Consti Cases Til Sec 16

AQUINO VS. COMELEC

placer doesn’t make him the duly appointed representative because it would violate the law.

Facts: ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of  Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of  residence.

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of  Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing information that she is a resident of  seven months in the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election. Subsequently, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency (must have been a resident for not less than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” This amendment was refused admittance for reason that it was filed out of time, so Petitioner filed her amended COC with COMELEC in division.

Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant t h e disqualifi disqualification cation of of Aquino Aquino from the positi position on in the electoral district.

The COMELEC in division found the petition for disqualification meritorious and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. In ruling thus, COMELEC in division found that when petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of  domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.

Held:

DOMINO VS. COMELEC

What is meant by the Constitution here is the domicile; “ where a party actually has his permanent home”. Aquino’s certificate of  candidacy in a previous election indicates that he was a registered voter for San juan, tarlac for more then 52 years. His residence in Makati was only a condo unit which was leased. This indicates that his purpose is not to have a new domicile but to qualify as a candidate Representative of the Second District of Makati.

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of  Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of  Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of  candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of  LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner Issue:

OCAMPO VS. HRET In the 2001 election, Jimenez won by 768 votes against Ocampo but was disqualified after almost 22months. Ocampo the candidate who garnered thesecond most number of votes seeks to be declaredas the winner in the election. th

- 6 District of Manila - Pablo Ocampo vs. Mario Jimenez - Ocampo said he shouldve taken the place of  Ocampo, but as the SC decided, being the second

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof  requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. Petition of Pimentel was deemed valid. FARINAS VS. COMELEC/ QUINTO VS. COMELEC

pending but he received most of the votes. His proclamation as winner was suspended because he was deemed disqualified. Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of  Locsin’s proclamation.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office. But at the same time the win of Locsin was void since you can nd  just give the seat to the candidate with the 2 highest number of votes.

DIMAPORO VS. MITRA TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC Petitioner Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. In January 1990, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM with the Comelec. Upon beinginformed of this development, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives (HOR) excluded ’

petitioner s name from the Rollof Members of the HOR pursuant to Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) enacted in 1985. He was excluded from allproceedings of the House, was not paid the emoluments due his office, and his office suites were occupied by other persons. When he lost his bid he wanted to resume his function but was not allowed. The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended ors hortened by the legislature. However, the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not even exist at all. Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, NOT his term. CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA Codilla ( Mayor of Ormoc) and Locsin (incumbent th Rep of the 4 district of Leyte) were candidates for th the position of 4 legislative district of Leyte. A petition was filed against Codilla alleging that he used equipment owned by the City of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte for the purpose of inducing and influencing them to vote for him. During the elections the case was still

In 2001 Sen. Guingona was appointed VP so his seat was vacated. (3 years of his term was left). Comelec declared that on the next election period th the candidate garnering the 13 highest votes will finish Guingona’s term.The candidates complained because they were not informed so the filing of  stuff for the regular and Guingona’s term was not separated. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the matter cause respondents say it is a quo warranto proceeding YES, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction bec what the petitioners are questioninghere is the validity of the special election in wc Honasan was elected, NOT his right in the exercise of his office asSenator. His election is merely incidental to the petitioner’s case of action. WON a special election to fill the term was validly held despite the lack of call for such election and lack of notice. YES, a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on although COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY w/ the requirements of RA 6645, either strictly or substantially, it does NOT invalidate the special election because although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be heldsimultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. The law already charges the voters w/ knowledge of this statutory notice, the COMELEC does not need to remind them of this. PHILCONSA VS. MATHAY

Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965. The court agreed with the petitioners that the increase in salary was void. MARTINEZ VS. MORFE Martinez and Bautista were members of the Constitutional Convention. They were arrested for falsification of docs-birthday and distribution of  free food, drinks and cigs at 2public meetings Sec 15, Art VI of the Constitution makes it clear that parliamentary immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony, and breach of  the peace. Since this happened before the 1973 Constitution they are not immune because the 1935 Consti only protects those with civil liabilities. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a nonbailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. The crime Jolosjos committed is punishable more than 6 months (this is the case for members of the congress). He is not protected and protecting him would give him a special status and it would also make a mockery out of the correction system. OSMENA VS. PENDATUM

Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of  the House, suspended from office for a p eriod of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior. Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of  Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed. JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the president and caused the same to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including Col. Jimenez, associating them in purported operational plans for a coup d’etat. Petitioners instituted this present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. In his defense, Cabangbang invoked parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art VI, Sec 15 of  the Constitution. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. GRAVEL VS. US Sen. Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers and since he was dyslexic he was not able to finish reading them so he decided to bring it to his office because he was scared the FBI would raid his home. He arranged to have it published by a private publisher Beacon Press. This was against the law aand this was not under the privilege of speech. Publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way

essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence ANTONIO VS. VALENCIA POBRE VS. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO *Facts are in the books. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of  decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of  IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question the Commissioner’s action. Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing.

LIBAN VS. GORDON

SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA

Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as “having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

*Case is in the book NEW YORCK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP INC. VS. STEINGUT US. VS. SMITH VERA VS. AVELINO

During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution:

The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted  – hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 ’79) to

Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. The petitioners were among those with the highest votes. They were not sworn in because of the report so they filed a case. The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. FIELD VS. CLARK US. VS. PONS Pons and Beliso were caught bringing tins of Opium inside the Philippines by means of wine barrels from Spain. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was

adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of  the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA Petitioners are members of the House of  Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of  Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. CASCO PHIL. CHEMICAL VS. GIMENEZ Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. This is a request for review of the Auditor Generals decision of denying the petitioner refunds pertaining to their purchase of foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde. Sec 2 of RA 2609 exempts payment of foreign exchange for those importing 'Urea formaldehyde" for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard. Court deemed them to be different. ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS House bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed it. However, it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it was going thru its revision. With this finding, the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement saying they are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No. 9266, therefore, it should not be considered as a law.

Issue; WON the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Ruling; The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of  the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not become a law. The temporary restraining order was also made permanent.The intent of the law making body based on its journals prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill. In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of  offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to ViceMayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they

affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. MORALES VS. SUBIDO Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: "Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief  of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of  learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of  Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher." Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of  a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: 'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of  captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.' Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee

the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of  police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the  journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of  any discrepancy.