Consti 2

George L. Borja

Constitutional Constitutiona l Law II

Case: MIGUEL BELUSO VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), G.R. no. 153974 August 7, 2006 Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of  the Municipality of  Panay issued Resoluti on No. 95-29 author izing izing the municipal gover nment nment through the mayor  to initiate expropr iati iati on proceedings. A petition for  expropr iati iation was ther ea eaf te ter  f iled iled on Apr ilil 14, 1997 by the r esp espondent Municipality of  Panay befor e the Regional Tr ial ial Cour t (RTC), B r anch anch 18 of  Roxas City. Petiti oner s f iled iled a Motion t o Dismiss alleging that the taking is n ot for  public use but only for  the benef it it of  cer tain tain individuals; that it is p olitically m otivated because petitioner s vo ted against the incumbent mayor  and v ice-mayor ; and that some of  the supposed benef icia iciar ies ies of  the land sought to be expropr iated iated hav e not actually signed a petition asking for  the proper ty ty but their  signatur es es wer e for ged ged or  they wer e misled int o signing the same. The tr ial ial cour t denied petitioner s¶ s¶ M otion t o Dismiss and declar ed ed that the expropr iati iation in this case is for  "public use" and the r esp o f  r  o ro r  o esp ndent has the law ul ul ight ight t take the p pe ty ty up n payment of  just compensation. Petitioner s then f iled iled a Petiti on for  Certiorari be Certiorari befor e the CA claiming that they wer e denied due process when the tr ial ial cour t declar ed ed that the taking was for  public pur pose without r ecei eceiving evidence on petitioner s¶ s¶ claim that the May or  of  Panay was motivated by politics in expropr iating iating their  proper ty ty and in denying their  Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hear ing ing of  the Cour t Appointed Commissi oner s; s; and that the tr ial ial cour t also committed gr av e abuse of  discr eti etion when it disr ega egar ded ded the aff ida idavits of  per sons denying that they signed a petition addr essed essed to the municipal gover nment nment of  Panay. Then CA r ende ender ed ed its Decisi on dismissing the Petiti on for  Certiorari . It held that the petiti oner s wer e n ot denied due process as they wer e able t o f ile ile an answer  to the complaint and wer e able to adduce their  def enses enses ther ein; ein; and that the pur pose of  the taking in this case constitutes "public use". Issue: Whether  the Municipal Gover nment nment of  Panay exer cise cise the power  of  Eminent Domain is being exer cised cised in accor dance dance with the delegating law under  the existence of  legislative g r ant ant in f avor  of  local gover nments nments. Decision: The petition is gr anted anted. Rationale: The Cour t in no uncer tain tain ter ms ms have pronounced that a local gover nment nment unit cannot . A. No. author ize ize an expropr iati iation of  pr iv ate proper ty ty through a mer e r es esolution of  its lawmaking body. R A 7160 other wise wise known as the Local Gover nment nment Code expr essly essly r equi equir es es an or dinance dinance for  the pur pose and a r es esolution that mer ely ely expr esses esses the sentiment of  the municipal council will n ot suff ice ice.  A r es esoluti on will n ot suff ice ice for  an LGU to be able to expropr iate iate pr ivate proper ty; ty; and the r eas eason for  this is settled: A municipal or dinance dinance is diff er ent ent from a r es esolution. An or dinance dinance is a law, but a r es esoluti on is mer ely ely a declar ati ation of  the sentiment or  opini on of  a lawmaking body on a specif ic ic matter. An or dinance dinance possesses a gener al al and per manent manent char acte acter , but a r es esoluti on is tempor ar y in natur e. Additionally, the two ar e enacted diff er ently ently -- a thir d r eading eading is necessar y for  an or dinance, dinance, but not for  a r es esoluti on, unless decided other wise wise by a maj or ity ity of  all the Sanggunian member s. If  Congr ess ess intended to allow LGUs to exer cise cise eminent domain through a mer e r es esoluti on, it would hav e simply adopted the language of  the pr ev ious L ocal Gover nment nment Code. But Congr ess ess did not. In a clear  diver gence gence from the pr evious Local Gover nment nment Code, Sec. 19 of  R A  .A. [No.] 7160 categor ically ically r equi equir es es that the l ocal chief  executive act pur suant suant to an or dinance dinance.  As r esp espondent¶s expropr iati iation in this case was based mer ely ely on a r es esolution, such expropr iati iati on is clear ly ly def ecti ective. While the Cour t is awar e of  the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the cour t cannot gr ant ant judicial sancti on t o an LGU¶s exer cise cise of  its delegated power  of  eminent domain in contr aventi on of  the ver y law giving it such p ower.

George L. Borja

Constitutional Law II

Case: JULITA P. TAN v s. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. no 170740 May 25, 2007 Facts: Julita P. Tan, petitioner  her ein, is the r egister ed owner  of  a par cel of  land consisting of  7,161 squar e meter s l ocated at the souther n bank of  the Zapote River  in Siti o Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City. She acquir ed this proper ty from the San Antonio Dev elopment Cor por ation (SADC). Pr ior  to the tr ansf er  of  the proper ty to petiti oner  by SADC, or  on Mar ch 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC r equesting per mission t o enter  the latter ¶s p roper ty, for  the pur pose of  constr uction of  road. PEA also proposed to SADC to star t their  negotiati on for  its acquisiti on of  the latter ¶s proper ty. The Public Estates Auth or ity (PEA) is a g over nment-owned and controlled cor por ation, or ganized and existing pur suant to Pr esidential Decr ee (P.D.) N o. 1084. SADC r eplied author izing PEA to enter  the proper ty, subject to the condition that the latter  should pay a monthly r ental of  P10,000.00. PEA then dir ected its contr actor , the Philippine National Constr uction C or por ation, to enter  the proper ty and begin the necessar y engineer ing wor ks on the Coastal Road. Then PEA r equested SADC either  to donate or  sell the proper ty to the gover nment. SADC r eplied by off er ing to sell the proper ty to PEA. SADC¶s asking pr ice was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for  the house and other  improvements ther eon that wer e destroyed dur ing the constr uction of  the Coastal Road. PEA infor med SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but only the 1,131 squar e meter  por tion above sea lev el. PEA then asked SADC t o submit proof s of  owner ship and costs of  the improvements which wer e demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the par ties. Howev er , for  the past twenty (20) year s, they f ailed to r each an agr eement. Petiti oner  in her  desper ation, wrote PEA expr essing her  willingness to be compensated through a land swapping arr angement. She proposed that PEA¶s Fishe r man¶s Wharf  be given to her  in exchange for  her  proper ty. The PEA Boar d approved the exchange of  a por tion of  petiti oner ¶s lot. The par ties enter ed into a Memor andum of   Agr eement wher ein PEA agr eed to execute a Deed of  Exchange by way of  compensation for  petitioner ¶s proper ty aff ected by the Coastal Road but withdr aw later  on then f ile a complaint of  expropr iation to the cour t. petiti oner  f iled with the RTC a m otion to or der  PEA to immediately pay her  just compensation based on the zonal v aluati on of  the BIR. Then the tr ial cour t gr anted the petition. Then PEA f iled for  cer tior ar i to the Cour t of  Appeals, and it was gr anted. Issue: Whether  the just c ompensation of  the taking of  the proper ty is proper ly applied. Decision: The decision of  CA is r ever sed and the RTC decision Aff ir med. Rationale: While PEA has been ear ning huge toll f ees, it has r ef used to pay petitioner  any compensation for  the use of  her  proper ty in violation of  her r ight as an owner. The abov e cir cumstances clear ly show that when PEA enter ed petitioner ¶s land in 1985, it was n ot for  the pur pose of  expropr iating it. We str ess that af ter  its entr y, PEA wrote SADC r equesting to donate or  sell the land to the gover nment. Indeed, ther e was no intention on the par t of  PEA to expropr iate the subject proper ty. Why did it ask per mission from SADC t o enter  the proper ty? Ther eaf ter , why did it r equest SADC to donate or  sell the land to the gover nment? It could hav e simply exer cised its power  of  eminent domain. Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropr iation) of  the same Rules prov ides, among other s, that upon the f iling of  the complaint or  at any time ther eaf ter  and af ter  due notice to the def endant, the plaintiff  shall have the r ight to take or  enter  upon the possession of  the r eal proper ty involved if  he deposits with the author ized gover nment depositar y an amount equivalent to the assessed v alue of  the proper ty. It bear s r eiter ating that in R epublic v. Vda. de Castellvi , we r uled that just c ompensation is deter mined as of  the date of  the taking of  the proper ty or  the f iling of  the complaint, whichev er  came f ir st. We hav e made it clear  that ther e was no taking of  the proper ty in 1985 by PEA for  pur poses of  expropr iation. As shown by the r ecor ds, PEA f iled with the RTC its petiti on for  expropr iation on September  22, 2003. The tr ial cour t, ther efor e, was c orr ect in or der ing r espondent, through PEA, upon the f iling of  its complaint for  expropr iation, to pay petitioner  just compensation on the basis of  the BIR zonal valuation of  the subject proper ty at P20,000.00 per  squar e meter.

George L. Borja

Constitutional Law II

Case: CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. v s. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. no 173863 September 15, 2010 Facts: Clar k Development Cor por ation (CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of  Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clar k Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) which the petiti oner  protest the assessment for  royalty f ees claiming that nothing in the law author izes CDC t o impose royalty f ees or  any f ees based on a per  unit measur ement of  any commodity sold within the special economic zone. Petitioner  elev ated its protest befor e r espondent Bases Conv er sion Dev elopment Author ity (BCDA) ar guing that the royalty f ees imposed had no r easonable r elation t o the probable expenses of  r egulation and that the impositi on on a per  unit measur ement of  f uel sales was for  a r ev enue gener ating pur pose, thus, akin to a "tax". The protest was howev er  denied by BCDA. Petiti oner  appealed to the Off ice of  the Pr esident which dismissed the appeal for  lack of  mer it and denied m otion for  r econsider ation ther eof. The petitioner  elevated the case to the CA which likewise dismissed the appeal for  lack of  mer it and denied the motion for  r econsider ation.The CA held that in imposing the challenged royalty f ees, r espondent CDC was exer cising its r ight to r egulate the f low of  f uel into CSEZ, which is b olster ed by the f act that it possesses exclusiv e r ight to dist r ibute f uel within CSEZ pu r suant to its Joint Ventur e Agr eement (JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Author ity (SBMA) and C oastal Subic Bay Ter minal, Inc. (CSBTI) . The appellate cour t also found that royalty f ees wer e assessed on f uel deliv er ed, not on the sale, by petitioner  and that the basis of  such impositi on was petitioner ¶s deliver y r eceipts to Nanox Philippines. The f act that r ev enue is incidentally also obtained does n ot make the impositi on a tax as l ong as the pr imar y pu r pose of  such impositi on is r egulation. Issue: a. b.

Whether  the royalty f ee imposed by CDC r egulator y in natur e. Whether  the Policy Guidelines of  Clar k Development Cor por ation is v alid gover nmental r egulation

Decision: The petition is DENIED for  lack of  mer it and the Decision of  the Cour t of  Appeals is her eby  AFFIRMED. Rationale: In distinguishing tax and r egulation as a for m of  police power , the deter mining f actor  is the pur pose of  the implemented measur e. If  the pur pose is pr imar ily to r aise r ev enue, then it will be deemed a tax ev en though the measur e r esults in some for m of  r egulation. On the other  hand, if  the pur pose is pr imar ily to r egulate, then it is deemed a r egulation and an exer cise of  the police power  of  the state, ev en though incidentally, r evenue is gener ated. Thus, in Gerochi v. Depar tment of  Ener gy, the Cour t stated: The conserv ative and pivo tal distincti on between these two (2) power s r ests in the pur pose for  which the char ge is made. If  gener ation of  r evenue is the pr imar y pur pose and r egulation is mer ely incidental, the impositi on is a tax; but if  r egulation is the pr imar y pur pose, the f act that r evenue is incidentally r aised does not make the imposition a tax. In the case at bar , we h old that the subject royalty f ee was imposed pr imar ily for  r egulator y pur poses, and not for  the gener ation of  income or  prof its as petiti oner  claims. The need for  r egulation is m or e evident in the light of  the 9/11 tr agedy consider ing that what is being moved from one locati on to another  ar e highly combustible f uel products that could cause loss of  liv es and damage to proper ties, hence, a set of  guidelines was promulgated on 28 June 2002. It must be emphasized also that gr eater  secur ity measur e must be observed in the CSEZ because of  the pr esence of  the air por t which is a vital public infr astr uctur e.  Administr ativ e issuances hav e the for ce and eff ect of  law. They benef it from the same pr esumption of  validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two pr ecepts place a heav y bur den upon any par ty assailing gover nmental r egulations. Petiti oner ¶s plain allegati ons ar e simply not enough to over come the pr esumption of v alidity and r easonableness of  the subject impositi on.

George L. Borja Law II

Constitutional

Case: CITY OF ILOILO vs . REMEDIOS SIAN VILLANUEVA and EUSEBIO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. L-12695, March 23, 1959 Facts: The Municipal Boar d of  Iloilo City enacted Or dinance No. 86, amending Or dinance No. 33, wher ein the following was provide: (1) tenement house (casa de v ecindad), P25 annually; (2) tenement house par tly or  wholly engaged in or  dedicated to business in the str eets of  J.M. Basa, Iznar t and  Aldeguer , P24 per  apar tment; (3) tenement house par tly or  wholly engaged in business in any other  str eets, P12.00 per  apar tment. Remedi os Sian Villanuev a and Eusebio Villanueva, spouses, ar e the owner s of  four  apar tment houses for  r ent situated in Il oilo City, to which the city sought to collect from the spouses an annual license tax f ee of  P24 for  each of  their  34 apar tments, or  the total sum of  P1,610 allegedly due dur ing the per iod from the four th quar ter  of  1946 to the thir d quar ter  of  1948, plus the sum of  P332 r epr esenting 20% penalty. The spouses having r ef used to pay the same, the City of  Iloilo f iled in the municipal cour t action to r ecover  the tax and penalty. Def endant spouses answer ed the complaint contending that the or dinance under  which the tax is sought to be c ollected infr inges the power s gr anted to the city by its Char ter  and that said or dinance is violative of  the constituti onal provisions r equir ing unifor mity of  taxation upon the theor y that it is oppr essiv e, unr easonable and discr iminator y. Because of  the issue of  constitutionality r aised, the case was elev ated to the Cour t of  Fir st Instance of  Iloilo. The CFI r ender ed judgment upholding the legality of  the or dinance and or der ing def endants to pay the taxes claimed, with inte r est and costs. Def endants appealed from this decision to the Cour t of  Appeals, but this case was elev ated to this Cour t because it involves only questions of  law. Issue: Whether  the Or dinance no. 86 is unconstitutional. Decision: The decision appealed from is r ever sed. The complaint is dismissed. Rationale: It is well-settled that a municipal c or por ation, unlike a sover eign state, is cl othed with no inher ent power  of  taxation. "The char ter  or  statute must plainly show an intent to conf er  that power  or  the municipality cannot assume it. And the power  when gr anted is to be constr ued strictissimi juris . Any doubt or  ambiguity ar ising out of  the ter m used in gr anting that power  must be r esolv ed against the municipality. Inf er ences, implications, deductions ² all these ² ha v e no place in the inter pr etation of  the taxing power  of  a municipal cor por ation." And it not appear ing that the power  to tax owner s of  tenement houses is one among those clear ly and expr essly gr anted to the City of  Iloil o by its Char ter , the exer cise of  such power  cannot be assumed and hence the or dinance in question is ultra vires insof ar  as its taxes a tenement house such as those belonging to def endants.

George L. Borja

Constitutional Law II

Case: HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991 Facts: Petitioner  Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which to conf ir m or  to r atif y the ongoing Bur ial Assistance Progr am Qualif ied benef iciar ies, under  the Bur ial Assistance Progr am, ar e ber eaved f amilies of  Makati whose gross f amily income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a m onth. The benef iciar ies, upon f ulf illment of  other  r equir ements, would r eceiv e the amount of  f ive hundr ed pesos (P500.00) cash r elief  from the Municipality of  Makati. Metro Manila Commissi on approved the r esolution. Ther eaf ter , the municipal secr etar y cer tif ied a disbur sement f ir ed of  four  hundr ed thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for  the implementation of  the Bur ial Assistance Progr am. The r esolution was r ef err ed to r espondent Commission on Audit (COA) for  its expected allowance in audit. Based on its pr eliminar y f indings, r espondent COA disapproved the r esolution and disallowed in audit the disbur sement of  f inds for  the implementation ther eof. Petiti oner , through its Mayor , was constr ained to f ile this special civil acti on of  cer tior ar i p r aying that COA Decisi on be set aside as null and void. Issue: Whether  or  not Resolution No. 60, of  the Municipality of  Makati is a valid exer cise of  police power  under  the gener al welf ar e clause. Decision: Petiti on is her eby GRANTED and the C ommissi on on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is her eby SET ASIDE. Rationale: COA is not attuned to the changing of  the times. Public pur pose is not unconstitutional mer ely because it incidentally benef its a limited number  of  per sons. As c orr ectly pointed out by the Off ice of  the Solicitor  Gener al, "the dr if t is towar ds social welf ar e legislation gear ed towar ds state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of  the gener al welf ar e , social justice, as well as human dignity and r espect for  human r ights. The car e for  the poor  is gener ally r ecognized as a public duty. The suppor t for  the poor  has long been an accepted exer cise of  police power  in the promotion of  the common good. Ther e is no v iolati on of  the equal protection clause in classif ying pauper s as subject of  legislation. Pauper s may be r easonably classif ied. Diff er ent groups may r eceive var ying tr eatment. Pr ecious t o the hear ts of  our  legislator s, down t o our  local councilor s, is the wel f ar e of  the pauper s. Thus, statutes hav e been passed giving r ights and benef its to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-f ar mer  from the bondage of  the soil, housing the ur ban poor , etc. Resolution No. 60, r e-enacted under  Resoluti on No. 243, of  the Municipality of  Makati is a par agon of  the continuing progr am of  our  gover nment towar ds social justice. The Bur ial Assistance Progr am is a r elief  of  pauper ism, though not c omplete. The loss of  a member  of  a f amily is a painf ul exper ience, and it is m or e painf ul for  the poor  to be f inancially bur dened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivif ies the v er y wor ds of  the late Pr esident Ramon Magsaysay 'those who hav e less in lif e, should hav e mor e in law." This decision, howev er  must not be taken as a pr ecedent, or  as an off icial go-signal for  municipal gover nments to embar k on a philanthropic or gy of  inor dinate dole-outs for  motives political or other wise.

Geor ge L. Bor   

ja

onstitutional Law II

Case: HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and VICENTE A. RUFINO, VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-23979

August 30, 1968

Facts: This is an acti on, against the Municipal Boar d and the Mayor  of  the City of  Manila, for  a declar ator y r elief. It was brought by the Homeowner s' Association of  the Philippines, Inc. and its Pr esident, Vicente A. Ruf ino, t o nullif y Municipal Or dinance No. 4841 of  the City of  Manila, approved on December  31, 1963, to take eff ect on Januar y 1, 1964. Which is an or dinance r egulating r entals of  lots and building for  r esidential pur poses. Af ter  appropr iate proceedings, the Cour t of  Fir st Instance of  Manila r ender ed judgment declar ing said or dinance "ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio without pronouncement as to costs. The lower  cour t st r uck down the questioned or dinance upon the ground that the power  to "declar e a state of  emer gency ... exclusively per tains to Congr ess"; that "ther e is no longer  any state of  emer gency" which may justif y the r egulation of  house r entals; that said or dinance disconstitutes an unr easonable and unjustif ied limitation on the use of  pr ivate proper ties and ar bitr ar ily encroaches on the constitutional r ights of  proper ty owner s"; that the power  of  the City of  Manila to "r egulate the business of  ... letting or  subletting of  lands and buildings" does n ot include the author ity to prohibit what is for bidden in said or dinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the gener al welf ar e clause in the City Cha r ter. Hence, this appeal by the Mayor  of  Manila Said O r dinance. Issue: Whether  or  not or dinance 4841 is unconstitutional Decision: the decision appealed from should be as it is her eby aff ir med, with costs against the appellant. Rationale: The pr actical r eason for  the r equir ement that a statute passed t o meet a giv en emer gency, should limit the pe r iod of  its eff ectivity, is that, other wise, a new and di ff er ent law would be necessar y t o r epeal it, and said per iod would, accor dingly, be "unlimited, indef inite, negative and uncer tain", so that 9 "that which was intended to meet a tempor ar y emer gency may become a per manent law", because "Congr ess might not enact the r epeal, and, ev en if  it would, the r epeal might not meet with the app roval of  the Pr esident, and the Congr ess might not be able t o overr ide the v eto". In line with the basic phil osophy under lying the author ity to aff ect individual r ights, this Cour t f elt that Commonwealth Act No. 671, other wise known as the Emer gency Power s Act, was meant t o be and "became inoper ative when Congr ess met in r egular  session on May 25, 1946," and that Executive Or der s Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 ² p romulgated subsequently ther eto ² "wer e issued without author ity of  law", because, other wise, said emer gency r egulations would pur por t to be in for ce for  an indefinite and unlimited period of time, and, hence, would be unconstitutional . The same consider ations impelled the Cour t to invalidate Executive O r der  Nos. 545 and 546, issued on November  10, 1952. Indeed, other wise "the r esult would be obvious unconstitutionality", by making  permanent a law intended to affor d a r elief  for  a temporary emer gency, the length of which should be "fixed in the law itself  and not dependent upon the ar bitr ar y or  elastic will of  either  Congr ess or  the Pr esident". We hav e not over looked the f act that the cases adv er ted to r ef er  par ticular ly to the constituti onal provision author izing Congr ess, "in times of  war  or  other  national emer gency", to delegate to the Pr esident, "for  a limited per iod", and subject to specif ied "r estr ictions", the power  "to promulgate r ules and r egulations t o carr y out a declar ed national policy". We ar e inclined to believ e, howev er , that in p roviding that the lif etime of  the author ity given must be "for  a limited per iod", the fr amer s of  our  Char ter  wer e inf luenced by the f act that power s wer e being delegated to the Executive, as much as by the ci r cumstance that, since the cause for  the gr ant of  power  was tempor ar y, so should the gr ant be, for  the eff ect cannot r emain in existence upon the r emoval of  its cause. In f act, Congr ess has, in actual pr actice, accepted this limitati on upon its exer cise of  police power  to meet a condition of  emer gency. Thus, Commonwealth Act No. 499 r egulated the tr ansf er  of  vessels and of  shipping f acilities, eff ectiv e until adjour nment of  the next r egular  session of  the National Assembly. This was followed by Commonwealth Act No. 689 which penalized speculation on r ents of  buildings destined for  dwelling pur poses, but only "for  a per iod of  two (2) year s af ter  its approv al." This Act was amended by Republic Act No. 66 which, inter alia, extended its per iod of  eff ectivity to "four  (4) year s af ter  it approval." Needless to say, the power s of  municipal cor por ations delegated ther eto by the National Gover nment cannot escape the inher ent limitati ons t o which the latter  ² as the sour ce of  said power s ² is subject. Then, again, since our  law on municipal cor por ations is, in pr inciple, patter ned af ter  that of  the United States, the r ule ther ein, to the eff ect that "in a proper  case, emer gency legislation, limited in time, may be enacted under  the police power " of  a municipal cor por ation, should be consider ed a par t of  our  legal system .