CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st Batch) (1).docx

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES 1. PEOPLE vs. PAREJA G.R. No. 202122

January 15, 2014

FACTS: AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates. AAA’s parents separated when she was only eight years old. At the time of the commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City. The first incident took place in December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, Pareja, while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of her. Then, Pareja, who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. Pareja then started to suck the breasts of AAA. Not satisfied, Pareja likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house. Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that Pareja might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to anyone. AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by Pareja. Under the same circumstances as the December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings were asleep, Pareja again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, Pareja caressed her and held her vagina and inserted his finger in it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw Pareja in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by Pareja x x x many times x x x. On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. RTC: Acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. CA: DENIED. ISSUE: Whether the trial court seriously erred in convicting Pareja of the crimes charged on the ground that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with inconsistencies. RULING: No. When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we enumerated them as follows: First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility. Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected. As this Court stated in People v. Saludo: Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has held: Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case 2. PEOPLE vs. YAU FACTS: Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom. On or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of

Mandaluyong City while respondent ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by Petrus Yau a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located in Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated. Ransom in the amount of US$600,000.00 and Php20,000.00 for each day of detention was demanded in exchange for his safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of the PNP. Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime and averred that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against him and his family. The RTC convicted appellants and was affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON THE CONVICTION IS PROPER RULING: The appeal is bereft with merit. In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden. Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led to the inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged like the victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding was found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus. 2|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) 3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA G.R. No. 195244

June 22, 2015

FACTS: Accused-appelant, Alvin Esugon was charged with Robbery with Homicide, allegedly for robbing cash money amounting to P13,000 from one Josephine Castro and in the process killing the same. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetra tor because there was no light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway. In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, on the evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and had then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect.

The RTC found appellant guilty for the crime charged. On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination. However, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant. ISSUE: W/N the identification of the perpetrator was credible and competent considering that the witness was a 5 year old lad? RULING: YES. (See Secs. 20 and 21 of RoC). As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, 3|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant. Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim. NOTE: supposedly, the case was under the topic Prosecution of offenses, however, nothing in the case proved relevant to said topic or any other topic under Crim Pro. 4. WILFRED N.CHIOK v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015 FACTS: Chiok was charged with Estafa in an information that reads: That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks, under the express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of P9,563,900.00.

RTC Convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa. The RTC, in an omnibus order dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for reconsideration, and also cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused indicated the probability of flight if released on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, he may commit another crime. Pursuant to the Omnibus Order, RTC issued a warrant of arrest but the same was returned on the ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given address. ISSUE: Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition. RULING: Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition. Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on her lack of personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy. Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA. In Villareal v. Aliga, we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may question the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz: x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). X x x To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private 4|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this guiding principle. The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an offended party, we direct the OSG to file its comment. When through its comment, the OSG takes a position similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private complainant's petition as its own. However, when the OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on personality or legal standing. In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the view that Chua's petition will place Chiok in double jeopardy. 5. PEOPLE vs. ESPEVA

6. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE G.R. No. 197291

April 3, 2013

Exclusion of an accused from the information did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious,

whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion. FACTS: This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioner’s petition for mandamus The NBI and the Philippine Natonal Police (PNP) charged petitioner, and other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre. Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 information for murder when he was arraigned. In the joint resolution issued, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. However, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request. Accordingly, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case 5|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) No. 10-124777), seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. On January 19, 2011, the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial order. In their manifestation and motion, respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. On March 21, 2011, the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777. Respondents moved to quash the subpoena to which petitioner opposed. On June 27, 2011, the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus

individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

ISSUES: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. RULING: No. Respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 7. UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. MICHAEL TAN a.k.a. PAUL D. TAN G.R. NO. 179367, JANUARY 29, 2014 J. BRION The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court. Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the 6|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Nevertheless, this policy of noninterference is not without exception. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." FACTS: Agent of the NBI applied for issuance of search warrants for the search of a warehouse allegedly owned by respondent, wherein it is alleged that the respondent had in his possession counterfeit shampoo products which were being sold or intended to be disposed of, in violation of Section 168, in relation with Section 170, of RA 8293 or Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. On the same day, Judge Eugenio, Jr. granted the application and issued Search Warrants. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI searched the premises and seized the alleged counterfeit shampoo products. The NBI thereafter filed with the DOJ a complaint against the respondent for violation of R.A. No. 8293. Respondent claimed that he is "Paul D. Tan," and not "Michael Tan" as alluded in the complaint; he is engaged in the business of selling leather goods and raw materials for making leather products, and he conducts his business under the name "Probest International Trading," registered with DTI; he is not engaged in the sale of counterfeit Unilever shampoo products; the sachets of Unilever shampoos seized from his are genuine shampoo products which they use for personal consumption; he does not own and does not operate the searched warehouse. State Prosecutor Abad of the DOJ dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ, which the Acting Secretary

of Justice, Merceditas N. Gutierrez, dismissed. Petitioner thereafter sought, but failed, to secure a reconsideration. As such, petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to establish facts and circumstances that would constitute acts of unfair competition. Under the present petition, petitioner argues that while it may be possible that the respondent is not the owner of the warehouse, the overwhelming pieces of evidence nonetheless prove that he is the owner of the counterfeit shampoo products found therein. The petitioner also maintains that the voluminous counterfeit shampoo products seized from the respondent are more than sufficient evidence to indict him for unfair competition. ISSUE: Whether the determination of probable cause lies within the competence of the public prosecutor. RULING: The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court. Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can neither override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case. Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely abused. In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice. 7|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of the DOJ shows that the complaint’s dismissal was anchored on the insufficiency of evidence to establish the respondent’s direct, personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the State Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner failed to prove the ownership of the warehouse where counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for unfair competition as the petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of the counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse. The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Thus, in concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the very offense charged. It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. 8. SATURNINO OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the murder of the victims found in a mass graveyard and with the crime of rebellion as leaders of the CPP/NPA/NPDF. They claimed that copies of the subpoena, the complaint and other supporting documents never reached them so that they were denied due process during the preliminary investigation, but the Court held that efforts were made by sending these to their addresses. Also, the judge complied with the Constitutional requirements in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was violated during the preliminary investigation RULING: NO. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies.The rule was meant to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses. A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint. 9. ALFREDO MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE AND JUNO CARS, INC. GR No. 197293. April 21, 2014 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari, assailing CA decision which reversed RTC’s dismissal of complaint against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa. 8|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) FACTS: Juno Cars hired Mendoza as a trade-in/used car supervisor, but upon partial auditing by the dealer/operator, it discovered that some of its cars have been sold by the Mendoza without prior permission and without his remittance of the payments, totaling to an amount of more than a million pesos. As defense, Mendoza alleged that Juno Cars failed to prove ownership or right to possess such cars. The Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause, to which Mendoza filed an MR. Upon denial, he filed a petition for review with the DOJ. While the MR was pending, the 2 informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before RTC Mandaluyong. Alfredo then filed a motion for determination of probable cause and a motion to defer arraignment. The clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted. Thus, the parties submitted the pending incidents for resolution. The RTC ruled to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. Juno Cars filed an MR, which was denied. It then filed a petition for certiorari with CA, arguing that the determination of probable cause rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor. CA found for Juno. Aggrieved, Mendoza elevated the case to the SC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause through the conduct of a preliminary investigation? RULING: Yes. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, for cases punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as qualified theft, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. During this stage, the conduct of preliminary investigation and determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor, On the other hand, once the information has been filed, the judicial determination of probable cause, to be handled by the judge upon evaluation of the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence, ensues for the purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest. As a rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public

prosecutor courts should not dismiss it for “want of evidence” because evidentiary matters are presented and heard during trial. RESOLUTION: While the information of the prosecutor was valid, the RTC judge however found that Juno Cars failed to prove their case by competent evidence. Hence, the petition was granted, in effect dismissing Mendoza’s case. 10. RAY SHU vs. JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND EDWIN SO G.R. No. 182573

April 23, 2014

FACTS: Ray Shu, Pres -- 3A Apparel Corporation filed a complaint before the NBI charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage (REM) submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC). Both REM deeds were allegedly signed by Shu, in his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation. After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati (city prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents; the complaint with the Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 (questioned documents report) which states that the signatures of the petitioner which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample signatures he submitted to the NBI. The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison. They also argued that the examination of the documents was conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate mortgage. The Ruling of the City Prosecutor found no probable cause against the respondents and, consequently, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. He ruled that the questioned documents report is not conclusive evidence that 9|Page

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) the respondents committed the crime charged. It only proves that the sample signatures which were submitted solely by the petitioner are different from the signatures appearing on the questioned deeds. The pieces of evidence presented before the city prosecutor, which were not made available to the NBI. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutor’s findings. She ruled that the city prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of the NBI questioned documents experts. This NBI finding is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof of irregularity in the performance of the experts’ duties. The complainant’s evidence is more credible and suffices to establish probable cause for falsification, as against the respondents’ questionable and flawed supporting documents. The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Justice; it ruled that the respondents were denied their right to due process in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice. In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the petitioner. In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not furnished with the petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even required to file their answer nor to comment. The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and personally involved in the investigation of the case, like the NBI investigating agent and the city prosecutor, were convinced that the evidence were not sufficient for purposes of filing charges against the respondents. The recommendation for the filing of the complaint came from the NBI chiefs and the Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate the case.

The CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor as he had the opportunity to examine the documents submitted by the parties, including the respondents’ evidence which the NBI did not consider. ISSUE I. II.

Whether the respondents were denied of their right to due process during the NBI investigation. Whether the findings of the city prosecutor are proper in preliminary investigation

RULING: I. NO. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration The Court held that the functions of this agency (NBI) are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible. Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, the Court found that no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. The court ruled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are more in accord with the duty to determine the existence of probable cause than the findings of the city prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the parties’ submitted pieces of evidence in ruling that "the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the 10 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. II. No. The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but should be threshed out in a full-blown trial In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents report issued by the NBI. He concluded that the documents submitted by the respondents showed that even a layman could see the striking similarities of the alleged signatures of the petitioner in the questioned deeds and in the documents submitted by the respondents. He also concluded that the petitioner misrepresented to the respondents-notaries public Miranda and Magpantay that the passport used in notarizing the questioned deeds was not yet cancelled.

genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine." The respondents' defense that there are striking similarities in the specimen signatures they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter of evidence whose consideration is proper only in a full-blown trial. In that proper forum, the respondents can present evidence to prove their defense and controvert the questioned documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the examination. The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's determination.

The city prosecutor already delved into the merits of the respondents’ defense. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or disproved. The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. Simply put, in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the rules of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical knowledge.

It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; when he grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.

That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as

The case is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court which annulled and set aside the Resolution dated 18 March 2008 of petitioner DOJ. The assailed Resolution: (1) set aside the Supplemental Resolution dated 16 December 2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte; and (2) directed the filing of the corresponding Information for three (3) counts of rape against respondent Alaon. (The Sec. of Justice’s directive was based on a letter of BBB, AAA’s mother, narrating what happened to AAA.)

Hence, the petition is granted and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals 11. DOJ vs. ALAON

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) FACTS: Private complainant AAA filed a complaint against Alain charging him with the crime of rape occurring on three separate but successive occasions. The first incident transpired sometime in October 2000, while she was picking guavas that had fallen from trees at a construction site beside Alaon’s house in Sta. Elena Camarines Norte. Alaon denied the charges against him and alleged that AAA’s family merely fabricated the charge in retaliation to their eviction from the land which Alaon owned. The Provincial Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte found probable cause to indict Alaon for three (3) counts of rape. However, acting favorably on Alaon’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, an Information against Alaon was filed before the RTC in Labo, Camarines Norte. Alaon entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment. Apparently confused, Prosecutor Estrellado, on 12 June 2003, filed a motion to withdraw appearance, insisting that the case remained pending review by the Sec. of Justice and as such, has been directed to withdraw appearance from the case, but it was denied. Then Prosec. Estrellado filed another Motion this time, to suspend proceedings which was also denied by the RTC. Alaon filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether DOJ acted in grave abuse of discretion. HELD: NO. The SC did not accept in its entirety the reasons behind the finding of the appellate court. There is no quarrel about the Sec. of Justice’s power of review over the actions of his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, the SC do not find abuse of discretion, much more grave abused of discretion, by the Sec. of Justice when he took cognizance of BBB’s letter and treated it as a petition for review from the provincial prosecutor’s resolution. It cannot be said that in this case, there was an “absence of a petition for review.”

Nonetheless, the SC agree with the appellate court’s holding that Alaon was deprived of his right to procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the letter-appeal of private complainant’s mother. The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigation officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. Even at the stage of petition for review before the Sec. of Justice, the requirements for substantive and procedural due process do not abate. With the SC’s holding that the Sec. of Justice acted in excess of jurisdiction when he failed to afford Alaon an opportunity to be heard on private complainant’s letter which he deemed as a petition for review, SC affirms the appellate court’s issuance of the special writ of certiorari, annulling the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ. The appeal is DENIED. 12. P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, et al vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Lilian filed a complaint before the DOJ charging with multiple murder Petitioners et al belonging to the PNP in connection with the Highway Patrol Group, as well as officers from the PNP Special Action Force. The complaint alleges that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG conspired in carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera (Jun) and their 7-year-old daughter, Lia Allana. After a shooting altercation transpired near their house, Lilian went back only to be prohibited from entering her residence. It appeared that her husband and daughter were in their vehicle when the officers suddenly fired at them. The husband was shot in cold blood and the daughter was rushed to the nearest hospital.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) The DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation finding probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action that led to the shooting of Jun and Lia for two counts of murder, and subsequently filed the information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque City. Petitioners filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants for their arrest. They also sought the annulment of the DOJ resolution on the ground of violation of their constitutional rights. Further, they asked that the information be quashed on the ground that the facts it alleged did not constitute an offense. RTC dismissed the case against petitioners for lack of probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of seeing anyone from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and his daughter. Instead, the RTC found that the evidence tends to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested and acted merely as blocking force in a legitimate police operation and Lilian had not refuted this. On the other hand the R TC issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers, having found probable cause against them. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order covering petitioner HPG officers but the RTC denied the same. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part, which the CA granted ruling that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in failing to evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses on whom the DOJ relied on. ISSUE: WON RTC erred in arriving in its decision RULING: No. The R TC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG officers.1âwphi1 Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's petition for special civil action of certiorari that assails the correctness of the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that such action is available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

Moreover, in case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only the Office of the Solicitor General, however, may pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required appellant's brief or withdraw the same. 13. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 197590 DEL CASTILLO, J.:

November 24, 2014

FACTS: Antonio Manly (respondent) is a stockholder and Exec. VP of Standard Realty Corporation,a family-owned corporation. The BIR issued Letter of Authority to investigate spouses’ internal revenue tax liabilities for taxable year 2003 and prior years. The CIR issued a letter to spouses requiring to submit documentary evidence to substantiate source of cash purchase of a 256-sqm log cabin in Tagaytay worth P17,511,010.00. Spouses failed to comply with the letter. The Revenue officers executed a joint affidavit alleging that respondent’s reported annual income is modest (more or less P150,000.00 a year) but the spouses were able to purchase in cash a luxurious vacation house, a Toyota Rav4, and a Toyota Prado. Hence, the Revenue officers concluded that respondent’s ITRs for 2000, 2001 and 2003 were underdeclared. Since the under declaration exceeded 30% of the reported or declared income, it was considered a prima facie evidence of fraud with intent to evade the payment of proper taxes due to the government. The Revenue officers recommended the filing of criminal complaints (tax evasion etc.) against spouses for failing to supply correct info in ITR. The spouses denied the accusations alleging that they used their accumulated savings from their earnings from the past years. CIR also failed to issue deficiency assessment. The State Prosecutor found probable cause. On appeal the CA found no no probable cause because the CIR failed to state exact tax liability and to show sufficient proof of their likely source of income. The CA further said that before 13 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) one could be prosecuted for tax evasion, the fact that a tax is due must first be proved. ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to indict respondent spouses for tax evasion. RULING: YES. The amount of tax due from respondent spouses was specifically alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. The computation, as well as the method used in determining the tax liability, was also clearly explained. The revenue officers likewise showed that the under declaration exceeded 30% of the reported or declared income. Respondent spouses’ defense that they had sufficient savings to purchase the properties remains self-serving at this point since they have not yet presented any evidence to support this. Moreover, by just looking at the tables presented by petitioner, there is a manifest showing that respondent spouses had under declared their income. The huge disparity between respondent Antonio’s reported or declared annual income for the past several years and respondent spouses’ cash acquisitions for the years 2000, 2001, and 2003 cannot be ignored. Infact, it makes uswonder how they were able to purchase the properties in cash given respondent Antonio’s meager income. In view of the foregoing, the SC is convinced that there is probable cause to indict respondent spouses for tax evasion as petitioner was able to show that a tax is due from them. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, is defined as such facts that are sufficient to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed, that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and that he should be held for trial. It bears stressing that the determination of probable cause does not require actual or absolute certainty, nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt; it only requires reasonable belief or probability that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the accused. 14. MA. GARCIA HAO and DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR NO 183345, September 17, 2014

FACTS: Private complainant Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and Victor Ngo. Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Ngo where the latter worked as a bank manager and because of this, took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced DY to Ma. Garcia Hao. Relying on them, Dy initially invested approximately 10million pesos. It earned the promise interest leading Dy to increase his investment up to more than 100million pesos through issuing several checks and in return Petitioner Garcia also issued him several checks representing his earnings of investment. But these checks issued to Dy were all dishonored. Subsequently, Dy sought the assistance of Ngo to recover the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo, in return, promised assistance but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned as bank manager and could no longer be located. Thereafter, he confronted Garcia. Eventually, Dy learned that Garcia used the money of Dy in the construction of a realty business of her husband, Danny Hao. Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s money. Hence, Dy filed the said criminal complaint before the prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor then filed an information for syndicated estafa before the RTC of Manila. Warrants of arrest were issued for the accused. However, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment and to lift the warrant of arrest invoking the absence of probable cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. The trial court denied the motion as well as the reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. HELD: Yes. In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-accused. To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The records showed that Judge Marquez 14 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) made a personal determination of the existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present any evidence to controvert this. Under this situation, the Court concludes that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense. 15. JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ AND RONALD MUÑOZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014 FACTS: The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless took place. The RTC denied the motion and the CA affirmed the denial. Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately survived the attack. Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant. Hence, they are entitled to a Preliminary Investigation and not only an inquest proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of RTC denying the motion for Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to state the facts and the law upon which it was based. HELD: The petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" is dependent on the particular circumstances of the case. The Court clarified the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances". Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. In the case at bar, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling. The complainant positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the parties lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the 15 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners. It is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests. Hence, when the RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case." Clearly, there is no grave abuse of discretion that has been committed by the Court in issuing the order of denial. In resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case and not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial. Additionally, it is the Constitution itself that provides that the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. Otherwise, it will prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. COMPLAINT/ INFORMATION 16. TERESITA A. CIRON vs. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, ET AL.

FACTS: Ortega filed a Complaint against Ciron, then Credit and Collection Officer of USANT, of estafa for failure to remit an amount. Ciron filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and a supplement motion for reinvestigation. The OCP of Iriga holds that no cogent reason to alter, modify or reconsider its earlier Resolution of finding probable cause that Ciron is probably guilty of the crime of estafa. RTC dismissed the case without prejudice to their re-filling. In view of the dismissals without prejudice to the criminal cases, OCP Iriga in his Supplemental Resolutions recommended the filing of a total of 21 informations for estafa against Ciron. Aggrieved, Ciron filed a ComplainAffidavit against Ortega, et al. before the Ombudsman, accusing them of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Ciron contends that the Order already attained finality and that OCP Iriga could no longer revive nor reinstate the estafa charges against her without Ortega filing a new Complaint. Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint against Ortega, et al. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict Ortega, et al. RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint against Ortega, et al. since the issuance of the Supplemental Resolutions and the filing of the new Informations against Ciron even without a new complaint having been filed for preliminary investigation were done in accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Furthermore, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether an Information should be filed. 17. DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013 FACTS: Disini was charged by the Office of the Ombudsman with corruption of public officials. The Information states:

GR Nos. 194339-41, 20 April 2015 16 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) Criminal Case No. 28001 That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials. CONTRARY TO LAW. Criminal Case No. 28002 That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and

Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCOAsia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT. CONTRARY TO LAW. Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Disini moved for reconsideration but Sandiganbayan denied his motion. ISSUES: Whether the information complied with the prescribed form under the law RULING: The informations (Criminal Case No. 28001 [corruption of public officials] and Criminal Case No. 28002 [violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019]) were sufficient in form and substance, in accordance with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, viz: Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. 17 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial. In Criminal Case No. 28001, the felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP (Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project) to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos. The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and 2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery. The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery. The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:

1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; 2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government; 3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government. The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia EscolinDisini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP (Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project); (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP. 18. VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 198389 December 11, 2013 FACTS: On April 15, 2002, Roallos who was the Executive Director of a Credit Cooperative inside Camp Aguinaldo, aproached the 15-year old daughter (AAA) of his secretary (BBB) inside his office. After asking a few questions with AAA, Roallos placed his right hand on AAA's shoulder then slid his hand towards AAA's breast and mashed it. Afterwards, 18 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) Roalos also kissed the cheek of AAA. Both of these acts were committed against her will. Roallos was later on charged and convicted before the QC-RTC of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b)[,] Art. III of R.A. 7610. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUES: 1) Whether Roallo's conviction is valid considering that the Information filed against him was defective since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. 2) Whether the charge against him was defective since neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information that was filed against him. RULING: 1) Yes. Roallos’ claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear – Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. 2) No. That neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not render the charge against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to the filing of the Information against Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously pursued the indictment against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos’ claim, AAA executed a complaint-affidavit for the indictment of Roallos. The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate the conformity of both AAA and BBB to the charge against Roallos. DOCTRINE:

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. 19. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE AND PLDT G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014 FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of PNP filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of PLDT. RTC granted the application for three search warrants. Petitioners filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, on the following grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were fruits of the poisonous tree. RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants. CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective. ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had the personality to question the quashal of the search warrants. SC RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search warrants. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal 19 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) Procedure states that all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. The provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or information, but by the filing of an application therefor. An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. The Court has consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly, the Court sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT/ INFORMATION 20. FELINA ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 173988

October 8, 2014

BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan

to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan told the incident to his mother and aunt who then immediately went to the Police to file charges. Petitioner was charged with violation of R.A. 7610 and then subsequently convicted by the Regional Trial Court. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence petitioner elevated the matter to the SC challenging the sufficiency of the information against her. ISSUE: Whether or not the information charging petitioner with child abuse is sufficient RULING: Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. In this case, the information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge. Hence, the petition was denied. 21. ENRILE vs. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414; October 22, 2014 20 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) FACTS: The mauling incident involving neighbors end up with filing of criminal case in the MTC for frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment. The MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled. ISSUE: Is it proper to invoke a motion to quash the information filed in the MTC in this case? RULING: No. The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable. 22. PEOPLE vs. ANDRADE G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014

FACTS: On June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples tested positive. After confirmatory tests done by the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division, those twenty-one (21) urine samples, which included that of herein respondents, yielded positive results confirming the result of the initial screen test. Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165). All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006. On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165, Respondents' lawyer, on the date set for hearing, manifested that he intends to pursue the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents' previous counsel, hence, the pre-trial and trial were reset to September 29, 2006. RTC: Granted respondents Motion to Dismiss. CA: Denied the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the court erred in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause in the information. RULING: Yes. Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge. 21 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists. Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information without dismissing the case. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, thus: Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.

In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. In People v. Talao Perez, this Court ruled that, "...even granting that the information in question is defective, as pointed out by the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a new information be filed, and save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be amended. 23. PEOPLE vs. RAYON FACTS: XYZ (mother) recalled that the appellant (father) would bring AAA, who is mentally deficient, in a videoke bar without her knowledge, and they would usually return home at 1:00 a.m. Upon their return, AAA would complain of experiencing loose bowel movement, and of pain in her stomach. One time, when XYZ arrived at their house after buying rice, she saw the appellant embracing AAA and spreading her legs; the appellant then put his hand on AAA’s breast, inserted his other hand inside her underwear, and touched her vagina. When the appellant noticed XYZ’s presence, he immediately stood up and instructed her to prepare food. XYZ felt "bad and afraid," but did not confront the appellant. She instead went to the kitchen to do her chores.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

On December 16, 2005, BBB, another child, revealed to XYZ that the appellant had raped her. XYZ requested assistance from a municipal social worker who, in turn, told her to file a case before the police.

If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.

The RTC and the CA convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. Hence, this petition.

Appellant claimed that XYZ falsely accused him of raping AAA because he disallowed her to have an American "pen pal." The appellant also denied BBB’s allegation that he sodomized her.

ISSUE: WON THE CONVICTION IS PROPER 22 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) RULING: The SC affirm the conviction with modification. The Information charged the appellant with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The body of the Information, however, alleged that the appellant sexually molested AAA; kissed her; mashed her breasts; fondled her; and forcibly opened her legs. These acts, to our mind, described acts punishable under Section 5(b) of the same law. In the present case, all the elements of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 have been established. First, the appellant embraced AAA, parted her legs, touched her breasts, inserted his hand inside the victim’s underwear, and touched her vagina. Second, the appellant used his moral ascendancy over her daughter in order to perpetrate his lascivious conduct. Finally, AAA was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident, based on her birth certificate and on her mother’s testimony. We stress that "the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, xxx but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information."31 The averments in the information against the appellant in Criminal Case No. 2006-174 clearly make out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. 24. ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170863

March 20, 2013

FACTS: An information was filed with the RTC charging petitioner Anthony Zapanta, together with one Concordia O. Loyao, of the crime of qualified theft, with the relevant part of the information quoted as follows: “That sometime in the month of October, 2001…steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value of ₱2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR…”

In 2001, AMCGS undertook the construction of Porta Vaga building in Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to ANMAR. ANMAR assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction materials. On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck driver, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo and several welders, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street. AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar’s warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook. Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision of qualified theft. The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) ISSUE: W/N the information was sufficient in form and as such, did not deprive petitioner of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him? RULING: YES. (see Secs. 6 and 11 of Rule 110 of the RoC). Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense. We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.17 Clearly, the month of November is the month right after October. 25. BENILDA N. BACASMAS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 189343

July 10, 2013

FACTS: All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu. By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing cash advances for the City. COA created a team to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Cash Division, City Treasurer’s Office of Cebu City. This team conducted a surprise cash count.

The examination revealed an accumulated shortage of ₱9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the cash and accounts of Gonzales. Hence, an Information25 was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The SB held that the acts of the accused had caused not only undue injury to the government because of the ₱9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash advances to which she was not entitled.36 Lastly, it found conspiracy to be present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they had confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one another in causing undue injury to the government through the loss of public money. The Sandiganbayan, denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because the three modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful, intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or employee.48 Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information.49 The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was the practice in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and grant of cash advances.50 The anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to ₱9,810,752.60.51 It further declared that the aforementioned cases cited by the accused were inapplicable, because there was paucity of evidence of conspiracy in these cases.52 Here, conspiracy was duly proven in that the silence and inaction of the accused albeit ostensibly separate and distinct  indicate, if taken collectively, that they are vital pieces of a common design. ISSUE: Whether the Information was sufficient. RULING: YES. The Information specified when the crime was committed, and it named all of the accused and their alleged acts or omissions constituting the offense charged. An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of 24 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was committed. The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no inherent contradiction and properly charged an offense.

addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the consequences of one’s actions or omissions. 26. PEOPLE vs. VIDANA

First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof.60 The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.61 Here, the date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. That the Information alleged a date and a period during which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as a result of petitioners’ acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster. Second, the Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances.62 Cesa is wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the Information. Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against petitioners,64 namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence"  in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law.65 In

FACTS: Accused was separated in 1998 and began living in with a certain Irene Valoria, his common-law wife, who became the stepmother of his four children including AAA. They were staying in a one-bedroom house owned by a certain Edgar Magsakay at Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Around midnight of 16 September 2003, Accused was alone at the sala and the children were asleep inside the bedroom. [AAA] suddenly was jolted from her sleep when somebody pulled her out of the bed and brought her to the sala . She later recognized the person as her father, who covered her mouth and told her not to make any noise. At the sala, Accused forcibly removed [AAA]’s short pants, t-shirt, bra and panty. As she lay naked, Accused inserted his penis into [AAA]’s vagina. [AAA]’s ordeal lasted for about five (5) minutes and all the while she felt an immense pain. Accused tried to touch [AAA]’s other private parts but she resisted. The Accused warned her not to tell anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings. The next day, [AAA] went to the house of Francisco and Zenny Joaquin. Spouses Joaquin are friends of Accused, whose house is about 500 meters away. Zenny Joaquin noticed something was bothering [AAA] so she confronted the latter. [AAA] broke down and revealed to Zenny what happened to her at the hands of [appellant]. Taken aback by the trauma suffered by the young lass, Zenny promptly accompanied [AAA] to the police to report the incident. The examination of the medico-legal officer on [AAA] revealed "positive healed laceration at 7 o’clock position positive hymenal tag. Trial on the merits ensued and at the conclusion of which the trial court rendered judgment against appellant by finding him guilty beyond reasonable 25 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) doubt of violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610. ISSUE: Whether the court erred in characterizing the offense charged as sexual abuse. HELD: Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that "the complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it." The information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the information with feloniously having carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter against her will by using his influence as a father. Considering further that the minority of AAA and her relationship to appellant were both alleged in the information and proven in court, the proper designation of appellant’s felony should have been qualified rape. As such, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, in lieu of the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 must be imposed. AMENDMENT/ SUBSTITUTION 27. DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. 179962

June 11, 2014

FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit with the Department of Justice against the petitioner. The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor doing business for taxable years 2001 to 2003 under certain trade names and registration addresses. BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the government.

After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor found probable cause against petitioner for non-filing of income tax returns for said taxable years and for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year. Accordingly an Information was filed with the CTA charging the petitioner with violation of Section 255 of Republic Act No. 8424. The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on March 5, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court." The petitioner failed to file his comment to the motion within the required period; thus on June 12, 2007, the CTA First Division granted the prosecution’s motion. The CTA ruled that the prosecution’s amendment is merely a formal one as it "merely states with additional precision something already contained in the original information." The petitioner failed to show that the defenses applicable under the original information can no longer be used under the amended information since both the original and the amended information charges the petitioner with the same offense (violation of Section 255). The petitioner filed the present petition after the CTA denied his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied RULING: No. Amendment of information Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter of amending the information: Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as the 26 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14. Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused of the charge of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information. Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments. In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for income earned." We cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as accused. 1. The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for income earned" Interestingly, in denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA implicitly ruled that there was in fact no amendment of the date in the information by correctly citing what the original information alleges. 2. In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is "doing business under the name and style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given the nature of a sole

proprietorship, the addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style" is merely descriptive of the nature of the business organization established by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the "entity" "Mendez Medical Group" because this entity is nothing more than the shadow of its business owner - petitioner himself. At any rate, we agree with the prosecution that petitioner has no reason to complain for the inclusion of the phrase "Mendez Medical Group." In the Reply-Affidavit it submitted during the preliminary investigation, the prosecution has attached copies of petitioner's paid advertisements making express reference to "Mendez Medical Group." 28. LETICIA I. KUMMER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 174461, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 J. BRION The date of commission in the complaint charging the accused of homicide was amended from July 19,1998 to June 19,1998 . Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. FACTS: Petitioner and her son Johan were charged with homicide for allegedly shooting Jesus Mallo, Jr (Mallo) on July 19, 1998. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed. The complaint was later amended changing the date of commission from July 19, 1998 to June 19, 1998. RTC find both the petitioner and Johan guilty of homicide based on 27 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Amiel Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo which was coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses. The petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA. She averred that the RTC erred, among others: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue. The petitioner also claimed that she was not arraigned on the amended complaint for which she was convicted. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment. Hence, this petition ISSUES: 1) Whether the discrepancies between the affidavit and testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses affect their credibility 2) Whether paraffin test results is admissible as evidence 3) Whether there is a need for the petitioner to be arraigned in the amended complaint RULING: Petition denied 1) Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect their credibility

It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context. The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.

In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and Cuntapay, the petitioner pointed inconsistencies in their affidavits and testimonies open court.

2) Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and authenticity

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 28 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly lighted.

the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.

3) Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required.

G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended. It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide. Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above,

29. KARLO ANGELO DABALOS vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA)

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. The RTC Ruling - The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262. ISSUE: Whether or not amendment is necessary to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended party. RULING: As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. 29 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) Court finds the Order of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION 30. DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM VS. PEOPLE GR NO. 192123. MARCH 10, 2014 NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the RTC and CA against a doctor. FACTS: Dr. Solidum, an anesthesiologist, was part of a surgical team of doctors in Ospital ng Maynila who conducted a pull-through operation (creation of anal opening by resection of large intestines) on Gerald Gercayo, a three-year old child with an imperforate anus. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia (low heart rate) and went into a coma. He subsequently regained consciousness, but then, he could no longer see, hear or move. Gerald’s mother filed a complaint against the attending physicians with the City Prosecutor of Manila. The Office filed an information in MeTC Manila solely against Dr. Solidum, for failing to monitor and regulate properly

the levels of anesthesia during Gerald’s operation, to his damage and prejudice. The case was transferred to RTC-Family Court, which found the doctor guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, and sentenced him to be imprisoned, pay damages amounting to P600,000 plus costs, and cancelled his bail. His colleagues filed for MR to exclude them from solidary liability as to the damages, to which the court acceded. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC on the case as a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Solidum can be held civilly liable after being acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt of reasonable doubt? RULING: No. Although the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not automatically exempt him from civil liability, the circumstances established do not present factual and legal bases for doing so. There was no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerald had been caused. The manner of administration of anesthesia was not necessarily the cause of hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerald. To adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would speculate on the cause of hypoxia and the court refused to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence. RESOLUTION: The court found the res ipsa loquitur inappropriate, as there was no sufficient proof that Dr. Solidum had been negligent during the operation. The same can be said for the dismissal of the criminal negligence case, as the prosecution failed to present any witness with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. As the determination of negligence and malpractice cannot be had, his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court granted the petition and acquitted Dr. Solidum of the crime, without any pronouncement on costs of the suit. 31. ANTONIO M. GARCIA vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. G.R. No. 172505

October 1, 2014

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) FACTS: Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The deed was for the sale and purchase of shares of stock from various corporations, including one class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and one proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc. These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia. The contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at public auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia. Thereafter, a deed of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc.; that Antonio Garcia can redeem the properties sold within 180 days from the signing of the agreement. However, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase the shares of stock. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific performance and annulment of transfer of shares.

private complainant hereby gives notice, out of extreme caution, that it is appealing the Decision dated 12 December 1996 and the Order dated 29 July 1997 on the civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that it is notin accordance with the law and the facts of the case. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due course thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the consolidation of this appeal with the said petition.

On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the contracts entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public auction to Philippine Investment System Organization.

ISSUE: Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the awards given as civil liability ex delicto

Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a complaint for estafa against Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial, for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances. In the decision dated December 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Antonio Garcia was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and ruled that private complainant was aware of the status of the subject CLUB SHARES. Thus, the element of false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means which constitute the very cause or the only motive which induced the private complainant to enter into the questioned deed of sale (Exh. "A") is wanting in the case at bar. On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the July 29, 1997 order of the Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case. The notice of appeal filed was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)." It alleged: Herein

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in its decision dated August 11, 2005, granted the appeal and awarded Ferro Chemicals, Inc. the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as actual loss with legal interest and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00. The appellate court found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings Organization’s lien over the club shares.

RULING: The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delictois instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that ‘the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist’." When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus, the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex delicto, is asserted in both actions before this court and the Court of Appeals. [T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately 31 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping. On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial Court or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping. This is not the situation here. The court sees no more reason to discuss the issue presented by the parties in light of the foregoing discussion. Hence, the petition is granted to set aside CA’s decision. 32. COSCUELLA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: On 9 Nov. 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman received a lettercomplaint from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province of Negros Occidental in the amount of P20M which allegedly

happened around a month before petitioner stepped down from office as governor. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated 16 Apr. 2012 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits. On 27 Mar. 2003, a Resolution was prepared, finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. Petitioners alleged that they learned about the 27 Mar, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB (19 Jun 2009). Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, inter alia, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. Other co-petitioners later adopted Coscolluela’s motion. In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash, explaining that although the Information was originally dated 27 Mar. 2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim. ISSUE: Whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated. HELD: YES. A person’s right to speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under the Constitution. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasijudicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 32 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioner’s duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. While the foregoing pronouncement should, as a matter of course, result in the acquittal of the petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue. Sec. 2, Rule 111 ROC provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Based on the violation of petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution o the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Sec. 2, Rule 120 ROC. Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only to recover the amount of P20M in public funds attributable to petitioner’s alleged malfeasance. 33. NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS vs. PURIFICACION F. FELIPE FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) was filed by petitioner against respondent for her issuance of a postdated check in the amount of ₱1,020,000.00, which was subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT", in consideration of a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and utility vehicle (SUV) from Nissan which Respondent’s Son purchased. Despite non-payment, Frederick took possession of the vehicle.

Because of this, a demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through Frederick, who lived with her. The letter informed her of the dishonor of the check and gave her five (5) days from receipt within which to replace it with cash or manager’s check. Despite receipt of the demand letter, Purificacion refused to replace the check giving the reason that she was not the one who purchased the vehicle. During the preliminary investigation, Purificacion gave ₱200,000.00 as partial payment to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter, however, no additional payment had been made. MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but holding her civilly liable to Nissan. On appeal, RTC affirmed the MeTC stating that Purificacion was estopped from denying that she issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit standing of Frederick and that Nissan agreed not to deposit the same. Further, the RTC considered Purificacion to be an accommodation party. The CA, before whom the case was elevated via a petition for review, granted the petition reasoning out that there was no privity of contract between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability could be adjudged against her because of her acquittal from the criminal charge. ISSUE: WON Purificacion may be made liable RULING: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal action, subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action (unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action). (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. 33 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.16 If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.17This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.18 The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists. Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly issuing a worthless check. Purificacion issued the bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly liable because the act or omission, the making and issuing of the subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists. INTERVENTION 34. LEONARDO A. VILLALON and ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON vs. AMELIA CHAN G.R. No. 196508 BRION, J.:

September 24, 2014

FACTS: Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua. During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Chua, this time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993. Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. A verified complaint-affidavit alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Antipolo. Consequently, an Information was filed with the RTC. On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia, the private offended party. Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia. Amelia opposed the omnibus motion, while the public prosecutor joined the petitioners in disqualifying Atty. Atencia from appearing in the case. The RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. Trial of the case ensued thereafter. Amelia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. The petition was granted and annulled the order disqualifying Atty. Atencia to intervene in the case. : Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violatedthe respondent’s rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the whole proceedings on the bigamy case. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violated the respondent’s rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. RULING: YES. Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, 34 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) reserves the right to institute it separatelyor institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the respondent. The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case. JURISDICTION/ VENUE 35. FELY Y. YALONG vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCILA C. YLAGAN GR NO 187174, August 28, 2013 FACTS: Respondent Ylagan filed a criminal complaint against Petitioner Yalong for the crime of violation of BP 22. Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the said charge. The case was then set for pre-trial and therafter, trial ensued. During the trial, Ylagan testifies that Yalong borrowed from her 450,000 with a verbal agreement that the same would be paid back to her in cash, and as payment therof, issued to her a postdated check in the similar amount. However, when Ylagan presented the subject check for payment, it was dishonored and returned her for the reason of “Account Closed”. After several demands from Yalong, Ylagan filed the instant case. Yalong averred that she already paid the said loan but did not require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. She also claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check did not cover sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan. The MTCC found Yalong guilty. A motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed a notice of appeal which was also denied on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies available to her under the law when she failed to appear without justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of

the MTCC Decision, she did not surrender within 15 days from the date of such promulgation, she did not file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law, and she remained at large. She filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition) before the RTC which denied the petition. The CA dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground that the order of the RTC was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – where appeal [by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC] – and not a petition for review is the proper remedy. Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of improper appeal. HELD: No. While the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. It is fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA. As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same. Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the 35 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) instant case. As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA. 36. RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014 FACTS: Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, assigned to its Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I. On March 20, 1995, at about past noon, Atibula, Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s birthday party in Ermita, Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked him to assist the latter in searching for a certain CA decision. Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office – followed a few minutes later by Dario – and searched for the aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions. As Dario was scanning through the said volume. On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound. Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of the volumes of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately left. On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260, which the latter turned down. He reported the incident to Atty. Arnel Macapagal, the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, who then instructed him (Atibula) to hide the Volumes in a safe place. On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 covering the period from January 28 to February 12, 1969 was missing and, hence, immediately reported the same to Atty. Macapagal. On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division, handed to Atibula a bag containing the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula. Having been notified of Volume 266’s return, Atty. Macapagal then directed Atibula to ascertain who borrowed the volume. Records, however, disclosed

no one. Separately, Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein. Atty. Tablate reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and requested the NBI to conduct an investigation on the matter. On the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the air–conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporter’s Division was conducted, whereby it was discovered that the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division “by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit” and there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public Document between Atienza and Dario for profit in view of their “concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous acts and deeds”. After investigation, the accused were charged for the crimes of Robbery and of Falsification of Public Document. Atienza denied having anything to do with the questioned incidents as he was not even summoned by the CA Clerk of Court or the Chief of the Reporter’s Division, and became aware of the incident only when he and Castro were subpoenaed by the NBI Special Investigators. The petitioners were found guilty by the RTC for the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether the court has a jurisdiction over the case HELD: No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Case since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of BP129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well–settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. 36 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) 37. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO GR No. 168539, 25 March 2014 FACTS: Arturo Enrile (Enrile), then secretary of the DOTC, in conspiracy with the accused, Henry T. Go (Go), Chairman and President of PIATCO, entered into a Concession Agreement in violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 “Entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract of transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not a public officer profited or will profit thereby.” The Sandiganbayan (SB) gave the prosecution ten (10) days to show that the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Enrile is already deceased. The prosecution complied with the order and stated that SB has already acquired Jurisdiction over Go because of his voluntary appearance when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. ISSUE: Whether or not SB acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused due to his voluntary appearance? RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that it is a well settled rule that the act of an accused in posting bail and in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. The accused to question the court’s jurisdiction over his person shall raise the question at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs the complaint of files any dilatory plea, he thereby submits his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the contention of the accused that by reason of the death of Enrile, the public officer whom he was alleged to have conspired before the filing of the information, that no public officer was charged hence prosecution against Go may not prosper, is untenable. It does not mean that the allegations of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Enrile is his criminal liability.

38. ASISTIO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015. FACTS: Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (RA 6938) before the RTC for allegedly defrauding A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative of which she was the Chairperson and Managing Director. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case arguing that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case. RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order and remanded the case records to the RTC for further proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case? RULING: YES. In this case, there was a mistake on the part of the accused and RTC in the use and interpretation of the provision mentioned above in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. It appears that the applicable provision is Section 46 (liability of directors, officers and committee members) in relation to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938, which provides that the liable person shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC. 39. ANA LOU B. NAVAJA v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-GARCIAHERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY. EDGAR BORJE 37 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015 FACTS: Sometime in October 2003, petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, while she was still its Regional Sales Manager of DKT Phils. falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it. Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-GarciaHernandez, Bohol. Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment on the ground that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue. ISSUE: Whether the MCTC of Jagna-Bohol has jurisdiction over the case. RULING: Yes. Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because not one of the essential elements of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof, the Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol. DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

40. ARMILYN MORILLO VS. PEOPLE G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015 FACTS: Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong. ISSUE: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case. SC RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in 38 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCI Bank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. ARREST 41. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI G.R. No. 201363

March 18, 2013

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: FACTS: On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30am as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet with his initials.

Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito for examination. Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his wallet which contained ₱1,000.00. Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters’ firing range. There, "Michelle" and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued to deny knowledge about the cellphone. Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment. The following day he was charged for illegal possession of drugs. The RTC convicted appellant for the crime charged. The CA sustained appellant’s conviction ISSUE: W/N appellant was lawfully arrested without warrant RULING: No. The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is 39 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu. 42. PEOPLE vs. SALVADOR G.R. No. 19062; February 10, 2014 FACTS: A report was filed by a confidential informant before the Quezon City Police about a supposed drug transaction by one named Glenn Salvador. Because of this information, the QC Police, led by PO2 Soriano, set-up a buybust operation. PO2 Soriano posed as a buyer of shabu. Salvador then sold him P200.00 worth of shabu. When the exchange of the buy-bust money and heated-plastic sachet of shabu took place, PO2 Soriano immediately arrested Salvador. The accused was found guilty by the lower courts and filed the present appeal on the ground that the marking of the seized sachets of shabu was not made in his presence at the scene of the crime, hence, his arrest was illegal. ISSUE: Is the failure of the police officers to conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the illegal items seized a ground to make the arrest illegal? RULING: No. In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved. It is clear from the earlier cited Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 that in a buy-bust situation, the marking of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator in the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant should not confuse buy-bust situation from search and seizure conducted by virtue of a court-issued warrant. It is in the latter case that physical inventory (which includes the marking) is made at the place where the search warrant is served. Nonetheless, "noncompliance with [the] requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."

43. PEOPLE vs. VELASCO G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013 FACTS: Appellant was charged of 3 counts of Rape and acts of lasciviousness. Appellant is the live-in partner of [AAA], the mother of private complainant [Lisa]. [Lisa] stayed with them in their house in x x x, Malolos, Bulacan since she was fourteen (14) years old. On December 27, 2001, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, [Lisa] was at the sala watching television. Momentarily, appellant approached her and thereafter, removed his shorts and underwear as well as that of [Lisa’s]. He then mounted [Lisa] and inserted his penis into her vagina. He warned her not to report the incident to anybody, otherwise, he will kill both [Lisa] and her mother. After satisfying his lust, appellant left without saying a word. At the time of the incident, [Lisa] and [appellant] were alone in the house as [Lisa’s] brother and mother were out for work. The following day, or on December 28, 2001, appellant again approached [Lisa] and removed both their shorts and underwear. He went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She was again threatened not to tell anyone of the incident. The incident took place outside the family’s bedroom at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning while [Lisa’s] mother and brother were not in the house. The next day, or on December 29, 2001, also at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, [Lisa] was raped for the third consecutive time by appellant while they were alone in the house. [Lisa] testified that white fluid came out of appellant’s penis. Like in previous incidents, she was threatened not to tell anyone of the incident. A year thereafter, or on December 21, 2002, at midnight, when the other members of the family were asleep, appellant attempted to insert his penis into [Lisa’s] vagina while the latter was sleeping on her folding bed. This time, [Lisa] cried. Although appellant succeeded in touching and kissing [Lisa’s] private parts, he did not push through with his intention of raping her for fear 40 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) of getting caught by the other family members who were sleeping just a few feet away from them. The medico legal report submitted by public physician Richard Ivan Viray states that [Lisa] is in a non-virgin state; that she had shallow healed hymenal lacerations at 2 and 3 o’clock positions and deep healed lacerations at 6 and 7 o’clock positions. RTC: Guilty of 3 counts of Rape and acts of lasciviousness. CA: Affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant as illegal. RULING: No. With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellant’s warrantless arrest, we are of the same persuasion as the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late in the day to be worthy of consideration. Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. 44. PEOPLE vs. COLLADO FACTS: Appellants Marcelino Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra) were charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den.

Relying on the information given by an asset, a buy-bust operation team was for formed and proceeded to Marcelino’s and Myra’s residence on board two private vehicles. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. PO2 Noble was handed with a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance after paying P200. and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene and arrest herein appellants and the seven others. The witnesses of the defenses denies all the charges against the appellants. Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to a misunderstanding he had with a former police officer named Rey who bought a VCD player from his shop. The trial court convicted appellants and was affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON THE ARREST WAS LEGAL RULING: Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it was not supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation. This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, 41 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes. Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground.They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them. Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."31 This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants’ claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail. BAIL 45. ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336

November 12, 2014

FACTS: Complainant is the accused in the aforementioned criminal case. She stated that she did not receive a notice of hearing for June 8, 2011. Despite such omission, respondent judge still issued a warrant of arrest on June 9, 2011. She was surprised when agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forcibly arrested her on June 15, 2011. She added that while on her way to the NBI office, a lady agent called the personnel of Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, to inquire on the amount of the complainant’s bail, but the personnel said that there was no bail indicated. The personnel was said to be reluctant in giving any information and asked, "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya." According to complainant, she examined the order of arrest and it appeared that the amount of bail recommended was erased to bar her from posting the bond for her temporary liberty. She claimed that on the same day, she instructed her bondsman to proceed to Branch 166 to inquire about the proper amount of bail. Respondent CoC and the staff, however, treated the bondsman with hostility, annoyance and indifference. The next day, on June 16, 2011, complainant’s son and her lawyer talked to respondent judge and the latter agreed to fix the amount of bail at ₱40,000.00. Respondent judge, however, initially refused to sign the order and advised them to file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest. Complainant avers that these acts show how cruel, ignorant and unorganized respondent judge is in running her office. It would also show that respondent clerk of court and the court staff exhibited hostility, partiality and wanton disregard of respect. The respondents averred that complainant failed to identify the court personnel who allegedly said "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya." Moreover, they claimed that there was nothing wrong even if the court personnel indeed asked the same.16 With respect to the allegation that the court personnel treated the bondsman with hostility, they claimed that no bondsman went to their branch that day. Even assuming that the bondsman indeed went to their branch, the court personnel were justified in not divulging any information due to the confidentiality of the court records.17 42 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) The respondents likewise stressed that the order of arrest did not state a bond for complainant’s temporary liberty because she jumped bail by failing to appear in court for the June 8, 2011 hearing. Thus, the original bail bond in the amount of ₱40,000.00 was forfeited and an order of arrest was issued.18

Jurisprudence dictates that the primary requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is that the absent-party was duly informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend so.37 As stated above, complainant was undeniably notified of the June 8, 2011 hearing but she failed to attend.

Respondent judge explained that she did not immediately sign the draft order granting bail because she could not motu proprio lift the warrant of arrest as there was no motion filed by the complainant’s lawyer.19 When complainant’s lawyer, however, filed the proper motion to lift the order of arrest, she promptly acted on the motion and complainant was released immediately from NBI custody. She alsostated that it was already beyond the control of the court if the PNP officers attempted to serve the warrant of arrest despite the order lifting the same.

Complainant also averred that respondent judge committed erroneous conduct (1) when she issued a bench warrant without specifically stating the amount of bail bond and (2) for not motu proprio lifting the bail bond when complainant’s son and lawyer showed their willingness to apply for bail.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent committed transgressions in the performance of their duty warranting the imposition of disciplinary penalties? RULING: NO. This Court is convinced that respondent judge acted in accordance with the law and jurisprudence. It must be noted that complainant was only granted provisional liberty when she applied for bail. Such provisional liberty could be taken away if she would violate any of the undertakings stated therein. One of the conditions for bail is that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or the Rules of Court. As a consequence of failing to attend the trial when so required, a bench warrant was issued against complainant. A bench warrant is defined as a writ issued directly by a judge to a law-enforcement officer, especially for the arrest of a person who has been held in contempt, has disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appear for a hearing or trial.36 The provision on bench warrant is expressed under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states that "[w]hen a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both."

According to respondent judge, the June 9, 2011 order of arrest failed to state a bail bond because complainant jumped bail by failing to appear in court for hearing on June 8, 2011. The Court finds this acceptable because when an accused fails to appear in person as required, the bond shall be declared forfeited.38 Also, it is not required by the Rules of Court that the amount of new bail bond be stated in the bench warrant. The Court cannot chastise respondent judge for an act not required by the Rules. Absent any abuse of discretion, it is sufficient that the bail bond was fixed after complainant was arrested. Such would be the proper time for the judge to consider whether to increase, decrease or retain the amount of bail based on the guidelines.39 Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the bench warrant once the accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any provision to the contrary, Section 1, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court40 governs such that a motion must be filed to seek affirmative relief. In the present case, respondent judge acted within the scope of her authority when she required complainant’s son and lawyer to file an ex parte motion to lift the order of arrest. When the motion was filed and the prosecutor did not express any objection, respondent judge deemed it fit to impose the same amount of bail at ₱40,000.00. Respondent judge immediately entertained complainant’s son and lawyer when they came to her branch despite her scheduled hearing and as a result, complainant was released on that same day. 46. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELCHOR D. BRITA

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) G.R. No. 191260

November 24, 2014

FACTS: Two separate Informations3 were filed against appellant before the RTC of Pasig City. One was for selling and the other for illegal possession of shabu. Immediately after his arraignment wherein he pleaded not guilty to both charges, appellant filed a Petition for Bail. In support of his Petition for Bail, appellant offered the testimonies of Maygene Fernandez (Fernandez), the daughter-in-law of appellant’s common-law wife, and Olivia Duhaylongsod (Duhaylongsod), a neighbor. Their testimonies aimed to establish that when appellant was arrested, no buy-bust operation was actually conducted and that no shabu was recovered from him. RTC-Pasig, however, did not resolve the Petition for Bail until after the prosecution rested its case9and appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence10 with prior leave. RTC-Pasig denied both appellant’s Petition for Bail and Demurrer to Evidence as it found the evidence against appellant for the charge of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 strong. However, it dismissed the case for violation of Section 11, Article II of the same law as it found that the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Transfer/Re-Raffle13 which was granted. Accordingly, the case was re-raffled to RTC-Taguig, Branch 70. RTC Taguig, Branch 70, after finding that the evidence of the prosecution was not that strong, reconsidered and set aside the RTC-Pasig and allowed appellant to post bail. Meanwhile, appellant, for his defense, proffered denial. He claimed that there was no buy-bust operation and that he was – merely a victim of frame-up. RTC-Taguig adjudged appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. It gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers who were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the object evidence consisting of the seized substance that tested positive for shabu, sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence, the present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the grant of bail in his favor means that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

RULING: NO. Appellant asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the prosecution is not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent [the trial court, as] the trier of facts, x x x from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits."22 As the Court ruled in People v. Baldoz,23 "[s]uch appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course." 47. PEOPLE vs. GO FACTS: The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB, the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090. On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit: 44 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer. ISSUE: Whether the private respondent’s act of posting bail and filing his motion for consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. HELD: Yes, The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]: "[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person." Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person. 48. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELCHOR D. BRITA G.R. No. 191260

November 24, 2014

A grant of bail does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. FACTS: Two separate Informations were filed against appellant before the RTC for violation of RA 9165, for selling of shabu and illegal possession of the same. After arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and filed Petition for Bail. In support of his Petition for Bail, appellant offered the testimonies from witnesses aimed to establish that when appellant was arrested, no buy-bust operation was actually conducted and that no shabu was recovered from him.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) The RTC-Pasig, however, did not resolve the Petition for Bail until after the prosecution rested its case and appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave. In an Omnibus Order, RTC-Pasig denied both appellant’s Petition for Bail and Demurrer to Evidence as it found the evidence against appellant for the charge of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 strong.

G.R. No. 213847. July 12, 2016

Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Transfer/Re-Raffle which was granted by RTC-Pasig. Case was re-raffled to RTC-Taguig, which then find the evidence of the prosecution was not that strong, reconsidered and set aside the RTC-Pasig’s Omnibus Order of and allowed appellant to post bail.

FACTS: This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Ombudsman to Assail the Resolution dated August 18, 2015 granting the petition for certiorari of the petitioner which ordered the provisional release of Juan Ponce Emile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of Php 1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan.

In a Decision by RTC-Taguig, it adjudged appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating of RA 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. It gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers who were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the said RTC Decision through a Decision17 dated November 18, 2009. Hence, the present appeal. ISSUE: Whether the grant of bail in favor of the appellant means that the evidence of guilt against him is not strong. RULING: No. The contentions of appellant deserve scant consideration. Appellant asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the prosecution is not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent [the trial court, as] the trier of facts, x x x from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits." Such appreciation of evidence is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course. 49. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The primary but limited purpose of granting bail, which is to ensure that an accused would appear during his trial and would continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the court to answer the charges levelled against him.

ISSUE: Whether the SC granted preferential treatment to respondent when his petition for bail was granted on account of his advanced age and the instability of his health. RULING: No. By its decision, the Court has recognized his right to bail by emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only if the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. Here, the records demonstrated that the risks of flight were low, or even nil. The Court has taken into consideration other circumstances, such as respondent’s advanced age and poor health, his past and present disposition of respect for the legal processes, the length of his public service, and his individual public and private reputation. There was really no reasonable way for the Court to deny bail to him simply because his situation of being 92 years of age when he was first charged for the very serious crime in court was quite unique and very rare. To ignore his advanced age and unstable health condition in order to deny his right to bail on the basis alone of the judicial discretion to deny bail would be probably unjust. To equate his situation with that of the other accused indicted for a similarly serious offense would be inherently wrong when other conditions significantly differentiating his situation from that of the latter's unquestionably existed. The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence that he would not be a flight risk. For one, his advanced age and fragile state of health have minimized the likelihood that he would make himself scarce and escape from 46 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) the jurisdiction of our courts. The testimony of Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, Director of the Philippine General Hospital, showed that the petitioner was a geriatric patient suffering from various medical conditions, 16 which, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks to his life. The medical findings and opinions have" been uncontested by the Prosecution even in their present Motion for Reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing supports this purpose. Thus, in Villasenor v. Abano,9 the Court has pronounced that "the principal factor considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of which most factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment." The Court has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear during his trial and would continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges levelled against him. Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL 50. ENRIQUE ALMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner is accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries. On 8 January 2007 the MTC found him petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction only upon being served the warrant for his arrest.

The prosecutor opposed his application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform the court of his change of address. The MTC denied his application, thus petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the denial of his application for probation. Upon appeal the RTC reversed and set aside the ruling of MTC and remanded the case to the latter. CA however reversed the RTC ruling and upheld the MTC’s decision in denying the application for probation. ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to probation? RULING: No, petitioner is not entitled to probation. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. 51. ATTY. SEGUNDO BONSUBRE vs. ERWIN, ERICO, AND RITCHIE, ALL SURNAMED YERRO GR NO. 205952. FEBRUARY 11, 2015 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of CA, affirming the order of RTC Cebu which denied due course to the notice of appeal of Atty. Bonsubre for the criminal aspect of estafa. FACTS: Atty. Bonsubre filed a case of estafa against the Yerros before RTC. Private prosecutor manifested that there was an on-going settlement between parties and that they would file the necessary motion relative thereto. The prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the compromise agreement as well as the necessary motion as manifested. In its order, RTC dismissed the case for failure of prosecution to comply with the court’s directive and the accused’s right to speedy trial. More than 2 years from the issuance of the dismissal, Atty. Bonsubre’s new collaborating counsel filed an MR, claiming a belated learning of the order and believing in good faith that the case merely 47 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) achieved in accordance with the terms of the compromise agreement. After several hearings and motions, including an amended MR and second amended MR, the RTC denied the motions and held that the dismissal, grounded on failure to prosecute had long become final and executory. However, RTC held that an independent civil action may be instituted tom collect the amount stipulated in the previous agreement. Atty. Bonsubre filed a notice of appeal, which was denied due course relative to the criminal aspect on the ground of the Yerros’ right to speedy trial, but gave due course to the civil aspect. Atty. Bonsubre thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, saying that the Yerros are estopped from invoking the aforementioned right after they have reached a compromise agreement to provisionally dismiss the case until its full settlement. CA dismissed the certiorari petition for failure to prosecute for almost 3 years from the time it was dismissed by the RTC, the remedy of appeal was lost through the Atty. Bonsubre’s own fault. MR was also denied through a resolution. Hence, the appeal to SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling which denied the notice of appeal on the criminal aspect of the case? RULING: No. A dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offence. In this case, the RTC dismissal order is a final order that is not appealable and is immediately executory. While certiorari may lie to challenge such order, petitioner must prove that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Here, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the RTC. Aside from the considerable lapse of time from the dismissal to the reconsideration, it was Atty. Bonsubre who caused the delay. Such unjustified delay on his part clearly prejudiced the respondents. Hence, their right to speedy trial had been violated. As to the provisional dismissal and compromise agreement, the requisites in Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure have not been met, as prosecution neither presented the compromise agreement nor filed the required motion to that effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the respondents are not estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial.

RESOLUTION: The petition is denied, and the decision and resolution of the CA were affirmed. 52. MARGIE BALERTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 205144

November 26, 2014

FACTS: Margie Balerta, being then an employee/cashier of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC)[,] was in[]charge of collecting and keeping the collections turned over to her by the collectors of the cooperative [and of] account[ing] for and deposit[ing] the collected amount to the depository bank which is the Balasan Rural Bank, but said accused, far from complying with her obligation, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfull yand feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert toher personal use and benefit the total collection of One Hundred Eighty[-]Five Thousand Five Hundred Eighty[-]Four Pesos and 06/100 (₱185,584.06) Philippine Currency and despite repeated demands, the said accused failed and still fails, to liquidate or render formal accounting of her collections or return the aforesaid amount to the Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative, to its damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ₱185,584.06. During the pre-trial, the prosecution presented BABMPC’s Manager, Napoleon Timonera (Timonera), to testify. He alleged that petitioner neither resigned nor was terminated from employment, but she stopped reporting for work from June 19, 1999 onwards after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in her records. Upon audit, BABMPC found that "there was a discrepancy of some ₱185,000.00," ₱90,000.00 of which in the passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the records of the cooperative kept by the petitioner. When asked by the petitioner’s counsel about where exactly was the discrepancy shown in the copy of the bank’s ledger and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPC’s records, Timonera answered that he is not an accountant and Ambros knew more about the matter.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) Timonera also testified that without the petitioner’s presence and permission, the latter’s table and drawers were opened through the use of duplicate keys kept by De Asis. The use of the duplicate keys to open each other’s office drawers was however a common practice between the petitioner and De Asis. On the other hand, the petitioner testified that the lastday she reported for work as a cashier in BABMPC was on June 17, 1999. Timonera got angry that day when the petitioner reminded him of his cash advances, which were already equivalent to his salaries for five months. The petitioner emphasized that Timonera had exceeded the allowable cash advance amount of one month salary. She was not however furnished a copy of the audit report. She protested that the audit was conducted in her absence. The petitioner likewise stated that she can no longer find the receipts, vouchers and books in her drawers showing the cash advances of Timonera. The petitioner proceeded to the Balasan Police Station to report about the forced opening of her table and drawers which occurred on June 25, 1999. She also informed the police that the amount of ₱5,000.00 kept in the drawers was missing. She confronted BABMPC about the missing cash. The petitioner alleged that Timonera was ill motivated when he initiated the filing of the criminal complaint against her and to evade his financial liabilities from BABMPC relative to his cash advances and the money which he had diverted to other projects in violation of the rules of the cooperative. She was aware of the shortage of ₱1,896.00, which was reflected in a past monthly audit. To date, the amount remains unsettled. RTC finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa by misappropriation and hereby sentences [the petitioner to] five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay [BABMPC] ₱185,584.06 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. CA affirms the decision of the RTC. The evidence of the prosecution was able to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that [the petitioner] committed estafa by misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.)

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not Balerta is entitled to an acquittal considering that a cashier possesses no juridical possession over the funds he or she holds; II. Her guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.41 RULING: Yes. Balerta held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set up against BABMPC. The petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the Court finds that juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation is absent in the instant case. "Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt."52 At the outset, it is significant to point out that neither the prosecution nor the defense had made any formal offer of documentary evidence. Considering the absence of formal offers of documentary evidence, the judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA solely hinged on who was more credible between the two witnesses. The court does not find Timonera’s testimony as incredible, by itself alone, it is insufficient to discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in criminal cases. The witness failed to state with certainty where in the records held by the petitioner were the discrepancies shown. It was thus fatal for the prosecution’s cause that Ambros, De Asis, Mombay and the bank personnel did not take the witness stand especially since documentary evidence were never formally offered as well. The RTC and the CA faulted the petitioner for not offering countervailing evidence, including an audit conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction to be handed on that ground because the "[c]ourts cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution’s failure to discharge the onus probandi." 49 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) "Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit."57 "In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."58 In the case at bar, however, the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting merely of Timonera’s testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of the petitioner, and does not amply rebut her right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged. The acquittal of the accused from the crime charged does not necessarily negate the existence of civil liability. However, in the instant case, the prosecution had failed as well to present preponderant evidence from which the Court can determinately conclude that the petitioner should pay BABMPC the amount of ₱185,584.06. In the case now under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner not because she is found absolutely innocent of the crime charged. The Court acquits merely because reasonable doubt exists anent her guilt. Hence, the petitioner can still be held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant evidence exist to prove the same. Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court indicates how preponderance of evidence shall be determined, viz: Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance

of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (Underscoring ours) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 is REVERSED. The petitioner, MARGIE BALERTA, is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa. 53. PEOPLE vs. DAHIL FACTS: On 1 Oct. 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three separate Information before the RTC for the violation of Sec.5, Art. II of RA 9165 for the sale of marijuana. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of selling and possession of illegal drugs against the accused. All the elements of the crimes were established. The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC ruled that the same was not fatal considering that a photocopy of the marked money was presented and identified by the arresting officers. It did not give credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could easily be concocted with no supporting proof. The accused appealed to the CA and argued that there were irregularities on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from them. The prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which generated clouds of doubts as to the identity of the seized items presented in evidence. The CA denied; hence this appeal.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) ISSUE: Whether the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of custody procedure required by RA 9165. HELD: NO. Although the prosecution offered in evidence the Inventory of the Property seized signed by the arresting officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 were not observed. The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. First, the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was only done at the police station. PO2 Cruz gave a the flimsy excuse that they failed to immediately conduct an inventory because they did not bring with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such explanation is unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of weeks.

FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the Information4 against the petitioners for taking the life of one Marlon Villanueca during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known. The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are summarized as follows: The victim was brought to the emergency room of JP Rizal Hospital. The attending physician observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat. The victim did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. The attending physician in his medico-legal report stated that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. Allegedly, the victim, after having taken copious amounts of alchohol suddenly dropped to the floor after receiving a hit from one of the master initiaters. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where the attending physician was unable to rescucitate him. The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their testimonies are summarized as follow:

Second, there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant Dela Cruz who prepared the said document. PO2 Cruz on the other hand, testified that it was their investigator who prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator. Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.

Petitioner Dungo alleges that he and his friend was only on their to Pansol when they chanced upon the victim, and that out of the goodness of their hearts, attempted to bring the latter to a hospital.

The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The appeal is GRANTED.

RULING: No. Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing, the petitioners guilt were proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.

54. DUNGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law. On appeal, CA ruled that the dismissed the petition of Dungo and Sibal for being bereft of merit. ISSUE: WON Pet constitutional righrts were violated

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove. The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate. As properly held by the RTC,

these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case. Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses to substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi. RIGHTS AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY 55. MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 176317 BERSAMIN, J.:

July 23, 2014

FACTS: Zafra (petitioner) was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR of San Fernando La Union from 1993-1995 on July 6, 1995. An audit was conducted on the cash and non-cash accountability of Zafra. After thorough examination of documents, there was a discrepancy for a total of P614,151.93. The audit team required Zafra to restitute the missing amount but Zafra did not comply. Thus, 18 cases for malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents was filed against him and found guilty thereof. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Zafra and further opined that he should also be guilty of malversation through negligence. The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents on the basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as Revenue District Officer; that the acts imputed to him did not constitute negligence; and that he could not be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time. 52 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) ISSUE: Whether or not Zafra may be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time. RULING: Yes. Even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned. 56. CESAR T. QUIAMBAO and ERIC C. PILAPIL vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ADERITO Z. YUJUICO, and BONIFACIO C. SUMBILLA GR NO 185267, September 17, 2014 FACTS: Private respondents filed before a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of BP 68 against the petitioners. After preliminary investigation, the petitioners were charged two informations before the MTC of Pasig City. Petitioners then filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and to Defer the Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest Pending Determination. The MTC denied the motion and set the arraignment of the petitioners. A petition for certiorari with application of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed seeking for the partial annulment of MTC’s order. They were arraigned on January 29, 2007. The RTC granted the petition holding that there was no probable cause to hold the petitioners for trial. It then directed to MTC to dismiss the case for want of probable cause. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, they brought an appeal to the SC via petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law. While G.R. No. 180416 remains pending before the SC, the MTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 on June 18, 2007. The private respondents thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MTC granted. Upon learning that a

petition for certiorari had been filed before the SC, the MTC issued an Order dated September 17, 2007 (Order of Revival) recalling the Order of Dismissal and reinstating the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 89724. It further ordered the suspension of the proceedings in G.R. No. 180416 to await the final outcome of the pending case. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. They thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It found that the MTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it revived and archived Criminal Case No. 89724. Since the RTC’s Order has not yet attained finality in view of the pendency of G.R. No. 180416, the MTC cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed orders. Likewise, the RTC ruled that the Order of Revival was pursuant to Section 5(g) of Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides for the inherent power of the courts to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Did the reinstatement of the revival of the dismissed case by the MTC place the petitioners in double jeopardy? HELD: No. The MTC’s Order of Revival is void. Like the Order of Dismissal, the Order of Revival that followed should be declared null and void. While said order merely sought to correct the previous Order of Dismissal, it suffers from the same infirmity of having been issued without jurisdiction. The MTC no longer had the authority to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 because the jurisdiction to act on and entertain the case had already been acquired by this Court. Hence, it naturally follows that all the issuances and/or orders issued by the lower court relative to the issue pending review will become null and void. There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent jurisdiction. Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Dismissal and the Order of Revival, there can be no double jeopardy. 57. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES 53 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) G.R. No. 189850

September 22, 2014

FACTS: On January 28, 2004, an amended lnformation was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino) who was killed on September 21, 2001 in Manila. Espino while he was on board his car and travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his belt-bag. That on the occasion of the said robbery the accused killed the victim when the latter resisted. Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario at the house of their friend, Marilou Garcia in Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not leave their friend’s house until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of someone. The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the RTC acquitted the accused of the crime special complex crime of robbery with homicide. However, they were found guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution. The C.A. modified the ruling of the RTC finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. ISSUE: Whether the acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double jeopardy.

HELD: No, when the accused filed an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy. "An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Hence, appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder. 58. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON AND YOYONG DE LEON GR NO. 197546, 23 MARCH 2015 FACTS: On 2 March 2002, Bayani De Leon (Bayani), Antonio De Leon (Antonio), Danilo De Leon (Danilo) and Yoyong De Leon (Yoyong), (De Leon, et al.), conspiring together rob Emilio A. Prasmo (Prasmo), together with his wife and daughter-in-law. De Leon, et al. shoots and hack Prasmo using sumpak, samurai and .38 cal revolver. The RTC held that robbery was not duly established, it cannot convict the accused of robbery. To sustain the conviction of robbery with homicide, it must be proven as conclusive as the killing itself and not a mere afterthought by the accused. In view thereof, the trial court charged De Leon, et al. of the crime of Murder instead of Robbery with Homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial Court, Bayani, Antonio and Yoyong were charged with Murder while Danilo, who took the money of Prasmo, was guilty of a separate crime of robbery.

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CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in its ruling for violating the constitutional right of Danilo against double jeopardy?

for failure to appear, without justifiable cause, at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the elements of double jeopardy are as follows: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated. All the elements are present in the instant case. RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence. The decision of RTC which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone. Acquittal based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. Therefore, the appellate court erred when it found Danilo guilty of a separate crime of Robbery on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: What are the effects of the non-appearance of the accused, without justifiable cause, in the promulgation of the judgment of conviction?

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO COUNSEL 59. REYNALDO H. JAYLO, et. al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (There is no issue involving the right of the accused to counsel. The issue involved pertains to promulgation of judgment in absentia) G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the PNP on special detail with the NBI. Petitioners were involved in a buy-bust operation, in the conduct of which the heroin sellers were killed. The Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, et. al. guilty of homicide. The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued. Counsel for Jaylo, et. al. moved for reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan denied the same ruling that the accused lose the remedies available to them

RULING: Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said judgment. Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court states: SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. xxx The proper clerk of court shall givenotice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address. In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves 55 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief. In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction. It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment. Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment of conviction. Neither did they ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we were to assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice thereof, it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change of address before the Sandiganbayan.

For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM/HER 60. CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 184320, JULY 29, 2015 FACTS: Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title. On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell where the petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of the land. Naval paid a down payment totaling P100,000.00, and then asked permission from the petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought. After the petitioner issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the subject land. On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to heed these demands. Petitioner was charged and convicted with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City. 56 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) 61. HARRY L. GO, ET. AL. vs. PEOPLE ISSUE: Whether the petitioner's right to be informed of the charges against her was violated when the specific acts complained of as constituting the offense was not alleged in the Information. RULING: Yes. The Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an express representation that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed even by the owner of the property. Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did not contain any representation by the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance. The trial courts erroneously convicted the petitioner of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other than that charged in the Information would be a violation of her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. DOCTRINE: Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012 FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC. The Information states that they defraud Highdone Company Ltd., represented by Li Luen Ping, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the effect that they have chattels installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. representing that the said deed is a First Mortgage when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION. Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. ISSUE: Whether or not deposition taking of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia is an infringement of the constitutional right of the petitioners to confront the said witness face to face. SC RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules 57 | P a g e

CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Remedial Law Review 2 (1st BATCH) of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the crossexamination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.

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