Consolidated Ver. of Case Digests-1

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CASTILLON, Annette Charmaine DOMALANTA, Evan Marish ESTUDILLO, Sophia Alessandra RILLERA, Ma. Ruby SANCHEZ, Precious Loren

TABLE OF CONTENTS CASTILLON Advance Decisions: Heirs Of Dr. Favis, Jr. Vs. Gonzales…..……………………….…….…………..……...…1 Alabang Development Corporation Vs. Alabang Hills Village Association………….…………….…...………3 Castro Vs. Gregorio.…………………………………….…………………………….………………………….4 Bartolome Vs. Social Security System………………………………………………..………………………….7 Valerio Kalaw Vs. Elena Fernandez……………………………………………………………………………..9 Abbas Vs. Abbas…………………..…………………………………………………………………………....11 DOMALANTA Republic v Encelan…………………………………………..……………………...………………………..…13 Grande v Antonio…………………………………………….…………………………………………………13 Republic v Albios……………………………..………………………………………………………...………14 Ando v Department of Foreign Affairs…………………………………………………………………..……..15 Salas,Jr. v Aguila………………………………………………………………………………………………..15

ESTUDILLO Macua Vda. De Avenido vs. Avenido..……………………………………………………………………..…..17 Salas vs. Matusalem……………………………………………..……………………………………………...17 Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen……………………………………………………………………………..………..19 Tupal vs. Rojo………………………………….……………………………………………………………….20 Ventura Jr. vs. Abuda ………………………….……………………………………………………………….21 Valino vs. Adriano…..………………………….……………………………………………………………….22

RILLERA Francisco Lim Vs Equitable PCI Bank……………………………………………………………………..…..23 Susan Lim-Lua V. Danilo Y. Lua………………………………………….…………………………………...24 Lavadia Vs. Heirs Of Juan Luces Luna………………………………………………………………..………..25 Advance Decisions: Republic Of The Philippines Vs. De Gracia……..……………………………………….27 Ining v Vega………...………………………….……………………………………………………………….28 Tan Vs. Andrade...………………………….……………………….…………………………………………..30

SANCHEZ Go Bangayan vs Bangayan Jr………..……………………………………………………………………...…..31 Santos vs Santos………………...………………………………………….…………………………………...32 Republic VS Cantor………………….………………………………………………………………..………...33 Advance Decisions: Republic Of The Philippines Vs. De Gracia……..……………………………………….34

CASTILLON _____________________________________________________________________________________________ HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., REPRESENTED BY THEIR CO–HEIRS AND ATTORNEYS–IN– FACT MERCEDES A. FAVIS AND NELLY FAVIS–VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA GONZALES, HER SON MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, ALL MINORS REPRESENTED HEREIN BY THEIR PARENTS, SPS. MARIANO FAVIS AND LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents. G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014 This case speaks of the feud over the intestate left by the head of the family. Article 151 of the Family Code was cited in this case for it prohibits filing of suits between family members subject to exclusive exceptions which is not seen in this case, then why such case is being filed? Were earnest efforts are not done to compromise things up? Who will get which? Who will prosper-- the children of the first wife or the second wife, her children and grandchildren?

FACTS: 

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina). They begot seven children.



When Capitolina died, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzalez (Juana), as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When he married Juana, he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children.



Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.



Claiming that the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.

RTC: Nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Hence, the trial court nullified the deed by reason of vitiated consent. CA: The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court. The appellate court justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of the trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.

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HELD: 

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.



The appellate court’s decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, Art.151.No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. 

The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.



It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corporation where we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.



A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.



In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.



Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.



The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

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ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION , ASSOCIATION AND RAFAEL TINIO, Respondents. G.R. No. 187456, June 02, 2014

Petitioner,

v.

ALABANG

HILLS

VILLAGE

This case speaks of legal capacity. What does it take to sue someone? How can you say that a corporation has a legal standing or capacity to sue another? If a corporation had already been dissolved, doesn’t he still have such capacity? FACTS: 

Alabang Development Corporation (ADC) filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with the RTC of Muntinlupa City on October 19, 2006 against Alabang Hills Village Association, Inc. (AHVAI) and Rafael Tinio (Tinio), President of AHVAI.



The complaint alleged that ADC is the developer of Alabang Hills Village and still owns certain parcels of land therein that are yet to be sold, as well as those considered open spaces that have not yet been donated to the local government of Muntinlupa City or the Homeowner's Association.



On September 2006, ADC learned that AHVAI started the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still owned by ADC without the latter's consent and approval, and that despite demand, AHVAI failed to desist from constructing the said improvements. ADC thus prayed that an injunction be issued enjoining defendants from constructing the multi-purpose hall and the swimming pool at the Alabang Hills Village.



AHVAI on its answer, denied ADC's asseverations and claimed that the latter has no legal capacity to sue since its existence as a registered corporate entity was revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003; that ADC has no cause of action because by law it is no longer the absolute owner but is merely holding the property in question in trust for the benefit of AHVAI as beneficial owner thereof; and that the subject lot is part of the open space required by law to be provided in the subdivision. They also demanded that the property be transferred under their name.

RTC: Dismissed herein petitioner's complaint on the grounds (1) that the latter has no personality to file the same; (2) that the subject property “is a reserved area for the beneficial use of the homeowners, as mandated by law;” and (3) that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the RTC, has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and respondents.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC. With respect to petitioner, the CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint as the same was filed when petitioner was already defunct and, as such, it no longer had capacity to file the said complaint. As regards, respondent AHVAI’s counterclaim, the CA held that “where there is no claim against the respondent, because petitioner is already inexistent and has no capacity to sue, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the respondent.”

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the petitioner corporation lacks capacity to sue.

HELD:

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

The Court does not agree that the CA erred in relying on the case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. The CA cited the case for the purpose of restating and distinguishing the jurisprudential definition of the terms “lack of capacity to sue” and “lack of personality to sue;” and of applying these definitions to the present case. Thus, the fact that, unlike in the instant case, the corporations involved in the Columbia case were foreign corporations is of no moment.



The definition of the term “lack of capacity to sue” enunciated in the said case still applies to the case at bar. Indeed, as held by this Court and as correctly cited by the CA in the case of Columbia: “lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims ; 'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. ...” In the instant case, petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer possesses juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse of the three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code.



The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is that the trustee of a corporation may continue to prosecute a case commenced by the corporation within three years from its dissolution until rendition of the final judgment, even if such judgment is rendered beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to initiate a suit after the lapse of the said three-year period.



In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate existence was terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a corporation. To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation Code. As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the instant case is petitioner's capacity to sue as a corporation and it has already been settled that petitioner indeed lacks such capacity. Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary to delve on the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864, sustaining the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-138, is AFFIRMED.

CASE DOCTRINE: IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CHECK THE STATUS/CAPACITY OF A PERSON---- IN TRIAL, THIS MIGHT BE USE AS A STRONG ARGUMENT IN DISCREDITTING THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE OTHER PARTY. AS DISCUSSED IN THIS CASE, THERE WILL BE NO CASE IF A PERSON HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE HENCE IMPENDING DISMISSAL. ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents. G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014 What will happen if there will be no strict enforcement of the law?

FACTS: 

Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose) and Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) were married unfortunately, their marriage had allegedly been troubled, they begot a child Rose Marie, born on 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of

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the incompatibilities between them. Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation." 

On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. During this time Jose was already 70 years old.



Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro. He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte, according to the Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court. The report also mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989. Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare officer noted: Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .



At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.



On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, having ruled that "no opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.” A certificate of finality was issued on February 9, 2006.



Rosario filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent. She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.



Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined. He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. He then implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and equity."



On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.



On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption. In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually

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Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. 

The CA denied their petition. Yes, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the hearing." The appellate court "abhorred the mind baffling scheme employed by Jose in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of his illegitimate children to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs" but stated that its hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained "finality and immutability."



The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the adoption is Null and Void pursuant to the requirements laid down by the law.

HELD: 

The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.



Petitioners are correct in arguing that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings. It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock: ARTICLE III ELIGIBILITY SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt: Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) (ii) (iii)

if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto; or if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)



The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.



The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

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

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.



The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552: SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)



The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.



It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.



To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid. For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.

CASE DOCTRINE: THE RULES ON ADOPTION MUST BE STRICTLY FOLLOWED FOR IT CAN ENDANGER THE HARMONY IN THE FAMILY WHICH THE LAW NOT JUST PROTECTS BUT ALSO PRESERVES. VIOLATORS ARE WILL BE PUNISHED ACCORDINGLY.

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014 What rights do you still have for claiming the death benefits of the child whom you gave up for adoption? FACTS: 

Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, over the death of her son John Colcol (John), who she gave up for adoption, and alleged that she was the sole remaining beneficiary.

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

Previously, John was employed as electrician by Defendant Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. He was covered by the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an accident on board the vessel wherein steel plates fell on him resulting in his death.



When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it stating that she was no longer the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner herself. On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling through a decision dated 17 March 17 2010 citing Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner can claim.

HELD: 

Petitioner was entitled to receive the claim for death benefits. “Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.



The ECC Rule limiting death benefit claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. “Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended…” Hence, it was held that “Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase ‘dependent parents’ to refer to ‘legitimate parents.'”



As the law does not define “dependent parents”, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope. Thus, “the term ‘parents’ in the phrase ‘dependent parents’ in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to ‘legitimate parents’ as what the ECC did. The phrase ‘dependent parents’ should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, ‘dependent parents’ are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.



“Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase ‘dependent parents’ to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that ‘in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries.’ Had the lawmakers contemplated ‘dependent parents’ to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not ‘legitimate descendants.’ The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase ‘dependent parents’ was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.”



The law is clear that “the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.”



As a result, it was held that “Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.”

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

“Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the ‘Social Security Law.’ While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.”



In sum, “the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome. CASE DOCTRINE: WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, ONE MUST NOT DISTINGUISH. APPLY THE LAW PLAINLY AS IT IS.

VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent. G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015 This case is quite intriguing for it was tried in the Supreme Court twice. Is the Court now really not that strict when granting Nullification of marriages? What about the Molina Doctrine, or the preservation of the family? Does this move reflect that divorce in the Philippines is fast approaching? FACTS: 

This cased was already been decided on September 19, 2011 however recently or on January 14, 2015, four years after the Court decided that the marriage was not void, they overturned the said decision and in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines (Molina Guidelines) with regard to this case.



In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.



However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity and basing on the events where they both alleged that there is infidelity on both sides, there can be a ground for legal separation but not for nullifying their marriage.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

9|Page

HELD: 

The marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.



The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.



In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.



We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.



There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”



Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.



Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.



The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.



The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case

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records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises. 

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”



The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.



The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.



The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent. G.R. No. 183896. January 13, 2013 This case speaks of the strict compliance with the law. Who will govern, one who is criminally charged or the one who filed the criminal charged? This case reiterated the need to strictly follow the rules laid down by the law. 

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani national whom Gloria met in Taiwan, was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines. He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.



Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura while the former is still validly married to Gloria Goo.



To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.



To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas. She also said that they had been married in Taiwan and it was Chinese people who

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conducted the ceremony however she is not sure if the marriage conducted there was valid. Hence the need for another ceremony here in the Philippines. 

Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else. RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. CA: Reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas---for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality. ISSUE:



Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio. HELD:



Their marriage was void ab initio. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.



The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.



The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.



The fact that the nullification was just demanded in order to avoid the criminal charge does not cure the fact that a formal requisite for marriage was in the first place is absent.



Exclusive exceptions to this requirement were laid down by the law however their case is not included, hence the need for a valid marriage license in order for it to be valid. Wherefore, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 030382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. CASE DOCTRINE: THE LAW IS CLEAR, A REQUIREMENT IS A REQUIREMENT; IF YOU ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE EXCEPTIONS THEN YOU ARE NOT INCLUDED. PROPER COMPLIANCE IS ALWAYS NEEDED IN ORDER TO AVOID SUCH INCONVINIENCES

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DOMALANTA

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN 688 SCRA 215, January 9, 2013 FACTS: 

To support his family, respondent Cesar Encelan (Encelan) went to work in Saudi Arabia. During his stay there, he learned that his wife was having an illicit affair and that she abandoned the conjugal dwelling bringing their children with her. Thus, Encelan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity.



Encelan presented a psychological evaluation report with the findings that although his wife is not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness, she was reluctant in fulfilling her marital obligations as manifested by his wife's transfering from one job to another, her problems with her co-workers and her impatience in attaining her ambition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the infidelity of respondent's wife, her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and her reluctance in fulfilling her marital obligations constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD: 

No.



Infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling are grounds for Legal Separation. In order for them to constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that they were caused by a disordered personality.



The wife's reluctance to perform her marital obligations should not be equated with her obligations and responsibilities in the workplace as they are different from each other.



In this case, the psychological evaluation report presented, showed that the wife is not suffering from any major psychiatric illness.

CASE DOCTRINE: To prove the existence of a spouse's psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the reason he or she was completely prevented from performing his or her marital obligations is because of a disordered personality.

GRANDE vs. ANTONIO 716 SCRA 699, February 18, 2014

FACTS: 

Out of the illicit relationship between petitioner and respondent, two children were born, but they were not expressly recognized by respondent in the Record of Births in the Civil Registry.

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

When petitioner and respondent's relationship did not work out, petitioner left for the United States together with the children.



One of respondent's petitions before the Regional Trial Court is for the Correction or Change of surname of his illegitimate children from their mother's surname (Grande) to his surname, Antonio.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not respondent can compel his illegitimate children to change and use his surname?

HELD: 

No.



According to Art. 176 of the Family Code, the illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. They may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly acknowledged.



The Court said that word 'may' in Art. 176 operates as a right granted to the illegitimate children whether or not they would like to use the surname of their father. This means that, the mother or the father is not the one granted the right to choose what surname the children should choose to use.

CASE DOCTRINE: Illegitimate children, generally, shall use the surname of their mother. Except, when their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father, they may choose to use his surname.

REPUBLIC vs. ALBIOS 707 SCRA 585, October 16, 2013 FACTS: 

Respondent Liberty Albios (Albios), a Filipino citizen, married Fringer, an American citizen in order to acquire an American Citizenship and for which she agreed to pay $2000. After the ceremony, Fringer left for the United States and Albios never had communications with him since then.



Therefore, Albios petitioned for a declarion of nullity of her marriage with Fringer as their marriage was one made in jest because they never intended to really marry each other and be bound by the consequences of marriage.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not respondent's marriage is a marriage in jest?

HELD: 

No.



Marriages in jest are void ab initio because of the absence of consent.



According to Art. 2 of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer. The consent must be real meaning it is not obtained under any of the instances in Articles 45-46 (fraud, force, intimidation and undue influence) and the consent was a

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conscious or intelligent one, therefore the parties must understand the nature and the consequences of their act. 

In this case, the parties gave their consent freely. Their consent was real because the consent was not obtained through fraud, force, intimidation or undue influence. Consent was also a conscious or intelligent one, because Albios wants to acquire an American Citizenship and Fringer wants the $2000 which Albios agreed to pay, in order for them to get what they want they have to marry each other and marriage requires genuine consent.



Therefore, the marriage cannot be declared void because consent is present.

CASE DOCTRINE: A marriage is not considered to be one made in jest when the essential requisites of marriage are present, especially consent freely given.

ANDO vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 723 SCRA 691, August 27, 2014

FACTS: 

Petitioner Edelina Ando (Ando) was married to a Japanese National, but her husband sought and was granted a divorce under Japanese laws. A Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila.



Petitioner got married again believing that the said Divorce Certificate capacitated her to marry. When she applied for a renewal of her Philippine passport to change her surname to that of her present husband's surname, she was told by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) that she has to prove by competent court decision that her marriage to her present husband is valid.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not her second marriage is valid?

HELD: 

No.



The validity of the divorce has to be proven and to prove this, petitioner should submit evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse.

CASE DOCTRINE: To determinde the validity of the divorce obtained by an alien spouse, the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be presented.

SALAS JR. vs. AGUILA 706 SCRA 255, September 23, 2013 FACTS: 

Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were married, but

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Salas left the conjugal dwelling and no longer communicated with his wife or their child. As a result, Aguila petitioned for a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with psychological incapacity as the ground. 

She stated in the petition that they have no conjugal properties. 

Their marriage was declared null and the dissolution of their conjugal properties, if any, was ordered. Aguila filed a Manifestation stating that she discovered properties and that the registered owner is Salas.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the discovered properties be partitioned on the basis of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains?

HELD: 

No.



The discovered properties shall be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.



Under Art. 147 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, the property which they have acquired during the marriage shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. It is presumed that the property was acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.



In this case, the marriage was declared void because of psychological incapacity and the rules on coownership governs the discovered properties as Salas failed to rebut the presumption that such properties were acquired through their joint efforts , work or industry.

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ESTUDILLO

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. AVENIDO 714 SCRA 447, January 22, 2014 FACTS: 

Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio. Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized in Bohol by the Parish Priest. According to her, their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3 was issued by the LCR.



During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children.



Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous.



On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.



Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla and Eustaquio.

HELD: 

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

SALAS vs. MATUSALEM 705 SCRA 560, 2013 FACTS: 

Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Salas (petitioner).



Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an

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apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child. Thus, this case. ISSUE: 

Whether or not the respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son is the illegitimate child of petitioner.

HELD: 

Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.



Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.



We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.



As to the Baptismal Certificate also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.



The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.



Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.Exhibits “E” and “F” showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account 33 (Exhibit “C”) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that

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petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity. 

As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN 702 SCRA 707, July 31, 2013 FACTS: 

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo.



Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.



Elise, his daughter, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration.



Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.



Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).



To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.



Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.



Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE:  

Whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous. Whether or not elise may impugn such marriage even after the death of her father.

HELD: 

Void. YES.



It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

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

Elise, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.



The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein.

TUPAL vs. ROJO February 24, 2014

FACTS: 

Rex M. Tupal filed a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.



Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not judge rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: 

Yes. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.



A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.



If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides: Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

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VENTURA JR. vs. ABUDA 708 SCRA 640, October 23, 2013

FACTS: 

Socorro and Esteban were married and never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto, the petitioner in this case.



Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin when she married Esteban.



Esteban purchased a portion of a lot, called Vitas Property. The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf. The Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."



Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments called Delpan property.



Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda.



Esteban and Socorro passed away.



Leonora the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged.



Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not socorro’s heir can claim over the property?

HELD: 

No. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.



It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.



This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision: Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence

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of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

VALINO vs. ADRIANO 723 SCRA 1, April 22, 2014 FACTS: 

Atty. Adriano and respondent Rosario were married. Their marriage turned sour. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children. Atty. Rosario died. At that time, Rosario was in the US with her children. Valino shouldered the funeral and burial expenses. Rosario learned the death of her husband. She immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for few days but her request was not heeded. The remains were interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino. Respondents were not able to attend the internment.



Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified.



Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than 20 years before he courted her. And he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. According to Valino, it was his last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Valino has better right over the body?

HELD: 

No. It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.



Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus: Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

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(1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. 

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified: (a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses.

RILLERA _____________________________________________________________________________________________

FRANCISCO LIM vs EQUITABLE PCI BANK 713 SCRA 555, January 15, 2014 FACTS: 

Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.



Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.



The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.



The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.

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

Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.

HELD: 

NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.



NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.



All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows: "Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."



The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one spouse]. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

CASE DOCTRINE: Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. [T]his presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

SUSAN LIM-LUA, petitioner v. DANILO Y. LUA, respondent 697 SCRA 237, June 5, 2013 FACTS: 

On September 3, 2003, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with herein respondent to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendent lite for herself and two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing huge respondent’s earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited article 203 of the family code, stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendent lite of P250,000.00

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x7 corresponding to the 7 months that lapsed. Respondent file a motion for reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. 

As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendent lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The respondent motion for reconsideration was denied. Respondent applied for second motion for reconsideration and having been denied for the second time respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals. Court of Appeals nullified the RTC ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. the appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by the respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses and the credit card purchases including groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother as well, and thus the amount of P3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It is also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in deducting the said amount from the current total support in arrears.

HELD: 

The supreme court declared that the petition is partly granted. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other and shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support in accordance with article 194 of the family code of the Philippines, comprises everything indispensable for the sustenance of the dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued instalments became judgment in favour, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by the respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendent lite. The amounts already extended to the 2 children, being commendable act of the petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources of his disposal.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, respondents.

 G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014 FACTS: 

Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement” whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.



In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the

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condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names of the owners, with Atty. Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. DelaCruz. 

Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.



The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage. In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.



In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.



The Supreme Court said that the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void: “From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.”



No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement: “Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit: Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.”



Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, their property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership: “In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

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Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. 

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on coownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz: Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)



In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals: In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.”



Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject of the case, the subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.



Therefore Petition denied.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, respondent. 716 SCRA 8, February 12, 2014

FACTS:  In 1969, Rodolfo De Gracia and Natividad Rosalem married each other. Their first child was born in the same year. In 1972, they begot a second child. However, after giving birth, Natividad left their conjugal home, even selling said house, and then had an affair with an engineer. She bore a child with the said engineer. In 1991, she left the engineer and cohabited with another man. 

In 1998, Rodolfo filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Natividad is psychologically incapacitated. Rodolfo engaged the services of Dr. Cheryl Zalsos to evaluate both parties. In court, Zalsos testified that both parties are psychologically incapacitated; that Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman; that Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters; that both suffered from “utter

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emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct”; that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. 

The RTC gave weight to Zalsos testimony hence the marriage was declared void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not psychological incapacity was proven in this case.

HELD: 

No. The evidence presented failed to support a finding of psychological incapacity. The psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.



The Supreme Court also ruled: Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.

Ining v Vega GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013 FACTS: 

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased. Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents. Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.



In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.



ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS: 1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate; 2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and 3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

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

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC 1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining 2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. 3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse possession). (2) CA: 1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining; 2. Trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. 3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his coownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,” ISSUES: I THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979. II THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. HELD: 

No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons: 1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate. 2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria. 3. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. 4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141. Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely

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Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the coownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs. 

OTHER NOTES: 1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co- owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co- heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee. 2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance. 3. “A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other coowners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.” 4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by

affinity. Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

TAN, petitioner, vs. ANDRADE, respondent G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013 FACTS: 

Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20 situated in Cebu City (subject properties) which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu (Simon). When the redemption period was about toexpire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subjectproperties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr.(Proceso, Jr.), for P100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 29, 1983 (subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment, cedingunto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration of P50,000.00.



The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When

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Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefore were issued in his name. Fourteen years later, Rosario’s children (petitioners in Gr. No. 172017) filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC. In their complaint, one of the arguments they maintain is that, since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name. The RTC ruled that the subject transaction was an equitable mortgage, that the subject properties were exclusive properties of Rosario, and that the action has already prescribed. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling except that it reversed its finding as to the nature of the properties. The CA held that the properties were conjugal. ISSUE: 

Whether the nature of the subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario there by allowing her to dispose of the same without any inhibitions or whether they pertain to the conjugal properties of Rosario and her deceased husband thereby entitling the children to retain their ownership therewith.

HELD: 

The subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario. In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the covertures of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same.



Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario. Rationale: Article 160 of the Civil Code states that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane: As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

SANCHEZ

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Go Bangayan vs Bangayan Jr. 700 SCRA 702, July 03, 2013

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FACTS: 

Benjamin was married with Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan. When Azucena left for the United States of America, --- Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.



Sally & Benjamin = signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally left for Canada. She then filed --criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin who in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not marriage between Sally & Benjamin is valid.

HELD: 

Affirmed the decision of the lower courts which ruled in favor of Benjamin.



The marriage between Sally & Benjamin is void because of lack of marriage license as this was testified by officers of local civil registrar hence their marriage is void from the beginning under Art. 35 of the Family Code.



The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.



The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous as under the law – it is required that the 2 marriages shall not be null & void. In this case, the marriage of Sally & Benjamin is void for lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.



For their Prop. Relations: Benjamin and Sally cohabited w/o benefit of marriage. Thus only the properties acquired by them through joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, pursuant to Art. 148 of the Family code.

Santos vs Santos 737 SCRA 637, October 8, 2014 FACTS: 

The RTC of Tarlac City -- declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo alleged that Celerina went to Hong Kong to work there. When Celerina left, he never heard anything from her again. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina: He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. When he petitioned to the RTC of Tarlac it was almost 12 years since Celerina left so he believed that she had passed away. On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived of her day in court because Ricardo misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City, despite his knowledge of her true residence in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City which was their conjugal dwelling since 1989.

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ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

HELD: 

Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment is valid as the family code does not preclude a spouse from availing other remedies existing in law not only the filing of affidavit of reappearance under Art. 42 of the Family Code.



Since Celerina is not merely seeking the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects (like the children of the subsequent marriage shall be considered legitimate & the property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same in valid marriages), Celerina’s petition is the best remedy as reappearance will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify its effects.

REPUBLIC vs CANTOR 712 SCRA 1, December 10, 2013 FACTS: 

Maria Cantor & Jerry = were married. They lived in their conjugal dwelling in South Cotabato. One day, they had a violent quarrel because respondent was not able to reach sexual climax during their intimate moments & Jerry's expression of animosity toward respondent's father. After the quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and the respondent has never seen nor communicated or heard anything from him. More than 4 years from Jerry's disappearance, respondent filed a petition for Jerry's declaration of presumptive death, arguing that she believes Jerry was already dead because she inquired from Jerry's relatives regarding his whereabouts, and whenever she goes to a hospital, she looks through the patient's directory to find Jerry, but to no avail.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

HELD: 

The efforts made by respondent which were: Inquiring from Jerry's relatives regarding his whereabouts; and Whenever she goes to a hospital, she looks through the patient's directory to find Jerry - do not constitute the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence pursuant to the strict standard prescribed under Art. 41 of the Family Code.



First, regarding the hospital visits, she did not purposely undertake a diligent search because her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for Jerry. The Court considers such act insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.



Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to police nor did she seek aid of authorities.



Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives from whom she inquired the whereabouts of Jerry.



Lastly, she did not present other evidence to support her claim that she conducted a diligent search.

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

The court said, "well-founded belief" under Art. 41 of the Family Code, requires an exertion of active efforts. But in this case, the Court is of the view that the respon. Merely engaged in passive search where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends.



Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court's declaration that Jerry Cantor is presumptively dead, is Reversed and Set Aside.

RP VS DE GRACIA February 12, 2014 FACTS: 

Rodolfo and Natividad were married & have 2 children. Later on, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Natividad and Rodolfo underwent psychiatric examination. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity” [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct." The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad is void on the ground of psychological incapacity?

HELD: 

There is no factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.



The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.As to the Court --- the findings of Dr. Zalsos remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving.



The Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).



Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.



In this case, it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state - thus dismissed.

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