Consti Midterm Exam Summary

State Sovereignty; Effective Occupation; Terra Nullius (2000) No XIX - a) What is the basis of the Philippines' claim to a part of the Spratly Islands? SUGGESTED ANSWER: The basis of the Philippine claim is effective occupation of a territory not subject to the sovereignty of another state. The Japanese forces occupied the Spratly Island group during the Second World War. However, under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 Japan formally renounced all right and claim to the Spratlys. The San Francisco Treaty or any other International agreement however, did not designate any beneficiary state following the Japanese renunciation of right. Subsequently, the Spratlys became terra nullius and was occupied by the Philippines in the title of sovereignty. Philippine sovereignty was displayed by open and public occupation of a number of islands by stationing of military forces, by organizing a local government unit, and by awarding petroleum drilling rights, among other political and administrative acts. In 1978, it confirmed its sovereign title by the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1596, which declared the Kalayaan Island Group part of Philippine territory. In the case of Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines has exercised both effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc since its independence. -

Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago. Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of islands. Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)part of Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan. Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan. RA 9552 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration of the archipelago, including the extended continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more compliant with the UNCLOS. It redrew the country’s baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as “regime of islands”. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris. Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) – consists of islands or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high tide. The principle forces claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands.

Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago”. -

Constitutional issues: Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty

of Paris vs. RA 9552 Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and right of overflight 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone) – READ: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas) Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline) Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupied

as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong. -

Kalayaan Island Group a) historic right b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978 c) effective occupation d) principle of contiguity because of proximity e) part of the continental shelf c) RA 3046 & RA 5446 c) RA 9552

Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belongbasis: terra nullius

Sabbah International law provides for the lease of a territory in which a state grants another state the right to control at least part of the lessor’s territory. Once the territory is leased the sovereignty remains with the lessor and not under its jurisdiction which is granted to the lessee. The lease of the territory is usually given in exchange of an annual fee. Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.

PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC. Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is justified only when: 1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be there where they are;

3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and 4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted. Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless searches and seizures: 1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553); 2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582); 3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established until after they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain view); 4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005); 5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Int’l Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 6. stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search – (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacat vs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon “reasonable suspicion” that a person may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires “probable cause” that a suspect committed a criminal offense. 7. Armed conflict (war time) 8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escaño, GR No. 129756-58, January 28, 2000); 9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup; 10. Conduct of “Area Target Zone” and “Saturation Drives” in the exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623); 11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000). WARRANTLESS ARREST

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites: 1. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time of the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest. 2. There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase. Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within the view of the arresting officer. PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of immediacy between the time of the offense was committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the crime. PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Right applies only against the government and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Only a judge may validly issue a warrantEXCEPT: By administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of law. Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration can issue a warrant of

arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be deported. SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one offense. PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004. Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state of an “imperium in imperio” (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments. Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence. LIMBONA VS MANGELIN [170 SCRA 786] Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. The second is abdication by the national government of political power in favor of the local government (essence in a federal set-up); the first consists merely in the delegation of administrative powers to broaden the base of governmental power (essence in a unitary set-up). Against the first, there can be no valid constitutional challenge.

Local autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by lgus vis-à-vis the central government. The system of achieving local autonomy is known as decentralization and this system is realized through the process called devolution. Decentralization – is a system whereby lgus shall be given more powers, authority and responsibilities and resources and a direction by which this is done is from the national government to the local government Devolution – refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. This includes the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Distinguish devolution from deconcentration: Deconcentration is different. If devolution involves the transfer of resources, powers from national government to lgus, deconcentration is from national office to a local office. Deconcentration is the transfer of authority and power to the appropriate regional offices or field offices of national agencies or offices whose major functions are not devolved to local government units. Devolution of Power (1999) Define devolution with respect to local government units. SUGGESTED ANSWER: Section 17(e) of the Local Government Code defines devolution as the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Searches and Seizures; Aliens (2001) No IV - A is an alien. State whether, in the Philippines, he: Is entitled to the right against illegal searches and seizures and against illegal arrests. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Aliens are entitled to the right against illegal searches and seizures and illegal arrests. As applied in People v. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 432 (1999), these rights are available to all persons, including aliens. Searches and Seizures; Incidental to Valid Search (1990) No. 9; Some police operatives, acting under a lawfully issued warrant for the purpose of searching for firearms in the House of X located at No. 10 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, Metro Manila, found, instead of firearms, ten kilograms of cocaine. (1) May the said police operatives lawfully seize the cocaine? Explain your answer. (2) May X successfully challenge the legality of the search on the ground that the peace officers did not inform him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel? Explain your answer. (3) Suppose the peace officers were able to find unlicensed firearms in the house in an adjacent lot, that is. No, 12 Shaw Boulevard, which is also owned by X. May they lawfully seize the said unlicensed firearms? Explain your answer. SUGGESTED ANSWER: (1) Yes, the police operatives may lawfully seize the cocaine, because it is an item whose possession is prohibited by law, it was in plain view and it was only inadvertently discovered in the course of a lawful search. The possession of cocaine is prohibited by Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As held in Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, an article whose possession is prohibited by law may be seized without the need of any search warrant if it was discovered during a lawful search. The additional requirement laid down in Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 that the discovery of the article must have been made inadvertently was also satisfied in this case. (2) No, X cannot successfully challenge the legality of the search simply because the peace

officers did not inform him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." As held in People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111. for this provision to apply, a suspect must be under investigation. There was no investigation involved in this case. (3) The unlicensed firearms stored at 12 Shaw Boulevard may lawfully be seized since their possession is illegal. As held in Magoncia a Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, when an individual possesses contraband (unlicensed firearms belong to this category), he is committing a crime and he can be arrested without a warrant and the contraband can be seized. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: In accordance with the rulings in Uy Keytin v, Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 and People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667, the unlicensed firearms found in the house at 12 Shaw Boulevard may not be lawfully seized, since they were not included in the description of the articles to be seized by virtue of the search warrant. The search warrant described the articles to be seized as firearms in the house of X located at 10 Shaw Boulevard. Searches and Seizures; Valid Warrantless Search (2000) a) Crack officers of the Anti-Narcotics Unit were assigned on surveillance of the environs of a cemetery where the sale and use of dangerous drugs are rampant. A man with reddish and glassy eyes was walking unsteadily moving towards them but veered away when he sensed the presence of policemen. They approached him, introduced themselves as police officers and asked him what he had clenched in his hand. As he kept mum, the policemen pried his hand open and found a sachet of shabu, a dangerous drug. Accordingly charged in court, the accused objected to the admission in evidence of the dangerous drug

because it was the result of an illegal search and seizure. Rule on the objection. (3%) b) What are the instances when warrantless searches may be effected? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) The objection is not tenable. In accordance with Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997). since the accused had red eyes and was walking unsteadily and the place is a known hang-out of drug addicts, the police officers had sufficient reason to stop the accused and to frisk him. Since shabu was actually found during the investigation, it could be seized without the need for a search warrant. b) A warrantless search may be effected in the following cases: a) Searches incidental to a lawful arrest: b) Searches of moving vehicles; c) Searches of prohibited articles in plain view: d) Enforcement of customs law; e) Consented searches; f) Stop and frisk (People v. Monaco, 285 SCRA 703 [1998]); g) Routine searches at borders and ports of entry (United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 [1977]); and h) Searches of businesses in the exercise of visitorial powers to enforce police regulations (New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987]). Searches and Seizures; Visual Search (1992) No. 5: During the recent elections, checkpoints were set up to enforce the election period ban on firearms. During one such routine search one night, while looking through an open window with a flashlight, the police saw firearms at the backseat of a car partially covered by papers and clothes. Antonio, owner and driver of the car in question, was charged for violation of the firearms ban. Are the firearms admissible in evidence against him? Explain. If, upon further inspection by the police, prohibited drugs were found inside the various compartments of Antonio's car, can the drugs be used in evidence

against Antonio if he is prosecuted for possession of prohibited drugs? Explain. SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Yes, the firearms are admissible in evidence, because they were validly seized. In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665, the Supreme Court held that checkpoints may be set up to maintain peace and order for the benefit of the public and checkpoints are a security measure against unauthorized firearms. Since the search which resulted in the discovery of the firearms was limited to a visual search of the car, it was reasonable. Because of the ban on firearms, the possession of the firearms was prohibited. Since they were found in plain view in the course of a lawful search, in accordance with the decision in Magancia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, they are admissible in evidence. b) No, the drugs cannot be used in evidence against Antonio if he is prosecuted for possession of prohibited drugs. The drugs were found after a more extensive search of the various compartments of the car. As held in Valmonte vs. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, for such a search to be valid, there must be a probable cause. In this case, there was no probable cause, as there was nothing to indicate that Antonio had prohibited drugs inside the compartments of his car. Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests (1993) No. 9: Johann learned that the police were looking for him in connection with the rape of an 18-year old girl, a neighbor. He went to the police station a week later and presented himself to the desk sergeant. Coincidentally. the rape victim was in the premises executing an extrajudicial statement. Johann, along with six (6) other suspects, were placed in a police lineup and the girl pointed to him as the rapist. Johann was arrested and locked up in a cell. Johann was charged with rape in court but prior to arraignment invoked his right to preliminary investigation. This was denied by the judge, and thus, trial proceeded. After the prosecution presented several witnesses, Johann through counsel, invoked the right to bail and filed a

motion therefor, which was denied outright by the Judge. Johann now files a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals arguing that: His arrest was not in accordance with law. Decide. SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the warrantless arrest of Johann was not in accordance with law. As held in Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, his case does not fall under the Instances in Rule 113, sec. 5 (a) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizing warrantless arrests. It cannot be considered a valid warrantless arrest because Johann did not commit a crime in the presence of the police officers, since they were not present when Johann had allegedly raped his neighbor. Neither can It be considered an arrest under Rule 113 sec. 5 (b) which allows an arrest without a warrant to be made when a crime has in fact just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge offsets indicating that the person to be arrested committed it. Since Johann was arrested a week after the alleged rape, it cannot be deemed to be a crime which "has just been committed". Nor did the police officers who arrested him have personal knowledge of facts indicating that Johann raped his neighbor. Searches and Seizures; Warrants of Arrest (1991) No. 8: On the basis of a verified report and confidential information that various electronic equipment, which were illegally imported into the Philippines, were found in the bodega of the Tikasan Corporation located at 1002 Binakayan St., Cebu City, the Collector of Customs of Cebu issued, in the morning of 2 January 1988, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the corporation for the seizure of the electronic equipment. The warrant particularly describes the electronic equipment and specifies the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code which were violated by the importation. The warrant was served and implemented in the afternoon of 2 January 1988 by Customs policemen who then seized the described equipment. The inventory of the seized articles was signed by the Secretary of the Tikasan

Corporation. The following day, a hearing officer in the Office of the Collector of Customs conducted a hearing on the confiscation of the equipment. Two days thereafter, the corporation filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to set aside the warrant, enjoin the Collector and his agents from further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing and to secure the return of the confiscated equipment, alleging therein that the warrant issued is null and void for the reason that, pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, only a judge may issue a search warrant. In his comment to the petition, the Collector of Customs, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contends that he is authorized under the Tariff and Custom Code to order the seizure of the equipment whose duties and taxes were not paid and that the corporation did not exhaust administrative remedies. Should the petition be granted? Decide. SUGGESTED ANSWER: The petition should not be granted. Under Secs. 2205 and 2208 of the Tariff and Customs Code, customs officials are authorized to enter any warehouse, not used as dwelling, for the purpose of seizing any article which is subject to forfeiture. For this purpose they need no warrant issued by a court. As stated in Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553. for centuries the seizure of goods by customs officials to enforce the customs laws without need of a search warrant has been recognized. CITIZENSHIP Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship. Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective: 1. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of the Philippines; and 2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority. Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the “evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.” The Court concluded that, “having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.” Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity. R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasa’s parents lost their Philippine citizenship “on account of political or economic necessity”]. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in

the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s application for repatriation. Supra. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino. NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)including citizens repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those repatriated.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases “which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-

born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.” LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 – Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship. Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 – Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted. Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the naturalborn Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship

for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or reacquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and

principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein. *Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989 AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004-

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship. Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same. Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) – grants Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged subsequent recognition of his naturalborn status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant. Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231A Filipino citizen’s acquisition of permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The “green card” status in the USA is a renunciation on one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.

Dual Allegiance vs. Dual Citizenship (1988) No. 13: Robert Brown was born in Hawaii on May 15, 1962, of an American father and a Filipina mother. On May 16, 1983 while holding an American passport, he registered as a Filipino with the Philippine Consulate at Honolulu, Hawaii. In September, 1983 he returned to the Philippines, and took up residence at Boac, Marinduque, hometown of his mother. He registered as a voter, voted, and even participated as a leader of one of the candidates in that district in the 1984 Batasan elections. In the elections of 1987, he ran for Congressman, and won. His sole opponent is now questioning his qualifications and is trying to oust him on two basic claims: (1) He is not a natural born Filipino citizen, but

is in fact, an American, born in Hawaii, an integral portion of the U.S.A., who holds an American passport; (2) He did not meet the age requirement; and (3) He has a "green card" from the U.S. Government. Assume that you are a member of the House Electoral Tribunal where the petition for Brown's ouster is pending. How would you decide the three issues raised against him? SUGGESTED ANSWER: The first and third grounds have no merit. But the second is well taken and, therefore, Brown should be disqualified. 1. Robert Brown is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. A person born of a Filipino mother and an alien father before January 17, 1973, who thereafter upon reaching the age of majority elect Philippine citizenship, is a citizen of the Philippines (Art. IV, sec. 1(3)). Under Art. IV, sec, 2 he is also deemed a natural-born citizen. 2. The Constitution requires, among other things, that a candidate for member of the House of Representatives must be at least 25 years of age "on the day of the election." (Art. VI, sec. 6). As Brown was born on May 15, 1962, he did not become 25 years old until May 15, 1987. Hence on May 11, 1987, when the election was held, he was 4 days short of the required age. 3. The Constitution provides that those who seek either to change their citizenship or to acquire the status of an immigrant of another country "during their tenure" shall be dealt with by law (Art. XI, sec. 17). The provision cannot apply to Brown for the following reasons: First, Brown is in addition an American citizen and thus has a dual citizenship which is allowed by the Constitution. (Cf. Art. IV, sec. 4), Second, Brown did not seek to acquire the status of an immigrant, but is an American by birth under the principle of jus soli obtaining in the United States. Third, he did not seek to change his status during his tenure as a public officer. Fourth, the provision of Art. XI, sec. 17 is not self-executing but requires an implementing

law. Fifth, but above all, the House Electoral Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide this question since it does not concern the qualification of a member-elect. Ways of Reacquiring Citizenship (2000) No XVIII. - Cruz, a Filipino by birth, became an American citizen. In his old age he has returned to the country and wants to become a Filipino again. As his lawyer, enumerate the ways by which citizenship may be reacquired. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Cruz may reacquire Philippine citizenship in the following ways: 1. By naturalization; 2. By repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171; and 3. By direct act of Congress (Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 63).

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the President to withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if “necessary and proper” in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military and national security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security secrets from the Legislature or the public. As the official in control of the nation’s foreign service by virtue of the President’s control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of the State. The President’s role as chief implementer of the State’s foreign policy is reinforced by the President’s constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this

responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it. There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the President’s communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues and executive matters knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid advice. Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases. The balancing of interests – between executive privilege on one hand and the other competing constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts. Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. xxx

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. “Operational Proximity Test” (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and nondelegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. The reason is the operation of what is called the “operative fact doctrine.” What is this? The doctrine of operative fact recognizes that a law or executive act, before it is declared unconstitutional, is an “operative fact” which produces consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. The law is nullified, but its

effect is sustained. “Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.” However, as Justice Arturo Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact cannot apply to the authors and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities. The Supreme Court is not the proper tribunal to determine that. Necessarily, therefore, the question must be asked about the good faith of the author of the law that has been declared unconstitutional. But what is good faith? Good faith is an abstract term which includes a sincere belief without any malice or intent to defraud. RH LAW

Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provisions in the IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as they punish any health care provider who fails and or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case as defined under RA 8544 to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible, regardless of his or her belief; Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the IRR regarding the rendering pro bono reproductive health service insofar as they affect the conscientious objector in securing Philhealth accreditation; Section3.01(a) and (11) insofar as it penalizes a health service provider who will require parental consent from the minor in not emergency or serious situations.

These were the provisions that the high court declared as unconstitutional: Section 5 – Freedom of Religion Section 7 and the corresponding provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, insofar as (a) they require private health facilities and non-maternity hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency of life-threatening cases, as defined under RA 8544, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible, and (b) allow minor patients or minors who have suffered miscarriage access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian; Section 23 (a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as it punishes a health provider who fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; Section 23(a)(2)(1) insofar as they allow a married individual not in an emergency or life-threatening situation, as defined under RA 8544, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

Conscientious Objector Test A person who, because of principles of religious training and moral belief, is opposed to all war regardless of its cause. A conscientious objector may be release from the obligation to serve in the armed forces or to participate in selective service registration. A conscientious objector must oppose war in any form, and not just a particular war, in order to avoid military service. He does not have to be a member of a religious congregation that forbids participation in war.