CONSTI Digests _ Judicial Dept

During the 11 th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the H ouse of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12 thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13 th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all ci ties under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ second motion for reconsideration. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, A rticle X of the Constitution;

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, A rticle X of the Constitution, and are thus The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not in to any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.” Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear  – the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code

and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the L GC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. T he uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is c lear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.

For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings: 1. Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010 dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and 2. Opposition [To the “Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010”]. Meanwhile, respondents also filed on Septembe r 20, 2010 a Motion to Set “Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010” for Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc. The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities.

The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount “sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population,” per Section 713 of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is difficult to comply with. While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of course, provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis the population of a municipality wanting to become a component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount ofP20 million would be insufficient. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2. The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a c ourt in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared

Yes, it’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA N o. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. “The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of R epresentatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.

The dissenting opinion stated that “a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.” However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed cases, the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the  judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. The 6 -6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Hence, the 18 N ovember 2008 judgment and the 31 March 2009 resolution stand in full force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior

affirmative action. The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional, was reinstated.

AD HOC SUPREME COURT MEMBERSHIP

FISCAL AUTONOMY – Section 3

FACTS: The Petitioners of this case were retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals currently receiving monthly pensions under  as amended by They filed this case against respondents involved in the release of funds appropriated in the annual appropriations.. President Marcos issued a repealing  which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. Subsequently, was issued by Marcos providing for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men while that of the retired justices was not restored. Prior to this petition, Justices Barcelona et al filed a case alleging that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law due to the lack of required publication. RA 1797 was still in effect. Thus the Congress included certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended to pay for said pension. President Aquino vetoed HB 16297 on the ground that it would be against the policy on standardization of compensation (RA 6758 Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989). The President vetoed parts of the special provisions for the Supreme Court and the lower courts on the ground that the resolution of the court has been enacted nullifying the veto on HB 16297.

HELD: The Constitution grants the Supreme Court fiscal autonomy to strengthen its independence. As provided in section 3 of Article VIII,

It guarantees full flexibility to a llocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Like the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman, the Judiciary must have the independence and flexibility needed to discharge their duties. T o impose restrictions and constraints on its allocation and utilization of funds appropriated for their operation is violative of the Constitution as well as the independence of the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the veto of specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law The petition was GRANTED and the questioned veto was held as unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid . The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary, pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy.

It was alleged that the said veto impairs the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. FACTS: ISSUE: WON the veto by the President of provisions in the GAA 1992 infringes upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

Section 14 of the People’s Court Act or Commonwealth Act No. 682 was assailed in this motion on the grounds, inter alia that it provides for additional qualifications other than those provided in Section 6 of Article VIII of the

Constitution, authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess such qualifications, creates two Supreme Courts and destroys the independence of the Judiciary. Section 14 of the People’s Court Act provides that any Supreme Court Justice who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or the Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in cases in which the a ccused also held any office under the said Commission or Occ upation government. On account of such disqualification or any of the disqualifications provided in Section 1 of the Rules of Court (such as illness, absence or temporary disability), the President may designate Judges of First Instance and Cadastral Judges to sit temporarily as Justice of the Supreme Court, to constitute the necessary quorum or until a judgment is rendered.

ISSUE: WON the temporary membership of the designees to the Supreme Court is unconstitutional.

RULING:

of law in the Philippines. Under said sec tion he need only have practiced law for a period of not less than five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. Thus, a "designee" under se ction 14 of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute Justice of the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases, and participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular member of said Court. A point of repugnancy between the challenged section and the c onstitution. The courts will continue to hold, invalid any attempt on the part of the legislature to deprive them by statute of any power the exercise of which they deem essential to the proper performance of their judicial function. The legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge, the express or necessarily implied powers granted to this court by the Constitution. The Judiciary with condemns any legislation which impinges or might impinge upon the fundamental independent powers of the judicature.

FACTS: The Supreme Court ruled that section 14 of the People’s Court Act is

unconstitutional because it contravenes

 which states that  and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. The arrangement provided by the assailed provision creates two Supreme Courts, the regular body and the temporary court for collaboration cases. According to section 4 of said A rticle VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices referred to in the provision and its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court is depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the Constitution. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. It also contravenes the provisions on the qualifications set forth in (now section 7 paragraph 1) which stipulates that no person may be appointed member of the Supreme Court unless he has been five years a citizen of the Philippines, is at least 40 years of age, and has for 10 years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. A Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised Administrative Code, need not be at least forty years of age, nor have more than ten years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice

President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to j oin the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by t he military on the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not IBP have legal standing in the case at bar? RULING Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily anchors its s tanding on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of

law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole citizenry. IBP’s fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law

profession & improve the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. Petition is dismissed.

2/3/04 (otherwise moot but capable of repetition) Facts: In the middle of the night of July 27, 2003, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers declared their withdrawal of support for the government and demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). These actions constitute the crime of rebellion thus, under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution whenever it becomes necessary, the president may call out s uch Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. In the wake of the Oakwood incident, the President Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, bo th declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out/directing the Armed Forces to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended and the soldiers returned to their barracks. O n Aug. 1 2003, the President then lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion through Proclamation 435. In the interim (in between/ meantime), several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the validity of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4. Specifically: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)- party list organizations VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contend that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there is no sufficient factual basis for such proclamation by the president. Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.

question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The present case is one such case. ‘Once before, the President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38 and General Order 1. On that occasion, “‘an a ngry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons’ assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the validity of the President’s declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.’ To prevent similar questions from reemerging, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President’s calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.

First, there must be an actual case or controversy; Second, petitioners have to raise a question of unconstitutionality; Third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and Fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

ISSUE: 1. W/N the issuance of Proc. No. 435 rendered the case moot? 2. W/N the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? 3. W/N Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. are c onstitutional?

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case . Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary)

RULING: 1. Yes. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the c ase moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of “actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will decide a

2. No. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM have no legal standing to sue. Petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime

of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringeme nt. Even assuming that petitioners are “peoples organizations”, this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances. That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such illegal disbursement is alleged. On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered s ome actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the c hallenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this case. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it’s right to freedom of expression and fre edom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Thus, The Supreme Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they c laim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to

assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the prese ntation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. *Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. 3. Yes. The Court rendered that both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-inChief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. Thus, the President’s authority to declare a s tate of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers making it clear that the President has f ull discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. Declaration of State of Rebellion is not Declaration of Martial Law. There was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion.

However, Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commanderin-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. The President's Commander-in-Chief Powers: (1) the calling out power, the power t o suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. I n the exercise of the latter 2 powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. While the only criterion in the calling out of power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary’ Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the s tate of rebellion declared by the President through Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 in the wake of the so-called Oakwood Incident. The questioned issuances, however, were subsequently lifted by her on August 1, 2003, when she issued Proclamation No. 435. Hence, as of today, there is no more extant proclamation or order that can be declared valid or void. For this reason, I believe that the Petitions should be dismissed on the ground of mootness. The judicial power to declare a law or an executive order unconstitutional, according to Justice Jose P. Laurel, is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Following this longheld principle, the Court has thus always been guided by these fourfold requisites in deciding constitutional law issues: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; 3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4) adjudication of the constitutional question must be indispensable to the resolution of the case. Unquestionably, the first and the forth requirements are absent in the present case. Absence of Case and Controversy: The first requirement, the existence of a live case or controversy, means that an existing litigation is ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination; as opposed to one that is conjectural or anticipatory, hypothetical or feigned. A  justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Hence, it admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, in contrast to an opinion which only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. As a rule, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or friendly suits between parties without real adverse interests. Neither do courts sit to adjudicate academic questions no matter how intellectually challenging[8] because without a justiciable controversy, an adjudication would be of no practical use or value.

While the Petitions herein have previously embodied a live case or controversy, they now have been rendered extinct by the lifting of the questioned issuances. Thus, nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue. Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the Petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. Be it remembered that they were filed directly with this Court and thus invoked its original jurisdiction. On the theory that the state of rebellion issue is capable of repetition yet ev ading review, I respectfully submit that the question may indeed still be resolved even after the lifting of the Proclamation and Order, provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance. In the present case, petitioners have not s hown that they have been or continue to be directly and pecuniarily prejudiced or damaged by the Proclamation and Order. Neither have they shown that this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. I would venture to say that, perhaps, if this controversy had emanated from an appealed judgment from a lower tribunal, then this Court may still pass upon the issue on the theory that it is capable of repetition yet evading review, and the case would not be an original action for declaratory relief. In short, the theory of capable of repetition yet evading review may be invoked only when this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be used in the present controversy for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original  jurisdiction. The Resolution of the Case on Other Grounds: The fourth requisite, which relates to the absolute necessity of deciding the constitutional issue, means that the Court has no other way of resolving the case except by tackling an unavoidable constitutional question. It is a well-settled d octrine that courts will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be disposed on some other grounds. With due respect, I submit that the mootness of the Petitions has swept aside the necessity of ruling on the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General order No. 4. In the wake of its mootness, the constitutionality issue has ceased to be the lis mota of the case or to be an unavoidable question in the resolution thereof. Hence, the dismissal of the Petitions for mootness is justified. WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions. On the constitutionality of a state of rebellion, I reserve my judgment at the proper time and in the proper case. Lis Mota —cause of action or means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The

petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its f avor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

NO. He cannot question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last appointed. The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence,

 vs. On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new adinterim  appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad  in te ri m appointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties thereof. On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid adinterim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month and year. On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office. Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new adinterim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor. Ruling

G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001) FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the A rmed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “ rebellion” were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, a nd the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

1. On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered

moot and academic. 2.

As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being

used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary investigations will be conducted. 3. Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless

arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 4. Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations against the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. 5. Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void since petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. 6. Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the award. 7. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. 8. As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real partyin-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.

Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the f irst instance over such a petition. PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required  judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege).