Ordinance.— This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. — Definitions of Terms — (a) 'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment selling to the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. (b) 'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and professional dancers are employed. (c) 'Professional hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman employed by any of the establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any woman who dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the operator or by the persons she dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the )+"
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owner, manager, administrator or any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3. — Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits. — Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on this community as explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.— Revocation of Permits and Licenses.— The licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. - lower courts dismissed the petition o Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan: known for sexual immorality o there is no alternative except to order legislative machinery, the closure of night clubs and/or cabarets o in the name of police power, the court upheld the constitutionality and validity of said ordinance ISSUE: WON ordinance issued that prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade (operation of night clubs) and the pursuit of a lawful occupation (employing club hostesses) is invalid RULING: - the ordinance must be held null and void - police power: reliance on police power is insufficient to justify enactment o if night clubs were merely regulated and not prohibited then assailed ordinance would pass test of validity o ordinance no 84 is characterized by overbreadth o purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than absolute prohibition
title of republic act no. 938 (main issue) o decision under review refers to said republic act o title: an act granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their respective territorial jurisdictions o first section: municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, xxx o first section was amended to included not merely the power to regulate but likewise prohibit o title remained the same o power granted by the title of the act is merely to regulate and not prohibit o according to the constitution: every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof o RA 938: limits the power to regulating and not prohibiting – statute becomes invalid - recently enacted government code o powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan: regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, etc o clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit operation of night clubs o may only be regulated but not prevented from carrying on with their business HELD: writ of certiorary granted and the decision of the lower court reversed; ordinance 84 of municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional -
Case: Lidasan vs. COMELEC Date: October 25, 1967 Ponente: Sanchez, J. Nature: Original action, Certiorari and Prohibition Facts:
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(1) In 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law HB 1247 known as RA 4790 or An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur. The municipality is to include 21 barrios. (2) It turned out later than 12 of these barrios are within two municipalities in another province which is Cotabato. Its operation will alter the boundaries of both provinces. (3) Despite such, due to the upcoming election, COMELEC issued a resolution to set-up election-related mechanisms in the municipality of Dianaton which will be comprised of the said 21 barrios. (4) However, the President recommended the suspension of the operation of the statute until clarified by correcting legislation but COMELEC stood by its own interpretation and said that the statute should be implemented until declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. (5) Triggered by such, Bara Lidasan who is a resident and taxpayer of a one of the 12 barrios in Cotabato to be incorporated in Dianaton filed this original action to declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional and that the COMELEC resolutions be nullified. He relies on the requirement as to title. Issue: Is RA 4790 unconstitutional as it embraces more than one subject and that it is not expressed in its title? Ruling and Ratio: Yes. The court ruled that RA 4790 is null and void. The said constitutional provisions which says “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” This contains two limitations on legislative power. First, that Congress shouldn’t conglomerate heterogeneous subjects in one statute. Second, the title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title. This is mandatory. The Constitution does not require that the language mirror, fully index, or catalogue all the contents and the minute details of the body. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of informing the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. The guidelines used in the determination of conformity of the title: a. Whether or not the title is misleading b. Consideration of the substance more than the form The title of herein disputed act projects the impression that only Lanao del Sur is affected. The title is therefore misleading and deceptive. For what will really happen is that one, it creates the municipality of Dianaton, and two, it dismembers two municipalities of Cotabato. It did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the municipalities of Cotabato that part of their territory is taken away; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected. It should also be noted that it’s void in its totality because the intent of the lawmakers was to create the new municipality with the 21 barrios and so the nine remaining will not suffice. Decision: Petition granted. RA 4790 is declared null and void and COMELEC’s implementation of the same is prohibited. Fernando, J. (Dissenting): RA 4790 just deals with one subject and that is the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Statutes should not be narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. (2) Requirements as to certain laws (i) Appropriation laws Article VII, Section 22 “The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bills, a budget of receipts and expenditures and sources )#"
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of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures” The Budget • The budget, the basis of the general appropriations bill, is prepared by the President and submitted to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session o Congress may not increase appropriation recommended by the President as specified in the budget (Art. VI, Sec 25(1)) • Budgetary process has been described as consisting of four major phases o Budget preparation ! Tasked upon Executive Branch ! Covers estimation of government revenues, determination of budgetary priorities and activities within constraints imposed by available revenues and borrowing limits o Legislative authorization ! Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposal ! Formulates an appropriation act o Budget execution ! Tasked on the Executive Branch ! Covers the operational aspects of budgeting o Budget accountability ! Evaluation of actual performance Article VI, Section 24 “All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” Origin of money bills, private bills and bills of local application • An appropriation bill is one whose purpose is to set aside a sum for public use • Revenue or tariff bills are those which are strictly for the raising of revenues
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Bills of local application are those whose reach is limited to specific localities Private bills are those which affect private persons All of the mentioned bills must originate from the House of Representatives o District Representatives are closer to the pulse of the people o Although the bill must be initiated by the House, the Senate can completely overhaul it, by amendment of parts or by amendment by substitution such that the one that comes out is different from what the House approved (Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance: it doesn’t matter if Senate formulated a bill in anticipation of the one the House might send)
Article VI Section 25 “(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.” (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies (4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it was intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; However, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. )$"
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(6)Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. (7)If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force an defect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the congress.” Limits on power to appropriate • Congress is not completely free to appropriate money in any manner and for whatever purpose it may choose. Article VI, Sections 24,25 and 29 and Article VII Section 22 contains a list of explicit restrictions on the power of Congress: o Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application and private bills must originate exclusively in the House, but Senate may propose or concur with amendments o Congress may not increase appropriations recommended by the President o Congress may not clutter the general appropriation law with provisions not specifically related to some item of appropriation. Such provisions shall be limited in operation to the appropriation item to which it relates. o Congress may not adopt a procedure for approving appropriations for itself different from the procedure for other appropriations o Special appropriations bill must specify the purpose which they are intended and must be supported by available funds. If not, it must provide a corresponding revenue proposal o Congress has limited discretion to authorize transfer of funds o Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to law o Congress cannot cripple the operation of government by its failure or refusal to pass a general appropriations bill
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Public money or property cannot be used for religious purposes General appropriations law must be based on the budget prepared by the President Public money can be appropriated only for a public purpose
Prohibition of increase • Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. o Does not prohibit Congress from increasing the budget for Congress and the Judicial Department Prohibition of “riders” in appropriation bills • Provisions unrelated to the appropriation bill are considered prohibited “riders” Transfer of funds • The President, Senate President, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice and heads of Constitutional Commissions may augment items in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations o List is exclusive ! Individual members of Congress must seek approval from Speaker or Senate President o Provision is intended to afford the heads of different branches considerable flexibility in the use of funds and resources o Limited because augmentation may only be taken from savings Appropriations must be for a public purpose • Power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax o If purpose of appropriation is one for which a tax may be collected, the appropriation is legitimate • The test to determine whether it is for a public purpose is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest as opposed to the )%"
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furtherance of advantage of individuals (although such advantage might incidentally serve the public)
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Article VI, Section 29 “(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any pries, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such pries, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.” Fiscal powers of Congress • Congress is the guardian of the public treasury and wields power of the purse o Power of the purse comprehends both the power to tax and the power to spend it o Congress alone can authorize the expenditure of public funds through its power to appropriate ! Power to appropriate carries with it the power to specify the amount to be spent and the purpose for which it may be spent Special funds • Paragraph 3 of Section 29 was intended to prevent the abuse in the disposition of special funds Case: Guingona Jr. vs Carague Ponente: Gancayco, J. Facts
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The 1990 budget was appropriated and authorized by PD 81 “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered 4860 as Amended by PD 1177 entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society” and PD 1967 entitled “An Act Strenghtening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose” o P98.4 B in automatic appropriation (P86.6 B for debt) o P155.3 B appropriated under RA 6831/General Appropriations Act o P27,017,813,000 of the budget went to Department of Education Petitioner seeks the declaration of PD 81, Sec.31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967 as unconstitutional and seeks to restrain the disbursement of budget under those decrees Respondents content that petition involves a political question
• Issues 1. WON the appropriation of P86.6 B for debt service is violative of Sec. 5 Article XIV of the Constitution (State shall assign highest budgetary priority to education). 2. WON PD 81 and PD 1967 are still operative under the Constitution. 3. WON they are violative of Sec. 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution (No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law). Held/Ratio 1. No. Although the Congress is mandated to assign the highest priority to education, the law did not mean to deprive Congress of the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest. They are vested with power to reasonably service our debt to protect the credit standing of our country and protect our economy. Furthermore, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled and the compensation for teachers has doubled. The P29 B allotted for education is the highest among all department budgets thus complying with the Constitution. 2. Yes. Although the said appropriation laws were legislated by Marcos, the transitory provision of the Constitution provides for their recognition therefore they were not repealed by his ouster. The framers, when they created the 1987 Constitution, did not intend to )&"
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reduce all existing PDs into bills that should be passed again in Congress. The Constitutional provision that says “bills authorizing public debt should originate from Congress” refers to bills yet to be passed and not existing PDs. 3. No. The questioned laws are complete in all essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therefore there was no undue delegation of legislative power. The Executive is not given unlimited discretion to amounts for debt servicing as they are already provided. Ruling: Petition dismissed. Case: Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance Date: August 25, 1994 Ponente: Mendoza J. Action: Certiorari and Prohibition Facts: - H. No. 11197 was the result of the HR’s efforts to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the restructuring of the value- added tax (VAT). - The bill was considered on second reading and was approved by the HR on the third reading. - The bill was sent to the senate, and the senate approved a different senate bill on the same subject, SB 1630, which was submitted “…taking into consideration HB 11197”. The senate bill was approved on the third reading. - The senate bill and the house bill were then sent to a conference committee, and were consolidated by the committee and subsequently became RA 7716. - Petitioners filed the consolidated cases alleging that the RA was unconstitutional. Issues: - Did the RA violate Art. VI Sec 24, Art VI Sec 26(2), Art VI Sec 28(1) and Art VI 28(3) of the Constitution? o Art. VI Sec 24 – all appropriation bills etc. must originate exclusively in the HR
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Art VI Sec 26(2) – The separate readings on three separate days rule
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WON the bicameral conference committee had the power to consolidate the two bills
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WON the bill violated Art III sec 1, 4, 5 and 10 of the constitution o Sec 1 – equal protection of the law o Sec 4 – freedom of speech, expression o Sec 5- religious rights o Sec 10 – impairing the obligation of contracts
Held: -
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It is not the law but the revenue bill that must come from the HR, and the senate has the power to amend the house bill since it would violate the coequality of the two houses if the senate can’t propose amendments to the bill from the HR. The senate can also propose an appropriation bill provided that the initial action came from the HR. Art VI Sec 26(2) can be dispensed with if the president certifies that the bill is urgently needs to be passed, and the rule only applies to the newly introduced bills in the senate or in the HR and not to the conference committee. It is entirely within the power of the conference committee to propose amendments or even an entirely new bill as long as the bill is germane to the subject of the house and senate bills. Discussions on whether the RA violated sections of Art III are considered as academic, and the court didn’t pass judgment on the issue.
Petition Dismissed Dissents: Vitug J. – Separation of powers
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Regalado J. – The senate violated the constitution with regards to the origination of the bill and the enactment of RA 7716 because it substituted the HB with the SB
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Davide J. – RA 7716 didn’t originate exclusively in the house, and the senate can’t amend the HB with substitution of the SB.
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Romero J.- the bicameral committee exceed its jurisdiction since its powers are limited only to settling disputes between the two houses regarding bills.
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Bellosillo J. – the constitutional provision regarding the origination of the revenue bills is mandatory. Puno J. – the BICAM can’t add amendments or remove provisions in bills that have already been approved by both houses. • (ii) Tax Laws Article VI, Section 28 “(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Governmen. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (4) No law granting an tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”
The power to tax, like police power and power of eminent domain, is an inherent power of government o Does not need to be stated by the Constitution ! Section 28 is not a grant of power but an enumeration of limits on taxing power The power of tax is given in order for government to be able to pay the debts and provide for common defense and general welfare Power to tax is an instrument of national economic and social policy An instrument for exterminating undesirable activities and enterprises o Justice Marshall: “power to destroy” o Philippine jurisprudence frowns on this as taxation must not be oppressive ! Tan vs del Rosario: when tax measure is unjust, courts will not hesitate to strike it down Tax has the power to “keep alive” o Example: imposition of tariffs to protect local goods from imports
Limitations on the power to tax • Power to tax can only be exercised for a public purpose Specific limits on the taxing power: “uniform and equitable” • Uniformity rule requires merely geographical and not intrinsic uniformity o Uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation ! Classification must not violate equal protection clause. Requirements for equal protection are discussed in the Bill of Rights • Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences • Must be germane to the purpose of the law • Must apply to present and future conditions • Must apply equally to members of the same class
Power if taxation: scope and purpose )(" "
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Bernas: this writer must confess his inability to find any meaning which “equitable” can add to the uniformity and equal protection clause
Progressive system of taxation • Congress is commanded to evolve a progressive system of taxation o A tax is progressive when the rate increases as the tax base increases o Progressive taxation reflects the wish of the Convention to use the power of taxation as an instrument for a more equitable distribution of wealth (following social justice) Delegated tax legislation • Although Congress may not delegate its law-making authority, this is not absolute. o One exception is the authority delegated to the President under Article VI, Sec. 28, Paragraph 2 ! The phrase “within the framework of the national development program of the Philippines” was a limit not on the President but on the delegated authority of the legislature Tax exemptions • Corollary to the power to tax is the power to exempt from tax o General and specific limitations on the power to tax apply also to power to create exemptions ! Exemptions must therefore be for a public purpose, uniform and equitable and in conformity with equal protection clause
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions or dividends and provisions for reinvestment. (4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.” •
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It is a fundamental constitutional policy on education that it is the duty of the State to make quality education available while at the same time affordable to as large a segment of the population as possible o Commisioner Nolledo: In order to provide an incentive to private institutions to share with the State the responsibility of educating the youth, I think we should grant tax exemption. o Commisioner Bacani: ..it is very appropriate and necessary that we donate and we do not burden the schools any further because there is no profit in them. To come under the exemption, the educational institution must be “non-stock non-profit” o Safeguard against abuse o Non-stock is not separated from non-profit with a comma ! A stock corporation is assumed to be for profit Exemption is given by the Constitution itself. It may not be diminished by legislation or administrative regulation
Case: TAN V. DEL ROSARIO Article XIV Section 4, Paragraphs 3-4 “(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Ponente: Vitug Issue: G.R. 109289: WON RA NO. 7496 is constitutional. G.R. 109446: WON section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93 is valid ))"
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Facts: Law: R.A 7496 • Regarding adopting a simplified net income taxation scheme for the self-employed and professionals • Amended the National Internal Revenue Code, Sections 21 and 29 • Petitioners think that there is unequal treatment of professionals who practice alone and those who do it in a general partnership.
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Means that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated should be treated alike. Classification can still exist as long as standards are substantial, categorization is germane, law applies to future and present conditions and the classification applies equally to all those belonging in the same class. • Court holds that classification is not arbitrary. o The intent is to maintain the global practice of taxing taxable corporations and to shift the income tax system of individual persons to the scheduler approach 3. Legislature: • They primarily decide and determine the kind, object, rate, csubject and place of taxation. The court cannot delve into such matters unless there is a violation of a constitutional right. •
G.R. 109289 Petitioners assert that the enactment of RA 7496 violates the following provisions of the constitution: o Article VI, Sec. 26(1): one subject, one title bill ! Title is a misnomer and deficient o Article VI, Sec. 28(1): taxation should be uniform and equitable; progressive system of taxation o Article III, Sec. 1: equal protection of laws; due process G.R. 109446 CIR, as public respondents, have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT (Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme) to general profession partnerships o The petitioners object the administrative interpretation of the CIR that SNIT should be applied to partners in general partnerships.
Ruling: PETITIONS ARE DISMISSED. • G.R. 109289: Constitutional • G.R. 109446: Valid provision Ratio: G.R. 109289 1. Title is enough. The title meets the objectives of the one subject, one title bill. 2. Uniformity of taxation
4. Due process contention not applicable because there is no inherent contravention on a constitutional right. G.R. 109289 1. A general professional partnership is not an income taxpayer. The income tax is on the partners themselves in their individual capacity. • section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93 did not alter anything, it only confirmed the standing rule that the extent of the allowable deductions are applicable to ALL individual income taxpayers. Case: Garcia v Executive Secretary Facts: EO 475 EO 443 EO 475 EO 478
Imposed an additional duty of 5% ad valorem on imports Imposed an additional duty of 9% ad valorem on imports Reducing rate of additional duty on imports to 5% ad valorem EXCEPT in cases of crude oil and oil products Continued 9% additional duty and added a special duty of P 0.95 per liter of imported )*"
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EO 517
crude oil and P 1.00 per liter of imported oil products Lifted additional duty in EO 443, but EO 475 and 478 continues.
Petitioner Congressman Garcia of Bataan protested the constitutionality of EO 475 and 478, as they were revenue-generating measures issued by the President and therefore not in accordance with the origination clause of the Constititution. He also stated it was against the Tariff and Trade Code, section 401 which stated that the President had the power to impose tariff rates only to protect local industries and not to raise revenue. Issues: WON EOs were unconstitutional and an undue delegation of legislative power. NO. The Constitution grants it explicitly in Sec 28 (8), Art VI, which states that the Congress can authorize the President, within specified limits and subject to limitations and restrictions, to impose tariff rates and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. The Tariff and Trade Code, which is the petitioners main argument, also grants it in TCC section 104 and 401.
investigation of Tariff Commission and recommendation of NEDA he may gradually reduce the protective levels. The Court disagreed with petitioner on four levels. 1. Petitioners main argument is based on the word protective – tariffs could only apply to protect local industries not generate revenue. The court ruled it was not enough, and a far too narrow interpretation of the rule. The language of 401 was not sharp and absolute. 2. The Bureau of Customs was one of the two principal traditionally revenue-generating bodies in government. 3. The bills were not just revenue-generating, but also regulatory. 4. The interpretation was too narrow, as in terms of goals, protection of consumers is as important as protecting industries. Additional Reasons 5. Customs are levied even if there isn’t a local market to protect. 6. There is a presumption of constitutionality that petitioner has to disprove. Held: Petition denied. The EOs were a valid delegation of power, constitutionally granted. Super Digest: Some EOs were attacked as unconstitutional because the President enacted them, and they were said to be revenue generators, the domain of Congress. The Court ruled that they were valid pursuant to Sec 28(8), Art VI of the constitution, and the Tariff and Trade Code sec 104 and 401.
Section 104 states that rates of duty may be revised by the President upon recommendation of NEDA. Section 401 (Flexible Clause) states that the president can reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty, but can’t decrease lower than 10% ad valorem or higher than increase 100%. HE can impose an additional duty not exceeding 10% whenever necessary, provided upon periodic
Procedure for the passage of bills (Art VI, Sec. 26(2)) Introduction: must be by any member of the House or Senate except for some measures that must originate only from the House *+"
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Bills that MUST originate exclusively from the House of Representatives (Art. VI, Sec. 24) - Appropriation bills (A bill appropriating a sum of money from the public treasury) - Revenue bills (A bill designed to raise money or revenue through imposition or levy) - A law regulating an industry, though incidentally imposing a tax, does not make the law a revenue bill - Tariff bills - Bills authorizing increase of public debt - Bills of local application - Private bills First reading: Reading of the title and number; the bill is passed by the Senate President or Speaker to the proper committee Committee Consideration and Action – committee evaluates to determine the necessity of conducting public hearings. Based on the result of the public hearings or committee discussions, the committee may introduce amendments, consolidate bills on the same subject matter, or propose a substitute bill. Afterwards prepares the corresponding committee report. Second reading: committee report is registered and numbered by the Bills and Index Service, included in the Order of Business and referred to the Committee on Rules. The Secretary General reads the number, title and text of the bill and the following takes place: a) Period of Sponsorship and Debate b) Period of Amendments c) Voting which may be by: viva voce, count by tellers, division of the House, or nominal voting Entire text is read and debates are held. Amendments are introduced. The bill as approved in the second reading is printed in its final form and copies are distributed 3 days before the third reading. Third reading: Only the title is read. No amendments are allowed. Votes shall be taken immediately thereafter and yeas and nays are entered in the journal.
Sent to the other chamber for concurrence: In the other chamber, the bill will also go under three readings. Conference committee/final legislative action Conference or bicameral committee – settles, reconciles or threshes out differences or disagreements on any provision of the bill. Not limited to reconciling the differences in the bill but may introduce new provisions germane to the subject matter or may report out an entirely new bill on the subject. Conference Committee Report is submitted for consideration and approval of both Houses, no further amendment allowed. Enrolled Bill: The bill is printed as finally approved by the Congress, authenticated with the signatures of the Senate Pres or the Speaker and the Secretary, and approved by the President Difference between degree of freedom of American and Phil Legislators: US Federal Congress is a master of its own procedures. Phil Congress is subject to limitations, such as three readings rule, no amendments may be introduced during 3rd reading, etc. Tolentino v Secretary of Finance: May Senate initiate a revenue bill? EVAT Law as a revenue bill is constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. Bicam passed a version different from both original House and Senate bills, stating it was based on Senate version. Doctrine: What the Constitution means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Anyhow Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House Bill. To insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the co-equality of legislative power of the *!"
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two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. Arroyo v de Venecia: Court ruled that it has no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. Pivotal issue was not lack of quorum, but lack of opportunity to raise lack of quorum, a procedural not constitutional requirement. Also, the enrolled bill theory holds in upholding the principle of separation of powers. Evidence of due enactment Enrolled bill theory – the duly authenticated copy of the bill, signed by the proper officers of each house, and approved by the President, is conclusive upon the courts not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Submission to the President President’s Veto Power (Art VI, Sec 27) Every bill, in order to become a law, must be presented to and signed by the President. If the Pres does not approve, he shall veto the same and return it with his objections to the House from which it originated. (Messaged veto) The House shall enter the objections in the journal and proceed to reconsider it. The Pres must communicate his decision to veto within 30 days from date of receipt. If he fails to do so, the bill shall become a law as if he signed it. Pocket veto – in other countries like the US, if Congress adjourns before the required period has passed, and the Pres has not signed it, the bill does not become a law. Ignoring legislation, or “putting a bill in one’s pocket” is known as the pocket veto. There is NO pocket veto in the Philippines because the Pres is required to communicate his veto the House within 30 days. If he does not, the bill becomes a law. To override the veto, at least 2/3 of ALL the members of each House must agree to pass the bill. In such case, the veto is overridden and becomes a law without need of Presidential approval. General rule: a bill must be vetoed in its entirety (absolute veto) Exception: Item veto
President may veto particular items in an Appropriation, Revenue, or Tariff bill (ART) This veto will not affect items to which he does not object. Veto of a rider A rider is a provision which does not relate to a particular appropriation stated in the bill. Since it is an invalid provision under Sec 25(2), the President may veto it as an item. (Inappropriate provisions) Doctrine of inappropriate provisions – a provision that is constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it is not an item. Compare 1987 Consti with 1935 Consti -
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1935 Consti, Art 6 Sec 11 (2): “When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. 1987 Consti, Art 6 Sec 27: “The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation…”
Even if 1987 eliminated “provisions,” the extent of the President’s veto power is unchanged. Only emphasized that item which can be subject of a separate veto must be a distinct and severable part of a bill. Gonzales vs. Macaraig (1990) FACTS: Petitioners are assailing Pres. Aquino’s veto of Section 55 and 16 of the General Appropriations Bill of 1989 and 1990, respectively. Both provisions prohibit the restoration of appropriations that are disapproved by Congress. Pres. Aquino vetoed said provisions because it will prevent her from augmenting appropriations in cases of calamity, urgency and dire need. Petitioner contends that Sec 55 and 16 are provisions, not items, and thus outside the veto power of the Pres. RULING: Veto is constitutional. Although the 1987 Consti eliminated “provisions”, the extent of Pres’ veto power is unchanged. Provisions are distinct and severable, and may be separately vetoed. A provision relates to some particular appropriation in the bill, and not to the entire bill. Sec 55 and *#"
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16 are inappropriate provisions because they apply generally to all items. They are more of an expression of congressional policy, hence, they are to be treated as “items” and may be vetoed. The Pres is granted statutory authority to augment appropriations within the Exec branch (PD 1177 and GAA 1989) Bolinao Electronics Corp vs Valencia PBS claimed right to damages from the fact that CBN continued to operate on Channel 9 even though PBS was supposed to take over and had a permit to do so. Supreme Court ruled that PBS had no right to any damages since (a) CBN did not abandon its right to operate on Channel 9, and (b) the part of the Appropriations Bill pertaining to the creation of PBS had a condition that no money would be spent on the operation of TV stations in Luzon. The President has the power to veto any item or items of an appropriation bill, but when a provision affects one or more items of it, the Pres could not veto that condition without vetoing the item which it was attached to. PBS therefore had no right to operate on Channel 9. Bengzon vs. Drilon Retired justices of the SC are assailing the constitutionality of the veto by Pres Aquino of certain provisions of General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1992. The House of Representatives submitted a bill which provided for automatic readjustment of retirement pensions for Justices of the SC, as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. Pres Aquino vetoed the bill because it would erode government’s efforts to strictly enforce the policy on standardization of compensation. RULING: Veto is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The President’s veto power is constitutionally vested, but it has limitations to its exercise. It is not absolute. Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. When it comes to appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, the Constitution has provided an “item veto power” which gives the President the power to veto only a particular item. This however does not mean that he or she could veto a part of an item and approve the remaining portion of the same item. Items are different from provisions. Item – particulars, details, distinct parts; in an appropriation bill it is a specific appropriation of money. In the case at bar, the Pres did not veto items but provisions, which is not allowed. Also, said veto entrenched upon fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, as
well as deprived the Justices of their vested right to retirement benefits/pension. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez Petitioners pray for declaration of certain articles of GAA (General Appropriations Act) as unconstitutional and void. The President signed the Bill into law but vetoed certain provisions. RULING: On veto of provision of debt ceiling: court held that vetoed provision was inappropriate – should be in separate law as it refers to funds other than those in GAA. Hence, veto is valid. Pres can veto inappropriate provisions separately from other provisions. (Note that court in Bolinao held that provisions cannot be vetoed without vetoing item which it was attached to. Here, court now expands veto power of Pres by saying inappropriate provisions may be vetoed separately without the need to veto appropriation to which they are attached.) On veto of provision on 70% (admin) / 30% (contract): pres vetoed this because contracting at 70% is more efficient. Court held that veto is invalid because provision is not inappropriate. On veto of provision on purchase of meds by AFP: provision cannot be vetoed since it is directly related and inseparable from the appropriation item. Can’t veto a provision without vetoing whole item. Legislative Veto - Veto by the legislature, either through a positive act or by inaction Miller vs. Mardo Petitioners question the validity of Reorganization Plan (RP) No. 20-A which gave Department of Labor power to settle cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards as well as cases for unpaid wages, overtime, etc. Court ruled that RP is invalid as it confers judicial power to regional offices, which is a power that rests solely in the judiciary. Also, RA 997 requires that provisions of the RP submitted by the Pres during the 2nd session of Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of that session. If either House disapproves, the disapproval has to be made known during the given period. The RP was submitted to the Pres, who submitted it to Congress. It adjourned sessions without passing a resolution that disapproved or approved said RP. The plan became a law simply by the *$"
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Congress’ non-action. (Legislative veto) Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative inaction is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. RA 997 is in contrast to Art VI Sec 20 and 21 of the Constitution which provides for the process of how a bill becomes a statute. The Consti requires a separate and positive action by each House so that the bill can be passed into law, and also requires the presentation to the President, which was dispensed with by RA 997.
the unpublished acts are operative fact, so consequences may no be justly ignored. 1986 decision based on new solgen position: The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Art. 2 of the Civil Code refers to the effectivity of the law and not to the requirement of publication (statutory limitation). Requirement of publication is indispensable; law cannot be effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Macalintal vs COMELEC The Overseas Absentee Voting Act provides for the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), which shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation, as well as the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs). Petitioners contend that these powers belong solely to the COMELEC, being the independent body mandated by the constitution to be in charge of all election-related matters. The Court ruled that creation of the JCOC is unconstitutional. Justice Puno concurs that Congress had gone beyond its powers in this case. He enumerated three forms of oversight powers of congress: scrutiny, investigation, and supervision. Supervision encompasses legislative veto, in that it utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. In requiring the Pres or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or disapprove regulation before it takes effect, Congress is actually exercising legislative veto.
$ Is publication only in Official Gazette? EO 200 passed June 18, 1987 amended Art. 2 and allowed publication in a newspaper of general circulation. It is recognition that the publication must be familiar and accessible to all.
Effectivity of Laws
What kinds of laws must be published? - All laws that affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable to only some individuals. - All statutes, including those of local application, city charters, private laws, presidential decrees and executive orders. - Administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement an existing law. - Internal regulations need NOT be published. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Article VII, 1987 Constitution 1. THE PRESIDENT a. SINGULAR EXECUTIVE
Art II, Civil Code: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This code shall take effect one year after such publication.
Executive power vested in the President (Sec. 1)
Tanada vs. Tuvera: Senator Tanada, Justice Sarmiento and MABINI dared Executive Assistant Tuvera to publish all presidential decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. 1985 decision: Without notice or publication, no basis for application of “ignorantia legis no excusat”. Publication is an imperative duty, a requirement of due process (constitutional limitation). But implementation of
a. The 1935 Constitution -Vested executive power to the President
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
b. The 1973 Constitution - Prime minister had executive power while President was reduced to a mere “symbolic head of state”. But: when original 1973 Constitution took effect, Marcos was allowed to retain his 1935 powers and at the same time became *%"
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ceremonial President and Prime Minister and was never merely a ceremonial head. - President almost became the de facto legislature (Marcos v. Manglapus) - In 1981, 1973 Constitution was revised: President again became the head of state and the Chief Executive while the Prime Minister was reduced to being a ceremonial figure c. The 1987 Constitution - Constitutional systems returned to the Presidential mode of 1935 Constitution: Executive power is vested in the President. - Intention in investing executive power in one person rather than in a plural executive: invest the power holder with energy. - Specific powers ( i.e. to appoint, to ensure that laws are faithfully executed, to be Commander-In-Chief of the armed forces, to grant clemency, and to contract foreign loans) given to the Pres have been attached with more specific structural limitations than previous documents. Planas vs Gil FACTS: Planas is accusing the President of violating the Constitution by stating preferences of candidates, and that the whole government machinery acted to prevent other candidates from being elected into the National Assembly. The President ordered Planas to appear before the Commission of Civil Service, Jose Gil, to prove that her statements were in good faith or sustain her charges. Otherwise, she will be suspended or removed from office. Planas contends Gil had no jurisdiction and that the investigation was an arbitrary exercise of power. RULING: The investigation ordered by the President is constitutional. All executive powers are vested in the President and he has a duty to faithfully execute all laws. He has control over all exec departments and shall exercise general supervision over local governments. He can also act through heads of exec departments. Control and Supervision are constitutional grants. The power of investigation falls under supervision, which implies an authority to inquire into facts. It must be in accordance with law, and founded on knowledge of facts. Villena vs Secretary of the Interior The Sec of Interior asked DOJ to investigate then-Makati mayor Villena, who was found to have committed bribery, extortion, abuse of authority and
unauthorized practice of law. Sec of Interior recommended his suspension, and this was granted by the President. Villena contends that Secretary has no authority to suspend, charge and decide on his case because these powers are lodged in other agencies of government. He asserts that it is the President who has power to exercise control over local governments. RULING: The Sec of Interior has legal authority to order an investigation, as well as suspend officials pending investigation of charges. The Secretary was acting as an agent of the President, and under our form of government, the acts of the secretaries of departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are the acts of the Chief Executive. However, there are certain acts that, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the Pres. There are certain constitutional powers of the Pres that must be exercised by him in person (e.g. power to suspend writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law). The Consti point to a clear purpose: the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. Heads of various departments are mere projections, or alter egos, of the Pres who assumes responsibility for the acts of his subordinates. Ang-Angco vs. Castillo Angangco, who was Collector of Customs, was suspended for alleged neglect of duty. After 3 years, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered a decision that found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner contends that the President could not take direct action over his case because pursuant to the Civil Service Act, it is the Commissioner of the Civil Service that must decide. RULING: The Commissioner of Civil Service has exclusive and original jurisdiction over administrative cases of personnel in the classified service. The power of control of the Pres extends to officers who belong to the executive department, if they are presidential appointees. But NOT to those who belong to the classified service. QUALIFICATIONS (1) President (Sec. 2): natural-born citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter; able to read and write; at least 40 years old on the day of the election; and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding such election *&"
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% Residency and domicile mean the same thing under election law % The ff must be considered: -bodily presence -animus manendi -animus revertendi (1) Natural born citizen Article IV, Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens. (2) Registered Voter - President must have then the qualifications of a voter prescribed in Article V, Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. (3) Able to read and write - Literacy requirement has been specified because under the qualifications of a voter, literacy is not required and it’s imposition is even prohibited (4) At least 40 years of age on the day of election for President - 1935 Constitution : 40 years old also - 1973 Charter: increased to 50 years old, supposedly for “more maturity” BUT opposes rationale for decreasing age from 21 to 18 years. - Must be possessed on the day of the election i.e. on the day that the law set on which votes are cast. (5) A resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding such election
Residence has same meaning in election law i.e. residence=domicile. Concurring elements: a.Bodily presence in the locality - BUT: requirement allows for temporary physical absences as long as animus revertendi to the domicile is never abandoned - An intention to remain there (animus manendi) - An intention to abandon the old domicile, if he had one (animus non revertendi) THE VICE PRESIDENT Vice-President (Sec. 3, par. 1): same qualifications, term of office, and manner of election and removal with the President The VP is essentially a President in reserve. No other function than assume presidency when vacancy arises. He may be appointed as department head in the Cabinet without consent from the Commission on Appointments. ELECTION (Sec. 4, par. 3): elected by direct vote of people; election happens on second Monday of May 1935 : directly elected president Original 1973: wanted to experiment with a President and a Prime Minister elected by the Legislature 1981: revision restored President elected by the people 1987: President and Vice President elected by direct vote of the people TERM Term begins noon June 30 next following election (Sec. 4, par. 1) (2) Length: 6 years (3) To enter execution of office, oath or affirmation (Sec. 5) President and Vice-President has a fixed term of 6 years Period: begins at noon on June 30th following the day of election and ends at noon on June 30th, six years thereafter Limit on the number of terms *'"
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(1) President Not eligible for any re-election for that office i.e.either immediately after his term or even after an interval of one or more terms Rationale: make a more independent President capable of making correct even if unpopular decisions Prohibition applies to any person who has served as President for more than four years (2) Vice President More liberal: may not serve for more than two successive terms but voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of VP’s service Note: if VP succeeds to the presidency, if he serves for less than 4 years, he may run fro election as President (not a re-election) CONGRESS AS NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS 1935 and 1973 Constitutions: Congress was merely charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make declaration on the bases of the election returns duly certified by the provincial and city board of canvassers Therefore, they could not determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount and determine the authenticity of each ballot cast 1987 Constitution: Congress now given authority to “determine authenticity and due execution” of the returns coming from provincial and city boards of canvassers in the manner provided by law. BREAKING A TIE: vote of majority of all members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately. PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CONTROVERSIES
1935 and 1973 Constitutions o No explicit provision designating the body with jurisdiction to be judge of presidential and vice presidential election contests o Lopez v. Roxas (1935 Constitution): petitioner seeking a recount of votes had no right thereto and therefore, matter is not justiciable R.A. 1793 o Passed by Congress as response to Lopez v. Roxas case, constituting the Supreme Court as the electoral tribunal for presidential and vice presidential contests o Implicitly repealed by the adoption of 1973 Constitution and was not restored under reconstituted presidential system of 1973 Constitution o BUT this statutory law has now become a constitutional provision: Section 4, Article VI OATH Taking of the oath of office by the President marks his formal assumption of his duties Oath is not a source of substantive power but is merely intended to deepen sense of responsibility of the President Corwin: “the fact that the President takes an oath to preserve and protect the Constitution does not authorize him to exceed his own powers under the Constitution on the pretext of preserving and protecting it Article VII, Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted]. *("
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Philippine Bar Association v.COMELEC Facts: In 1985, to seek a “fresh mandate” from the people, President Marcos submitted a questionable letter of resignation that was to be effective on the tenth day after the following the proclamation of the winners in the “snap election” to be called by the legislature on the strength of such resignation. Petitioners challenged the election on the ground that inter alia that the vacancy contemplated in Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which would justify the call of a special presidential election before the expiration of the resignation of President Marcos’ term in 1987 was supposed to occur before and not after the said election. Held: SC denied the petition and sustained the resignation and the call for a “snap” election on the ground that the calling of a “snap” election is not a justiciable but a political question resoluble only by the sovereign electorate. PRIVILEGE AND SALARY (Sec 6) Article VII, Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
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A President has no right to “hold-over”: when designated date for the end of the term comes (noon of the 30th of June six years following his election) he MUST leave his office and president-elect assumes office. If at appointed hour and day there is no president-elect (he died or failed to qualify or because no winner was proclaimed), apply sec. 7 a. Before the beginning of the term (Section 7 Article VII)
1. If the Pres-elect cannot assume his post at the beginning of his term because -he has not qualified as yet (e.g. he had an operation and could not take oath) - a Pres has not been “chosen” and qualified as yet (e.g. there is a tie and Congress has not yet broken that tie) then the VP shall act as Pres until the Pres-elect shall have qualified, or shall have been “chosen” and qualified as the case may be. 2. If the Pres-elect a. Dies, or b. Becomes permanently disabled at the start of the term then the VP-elect shall become the President.
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In Section 6, Article VII, salary of President and VP shall be determined by law - shall not be DECREASED during their tenure - NO INCREASE shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved - No other emoluments from the government or any other source can be received during tenure “Emoluments” which they may not receive during their tenure refers to any compensation received for services rendered or from possession of an office; therefore the President cannot accept other employment elsewhere, private or public. VACANCY AND SUCCESSION
3. If both Pres and VP a. Have not been chosen or b. Have not qualified, or c. Die, or d. Become permanently disabled, then the Senate President, or in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House, shall act as President until a President or a VP shall have been chosen and qualified. In case both the Senate Pres and the Speaker of the House are unable to act as Pres, then Congress shall by law, provide for the “manner of selecting” the *)"
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one who will act as President until a Pres or VP shall been either chosen or elected (pursuant to the special election under Sec 10, Art VII), and qualified. b. Permanent Vacancy During the Term Article VII, Section 8. 1. In case of President’s a. Death b. Permanent disability c. Removal from office (by impeachment) d. Resignation The VP shall become Pres for the unexpired portion of the term. 2. In case of both the President’s and the VP’s a. Death b. Permanent disability c. Removal from office by impeachment d. resignation The Senate Pres, or in case of his disability, the Speaker of the House, shall act as Pres until the Pres or VP shall have been elected (by special election) and qualified. (par. 1) 3. When the Acting President (i.e. Senate Pres or Speaker of the House) a. Dies b. Becomes permanently disabled c. Resigns (but is not removed, because there is no need to impeach him, his stay being temporary) Then the Congress shall by law, provide who shall be Acting President until the Pres or VP shall have been “elected” (pursuant to the special election) and “qualified”. This Acting Pres shall be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications. c. Temporary vacancy during the term *A vacancy in the Presidency arising from his disability can occur in any of the ff ways:
1. a written declaration by the Pres 2. written declaration by the Cabinet 3. finding by Congress by 2/3 vote that the President is disabled. In all these cases, the VP temporarily acts as the President. *Voluntary declaration of inability by President a. When the Pres transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker a written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the VP as Acting President. b. The VP shall so act until the Pres transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker a written declaration that he is no longer unable to discharge his office. *Contested inability of the President a. When the majority of all the members of the cabinet transmit to the Senate Pres and the Speaker their written declaration that the Pres is unable to discharge his office, then the VP shall immediately assume the Presidency in an acting capacity. b. The Pres can contest this by sending his own written declaration to the Senate Pres and the Speaker, that no inability exists. Upon such transmittal, the Pres shall automatically assume his office. c. Should the majority of the Cabinet insist on their original stand by transmitting a second written declaration of the Pres’ inability within 5 days from resumption of office of Pres, then Congress shall step in. d. Upon receipt of his second declaration by the Cabinet, Congress shall convene, if is not in session, within 48 hour, without need of call, in accordance with its rules. (If already in session, it must meet right away, since they have only 10 days to decide, whereas if is not in session, it must convene in 2 days and decide before the 12th day)
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e. Congress shall determine the Pres’ inability within 10 days after receipt of the second written declaration by the Cabinet if it is in session, or within 12 days after it is required to assemble if it is not in session. f. If President, by a 2/3 vote of both houses voting separately, determined to be “unable” to discharge his office, then the VP shall act as Pres. If less than 2/3 find him unable, then the Pres shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. Serious illness of the President - The public shall be informed of the state of his health - The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the AFP shall not be denied access to the Pres during such illness. Vacancy in the office of the VP (Sec. 9, Art. VII) New rule - President authorized to nominate member of Congress from either Senate or the House of Representatives - For nomination to be effective, it must be confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both Houses voting separately Estrada vs. Desierto -on the legitimacy of the ARROYO Administration ISSUES 1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy 2. WON the petitioner resigned as president 3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president 4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity) 5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity. HELD 1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of
the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution.. 2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8) 3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision without violating the principle of separation of powers.) 4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.) 5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. Removal: IMPEACHMENT (Art XI, Sec 3) (1) Who may initiate: The House of Representatives (HoR) shall have exclusive power to initiate ALL cases of impeachment. (2) Verified complaint a. A verified complaint may be filed by any member of the HoR or by any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof b. Verified complaint shall be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days, and referred to the proper Committee within 3 session days thereafter.
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c. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within 60 session days from such referral, together with resolution. d. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration within 10 session days from receipt. (3) Number of votes necessary A vote of at least 1/3 of ALL the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favourable resolution or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the Pres of the Phils is on trial, the Chief Justice of the SC shall preside, but shall not vote. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the RP, but the party convicted shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment. *The officer can still be tried for a criminal case aside from impeachment “Initiation” – governed by the rules of HoR “trial” – governed by rules of Senate f. Prohibitions Art. VII, S13
Section 13 outlines the prohibitions placed on the President, Vice President, members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants o Shall not hold any other office or employment during tenure o Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, business etc. o No franchise or special privilege from the government or gov’t controlled companies • Art. IX-B Section 7 is the general rule for public officials, this Article is the exception for the Pres, VP and Cabinet. • The P, VP and Cabinet have stricter rules because of the sensitivity of their position. They are only allowed positions expressly mentioned in the Constitution. • On the other hand, the rest of the appointed and elected officials can hold other offices when allowed by law. g. Exceptions to the prohibition from holding another office • VP as member of the cabinet Art VII S 3 • Secretary of Justice as member of the Judicial and Bar Council CLU v Executive Secretary • Pres Aquino issued EO which allowed Cabinet members and subordinates to hold multiple offices. EO was declared null and void by the Supreme Court. They cited Section 7, Art IX-B as a blanket provision that as a general rule for all elective and appointive public officials. They were allowed to hold multiple positions if allowed by law. The Pres, VP and Cabinet are held to stricter standards as stated in Art VII Section 13, they are only allowed to have other positions when allowed by the Constitution. However, Art VII section 13 does not prohibit exofficio positions. Ex-officio work is included in work done for the primary position. Dela Cruz v COA • COA discontinued payment of petitioners because they were holding ex-officio positions. Petitioners say they have lower rank than Asst. Secretaries so they can hold other positions. But the Sc held that they are stand-ins for Cabinet Members. They are allowed ex-officio positions but NOT compensation. Because the position is ex-officio the work done is included in the primary position so the services done are paid for by the primary salary. h. Powers and Functions of the President •
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1. Executive Power Art VII, S 1 and 17 • Vested in the President only • Heads of exec. dept. occupy advisory positions but they are subject to direction of the President Marcos v Manglapus • Marcos wants to return home to die. He wants court to overrule Pres. Aquino’s decision to bar their return. The President has many powers listed in the Constitution, but executive power isn’t limited to that. Pres has duty to protect general welfare and so can bar the return of the Marcoses. Ople v Torres • Ople challenges AO 308 which creates a Nationalized Computer Identification System. Ople contends that it would violate the privacy. Life and liberty of all Filipinos. Supreme Court says that the AO is more of a law (it imposes duties on people). The Legislature enacts laws and the Executive executes them, the Executive can’t enact laws. He can only execute administrative rules and regulations. 2. Control of Executive Departments • President shall have power of control over all executive officials (the power to nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done and replace his actions) • Doctrine of qualified political agency, which states that the executive and administrative agencies are agents of the executive. The executive is singular not plural. The various functions of the President are done through the executive departments. Unless acts by subordinates are disapproved they are presumably acts of the Chief Executive. • Disciplinary power, which flows from his power to appoint, is the power to remove. Subject to legislative limitation. So Executive has the power to control subordinate’s judgment but Legislature has control over their person. • Power of supervision is the power to ensure that laws are properly executed by inferiors. Lacson-Magallanes v Pano
Director of Lands awarded land to corporation instead of Pano and other farmers. Executive Secretary reversed decision and gave land to farmers for the sake of social justice. President has control over all executive departments. He can confirm, modify, ore reverse actions of subordinates. Also President can delegate power to Executive Secretary, unless his decision is repealed by the President it is assumed that he acts as the President’s alter ego. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v Executive Secretary • Pres Aquino created on bureau and Pres Estrada deactivated it and created another. The President has the power to reorganize executive agencies because he has control (not just supervision). The power to abolish comes with power to create, but must be express. Security of tenure not violated because positions are not taken away; they are abolished. Gone. 3. General Supervision of LGU and Autonomous Regions Art. X S 4 •
and 16 The power of general supervision is power to see that subordinates follow function according to law. Does not include power to substitute action or judgment with subordinates • President has general supervision over all LGUs. Pimentel v Aguirre • Petitioners want to compel Executive Sec to submit Rome Statute to Senate for ratification. Petitioners think Senate ratifies. Supreme Court says the President is the representative of the country to the world; he negotiates with foreign governments not Legislature. President needs 2/3 of Senate approval, but ratification depends on the Pres. He can choose not to submit treaty to senate. Ratification is an executive act which is when the state accepts and confirms provisions of treaty. Senate can give or withhold concurrence (not ratification). Ganzon v CA • Mayor Ganzon accused of transferring officials to other posts for personal reasons. He kept postponing hearings and was preventively suspended 3 times in 20 mos. The DILG •
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secretary can preventively suspend the Mayor. Local Governments have independence but executive and legislative still have power over them. 4. Power of appointment Art VII, S 16 • It is an executive function, may not be usurped by legislature. Legislature may create an office and prescribe qualifications of candidates but cannot specify who will be appointed and cannot appoint • President can appoint those enumerated in Section 16 and members of the SC, judges of the LC, regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council, chairman and members of the Constitutional Commission, the Ombudsman and deputies. a. with consent of commission on appointments Sarmiento v Mison • Petitioners want to enjoin Sarmiento from holding his position as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs because he was not confirmed by COA and so his position is unconstitutional. • Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: 1. Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law 3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint 4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Only the first group of officers is appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, all the rest don’t need COA confirmation. Bautista v Salonga • Pres Aquino designated Mary Bautista as Chairman of Commission of Human Rights. COA asked her to submit
info about her appointment but she refused because she said she wasn’t under COA’s jurisdiction. Pres Aquino appointed someone else to the position pending Bautistas case. But in ’89 Pres Aquino offered it to Bautista again and submitted the appointment to COA for approval. • Pres Aquino didn’t need to get COA approval the first or second time, the appointment is an executive act. CHR chair is not one of those positions mentioned in Art VII Section 16’s first sentence so it doesn’t need COA approval. The Civil Service Commission, COMELEC, Commission on Audit all need COA approval according to the Consti. • The Pres can’t voluntarily submit Bautista’s appointment to COA for approval. Chief Executive can’t give COA a duty that was explicitly stated in Constitution as being for the President. Can’t create power where there is none. Quintos-Deles v COA • Quintos-Deles was appointed Sectoral Representative while Congress was in recess. COA opposed because she was not confirmed by COA. Yes, Sectoral Representatives fall under Art VII Section 16 sentence 1. It says “other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” the seats for sectoral reps are filled by the President. Manalo v Sistoza • Petitioners assailed constitutionality of 15 PNP appointments without COA confirmation. Even if the Local Government Code says that senior PNP officials have to be COA confirmed it must give way to constitution. Constitution does not include PNP officials in list of officials that need COA confirmation. PNP not AFP. AFP needs COA confirmation. b. limitations on appointing power of the president Art VII S 13 and 15 •
2 mos before the next presidential elections the Pres shall not make appointments !+$"
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Aytona v Castillo • Pres. Garcia made an ad interim appointment by placing Aytona as Gov. of Central Bank (midnight appointments). Pres. Macapagal issued AO 2 to recall all ad interim appointments made by Pres Garcia after Dec 13, 1961. Garcia abused position as just care-taker of administration. Garcia deprived new administration of opportunity to make appointments. • Padilla: Recess is period of time from adjournment to opening session of same Congress. • Bautista: Recess is temporary dismissal. COA ceases to exist until next session of new Congress. Jorge v Mayor • Jorge was an ad interim appointee of Pres. Garcia in Dec 13, 1961. Macapagal revoked all ad interim appointees after Dec 13, 1961 with AO 2. Presumably the appointment of Jorge was made during office hours so it’s not affected by AO 2. Quisimbing v Tanjanglangit • Dec 28, 1961 Quimsing was given ad interim appointment as Chief of Police by Pres. Garcia. Confirmed by COA May 16, 1962, but Sen. Puyat moved for reconsideration. Court did not declare ALL midnight appointees revoked. Quimsing was not questioned because his appointment was carefully considered, while the midnight appointments were rushed and ill-conceived. • Laying motion for reconsideration on table (Puyat) has no effect on confirmation. c. interim recess appointments Art VI, S 19; Art VII S 16 • Ad interim appointments are those made during the recess of Congress • Effective without need for confirmation, but last only until disapproval of COA or the next adjournment of Congress • Can be revoked by the President at his discretion • Different from appointment in acting capacity, which does not need COA confirmation and may be given when Congress is in session.
d. temporary designations Admin Code 1987, Book III Section 17 (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer: a. already in the government service b. other competent person To perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed is unable to perform his duties because of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy; (2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position a. if he is already in the government service he shall receive additional compensation which shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. b. The compensation be paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned. (3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. e. limitations on appointing power of acting president 5. Executive Clemencies Art VII S 19; Art IX-C S 5 • This power exists to correct mistakes made by the courts • It can be used for administrative penalties • Reprieve: postpones execution of punishment • Commutation: remission of part of penalty • Limitations to executive clemency: 1) can’t be exercised over impeachment 2) concurrence of majority of Congress for amnesty 3) no amnesty, pardon, parole for violation of election laws without approval of COMELEC a. pardon v. probation a. pardon: official, private act of executive, not complete without acceptance. Removes penalties and legal disabilities. Only extended to one whose conviction is final. b. Probation: freedom with restrictions for a limited period of time, chance to be free provided there is good behavior b. pardon v. parole !+%"
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a. Parole: release after sentence is completed, during this period if there is proof of rehabilitation then there will be no further prison sentence. c. Pardon distinguished from amnesty Amnesty- It is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted. (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S. 602)
d. Effect of Pardon: People vs Salle, Jr. - Pardon may be granted only by final judgment. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal, executive clemency may not yet be granted. Before an appellant may be granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal. e. Sanctions for violations of conditional pardons Torres vs. Gonzales
Pardon- It is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. Bernas: Barioquinto v. Fernandez, People vs. Patriarca Difference of Amnesty from Pardon Pardon Amnesty -granted by the Chief Executive, thus -by proclamation of the president a private act which must be pleaded with the concurrence of the and proved by the person pardoned Congress, and is a public act of and which the courts may not take which the courts may take judicial notice of. notice. Granted to one after conviction Granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty, generally before or after institution of prosecution and sometimes after conviction -looks forward and relieves offender -looks backward and abolishes and of consequences of crime; abolishes puts into oblivion the offense itself, and forgives punishment, but doesn’t as though he had committed no abolish civil liability offense Doesn’t restore rights to hold public Rights not affected as the offender is office, suffrage, unless expressly treated as if he committed no crime restored by pardon at all
Facts: - an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. - Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs, (10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000. - On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. - On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons and Espuelas us. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which were then pending trial before the RTC, and convicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition, which was then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges have been brought against the petitioner, although some have been identified as dismissed. - On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. !+&"
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- On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. - On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. - Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution. Issue: WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. Held: - Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the determination if the parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGen's determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. - Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is extended upon the conditions named in it, and it is accepted upon those conditions. The governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales rulings. "Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To no other department of the Government [has] such power been entrusted." The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. - A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed upon him. Since Art 159 RPC defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, !+'"
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prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Art 159. - In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC. Decision Petition dismissed f. Pardon in administrative cases g. Who may avail of amnesty? People vs. Patriarca Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994. Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus: "Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War; Provided,
That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal ends." 6. Powers as Commander-in-Chief Art. VII Section 18. The President shall be the Commanderin-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians !+("
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where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. IBP vs. Zamora Facts: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Estrada ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The IBP filed petition to declare the deployment of the Marines null and void and unconstitutional because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work, deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government, and deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. It also makes the military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution. Held: 1) The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing. It has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. It has not shown any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned government act. The invocation of its duty to preserve the rule of law is too general and is therefore not sufficient to clothe it with standing. 2) The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause. The act constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement or crime prevention. Art VII Sec. 18 – (1) The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. (2) The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. (3) The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (4) A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (5) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. (6) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Art II Sec 3 - Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. Art XVI Sec 5 - (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution. !+)"
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(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty. (3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. (4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. (5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service. (6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable. (7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty. Lacson vs. Perez
(2) G.R. No. 147781
-mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with TRO - filed by Miriam Santiago
(3) G.R. No. 147799 -prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order -filed by Ronaldo Lumbao (4) G.R. No. 147810
-certiorari and prhobition -filed by Laban in Demokratikong Pilipino
% All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by the Pres. And the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law % Later, the Pres. lifted the declaration of a “state of rebellion” % The instant petitions therefore, became moot and academic Issue: WoN the declaration of a “state of rebellion” and the effected warrantless arrests are valid
Facts: % Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the NCR when a an angry mob assaulted and attempted to break into Malacanang % She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. % Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected % Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” four petitions were filed (1) G.R. No. 147780 habeas corpus
- filed by Panfilo Lacson, Michael Aquino, and Cezar Mancao
-prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and
Held: (1) The relief sought after by the petitioners is premature since no complaints or charges have been filed against any of them for any crime. With regards to their prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. The writ of habeas corpus is also not called for since petitioners’ unlawful restraint remains speculative (2) For mandamus, the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and !+*"
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complete. Petitioner has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant (3) Petitioner’s argument that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to “determine of interpret” what took place in Malacanang is untenable. The Court cites Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and its ruling in IBP vs. Zamora (4) The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision but petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Moreover, petitioner is a juridical person and therefore cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. The petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, but the Court has no jurisdiction in the first instance of such petition Decision: DISMISSED!
Sanlakas vs. Angelo Reyes Facts: On July 27, 2003, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City demanding, among others, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police. In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hourslong negotiation, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did only on August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435 “DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST.” This case is a consolidation of the cases filed before the Court that challenge the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General order No. 4 Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court can adjudicate cases that are moot 2. Whether or not the President has the power to declare a state of rebellion Held: First Issue: The Court can adjudicate cases that are otherwise moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of “actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The case at bar is one such case. Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, “‘an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons’ assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the President’s declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President’s calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding. Second Issue: The President, as Chief Executive, can declare a state of rebellion. The Constitution does not require the President to declare a state of rebellion to exercise her calling out power grants. Section 18, Article VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, “these conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it !!+"
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becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’” Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in- Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: “The executive power shall be vested in the President….” As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: “He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States. The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State. In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the “unitary and highly centralized” nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, “There is no counterpart of the several states of the American union which have reserved powers under the United States constitution.” Justice Cortes conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines.” Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter has restricted the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the President’s powers as Chief Executive. The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states: SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotionaleffects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But the Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. David vs. Macapagal Arroyo [1] Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. [2] The requirement of locus standi which is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case is of transcendental importance. [3] Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the sufficiency factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally permissible limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise. Codal – Art 8 Sec. 1 on Judicial power [4] Facial invalidation of laws (Overbreadth Doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3) the Court has no other alternative remedies available. [4.a] The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a !!!"
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valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Codal – Art. 7, Sec. 18 [4.b] The take care power of the President, which includes the power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. Codal – Art. 6, Sec 17 Note: The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make “decrees” with the same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos. [4.c] In the absence of delegated authority from Congress the authority of the President to declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Codal – Art. 6, Sec. 23 (2) Note: Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor. [4.d] The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to implement them. Note: The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions against specific abuses committed by authorities Notes: [a] In this case, the extent of judicial review is not concerned with correctness, but with arbitrariness of the invocation of such power. Arbitrariness would mean WON there is a sufficient factual basis. [b] Art 12 Sec 17 should be read in relation to other provisions, like Art 6 Sec. 23. Gudani vs. Senga
Facts: Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon. Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent. However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. ` While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that such directive was “in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;” and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise !!#"
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relieved of their assignments then. On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive. The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional? Held: The Petition is dismissed. Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-inchief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of
restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under “house arrest” by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting: !!$"
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“… to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.”
The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.
As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.
Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Judicial relief as remedy:
It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries. !!%"
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Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, “all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP],” and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. 7. Emergency powers Article VI Section 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. Araneta vs. Dinglasan Facts: ! The petitions challenege the validity of the executive orders of President Quezon avowedly issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act. No. 671, entitled “An Act Declaring A State of Total Emergency As A Result of War Involving the Philippines and Authorizing the
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President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet Such Emergency” & An act that grants emergency powers to the President Cases No. L-2044 and L-2756: Involved is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Petitioner J. Araneta is under prosecution in the CFI of Manila for violation of the provisions and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal L-3055: Involved is EO No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refused to issue the required export license because it is prohibited by the EO. L-3054: Relates to EO No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from 01 July 1949 to 30 June 1950, and for other purposes. Petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, as a taxpayer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money under this EO. L-3056: Involved is EO No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding of national elections to be held in November 1949. Petitioner Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, taxpayer, and voter asks the SC to prevent respondents from disbursing the amount or part of it
Issue: Whether Commonwealth Act 671 has ceased to have any force or effect when the Executive Orders were passed Held: !
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law [assed by virtue thereof should be for a “limited period,” “limited” having been defined as “restricted; bounded; prescribed, etc.” The words “limited period” as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of the powers, must be temporary, or “it cannot be said to be an emergrny” (First trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. !!&"
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Adolph). There is the presumption that Commonwealth Act 671 has been written with that limitation in view. Otherwise, it would be repugnant to the Constitution. The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of express provision for the repeal of rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former Another anomaly if the Commonwealth Act continued to be effective is that there would be two legislative bodies operating. Even if the emergency power of the Executive is suspended while Congress is in session, the anomaly would not be eliminated. There is good basis in the language of Act. No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides that the President, as soon as practicable upon the convning of the National Assembly, to report all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers granted by the Act The autobiography (“The Good Fight”) of President Quezon, who recommended the enactment of Act No. 671 and who was entrusted for its execution, was also taken into consideration. He says that the Act was only for “a certain period” and “would become invalid unless reenacted.” The court held that these phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. These denote that a new legislation is necessary to keep the law alive after its expiration. President Quezon’s autobiography also partly answered the contemplated period. He says that the Act was made effective when it was obvious that because of the attacks, the National Assembly could not have met To uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of duration, there should be the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. Hence, Court opines that the Act became inoperative when Congress met on regular session on 25 May 1946, and the EOs being questioned were issued without the authority of the law.
Ruling Petitions GRANTED. 8. Contracting and Guaranteeing Foreign Loans Article VII Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. Article XII. Section 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. 9. Power over foreign affairs a. Recognition of foreign states US vs. Belmont Facts: In 1933, the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This case involved a Russian metal works company which had deposited money in an American bank prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Soviet Union nationalized the company and attempted to reclaim its assets with the help of the United States. The bank refused to cooperate, citing protection of a New York law. Issue: !!'"
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Did the diplomatic agreements between the two countries compel the bank to release the assets?
Executive branch by means of mandamus because it is beyond its jurisdiction.
Held: Yes. Even though the diplomatic agreements had not been implemented as formal treaties with Senate approval, they did empower the United States to seek assets on the Soviet Union's behalf. Justice Sutherland argued for a unanimous Court that different kinds of treaties existed which did not require Senate approval, but nonetheless overrode state statutes. "Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies," he reasoned.
PITC vs. Angeles
b. Conduct of foreign relations
Facts -
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Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Facts: The Rome Statute was signed by the Philippines through the DFA. Its’ provisions, however, required that it be subject to ratification, acceptance and approval of the signatory states. Pimentel, as senator, files a petition for mandamus claiming that the ratification of a treaty (under domestic and international law) is a function of the Senate, hence, the Executive Dept. has a duty to transmit the signed statute to the Senate for ratification. Issue: WON the ExecSec and DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute. Held: No. As chief architect of foreign policy, President is the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. In the realm of treaty making, President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states; ratification is under his/her authority. The Constitution, however, provides a limitation to such power to ratify by vesting in the Senate, the power to concur with the President’s decision. It does not the agency delegated to ratify but the agency to concur or not with said decision. The duty being in the province of the President’s official duties, the court cannot compel the
RTC: -
PITC issued AO No. 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for (meaning 1:1 ratio). Private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, individually applied for authority to import to PROC with the petitioner. Granted authority after satisfying the requirements However, the import applications were withheld by petitioner when the private respondents failed to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations. Private respondents assert that the AO is an undue restriction of trade and hence, unconstitutional. PITC’s authority to approve and process applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and PD 1071 has already been repealed by EO No. 133. Says also that none of the trade protocols (1989-1991) has expressly or impliedly empowered the PITC to formulate or promulgate the assailed AO. Says that the subject AP and other similar issuances by the PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated in pursuance of an international agreement (MOA between RP and PROC) which has not been concurred in by at least 2/3 of all members of the Senate pursuant to Sc. 21 of 1987 Consti.
Other historical facts (supervening events): - FVR entered into a new trade agreement between RP and PROC encouraging liberalization of trade between the two countries. He !!("
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directed that DTI and the PITC to cease implementing AO No. 8908-01. PITC Pres. Yulo issued a corporate memorandum instructing that all import applications for the PROC filed with the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer be covered by the trade balancing programs. Private respondents allowed to import anew from the PROC. Remington expressed its desire to have the present action declared moot and academic. Cites EO No. 244. PITC disagrees with the contention that it has become moot and academic because Remington has incurred obligations to the petitioner consisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development service. Firestone issued a Manifestation informing the court of the developments of the new trade program.
Issue: 1. Was the authority of the PITC to issued the assailed AO and similar issuances repealed by EO 133? NO. 2. Is the AO valid? NO. 3. Is the obligation still subsisting or are the respondents freed from it? No longer subsisting. Decision: No. 1.
In promulgating EO 133 the president did not intend to overhaul the functions of PITC. o LOI 444 issued by Marcos directed that trade between the Philippines and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries shall be coursed through the PITC. o wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and exports during that period. o Conformably with the MOU, RP and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for 1989, 90 and 91 which specified the commodities to be traded between them. Allegedly in line with the powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the
o o o o
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MOU and Trade Protocols with PROC that PITC issued the assailed AO. Pres. Aquino in issuing EO 133 is empowered to modify and amend the provisions of LOI 444. No indication in the law (EO 133) of the removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise regulatory functions. EO 133 is silent about it. Also, the general repealing clause in EO 133 cannot operate because there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two issuances. EO 133 established DTI which is the primary coordinative arm of the government for the country’s trade. It shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate economic growth. PITC – government owned or controlled corporation created under PD No. 252. PITC was attached as an integral part of DTI as one of its line agencies. It was given the focal task of implementing the department’s programs. This des not mean that t has lost the authority to issue the questioned AO. SC: PITC still has the authority to issue the AO. PITC still holds such authbority to issue that assailed AO, as an implementing arm of DTI. EO 133 was issued with the intent to reorganize the DTI and cope with streamlined bureaucracy. No real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. It rearranges that administrative functions but it is not an abolition of executive power. Contention of petitioners: Trade protocol did not bestow power to PITC to issue such AO. SC: Trade Protocols are only the enumeration of the products and goods which the signatory countries have agreed to trade. Do not bestow regulatory power.
2. The AO is not valid. - the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is NOT unconstitutional. These bodies have more expertise in their fields. - However, the AO was not published in the Official Gazette. !!)"
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Thus, even before FVR lifted the trade balancing measures, it was never legally effective and private respondents could not be made subject to them. The amendments filed at the UP Law Center and published in the ONAR do not cure such defect. Also the AO is an unnecessary barrier to trade.
3. Obligation no longer subsisting. Held: Judgment AFFIRMED in favor of the respondents with the following modifications: 1. Petitioner cannot further charge the petitioners of the service fee 2. petitioner cannot implement the provisions of AO No 89-08-01 3. Petitioner required to approve all pending applications free from the requirement prescribed in the issuances. c. Settlement of disputes with foreign powers d. Treaty-making Article VII Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. e. Executive Agreements Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Facts: - This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners) - March 14, 1947 – The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, formalizing, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. - August 30, 1951 – The Philippines and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye… but Mutual Defense Treaty still in effect.) - February 10, 1998 – President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and negotiations. - October 5, 1998 – President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA. - May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VFA. (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmeña, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmeña III, Pimentel, Legarda-Leviste. Total=5) - The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is an agreement which defines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It also defines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Issues: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA. 2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State) 3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty. a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by the US Military personnel. b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher. 4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA? !!*"
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5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution. Held: 1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no public funds raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions. 2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The ‘or’ is important to take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can just be an agreement covering only troops – not bases—like the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no distinction whether the troops or facilities will be “transient” or “permanent”, so the VFA is covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says “duly concurred in by the Senate” with no specified number). - Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with? Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions: a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFA as a treaty. b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so required by the Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP). Requirement of ratification in a national referendum unnecessary since Congress has not required it. c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).-Complied with. Ambassador Hubbard’s letter states that the VFA is binding on the US gov’t and that in international legal terms such agreement is a ‘treaty’.
- A ‘treaty’, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an “international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by the international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.” - In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. 3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the “xxx Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx” (this doesn’t really answer the issue above, but the ponente didn’t really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an abdication of sovereignty.. oh well… here goes…) - With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. We cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law. - Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations. Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda. 4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA? No. - Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despostic manner. - The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or International agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of the members of Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted by the Constitution. - As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the !#+"
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Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse of power. Decision Petitions Dismissed 11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part. f.
Deportation of undesirable aliens
Go Tek vs. Deportation Board Facts: • Go Tek is a Chinaman residing at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B, Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. A deportation case was filed against him on 3 March 1964 because he was allegedly an undesirable alien, as he was the sector commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit of the “Emergency Intelligence SAection, Army of the United States”. He was one of those who were arrested at the believed headquarters of said unit at 1439 O’Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was also alleged that fake dollar checks were found on him, therefore he had violated RPC Article 168. • Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss. He said the complaint was premature because he already had a case pending in city fiscal’s office of Manila for violation of said article in RPC. He also contended that the Board had no jurisdiction to try his case as in the case of Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, obiter dictum said that the President may only deport aliens on the grounds specified in the law. • The Board (composed of Manuel Concordia, Arturo Alafriz and Manuel Reyes) denied said motion because a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite in order for the State to exercise right to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a “fact-finding body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or dismiss a deportation proceeding.” • Go Tek filed a prohibition action and on 8 July 1964, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the board from hearing the case. The trial court also granted the writ of prohibition
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in its decision on 31 October 1964, ordering the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the complaint against Go Tek. It said that according to the dictum mentioned, “mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law; that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude, a conviction is necessary, and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168, the deportation proceeding was premature.” The Board appealed because the decision was said to be contrary to law; that the court erred in assuming that the President could only deport on the grounds enumerated by law and that mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation; that a criminal conviction is necessary, and that they had jurisdiction over the case. Does the Board have jurisdiction over the case? YES Does the case of Qua Chee Gan apply in this case? NO Is criminal conviction necessary for deportation? NO Can the President deport undesirable aliens only on the grounds enumerated by the law? NO
Held and Ratio: Decision reversed and set aside. Writ dissolved. Case remanded to Board for further proceedings. • The Deportation Board actually is an agency of the President “charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein.” Therefore, the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for the illegal possession of fake dollar checks and his alleged guerilla activities even though he hadn’t been convicted and that it isn’t among the grounds for deportation in Immigration Law. The charge wasn’t premature. • The dictum mentioned doesn’t apply to this case because in that case, the aliens were charged with economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under RA 503. Its ratio decidendi was about the provision of EO 398 (which stated that the Board may issue a !#!"
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warrant upon formally filing a complaint against a person) being unconstitutional because in the 1935 Constitution, only judges had the power to determine probably cause to issue warrants. Jurisprudence states that deportation should not be dependent on criminal conviction: “it was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a criminal proceeding of the particular charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. Under the existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Sec 69 RAC; and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under Sec 37 of the Immigration Law. Sec 69 of RAC states that the Governor General may deport, expel or exclude from said Islands or repatriate to his own country upon prior investigation conducted by the Executive or his authorized agent and recommendation of said action. Person in question has at least 3 days to come up with defense and has the right to be heard, etc. Sec 37 of IL enumerated 13 classes of aliens that may be deported. It also said that the aliens may be arrested upon issuance of a warrant issued by the Commissioner of Immigration or an agent assigned by him, and may be deported upon warrant of the CoI. The President has the power to deport undesirable aliens “when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.” According to Justice Johnson, if the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, “he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them.” … “The right of a country to deport aliens because of their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified.” Sec 69 and EO 398 reorganized the Deportation Board but it did not specify grounds for deportation. Nevertheless, “It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens, as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with aliens… No other
tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted… It should be borne in mind that the decision of the Deportation Board is merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to approve the board’s recommendation. Abuses or harassments committed by the prosecutor or by the Board should first be brought to his attention.” Antonio, J. concurs – full discretion is lodged in the Chief Executive to determine WON an alien’s residence in the country is injurious to national security, welfare, and interest. “It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. 10. Power over Legislation (see President’s Veto Power under Legislative Process) 11. Immunity from Suits The President may not be sued during his tenure although there is no express provision in the 1987 Constitution. This is to assure he exercises his duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction. - can only be invoked and waived by the President himself In Re: Bermudez facts: Petitioner is a lawyer, filing a petition for declaratory relief regarding the first paragraph of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. This provision is about the term of the incumbent President and VP elected in the Feb. 7, 1986 elections. Petitioner is claiming that the said provision is “not clear” as to whom it refers (whether it refers to incumbent President Aquino and VP Laurel, or elected President Marcos and VP Tolentino) ruling/doctrine: The petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic (Aquino), and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during of their incumbency and tenure. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness is gratuitous, because it is obvious that the provision refers to Aquino and Laurel. The legitimacy of Aquino’s government has already been resolved in previous cases. Petition was dismissed. Beltran vs. Makasiar !##"
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Facts: A consolidation of three cases; wherein the President (Aquino) is asking for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and business manager for libel. Beltran (one of the petitioners) argues that since the President has immunity from suit, she (Aquino) cannot file the case against him because by doing so, the President would have to appear in court sooner or later, as witness for the prosecution and effectively negating the purpose of immunity from suit. Ruling/doctrine: There is no law that prevents the President from waiving this priviledge, so in this case, she can do what she wants. Also, this priviledge can only be invoked by the holder of the office; the complainant cannot use it as a defense. The petitions were dismissed. Nixon v Fitzgerald Facts: Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as management analyst with the department of the air force- occurred in the context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in force in which his job was eliminated. His discharge attracted unusual attention in the congress and the press, civil service commission decided on the case: dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations – motivated by reasons purely personal towards the respondent. Following the decision, Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages with the US district Court Ruling/doctrine: the Court recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages. reason: in the absence of immunity, executive officials would hesitate to exercise their discretion in a way injuriously affecting the claims of particular individuals. The court holds that petitioner, as a former president of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts o functionally mandated incident of the President’s unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by history o president’s unique status under the constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials o in view of visibility of his office and the effect t of his actions on countless people, the president would be an easily identifiable target for
suits for civil damagesabsolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office o it clearly is within the president’s constitutional and statutory authority to prescribe the manner in which the secretary will conduct the business of the air force constitutional remedy from immunity of suits: impeachment Clinton v Jones Facts: The petitioner was the sitting Governor of Arkansas at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. The private respondent was a former employee of Arkansas Industrial Development Commission. During a conference, she alleged that Clinton made sexual advances to her. Petitioner informed the court that he is going to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. He asked the court to defer the proceedings. Ruling/doctrine: As explained in Fitzgerald, the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity’s justifying purpose which is the conduct of the President related to his official capacity of duty. The court never suggested that the President or any other official has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity. Immunities are grounded on the nature of the functions performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. 12. Executive Privilege In the Philippine setting, “executive privilege” means the inherent power of the President to withhold certain types of info from the Courts, from Congress and from the public. From EO 464: 1)Conversations and correspondence between the Pres and the public official concerned 2)Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged. 3)Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and exec agreements. 4)Discussion in closed-door cabinet meetings 5)Matters affecting national security and public order !#$"
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Privilege is strongest when used not out of a personal desire to avoid culpability, but based on a legitimate need to protect the President’s constitutional mandate to execute the law, to uphold separation of powers, and to promote public interest Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after the expiry of the terms of office of the President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers. In proceedings, Executive privilege must be invoked after the question is asked by the legislative committee, not before. It must also be stated with sufficient particularity to enable the Congress or the court to determine its legitimacy. Neri v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Facts: Neri invoked executive privilege in refusing to answer the three questions; alleged that his non-appearance at the hearing was upon President’s order; and his conversations with the president on NBN project were covered by the privilege being about national security and diplomatic matters. Ruling/doctrine: - laid down the three elements of presidential communications privilege: 1. protected communication must be quintessential and non-delegable presidential power 2. communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by an advisor in operational proximity with the president 3. presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and unavailability of the information elsewhere - claim of executive privilege is properly invoked by Neri applying the three elements in the case 1. authority of the President to enter into executive agreement is recognized in Phil. Jurisprudence 2. Neri is considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s cabinet 3. No adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of information
2. The Vice President AKA the “President in reserve”. Essentially the same as the President. ( Same qualifications, same term, same process of removal from office) but does not exercise any substantial functions ( unless appointed to the cabinet or given an executive function ) His appointment to a cabinet position does not require confirmation. - Elected to a term of 6 years, commencing 12 noon on the 30th day of June. The VP can serve for a maximum of 2 successive terms. - The Congress serves as the board of canvassers for the Presidential and VP elections. All contests relating to the election of the President and VP are solely judged by the Supreme Court, en banc. - In the event that there is a tie in the elections for VP, (also the Presidency), the Congress can break the tie through a majority vote (houses vote separately) - IF a VP steps into the Presidency, he can run for reelection provided he served for not more than four years. ( the general rule is that a President cannot run for reelection. He can only serve for one term.) - Before he enters into the execution of his office, he must take an oath or affirmation. (Art VII Sec 5) - His salary is determined by law and cannot be decreased during his tenure. Increases will only take effect after his term. Also, he cannot receive any emolument from anywhere. - Should there be a vacancy in the VP, the President shall nominate a VP from the Senate and HoR, to be confirmed by a majority vote of both houses voting separately. - He is removed from office through impeachment ( culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust ) Right of succession and membership in the cabinet - He takes over the Presidency when the latter dies or is permanently disabled, or resigns or is removed from office. He can serve as President temporarily should there be a vacancy before the term starts ( failure to qualify) !#%"
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- Vice President discharges the powers of the President should the latter submit to the Senate President and House Speaker a written declaration of inability. This can also be done by a majority of the cabinet members. The original President can reclaim his position by submitting to the same parties a written declaration to the contrary. IF within 5 days, a majority of the cabinet submits a written declaration of the President’s inability, the Congress shall decide the issue. ( Art VII Sec 11) -He can be appointed as a member of the cabinet, and such appointment does not require confirmation. Estrada v Arroyo Facts: Erap resigned, left Malacañang Palace through the back door at the Pasig River, went to San Juan City Hall, and then went home to Polk Street in Greenhills.The petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration regarding an earlier case, where he contended that he didn’t resign from his post, and that he was ONLY temporarily unable to act as president at that time. Ruling/doctrine: Congress can decide whether the president has resigned or not, and the court can’t decide on the matter of the proclamation of congress on the grounds that it is a political question. There is nothing in the constitution which states that congress can’t decide on the president’s inability to act after the fact, and at that time congress was not in session and had no opportunity to act a priori. The court ruled that the resignation of Estrada was implied, and that his temporary incapacity to act is a political question in which the court had no jurisdiction to rule upon. VII. Distribution and Separation of Powers Basically means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the executive, settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the other, but the separation is not total. System of Checks and Balances None of the departments are able to act without the cooperation of at least one of the other departments.
This is to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power and prevent concentration of power in one department at the risk of inefficiency and gridlock. Government v Springer Facts: National Coal Company: Voting power of all such stock owned by the government of the Philippines shall be vested in a committee consisting of the Governor- General, President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives National Bank: By the original act, the voting power of the government owned stock was vested exclusively in the GovernorGeneral. By an amended act, power was moved exclusively to the Board of Control composed of the Governor-General, President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Petitioners were then voted in the National Coal Company and the National Bank according to the amendments stated above. Respondents claim that the election of the directors and managing agents is an executive function of the GovGeneral. Ruling/Doctrine: Court holds that the voting of stock is executive power, the legislature cannot take part in it. 1. Separation of powers a. All the departments are forever separate and distinct 2. Unless otherwise provided by law, the legislature cannot exercise judicial or executive functions. 3. Legislature creates laws; executive enforces or appoints agents charged with the duty of enforcing the law created by the legislative. 4. The powers exercised by the legislative were powers of the Governor- General a. Control over all departments Kilosbayan v Guingona Facts: PCSO partnered with PGMC to create an online lottery system. Despite much opposition, Malacanang gave the go-ahead. Petitioners went to coaurt as the contract of lease was against the PCSO charter. KILOSBAYAN sued as taxpayers and citizens, Webb and Tanada and Arroyo sued as members of Congress as well. Petitioners opposed many !#&"
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provisions in the contract of lease, particularly its violation of the PCSO charter (RA 1169, amended by BP Blg 42) which grants it the authority to conduct lotteries etc. There was paramount public interest, and thus the case was decided. Ruling/Doctrine: Only a court order can stop Malacanang (the executive) from proceeding. PCSO cannot share its franchise or transfer it. It is at the least a joint venture. The provisions betray its intent. Collaboration: acts of working together. A. Legislative Intrusion into Executive Domain Concepcion v Paredes Facts: RA 2941 : Raffling off of judges to disricts. All CFI judges were called to Manila by Paredes to participate in a “drawing of lots” for judicial districts. Some members of the Bar challenged this, and the validity of Act 2941 Ruling/doctrine: Organic Act specifically prescribes that the judges of the courts of first instance shall be appointed by the Governor-General, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. Judges are normally appointed for specific offices, definite districts, until they either resign, reach the age of retirement, or are removed thorough impeachment proceedings. *Intention of law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices. *Judicial lottery, or appointment by lot/chance, is not appointment with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature.
In Re Cunanan Facts: Bar exam; Under the Rules of Court, the required general average is 75%. However, the court passed candidates that got a lower GA (72 in 1948, 69 in 1947, 70 in 1948, and 74 in 1949). Senate Bill no. 12 was passed. It reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70% effective since 1946. The President vetoed it. Instead of overriding it, the Congress approved a different Senate Bill, which embodies substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. This became law without the signature of the President. It became RA no. 972 or the “Bar Flunkers” Act of 1953.§ After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking this provision. If they are admitted to the bar, the RA should be applied to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. Ruling/doctrine: The candidates that are going to be admitted pursuant to the RA are inadequately prepared to study law. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving the Court to determine if they are prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Court to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is an encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the SC. The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. The Congress can only repeal, alter and supplement the said rules. The Constitution has not conferred on the Congress and the Court equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. However, the part in article 1 referring to examinations of 1953 to 1955 lacks 8 votes to be declared null, hence it shall continue in force. C. Executive Intrusion into Legislative Domain Araneta v Dinglasan Facts: National Assembly enacted Act No. 671 It granted President Quezon the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the needs of the state of emergency as a result of war
B. Legislative Intrusion into Judicial Domain !#'" "
Sec. 26, Article VI of the Constitution supports this (in times of war or emergency, Congress may authorize the President to promulgate rules an regulations)· Petitions were filed challenging the validity of executive orders issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (several varying cases involved) Ruling/doctrine: a. Article VI provides that any law passed in virtue thereof should be for a limited period. If a new law were to be needed to repeal Act 671, the President could just veto it. The power could end up unlimited. b. Section 4 of Act 671 provides that “rules and regulations shall effect unless the Congress otherwise provides.” Congress provided for the repeal of the rules but not the authority meaning they knew that Act 671 was made to be limited c. Section 3 of Act 671 said that the President will report his rules in a meeting. It did not say meetings. So Act 671 was not made to last long e. Quezon issued the call for Act 671 under the intention that “we were helpless against air attack and Phil Legislature would unlikely hold its next regular session.” Therefore, Act 671 became inoperative when Congress was actually able to hold its regular session on May 25, 1946. EO 62, 192, 225 an 226 which was issued under Act 671 after this time was without authority Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v Sawyer Facts: Wage negotiations between U.S. Steelworkers and the industry were deadlocked. The President (TRUMAN) referred the parties to the Wage Stabilization Board for resolution, who recommended wage increases, the industry rejected that proposal unless it received $12 per ton increase in the ceiling price.That was refused by the Board. A strike was announced. Upon learning this, the President, fearing that this would halt steel production, ordered the seizure of the steel mills (Exec Order 10340) to ensure the continuous production of steel. ( The Korean War was going on, and steel is a raw material that is used for almost everything. ) The presidents of the steel mills were ordered to operate under government standards.
Truman believed his action was valid under his inherent power as president and commander-in-chief, also citing historical instances wherein seizures where made without the consent of Congress. Ruling/Doctrine: The President’s power to issue an order must stem either from an act of Congress of from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress from which such a power can fairly be implied. If an executive order mimics a statute, it is legislative and is not a function of the executive; in this case, it does. The court held that the separation of the three branches of government should be respected and that Truman exercised a law-making task that was clearly the role of the legislature. D. Executive Intrusion into Judicial Domain Zaballero v NHA Facts: 1977: NHA instituted separate complaints for expropriation of sugarcane lands in Dasmarinas, Cavite belonging to Zaballeros. Stated public purpose of expropriation: expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area Case is about failure of parties to reach an agreement on the market value of the lands in question. Ruling/Doctrine: The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive or legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of Const’l rights that private property may not be taken for public use w/o just compensation, no statute, decree, or EO can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation. Trial court correctly applied the law on the matter of just compensation in rendering the disputed decision of April 7, 1982. Trial Court: “…Meaning to be given the cited PDs should be that the rules therein enumerated are intended merely to provide guidelines for the courts as they go about their functions of determining just compensation. NHA, therefore may not impute upon the presidency the !#("
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unconstitutional intent of direct executive determination of just compensation in the promulgation of the cited decrees and as a delegate of presidential powers, the NHA certainly cannot rise higher that its principal’s constitutional source of authority. In determining just compensation, Trial court considered the evidence presented by the Zaballeros consisting of documents and the testimony of Marina Reyes: 1) classification and use; 2) developmental costs for improving land; 3) value declared by owners; 4) selling price of similar lands in the vicinity; 5) reasonable “disturbance compensation” for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of the sugar cane crops, trees, and other improvements thereon. VIII. The Constitutional Commissions A. Civil Service Commission Serves as the “personnel office” of the government. 1. Scope Includes all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of Govt, including owned and controlled corporations with original charters. (created by special law) A. Terms and Conditions of employment in the Civil Service (1) Oath of Allegiance “Sec.4 All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution “ “Sec 18. …..any public officer or employee who wishes to change citizenship or acquire status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure will be dealt with by law” (2) Merit System A. Appointment of “lame ducks” Defeated candidates to any elective position cannot be appointed to any office in Govt or any govt owned or controlled corporations within a year of their defeat.
Elective officials cannot be appointed or designated in any capacity to public office or position during his tenure. Appointed officials cannot hold any other office or position in govt or govt owned and controlled corporations unless provided for by law or by the primary functions of his office. - The president, VP, cabinet members and their deputies and assistants, senators, congressmen, members of a constitutional commission shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment, ANYWHERE. (to avoid conflict of interest) (exceptions: VP who may be appointed to the cabinet, Sec. of Justice and one representative of Congress who are ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council ) - spouse and relatives both by affinity or consanguinity within the 4th civil degree of the President cannot be appointed to the Constitutional Commissions or the Office of the Ombudsman, or any other bureau or office including government owned or controlled corporations. Reviewer for page 14 of the syllabus appended. (Page 15 of the outline, under Commission on Elections) Decide election contests Art IX-C, §2(2) “Judicial power” of COMELEC Exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving: election, returns, and qualifications of elective regional, provincial, and city officials Appellate jurisdiction over contests involving: Elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction Elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction •
The decision of COMELEC on these cases may be appealed to the SC through certiorari limited to question of law involving lack or excess of jurisdiction.
B. Ban on partisan political activities !#)" "
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COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends when a winning House of Rep. candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office. (HRET’s jurisdiction begins)
Art IX-C §2(3) “Administrative Questions” • Power to decide all questions affecting elections • Includes: determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters • Excludes: questions involving the right to vote (falls within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts) • COMELEC may punish for contempt only in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power and of its “judicial power” RA 7166 §22 Election contests for Municipal Offices • Original Jurisdiction – RTC; Appeal to the COMELEC 4. Rule-making Art IX-A, §6 • COMELEC en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights Art IX-C, §3 • COMELEC may sit en banc or in 2 divisions • Shall promulgate rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies • All the such election cases shall be heard and decided in division Motions for Reconsiderations of decisions shall be decided en banc 5. Other functions Art IX-A, §8 • Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law
6. Act as National Board of Canvassers for senators EO 144, §1 • National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators • Composed of a chairman and members of the COMELEC sitting en banc • Shall canvass certificates of canvass from the district, provincial, and city boards of canvassers of those cities which comprise one or more legislative districts • A board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality and district of Metro-manila 7. Review of COMELEC decisions, orders and resolutions Art IX-C, §2(2) • Decisions, final orders, or rulings of COMELEC on contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable Art IX-A, §7 • COMELEC decision: Decided by a majority vote of all its members within 60 days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution • Review: by the SC on certiorari brought by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy of the decision, order or ruling • Exception: unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or b law 8. Fiscal Autonomy Art IX-A, §5 The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically released C. Commission on Audit Function: to examine the accuracy of the records kept by accountable officers and to determine whether expenditures have been made in conformity with law. Art IX-D • Composed of 1 chairman and 2 commissioners !#*"
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Qualifications: (1) Natural born citizen (2) At least 35 years old (3) Either CPA or lawyer both with 10 years experience (members cannot all belong to same profession) (4) must not have been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding the appointment Appointed by the president with the consent of the Commission on Appointments Term: 7 years without reappointment
D. Commission on Human Rights • The Commission on Human Rights is a creation of the Constitution although it is not on the same level as the 3 Constitutional Commissions • Its full operationalization will require congressional action IX. Other Agencies of the Government
Art VII, §12, par 2 (inexistent") Art XVIII, §17 Annual Salaries Chairmen: P204,000 Members: P180,000 Art IX-A, §2 Common provisions on disqualifications: • Hold any other office or employment • Engage in the practice of any profession or control of business which may be affected by the his office • Be financially, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, agencies, GOCCs Art IX-A, §5-8 Common provisions • Fiscal Autonomy • Promulgate rules concerning pleadings an practice before the them • Decision through majority vote • Other functions as may be provided by law Art XI, §2 Members of Commission on Audit to be removed only through impeachment Art VI, §20 Records and books of accounts of Congress to be audited by COA which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member.
A. Office of the Special Prosecutor Art XI, §7 • Two offices are created: Ombudsman/Tanodbayan and the Special Prosecutor • The Special prosecutor inherits the prosecutorial responsibility of the Tanodbayan of the 1973 Constitution, and no longer called Tanodbayan • •
Power to investigate given to Ombudsman The Special prosecutor may investigate and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman
ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Petitioner, governor of Antique, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to restrain the Sandiganbayan & Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution & hearing of criminal cases against him on the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan w/o legal & constitutional authority since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. RULING: The SC found the petitions impressed w/ merit. Under Art. XI, Sec. 13, par. 1 of the Consti., the Ombudsman (as distinguished w/ the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged w/ the duty to: "Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, !$+"
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employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." On the other hand, Art. XI, Sec. 7 of the Consti. provides that "The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." Now, then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (now called Special Prosecutor) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective Feb. 2, 1987
PD 1630 Law creating the office of the Tanodbayan B. Central Monetary Authority Art XII, §§20-21 Qualifications of members: • Natural-born citizen • Of know probity, integrity and patriotism • Majority from private sector • As prescribed by law Central bank, until the Congress provides otherwise, shall function as the Central Monetary Authority Functions: • Provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit
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Have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise regulatory powers over operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions
RA 7356 Law creating National Commission for Culture and the Arts C. Economic and Planning Agency: NEDA Art XII, §§9-10 •
NEDA, unless congress provides otherwise, shall function as the independent planning agency
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS FACTS GSIS sold through public bidding 51% of the outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, & Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. Renong Berhad won the bidding the but the the Filipino firm sent a letter to the GSIS declaring it was matching the Malaysians’ bid and then filed an action for prohibition and mandamus with the SC to compel GSIS to declare it the winner of the bidding. RULING SC held that the Filipino firm should be allowed to match the bid and therefore win the bidding. The provision is self-executing as it does not require any legislation to be operative. Constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing unless the contrary is clearly intended. The Manila Prince Hotel is considered part of our national patrimony. The term “national patrimony” includes not only natural resources but also cultural heritage. 51% percent of the shares of stock of the MHC is considered national patrimony because whoever owns it will have actual !$!"
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control of the hotel. It cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which it stands. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. D. National Commissions Commission on Human Rights, supra National Language Commission Art XIV, sec 9 • Composition: representatives of various regions and disciplines • Functions: undertake, coordinate and promote researches for the development, propagation, and preservation of Filipino and other languages. National Police Commission Art XVI, sec 6 • • •
The State shall establish one police force Characteristics: (1) national in scope (2) civilian in character (3) administered and controlled by a national police commission. Jurisdiction: The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law
Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities Art XVI, sec 12 • •
The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities Composition: majority of the members shall come from such communities
X. Accountability of Public Officers
A. Public Office as a Public trust Art XI, §1 The basic idea of government is that of a representative government, the officers being merely agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of law and holds office as a trust for the people whom he represents. Art XI §18 Public officers/employees owe allegiance to the State and the Constitution. Any public officer/employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law • This provision applies to “incumbents” Art IX-B, §4 Public officers and employees shall take an oath of affirmation to uphold and defend the Constitution RA 6713 Law establishing a code of conduct and ethical standards for public officials and employees B. Disclosure of assets, liabilities and net worth Art XI, §17 In the case of the (1) President, (2) Vice President, (3) Cabinet members, (4) Congress, (5) SC, (6) Con-com, (7) other Constitutional offices, (8) AFP members with general or Flag rank # the declaration shall be disclosed to the public C. Ban on financial accommodations Art XI, §16 To the (1) Pres, (2)VP, (3) Cabinet members, (4) Congress, (5)SC, (6) Con-com, (7)Ombudsman, (8) or any firm in which they have interest # No loan, guaranty, or other financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly !$#"
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D. Agencies for insuring public accountability (END OF PAGE 15 ") 1. Congress - Impeachment Art 11, Sec. 2: The president, VP, members of Supreme Court, Constitutional commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Bernas: Impeachment as political justice, outside the monopoly of courts. A function exercised by Congress. The object of impeachment is not to punish but to only to remove a person from office, “to secure the state against gross political misdemeanors… (by) simply divesting him of his political capacity” (Justice Storey). The right to be removed only by impeachment is the Constitution’s guarantee of security of tenure. The crimes are also of such enormous gravity that they strike at the very life or orderly working of government. Art 11, Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Bernas: There are 2 phases: initiation of impeachment by the House of Representatives & trial by Senate. Impeachment proceedings seek to discover the worthiness or unworthiness of a public official of public trust, not just his innocence or guilt in a criminal sense. An impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, supra On Impeachment: Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over public officers except for impeachment proceedings of constitutional officers as mandated in the constitution. Judgment in cases of impeachment is solely removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust under the RP but he shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment in accordance with the law. Effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position. Francisco v. House of Representatives !$$"
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Facts: This was the second attempted impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide after he facilitated the swearing into office by PGMA. Held: An impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is filed or referred to the Committee on Justice for action. 2. Sandiganbayan Art 11, Sec 4: The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. Bernas: Created by Pres. Marcos’ PD 1606, the Sandiganbayan was a recognition of the continuing need to combat graft & corruption. It has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft & corrupt practices against public officers and private persons who may be tried jointly as accomplices or accessories to the crime. 3. Ombudsman Art 11, Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law. Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office. Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents !$%"
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relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Art 11, Sec 7: The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Art 11, Sec 15: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
Bernas: Coined as the “People’s Champion”, the Ombudsman has the following duties: • Complaints and actions bureau • Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of nay public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient (Art 11 Sec 13 (1)) • Duty to investigate “any illegal act or omission of any public official” even if the offense committed is not related to the performance of his functions • May be delegated to others who have power to investigate and take back any time. As a constitutional office it may no be abolished nor may its composition be changed by ordinary legislation. Appointment of Ombudsman and his Deputies require no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and the office is also privileged with fiscal autonomy. The Ombudsman & his deputies shall be removed only through impeachment, and 7 year tenure period is protected.
Bernas: In contrary to the Ombudsman (known also as the Tanodbayan), the Special prosecutor has prosecutorial duties which are subject to authorization of the Ombudsman. It stands in subordinate to the Ombudsman, without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon order of the Ombudsman. E. Actions for Recovery of illegally acquired property
Bernas: The intention of the commission in creating this provision was to make imprescriptibility applicable to both the civil & criminal aspects of a case. XI. The Philippines as a State A. Concept & Definition State: A community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite territory, independent of external control and possessing an organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. The Philippines is a republican state & sovereignty is correlated with the people. Essential constituents of a state: a) Territory b) People c) Government d) Sovereignty
4. Office of Special Prosecutor !$&" "
Distinguished from Nation The state is a legal concept while a nation is a racial or ethnic concept. A nation is a non-juristic concept made of people bound together by an awareness of community interests based upon one or more factors such as racial, cultural identity, common economic and social interdependence or other bonds of organic unity.
b. Treaty of Washington, (November 7, 1900) Sibutu and Cagayan de Sulu were deemed included in Philippine territory.
Nation-state: where different races living together as a political group acquire a community of cultural and economic interests and develop common sympathies and aspirations.
*Bernas gives a 4th point of reference in determining Philippine territory to be “all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction”. This included Batanes Island which since time immemorial had undisputedly been part of the Philippine Islands.
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda Facts: Alleged is a tax exemption in favor of a resident of Tangier, Morocco, subject to whether or not it can be recognized as a state even without an international personality. Held: Neither independence nor an intentional personality is a requisite to be called a foreign state. Tangier national falls within the tax exemption of Sec. 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. B. Elements 1. Territory- The Philippine Archipelago: Art. I: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of it terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimension, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. Treaty Limits: a. Article III, Treaty of Paris, (December 10, 1898) - Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line. A technical definition was provided to delineate the limits of Philippine territory, however it left some doubt about the inclusion of Batanes islands to the north and Sibutu islands & Cagayan de Sulu to the south, as well as Turtle & Mangsee Islands.
c. US-Great Britain Treaty (January 2, 1930) Jurisdiction over the Turtle and Mangsee Islands was clarified by the convention, but inclusion of Batanes was left in question.
Determination of the National Territory Seaa. RA 3046 (June 17, 1961)- "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines": All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters of the Philippines. b. RA 5446 (September 8, 1968) - Amended RA 3046, drew straight line baselines around the Philippines. c. PD No. 1596, June 11, 1978 (other territories) – claim to Kalayaan Island Group on historical basis and indispensible need. d. PD No. 1599, June 11, 1978 (200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone ) – President FM established the Exclusive economic zone of the Philippines to be within 200 nautical miles from the baseline. e. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea – distinguished between an archipelagic state and an archipelago. The former means a state composed of one or more archipelagos & may include other islands; the latter refers to a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated. Following the definition of an archipelago, Batanes Island falls within the area of the Philippine archipelago. Determining the baseline !$'"
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1. Normal baseline method: drawn following the low-water mark, the mean of the high and low tides, along the coast. 2. Straight baseline method: (used in Archipelagic States) straight lines are drawn connecting selected points on the coast without appreciable departure from the general shape of the coast. RA 3046 & RA 5446 drew straight baselines around the Philippines. Relevance of an article on National Territory in the Constitution Arguments for the exclusion of a definition on national territory were that it was a subject of international law, not of municipal law (Delegate Garcia of Rizal) and that it was a repulsive reminder of the indignity of our colonial past having been lifted from the Treaty of Paris (Delegate Sorongon & Gunigundo). Arguments for inclusion ran on 2 levels: 1. A territorial definition was necessary for the preservation of our national wealth, for national security, and a s a manifestation of our solidarity as a people (Delegate Raul Roco, Camarines Sur). 2. A definition of territory is for the protection of our natural resources (Delegate Nolledo, Palawan). Subsequent arguments for inclusion was for the definition of national territory be made in an authoritative fashion such as the Constitution rather than on “whereas” clauses in the prior republic acts. There is also a need espoused to strengthen the country’s position in international law and for the provision to be flexible enough to allow for future territorial acquisitions of the Philippines (ie. Issues on Sabah, Marianas Island and Freedom Land) In sum, the constitutional definition of territory provided a security blanket and a rhetoric assertion of historic identity. The difference in the 1987 version from the 1973 was to remove a language possibly offending to neighboring ASEAN countries & achieving a more logical sequencing of the elements that make up the national territory. 2. People - A community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining the continued existence of the community, held together by a common bond of law. In the Constitution, the meaning of persons and people depends on the context where it is found.
a. As Inhabitants – Article III, section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Article III, section 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Article 2, section 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. Article 2, section 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Bernas: In the Bill of rights, “people” refers to individuals, whether citizens or aliens, electors or non-electors, so long as they are inhabitants, to be subject of the right to due process and equal protection from the law. All are likewise protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. Likewise, in the state policies, inhabitants of the Philippines shall be protected by the State in their rights to health, a clean environment and a balanced ecology. b. As Electors – Article VII, section 4: The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people Article XVI, section 2: The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum. !$("
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Article XVIII, section 25: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. * The people, as the reservoir of sovereign will, are deemed to have a direct participation in electing their national leaders by a direct vote, as well as in adhering or opposing to state decisions by means of a plebiscite or national referendum. People as referred to in this sense is the electorate, that segment of the political community which can establish or alter the fundamental law c.As Citizens – Article II, Sec1 & 4; Art III sec7 Article II, section 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Article II, section 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. Article, III, section 7: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. *People as citizens belong to the Philippine political community, vested with full civil and political rights subject to disqualifications by law. As the State has a duty to protect its citizens, the latter have reciprocal duties of allegiance to the country. 3. Government – is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing such. It is one of the component parts of that state, not the state itself, the agency through which the state enforces its will (Bernas). US v. Dorr Facts: Defendants were charged of scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands by insulting the appointment of natives in administrative positions. Held: The article contains no attack upon the governmental system of the U.S. and the system by which the authority of the United States is enforced in the Islands. Rather, it is the character of the men who are entrusted with the administration of the government that the writer attacks. (The definition of a government in this case, is that which is stated above.) a. Government of the republic of the Philippines defined – Section 2 (1), Administrative Code of 1987: The corporate governmental authority through which the function of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to: Autonomous regions, provincial city, municipal or barangay subdivisions, & other forms of local government. Not included are government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by corporation law. People v. Sandiganbayan Facts: On point is the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan to try a case involving the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), alleged to be a government-owned & controlled corporation. The issue is whether it is a private corporation with private funds. Held: The AFP-RSBS was created for the purpose of handling & disbursing retirement and pension funds in the military system i.e. of the members of the AFP and the PNP. The sources of the funds of the System do not preclude the Government from later adding to the !$)"
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funds of the AFP-RSBS in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. The character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, AFP-RSBS is a government entity and its funds are in nature of public funds. b. Constituent and Ministrant Functions of the Government Ministrant - Powers of government which are optional and intended for achieving a better life for its citizens. Most important functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health & safety regulations, and trade & industry. Constituent- Functions that are compulsory and which constitute the very bonds of society examples of which are keeping of order & providing protection, fixing of legal relations in the family, regulation of the holding, transmission & interchange of property. ACCFA v. CUGCO ACCFA v. CUGCO 30 SCRA 649 (1969) Facts: At issue is the characterization of the functions of a government agency charged with the implementation of the land reform program. Held: The function may not strictly be “constituent”, but the compelling urgency with which the Constitution speaks of social justice does not leave any doubt that land reform is not an optional but a compulsory function of sovereignty. Valmonte v. Belmonte (1989) Facts: Petitioners Valmont et al assert their constitutional right to information and asks the respondent GSIS to furnish for them the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members of UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure ‘clean’ loans with the intercession of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Ruling: (Relevant) It was contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to “official” functions. The Supreme Court held that the “constituent-ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. Citing ACCFA
v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently, the GSIS in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function which would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. c. Parens Patriae Parens Patriae is a doctrine that grants to the State the inherent power and authority to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their own behalf. Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution highlights the inherent duty of the State to act as parens patriae and to protect the right of persons and individuals who because of age or inherent incapacity are in an unfavorable position vis-à-vis other parties. Court decisions have called attention to the inherent connection between the duty of the State as parens patriae and the concern of the fundamental law for the strengthening of the family as the basic social institution. d. De Jure and De Facto Governments On the basis of legitimacy, governments are classified into either de jure or de facto governments. A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by other states. In contrast, a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the state. For example, a government that has been overthrown and has moved to another state will attain de jure status if other nations refuse to accept the legitimacy of the revolutionary government. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (1945) Facts: In here, petitioner prays that the respondent court be ordered to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 3012 which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. The respondent judge refused to continue the proceedings by virtue of the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur which provided that “all laws, regulations and processes of any !$*"
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other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect…” Ruling: 1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent State. Citing Thorington v. Smith, the distinguishing characteristics of a de facto government of the second kind are 1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government and, 2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible for those acts though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. According to the Hague Conventions, a belligerent occupant has the right and duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, that he possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and that he can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he sees fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented the municipal laws in force in the country. The third kind, on the other hand, differed from the second kind in that its authority did not originate from lawful acts of regular war. The Court took notice that the Philippine Executive Commission and the Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines belong to the second kind of de facto governments and that during a military occupation, it may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conquer over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which it imposes. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments were good and valid, and by virtue of postliminy, remained good and valid
after the liberation, provided that such judicial acts and proceedings are not of a political complexion. Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino (1986) Ruling: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made their judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino, which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law, a de jure one. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. e. Decentralization: Autonomy of Local Governments Local government has been described as “a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, local government can only be an intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of autonomy and decentralization of the functions of government. (Art. X, Sec. 1) Art. X, Sec. 2 gives the assurance that local autonomy will not only be for Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras but for all local units. Autonomy for local governments is, however, less than for the autonomous regions. In San Juan v. Civil Service Commission, the court stated that the exercise of autonomy of local governments has been a national goal since the turn of the century. However, national officers are still reluctant to give up its centralized hold over local governments. (Art. X, Sec. 2) The 1935 Constitution placed local governments under the power of control of the legislature. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution expressed the promotion of local autonomy which was made explicit in Art. XI. The 1987 Constitution adopted this attitude and embodied them in Art. X of the Constitution. (Art. II, Sec. 25) Dadole v. Commission on Audit (2002) Facts: !%+"
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In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. The Department of Budget and Management then issued Local Budget Circular No. 55. The Mandaue City Auditor, acting on the said directive, issued notice of disallowance to respondent judges. Ruling: Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he/she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his/her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs. Any directive by the President or any of his/her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and the separation of powers in governing municipal corporations.
Government Code of 1991 provides for initiative and referendum on the local level. Tan v. COMELEC (1986) Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was conducted by petitioners as being unconstitutional and is not in accord with the Local Government Code enacted under the 1973 Constitution. Ruling: The interpretation of Art XI, Sec 3 of the 1973 is in question in this petition. The Court ruled that the said article provides that whenever a province is created, divided or merged, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected should be secured. Two political units are at one subject to the creation of Negros del Norte i.e. Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental. In order for a ratification to be effected, there should be a majority of affirmative votes in the plebiscite conducted in the areas directly affected by the creation, division or merging of political subdivisions.
1. General supervision of local governments by the President General supervision by the President was seen during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission as meaning no more than ensuring that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law. The power of the President over autonomous regions is the same as his power over local governments. It is only of general supervision that is, the power to ensure that subordinate officers execute and act within existing laws.
3. Power of Local Governments Municipal corporations possess no inherent power to tax. Art. X, Sec 5 of the 1987 Constitution does not change this doctrine. What it provides is that it confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. Taxes imposed by local governments must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and must be within the jurisdiction of the local units to pass.
2. Local Government Code The structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials has been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress. The principal guidelines given to Congress for structuring local government units are that the structure must be responsive and accountable and instituted through a system of decentralization. RA 7160 or the Local
4. The Two Autonomous Regions a. Creation Section 13 authorizes local government units to group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law. It is important to note that the authority to decide whether to enter into group efforts with local government units is given to the units themselves. !%!"
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Section 18 and 19 of Art X of the 1987 Constitution provides for the process of establishing these autonomous regions. Sec 18 refers to the formulation of Organic Acts while Sec 19 commands Congress, with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commissions, to pass the Organic Acts within eighteen months from the time of its organization. b. Powers of Autonomous Regions Section 17 enunciates that these autonomous regions are local units which are given enumerated powers. Powers not included in the enumeration and not implicit in those enumerated remain vested in the national government. Notably not included in the enumeration are: National Defense and Security Foreign Relations and Foreign Trade Customs and Tariff Quarantine Currency Monetary Affairs Foreign Exchange Banking and Quasi-Banking External Borrowings Posts and Communications Air and Sea Transport Immigration and Deportation Citizenship and Naturalization General Auditing Section 20 enumerates the irreducible legislative powers conferred by the Constitution on autonomous regions. The grant of power, however, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws. Section 21 makes a distinction between the problem of internal peace and order and the problem of national defense and security. c. General Supervision by the President (See above, Art. X, Sec. 16) d. Recall Recall, as an instrument for effecting official accountability, means a device or procedure by which a public official’s tenure may be terminated by a public vote. It is encompassed in the notion of popular sovereignty. It may be applied to both elective and appointive officials. Section 3 tells Congress that in formulating a system of recall the system formulated must be
“effective.” The current law on recall is now found under the Local Government Code of 1991.
4. Sovereignty Doctrine of State Immunity The State is regarded as immune from suits unless it itself gives consent to the suit. Various rationalizations were offered by Philippine decisions to justify this doctrine. Santos v. Santos based the principle on “the juridical and practical notion that the State can do no wrong,” which is a restatement of the expression “the King can do no wrong.” Philippine jurisprudence also accepted Holmes’ formulation to the effect that a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Metran v. Paredes offered the justification that “In a republican state like the Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government.” In the end, however, the most acceptable explanation is a practical one. As stated in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, “a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. a. When is a suit against a State? When the suit is against the Republic of the Philippines eo nomine the suit is one clearly against the State. Problems arise when the Republic is not sued by name but rather through any of its instrumentalities or officers. The need for consent would flow from the fact of having been established for governmental purposes which makes the corporation participate in the immunity of the sovereign. When the suit is against an officer of the state, enquiry must be made whether in fact ultimate liability will fall on the officer or on the government. If it is the latter, the suit must be considered as one against the State itself. !%#"
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Republic v. Feliciano (1987) Facts: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority , for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. However, said land was, by virtue of Proclamation No. 90, designated for reservation for subdivision and distribution to settlers. Ruling: The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. Plaintiff, however, failed to show that the State consented to be sued. The State may be said to have provided for consent either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. Proclamation No. 90 does not give consent to the petitioner to sue the State. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. b. Express Consent Consent to be sued may be given by the legislature through a special law or by general law. A special law waiving immunity may come in the form of a private bill authorizing a named individual to bring suit on a specified claim. A general law authorizes any person who meets the conditions stated in the law to sue the government in accordance with the procedure specified in the law.
Facts: In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. However, the General Auditing Office found that the office charged excessive prices for the purchase of the spare parts and equipment as shown by the vouchers. Ruling: The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claims against the government may be filed. Republic v. Purisima (1977) Facts: There was a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract filed by Rice and Corn Administration against Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. The controlling doctrine was Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service. Ruling: The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution is a logical corollary to the positivist concept of law which negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of law on which such a right may be predicated. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. The judge was misled. The consent to be effective must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute. Whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. ii. Torts Committed by Special Agents Meritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1916)
i. Money claims arising from contract Sayson v. Singson (1973)
Facts: !%$"
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Plaintiff was involved in an accident concerning him and a General Hospital ambulance resulting in him being incapacitated and sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. Act No. 2457 was enacted in his favor. Ruling: The accident was due to the negligence of the ambulance’s chauffeur. As the negligence was committed by an agent or employee of the government involving tort, the inquiry arises whether the government is legally liable for damages. The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend his liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches in the public service and in the appointment of its agents. The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. iii. Incorporated Government Agencies PNB v. CIR (1978) Facts: The money of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was sought to be garnished to satisfy a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. Ruling:
When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations. SSS v. Court of Appeals (1983) Facts: Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS. On July 1968, SSS filed with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the conditions of the mortgage had been broken since October 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and interest and all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date. Ruling: The amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts have come to the courts, there should be no question considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act provides that it can sue and be sued in court. The Government has waived its immunity with respect to the SSS. Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals (1993) Facts: The vessel S/S “Pacific Hawk” arrived at the Port of Manila carrying 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Said importation was declared through a customs broker. However, it was misdeclared and the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Ruling: On the third issue, we opine that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, !%%"
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for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail. C. Implied Consent When the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers or agents in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise, the state itself may be sued even without its express consent because by entering into a contract the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. Consent can also be implied when the state authorizes an agency not to maintain a necessary function of government but to run what is essentially a business. It has also been held that when the state through its duly authorized officers take the initiative in a suit against a private party, it descends from its privileged position to the level of a private individual and thereby opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the private individual may have against the state. SOVERIEGNTY (p18) c. Implied Consent (Bernas): 1) When the state/government enters into a contract a. Because it descended to the level of a citizen b. Must be entered into by the proper officer acting within the scope of his authority
c. Santos vs. Santos d. Santiago vs Republic i. A donor, with the Rep of Phil as a done is entitled to go to court in case of alleged breach of such donation 2) When the state takes initiative in a suit against a private party (through its duly authorized officers) a. Descends to level of private individual b. Opens itself to counterclaims or defenses c. NOT when it is a complaint in intervention merely to resist a claim against a private party 3) When the state authorizes an agency to run what is essentially a business ( not maintain a necessary function of government) a. Normally undertaken by the private sector b. It descended to the level of a private citizen i.
When government submits itself to the court’s jurisdiction
ii. When the State itself files a complaint Republic vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: (1) Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG filed a complaint against Marcos et. al. for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages, in the Sandiganbayan. (2) Then, Simplicio Palanca and other stockholders of Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation (BREDCO) filed a “Motion for Leave to Intervene” saying that they have a legal interest in the action because their properties and stocks are included in the “illgotten wealth” to be reconveyed even if the complaint made no mention of BREDCO. They said that such properties should not be involved in the said action as the company is not a party to it. (3) RP filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction and that intervenors do not have a legal interest in the case. (4) The Sandiganbyan denied such motion, allowed intervention and entered the Answer in Intervention. !%&"
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(5) In herein petition for certiorari, the State, through the SG argued that in allowing such intervention, the court acted in contravention of a public policy as RP cannot be sued without its consent and the intervention amounted to a suit or counter-suit against the sovereign RP. Furthermore, the court lacks jurisdiction and the intervenors do not have legal interest. Issues: 1. Did the Sandiganbayan lack jurisdiction in this case? 2. Did the intervention amount to a suit against the State such that it is not legal? Held: 1. No. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction. Such has been settled in PCGG vs. Pena which ruled that “Section 2 of EO 14 xxx all cases of the Commission regarding Funds, Moneys, Assets, Properties illegally acquired by President Marcos xxx, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, xxx.” 2. No. Intervention is not an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. It can be made for the purpose of uniting with the plaintiff in the party’s complaint or uniting with the defense in resisting the claims of the plaintiff. In this case, the intervention is merely to unite with the defendants and the intervenors are not asking for any relief from the plaintiff. This is not a case where respondents take the initiative in an action against the plaintiff. Thus, it is not suit or counter-suit against RP. Decision: Petition dismissed. In relation to the syllabus: The case sites Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. which laid down that whenever the government files a complaint in intervention, it in effect waives its right to non-suability. In this case, there is implied consent that allows the
State to be sued as such intervention involved the State in a complaint with the knowledge that a counterclaim can be filed against it. Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. Facts: Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental alleging that he purchased from the shipping commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000 and paying P50,000 downpayment. He executed a chattel mortgage against the vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. The Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel due to nonpayment of the instalment. Froilan appealed to the President of the Philippines and as a result the Congress restored to him all right under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Pan Oriental Shipping Corporation refused to give to Froilan the vessel. ' The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan, but Pan Oriental Shipping Co denied the right of Froilan and it alleged that the action of the Cabinet was null and void. ' After obtaining the intervenor-appelle the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance, interest and the advances on the insurance premium excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of the vessel. ' Pan Oriental Shipping Co. answered that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase. ' Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in the amount of P162,576.93 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration ' Lower court held that the payment made by Froilan constituted a payment and a discharge of his obligation to the Government of the Philippines. ' The Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co., against it on the ground that the purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government to deliver the !%'"
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vessel to Pan Oriental in the event that the Government recovers the vessel from Froilan. The motion of Pan Oriental was dismissed. As a result of the dismissal Pan Oriental appealed the case Issue: WON the case should be dismissed because the State is immune from suit. Held: No. The Government’s action of filing its complaint in intervention had the effect of waiving its immunity and right on nonsuability. By taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The US SC held that no direct suit can be maintained against the US. But when an action is brought by the US to recover money in the hands of a party who has legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress. iii. Government entering into business contracts Malong vs. PNR Facts: Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, fell and died from a PNR train because the train was overloaded and he had to sit near the door of the coach. His parents (Malong sopuses) prayed in the CFI that PNR be ordered to pay them damages. The court dismissed the complaint saying that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR is a government instrumentally and the action was a suit against the State. The Malong spouses appealed to the SC.
Sec36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Sec 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court. Issue: WON the state acted in a sovereign capacity or corporate capacity when it created PNR WON PNR, being government instrumentality, is immune from suit Held: The state acted in a corporate capacity, it is not immune from suit. SC held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. MRC is not immune from suit according to its charter. When the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation. “Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the State.” In this case, the State has impliedly given its consent to be sued by engaging into a business activity.
The charter of the PNR provides the ff: Sec 1-a. Statement of policy - …the Philippine National Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured… Sec 4. General powers – the PNR shall have the ff general powers: (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of railroad corporation under the Corporation Law
Fontanilla vs. Malliaman Facts: Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla filed an action against the National Irrigation Administration for damages for the death of their son after Hugo Garcia, an employee of the NIA, bumped a bicycle being ridden by their son (Francisco Fontanilla), who was brought to the hospital after the incident where he eventually died. The trial court ordered NIA to pay the spouses damages (death benefits) and actual expenses (the cost of the burial). The NIA filed for a Motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial !%("
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court. After which they filed an instant petition with the Supreme Court. The issue deliberated by the SC was whether or not the NIA was liable to pay for damages since it was an agency of the State performing governmental functions and the driver was an ordinary employee, not a special agent who was performing a job or an act foreign to his usual duties hence the liability of the tortuous act should not be borne by the NIA. According to the SC the NIA was a government agency with a juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortuous act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. Since the assumption of liability rests on whether there was negligence of supervision on the part of NIA. The Court said that there was negligence since from the facts of the case, the impact of the pick-up truck threw Francisco 50 meters away from the road which shows that the driver was driving at high speed when he bumped Francisco’s bicycle and at that time Garcia was with his supervisor who obviously failed to caution him about going too fast along the road. The Court eventually affirmed the trial court’s decision and ordered NIA to pay the spouses damages and actual expenses. The NIA filed a Motion for reconsideration citing P.D. No. 552 which amended the charter of NIA (R.A. 3601) , which states that the NIA does not solely and primarily perform proprietary function but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions and therefore not liable for the acts of their driver who was not a special agent. Held: Yes, NIA is liable for the acts of its ordinary employee and the Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality by the Court. The Court ruled that the NIA was indeed a government agency but they were invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true
that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. The NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law, also P.D. No. 552 allows the NIA to sue and be sued. iv. When unequitable for government to claim immunity Santiago vs. Republic Facts: Santiago donated a property to the Phil government through the Bureau of Plant and Industry under the condition that the Bureau shall install lighting facilities and water system on the property donated and build an office building and parking lot. The Bureau failed to comply with said conditions. Santiago now filed a suit against the State for a revocation of the deed of donation. Santiago’s petitions were dismissed due to the constitutional provision re: State’s non-suability without its consent. Santiago filed a petition for certiorari. Held: Santiago can sue for the breach of conditions of donation. The general rule is the State cannot be sued when it enters into a contract in the fulfillment of its government functions, EXCEPT: 1) when the contract is of a proprietary nature or 2) Consent is waived either expressly or impliedly. The doctrine of governmental authority from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to the citizen. Thus, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions in the donation is an enough cause for a civil action& consent is presumed. With regards to equity and justice, The government should set the example. If the government is susceptible to the charge of acting !%)"
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dishonorably, then it forfeits public trust. Government should manifest its adherence to the highest ethical standards. Dismissal of case in compliance with the doctrine of non-suability would result in unfairness Amigable vs. Cuenca Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City with Transfer Certificate of Title No.T-18060 issued by Register of Deeds of Cebu on Feb. 1, 1924. Note: There was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used 6,167 square meters of said lot for construction of the “Mango” and “Gorordo” Avenues. Petitioner’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment for the portion of lot but Auditor General dismissed it. On Feb. 6, 1959, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint against Nicolas Cuenca, Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the appropriated land. Trial Court held that a) it had no jurisdiction over plaintiff’s cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the gov’t cannot be sued without its consent; b) that it had no original or appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 and; c0 that the claim for moral damages have long prescribed nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the gov’t had not given its consent to be sued. Held: Yes. Decision appealed from is set aside and case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled. • As held in Ministerio vs CFI, where the government takes away property from a private land owner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government w/o thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
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The doctrine of governmental immunity of suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there was an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the said plaint they are now. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
d. Suits against Public officers Bernas: • Will the ultimate liability fall on the government? • Suit against office is not suit against government: a. Where the suit is filed against the a foreign government without it giving its consent i. Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez b. Where government has no interest to protect in the outcome of a suit i. Ruiz vs. cabahug c. Where a statutory consent of the state is absent i. Only applies if the state or its subdivision is made a party upon the record, or is actually necessary to be made a party in order to furnish the relief demanded by the suit d. Where the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action or discharge of any obligation on the part of the state i. Even though the officers or agents disclaim any personal interest in themselves and claim to act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants
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ii. Relief: require the state or its political subdivision the affiormative performance of some asserted obligation iii. Example: 1. If officers of the state, acting in official duties, seize the property of a citizen without the state having a valif right thereto, the courts have jurisdiction to eject them. e. Where liability of the officer is personal, arising from a tortuous act in the performance of his duties i. An officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law must bear the liability personally ii. Immunity cannot serve as an instrument of pepetrating an injustice on a citizen iii. There must be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained The rule on immunity of the state however, may be relaxed where its strict application will result in an injustice.
US vs. Reyes Facts: Montoya, a Fil-Am, was searched at the parking lot of a retail store of the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters upon the instructions of its store manager, Bradford. She was searched on the premise that the process was routine for everyone that daw. However, Montoya found out that she was the only person searched that day and that store policy dictates that searches are not to be made outside the store unless there is strong evidence of wrongdoing. Montoya claims that due to illegal; search, she was subjected to speculations of theft, shoplifting and such other wrongdoings and has exposed her to contempt and ridicule which has caused her undue embarrassment and indignity ant that the illegal search was due to racial discrimination. She claims damages through a suit. As a defense, Bradford and the USA claims that the suit was against the country who cannot be sued without its consent and that Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Excahnge Branch at JUSMAG, QC, is immune from suit for acts done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines and that the checking of purchases at the NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash and equipment
Held: WON the complaint is a suit against the US (a foreign sovereign immune from suit which has not given consent to such suit) The US is immune from suit under the doctrine of state immunity as indicated by Art XVI, Sec 3, of the 1987 Consti and adopted as part of the law of the land under Art II, sec 2. However, the rule is that if the judgment against such ofifical will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It is however, a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of another. Unauthorized acts of the government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one wshose rightes have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. WON Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her in the performance of her official functions The doctrine of immunity will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him Republic vs. Sandoval Facts: The case is a complaint for damages against the Republic of the Philippines for the death of 12 rallyists in the Mendiola massacre. The Mendiola massacre started when members of the KMP started demanding for “genuine agrarian reform”. The KMP and the government couldn’t reach a settlement in their negotiations and eventually a heated discussion ensued between them. KMP then decided to march to Malacanang from QC Circle to air their demands to the President. Meanwhile, in anticipating a civil disturbance, CAPCOM commander Ramon Mantano made preparations for government forces to quell impending attacks. OPLAN YELLOW was put into effect.
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When the marchers reached CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place, but a clash occurred and “pandemonium broke loose”. After the clash, 12 marchers were confirmed dead. After the event, Pres Aquino issued AO11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission whose purpose was to conduct investigations of the disorder, death and casualties that took place. After the investigations, the Commission issued recommendations to aggrieved parties. The most significant recommendation was for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. Thus, the complaint for damages. The Solicitor General contends however that the State cannot be sued without its consent. But it was argued that the state impliedly waived its immunity from suit when the Commission issued its recommendation and in the public addresses of Pres Aquino in the aftermath of the killings. Held: The state did not waive its immunity from suit. 1) The recommendation made by the Commission does not mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. a. The findings of the Commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate his/her claim b. Its recommendations do not bind the state immediately c. It is only a fact finding body 2) Whatever acts or utterances that the President may have done or said, is not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. a. Those were acts of solidarity by the government with the people b. The promise that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists is not an admittance of liability of the State, nor consent to the suit. 3) The case does not qualify as a suit against the State. a. Proper suits: i. When the Republic is sued by name ii. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency iii. When the suit is on its face against a govt officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. 4) The ultimate liability does not pertain to the government
a. Although the military officers and personnel (who may have caused the deaths) were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. b. An officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts re wholly without authority\immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. c. Immunity of suit cannot be invoked by military officers i. The principle of immunity from suit does not apply when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its official capacity, even though the officers claim to hold or act only by virtue of title of the state and as its agents and servants. ii. High position in the govt does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. EXTRA NOTES: The principle of immunity of suit is based: 1) On the very essence of sovereignty 2) On the practical ground – t at there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends 3) On Public policy – that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for proper administration of the govt. e. Consent to execution Bernas: • When the state consents to be sued, it does not: o concede to the liability o deprive the state of the right to interpose any lawful defense o Follow that the judgment can be enforced by execution • Case: Commissioner of Public Highways vs. SanDiego !&!"
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Rule: Consent may limit the claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to stage of execution , and the powers of the Courts end when the judgment is rendered Government funds may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy court judgments Disbursement of public funds = covered by corresponding appropriation as required by law Functions and public services of the State cannot be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
PNB vs. Pabalan Facts: Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution, followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment, instructing PNB to deliver the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration deposited with it. PNB initiated a certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent judge. Invoking the doctrine of state non-suability, PNB contended that the garnishment order should be set aside. Held: The State may not be sued without its consent. If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that PNB is a government owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. Following the ruling in National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, PNB, as a public corporation, has a personality of its own and may be sued as an entity distinct from the RP by another government instrumentality. The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation decision was not the first of its kind. The ruling therein could be inferred from the judgment announced in Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, decided as far back as 1941. In the language of its ponente, Justice Ozaeta: “On the other hard, it is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of
its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." It is worth mentioning that Justice Ozaeta could find support for such a pronouncement from the leading American Supreme Court case of United States v. Planters' Bank, with the opinion coming from the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall. It was handed down more than one hundred fifty years ago, 1824 to be exact. It is apparent, therefore, that petitioner Bank could not legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a notice of garnishment the doctrine of non-suability. GARNISHMENT -- A directive from a court or other related authority directed to a third party who owes money or property to a judgment debtor not to pay or surrender the property to the judgment debtor but to deliver it to the judgment creditor for use in either satisfying a judgment Municipality of Makati vs CA • Facts: There were expropriation proceedings initiated by Makati against Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo regarding a parcel of land and improvements on it. Land is located at Mayapis St, San Antonio Village, Makati and registered under Arceli Jo. • Eminent domain proceedings were filed and Petitioner showed certification that a bank account had been opened with PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner’s name containing P417,510 pursuant to PD 42. RTC decided that property was valued at P5,291,666 and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced P338,160 which was released earlier to Jo. When this decision became final, respondent moved for issuance of writ of execution, which was granted by respondent judge and a Notice of Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon manager of PNB Buendia Branch. However, sheriff was informed that a “hold code” was placed on the account, so Jo filed a motion on 27 Jan 1988 praying that an order to direct the bank to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to unpaid balance be issued. • Petitioner filed a motion to lift garnishment since payment should be done in installments which the respondent judge failed to indicate in his decision. Jo filed opposition to motion. Pending these motions, P filed a “Manifestation” informing the court that Jo no longer owned the land because a new title had been registered in name of !&#"
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Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB) Respondent judge ordered PSB to show documents pertaining to its transactions regarding land and PNB to reveal the amount in P’s account garnished by sheriff. PSB informed court that it had consolidated ownership over the property. “After several conferences, PSB and Jo entered into compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings.” Respondent judge issued an order approving the compromise agreement and ordering PNB to release P4,953,506.45 from the garnished account of the petitioner and ordering PSB and Jo to execute the necessary deed of conveyance of property in favor of Makati. Makati’s motion to lift garnishment was denied. Manager of PNB, Antonio Bautista, failed to comply and was held in contempt even though he said that he was waiting for the authorization of PNB Head office. P also contended in its motion for reconsideration that its funds at PNB could neither be garnished nor levied for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. Respondent judge denied motion for reconsideration so both filed separate petitions for certiorari with CA, which were eventually consolidated. CA dismissed both petitions for lack of merit. Hence the present petition for review.
Held: Can the PNB Account made in compliance with PD 42 be subject to execution – NO Held and Ratio: Court orders Makati to pay within 60 days. • Petitioner alleged that it actually had 2 accounts with PNB: one for the subject property and transaction, and another for the public funds of the municipality. Since this was only alleged in the latter periods of the case, court believes that the 2nd account could’ve been made in order to be able to assert the disbursement argument. However, the court gives Petitioner the benefit of the doubt. • P had no objection to the garnishment or levy over PNB Account specifically opened for expropriation. “However, it is the petitioner’s main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45 the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are
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public funds earmarked for the municipal government’s other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.” The funds are public funds and such are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Properties of a municipality which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. “Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. … Absent showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision … , no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner….” This isn’t to say that Jo doesn’t have legal recourse: mandamus may be filed to make Makati pay. Since it’s been 3 years and evidently, Makati is benefitting from the property (it’s the site of Makati West High School), it has had reasonable time to be able to pay.
Nessia vs Fermin Facts: Nesia claimed reimbursement of travel expense allowances but Fermin deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of the vouchers in question because Nesia defied Fermin’s request to all municipal officials to register and vote in Voctorias in the 1980 local elections. Nesia filed a complaint against Fermin and the municipality of Victorias Negros Occidental for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of his official duties as the then Deputy Municipal Asseso of Victorias. Fermin countered that the claims of Nesia could not be approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations therefor. The trila court ruled in favor of Nesia findint that Fermin deliberately refused to act on plaintiff;s vouchers and failed to act on the latter’s follow-up letters. Upon appeal to the CA, the court of appeals ruled in favor of Fermin.
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Held: WON the court may reverse the decision of the trial court which has become final and executor against Victorias for failure to appeal therefrom - NO. Opinion of the trial court deserves greater acceptance since it was the trial court who originally heard the case. Its appraisal of conflicting testimonies is afforded greater weight. WON appellate court may grant affirmative relief to Victorias which did not appeal the trail court’s decision - NO. a non appellant cannot, on appeal, seek an affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the court below.
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WON Fermin erred in exonerating Fermin from laicious refusal to act on petititioner’s claims - YES. Public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. Inaction constitutes an offense against the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act Inaction results to material/moral loss City of Caloocan vs. Allarde ' Facts: In 1972 Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via the ordinance no. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition and in 1973 the CFI declared that it was illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries and other emoluments. The City government appealed the decision but it was also dismissed. ' During 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages. Remaining balance = P530,761.91 The others were paid in full. ' In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan were arguing that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. ' On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at a public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for 100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle maintaining that the properties of the municipality
were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. ' October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed ordinance no. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can’t release it because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. ' May 7, 1993 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB decided to follow the order of Judge Allarde. Held: Issues and Ratio 1. WON the garnishment of the funds of the City if Caloocan still needed authority of the Mayor to be released – NO ' Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a 3rd person., or money owed by such 3rd person or garnishee to the defendant. ' RULE: All government funds deposited in PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government remains government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Based on consideration of Public Policy. State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. EXCEPTION: When there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a case monetary judgement may be legally enforced by judicial process. ' Pasay City Government vs. CFI of Manila – government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from execution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for the payment of the City’s obligation. ' Ordinance no. 0143 was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The sum that was indicated in the ordinance was deemed !&%"
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automatically segregated from other budgetary allocation of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s monetary obligation to her. A valid appropriation lifts its exemption from execution. The appropriation was duly signed and approved by the council and the mayor.
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2. WON the levy and sale at public auction of 3 motor vehicles owned by the City cannot be attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a money judgement against the City of Caloocan. – MOOT CASE Judge Allarde already the levy on the three vehicles thereby formally discharging them from the jurisdiction of this court.
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3. WON the auction of the vehicle was valid. YES Sheriff complied with the rules on public auction and the administrative complaint acknowledges that fact. Petitioner cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction sale.
XII. CITIZENSHIP A. Definition • Personal and permanent membership in a political community • Denotes possession of full civil and political rights in the political community • Imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community B. Importance • Land ownership Case: Lee vs. Republic o Facts: The heirs of Lee Liong was requesting for a reconstitution of certificate of title for a certain parcel of land Lee Liong acquired. However, it was alleged that Lee Liong is Chinese and hence is not entitled to own such land. o Held: Liong was not entitled to own the land, but since his heirs were Filipino, there is no more violation of public policy. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of
lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. Since the prohibition no longer applies, the heirs are entitled to own the land. It gives the capacity to enjoy political rights o Right to participate in government o Right to vote o Right to hold public office o Right to petition the government for redress of grievances o Right to have rights A person with no citizenship is stateless – disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen
C. Modes of acquisition • Jus sanguinis – acquisition on the basis of blood relationship (this is the one applied in the Philippines) • Jus soli – on the basis of birth • Naturalization – legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen D. Who are Philippine Citizens Article IV Sec 1: The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3. Those born before Jan 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Bernas Notes: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution: a. Citizens under the 1935 Constitution i. Those whose fathers were citizens ii. Those who elected Fil citizenship upon reaching majority age (mothers are Filipinos, father are not) 1. aka The Caram rule !&&"
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2. This provision was tailor-made for one of the delegates of the constitutional convention, Delegate Fermin Caram to erase all doubts as to his citizenship 3. Caram was born in the Philippines by Syrian parents, and although he has never been naturalized, he was elected provincial board member of Iloilo before the consti convention. iii. Those who were naturalized iv. Those born of foreign parents, elected to public office before the adoption of the 1935 Consti b. Citizens under the 1973 Consti i. Those who are already citizens at the time of the adoption of Consti ii. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens iii. Those who elected Fil citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Consti iv. Those naturalized Note: if a person’s citizenship was subject to judicial challenge under the old law, it remains subject to challenge under the new law – WON judicial challenge had been commenced prior to the new law’s effectivity 2. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens (Principle of jus sanguinis) a. 1935 Consti • The child of a Filipino father, whether born in the Philippines or abroad, is a Fil citizen from the moment of birth b. 1973 Consti • Expanded application of jus sangunis: Fil woman = Fil male (in matters of citizenship • If the mother is a Fil citizen, the child is a Fil citizen (even if the father is an alien) o BUT! Mother must be Filipino at the time of the birth of the child (not at the time of her marriage)
Not retroactive: applies only on or after adoption of 1973 Consti (Jan17,1973) o Came under assault by: ! Roberto Concepcion: Arguing based on the nationalist perspective, he thought the provision could open up to exploitation of natural resources by “half-breeds” ! Ambrosio Padilla: Saw this as a fruit of the feminist movement and said that it ignored the real differences between children of a Filipino father and that of a Fil mother (because a Fil mother must leave her country with her foreign husband to raise her child abroad) c. 1987 Consti Jus sanguinis • Applies only to natural filiation, not to filiation by adoption • Parental authority remains unchanged under the new Consti o Only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father ! Illegitimate children follow the mother’s ! Illegitimate child, Fil father + and alien mother = Filipino (FPJ) • Child may also have dual citizenship • the legislature may adopt the principle of jus soli (if they wanted to) o
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship • Scope of the right of election given by the 1935 Consti: o Those whose mothers are Fil citizens and, upon the age of majority, elect Fil citizenship (sec4) ! This provision is supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 625 (procedure for making the election) • Case: Villahermoso vs. Commissioner of Immigration o Must the mother be a Filipino at the time of the election by the child?
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It is sufficient that the mother be a Fil citizen, either by birth or by naturalization, at the time of her marriage o If the mother lost her citizenship by marriage, but subsequently reacquired it during the minority of the child? ! the child must still make the election CA 625 Procedure for making the election (June 7,1941) o The election must be: ! Expressed in a statement sworn before any officer authorized to administer oaths ! Filed with the nearest civil registry ! Accompanied by an oath of allegiance to the Phil Consti o Before, there was no fixed procedure. For proof of election, the Court accepted: ! Participating in elections ! Campaigning for a candidate Case: Dy Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice o Reasonable period within which the child must make the lection upon reaching 18: 3 years o Except: when the person concerned has always considered himself a Fil citizen (3-year period can be extended) Case: Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of House of Representatives o Election of citizenship is not needed if the father has been naturalized while he is still a minor Case: In re Mallare o The court recognizes informal election under special circumstances: participation in the election process on the belief that one was a citizen 1973 Consti o A Filipino woman who marries an alien can retain her original citizenship ! And their child is allowed to follow her citizenship o The right to elect was acquired under the 1935 Consti ! It is a transitory provision applicable to children born under the 1935 Consti who had not yet reached the age of majority when 1973 Consti took effect.
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The 1973 Consti does not grant but merely preserves a right already acquired Expires once those who have the right to elect have already elected or have forfeited • 21 years after the 1973 Constitution = 1994 (and so it was carried over to the 1987 Consti)
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law o Naturalization ! Legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that belong to a natural born citizen ! Obtained through a general law of naturalization applied through a judicial process • Revised Naturalization Law (CA473) ! Named individuals may acquire citizenship through a special act passed by the legislature or by the President in the exercise of legislative power ! Philippine Bill of 1902 • Mass naturalization law • All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside in them who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and then resided in said islands were made Filipino citizens ! Positivist rule • Citizenship is not a right, but a privilege o Privilege of the most discriminating, delicate and exacting nature o Affects public interest of the highest order o May be enjoyed only under precise conditions prescribed by the law • Admission to citizenship is an aspect of sovereignty o Every independent nation has the inherent right to determine what classes of people shall be entitled to its citizenship ! Letter of Instruction 270 • Provided for administrative screening preparatory to the grant of citizenship by presidential decree • Historical Background: !&("
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Measure to counteract the potential national security threat o Vast number of Chinese residing in the Philippines when the country was establishing diplomatic relations with Peking o For greater simplification and liberalization of naturalization law Power of the legislature in naturalization: ! Control over processes through which citizenship is acquired or lost ! Determination of substantive criteria for admission to citizenship ! Fixing the consequences of the grant of citizenship on the wife or minor children of the grantee Prevailing policy: make acquisition of citizenship a slow, arduous, cumbersome process ! Sec 2 of CA 473Requirements: • Age • Residence • Moral character and political belief • Real property or lucrative occupation • Language • Education of children ! Procedural requirements • Declaration of intention • Filing of petition • Hearing and initial judgment • Period of probation • Rehearing and final judgment • Oath of citizenship The grant of citizenship to a parent extends to the minor children under parental authority ! Wife is deemed a citizen, but becomes one after: • Administrative procedure to cancel her alien certificate of registration • She has none of the disqualifications found in CA 473 o
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Administrative naturalization ! Handled through the Special committee on Naturalization ! Chaired by the Solicitor General ! Governed by Sec 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RA 9139
E. Natural Born Citizens –Art. IV, Section 2 - “Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.” 1. Advantages of natural born citizens Article XII, Section 8 – “Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.” Article VII, Sections 2 &3 “Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election” “Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. XXX” Article VI, Sections 3 & 6 “Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.” “Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the !&)"
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district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.” Article VIII, Section 7(1) – “Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.” Article XI Section 8 – The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. XXX” Article IX-B Section 1(1) – “Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.” Article IX-C Section 1(1) – “Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.” Article IX-D Section 1(1) – “Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten year, and must not have been candidates for a any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession.”
Article XII, Section 20 – “Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. XXX” Article XIII, Section 17(2) – “Section 17. (2) The Commission [on Human Rights] shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.” 2. Who are Natural Born Citizens a. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens b. Those who elect Filipino citizenship c. Former natural born citizens who reacquire citizenship by repatriation Tecson vs Comelec (2004) Facts: Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition praying that the Comelec disqualify FPJ from running for president on the grounds that he misrepresented himself in his certificate of candidacy when he claimed that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Fornier argued that Poe’s mother was an American citizen and that his father was a Spanish national, and even if his father was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. Ruling: (taken from Bernas) As long as paternity is proved, an illegitimate child of a Filipino father is a natural born Filipino citizen. Fornier failed to substantiate his case. Bengzon vs HRET (2001) Facts: Teodoro Cruz was a Philippine citizen, but he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and subsequently became a naturalized US citizen. He reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 (Title: “An Act Providing For Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States”). Cruz ran and was elected for the position of Representative of Pangasinan, and the HRET declared Cruz a duly elected Representative. Petitioner Bengson III contends !&*"
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that Cruz was not qualified to be Representative of Pangasinan because he was no longer a natural born citizen. Ruling: Cruz is a natural-born Filipino Citizen. Under the 1987 Constitution, only naturalized Filipinos are not considered natural-born citizens. Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of the House of Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. In re Ching, Bar Matter No. 914 (1999) Facts: Vicente D. Ching is the son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Under the 1935 Constitution, he had to elect his Filipino citizenship by the time he reached the age of majority. He graduated from Law school and passed the Bar, but because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Ching had to formally elect Philippine citizenship within “reasonable time” prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. Ruling: Ching’s citizenship election was beyond the allowable period within which to exercise his privilege. This privilege should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm, and promptitude. Ching was already 35 when he complied with the requirements of CA 625. By then he well past the age of majority and his election could not be considered to have retroacted to the time he took the Bar. Co vs HRET (1991) Facts: Jose Ong, Jr. was elected for the position of representative of the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar. His opponents, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co filed election protests again Ong, saying that he was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and that he was not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Ruling: Ong’s mother was a natural born Filipina, and while his father was born (1905) a Chinese citizen who applied for and was granted naturalization when Ong was still a child, Ong grew up as a Filipino, and his citizenship is cemented by his mother’s citizenship. Jose Ong, Jr. was declared a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Norther Samar.
F. Naturalization (I just put in the original texts since I know they can be hard to come by) 1. By Judicial Proceeding a) Com. Act No. 473 (Revised naturalization Law) –Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15 & 18 “Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization: First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years; Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation; Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following qualifications: 1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof; !'+"
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2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines; 3. Being married to a Filipino woman; 4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years; 5. Having been born in the Philippines. Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos; g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war; h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3 whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice4 a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration.
No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education5 of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself. Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.6 Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the !'!"
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petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition. Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the petition.” “Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.-Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof. A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.”
“Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor-General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register: 1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally. 2. If the person naturalized shall, within the five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same; 3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention; 4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring hem to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree cancelling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Justice. 5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.” b) RA No. 530, Section 1 – effect on the wife and children “Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its !'#"
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promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.” Republic vs. De la Rosa (1994) Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was elected Governor of Sorsogon, but he was declared an alien and disqualified from serving as governor. He was originally a natural-born Filipino citizen, but he became a US Citizen when he fled the Marcos regime. He later returned to the Philippines and sought Filipino citizenship again, first through petition for naturalization, and then by direct act of congress, but to no avail. He also attempted repatriation but prevailing repatriation laws at the time were only open to army deserters and Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to foreigners. Raul Lee wanted annulment of Frivaldo’s proclamation as Governor-elect and cancellation of Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy, because he was not a Filipino citizen. Ruling: Frivaldo’s naturalization proceedings were full of procedural flaws and he could not be considered a Filipino citizen. Frivaldo was disqualified. He had to vacate his office and turn it over to the Vice Governor. Republic vs. Liyao (1992) Facts: William Li Yao was a Chinese national who was granted naturalization. His citizenship was revoked, however, when it was found that he was not a person of “good moral character;” he evaded taxes and used different names. He filed a notice of appeal, but while it was pending, he died. Ruling: The cancellation of Li Yao’s certificate of naturalization was valid. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the government and against the applicant. His moral character was found lacking; this disqualified him from naturalization.
Moya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner (1971) Facts: Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese citizen, married Moy Ya Lim Yao a.k.a. Edilberto Aguinaldo, an alleged Filipino citizen. She overstayed her nonimmigrant visa and was about to be deported, but Moy Ya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed her arrest and deportation. Ruling: Under Sec. 15 of CA 473, by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao, Lau Yuen Yeung has become a naturalized Filipino citizen; provided that she did not suffer from any of the disqualifications under Sec. 4 of CA 473. As a Filipino citizen, she cannot be deported. 2. By Administrative Proceedings (R.A. No. 9138) - “R.A. No. 9138” is a typo, kase sinearch ko sa internet, and statute na ito ay “act establishing the Guimaras State College.” Joketime. Dapat “R.A. No. 9139” siya. Title: RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION LAW OF 2000” 3. By Direct Act of Congress 4. Denaturalization G. Loss of Citizenship – Article IV, Section 3 - “Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.” - Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended, and RA 965, and RA 2639, and PD 725 on repatriation; govern loss and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship - A certificate of naturalization may be canceled if there is a clear, unequivocal and convincing showing that it had been obtained fraudulently or the person is shown to have violated the prohibitions - When one had a Portuguese passport and was granted naturalization as a Filipino citizen, but still declared Portuguese citizenship and obtained a Portuguese passport, his actions constituted a renunciation of Filipino citizenship. - When a Filipino took an oath of allegiance to another country, it was a renunciation of Filipino citizenship !'$"
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- Lost citizenship may be reacquired either through naturalization, or repatriation. - Repatriation is the recovery of original citizenship. If what was lost was naturalized citizenship, what will be reacquired would be naturalized citizenship - Repatriation may be accomplished depending on how citizenship was lost o Women who lost their citizenship through marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of economic or political necessity o Those who lost citizenship serving in the US Armed Forces - Registration of repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation - Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in 1934, in Australia, to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, because her father was a Filipino citizen, she is also a Filipino citizen. - For citizenship to be lost by renunciation, it renunciation must be express - Effective date of repatriation when approved is date of application for repatriation (for natural born citizens) - There is no law authorizing “judicial repatriation;” a woman who has lost her citizenship through marriage only needs to take the oath of allegiance and register it in the proper civil registry - Philippine citizenship may not be declared in a non-adversary suit where affected persons are not made parties - A mother’s repatriation entitles her minor son to a declaration that he is entitled to Philippine citizenship. Coquilla vs. Comelec (2002) Facts: Coquilla was born and grew up in Eastern Samar. He later joined the US Navy and was naturalized as a US citizen. He returned to the Philippines and got a residence certificate, but continued to go on trips to the US. He applied for and was granted repatriation under RA 8171 and he later filed for a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar; saying that he had been a resident of Oras for “2 years.” Respondent incumbent mayor sought cancellation of Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy, saying that he had resided in Oras for only about 6 months. Comelec was unable to render judgment and Coquilla won the elections.
Ruling: Comelec has jurisdiction over the case even though Coquilla was already proclaimed mayor. Coquilla lost his domicile of origin when he became a US citizen. He was an alien without a right to reside in the Philippines until he reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he lacked the requisite residency to qualify for the position of Mayor. H. Reacquisition of Citizenship – See Com. Act. No. 63, Section 1(2) “Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country (2) By express renunciation of citizenship” Frivaldo vs. Comelec (1996) Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon and won. Again. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. Again. He petitioned for repatriation under PD 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen, but on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee -2nd placer- as Sorsogon Governor-elect. Ruling: Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal and because of PD 725’s curative nature, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Angat vs. Republic (1999) Facts: Gerardo Angat y Legaspi was a natural born citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. On petition at the RTC to regain citizenship, he was repatriated and declared a citizen under RA 8171; Sol Gen asserted that petition for repatriation should have been dismissed because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization. Ruling: The RTC could not take cognizance of Angat’s petition for readmission as a citizen of the Philippines under CA 63 and RAs 965 and 263 (0). An application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and by natural !'%"
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born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship with the Special Committee on Naturalization. I. Dual Citizenship - “Dual citizenship” is different from the 1987 Art. IV Sec. 5’s concept of dual allegiance; recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification (for candidacy, appointive positions, etc.) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance” J. Dual Allegiance – Article IV, Sections 4 & 5; (See Sec. 40, RA 7160, Local Govt. Code) - “Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.” o Before the 1973 Constitution, CA 63, Sec. 1(7) was the law on citizenship of Filipinas married to aliens. A Filipina loses her Philippine citizenship “upon her marriage to a foreigner, if by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.” The 1987 Constitution made this rule applicable to male citizens as well - “Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.” Mercado vs. Manzano (1999) Facts: Eduardo Manzano won the 1998 vice mayoral elections for the City of Makati. Ernesto Mamari alleged that Manzano should be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. His parents were Filipino (Filipino according to the 1935 Constitution), but he was born in San Francisco, California (American under US law). He has dual citizenship. Ruling: Dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In relation to Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, those who have dual citizenship are…
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Those born to Filipino parent/s in a foreign country that follows the principle of jus soli ii. Those born in the Philippines to alien fathers, if the law of the father’s country says that they are citizens of that country iii. Those who marry aliens, if by the laws of the foreigner’s country, they are citizens of that country On the other hand, dual allegiance is when one shows, by some positive act, that one owes loyalty to 2 states. It is voluntary. Manzano manifested in his certificate of candidacy that he will defend the Constitution and bear true faith and allegiance to it. As far as Philippine law is concern, he has repudiated his American citizenship. Manzano grew up and had a career in the Philippines. Therefore, Manzano is a Philippine citizen and is not disqualified from running for office. XIII. Suffrage – Article V “Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.” , Suffrage is the right to vote. In the 1973 Constitution, it was also an obligation, but under the 1987 Constitution, it’s just a right. , The voting age was lowered to broaden the mass electoral base and emphasize the role of the youth in public affairs , “Residence” as used in election law has 2 meanings o Synonymous with “domicile” – intention to reside in a fixed place, as well as a personal presence in that place. The person’s acts must conform with his purpose and the change must be voluntary. To acquire a domicile by choice, these must concur: 1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality 2. Intention to remain there 3. Intention to abandon the old domicile (loss of domicile is evidentiary and there is presumption that being an immigrant according to another country’s laws may not necessarily mean loss of domicile) o Requirement of residence where one is to vote can mean either domicile, or temporary residence. !'&"
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, Romualdez v RTC: Philip Romualdez returned from US where he sought asylum after EDSA, and was allowed to register as a voter in Tolosay, Leyte, since it was recognized as never having been abandoned. , Section 8, RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996): “System of Continuing Registration of Voters” o …No registration shall be conducted 120 days before regular election and 90 days before special election , Section 35, RA 8189: Any registered voter, representative, or political party may file for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter’s list, except 100 days prior to a regular election , Congress has been given discretion to create disqualifications, but it is prohibited from prescribing any literacy, property, or other substantive requirements , Persons not qualified to vote under the Election Code (substantive disqualifications): o Anyone sentenced by final judgment to not less than 1 year of imprisonment. Can vote again upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence. o Anyone adjudged by final judgment of having violated his allegiance to the Philippines o Insane or feeble-minded persons , 15 year olds can vote in the referendum on 27 February 1975p it was purely consultative (Gonzales v. Comelec) “Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disable and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they call be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.” , Absentee voting is allowed under RA. 9189. , Sec. 4 of RA 9189 covers… o Philippine citizens abroad not otherwise disqualified o At least 18 years of age on the day of elections o …who have not lost their domicile in the Philippines o May vote for president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives
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Sec. 5 of RA 9189 says… o Individuals recognized as immigrants in their host countries can vote in absentia if… ! Upon registration, he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippine not later than 3 years from approval of his/her registration, and stating that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. ! Failure to return means permanent disqualification to vote in absentia Material points of: Macalintal vs. Comelec (2003) Facts: Petitioner assails constitutionality of RA 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as a taxpayer and a lawyer Ruling: RA 9189 does not violate the Constitution. The Constitution provides for a system of absentee voting for qualified Filipino abroad. Some parts clash with Constitution, such as the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to implement RA 9189, and some other parts. Akbayan Youth vs. Comelec (2001) Facts: Akbayan-Youth wanted Comelec to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General elections for new voters. Comelec disapproved the request for additional registration; Sec. 8 of RA 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election. Ruling: The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register; they missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend RA 8189. XIV. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES !''"
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A. Preamble: Nature, purpose and aims PREAMBLE We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. B. Principles 1. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism Art. II, Sec. 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. • Republican form of government: one constructed on the principle that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. Its purpose is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves (usually determined by the rule of the majority). • In a republican form of government, sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. • - “Democratic”: the Constitutional Commission to the 1987 Constitution added this phrase. This shows that the Philippines is not just a representative government but also shares some aspects of direct democracy. o Ex. Initiative and referendum •
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Essential features of republicanism: o representation and renovation o Manifestations ! Ours is a government of laws and not of men ! Rule of the majority [plurality in elections] Accountability of public officials Bill of rights Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws
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Separation of powers
2. ADOPTION OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Art. II, Sec 2: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. • This is nothing more than a formal acceptance of a principle to which all civilized nations must conform. • Doctrine of Incorporation: every state is, by reason of its membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of its own laws. • When there appears to be a conflict between international law and municipal law, efforts should be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both. • It should be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted rules of international law. However, if the conflict is irreconcilable, municipal law should be upheld as against international law (Ichong v. Hernandez, Gonzales v. Hechanova, In re: Garcia). Art. II, Sec. 7: The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration will be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. • This ensures that the foreign policy of the Philippines shall be independent of the dictates of foreign influence Art, II, Sec. 8: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. • The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons includes the prohibition not only of the possession, control, and manufacture of nuclear weapons, devices, and parts thereof, but also nuclear arms tests. !'("
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However, the political departments may provide for the exceptions to this policy but this must be justified by the demands of the national interest. _ This policy does not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. •
• Seven Fundamental Principles a. Sovereignty b. Recognition c. Consent d. Good faith e. Freedom of the seas f. International responsibility g. Self-defense Duties of States (Based on the “Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States”) a. Abstention from the use of threat or force b. Peaceful settlement of disputes c. Non-intervention on matters within the jurisdiction of any state d. Cooperation e. Upholding the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples f. Respect for the sovereign equality of states g. Fulfilling in good faith the obligations assumedin the un Charter 3. Civilian Supremacy Art. II, Sec. 3: Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. • Civilian supremacy is not a guaranteed supremacy of civilian officers who are in power but of supremacy of the sovereign people. • The principle of civilian supremacy is institutionalized by the provision, which makes the President Commander-inChief of the AFP. (Art VII, Sec. 18)
Armed Forces Art. XVI, Sec. 4: The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State. The armed forces of the Philippines shall consist of a citizen armed force and a regular force. - Regular force: the segment of the citizen armed force which is kept in active duty - Citizen armed force: maintaining such a force would be more economical than maintaining a large standing force, and would also provide the nation with a force well trained in military matters as well as in respect for human rights. •
Art. XVI, Sec. 5: (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution. (2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty. (3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. (4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. (5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service. (6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable. (7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty. !')"
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- Members of the Armed Forces are sworn to defend the Constitution - Because of the power that is wielded by a holder of arms, it is expected that members of the armed forces should be imbued not only with a patriotic and nationalistic spirit but also with deep respect for people’s rights. These are necessary components of “professionalism”. - Professionalism should not only mean expertise in the technical and martial aspects of military science. - Since much is expected of a soldier, the state owes him adequate remuneration and benefits. - Partisan politics: can seriously erode military professionalism. Thus, soldiers are prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity. - Partisan political activity means campaigning for a candidate or for a party. - This prohibition does not prevent a soldier from expressing his preferences. But it prevents him from campaigning for a specific candidate. - The prohibition of holding civilian positions concurrently with active military service does not allow for exceptions. - The rule of prohibiting exclusion of service of those who under law are retirable is intended to prevent the demoralization of junior officers who cannot go up in rank because of the extension of service of senior officers. - Section 5(6) attempts to spread out the recruitment of officer and men proportionately among the different provinces in order to prevent the creation of regional blocs within the military. - War or national emergency will allow for extension of the tour of duty of the AFP Chief of Staff. - The emergency contemplated is one in which the office of the Chief of Staff is a relevant factor, such as lawless violence, invasion, or situations which have direct military implications.
4. Government as protector of People and People as Defenders of the State
Defense of State Art. II, Sec. 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service. • This provision is based upon the inherent right of every state to existence and self-preservation, by virtue of this right, a State may take up all necessary action, including the use of armed force, to repel any threat to its security. -The duty to defend the state is imposed upon all citizens, including women, and that the military or civil service required from them must be personal. - This precludes the hiring by the rich of “mercenaries” or p[professional soldiers to take their place in the defense of the state. Art. II, Sec. 5: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessing of democracy - This provision has no counterpart either in the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. -This provision recognized a hierarchy of rights: firs, life; second, liberty; third, property. 5. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE Art II, Sec. 6: the separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. • Purpose: to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. (Cruz) • State: prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs • Church: barred from meddling in purely secular matters (Cruz) • Reason: A union of church and State “tends to destroy government and to degrade religion” (Cruz) !'*"
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Note: In settling recent non-establishment problems, whathas been useful for the court is not the metaphor of a dividing “wall” but the concept of neutrality. (American jurisprudence on the non-establishment clause) •
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE/ freedom of religion clause (Sec. 5, Art. III): Prohibits the state from passing “laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over the another” • 2 intermediate views: 1. Clause prohibits only direct support of institutional religion but not support indirectly accruing to churches and church agencies through support given to members 2. Both direct and indirect aid to religion are prohibited but only if the support involves the preference of one religion over another or preference of religion over irreligion • Values non-establishment seeks to protect: Voluntarism 3. Personal: inviolability of the human conscience (protected by the free exercise clause) -Insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension 4. Social: growth of a religious sect as a social force must come from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both spiritual and secular society will benefit of official patronage Four general propositions of government neutrality: 1. Government must not prefer one religion over another or over irreligion 2. Government funds must not be applied to religious Purposes 3. Government action must not aid religion 4. Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion Test for laws to pass as not violating the NonEstablishment clause: (1) What are the purposes and primary effect of the enactment? (2) If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution? •
** For it to be valid, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. ** EXCEPTIONS 1. Religious, Charitable, Educational Institutions and their properties— Exempted (Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)) · 1973: Did not include educational institutions in exemptions. · Applies to both profit and non-profit educational institutions with respect to realty tax; exemption would redound to the benefit of the students · Charitable institutions; so as to enhance services they are capable of giving · Religious property; to ensure religious liberty · Not only for property but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purpose. 2. No appropriation for sects, exemptions: Art. VI Section 29 (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. 3. Optional Religious Instruction Art. XIV sec. 4 (3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government. 4. Filipino ownership for schools, except religious groups and mission boards Art. XIV Sec. 4 (2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or !(+"
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corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. C. POLICIES 1. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines Art, II, Sec. 8: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. • The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons includes the prohibition not only of the possession, control, and manufacture of nuclear weapons, devices, and parts thereof, but also nuclear arms tests. • However, the political departments may provide for the exceptions to this policy but this must be justified by the demands of the national interest. _ This policy does not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. CASE LAW 1. BAYAN v. Executive Sec.: VFA intends to supplement the 1952 Mutual Defense Pact with the US, so it allows Amercian military to enter the Phils on a temporary basis for training purposes. The Court held that the agreement requires a treaty because of Sec. 25 of Art. XVIII, which covers not only the presence of bases but also of troops.” Moreover, it is a treaty that would require concurrene of the Senate pursuant to Art VII, sec. 25. The phrase “recognised as a treaty be the other contracting State” means that it only requires taht the other contracting State must go through all the steps needed to make the agreement a treaty under their laws before the Phils recognises it as effective. VItenna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives freedom to each state to choose form of giving consent to treaty. 2. LIM v. Exec. Sec.: Questioning the Consitutionality of the Balikatan exercises, petitioners contending that (1)MDT of 1951 only allows “assistance” in cases of armed attack by external aggressors or a third country; (2) Abu Sayyaf bandits are not external aggressors;
and (3) VFA does not allow US soldiers to engage in combat in Philippine territory, not even to fire back if fired upon. Court ruled that The MDT and the VFA must be read with the Constitution; hence, the scope activities shall not include combat or engagement in offensive war in the Philippine territory. UN Charter refrains all members from using threat or force against other territories. The 1987 Constitution, in its Declaration of Principles and State Policies: (1) renounces war in Section 2; (2) pursues an independent foreign policy with paramount consideration for national sovereignty in Section 7; and (3) adopts a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in Section 8. In the Executive Department: (1) concurrence of Senate by at least 2/3 in Section 21. In the Transitory Provisions: (1) foreign military bases shall not be allowed EXCEPT by another treaty concurred by Senate, or when Congress so requires, ratification of the people in Section 25. Also, International laws are to be given equal standing with local legislation, and when in conflict, the Constitution shall prevail (doctrine of incorporation). 2. A JUST AND DYNAMIC SOCIAL ORDER a. PROMOTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE Article II Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 9: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. •
It reflects the state’s preoccupation with poverty as resulting from structures that mire the people in a life of dependence.
Section 10: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
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- (Social Justice in the 1935 Constitution) Although frequently invoked as a protest against arbitrariness in legislation, substantive due process was rarely invoked with success. - In the 1935 Convention, the idea of social justice was developed to mean justice to the common tao or to the “little man.” - Those who have less in life should have more in law The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interests. - At the outset, the Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress. - Because of this, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution intended to bring about the needed social economic equilibrium through the application of justitia communis. “The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people” was thus inserted as a vital principle in the Constitution. - (Social Justice in the 1973 Constitution) What the 1973 Constitution had succeeded in doing was merely to preserve and codify what had been accomplished under the 1935 Constitution. - The constitutional command in Sec 6, Art. II of the 1973 Constitution was addressed to the legislative arm, which creates policy, to the executive arm which implements policy, and to the judicial arm, which interprets policy. - Under the 1973 Constitution, where the President was both executive and legislator, the response to the social justice command came principally from the president. - Mere procedural technicalities should not be allowed to get in the way of adequate protection of labor. Social and welfare legislation must be interpreted liberally in favor of labor. - For purposes of judiciary, the import of social justice, which developed, was that when the law is clear and valid, it simply must be applied; but when law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be followed. (Social Justice under the 1987 Constitution) The provisions on social justice go beyond what was covered in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
- The new constitution covers all phases of national development, unlike its precedents, which focused on economic inequities. - The new constitution emphasizes not just the socioeconomic but also the political and cultural inequities. Section 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. - The concretization of this provision is found principally in the Bill of Rights and the human rights provisions of Article XIII Social Justice and Human Rights Section 1: The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,use, and disposition of property and its increments. Section 2: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. • Social justice is principally the embodiment of the principle that those who have less in life should have more in law, commanding a legal bias in favor of those who are underprivileged. • However, it does not tolerate behavior that is contrary to law. • The 1987 Constitution advances beyond the other constitutions because it seeks not only economic social justice but also political justice. • The guarantees of the civil and political rights found principally in the Bill of rights are self-executory and ready for use. • Social rights are primarily in nature of claims or demands which people expect government to satisfy, ideals which government is expected to respect. !(#"
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- Satisfaction of these demands depends for the most part on legislation.
ii. Aspects of social justice 1. Labor
In Sec. 1, one goal of the State is to reduce inequalities, not remove them, because inequalities by themselves are not evil. - Cultural inequities are evil and therefore must be removed. - The section communicates what expected of the Congress is not just day-to-day police power but of powers needed to achieve radical social reform of critical urgency - While Sec. 1 puts down a dual goal of diffusing economic wealth and political power, the 2nd paragraph and Sec. 2 deal only with wealth, a recognition of the reality of poverty. - In a situation of extreme mass poverty, political rights become rights largely enjoyed by the upper and middle classes and are a myth for the underprivileged. - Without the improvement of economic conditions, there can be no real enhancement of the political rights of all people. •
CASE LAW Calalang v. Williams FACTS: Petitioner alleged that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution resolved to recommend that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along certain roads at certain times from a period of 1 year in pursuance of the provisions of CA 548. HELD: Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of Society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures justifiable, or even extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). It is inconsistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
Article 2, Section 18: The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. • •
Proclaims the primacy of the human factor over the non-human factors of production Commissioner Bacani: In our present system, capital is sometimes given more weight than labor xxx such that labor takes the last place in the consideration and computation of the things that must be increased. This is really an assertion of human dignity over things.
Article 13, Section 3: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth. !($"
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Employers Confederation v. NWPC: Under the constitution, labor and management are not completely free to decide between themselves how their relationship should go even in the matter so personal as wages. Although all workers are protected, the rights guaranteed are not necessarily the same for all. Distinctions can arise either from the public or private character of the employment or from the nature of the work that is performed. The right to in engage in “peaceful concerted activities” includes everything short of strike. The right to strike was first recognized in the 1953 Industrial Peace Act. It is not in the Constitution qualified by the phrase “in accordance with law” as a recognition that the law has traditionally denied the right to strike to certain sectors of the working force. The valid grounds to strike are unfair labor practice and bargaining deadlocks. Line 3, Paragraph 2 of the foregoing section is a guarantee that labor can participate in decisions which affect their rights and benefits through grievance procedures, conciliation proceedings, voluntary modes of settling disputes, and collective bargaining and negotiations. Paragraph 3 establishes a preferential bias for voluntary modes of settling disputes as it is recognized can be too costly for the nation.
a. The right of government workers to form unions Article 3, Section 8: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. •
PAFLU v. Secretary of Labor: The right to association (labor unionism) may be exercised with or without registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality xxx. Bernas: It is correct that the right to form associations does not include the grant of legal personality. However, it the law itself should make possession of legal personality a precondition for
effective associational action, involved would be not just the right to have legal personality but also the right to be an association. Article 9-B, Section 2(5): The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. •
Commissioner Lerum: They right to organize does not include the right to strike. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as union. Bernas: This does not mean that government employees may not be given the right to strike by statute.
2. Agrarian and natural resources reform Article 2, Section 21: The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. •
The emphasis is on the word comprehensive. Rural development is not just agricultural development but includes a broad spectrum.
Article 13, Section 4: The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. •
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Commissioner Aquino: The farmer has the right to the land he tills, but this is not an immutable right. His claim of ownership does not automatically pertain or correspond to the same land that he is actually and physically tilling. It would yield to retention limits. Farmers are those who have a tenancy relationship with the landowners, which may be present or historical. !(%"
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The right to claim the land they till is recognized only in the regular farm worker, and only a right to a just share in the fruits of production is conceded to the non-regulars. The right to a waiver of this right is not recognized when it amounts to a waiver in favor of the other (landowner). What the provision recognizes is a situation when the tenant may not want to exercise his right. In determining retention limits, the right of the small landowners should be respected. Retention limit, which is the size of land an individual owner is allowed to keep, should be reasonable (standard). According to jurisprudence, small landowners refer to “teachers, clerks, nurses and other hardworking and frugal people xxx”. Congress is given the discretion o set priorities and retention limits. If Congress does not act on this, the executive can proceed with implementation or there can be judicial expropriation. DAR: Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined by RA 6657 (CARL of 1998) and not classified as mineral or forest by the DENR xxx. Commissioner Rodrigo: Just compensation is the amount paid to the owner and it does not necessarily have to come from the farmer. According to the Constitution and jurisprudence, just compensation is defined as the fair or market value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell. It also involves payment on reasonable time from its taking. It requires prompt payment. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or R.A. 6657 implements the agrarian reform provisions.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343) FACTS: Proclamation 131 creates the fund for the implementation of the CARP. Petitioners assail it on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners allege that Proclamation 131 and EO 299 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits required by Article XII Sec. 4.
HELD: Measures under challenge merely describe retention limits for land owners; there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the constitution. But where to carry out the regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive landowners of what they may own in the excess of the maximum allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is necessary. This power is inherent in the State. Private rights must yield to irresistible demands of public interest on the justification that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Article 13, Section 5: The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers' organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services. •
It should be note is that this participation in the management of the land reform program and not the management of privately-owned farms.
Article 13, Section 6: The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law. • •
One can say that the same principles apply to “natural resources reform”. The principal natural resource is land, which can be alienable or inalienable. !(&"
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Commissioner Monsod: In applying the principles, the chief beneficiaries should be the people in the areas. Stewardship: the individual would have free use of free occupancy but will not be given legal title. In other words, usufructuary.
Article 13, Section 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. •
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Commissioner Ople: The intent of the proposal is almost allencompassing with respect to real and actual fishermen in the area who fish for a living. Foreign intrusion also refers to foreign capital. Fish workers include fish-haulers, fish sorters and Pescadores which refer to the former two.
Artcile 13, Section 8: The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice. •
This provision sees agrarian reform as a unique instrument for releasing capital locked up in land for use in industrialization in particular and economic development in general.
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under-privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. •
Commissioner Foz: The goals are to liberate human communities form blight, congestions and hazards to promote their development and modernization; to bring the optimum use of land for public welfare; to provide equitable access to and opportunity for the use and enjoyment for the fruits of the land; to acquire such lands for public welfare; and to maintain and support a vigorous enterprise system responsive to community requirements in the sue and development of urban lands.
Article 13, Section 10: Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated. • • • • •
These refer mainly to squatters. Extends to both those who have valid claims to the land and those who do not Due process, i.e. consultation, notification, and humane treatment, should always be the present. R.A. 7279 is the law on demolition and resettlement. The National Housing Authority (NHA) will be the main agency tasked for the management of expropriated properties as well as the relocation of the evicted.
iii. Urban land reform and housing
iv. Health
Article 13, Section 9: The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
Article 13, Section 11: The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the !('"
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people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the under-privileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
Article 13, Section 12: The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
vi. People’s organizations
Article 13, Section 13: The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Article 2, Section 23: The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
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Health is a fundamental human right (Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978). Health: state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Integration: a unified health delivery system, a combination of public and private sector, and a blend of western medicine and traditional healthcare modalities. Comprehensiveness: health promotion, disease prevention, education and planning This expresses a clear bias for the underprivileged.
v. Women Article 2, Section 14: The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. •
This does not mean absolute sameness, thus, qualified by fundamental equality before the law. However, it is vague because it is actually in the fundamental that men and women are different, according to Bernas.
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Bernas: This acknowledges that men and women have distinctions which make for real differences.
Article 13, Section 15: The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. Article 13, Section 16: The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. •
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This is recognition of the direct role that people play and will play in setting the directions the nation will take. This is people empowerment. This does not confer standing to challenge in court the validity of government policies.
b. Respect for human dignity and human rights Article 13, Section 17: There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
Article 13, Section 14: The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account !((" "
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law. (3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers. (4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released. •
The commission cannot be dispensed with by Congress but it is not of the same level as other Constitutional Commissions.
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
Article 13, Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions: (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations. • • •
The principal function is investigatory and it relies on the DOJ for prosecution. The scope is civil and political rights and does not include economic and social rights. It also has visitorial powers and power to grant immunity to witnesses.
Article 2, Section 11: The State values the dignity of every human persona and guarantees full respect for human rights. Article 16, Section 5(2): The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.
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c. The priority of education, science, technology, arts, culture and sports Article 2, Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation. •
This is as gateway to economic advancement and the cultivation of the yearning for freedom and justice.
i.
Education
1. Right to education Article 14, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. • •
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Quality education should be made accessible and affordable to the people by the State. This entails to duty of screening those who seek education. As a corollary, standards must be reasonable and not arbitrary for the courts to not set them aside. This right is demandable from the State only. As to private institutions, the damnd should be commensurate to the tuition fees paid.
Villar vs. TIP (1985) FACTS: Petitioners are asking the Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition to compel the Technological Institute of the Philippines to let them enroll in SY 1985-86. The petitioners were claiming that they were barred from enrolling because they led the students in “exercising their freedom of assembly”. Through a closer look at the grades of the petitioners, it will show that only petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco Jr., and Recitis and entitled to enroll again in the coming semester
because their co-petitioners all have failing grades that would not merit them to enroll in the coming semester. ISSUE: WON TIP exceeded in their exercise of academic freedom HELD: No. Most of the petitioners have failed majority of their classes and they are barred form enrolling not because they have picketed in their schools but because (obviously) of failing grades. Mere exercise of freedom of assembly does not bar a student from enrolling. A university or college has the right to set academic standards and exclude from enrollment those with several failing grades, but not students who merely exercised these constitutional rights. Tangonan vs. Cruz-Paño (1985) FACTS: Mely Tangonan was refused enrollment by the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing because of three grounds namely: 1) Poor academic records, 2) failure to present a “sealed” honorable dismissal and transcript of records 3) bribing a dean. She agreed to transfer to another school but instead of doing so, she filed a petition for mandamus before the CFI of Rizal presided herein by respondent Judge Pano but was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Won mandamus should be granted to her HELD: No. Petitioner has miserably failed to show a clear and legal right to be admitted and be enrolled in respondent’s School of Nursing. Mandamus is to be employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being themain objective. It douse not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. Mandamus does not lie in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. A school may refuse to enroll a student for academic delinquency. It cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a student. A school’s right to refuse to enroll a student falls with the “academic freedom clause” of the Constitution. 2. Educational mandate of the State !(*"
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Article 14, Section 2: The State shall: (1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society; (2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age; (3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged; (4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and (5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills. • •
Compulsory education is only up to elementary. The obligation to give quality education also has an effect on the obligation and right of public school teachers.
Article 14, Section 5: (1) the State shall take into account regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall encourage local planning in the development of educational policies and programs. (2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. (3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to professional advancement. Non-teaching academic and non-academic personnel shall enjoy the protection of the State. (5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. • •
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The intent of the Convention was to guarantee the academic freedom and administrative autonomy of educational institutions. Garcia v. Faculty Admissions Committee (Frankfurter through Fernando, J.): the four essential freedoms of a university – to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. This also means freedom of intellectual enquiry. Minimum standards to satisfy due process: (a) students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (b) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (c) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (d) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Tablarin v Gutierrez Petitioners claim that there was undue delegation of legislative power granted to the Board of Medical Education in that no sufficient standard had been set by the law for the board’s promulgation of rules and regulations, and thus released a regulation that required the passing of the NMAT for aspiring medical students. Court held that the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, and so giving rise to subordinate legislation. The standards set for subordinate legislation are necessarily broad and highly abstract and therefore the Board was acting within its scope. Court further ruled that the desirability or wisdom or utility !)+"
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of legislation or administrative regulation is not a matter to be decided upon by the courts.
without due process. Tamayo had been with the PSBA for 3 " years, Encarnacion for 2 " years and Cortes for 1 " years. They were dismissed for engaging in unlawful demonstrations.
University of the Philippines vs. Ayson (1989) ISSUE: Won dismissal is valid FACTS: The UP Board of Regents recommended the phasing out of the UP College Baguio High School (UPCBHS) and in line with this, Dean Patricio Lazaro issued a memorandum directing the principal of UPCBHS not to accept any incoming freshmen anymore. The reason for this is that the High School does not serve the purpose for which it was created which were: 1)to be a self-supporting high school and 2) that it will serve as a laboratory school for prospective teachers. The UPCBHS filed a petition with herein respondent RTC judge Ayson alleging that the decision was without basis and unconstitutional because it violates the rights to quality education and free public secondary education. Petitioners, on the other hand, are claiming their right to exercise of academic freedom. ISSUE: WON the phasing out of UPCBHS is a valid exercise of academic freedom HELD: Yes. The University of the Philippines as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditions, which were not met. The University of the Philippines was created under its charter to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary education. Secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of the Philippines. As an institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of academic freedom, RA 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein “shall be free from payment of tuition and other school fees.”
HELD: Yes. Full-time teachers who have rendered 3 years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent. Thus, having attained a permanent status they cannot be removed from office except for just cause and due process. Tamayo is permanent but having joined the unlawful rally, his performance is deemed far from satisfactory. The other 2 on the other hand do not enjoy the permanency status. 3. Educational system Article 14, Section 3: (1) All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula. (2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency. (3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.
Alcuaz vs. PSBA (1989) FACTS: Petitioners are students of PSBA. They are questioning the dismissal of Tamayo, Encarnacion and Cortes, who are all teachers of the PSBA. They hold that the teachers were dismissed
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Heroes should not be blindly worshipped but critically studied. The desire should be critical thinking and not rote memorization.
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Section 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions. (2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. (4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. • •
The private and the public both form the Philippine educational system. The supervision and regulation of the State must be reasonable.
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Education has to be Filipinized to attain its goals. This provision has a threefold rationale: (1) to preserve the democratic choice of students; (2) to enable educational institutions to improve their quality; and (3) to make quality education available to students. There are tax exemptions to help educational institutions maintain quality education. However, such institutions should be non-stock and non-profit.
ii. Language Article 14, Section 6: The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages. Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system. Article 14, Section 7: For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis. •
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Official language means the prescribed medium of communication for all acts of or transactions with various departments and agencies of government. Filipino, as distinguished from Pilipino, was seen as the language yet to be developed as the common national language.
Article 14, Section 8: This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish. !)#"
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Article 14, Section 9: The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation, and preservation of Filipino and other languages. •
The Commission is silent about what text should prevail in case the Pilipino (not Filipino) text is in conflict with the English one.
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These are expressions of national policy and concern which direct the attention to the lagging state of science and technology in the country.
iv. Arts and culture Article 14, Section 14: The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression.
iii. Science and technology Article 14, Section 10: Science and technology are essential for national development and progress. The State shall give priority to research and development, invention, innovation, and their utilization; and to science and technology education, training, and services. It shall support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, and their application to the country's productive systems and national life. Article 14, Section 11: The Congress may provide for incentives, including tax deductions, to encourage private participation in programs of basic and applied scientific research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incentives shall be provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors, technologists, and specially gifted citizens. Article 14, Section 12: The State shall regulate the transfer and promote the adaptation of technology from all sources for the national benefit. It shall encourage the widest participation of private groups, local governments, and community-based organizations in the generation and utilization of science and technology. Article 14, Section 13: The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists, and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such period as may be provided by law.
Article 14, Section 15: Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations. Article 14, Section 16: All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of the nation and shall be under the protection of the State which may regulate its disposition. Article 14, Section 17: The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. Article 14, Section 18: (1) The State shall ensure equal access to cultural opportunities through the educational system, public or private cultural entities, scholarships, grants and other incentives, and community cultural centers, and other public venues. (2) The State shall encourage and support researches and studies on the arts and culture. •
Evidence of a nation seeking to understand and articulate its own cultural identity after many years of colonial rule.
v. Sports !)$"
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Article 14, Section 19: The State shall promote physical education and encourage sports programs, league competitions, and amateur sports, including training for international competitions, to foster self-discipline, teamwork, and excellence for the development of a healthy and alert citizenry. (2) All educational institutions shall undertake regular sports activities throughout the country in cooperation with athletic clubs and other sectors. d. Promotion of health and ecology Article 2, Section 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. •
Same as discussion on Health in Article 13.
Article 2, Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Article 2, Section 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Article 2, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Article 15, Section 1: The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. Section 2: Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Section 3: The State shall defend:
Oposa v. Factoran FACTS: Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the natural resource property and violates their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution) and the protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Ratio: EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions of DENR, under whose authority and office the complaint falls. The petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right. The petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of their own as well as the future generations’ behalf can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the said right is concerned. 3.The family as basic autonomous social institution
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. Section 4: The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security. • •
The source of the presumption of validity of marriage. The family is understood as a stable heterosexual relationship whether formalized by civilly recognized marriage or not. !)%"
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The family is anterior to the state and not its creation. The provision intends to prevent the State from adopting Roe v. Wade or abortion in the within the first six months. The protection extends from the time of conception but such time was not exactly defined. The State has the inherent duty to acts a parens patriae. The provision on marriage is not a blanket prohibition of divorce.
4. A SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC ORDER ART. II Sec. 19 – commands an independent and nationalist approach to economic development Sec. 20 – affirms that private sector is an indispensable engine of development ART. XII Sec. 1 – three basic directions that can be gleaned from this section: 1st- sets the dual goal of dynamic productivity and a more equitable distribution of what is produced 2nd- seeks complementarity between industrialization and agricultural development 3rd- protective of things Filipino TANADA vs ANGARA While the constitution indeed mandates a bias on favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either, in fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. Moreover, the GATT has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Where local business are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. The
weaker situations of the developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account. The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment , but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. 2. NATURAL RESOURCES ART. XII Sec. 2 PUBLIC LAW: 1. Imperium- the government authority possessed by the state expressed in the concept of sovereignty 2. Dominium- capacity of the state to own or acquire property -foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia that all lands were held from the Crown % Under Republican system jura regalia stripped of royal overtones; ownership is vested in the State % Any person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the state according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title % When regalia doctrine was introduced in the Philippines, colonizers did not intend to strip the natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them. CARINO v INSULAR GOVERNMENT % If a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, the person’s ownership of such land is does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the state which owns the minerals. ONLY AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE ALIENATED. ALL OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES MAY NOT BE. !)&"
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Who may participate in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources other than agricultural land? Only Filipinos and Filipino corporation may engage in the development and utilization of these natural resources. Forty percent FOREIGN capitalization still considered Filipino corporation on the ground of the need for capital in an area of high risk. If natural resources, except agricultural land, cannot be alienated, how may they be explored, developed, or utilized? 1987 Constitution no longer speaks of “grant, lease, or concession” but of either direct undertaking of activities by the State or “coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements” with the State and all “under the full control and supervision of the State.” LIMITATIONS: 1. Agreements for the exploitation of natural resources – only 25 years 2. The use and enjoyment of the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone are reserved for the exclusive use and enjoyment of “Filipino citizens,” that is Filipino natural persons. 3. Provision made in favor of subsistence fishermen and fish workers-in harmony with the provision on Social justice; smallscale=single proprietorships 4. Limitation on service contracts- “accdg. to the general terms and conditions prescribed by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country”; President must report to Congress every contract he enters into; agreements only for “technical and financial assistance”; only in relation to “large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils” Sec. 3 Classification of Lands of Public Domain 1. Agricultural
% Agricultural Lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted 2. Forest or Timber 3. Mineral Lands 4. National Parks Who classifies lands? The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive department of the government and the not of the Courts. (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals) The Executive’s power is exclusive BUT not inherent. It is a delegated power given to him by CA No. 141 % Classification is descriptive of the legal nature of the land and not what it looks like % Classification must be categorical: that is, land is either COMPLETELY agricultural or COMPLETELY mineral or COMPLETELY forest or park. RULES ESTABLISHED IN SEC. 3: 1. Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated 2. Only public corporations and qualified individuals may acquire alienable lands of the pubic domain. Private Corporations can hold alienable lands of the public domain only by lease. When land ceases to be of the public domain and commences to be private? • MERALCO vs. Judge Bartolome – act which segregates the lot from the public domain is the actual grant of title. • Herico vs. Dan – the document, be it patent or Torrens title, which evidences ownership is precisely that, evidence of ownership; it does not grant ownership. The acquisition of ownership, from the tenor of jurisprudence, antedates the issuance of ownership. • Lauson Ayog vs. Judge Cusi – where the applicant, before the constitution took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him !)'"
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to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Courtalienable land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30yrs) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
3. Size of the land which may be acquired by individuals or leased by individuals or corporations Private Corporations – allowed to lease no more than 1,000 hectares Individuals – allowed to: a. lease up to 500 hectares b. acquire up to 12 hectares 4. Limits the discretion of Congress to open public lands for lease or acquisition The discretion to determine how much of alienable public land may be opened to private acquisition or lease is given to Congress – but subject to the “requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform.” Sec. 4 (Forest land and parks) % Discretion is given to Congress about what should be done in terms of delimiting areas and time limits for exploitation % Once forest lands are converted into parks, logging may no longer be permitted in the area % Reclaimed land is public land Sec. 5 Ancestral Domain – an all-embracing concept which refers to lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water and other natural resources.
Ancestral Land- refers to those held under the same conditions as ancestral domain but limited to lands that are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by cultural communities under the claim of individuals or traditional group ownership % For the purpose of protecting indigenous cultural communities, the provision in effect authorizes Congress to prescribe how priorities are to be determined in case of conflict between civil and customary law. % CRUZ vs. Secretary- with a vote of 7-7, it meant that the validity of RA 8371 (IPRA) Sec. 7 PRIVATE LAND- any land of private ownership; includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands which are patrimonial property of the State or of municipal corporations % The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. % The time to determine whether the person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired and not the time to register ownership % EXCEPTION: ALIENS MAY ACQUIRE PRIVATE LAND “IN CASES OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION” % FILIPINO PRIVATE CORPORATIONS CAN ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS. IN THE ABSENCE OF CAPITAL STOCK, THE CONTROLLING MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF FILIPINOS. LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION vs. RAMOS RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) is UNCONSITUTIONAL for permitting fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine Natural Resources. The said law is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements,” its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as !)("
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service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the agreement itself is a device contract. These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens 3. PRIVATE LANDS 1. Citizenship requirement 1973 CONSTI ART. XVII Sec. 11 LEE vs REPUBLIC The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of non-Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. 2. Exception a) Acquisition by legal succession RAMIREZ vs VDA DE RAMIREZ The constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land. b) Acquisition by former natural born citizen ART. XII Sec. 8 (EXCEPTION FOR FORMER PHILIPPINE CITIZENS) % As a response to clamor from former Filipinos who were living abroad and who expressed a wish not only to own residential land but also to participate in the development of the country, the strict requirement that the exception be only for residential
purpose and up to an area not exceeding 1,000 hectares was deleted. The matters of both purpose and area were left for the discretion of Congress to determine. 3. Agrarian Reform ART. XIII Sec. 4 % Land-to-the-tiller program % Lands not devoted to agricultural activities are outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law % Agricultural lands-lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial, and residential lands % JUST COMPENSATION- fair or market value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell % The extent that it sets retention limits-POLICE POWER % Taking of private lands for redistribution-EMINENT DOMAIN Sec. 5 % Farmers and regular farm workers are given the right to participate, more than just the right to be consulted in the planning, organization, and management of an agrarian reform program Sec. 6 % Mineral and forest resources, including timber concessions, although covered by existing valid contractual and vested rights, come under the principle of agrarian reform in one way or another Sec. 7 % Subsistence fishermen are given PREFERENTIAL, but not EXCLUSIVE right of the use of communal marine fishing resources, both inland and offshore. % Subsistence fishermen shall also have the right to expect support from government by way of appropriate !))"
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technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other support services. Sec. 8 4. Urban Land Reform and Housing ART XIII Sec.9 % Social housing program addresses those who can not afford even low cost housing and therefore need some form of subsidy % Urban land reform and housing are to be undertaken in cooperation with the private sector % Important elements of the program should be “basic services” and “adequate employment opportunities” Sec. 10 % Urban or poor rural dwellers refers principally to squatters % Evictions are not prohibited but must be conducted in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner % Due process must be observed 4. Lease to foreigners of private lands valid
% RA No. 912 -Prescribing the use of Philippine-made materials % RA No. 5183- Governing procurement contracts of government % Flag Law - giving Filipino contractors a 15% advantage in government contracts. Sec.13 (FORMS AND ARRANGEMENTS IN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE) % Must serve the general welfare – health, safety, security, idea of protection of local enterprises % Must be characterized not only by reciprocity but also by equality which imports mutual benefit 2. Organization and regulation of private corporations ART. XII Sec.16 (PRIVATE CORPORATIONS) % Creation of GOCCs- they must show capacity to function efficiently in business and that they should not go into activities which the private sector can do better; economic viability-not just financial viability but also capability to make profit and generate benefits not quantifiable in financial terms
SMITH, BELL & CO. vs REGISTER OF DEEDS(in Spanish) Those who are disqualified to buy land are also disqualified to lease. 5. Regulation of economic activities 1. Rationale ART. XII Sec. 6 % Rejection of laissez faire and adopts the principle of solidarity Sec.12 (FILIPINO FIRST POLICY) This provision enshrines in the Constitution the Filipino-first policy enunciated in: % CA No. 138 - Giving native products and domestic entities preference in government purchases
3. Operation of Public Utilities ART. XII Sec. 11 (PUBLIC UTILITITES) PUBLIC UTILITY - a utility corporation which renders service to the general public for compensation -the public or private character of a utility does not depend on the number of persons who avail of its services but on whether or not it is open to serve all members of the public who may require it % Congress has the authority to grant franchises but it can also delegate the authority to government agencies !)*"
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% Filipinization of public utilities- requires that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only to “citizens of the Philippines at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.” Who is considered a Filipino Corporation: 1. It is organized under Philippine laws and 2. At least 60 per centum of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens % The moment for determining whether a corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is when it applies for a franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for that purpose. (Tatad vs Garcia Jr.) % Franchises granted by the government cannot be exclusive in character % Authority given to foreign investors to participate in the governing body of public utilities to the extent of their proportionate share in the capital, is a reversal of the Filipinization trend Sec. 17 (TEMPORARY TAKE OVER OF BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST) % Introduced as a product of the “martial law” thinking of the 1971 Con-Con % 1987 Constitutional Commission defined national emergency as encompassing threat from external aggression, calamities, or natural disasters, but not strikes. % The duration of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover % Obiter dictum in David vs Ermita says that Sec 17 gives the power to the State and not to the President. The President acquires emergency powers when given to her by the Congress in a state of emergency declared by Congress.
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“business with public interest” means “business that has a lot of repercussion on the public, whether it be public utility or other businesses which may partake of the characteristics of public utility but which is not yet considered public utility” or any business “ which concerns a mass-based consumer group” and especially among “the low-income groups.” 4. On mass media and advertising agency ART. XVI Sec. 10 (COMMUNICATION POLICY) % what the provision prescribes is a communication structure which allows for a national and international balance that is beneficial to the nation: “the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country” % whatever policy is formulated, it must respect “the freedom of speech and of the free press” Sec.11 % Mass media includes radio, television, and the printed media % Does not include commercial telecommunications nor advertising agency % ONE HUNDRED PER CENT FILIPINO OWNERSHIP IS REQUIRED % Commands Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media % Advertising Industry -70% Filipino-owned 5. Practice of Professions ART XII Sec.14 (CARE FOR FILIPINO PROFESSIONALS AND SKILLED WORKERS) % The limitation on the practice of professions is subject to exceptions found in reciprocity laws. 6. State operation of private enterprises ART XII Sec.18 (NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIES) Filipinization- Filipino ownership !*+"
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Nationalization – State ownership; an instrument toward Filipinization rather than as an expression of an option against private ownership % The decision to nationalize may be made by the State through Congress, on the broad grounds of “interest of national welfare or defense.” % Sec 18 is a textual acceptance of the equation of the concept of “public use” with the broader concept of “public welfare” or “national welfare” AGAN vs PIATCO The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the OPERATION of the business and NOT to the OWNERSHIP thereof. As such the government is not required to compensate the private entity owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The temporary takeover is in exercise of the government’s POLICE POWER. It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Constitution but may be permitted to exist to aid the government in carrying on an enterprise or to aid in the performance of various services and functions in the interest of the public. 7. Monopolies, combinations, and unfair competition ART. XII Sec. 19 (MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS) % Espouses competition % Monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether PUBLIC INTEREST demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited NEA vs MENDOZA
NEA can approve the increase in the electric rates of the cooperative without any notice of public hearing. The consumers are members of the cooperative ORMECO I who are already represented by the Board of Directors whom they had elected. The necessity of a public hearing is lost. It was no less the ORMECO I which solicited the approval of the NEA to adjust the rates upward and this the NEA granted as it was necessary for the continued financial viability of the ORMECO I. 8. Money, Banking and Credit ART. XII Sec. 20 (A CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY) % The main concern in the formulation of this provision was to assure INDEPENDENCE of the central monetary authority from all sectors, local or foreign, but especially from the executive department % Under the current law, the board of directors of the BSP is the monetary board % Constitutional requirement: a. Natural-born Filipino citizen b. Of known probity, integrity, and patriotism c. Majority of whom shall come from the private sector 9.
Sec. 21 Cooperatives ART. XII Sec. 15 (DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVES) % What was contemplated was a line of agency under the Office of the President and outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture % The purpose would be to promote the growth and viability of cooperatives in the private sector
5. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION IN NATION BUILDING ART. II Sec. 24 % 1986 Constitutional Commission refused to impose a “social responsibility” in media on the reasoning that imposing such !*!"
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duty will open the door for the state to require media to follow a certain line ART XVIII Sec. 23 % Advertising entities -70-30 Filipino-foreign equity ratio 6. AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 7. RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES ! Art. II, Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. o Initial proposal: to ban and rectify erroneous allusions to ethnic minorities in books, museums, other institutions and recors of government. ! Art. VI, Sec. 5(2). The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from…indigenous cultural communities… o Sectoral representation for indigenous cultural communities was a later addition. ! Art. XII, Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being. The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain. o Ancestral lands refer to both those outside and those inside autonomous regions. o Cruz v. Secretary: ancestral domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of the public domain, since they are private and belong to indigenous people. ! Right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. ! Limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly allowed in Sec. 2, Art. XII. ! What is given is priority right, not exclusive right.
Cariño v. Insular Government: excludes native titles from the coverage of jura regalia Art. XIV, Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. o Of little significance as constitutional law, but nevertheless express national policy. Art. XVI, Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities. R.A. No. 8371 (1997), The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act o Distinguishes “ancestral domain” from “ancestral land” o Domain is a broader concept, all-embracing o
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8. Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure ! Art. II, Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. o A constitutional confession of the prevalence of graft and corruption ! Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. o Recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands; not self-executory ! Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. o Subido v. Ozaeta: press had a statutory right to examine the records of the Register of Deeds because the interest of the press was real and adequate o 1973 Constitution: right of access to public documents is selfexecutory !*#"
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1987 Constitution: amendment adds “government research data” because such was restricted during martial law o “Limitations”: question on determination of scope of official regulatory discretion o Chavez v. PCGG: limitations include: 1) national security matters, 2) trade secrets and banking transactions, 3) criminal matters, and 4) other confidential matters Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. o Guarantees people’s right to know about the state of the President’s health Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report… o More effective way of checking the President o Pursuant to Art. XII, Sec. 21 Art. IX-D, Sec. 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and nongovernmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law. Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. o Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan: Sandiganbayan is a constitutional recognition of the need to combat graft and corruption o Congress has the authority to fix the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan o
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Art. XI, Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. Art. XI, Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law. o Ombudsman is an independent body. o Vested with power of administrative control and supervision of Office. Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall…submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth… o All public employees are required to file a declaration of assets and liabilities o President, Vice-President, cabinet members, congressmen and constitutional commissions are required to publicly disclose assets and liabilities in a manner provided by law Art. XII, Sec. 2(5). The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. o Information on public foreign loans and government guaranteed loans must be made public o Reaction to the centrality of the foreign loans problem during the 1986 Constitutional Commission Valmonte v. Belmonte (1989) FACTS: Valmonte wrote a letter to Belmonte (GSIS General Manager), requesting for a list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarantee of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. If they could not access the loans, he is asking that they be allowed access to the documents certifying the said loans. His request is premised on the provision in the Freedom Constitution on the right of people to information on matters of public concern. Deputy General Counsel !*$"
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for GSIS replied, saying that he cannot grant the petitioner’s request because there is a confidential relationship between the GSIS and those who borrow from it. It would not be proper for GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless ordered by he courts. RULING/DOCTRINE: Art. III, sec 7 of the 1987 Constitution, and Art. IV, sec. 6 of the 1973 Constitution recognize the right of people to information on matters of public concern. The right to information is consistent with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. But the right to information is limited to matters of public concern and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In this case, the information sought by the petitioners is of public concern. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (2002) FACTS: Public Estates Authority entered into a controversial Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI to develop the “freedom islands” in Parañaque. A Senate investigation later found out that 1) the lands to be transferred to AMARI were lands of public domain not yet classified as alienable 2) the certificates to the islands were void, 3) that the JVA was illegal. RULING/DOCTRINE: Constitutional right involves on going transactions before a final contract, so long as they don’t contain privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters. The commissioners of the 1987 ConCom understood the right to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.” To require the constitutional right to apply only to consummated contracts would be grossly disadvantageous.
XV. GENERAL PROVISIONS A. On the flag ! Art. XVI, Sec. 1. The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars, as consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law. o Attempts to add a ray each for the Cordilleras and for Muslim Mindanao died in the Committee. o Design of the flag may be changed only by constitutional amendment ! Act. No. 2928
Described "the construction of the Philippine Flag without the necessary specifications of the different elements of the flag o Provided for the adoption of the Philippine flag as the official flag for the Philippine Islands. From 1919 until the eve of World War II, Flag Day would be celebrated on the 30th of October, the day the ban on the Philippine flag had been lifted in 1919. Ebralinag v. Division Supt. of Schools (1993) FACTS: Jehova’s Witnesses schoolchildren were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265, which penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony with-public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit on second offense. RULING/DOCTRINE: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect—freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one’s belief; the latter is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect public welfare. Forcing a small religious group through the iron hand of the law to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. They may be exempt as long as they do not disrupt. o
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B. On the name, anthem and seal ! Art. XVI, Sec. 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum. o 1973 Constitution: authorized the interim National Assembly to choose a new name for the country, a national anthem, and a national seal, but nothing came of it. !*%"
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CA No. 382. An Act to adopt the original authentic form of the Philippine National Anthem and to appropriate funds
C. On the Armed Forces of the Philippines ! Art. XVI, Sec. 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State. o This was set forth in Commonwealth Act No. 1 (National Defense Act) o Segment of the citizen armed force which is kept in active duty is the regular force o Commissioner de Castro: maintaining this force would be more economical than maintaining a large standing force and would also provide the nation with a force well trained in military matters as well as in respect for human rights ! Art. XVI, Sec. 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution. (2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty. (3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. (4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. (5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service. (6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable. (7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.
Members of the armed forces should be imbued not only with a patriotic and nationalistic spirit but also with a deep respect for people’s rights. o Military must be insulated from partisan politics. o Military positions cannot be held concurrently with civilian positions o Extension of service is prohibited to prevent the demoralization of junior officers who cannot go up in rank because of the extension of the service of senior officers Art. XVIII, Sec. 24. Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force. o “Armed groups” means private armies and fanatical groups; “paramilitary forces” includes CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces); guards and watchmen of licensed government and security agencies are not covered by the provision o
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D. On the national police ! Art. XVI, Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. o Before the 1987 Constitution: there were two police forces, one consisting of the municipal and city police forces and a national police force which was the Philippine Constabulary (a national police force and a military force at the same time) o Day-to-day functions of police would be under the operational control of local executives. o National police comes in and takes control when local police could not cope with local situation o The PNP is civilian in character and as such is subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission E. On the retirement and other benefits !*&"
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Art. XVI, Sec. 7. The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given them in the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of natural resources. Art. XVI, Sec. 8. The State shall, from time to time, review to increase the pensions and other benefits due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors. o Veterans covered are not just veterans of a declared war but also veterans of peace-keeping campaigns. o The determining factor should not be status but need
F. On consumer protection ! Art. XVI, Sec. 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products. o Protection not only against traders but also against manufacturers who dump defective substandard or even hazardous products in the market. XVI. AMENDING PROCESS Review Amending and Revisionary process under popular sovereignty and constituent powers A. Judicial review of the amending process ! Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967) FACTS: Joint Resolutions to amend the constitution—to increase House membership to 180 and to allow congressmen to become constitutional convention delegates without forfeiting their seats— were challenged as unconstitutional for a number of reasons: elections for con-con delegates must be held during special not general elections; and congress cannot avail of both amending and calling for a convention at the same time, among other arguments. RULING/DOCTRINE: the resolutions are constitutional because the resolutions have different subject matters (and therefore both actions are warranted). Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between “general” “special” elections. ! Tolentino v. COMELEC (2004)
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FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being under RA 6132. They approved Organic Resolution 1 (Lowering the voting age to 18). President Macapagal called upon COMELEC to implement the said resolution through a plebiscite. COMELEC agreed. There was a pending election involving 8 senators and local officials which is why the Concon sought to implement Organic Resolution 1 even though they weren’t done proposing the other amendments to the Constitution RULING/DOCTRINE: The plebiscite was unconstitutional. Article XV, Sec. 1, states that there is to be “an election” for all amendments. It means that all amendments are to be decided in one election. There can’t be a separate plebiscite for Organic Resolution 1 from all the other amendments the Concon will make. Each part of the Constitution is harmonious with the whole. Therefore, all amendments must be taken together and consequently, ratified together. Voting now on the amendment could have unforeseen consequences that voters would not be able to see. There could be further amendments to the election process. It would be premature to decide now. Javellana v. Executive Secretary (1973) Supra. See earlier pages. " Art. VII, Sec. 1, para. 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
B. When will the proposed amendments take effect? ! Art. XVII, Sec. 4 versus XVIII, Sec. 27 o Art. XVII, Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition o Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. The Constitution shall take effect immediately. The requirement of a prima facie factual !*'"
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foundation for a sequestration order is based not only on Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII…but likewise on some provisions of the Freedom Constitution which recognized the power and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts…upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supercede all previous constitutions. !
De Leon v. Esguerra (1987) FACTS: Petitioners were elected as barangay captain and barangay councilmen in the May 17, 1982 elections. This was held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Barangay Election Act of 1982, which stated that the term of the barangay captain and the barangay councilmen would last for 6 years or up to June 7, 1988. February 9, 1987: The OIC Governor gave a memorandum stating that the petitioners are being removed from office and replaced by the respondents as the new barangay captain and councilmen. The memorandum was antedated Dec. 1, 1986. Petitioners pray that the Memorandum be considered null and void because pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act, their term only ends on June 7, 1988. RULING/DOCTRINE: Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no executive order or proclamation terminating the term of barangay officials. Despite the memorandum being antedated on December 1, 1986, the date of promulgation should be followed for the sake of justice. What will govern would be the provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Until the term of office of barangay officials have been determined by law, the term of 6 years from the Barangay Election Act will stand.
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