November 26, 2017 | Author: JulieAnn Gil | Category: Loans, Constitutional Amendment, Promissory Note, Foreclosure, Judgment (Law)
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CONSTI LAW 1 1. De Leon vs Esguerra, 153 SCRA 642 G.R. No. 78059 153 SCRA 602 August 31, 1987 Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al. Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his capacity as OIC Governor in the province of Rizal, et al. FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace them as well as designate successors. Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions. ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification.

2. Marcos vs Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668

FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.


50 SCRA 30 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity of the 1973 Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

4. Gonzalez vs COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 Sense and Sensibility SENSE: (v) to become aware of, to grasp the meaning of; understand SENSIBILITY: (n) awareness, responsiveness, keen consciousness and appreciation

Gonzales vs COMELEC

21 SCRA 774 G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967 Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.): 1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member. 2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971. 3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election. Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional. 2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: 1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED. 2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court. Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable Question (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita) 5. Caltex Philippines Inc. vs Palomar, L-19650, September 29 1966

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966 CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FACTS: In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law. Issue: Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

HELD: The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products. By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included 6. Montenegro vs Castañeda, 91 Philippi es 882 G.R. No. L-4221 August 30, 1952 MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-appellees

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the President

In October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his son’s body and explain his detention. Castaňeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker. ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted. HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegro’s petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt.

7. Central Bank of the Philippines vs CA, 63 SCRA 431 Central Bank v Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-45710 October 3, 1985

The bank’s asking for advance interest for the loan is improper considering that the total loan hasn’t been released. A person can’t be charged interest for nonexisting debt. The alleged discovery by the bank of overvaluation of the loan collateral is not an issue. Since Island Savings Bank failed to furnish the P63,000.00 balance of the P80,000.00 loan, the real estate mortgage of Sulpicio M. Tolentino became unenforceable to such extent. Facts: Island Savings Bank, upon favorable recommendation of its legal department, approved the loan application for P80,000.00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as a security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate mortgage over his 100-hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, Agusan. The loan called for a lump sum of P80,000, repayable in semi-annual installments for 3 yrs, with 12% annual interest. After the agreement, a mere P17K partial release of the loan was made by the bank and Tolentino and his wife signed a promissory note for the P17,000 at 12% annual interest payable w/in 3 yrs. An advance interest was deducted fr the partial release but this prededucted interest was refunded to Tolentino after being informed that there was no fund yet for the release of the P63K balance. Monetary Board of Central Bank, after finding that bank was suffering liquidity problems, prohibited the bank fr making new loans and investments. And after the bank failed to restore its solvency, the Central Bank prohibited Island Savings Bank from doing business in the Philippines. Island Savings Bank in view of the non-payment of the P17K filed an application for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Tolentino filed petition for specific performance or rescission and damages with preliminary injunction, alleging that since the bank failed to deliver P63K, he is entitled to specific performance and if not, to rescind the real estate mortgage.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Tolentino’s can collect from the bank for damages 2) Whether or not the mortgagor is liable to pay the amount covered by the promissory note 3) Whether or not the real estate mortgage can be foreclosed Held:

1) Whether or not Tolentino’s can collect from the bank for damages The loan agreement implied reciprocal obligations. When one party is willing and ready to perform, the other party not ready nor willing incurs in delay. When Tolentino executed real estate mortgage, he signified willingness to pay. That time, the bank’s obligation to furnish the P80K loan accrued. Now, the Central Bank resolution made it impossible for the bank to furnish the P63K balance. The prohibition on the bank to make new loans is irrelevant bec it did not prohibit the bank fr releasing the balance of loans previously contracted. Insolvency of debtor is not an excuse for non-fulfillment of obligation but is a breach of contract. The bank’s asking for advance interest for the loan is improper considering that the total loan hasn’t been released. A person can’t be charged interest for nonexisting debt. The alleged discovery by the bank of overvaluation of the loan collateral is not an issue. The bank officials should have been more responsible and the bank bears risk in case the collateral turned out to be overvalued. Furthermore, this was not raised in the pleadings so this issue can’t be raised. The bank was in default and Tolentino may choose bet specific performance or rescission w/ damages in either case. But considering that the bank is now prohibited fr doing business, specific performance cannot be granted. Rescission is the only remedy left, but the rescission shld only be for the P63K balance. 2) Whether or not the mortgagor is liable to pay the amount covered by the promissory note The promissory note gave rise to Sulpicio M. Tolentino’s reciprocal obligation to pay the P17,000.00 loan when it falls due. His failure to pay the overdue amortizations under the promissory note made him a party in default, hence not entitled to rescission (Article 1191 of the Civil Code). If there is a right to rescind the promissory note, it shall belong to the aggrieved party, that is, Island Savings Bank. If Tolentino had not signed a promissory note setting the date for payment of P17,000.00 within 3 years, he would be entitled to ask for rescission of the entire loan because he cannot possibly be in default as there was no date for him to perform his reciprocal obligation to pay. Since both parties were in default in the performance of their respective reciprocal obligations, that is, Island Savings Bank failed to comply with its obligation to furnish the entire loan and Sulpicio M. Tolentino failed to comply with his obligation to pay his P17,000.00 debt within 3 years as stipulated, they are both liable for damages. 3) Whether or not the real estate mortgage can be foreclosed Since Island Savings Bank failed to furnish the P63,000.00 balance of the P80,000.00 loan, the real estate mortgage of Sulpicio M. Tolentino became unenforceable to such extent. P63,000.00 is 78.75% of P80,000.00, hence the real estate mortgage covering 100 hectares is unenforceable to the extent of 78.75 hectares. The mortgage covering the remainder of 21.25 hectares subsists as a security for the P17,000.00 debt. 21.25 hectares is more than sufficient to secure a P17,000.00 debt.

8. Roa vs Collector of Customs, 23 Philippines 315

Roa v. collector of Customs TRANQUILINO ROA, Petitioner-Appellant , vs. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Respondent-Appellee. En Banc Doctrine: Series of Conflicting SC Decisions re Citizenship Date: G.R. No. L-7011 October 30, 1912 Ponente: Justice Trent Facts:

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This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino Roa, to the custody of the Collector of Customs and declaring the Collector's right to effect appellant's deportation to China as being a subject of the Chinese Empire and without right to enter and reside in the Philippine Islands. There is no dispute as to the facts. Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age. After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant was a Chinese person and a subject of the Emperor of China and not entitled to land. In view of the fact that the applicant for admission was born in lawful wedlock On appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs this decision was affirmed, and the Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings remanded the appellant to the Collector of Customs Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, children, while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality of their parents. Therefore, the legitimate children born in the Philippine Islands of a subject of the Emperor of China are Chinese subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty Issue: WON Roa is a citizen of the Philippines Held: YES, The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country. We therefore conclude that the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and entitled to land. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant is ordered released from custody, with costs de oficio. Ratio:

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His mother, before her marriage, was, as we have said, a Spanish subject. Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides: That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then living in that country and had never left it. She was then the natural guardian of Tranquilino. Upon the dissolution of a marriage between a female citizen of the United States and a foreigner, she ipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at that time she is residing in the United States. There is no statutory declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that of their widowed mother. If the children were born in the United States, they would be citizens of that country. If they were born in the country of which their father (and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a citizens of that country until the death of their father. But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as a logical consequence, follow that of their mother, she having changed their domicile and nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the United States. But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect, under the principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people, the nationality of the country of "no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and more constantly acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of it." Quoted with approval in the case of Boyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135) 9. CO Cham vs Valdez Tan Res, 75 Philippines 113

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945 CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.1 FERIA, J.: Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.” Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.” In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.

3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

10. Republic vs Purisima, 78 SCRA 470 Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground – Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since it is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct? HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.

STRICLY ONE PARAGRAPH FOR FACTS AND RULINGS. As in strictly. :D Pati ilagay sa notebook kasi ikokolekta.

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