Consolidated Cases in Criminal Procedure

RULE 110 TOPIC: JURISDICTION UY v. CA 276 SCRA 374 BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS: Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of one Consolacion Leong. While helping her husband manage their lumber business Rosa and Consolacion agreed to form a partnership. Various sums were claimed to have been given by Consolacion as capital of the lumber business of Rosa, but no receipt was ever issued. The friendship of the two turned sour, thus, Consolacion demanded the return of her money but the checks issued by Rosa were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Consolacion filed a complaint for Estafa and for violation of BP 22. The Manila RTC acquitted the petitioner of Estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP 22. Petitioner contends that Manila RTC never acquired jurisdiction over offenses under BP 22 and assuming arguendo that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal, she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violation of the Bouncing checks law. RULING:

The crimes of Estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. The respondent court is wrong to conclude that inasmuch as the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violation of BP 22. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila court to acquire jurisdiction. BP 22 on the other hand, as a continuing offense, may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committee. Petitioner also timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court. As provided by jurisprudence, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over a subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed

RULE 110 decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted. CRUZ v. CA 388 SCRA 79 Carpio, J.; TOPIC: JURISDICTION FACTS: Lutgarda Cruzexecuted before a Notary Public the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, on the same decision, the trial court rendering decision on the civil aspect of the case, ordered the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan. A Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit. A second move for a reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. CA held that if service is made by the registered mail, proof shall be made by such

affidavit and registry-receipt issued by the mailing office. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the prosecution was duly furnished a copy of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration with respect to the decision on the civil aspect of the case. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the case. RULING: 1. Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on Feb. 10, 1994. SC agrees to the ruling of the CA. An MR filed, thru a registered mail, without proof of service is considered a mere scrap of paper. Hence the period continued to run and lapsed making the trial court’s decision final and executory. Proof of service is mandatory. 2. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules that pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. There are 3 important requisites which must be present in order that a court acquires jurisdiction: first, jurisdiction over the subject matter; second, over

RULE 110 the territory; third, over the person. The trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear cases involving Estafa through falsification of document. The RTC also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, RTC had jurisdiction over the person of the accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority. WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Dela Cruz vs. Moya 160 SCRA 838 CORTES, J.: TOPIC: JURISDICTION FACTS: Rodolfo Dela Cruz is a member of the Armed Forces Intelligence and Operations Section. Armed with a MISSION ORDER, Dela Cruz proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte to investigate reports of illegal cockfighting being conducted. Dela cruz and company caught in flagrante delicto the operators of cockfighting, but the latter refused arrest. The operators, including Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way bak to the OC

headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. On Aug 2, 1979, Dela cruz was charged with homicide in the CFI of Davao. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the criminal case. RULING: SC resolves the issue on the negative. In civil procedure, one of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing must have jurisdiction over of the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction is determined by the statute at force at the time the action was commenced. At that time, General Order 59 was operative giving military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel while in the performance of their official duty. Since Dela cruz was executing a Mission Order, he his deemed performing his official duties. Court records contain a copy of Mission Order, thus, certificate from secretary of DND is unnecessary. CFI was without jurisdiction to try the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp

RULE 110 Crame, Quezon appropriate action.

City,

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GUEVARRA v. ALMODOVAR 169 SCRA 476 PARAS, J.: TOPIC: JURISDITION FACTS: John Philipp Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend, Teodoro Amine, Jr. and other children. They were targetshooting a bottle cap with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collarbone which caused his unfortunate death. After preliminary investigation, Fiscal acquitted petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate event appeared to be an accident. The parents of Teodoro appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered to file a case against petitioner Guevarra for Homicide through reckless imprudence. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an 11 year old could be charged with the crime of homicide thru reckless imrpudence 2. Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that it did not pass thru the barangay lupon. RULING: 1. Intent and discernment are two different concepts. While they are products of mental processes within a person, intent refers to the desire of one’s act while

discernment refers to the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act. Minors 9 years to 15 years are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that they acted with discernment. 2. SC mentioned its ruling on a previous case. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty imposed. In construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty, which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter, shall be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered. As categorically stated in Ebol v. Amin, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let the case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits. No costs. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. MARIANO 71 SCRA 600 MUNOZ PALMA, J.:

RULE 110

TOPIC: JURISDICTION FACTS: Hermogenes Mariano is an appointed Liaison officer by Mayor Constantino Nolasco of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Mariano is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC. Mariano, instead of delivering it to the Office of the Mayor, misappropriated, misapply and converteed the said items for his personal benefit. Hence, the Office of Provinsial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing private reponsdent Mariano of Estafa. Mariano filed a motion to quash thee information. He claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property. The judge of RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisction. It held that it had already taken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter, as such the court has without the jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter. ISSUE: Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods allegedly committed by a civilian. RULING:

Sec. 44 of Judicary Act of 1948 provides that: xxx CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months xxx The offense charged against Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and prision correccional in its maximum period. Thus, Mariano falls under the original jurisdiction of the CFI. In a previous case decided by SC, it ruled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon CFI was the Judiciary Act of 1948. SC also made it clear that Estafa and Malversation are two and separate distinct offenses. Lastly, Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular offense charged against respondent Mariano. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14, 1975, is set aside and respondent Judge is directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. SM649 without further delay. SO ORDERED.

RULE 110

PEOPLE vs. CHUPECO, 10 SCRA 838 TOPIC: JURISDICTION Facts: The accused-appellant, Jose L. Chupeco, was charged in the City of Manila, Philippines, under the information: That the said accused being the owner of, and, having previously on the 24th day of July, 1946, executed a Chattel Mortgage on the properties, sawmill machinery and equipment and transportation units to be used sawmill building, located at Sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataa, in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation with principal office at the City of Manila, Philippines, to secure a loan of P20,000.00, from said Agricultural and Industrial Bank. The accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and incumber, or cause to be pledged and incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term thereof and without the consent of the mortgagee bank, knowingly transfer and remove, or cause to be transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality of Subic, Zambales, also without the written consent of the mortgagee bank, to the damage and prejudice of the said

Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the sum of P15,935.80, Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the aforesaid mortgage. The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction. The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the strength of the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of repledging or remembering the chattels already mortgaged to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank thus leaving in force only the accusation of having transferred the encumbered property from Bataan to Zambales without the consent of the mortgagee. It is argued that since the place where the chattels were, as well as the site to which they were moved, are both outside of Manila, the courts of the latter acquired no jurisdiction to try the case, because the offense was not committed within the Manila territory. Issue: Whether or not the trial court has a jurisdiction over Chupeco’s case Held: No. We find this stand without merit. The original terms of the charge averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of the essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first mortgage) having been alleged, to have taken place in Manila, the court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction

RULE 110 over the offense under the Rules of Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331; Rule 110, section 9). It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense. Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss, and directed that the cue be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so amended as to discard that particular averment. Even if the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the case, the accused cannot be found guilty on the evidence on record of the crime for which he stands indicted. FOR THE FOREGOING REASON, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L. Chupeco. MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs ATTY.GENERAL, 20 Phil 523 TOPIC: JURISDICTION Facts: In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to

Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this action is brought. The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in the office of the registry of property and of the tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac. On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of dismissal. Issue: 1. The question for our consideration and decision is the power and authority of a Court of First Instance of Tarlac to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province. 2. Whether or not Sec. 377[1] of the Code of Civil Procedure and

RULE 110 Act. No. 1258 are applicable and therefore the CFI has no jurisdiction. Held: 1. Yes, CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another province. Sections 55 and 56[1] of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate in the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned. Furthermore, in terms of jurisdiction over person of the plaintiff, the procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that

the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached. 2. No. Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The prohibition provided therein is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with it either. The prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live.

RULE 110 Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it. The judgment must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law. FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE, 474 SCRA 580 TOPIC: JURISDICTION

Facts: A petition for certiorari finding the accused-appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime of estafa. In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows: That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount of P424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for

RULE 110 his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount of P424,000.00. Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.[27] Trial ensued. In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed. Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Makati have jurisdiction over the case of Fukuzume. Held: No. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house.

It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or crossexamination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals we held in the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. People that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.

RULE 110 Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary

to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati PEOPLE vs. MAGALLANES, 249 SCRA 212 TOPIC: JURISDICTION Facts: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abeto’s cooperation, induced other police officers and civilian agents to abduct kidnap and detain Rufino Garagar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accuse secretly buried the victims in a make shifts shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each. The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged one eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused,

RULE 110 but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the motions for inhibition of Judge Gravilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the transmittal of the records to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then reraffled to Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over this case. Held: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by law in force

at the time of the commencement of the action. When the informations in the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D.1861, which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1.) violations of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2.) offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional for imprisonment of six (6) years or affine of P6,000, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of “taking advantage of his position” are not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of the “offenses committed in relation to public office.” It’s considered merely an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position

RULE 110 classified as Grade “27” or higher. Accused Torres, who is the highest in rank among the accused only has a rank classified Grade “18”. Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the subsequent enactment R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade “27” or higher, because the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A.7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED. BUAYA vs. POLO, 169 SCRA 471 Facts: TOPIC: JURISDICTION Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buaya’s account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by respondent Judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise

denied. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya. Held: The allegation in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. 14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit. Clearly, RTC Manila has no jurisdiction since the respondent’s principal place of business in Manila and Buaya’s failure to remit the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in Manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. Petition is DISMISSED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner, vs. HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON

RULE 110 ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents Facts: That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter. On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn

statement which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime. Her version of the facts is as follows: "At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park. At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked,

RULE 110 placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and "seemed to be pumping." After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands. Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled against her malefactors. After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind. When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil

then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone." Upon the other hand, accused proffered alibi.

all

the

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. Through a sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansang's promise to give him P500.00. DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. While the others are acquitted and Locil is discharged as state witness. Automatic review by SC. ISSUES: (1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state

RULE 110 witness is in accordance with law; and (2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt (3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence? HELD: The accused were acquitted. (1) NO. Requisites: 1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness; - YES 2. his testimony necessary; - YES

is

absolutely

Based on Locil's sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. 3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony; YES

Locil's account for they relate --not to the crime itself but to events THEREAFTER. An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes of Locil's testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on review. b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre. 5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES

4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; - NO

6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. - -YES

a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil's testimony. The declarations of other witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of

But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade

RULE 110 being traced by her mother and aunt? (2) NO, see items 1 and 2. In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecution's case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi, the prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants' presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted. (3) NO. From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora (Sunga's counse during custodial investigation) did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an

independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible. The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. RATIO: (1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate of the accused. (2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a selfconfessed accomplice or coconspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points

RULE 110 by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecution's other evidence? - NO b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil's trustworthiness becomes manifest? - NO In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [This was not present in this case] NOTES: (1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. . JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.

FACTS: Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. The latter is the son of respondent SPO2 Maderal was arrested and executed a sworn confession identifying Jose Miranda, PO3 Romeo Ocon and SPO3 Alberto Dalmacio (Petitoners0 as responsible for the death. Hence, private respondent filed a criminal complaint for murder against the three petitioners. A motion to quash warrant of arrest was filed by petitioner. Noting the absence of petitioners, Judge Tumaliluan denied the same on the ground that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is not yet acquired. ISSUE: Is the dismissal valid? HELD: No, it is not valid. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused nor custody of the law over the body of the accused. As a general rule, the act of seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The exemptions to this rule are those whose pleading whose prayers is avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court. In criminal cases, these pleadings include motion to quash a complaint on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and motion to quash warrant. In these cases, custody over the body of the accused no jurisdiction over his person is not required.

RULE 110

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent. FACTS: Alfredo Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered a speech in the “Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines” held in UP Diliman. The same was published in Manila Bulletin. In the same speech he allegedly delivered libelous speech against Photokina Marketing Corporation regarding anomalous contract contracted by the latter. Hence, People of the Philippines with Photokina Marketing Corporation filed a criminal complaint for libel against Benipayo in RTC. Benipayo questioned the jurisdiction of RTC to try the libel case alleging that the speech was delivered in relation to his office and hence, it should be the Sandiganbayan that should have jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to try the case. HELD: Yes, RTS has jurisdiction over the case. While the speech was delivered in relation to his office, Article 360of RPC is explicit in which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamation : “The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this

chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx” MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed before the Sandiganbayan. The complaint alleged that the accused, a public officer, being then the mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, taking advantage of his public position and which offense was committed in relation to his office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said gasoline station and some pieces of yellow pad paper for the purpose, and padlock dispensing pump thereof without authority of law, depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or occupation. The information was amended with the insertion of the phrase "by ordering his policemen companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the

RULE 110 gasoline. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the respondent court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed. ISSUE: Does Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Rspondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. If petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Par’s gasoline and padlocked the station. PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAPAP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent s. ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors. FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). The ABRITG was composed of police officers with Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson. An information for murder was filed against petitioner after an allegation that was transpired was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory. Accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court because RA 8249 ISSUE: Does Sandiganbayan has jurisdicition over the case?

RULE 110 HELD: No. Fo acase to be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it must be shown that the offense charged in the informationwas committed in relation to the office of the accused. In People vs. Montejo, the court held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and perpetrated whie he was in the performance of his official functions. This “intimacy” must be alleged in he information, which determines the jurisdiction of the court. The controlling factor is the specific factual allegations in the information that would sow the close intimacy of the discharge of the accused official duties and the commission of the offense charged. It does not even matter the phrase “committed in relation to his office” appears in the information or not. In the case at bar, what the amended information contains is a mere allegation that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office and that is not sufficient. Such phrase is merely a conclusion of law. Since it was not proven that the crime of murder was committed in the discharge of their duties, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case

RULE 110

FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 143647, November 11, 2005 Topic: Venue of criminal actions FACTS: Private complainant Javier Ng Yu is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires. Sometime in 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate, went to the house of the accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume then told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. Thereafter on 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials. Fukuzume then agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the

aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound. When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found. Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel but the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter. Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him. Failing to refund the money, Yu then filed a criminal complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against Fukuzume for the crime of estafa. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the crime charged RULING: No. The CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of ₱50,000 in Makati. However, Yu testifed during his direct examination that he gave the said amount to Fukuzume in the latter’s house which is in Parañaque. Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony

RULE 110 commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate. Moreover, we find nothing in the cross examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ASUNCION, MANIO, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994 Topic: Venue of criminal actions FACTS: Private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the PNP assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt.

Romeo Sadang. Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the RTC of Quezon City an Information charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide. The respondent Judge dismissed the criminal complaint "for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case for crimes committed by public officer when penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional. Private prosecutor moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal, citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that "crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" because "they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" and "the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court." ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all crimes committed by public officers with a penalty higher than prision correccional RULING: No. If the crime committed by the public officer is not related to his public function, then the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction of the offense. There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in the course of the latter's mission.

RULE 110 However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged therein was committed by the private respondent in the course of his public mission, which fact, however, was not alleged in the information. In view of this eventuality and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, we shall direct the court a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and render judgment thereon. Any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation who is investigating an offense committed by a public officer where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional, must determine if the crime was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over the investigation of the case pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. If the

investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in relation to his office, he shall then file the information with the proper court. PEOPLE vs. VANZUELA, G.R. No. 178266, July 21, 2008 Topic: Venue of criminal actions FACTS: Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr. who is the registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, situated in Barangay Mabini (Roxas), Mainit, Surigao del Norte. 1 hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants for more than 10 years, with an agreed lease rental of 12½ cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Surigao del Norte, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondents. The RTC dismissed the criminal case contending that the instant case pertains to the non-payment of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an agricultural land by the former from the latter. This being so, the controversy in the case involves an agrarian dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian

RULE 110 Reform (DARAB).

Adjudication

Board

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Surigao City has jurisdiction over the charge for estafa even if it involves agricultural tenants of the private complainant RULING: Yes. In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa. Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an agrarian dispute. In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an alleged misappropriated amount of

P80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena, we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit: For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the DAR; more specifically, in the DARAB. KWONG SING vs. CITY OF MANILA, 41 Phil., 103 Topic: Cause of the accusation FACTS: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or general interest in the subject-matter of this action, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the city of Manila from enforcing Ordinance No. 532, questioning the ordinance’s validity. The said ordinance requires receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. Appellant’s claim is that the ordinance savors of class legislation; that it unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. There are, in the city of Manila, more than 40 Chinese laundries. The laundrymen and employees in Chinese laundries do not, as a rule, speak, read, and write English or

RULE 110 Spanish. Moreover, petitioner also contended that the ordinance is invalid, because it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and not justified under the police power of the city. ISSUE: Whether or not the enactment of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power of the City of Manila RULING: Yes. The ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each everyone of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them. Even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the hands of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. After the case was submitted to this court, counsel for appellants asked that a preliminary injunction issue, restraining the defendant or any of its officers from enforcing the

ordinance, pending decisions. It was perfectly proper for the trial and appellate courts to determine the validity of the municipal ordinance on a complaint for an injunction, since it was very apparent that irreparable injury was impending, that a municipality of suits was threatened, and that complainants had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. But finding that the ordinance is valid, the general rule to the effect that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution should be followed. ZALDIVIA vs. REYES, G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992 Topic: Designation of Offense FACTS: The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of an ordinance of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. The petitioner argues that the charge against her was governed by Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on Summary Procedure and Act. No. 3326. The prosecution, on the other hand,

RULE 110 contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the said offense is governed by the Rules on Criminal Procedure or by the Rule of Summary Procedure. RULING: The offense is governed by the Rule of Summary Procedure. The Court held that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner

commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. BENJAMIN K. GOROSPE, ET AL., VS. MARIANO B. PEÑAFLORIDA, ET AL. G.R. No. 11583, 19 JULY 1957, EN BANC (BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:) Topic: Criminal actions, when enjoined; Petition for Quo Warranto Zulueta and Peñaflorida were candidates for the position of Provincial Governor of Iloilo. Penaflorida was declared elected by the Board of Canvassers. Zulueta filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a protest contesting the election of Peñaflorida on the grounds of errors, irregularities, frauds and corrupt practices. Similarly, Ceferino de los Santos, Jr., a defeated candidate for board member, filed a criminal complaint in said court against Peñaflorida and Ladrido charging the latter

RULE 110 with a violation of Section 49 of the Revised Election Code relative to corrupt practices. This complaint was dismissed on the ground that, the violation charged being a public offense, the same can only be prosecuted by a government prosecutor and not by a private individual. And taking cue of this suggestion, Zulueta lodged a complaint with the fiscal involving the same charged against Peñaflorida and Ladrido. Peñaflorida and Ladrido, through counsel, filed a petition for-prohibition with injunction with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that the provincial fiscal be enjoined from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal case until after the election contest shall have been finally determined, and the court issued a preliminary injunction after petitioner had filed a bond in the amount of P1,000. On the other hand, Zulueta filed in the election protest an amended petition seeking to strike out from the original protest the averment relative to corrupt practices which are involved in the criminal case then under investigation by the fiscal, which was strongly resisted by Peñaflorida. The court admitted the amended petition. Peñaflorida’s motion to file an amended answer containing a counterclaim was denied. Peñaflorida and Ladrido brought the case by way of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the

petition but enjoined forever the fiscal from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Zulueta against Peñaflorida and Ladrido. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in enjoining the provincial fiscal from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal charge filed by Zulueta against Peñaflorida and Ladrido on the sole ground that, the charge involving as it does a disqualification to hold office, the same is tantamount to a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed within one week from the proclamation of the one declared elected. HELD: Yes. The Court held that one should not confuse an action of quo warranto with the complaint for a violation of the Election Code even if the same may have the effect of disqualifying a candidate to hold the office to which he is elected. One partakes of the nature of a civil case wherein the petitioner is the defeated candidate, while the other is a criminal action which is prosecuted in the name of the People. Both proceedings have different objectives and are predicated on different grounds. The purpose of quo warranto is merely to prevent an elective official from assuming office on the ground of ineligibility. To be eligible, one must have the

RULE 110 qualifications required by law with regard to citizenship, residence, age, loyalty, etc. On the other hand, the principal purpose of the criminal action is the imprisonment of the offender, be he a candidate or not, and the grounds of the action vary depending upon the acts committed. Here the acts involved are those prohibited by Section 49 of the Election Cade relative to corrupt practices. The fact that the present offense carries with it the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding office does not convert it into an action of quo warranto. Lastly, there is a difference as regards the prescriptibility of the action. While an action of quo warranto should be filed within one week from proclamation, an election offense prescribes after two years, from the date of its commission, and if the discovery is made on the occasion of an election contest, the period shall commence on the date the judgment becomes final (Section 188, Revised Election Code). Another point to be considered is that, “as a general rule, an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution” (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 1.03). The reason is obvious. Public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society. This is more so in connection with a violation of the Election Law. The only way to curb fraud, terrorism and other corrupt practices that are committed in the

elections is to demand their immediate investigation and prosecution. Only in this way can we maintain a clean election and secure the free expression of the people’s will at the polls. Appellee, who is not appellant, may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he may not do so if his purpose is to have the judgment modified or reversed, for, in such case, he must appeal. JESUS GUIAO vs. ALBINO L. FIGUEROA, in his capacity as Provincial Fiscal of the Province of Pampanga G.R. No. L-6481, 17 May 1954, EN BANC (LABRADOR, J.) Topic: Control of Prosecution; Mandamus Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo participated either as principals or accomplices in the kidnapping and murder of Felix Lampa, and that the only reason why the fiscal excluded them from the amended information is because he thought it more convenient, or perhaps more expedient, to do so. IIn view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, a motion for contempt was filed against the fiscal, but this motion was dismissed on the ground that if the fiscal committed an error of judgment, or even an abuse of discretion, the recourse against him was not an action for contempt but one of mandamus.

RULE 110 Due to this order of the court, the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as accused in his information. ISSUE: Whether or not a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein, but whom the fiscal believes to be indispensable witnesses for the State. HELD: No. The rules of Court make it a mandatory duty for the fiscal to file charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an offense. When it becomes necessary to exclude from prosecution persons who appear responsible for a crime in order that they may be used as State witnesses, the exclusion is lodged in the sound discretion of the competent court, not in that of the prosecuting officer. When the fiscal chose to ignore his legal duty to include the said Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as accused in the criminal case, and to follow the procedure outlined in the rules by which said persons may be discharged in order that they may be utilized as witnesses for the prosecution, it became proper and necessary for the competent court to require him to comply therewith. Petitioner-appellee Jesus Guiao has no right to institute the action of mandamus, because he has no clear right to the

performance of the alleged legal duty by the provincial fiscal Every person accused of a crime has a positive interest in the inclusion of all his co-conspirators because they are jointly and severally liable with them for indemnities that may be imposed upon them for the offense they may have committed together. LINO BROCKA ET AL. vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE ET AL. G.R. No. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, EN BANC (MEDIALDEA, J.) Topic: Criminal actions, when enjoined; Preliminary/Final Injunction Petitioners were arrested by the Northern Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly. Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings were held. However, despite service of the order of release, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a

RULE 110 Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them. Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them. Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged with Inciting to Sedition, without prior notice to their counsel.The original informations filed recommended no bail. The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined. HELD: Yes. Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

There are however exceptions, among which are: a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. In the case at bar, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to

RULE 110 show that the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985. JOSELITO V. NARCISO vs. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ G.R. No. 134504, 17 March 2000, THIRD DIVISION (PANGANIBAN, J.) Topic: Control of Prosecution Petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua. Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the Regional Trial court (RTC) granted his Motion to Post Bail. However, Court of Appeals (CA) ruled otherwise. He argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution

evidence strong.

against

him

was

not

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent

Court of Appeals has erroneously reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail. 2. Whether

or

not the private respondent has the legal personality to intervene in the present criminal case HELD: 1. No. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands

RULE 110 charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.” Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.

2. In parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended party just because he was married to the deceased. In the interest of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the victim may be deemed to be an "offended party"; hence, she has the legal personality to challenge the void order of the trial court. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE. HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI ET AL. No. L-34162, 29 December 1987, SECOND DIVISION (SARMIENTO, J.) Topic: Control of Prosecution Petitioner Ebarle was then the provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for reelection in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action) for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have

RULE 110 the same lifted and the case itself dismissed. Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) ordering the respondents to desist from further proceedings. AntiGraftLeague moved to have it lifted and the case itself dismissed. On the other hand, the petitioner submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated as he being a candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and citing provisions of EO 264 "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED." ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED”. 2. Whether or not the AntiGraft League has the standing to commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628).

3. Whether or not the prosecutions in question are politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur. HELD: 1. No. Executive Order No. 264 (October 6, 1970) has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. 2. Yes. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines is not an "offended party" within the meaning of Sec. 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). However, A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation

RULE 110 purposes, by any competent person. The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal. In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 3. It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which belongs to another agency, in this case, the respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions. The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or otherwise void. We cannot perceive any of the exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of complaints commenced by the private respondent below, but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for

the petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he wishes blocked here. Rodriguez v. Gadiane et al GR No. 152903, July 17, 2006 Facts: The Court is called upon to resolve the question of whether a private offended party in a criminal proceeding may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing an interlocutory order, without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Thomasita Rodriguez filed complainant, a criminal case, against Rolando Gadiane and Ricardo Rafols, Jr., for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. However, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition was filed by the private complainant, instead of the government prosecutor representing the People of the Philippines in criminal cases. Issue: Whether or not the aggrieved person may file a special civil action for certiorari. Ruling: A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.[8] In a long line of cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to

RULE 110 include the State and the private offended party or complainant. It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of

the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. Bautista v. Fiscal GR No. 59830, July 31, 1984 Facts: Juan Bautista and Nenita Marquez filed with the office of the City Fiscal a complaint against Estrada, Banigued, and F. Bautista for estafa thru falsification of public document. The assistant Fiscal dismissed the case for lack of prima facie evidence. Bautista did not move for the reconsideration of the fiscal's resolution; neither did he appeal to the Ministry of Justice. Instead, Mr. Bautista filed a new complaint with the City Court of Dagupan against the same respondents, charging them with the same offense. The City Court found that an offense has been committed and the respondents therein are probably guilty thereof. Accordingly, a warrant for their arrest was issued and an order directing respondent city fiscal to file the corresponding information. However, the respondent city fiscal, through Assistant Fiscal Manaois, filed a manifestation with the city court that he will reinvestigate the case in view of his prior resolution. After reinvestigation, the city Fiscal, filed a motion to dismiss the case but was denied by the City Court. Thereafter, the city court again forwarded the records of the case to respondent city fiscal for the filing of the information. In turn, respondent city fiscal filed a

RULE 110 manifestation informing the city court of his inability to prosecute the case because of his sincere and honest belief that he has no prima facie case to warrant the prosecution of the accused. The court filed a petition for mandamus, ordering the city fiscal to file the corresponding information for falsification of public documents. The court of appeals reversed the decision or the trial court and dismissed the petition for mandamus. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court can direct the City Fiscal to file the corresponding information and to prosecute the case. Ruling: The Supreme Court did not find any cogent reason to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically provides that "all criminal action either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. Indeed, how can the prosecuting fiscal secure the conviction of an accused on evidence beyond reasonable doubt when he himself is not convinced that he has a prima facie case against the petitioners. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.

Crespo v. Mogul No. L-53373, June 30, 1987 Facts: The Assistant Fiscal with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. However, the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. So the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction in the Court of Appeals. CA, restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment. On the other hand, Undersecretary of Justice resolved the petition for review by reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal for Immediate dismissal of the information. However, respondent Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. Hence, the accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss

RULE 110 a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. Ruling: Petition was dismissed. The rule therefore is that once a complaint or information is filed in the Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the secretary of Justice, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the court Padilla v. CA L-39999, May 31, 1984 Facts: The Fiscal accused the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion. Confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall. In committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being

the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion. Hence an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the ruling of the trial court, and decided in favor of the petitioners. Stating that they were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay for the actual damages. Still not content with the CA’s decision, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge Ruling: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not

RULE 110 exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811) Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. People v. Camba L-36471, November 19, 1980 Facts: Camba was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery with assault upon an agent of a person in authority was sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of Gongora. However, upon the observation of the court, the crime committed is more of robbery with homicide, for the reason that the victim Pat. Gongora was killed while responding to the call for help of a victim of snatching. Hencem the appellant claims that his conviction for murder should be set aside.

Ruling: It should be born in mind in this connection that the label or caption in the information in respect of the crime committed is not controlling- what matters are the material allegations in the information. The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery but without any other modifying circumstance. The crime was compounded, according to the trial court, with assault upon an agent of a person in authority. In this light the appropriate penalty, pursuant to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is death. If it be held as we do that the crime committed was robbery with homicide, the result will be the same for the aggravating circumstances of treachery and contempt of public authority will have to be assigned. The death penalty, however, cannot be imposed on the appellant who was only 20 years old when he committed the crime for lack of the necessary votes. The judgment of the court a quo is modified by reducing the sentence on the appellant to reclusion perpetua and consolidating the damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of the offense charged despite the fact that what was proven was a different crime.

Manangan Jaeniz Buhat vs. CA 265 scra 701 Topic: Amendment Information

of

the

RULE 110 Facts: On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the RTC against petitioner Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe. The information alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, using superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which were x x x the direct x x x cause of his death. Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yu’s appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City to amend the information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein additional accused Herminia Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat. On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a

motion for leave to amend information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner. In an order, dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend information. The denial was premised on (1) an invocation of the trial courts discretion in disregarding the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs. Mogul and (2) a conclusion reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest prosecutor is more persuasive than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having actually conducted the preliminary investigation where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigated The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed a petition for certiorari assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave to amend information. Finding the proposed amendment as nonprejudicial to petitioners rights, respondent court granted the petition for certiorari. Issues: 1. Whether or not the additional allegation of conspiracy is a substantial amendment 2. Whether or not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is such a substantial amendment that it is disallowed if made after the

RULE 110 accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide Held: 1. No. The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, hence petitioner's participation as principal is not affected by such amendment. Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu whom he is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another" does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in the killing. Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to defend himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public protection the punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior strength, a fellow citizen in whose health and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no tenable basis to decry the amendment in question 2. The Court ruled in the negative. In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo,the

Court ruled that the amendment of the information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made "even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused." Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that having already pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim "using superior strength." This particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a killing is technically designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor, as provided for in Article 248 of the RPC. Thus, the allegation of petitioner using superior strength constitutes a mere formal amendment, which is permissible even after arraignment. Tehankee Jr. vs Madayag 207 scra 134 Topic: Amendment Information

of

the

RULE 110 Facts: Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the crime of frustrated murder of one Maureen Navarro Hultman. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended information, filed on October 31, 1991, reads: That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.

Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, as well as a rejoinder to the reply of the prosecution. The trial court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely different offense, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted. At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. Issue: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted Held: In the present case, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended

RULE 110 information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper. Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable. Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all After arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to

aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. 17 WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant

RULE 110 petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

fate, this petition for prohibition was filed.

Jalandoni vs. Andaya 55 SCRA 261

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge’s insistence to try a prosecution for libel, instead of having it elevated to the proper court of first instance is correct

Topic: Jurisidction Facts: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel in the Municipal Court of the Municipality of Batangas presided over by the respondent Judge. The accused named therein was Serafin D. Cruz. There was the corresponding preliminary examination of the witnesses for the complainant with respondent Judge finding that there was reasonable ground to believe that such offense was committed by the person named. After respondent Cruz posted the corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty, the respondent Judge set the case for hearing on the merits on July 13, 1964, at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon. When that time came, complainant, now petitioner, through counsel manifested in open court that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative response. After hearing arguments on such motion for desistance including memoranda submitted by both sides, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioner's verbal motion to have Criminal Case No. 801 elevated to the Court of First Instance of Batangas. With a motion for reconsideration meeting the same

Held: There is no need to make mention against that it is a court of first instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code so provides. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leaves no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. 4 What the law ordains must then be followed. It is as simple as that. It did not appear to be so to respondent Judge. He would go ahead. He therefore did invite a suit of this character bent as he was on treading grounds where his presence was, to put it at its mildest, unwelcome. He must be restrained. WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on December 18, 1964, is made permanent.

People vs Pineda 20 SCRA 748 Topic: Consolidation of offenses in one InformationFacts:

RULE 110 Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases for murder. On July 29, 1965, spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza, along with their children were attacked by private respondents. Teofilo and the children were shot dead, leaving only Valeriana alive but wounded. Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse." Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket." The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed. Respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained

of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one." Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge was correct in averring that the five cases be consolidated, and that only one information should be filed by the City Fiscal Held: The Court ruled in the negative. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. In People vs. Gatbunton, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one burst of machine gun fire; and then, by a second burst of machine gun fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders." The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable.

RULE 110 Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. Upon the facts and the law, the Court holds that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder. People vs. Devaras 228 scra 482 Topic: Qualifying circumstances shall be alleged in the Information Facts: A pedicab driver and his passenger were attacked without provocation by two men who hacked them to death and later threw their bodies over the bridge with the help of another person. Investigation that same night disclosed the participation of the herein appellants, who were subsequently accused of murder in two informations alleging that they committed the offenses in conspiracy with each other and with treachery and abuse of superior strength. The principal witness for the prosecution was Raul Animos, who claimed to have witnessed the killing of the two victims. He said that on July 10, 1990, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the three appellants were drinking with him in the house of Devaras and that thereafter they joined him on his

tour of duty as bantay-bayan. They had been making the rounds in the town for about four hours when, while at the Daguitan bridge, they saw a zigzagging pedicab approach. When the pedicab was halfway across the bridge, Blademir Devaras, who was carrying a long bolo, suddenly attacked Efren Verzosa, the pedicab driver. Efren fell from his seat but Blademir continued hacking him with the bolo, hitting him in the head and neck. At abut the same time, Ronilo Caisek, who also carrying a long bolo, attacked Felix Verzosa, the passenger, who tried to parry the blows with his arms as he got out of the vehicle. He fell, staggered and ran but was overtaken by Ronilo, who continued striking the helpless old man in the head, neck, chest and shoulders. Pablo Devaras did not participate in the brutal slaying but later helped Blademir throw Efren's body over the bridge into the river below. Ronilo himself was ordered to help throw the body of Felix and, although he initially hesitated, had to comply in the end because he was threatened with death if he refused to obey. The body of Felix was found the following morning under the bridge. The body of Efren was found about three hours later near the seashore. The autopsy revealed that Felix had sustained twenty wounds and nine wounds had been inflicted in Efren.

RULE 110 All three accused denied participation in the killings. After assessing the evidence of parties, the trial court decided in favor of the prosecution and convicted Blademir Devaras as principal and Pablo Devaras as accessory in the murder of Efren Verzosa; and Ronilo Caisek for the murder of Felix Verzosa. Issues: 1. Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting them of murder instead of homicide 2. Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting appellant Pablo Devaras as an accessory Held: 1. The first error assigned by the appellants is untenable because the evidence of record clearly shows that Blademir and Ronilo suddenly attacked their unarmed victims with bolos, thereby insuring the commission of the offense without risk themselves arising from the defense the victims might make. The killings would have been homicide only without the attendance of treachery, which is one of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. We agree that there was no conspiracy between the appellants

to justify their common conviction for both murders. There is no evidence that Blademir and Ronilo had earlier come to an agreement to kill the Verzosas; on the contrary, it would appear that they had acted on impulse, independently of any common plan. The trial court was correct in finding Blademir guilty of the murder only of Efren Verzosa and Ronilo guilty of the murder only of Felix Verzosa instead of holding them equally liable for both murders. 2. The second assigned error must also be dismissed. The determination of the persons to be prosecuted on the basis of the evidence against them rests primarily with the prosecutor, who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. We have held that, as an exception, the prosecutor can be compelled by mandamus if he abuses this discretion and refuses to include a person as a co-accused against whom there appears to be at least prima facie. However, this extraordinary writ is available only if the petitioner shows that he has first exhausted all remedies in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion filed with the trial court for the indictment of the person or persons excluded by the prosecutor. It does not appear that such a motion was filed by the appellants in the case at bar. An accessory is defined as one who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated

RULE 110 therein, either as principal or an accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery. For having assisted in throwing Efren's dead body into the river, Pablo Devaras was correctly held guilty as an accessory. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, but with modification. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NARCISO NAZARENO, et. al. G.R. No. 103964, August 1, 1996, Mendoza, J., Second Division TOPIC: Prosecution of Offenses FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 136), finding accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala guilty of murder for the killing of Romulo "Molet" Bunye II in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Two others, accused with them, Manuel Laureaga and Orlando Hular, were acquitted. On December 14, 1988, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Bunye took a “stainless” tricycle, which was driven by Fernando Hernandez. Unknown to Bunye was that two men were waiting outside his house and that the two hailed another tricycle in order to

follow him. Bunye alighted at the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa and crossed to the left side of the street. Shortly after, the tricycle, driven by Rogelio de Limos, arrived and stopped in front of Hernandez's tricycle. One of the men jumped out of the tricycle and shot Bunye at the back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, the assailant fired another shot at Bunye's head. Then, the other man approached Bunye and shot him also in the head. The autopsy report on the victim showed that he died of gunshot wounds in the head. On December 28, 1988, Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando Hular and Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and Nazareno were put in a police line-up. They were identified and pointed to as the assailants by the tricycle drivers. Regala executed affidavits, admitting participation in the slaying of Bunye and pointing to Nazareno and a certain Rey Taling as his co-conspirators. He claimed that they had been hired by Hular to kill the victim and told that they would be paid by Laureaga. His affidavits were corroborated by Hular who stated that it was Laureaga who wanted Bunye killed, apparently in connection with Bunye's job as administrator of the public market in Alabang. However, Regala and Hular recanted. Regala claimed that he had been tortured. On the other

RULE 110 hand, Hular claimed that, although he was not tortured, he admitted to the crime and signed the affidavit because he was afraid he would also be tortured. Nazareno also claimed to have been tortured to admit to the crime but refused to sign any written statement. The trial court ruled the confessions of Regala and Hular to be inadmissible. However, it held Regala and Nazareno guilty on the basis of their positive identification by Hernandez and de Limos during the police line-up and their testimony in court. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right to due process of the accused-appellants was violated. RULING: No, there was no violation of due process in the prosecution and subsequent conviction of Nazareno and Regala. Accused-appellants claim that their arrests without warrant were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings of the trial court. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Nazareno was upheld by this Court in 1990 in a petition for habeas corpus. It appears that, on January 9, 1989, Nazareno filed a motion for bail. As the trial court denied his motion, a petition for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf with this Court. It was alleged that Nazareno's arrest was illegal because it was made without warrant fourteen days after the killing of Bunye. This Court dismissed the petition. He filed a

motion for reconsideration which the Court also denied on the ground that the warrantless arrest was in accordance with Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The question which Nazareno raises has thus been settled long ago in a final decision of this Court. Furthermore, Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of accused. DOCTRINE: The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. HONORATO GALVEZ, et. al. v. COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), et. al.

RULE 110 G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994, Regalado, J., Second Division TOPIC: Prosecution Offenses; Amendment Substitution of complaint information

of or or

FACTS: On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention. On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper crimes chargeable against the accused," which was granted by Judge Villajuan. Respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein petitioners. By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion filed by respondent prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for change of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court,

and the preliminary investigation being conducted by the former shall have been terminated. It appears that on December 2, 1993, private complainants had filed with the SC a Petition for Change of Venue, purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Informations. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor VillaIgnacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms which were subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. No bail having been recommended for the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners. On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos were reset due to the absence of respondent prosecutor. On even date, petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan a Motion for Reconsideration of his order of December 15, 1993 which granted the motion to withdraw the original informations. Thereafter, a

RULE 110 Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash and, at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter refused to enter their plea. In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. However, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion to quash. Respondent court dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110. RULING:

It is petitioners' submission that the prosecution's failure to serve them a copy of the motion to withdraw the original informations and to set said motion for hearing constitutes a violation of their right to be informed of the proceedings against them. Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have amended the original informations instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. They postulate that the principle of nolle prosequi does not apply in this case since the withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court which has the option to grant or deny it and the prosecution cannot impose its opinion on the court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need to change the nature of the offense charged, that is, from homicide to murder, by adding the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper remedy is through the filing of the corresponding amended information; and that the withdrawal of an information is allowed only where the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not included in the offense originally charged. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had

RULE 110 these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information. DOCTRINE: The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasijudicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought

therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. FELIX A. VELASQUEZ v. HON. UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, et. al G.R. No. 88442, February 15, 1990, Griño-Aquino, J., First Division

TOPIC: Prosecution of Offenses; Control of Prosecution

FACTS:

Respondent Edgardo Avila was a Cash and Business Development Consultant of the Techtrade Management International Corporation, authorized to followup business transactions, including loan applications submitted to the company. On September 29, 1986, Avila informed the company that he had a borrower (whom he did not identify) for P200,000 with interest of 3%/month for a 30-day term from September 29 to October 29, 1988. This was approved by the company which issued to him a pay-to-cash check for P194,000

RULE 110 after deducting the 3% interest of 6,000. Instead of returning the borrowed amount on due date or giving a satisfactory explanation for the supposed borrower's failure to pay the loan despite written demands, Avila resigned from the company on December 17, 1986 promising that: "... I shall set aside the P200,000 upon its subsequent collection xxx to answer for the P100,000 portion of Tony's P700,000 loan to you; please treat the P100,000 — balance, less my unpaid professional fee and gas expenses from November 16 to December 15, 1986, as my separation and compulsory benefit". On December 23, 1986, petitioner Felix A. Velasquez, as Executive Vice-President/Managing Director of Techtrade, filed a complaint for estafa against Avila in the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Assistant Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by the Chief, Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's Office, the latter set aside Fiscal Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of an information for estafa against Avila in the RTC. Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but both motions were denied by the City Fiscal. Before arraignment, Avila filed on June 29, 1987 in the Department of Justice a petition for review which the petitioner opposed. Justice Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III denied the petition for review. A

motion for reconsideration of the denial did not prosper. On October 14, 1988, Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the Undersecretary of Justice, Honorable Artemio Tuquero granted on January 4, 1989. He directed the City Fiscal “to conduct a reinvestigation of this case to afford respondent to properly present evidence that he was duly authorized to pay the subject creditors and for complainant to rebut the same with controverting evidence, and thereafter to resolve the case anew on the basis of all the evidence adduced”. The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of that resolution but it was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, or the Fiscal interfere with the judge’s disposition of the case. RULING: No, neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of that. Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone.

RULE 110 Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

DOCTRINE: Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.

STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY v. ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-INCHARGE OF THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL'S OFFICE OF CAMARINES NORTE, et. al.

G.R. No. L-44723, August 31, 1987, Bidin, J., En Banc TOPICS: Prosecution of Offenses; Criminal Actions, how Control of Prosecution

instituted,

FACTS: On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution.

On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte Information, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated

RULE 110 October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review."

The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed against private respondents for which reason the request for review has become a moot question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft. On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same.

A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the

court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order dated February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.

On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein.

ISSUE: After a case has been filed in court, whether or not a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss it has been denied. RULING: There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information according to whether the evidence

RULE 110 is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so. However, after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court".

Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control. Otherwise, the entire proceedings will be null and void.

However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion by the fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court and, therefore, within its discretion and control. “The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the court." It is discretionary on the court where the case is pending to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same.

The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a prima facie case against private respondents.

DOCTRINE: Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of

RULE 110 criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. FIDEL M. BAÑARES II, et. al., v. ELIZABETH BALISING, et. al. G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, Kapunan, J., First Division TOPICS: Prosecution of Offenses; Criminal Actions, how instituted FACTS: Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Bañares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty, they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 18 of the 1991

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court. The MTC issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. On November 13, 1995, the MTC issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice. More than two months later, private respondents through counsel, filed a motion to revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with. The parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private respondents against petitioners but they failed

RULE 110 to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a comment and opposition to motion to revive claiming that the Order of the MTC dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive. The MTC issued an Order granting private respondents' motion to revive. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the MTC. Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing the Order of the MTC. They claimed that the said Order, dismissing the criminal cases against them had long become final and executory considering that the prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order. In response thereto, private respondents filed their Comment, arguing that the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with law. The RTC rendered the assailed decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition. The RTC, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not

appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case; and 2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory RULING: This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. Contrary to private respondents' claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. Thus, the RTC erred when it denied the petition for certiorari,

RULE 110 injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the MTC, dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive. Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies

suppletorily to cases covered by the former. The rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality. The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously. To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with finality, thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system. DOCTRINES: Doctrine of finality of judgments and orders: An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal

RULE 110 therefrom is timely filed. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. Maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. (Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.) Magbalon – Reboroso People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Barcena y Poca G.R No. 168737 February 16, 2006 Topic: AVERMENTS IN COMPLAINT/ INFORMATION Facts: Edgardo Barcena, the accused, is the common law wife of Nenita Barcena, which is the mother of victim, Estrella Cabida. Barcena was charge with qualified rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, due to the fact that the victim is a minor (15yrs old) and the accused was the common-law husband of his mother.

Estrella testified that she was alone in their house in the morning of April 10, 1997, when suddenly the accused strangled and embraced her from behind pulling her from their sala to the room, where she was ravished. After the incident, she was warned by the accused not to tell anybody or else she would be killed. The accused, however, raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that during April 10, 1997, on that morning he reported for work at a Rice Mill and went home already in the evening. He insisted that the rape case is motivated by the remorse of Nenita’s relatives against him, since he squandered the money of the latter. The alibi of the accused was corroborated by his co-worker at the rice mill, which testified that the accused really reported for work that day. The accused further averred that the age of Estrella was not duly established due to the fact that only a photocopy of the latter’s birth certificate was presented. The lower court found the accused guilty of the offense of qualified rape through the use of force or intimidation, having been committed with the attendant circumstance of “the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim”. When the case was elevated to the CA, it was affirmed. Issue: Whether or not the averments in the information/complaint was duly established.

RULE 110 Held: Yes. R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, imposes the death penalty for rape committed under any of the circumstances provided under Section 11 thereof. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim of rape is under 18 years of age and the offender is the parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Minority and relationship constitute special qualifying circumstances, which, in accordance with the settled rule, must be alleged in the information and proven during trial. In the instant case, the filial relationship between appellant and the complainant has been sufficiently alleged in the information and established during trial. Several witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense testified that the appellant is the common law husband of Nenita, the mother of the victim. In fact, the appellant himself admitted that he exercised parental authority over the children, including the complainant, of his common-law wife Nenita. With regard to Etrella’s minority; even granting that the certificate of live birth is only a photocopy of the original, the same sufficiently proved Estrella’s age and minority.

In People v. Cayabyab, we held that: We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim’s minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose. However, there are other exceptions to the "best evidence rule" as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to

RULE 110 be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. Doctrine: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information to be appreciated by the court. Anything not alleged cannot be acted upon. People of the Philippines vs. Juan Manggasin y Lucanas G.R No. 130599-600 21, 1999

April

Topic: Facts: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information

Accused-appelant, Juan Maggasin, is the common-law spouse of Lilia Mangasin, the latter being the mother of the victim Maria Fe Empimo. Maria Fe testified before the lower court that at around 12 noon of Spetember 3, 1991, she was allured/hypnotized by the accused which rendered her unconscious, making it successful for the accused to ravish her at that date. Right after the sexual incident, the accused warned her not to tell her mother or else she and her mother will be killed. On another date, November 14, 1995, on their small house, when everyone was asleep, she was dragged then by the accused and was successfully ravished again by the accused. Complainant said she related her ordeal to her mother, but the latter just told her to keep her disgrace to herself. The complaint reads as follows: “That sometime during the last week of March, 1995, in Brgy., Tambulilid, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUAN MANGGASIN y Lucanas alias Johnny, being then the stepfather of the complainant herein MARIA FE EMPIMO, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the said MARIA FE EMPIMO, a seventeen (17) year old lass, against her will.” The accused rejected the victim’s claim, he averred that the first

RULE 110 claim of rape was false since he reported for work at that time, which the complainant’s mother assented. The accused further contends that he and the complainant engaged in an amorous relationship and had several occasions of sexual intercourse and all started when the complainant was seventeen (17) years old. The trial court found him guilty of two (2) counts of rape and sentenced him to DEATH. By virtue of R.A 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law which provides that death penaly shall be imposed in the if the crime of rape is committed “when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.” Issue: Whether or not the imposition of death as penalty is correct. Held: No. As this Court has held, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender being a special qualifying circumstance, which increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, should be alleged in the information, because of the accused's right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this case, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 4730-0 and 4731-0 alleged that accusedappellant, who is the stepfather of complainant, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the latter who was then below eighteen (18) years of age. However, the evidence shows that accusedappellant is not the complainant's stepfather because he and complainant's mother were not really married but only lived in a common-law relationship. To this effect are the testimonies of the complainant, her mother, and even accused-appellant himself. Thus, although a common-law husband is subject to punishment by death in case he commits rape against his wife's daughter, nevertheless the death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant because the relationship alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 4730-0 against him is different from that actually proven. Accordingly, accused-appellant must be sentenced to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Doctrine: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information. An incorrect imposition of a qualifying circumstance in the information will not be appreciated by the Court. This is anchored on the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ vs. The Honorable HARRIET O.

RULE 110 DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office) G.R No. 111771-77 November 9, 1993 Topic: SUITS

`DUPLICITY OF

Facts: Mayor Antionio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, was among others, charged in connection of the rape-slay of Mary Elieen Sarmena and the killing of Allan Gomez of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide which was requested to be acted upon by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission. Mayor Sanchez was invited for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim, and was immediately taken there. The Mayor was positively identified as suspect by witnesses present in the investigation and was placed on “arrest status” and taken to DOJ Manila. The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon arrival, and after hearing a

warrant of arrest was served. Mayor Sanhez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Cam Crame, where he remains confined. The respondent prosecutors filed with RTC of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Mayor Sancehz among others, with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmaneta. Aftrer several days, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including Mayor Sanchez, in connection with the said crime. The Court later ordered the treasfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, where it was raffled to the sala of Judge Demetriou. On that court, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same day, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition, which, however, was denied. Mayor Sanchez now argues that the seven information against him should be quashed because, among others, “he is being with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons.” Issue: Whether or not the information is correct, wherein seven counts of homicide was charged which arose from the death of only two persons. Held: Yes.

RULE 110 It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses. Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner and his six coaccused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were

committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta. It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard. This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise: Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute a constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death. Doctrine: In the crime of Rape with Homicide, the Homicide partakes

RULE 110 the element of force and intimidation in rape. Hence, the crime of Rape and Homicide are not distinct from each other. By virtue of this, it does not run afoul the rule on duplicity of suits, although there were only two counts of death in this case, each one who participated in the crime shall be charged with one count of Rape with Homicide.

Agents cannot receive any form of payment from buyers as well as to issue any receipts, and after receiving sum of money from prospective buyers as downpayment, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use the said amount and despite several demands upon them to return, failed and refused to restitute the same.

Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Pinon and Rosend Pinon vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Arturo A. Romero, Salavado Q. Quimpo and Hometrust Development Corporation

Petitioners moved to quash the informations on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged. The same was dismissed by the trial court declaring that each informations show different private complainants and different transactions on different dates. Unfazed, the same was elevated to the CA by writ of certiorari which was still denied.

G.R No. 110617 December 29, 1994 Topic: Separate Crimes in an Information Facts: Petitioners herein were charged with eight infromations of estafa. It were adduced that by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to prospective lots and house and lot buyers, by representing themselves that they are authorized to collect/receive and issue receipts of payments from said buyers. Another information states that petitioners herein confederating with each other, defrauded and deceived HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, by being agents by the corporation on a commission basis with the restriction however, that the

Issue: Whether or not the offenses charged in the eight informations actually constitute only one offense or were correctly considered as eight separate crimes of estafa. Held: The lower court and the CA were correct in considering eight separate crimes of estafa. The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different

RULE 110 acts, consummated on different occasions, and caused injury to different parties. The crime of estafa against respondent corporation was committed through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, specifically as provided in Paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, Revised Penal Code. The operative act in the perpetration thereof was the failure to turn over or deliver to respondent corporation the amounts collected by the accused, despite their duty to do so. The felony was consummated on the dates when and at the places where such amounts were to be delivered to respondent corporation under the agency agreement therefor or within a reasonable time from receipt of the payments made by the lot buyers. The aggrieved party was respondent corporation which suffered damages basically to the extent of the sums collected in its behalf but not delivered or accounted for by the accused. With respect to the lot buyers, the offense of swindling was committed by deceit or false pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, more specifically as provided in Paragraph 2(a) of the same article of the Code, that is, by the accused falsely pretending to possess the power to collect the payments due from said buyers, despite the peculiar but specific prohibition imposed by their said principal. The felony was perpetrated

through the aforesaid the deceitful misrepresentations which made possible the unauthorized collections. The offense was consummated upon receipt by the accused of the amounts in the different occasions and places where the payments were made by the lot buyers. The aggrieved parties were the lot buyers who individually and separately suffered damages by being deprived not only of their money but primarily of their property rights to and in the lots they respectively purchased. Doctrine: The rule provides that one information should only contain one offense. If the crime is Estafa which could be committed by a single offender to different prospective victims by different criminal motives, each offense is distinct from each other. Each information then is distinct from each other which only constitute one count. Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Hon. Justice Francis Garchitorena, Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines. G.R No. 109266 December 2, 1993 Topic: CONTINUING CRIMES Facts: Petitioner was charged of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3€ of R.A No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

RULE 110 Act, allegedly commited by her favoring “unqualified” aliens with the benefit of the Alien Legalization Program.

Sandiganbayan admitted the 32 Amended Informations and ordered the petitioner to post bail bonds. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as he was then a presidential candidate. On another date, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena. The Sandiganbayan, of which Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment. Petitioner then moved to defer the arraignment of the ground that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. Motion to defer arraignment was denied later on. A day after being denied the motion, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars, stating that unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for tiral. The arraignment was then reset to another date and the Sandiganbayan was ordered to act upon the disqualification of Justice Garchitorena and the motion for bill of particulars.

Issue:

At the hearing for the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated that they would file only one amended information against petitioner, however, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the thirty-two (32) Amended informations. At a later date, the

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in admitting the 32 Amended Informations; does the offense fall under the ambit of “delito continuado” or continuing crimes? Held: It is a continuing crime. Hence, the Sandigan is not correct in admitting the 32 Amended Informations. The Supreme Court held that technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner’s case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against her. Simply put, a delito continuado is an offense consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. Pp. 53-54). In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single

RULE 110 stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows: . . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified. Doctrine: A continuing crime comprises of several acts but only constitute of one offense, because the sole criminal motive of the offender. Jose Gamboa v. Court of Appeals and Benjamin Lu Hayco 68 SCRA 308; November 28, 1975 Topic: Continuing Crimes Facts: The private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former employee of petitioner company in its optical supply business at Sta. Cruz, Manila. One hundred twentyfour (124) complaints of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code were filed against him by the petitioner

company with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After the procedural preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases of estafa against private respondent before the City Court of Manila. While the criminal suits in particular were pending trial on the merits before the twelve branches of the City Court of Manila, private respondent commenced a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XV) against the petitioners herein and the City Court Judges of Manila, claiming that the filing, prosecution and trial of the seventy-five (75) estafa cases against him is not only oppressive, whimsical and capricious, but also without or in excess of jurisdiction of the respondents City Fiscal and the City Court Judges of Manila. Private respondent asserts that all the indictments narrated in the seventy-five (75) informations were mere components of only one crime, since the same were only impelled by a single criminal resolution or intent. The lower court dismissed the petition on the ground that the series of deposits and the subsequent withdrawals thereof involved in the criminal cases were not the result of only one criminal impulse on the part of private respondent. As

a

consequence,

private

RULE 110 respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the order of the lower court and granted the petition for prohibition. It directed the respondent City Fiscal "to cause the dismissal of the seventyfive (75) criminal cases filed against petitioner- appellant, to consolidate in one information all the charges contained in the seventy-five (75) informations and to file the same with the proper court." Issues: (1)Whether or not the crime committed is a continuous crime. (2)Whether or not the necessary elements of estafa may separately take place in different territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself is consummated. Rulings: (1)No. “Delito continaudo” or continuous crime” is a single crime consisting of a series acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which although of a “delitual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a “delito continuado”. In order that it may exist, there should be “plurality of acts

performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.” Hence, daily abstractions from and diversions of employee to his own personal use and benefit of deposits made by customers of company constitute separate acts, each with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own. (2)Yes. The necessary elements of estafa may separately take place in different territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself is consummated. The moment, however, that the elements of the crime have completely concurred or transpired, then an individual crime of estafa has occurred or has been consummated. The term “continuing” must be understood in the sense similar to that of “transitory” and is only intended as a factor in determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. This is so, because “a person charged with transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offense in which some acts material and

RULE 110 essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the other.” Doctrine: When a crime committed constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own it cannot be considered a “continuing crime”. People v. Hubilo 220 SCRA 389; March 23, 1993 Topic: Continuing Preliminary Investigation

Crimes;

Facts: On 18 August 1988, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,, Hermogenia Cacayurin, Cesario Gamiz and Ferdinand Gamiz were riding on a tricycle driven by Rogelio Antonio, proceeding north toward Barangay Nagcuralan, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, where they resided. As they approached the cemetery of Nagcuralan, gunfire greeted them and driver Rogelio, being hit fell off the tricycle. Ferdinand Gamiz who had been seated behind the tricycle driver jumped off the tricycle and ran in a northerly direction. He was met or confronted by an armed man

whose face was covered by handkerchief. The masked gunman lifted his weapon, a 2-1/2 foot long firearm and fired at Ferdinand, hitting him near the right armpit. As the gunman fired, the cover on his face fell off. Ferdinand recognized the assailant as Adly Hubilo, also a resident of Nagcuralan and known to him since he reached the age of reason. Wounded and fearing for his life, Ferdinand pleaded: "Please, have mercy on me, manong." Hubilo, however, squeezed the trigger again but this time the gun did not fire Ferdinand seized his chance to escape death and ran away as fast as he could in a westerly direction. Hubilo tried to pursue Ferdinand and reload his weapon at the same time. Ferdinand was able to elide him and as he looked back while fleeing, he saw Hubilo approach stalled and fire tricycle and fire many shots. Thereafter, Police Station Commander of Cuyapo filed o complaint for multiple murder with frustrated murder against appellant Hubilo and Bernardo Silapan before the Municipal Trial Court("MTC") of Cuyapo. The next day, which was also Ferdinand Gamiz fifth day in the hospital, policemen brought appellant Hubilo with them to the hospital. There, Ferdinand identified appellant Hubilo as person who had shot him. Counsel for Hubilo manifested that they were waiving their right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation and prayed that the records of the

RULE 110 case, including the motion to fix bail, be forwarded to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Defense counsel also requested that accused Hubilo be transferred and detained at Guimba. The MTC thereupon issued an order granting the request. An information was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ubaldino A. Lacuron against appellant, with the RTC. Appellant Hubilo filed another motion to fix bail, but this motion was detained by the trial court. On a motion for reconsideration, however the trial court reversed itself and held a hearing on the application for bail. Ultimately, the RTC denied the application for bail, holding that the evidence of guilt of accused Hubilo was strong. Appellant responded by filing a motion to disqualify or inhibit the judge alleging that appellant would not be afforded a fair trial because of the findings of the RTC. Judge Raymundo Z. Annang then inhibited himself and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Executive Judge, but Executive Judge Pablo D. Atienza ordered the return of the case to the sala of Judge Annang. Judge Annang set the case for arraignment, pre-trial and trial; but these settings did not materialize. Appellant Hubilo filed a Petition for certiorari before this Court, questioning the denial of his application for bail and the order of Executive Judge Atienza returning the case to Judge Annang for continuation of proceedings. This Petition was

dismissed by this Court for failure to attach clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned orders. Appellant then filed with the trial court a motion for preliminary investigation. This motion was denied. Appellant Hubilo was finally arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. The case proceeded to trial on the merits. In due time, the RTC promulgated its judgment convicting the accused. Hubilo now contends that the trial court erred in denying the accused of his constitutional rights of due process of law, when it denied his 'Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or Investigation'. Issue: 1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of multiple murder (triple) with frustrated murder. 2. Whether or not the appellant was denied of his constitutional rights of due process of law, when RTC denied his 'Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or Investigation' Ruling: 1. The crime was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder, appellant having employed treachery in staging the ambuscade. Appellant selected a secluded and uninhabited area, where thick cogon grass grew on the side of the road, and suddenly fired as the tricycle with its

RULE 110 three (3) passengers driver approached.

and

A separate and distinct acts (or shots) were directed at each of the deceased victims. Cesario had suffered eight (8) bullet wounds, Rogelio Antonio, three (3); and Hermogenia Cacayurin two (2) which resulted to their immediate death. Moreover, the evidence showed that, after the wounded Ferdinand had escaped, appellant Hubilo went back to the stalled tricycle and fired multiple shots at the three (3) victims on the road, presumably to make sure all three (3) were dead. 2. No. The right to preliminary investigation is a substantive right and its denial amounts to a denial of due process of law. An accused in a criminal case, however may waive his right to preliminary investigation, and here appellant Hubilo expressly waived preliminary investigation. Moreover, appellant, by applying for bail and by submitting to arraignment and proceeding to trial, must be deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary investigation to question any irregularity that might have attended such investigation. The court notes further that appellant did not question the supposed denial of his right to preliminary investigation by going to an appellate court on certiorari and prohibition. In the light of the foregoing circumstances,

and considering that the trial court has rendered after trial on the merits a judgment of conviction on what it regarded as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is too late in the day for appellant to make an issue of his right to a preliminary investigation. Doctrine: When the evidence presented by the prosecution did not show that a single shot slain three (3) different persons, appellant is properly held liable for three (3) separate murders. People v. Victor 181 SCRA 818 Topic: Complex Crimes Facts:

When Victor went to Boljoon to visit his wife, Guneda met him at the market place and proposed to him a plan to rob the residence of an American named Myles Castle and the cottage of Charles Turner, an American Peace Corps Volunteer assigned in the Municipality of Boljoon The two agreed to execute their plan on Oct. 16, 1984. As planned, Victor went to Boljoon in the afternoon of October 16, 1984, together with Montebon, who brought with him a .38 caliber homemade revolver. They proceeded to the store of a certain Josefina Romero along McKinley Street, where Victor used to leave his things intended for his wife everytime he came to Boljoon.

RULE 110 They passed the time there drinking "tuba" and eating bread while they were conversing in subdued voices. At past 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, Victor and Montebon left and proceeded towards a bridge where they were subsequently joined by Guneda, who led them to the house of Myles Castle along Rodriguez Street. As they entered the gate of Castle's house, a maid went out to get the clothes which were being hanged to dry. Forthwith, Montebon held her and said: "Don't move this is a hold up!" Frightened the maid instinctively shouted, causing the three to scamper away and return to the bridge where they stayed for a while. From there, the trio proceeded to rob Charles Turner in his rented cottage located at Lusapon Beach in the outskirts of Boljoon Poblacion. However, upon entering Charles Turner's cottage, Montebon shot him at the back of his head upon instruction of Guneda, who wanted the American killed because the latter knew him. After killing Turner, the trio ransacked the cottage of Turner's personal belongings, and returned to the culvert near the bridge where they left the things which they found to be unimportant. At about 6:30 o'clock in the morning of October 17, 1984, a report was made to the Police Force of Boljoon that Charles Turner was seen lifeless in his cottage. Forthwith, Patrolman Marcos Florida, Archimedes Villanueva and Romulo Medida

proceeded to the cottage of the Peace Corps Volunteer where he was found dead while sitting on a chair with his head stooping towards a table. That same day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a six-man PC-INP Team proceeded to Cebu City to track down the suspect. Upon apprehension Victor verbally admitted being one of those who killed the American Peace Corps Volunteer in Boljoon, Cebu. Victor even voluntarily turned over to the PC-INP team a size 40 corduroy jacket owned by the victim. The team also recovered an empty .38 caliber revolver shell inside the house of Victor who explained that said empty shell was left by his coaccused Roberto Montebon while they were drinking liquor inside the house immediately after the incident From there, Victor led the team to the house of Montebon in Inawayan Pardo, Cebu City. Montebon was lying down inside his house when the PC-INP team arrived at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning that same day. Then and there, Captain Barias placed Montebon under arrest. The team also retrieved the items taken by the suspects from the victim's cottage in Boljoon. Regional Trial Court found: a) Both Roberto Montebon and Ceferino Guneda guilty beyond doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. They were both sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua, and the accessory penalties provided for by law; and b) Roger Victor guilty beyond

RULE 110 doubt of the offense of simple Robbery, with two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty to Robbery and testifying as to true facts in favor of the State. It is argued that Guneda cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as the information filed against him failed to allege that the Homicide was committed "by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery," and that neither may one infer from that charge alone that the alleged Homicide was done for purposes of committing the alleged Robbery, thus violating Guneda's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Issue: Whether or not Guneda can be convicted of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as the information filed against him failed to allege that the Homicide was committed "by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery," Ruling: Yes. The court held that although the phrase "by reason or on occasion of the robbery", as provided for by the Revised Penal Code, was not literally used in the recital of facts alleging the commission of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the Information, as filed, sufficiently and distinctly alleges the commission of the two crimes of "Robbery" and "Homicide" and

adequately informs the accused of the offense charged. Doctrine: An information charged is sufficient when it adequately informs the accused of the offense charged. People v. Feloteo 290 SCRA 627 Topic: Complex Crimes Facts: SONNY SOTTO, and his friends, ARNEL ABELEDA and JOHNNY ABREA, were walking along the highway in Barangay Bintuan, Coron, Province of Palawan. They had a few drinks earlier that day and were on their way home to Sitio Nagbaril. Abrea walked ahead of the group, about thirteen meters away from Sotto, followed by Abeleda. They were in a lively mood as Abeleda playfully walked backwards, facing Sotto. The accused, WILFREDO FELOTEO, appeared on the opposite side of the road and walked past Abrea and Abeleda. He was armed with an armalite rifle. Abeleda and Abrea recognized the accused, their barriomate, as the moon was shining brightly. They did not pay much attention to the accused as Abeleda was playing "habulan" with Sotto. Without uttering a word, the accused aimed the armalite at Sotto and pressed its trigger. Sotto was hit above the left chest and fell on the ground, face

RULE 110 down. Abeleda and Abrea scampered away to find help, while the accused fled from the crime scene. Ten (10) minutes later, Abeleda and Abrea, accompanied by Barangay Tanod Tito Abrina and a certain Inyong Adion, returned to the locus criminis. They found Sotto dead. After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion perpetua, for murder, and imprisonment of twenty (20) years, for illegal possession of firearm. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of Sotto the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), as civil indemnity. The appellant now contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery as attending the commission of the crime alleged and in holding accused-appellant guilty of murder in the killing of Sonny Sotto. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery as attending the commission of the crime alleged and in holding accused-appellant guilty of murder in the killing of Sonny Sotto. Ruling: No. Under par. 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the

crime which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In the case at bar, treachery is present for there was a sudden attack against the unarmed Sotto. When Sotto and his friends encountered appellant on the road, they were in a "jovial mood" as they just came from a drinking spree. Although they saw appellant carrying an armalite, they did not suspect anything untoward to happen. However, without any provocation, appellant shot Sotto. The fact that the attack was frontal cannot negate treachery. The shooting was unexpected. There is no showing that the alleged warning given by appellant to Sotto afforded the latter sufficient time to defend himself. Indeed, Sotto could not defend himself as he was unarmed and a bit drunk — as observed by the appellant himself, the victim was walking in a zigzag manner. There was no way for Sotto to avoid the armalite bullets. Doctrine: Questions regarding the information charged should be

RULE 110 raised at the earliest possible time otherwise it shall be deemed waived. People v. Valdez 304 SCRA 611 Topic: Complex Crimes Facts: William Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Maria Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding party of Jean Marie's cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan. After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano. After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan they met appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with guns. The tricycle's headlight flashed on their faces. Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montano's group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, "nataydan, mapan tayon" (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and companions left. The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead. The trial court held that the accused Ronaldo Valdez is guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law, the offense having been a complex crime the penalty of which is in the maximum, and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby sentences him the ultimum suplicum of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and SANDRA MONTANO and the injured victims WILLIAM MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the erroneous Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple murder and double frustrated murder. Ruling: Yes. It may be noted that in his Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found a prima facie case for four separate counts of murder. Too, the same investigating judge in his Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found prima facie for two counts of

RULE 110 frustrated murder. It was upon reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated November 17, 1995. The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.) The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from

that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also several empty bullet shell recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative position of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder. Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, accusedappellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four

RULE 110 sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of 6 years and 1 day of prison mayor to maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion perpetua for each offense. Accused- appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four sentences of reclusion perpetua. He is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of frustrated murder and hereby meted two indeterminate sentences, each, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

her alleged recklessness, she hit the car of Norberto Bonsol causing him physical injuries, and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which reaffirmed the lower court’s decision.

Doctrine: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Issues: I

II

Reodica v. Court of Appeals 292 SCRA 87; July 8, 1998 Topic: Complex Crimes

III

Facts: Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Dona Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Due to

IV

Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question. Whether the duplicity of the information may be

RULE 110

V

VI

Ruling: I

II

questioned for the first time on appeal. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed. No. The Court held that the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure, it being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor, and the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of the Revised Penal Code as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by acorrectional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by

petitioner. III

Yes. Applying article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court held that it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties.

IV

No. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

V

No. The Court ruled that the MTC has jurisdiction as it has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. As to the reckless imprudence

RULE 110 resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. VI

No. The Supreme Court held that the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case.

months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages. Napoleon had jumped bail and remained at-large, and Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by the petitioner, filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. The judgment against accused then became final and executory. The RTC further ruled that Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., in the event of the insolvency of Napoleon, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the latter. Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts: Napoleon Macadangdang Roman, an employee of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that when the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer, as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, are

RULE 110 carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. Javier v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 75379, March 31, 1989 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts: Private respondent, Leon S. Gutierrez, Jr., issued to petitioners, Reynaldo and Estelita Javier, a check that was subsequently dishonored and not made good despite the required notice of dishonor. For this he has been charged with estafa under B.P. Blg. 22 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The information against the private respondent was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and the civil case was not reserved. Gutierrez then filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, in the complaint, the herein petitioners were charged with having inveigled Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of the criminal case in the Makati court. The complaint in effect explains why he issued the check for which he was facing prosecution for. Issue: Whether or not private respondent can raise the reason that he was inveigled into signing the very check subject of the criminal case in the RTC of Makati in another court, in a separate civil action for damages filed by him against the petitioners

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court sustaining the trial judge. It held that as the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati in accordance with Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as defendant in the criminal charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the civil action based on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was also before that same court that he could offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the petitioners. Further, the Court held that the private respondent should have done in the form of a counterclaim for damages for his alleged deception by the petitioners. In fact, the counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action. Casupanan v. Laroya G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by

RULE 110 petitioner Avelino Casupanan , figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac which was dismissed for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Issue: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasidelict against the private complainant in the criminal case Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation, and that the petitioners were right in filing an appeal. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under the said articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability exdelicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasidelict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasidelict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim

RULE 110 of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. General v. Claravall G.R. No. 96724, March 22, 1991 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts: Private respondent Benneth Thelmo filed a sworn complaint accusing petitioner, Honesto General, and another person of libel, and alleged that by reason of the offense he had suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in the total sum of P100 million. The information for libel was subsequently filed with the RTC at Pasig, after preliminary investigation, did not however contain any allegation respecting the damages due the offended party. At the trial, the defense raised the issue of non-payment of the docket fees corresponding to the claim of damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action therefor. The trial Court overruled the objection. It also denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration and motion for suspension of proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the rule should be that the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due course.

Ruling: The Supreme Court found no error in the challenged orders of the respondent and held that when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action—the rule is as follows: 1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"

Tan v. Mendez G.R. No. 138669; June 6, 2002 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111) Facts: Petitioners Steve Tan and Marciano Tan are the owners of Master Tours and Travel Corporation and operators of Philippine Lawin Bus Co., Inc., while respondent Fabian Mendez, Jr. is the owner of three gasoline stations in Iriga City, Ligao, Albay, and Sipocot, Camarines Sur. Petitioners opened a credit line for their buses lubricants and fuel consumption with respondent. At the same time, the latter was also

RULE 110 designated by petitioners as the booking and ticketing agent of Philippine Lawin Bus Co. in Iriga City. Petitioners issued several checks to respondent as payment for oil and fuel products. One of the checks was dishonored by the bank upon presentment for payment for being drawn against insufficient funds. Respondent sent a demand letter dated to petitioners demanding that they make good the check or pay the amount thereof, to no avail. However, petitioners failed to pay the amount thereof. Hence, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners argue that he cannot be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the amount subject of the check had already been extinguished by offset or compensation against the collection from ticket sales from the booking offices. He presented a memorandum showing the return to respondent of various unencashed checks in the total amount of Php 66,839.25 representing remittance of ticket sales that were earlier sent by respondent. After the alleged offset, there remains a balance of P226,785.83. On cross-examination, Marciano admitted to have drawn the subject check to pay private respondents gasoline station and that it was not covered by sufficient funds at the time of its issuance due to uncollected receivables. Upon query by the

court, he claimed that he did not talk to private complainant and could not tell if the latter agreed to offset the checks with the remittances. Respondent disputed petitioners claim of payment through offset or compensation:

1. the amount of the four unencashed checks totaling P66,839.25 could not have offset the amount of the dishonored checks since petitioners total obligations at that time had already reached P906,000; and 2. the compensation did not take place as there was no application of payment made by the petitioners in their memorandum dated June 10,1991.

The trial court ruled against the petitioners, convicting the petitioners for violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioners can be held liable for violation of B.P. 22. 2. Whether or not payment through compensation can offset or preclude prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.

Ruling: 1. Yes. The elements of B.P. 22 are present in the case at bar. The law enumerates elements of B.P. Blg. 22:

the

RULE 110 a. the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; b. the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and c. (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 2. No. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Thus, even if there had been payment, through compensation or some other means, there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. Furthermore, according to the Court, petitioners’s defense of compensation is unavailing because petitioners did not clearly specify in the memorandum dated June 10, 1991 which dishonored check is being offset. The Court also said, in accordance Article 1279 of the Civil Code, no compensation can take place between petitioners and respondent as respondent is not

a debtor of petitioners insofar as the two checks representing collections from the Baao ticket sales are concerned.

Republic v. Bello G.R. No. L-34906; 1983

January

27,

Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111) Facts: Private respondent Arceño, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School, was charged for malversation of public funds in the amount of Php6,619.34 which he supposedly failed to produce or to make proper accounting thereof after repeated demands. After due trial, the respondent Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding the evidence of the prosecution not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, rendered a decision acquitting Arceño on the following grounds: 1. undisputed facts clearly and unmistakably show lack of criminal intent on accused's part; 2. absence of proof that the accused benefited personally from his disbursements nor has it been shown that he was inexcusably negligent in the administration of public funds and properties entrusted to his care; 3. it has not been shown and proven that the government

RULE 110 suffered damage or prejudice as the accused's disbursements were for the benefit of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School; and 4. the funds claimed to be missing in the amount of Php6,619.34 is not really missing for the accused demonstrated that said amounts were spent for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School.

After the acquittal of Arceño, the Provincial Fiscal filed a civil case against Arceño for the recovery of the total sum of Php13,790.71 which represented the accountability of Arceño due to his failure to issue official receipts and to immediately deposit said funds with the National Treasury. Arceño filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in the said civil case alleging that the petitioner had no cause of action against him inasmuch as "the cause of action had been decided in a prior judgment." Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of Arceño in the criminal case bars the filing of the civil action against him. Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the decision did not absolve Arceño or free him from responsibility insofar as his accountability as Cashier and Disbursing Officer is concerned.

A judgment of acquittal on the ground that accused had no criminal intent and that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused does not bar a civil action for recovery of government funds disturbed without prior approval by the auditor. It is also to be noted that the subject subject-matter of the malversation case was the amount of Php6,619.34, the sum sought to be recovered in the civil action totalled Php13,790.70 which included the additional sum of Php7,170.31 representing the income of the school from its various projects for which the accused failed to issue official receipts. Even insofar as the amount of P6,619.34 is concerned, the finding by the respondent court is not a declaration that the fact upon which the civil case is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. Therefore, Arceño cannot invoke the provision of Section 3(c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court to dismiss the civil case filed against him.

RULE 110 Dela Cruz v. Ejercito G.R. No. L-40895; November 6, 1975 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111) Facts: On May 20, 1974, the first husband of Milagros Dela Cruz filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga charging the Dela Cruz with bigamy for having married Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino on September 15, 1973. On August 1, 1974, Dela Cruz filed in the same court a complaint for the annulment of her marriage with Gaccino on the ground of duress. Since the court did not receive an answer from Gaccino and there was no collusion on the part of both parties, Judge Castaneda rendered a decision annulling the marriage of Dela Cruz and Gaccino. The decision became final. On January 27, 1975, in view of the annulment of her second marriage, Dela Cruz filed a motion to dismiss the bigamy charge against her. Judge Ejercito denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the decision in the annulment case is not controlling in the criminal case because the parties and the issues in the two cases are not the same. Issue: Whether or not the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage was annulled.

Ruling: Yes. It is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be declared valid if its validity is questioned in a civil action. The Court ruled that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Dela Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted. Furthermore, the Court said that even supposing that the decree annulling the second marriage was questionable or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by default, still that would not prevent the decree from having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment."

Donato v. Luna G.R. No. L-53642; April 15, 1988 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111) Facts: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information for bigamy against Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.

RULE 110 On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner on the ground that the private respondent had no previous knowledge that the petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping. Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the bigamy case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case on the ground that the civil case seeking the annulment of his second marriage raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings for bigamy based on the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito. The motion was likewise denied due to lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

Ruling: No. The requisites of a prejudicial question is not present in the case at bar. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The Court stated the ruling in Landicho vs. Relova that “it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.” In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

RULE 110 With regard to the contention of the petitioner alleging that the case of Dela Cruz vs. Ejercito should be applied to the case at bar, the Court said that the Dela Cruz case and the case at bar are markedly different due to the following reasons: 1. Dela Cruz, the party who was accused of bigamy was the one who filed an action or annulment of the second marriage while in the case at bar, it was the private respondent who filed an action

for the annulment marriage; and

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2. A judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.