conflict of laws_complete notes.doc

CONFLICT OF LAWS Course Outline PART ONE: INTRODUCTION I.

SCOPE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS • Embraces cases or situations where a foreign element is involved • A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by diverse laws of two or more States is said to contain a foreign element NATURE • Municipal Law or private law of each state which regulates relations of individuals among themselves or with their state • It is the law of the forum that furnishes the yardstick for the presence or absence of jurisdiction DEFINITION • Is that part of the municipal law of the state which directs its courts and administrative agencies, when confronted with a legal problem involving a foreign element, whether or not, they should apply a foreign law or foreign laws (Paras) IMPORTANCE 1. to adjust conflicting rights in international, mercantile and corporate transactions; and 2. to solve personal, family, property and successional contractual problems, possessed of facts or elements operating in two or more states OBJECT AND FUNCTION • Is to provide rational and valid rules or guidelines in deciding cases not only by courts but also by administrative agencies and public officers who are called upon to act on a given situation where either or all the parties, event or transaction are linked to more than one jurisdiction FUNCTIONS According to Paras 1. the determination of which country has jurisdiction 2. the applicability to a particular case of either the local or the foreign law 3. the determination of the force, validity and effectiveness of a foreign judgment According to Coquia 1. to proscribe the conditions under which a court or agency is competent to entertain a suit or proceeding involving facts containing a foreign element; 2. to determine the extent, validity and enforceability of foreign judgment; 3. to determine for each class of cases the particular system if law by reference to which the rights of the parties must be ascertained

BASIS

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (CONFLICT OF LAW)

1. As to nature 2. As to persons involved

Municipal in character Dealt by private individuals

3. As to transactions involved

Transactions are private one between private individuals

4. As to remedies or sanctions

Resort to Municipal Tribunals

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW International in character Parties involved are sovereign states and other entities possessed of an international personality Transactions are entered into which generally affect public interest; those which in general are of interest only to sovereign states Remedies may be peaceful or forcible

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II. BRIEF HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (25) In Ancient Rome, it presented a fertile place for the development of “ conflict rules” because two legal systems were in vogue: Roman citizens were governed by the civil law of Rome; all others were under the jurisdiction of their own provincial legislation -- how easily, therefore, “conflict” theories could have arisen. But the theories did not come for only one law prevailed whenever a Roman citizen was involved, namely, Roman civil law. However, there were two incidental developments – the concept of domicile and the concept of lex situs – ( where the immovables were concerned. ) In 212 A.D., the Edict of Caracalla conferred Roman citizenship on all the people living within the Roman Empire: consequently only one law remained – the civil law of Rome – for any and all acts, events, and transactions within the Empire. Law was, thus, placed on territorial without personal or racial discrimination. In the 5th century, the Roman Empire was overthrown by the socalled “barbarian tribe”: personal law replaced territorial law. This simply means that every person, regardless of residence, was considered subject to the law of his original nation or tribe. If the parties to a contract came from different nations, the law of the debtor prevailed – for it was then believed that his interest were paramount. III. SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 1. Indirect sources  Natural moral law  Works of writers 2. Direct sources  constitutions  codifications  special laws  treatises and international conventions  judicial decisions  international customs such as lex situs, lex loci celebrationis, lex nationalii/domicilii, territoriality, generality

PART TWO: JURISDICTION IV. JURISDICTION (2) • Authority of a tribunal to hear and decide a case and possible enforceability in foreign states, subject to the rights of said states (Paras) • In international law, it is often defined as the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries, subject to certain exceptions JUDICIAL JURISDICTION VERSUS LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION (Coquia) • Judicial Jurisdiction is the power or authority of a court or administrative tribunal to try a case, render judgment and execute it in accordance with law while Legislative Jurisdiction which is the power of the state to promulgate laws and regulations and enforce them on all persons and property within its territory FOUR MAJOR QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEM 1. Has the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over his property 2. Has the court jurisdiction over the subject matter, usually referred to as “competency” 3. Has the suit been brought in the proper venue in cases where a foreign element is involved and 4. Is there a statute or doctrine under which a court otherwise qualified to try the case may or may not refuse to entertain it

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A. BASIS OF EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION / KINDS OF JURISDICTION 1. Jurisdiction over the person which is based on forum-defendant contacts; 2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter and 3. Jurisdiction over the res based on forum-property contacts

1. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON • is the power of the court to render judgment that will be binding on the parties involved: the plaintiff and defendant (Paras) Acquired through Plaintiff - institution of action by proper pleading Defendant - voluntary appearance or by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person (Paras) Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the moment he invokes the aid of the court and voluntarily submits himself by institution of the suit through proper pleadings Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through voluntary appearance or personal or substituted service of summons (Coquia)

WILLIAM GEMPERLE V. HELEN SCHENKER 19 SCRA 45 (Jan. 23, 1967 GR No. L-18164) FACTS : Paul Schenker acting through his wife Helen Schenker filed a complaint against petitioner for the enforcement of Paul Schenker’s allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Phil. Swiss Trading Company and the exercise of his alleged preemptive rights to the unissued original capital stock of said corporation. Believing that the suit was only for the purpose of harassing and degrading his reputation, he also filed a damage suit against the Schenkers. The trial rendered in favor of Gemperle thus Helen Schenker appealed alleging that Paul Schenker cannot be sued or joined as defendants because the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because he was outside of the Phil. thus he is beyond the jurisdiction of our court. ISSUE

: Whether or not the court can acquire jurisdiction over the person of an alien defendant?

HELD

: Yes, where a Swiss citizen, residing abroad was served with summons through his wife who was residing in the Phil. and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case which was filed at her behest in her aforementioned capacity, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person by means of service of summons to his wife. As a the wife had authority to sue in his behalf, so she was also empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case which is a consequence of the action brought by her in his behalf.

SPS. DOMINGO BELEN vs. HON. PABLO CHAVEZ G.R. No. 175335, March 26, 2008 FACTS : Respondent Sps. Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb filed an action before the RTC of Rosario, Batangas against petitioners, Sps. Belen for the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by Judge Green of the superior court of the State of California, in a complaint for breach of contract against herein petitioners ordering them to pay private respondents monetary award. The summons was served on petitioner’s address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna received by a certain Marcelo Belen as alleged in the complaint. Atty. Alcantara, whose services were retained by the petitioner’s relatives, entered his appearance for

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the petitioners, filed an answer stating among others that petitioners are actually residents of California, USA. Atty. Alcantara on a later date moved to dismiss the complaint due to the judgment of dismissal rendered by the same foreign court which was denied for failure to present a copy thereof. Subsequently, the RTC ordered a judgment in favor of the respondents which judgment was not received by Atty. Alcantara due to his death but by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Thereafter, Att. Carmelo Culvera, petitioner’s new counsel assailed the judgment before the CA for lack of jurisdiction over the petitioners in view of the improper service of summons. The CA affirmed the said decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE

: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

HELD

: Yes. Even if the service of summons was defective upon non- resident defendants, the appearance of Atty. Alcantara impliedly authorized by the defendants to appear on their behalf and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.

2. JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPERTY • is the subject matter of litigation results either from the seizure of the property under a legal process or from the institution of legal proceedings wherein the court’s power over the property is recognized and made effective • this kind of jurisdiction is referred to as in rem jurisdiction. Another form of jurisdiction is quasi in rem jurisdiction which affects only the interests of particular persons in the thing NOTE: Summons of publication is effective in the following cases – • if the action is in rem • quasi in rem • involves personal status of plaintiff MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS TEST • Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, is he is not present within the territory of the forum, he should have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice • In both in rem and quasi-in rem actions, all that due process required is that defendant be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard which are met by service of summons by publication LONG-ARM STATUTES  statutes which specify the contacts which jurisdiction will be asserted over a defendant outside of state territory 3. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER • is conferred by law and defined as the authority of a court to hear and decide cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong • acquire through the allegations in the petition or complaint, read together with the proper jurisdictional law, that will confer jurisdiction on the court CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS (as to object) 1. 2. 3.

Action in personam – any judgment that the court will render in that case binds only the parties to the action and their privies or their successors-in-interest; Action in rem – any judgment that the court will render in the case binds not only the parties to the case but the whole world Quasi in rem action – quasi in rem is actually in personam because it is directed only against a particular individual but the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his property to the obligation of lien burdening it. The object of the case is the sale or other disposition of property of the defendant which one may have a right or lien over the property Example: an action to subject certain property of the defendant to payment of a claim. An action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein

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IDONAH PERKINS V. ROXAS June 19, 1941 GR No. 4751 FACTS : Respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint against Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of dividends but it was withheld by the corporation because of the demands made by the petitioner Idonah Perkins and George Englehard. Respondent then amended the complaint and included the herein petitioner. Summons by publication were then served upon the nonresident defendants, Idonah and Englehard. Petitioners contended that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter because there was already a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York declaring that she was the legal owner of the questioned shares and the trial court cannot amend, annul, modify or reverse the same because it was already res judicata. ISSUE

: Whether or not CFI can assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

HELD

: Yes, because jurisdiction over the subject matter is the nature of the cause of action which is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court. In the case at bar the respondent’s action calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the corporation and the granting of affirmative reliefs which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI of Manila.

B. WAYS OF DEALING WITH A CONFLICTS PROBLEM / WAYS OF DISPOSING CONFLICTS CASES 1. Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction 2. Dismiss the case on the ground of Forum Non-Conveniens 3. Assume jurisdiction and apply the forum law 1. DISMISS THE CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Effect of absence or presence of Jurisdiction (Paras) 1. when a court is without jurisdiction, it has no alternative except to dismiss the case for being null and void due to lack of due process 2. if a tribunal possesses jurisdiction, it may: a. refuse to assume jurisdiction on the ground of forum non convenience or b. assume jurisdiction, in which case it may: - apply the internal law of the forum (lex fori) or - apply proper foreign (lex causae) 2. DISMISS THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS • refusal of assume jurisdiction because it would prove inconvenient for the forum • a forum may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by law on the ground that the forum is inconvenient or the ends of justice would be best served by trial in another forum or the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere (Doctrine of Forum Non-Conveniens) ELEMENTS: a. the forum state is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; b. it is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and c. it has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision MANIFESTATIONS: • the witnesses and evidence may not be readily available • the court dockets of the forum may already be clogged; to permit additional cases would inevitably hamper the speedy administration of justice • the evils of forum-shopping ought to be curbed • the forum has no particular interest in the case

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other courts are open: certainly the case may be better tried in said courts

HEINE V. NEW YORK INSURANCE CO., 45 Fed (2d) 426 (1940) FACTS : Plaintiffs were German nationals and residents of Germany. Defendant on the other hand was a corporation or an entity organized in New York. Plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants for the recovery of insurance claims on insurance contracts issued by the defendant corporation. But the action was brought not in New York nor in Germany but in Oregon, USA. Plaintiffs contends that the court should take cognizance of the case because anyway it has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the plaintiffs (because plaintiffs filed a pleading in Oregon court) and over the defendant (by means of service of summons having been made on its residents or statutory agents in Oregon). ISSUE

: Whether or not the Oregon court can refuse to take cognizance of the case.

HELD

: Yes, the Oregon court can refuse to take cognizance or to assume jurisdiction over the case on the ground of forum non-conveniens, were both parties are not residents of the place where the court was located and exercising jurisdiction and especially the courts of Germany and New York are open and functioning. But it may also take cognizance of the case in the exercise of its sound discretion.

3. ASSUME JURISDICTION AND APPLY THE FORUM LAW • As a general rule, no rule of Private International Law would be violated if the courts should decide to dispose cases, according to the internal law of the forum • EXCEPT: where a foreign, sovereign, diplomatic, official or public vessel or property of another state is involved, or where a state has by treaty, accepted limitations upon its jurisdiction over certain persons of things INSTANCES WHEN INTERNAL / DOMESTIC LAW SHOULD BE APPLIED: 1. when a specific law of the forum expressly provides or decrees in its conflict rules that internal law should apply Examples: i. Article 16 of the Civil Code – real and personal property subject to the law of the country where they are situated and testamentary succession governed by lex nationalii ii. Article 829 of the Civil Code – makes revocation done outside the Philippines valid according the law of the place where will was made or lex domicilii iii. Article 819 of the Civil Code – prohibits Filipinos from making joint wills even if valid in foreign country 2.

when the proper foreign law has not been properly pleaded and proved • NOTE: as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws must be pleaded and proved •

3.

The following actions may be resorted in case of failure to prove and plead the proper foreign law i. Dismiss the case for inability to establish cause of action ii. Assume that the foreign law of the same as the law of the forum (processual presumption) iii. Apply the law of the forum

when the case involves any of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law as when the foreign law is  contrary to an important public policy of the forum  penal in nature  procedural in nature  purely fiscal and administrative in nature

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 application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum  the case involves real or personal property situated in the forum  contrary to good morals  application might endanger the vital interest of the state Foreign Law was not properly pleaded and proved

FLEUMER V. HIX, 54 PHIL 610 March 17, 1930 GR No. L-32636 FACTS : Petitioner was an administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. When the petitioner went to court to have the will of deceased Edward probated, it was refused by the court. Petitioner contends that the deceased was a resident of Virginia and the will he executed was within the formalities of Virginia law. In fact he presented the proof such law in a book found in a national library and thereafter he let it certified by the director of our national library. ISSUE

: Whether or not proof of Virginia law was properly laid down.

HELD

: No, because there was no showing that the book which he presented was an official publication of West Virginia, nor there was an attestation by the officer having the custody of the original and there was no proof that the law he presented was still enforced at the time alleged will was executed. Phil. court are not bound to take cognizance of a foreign law which must be proved as a fact and in the absence of such proof it is considered as the same as ours. Furthermore, the due execution of the will was not established because it was not acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses or that these witnesses subscribed to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require.

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. V. BOHONAN 106 Phil 997, January30, 1960 L-12105 FACTS : During the probate of the will and testament of C.O. Bohonan, it was not disputed that testator Bohonan was a citizen of Nevada and that his will shall be disposed in accordance with the law of Nevada. Proof of such foreign law having been offered and taken by the probate court. After the probate becomes final Magdalena and her children filed with the court contending that they have deprived of the legitime so they asked the court to present again the Nevada law to determine on whether or not the deprivation was in accordance with Nevada laws and to determine also whether the Nevada law shall apply. ISSUES : 1) Whether or not the court shall again take judicial notice on Nevada law 2) Whether or not Nevada law shall apply in the disposition of the estate of a foreign individual HELD

: 1)

Not anymore because it has already been presented and admitted in court during the probate of the will and that appellant did not dispute the said law. In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Thus, the court can taken judicial notice without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

2)

Nevada law shall apply. Art.16 of the Civil Code provides that the validity of testamentary disposition the amount of successional right the order of

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succession, the intrinsic validity of the will and capacity to succeed shall be the governed by the law of the person whose succession is under consideration regardless of the nature of the property and regardless of the place where the property is situated. NOTE:

there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact, otherwise, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our internal law

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL INC., vs. STOCKTON ROUZIE, JR., G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 FACTS : Respondent, a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages arising from breach of contract against petitioner as well as Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI) and Rust Intl. Inc. (RUST) alleging that BMSI a foreign corp. organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut, entered into a contract with respondent where BMSI hired respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects in which respondent was not paid his commissions from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured in behalf of BMSI. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens since the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. ISSUE

: Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens

HELD

: No. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court in conflict of laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. In the said case, petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction. The propriety in dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination thus, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

V. THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTERIZATION (6) CHARACTERIZATION, defined • the process by which a court at the beginning of the choice-of-law process assigns a disputed question to an area in substantive law, such as torts, contracts, family law of property (Coquia) • the process of determining under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall, the ultimate purpose of which is enable the forum to select the proper law (Paras) Factors which give rise to the problem of characterization: Different legal systems – • attach to the same legal term with different meanings, that is, an identity of names covers a difference of nature or content of legal idea; • may contain ideas or conceptions completely unknown to one another; • apply difference principles for the solution of problems, which, in general terms, are of common nature STEPS IN CHARACTERIZATION 1. The determination of the facts involved • determine whether or not foreign element is involved • law of the forum must be guided by its own rules of pleading and proof 2. The characterization of the factual situation • process of assigning facts into their particular category • do the facts constitute a problem of – Suggested Solution – a. in the absence of an express conflicts rule on the matter, it is suggested that the characterization of the forum should be adhered to unless there would result a clear case of injustice b. apply Philippine express conflict rules

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GIBBS V. GOV’T. OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS 59 Phil 293 (1933) FACTS : Petitioner Allison Gibbs was the husband of the deceased Eva Gibbs. Both were citizen and domiciliary of California at the time of Eva Gibbs’ death. During the existence of their marriage, the spouses acquire parcel of lands located in the Phil. When Eva died Allison the petitioner then went to the Register of Deeds and demanded the latter to issue to him a transfer certificate of title but the Register of Deeds refused to issue and to register the transfer of title in favor of Allison. So he went to the court praying that the Register of Deeds shall issue a corresponding title to him without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax because they are citizens and residents of California therefore Californian law will apply, which provides that community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband belongs, absolutely to the husband without admission ISSUE : Which law shall apply (California or Phil) HELD

: The Phil. law shall apply because the property in question was located in the Phil. because real property as well as personal property shall be subject to the law of the country where it is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or of the place where the marriage was celebrated. Phil. jurisprudence adopted the doctrine of lex rei sitae therefore Phil. law shall apply.

3. The determination of the conflicts rule which is to be applied • what conflicts rule must be followed? • our own conflicts rule should be followed for the following reasons – a. purpose of conflict rules b. we still have to identify or definitely ascertain the precise foreign country that has the nearest or the most intimate connection with the facts that have been brought out 4. The characterization of the point of contract or the connecting factor – • whose characterization of the point of contact should be adhered to? • in case of doubt, the characterization of the forum must certainly prevail Exceptions – 1. if problem deals with real or personal property, if the question deals with the validity of their disposition or alienation, or the capacity of the contracting parties – lex situs govern. If property is situated at the boundary of two states, lex situs of the portion of the land directly involved 2. if the forum is merely an incidental place of trial, the characterization of the forum has to give way to any common characterization that may exist in the foreign countries involved. If, upon the other hand, there is no common characterization, we are of the belief that we may avail ourselves of the characterization that will uphold the efficacy of the contract. If this may be attained by making use of our own characterization, by all means, we must do. 5. The characterization of the problem as substantive or procedural • procedural matters are governed by the law of the forum (exception to the application of the proper foreign law) • a law on prescription of actions is sui generic in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given to such law • characterization as to substantive or procedural is irrelevant when the country of the forum has borrowing statute, which has the effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one substance Solution:

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consider prescriptive period or the statute of frauds that the parties had in mind at the time the transaction took place.

Totality approach: a. first get the law intended by the parties to govern the contract; b. then, proceed to apply that intended law in its totality including its periods of prescription and its statute of frauds, except if subject matter governs property located in the Philippines, our own law on prescription and our own statute of frauds must apply Sec. 48, Rules of Civil Procedure – if barred at the place where the cause of action arose, it is also barred here •

STATUTE OF FRAUDS Substantive – if the words of the law relate to forbidding the obligation Procedural – if the law forbids the enforcement of the obligation

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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Substantive – when the limitation was directed to the newly created liability specifically to warrant a qualification of the right Procedural – if it operates to bar the legal remedy without impairing the substantive right involved

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BORROWING STATUTE directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (treats the statute of limitations as a substantive law) CADALIN V. POEA ADMINISTRATOR 238 SCRA 721 (1994)

FACTS : Petitioners filed a class suit against ABC corporation and BRII corporation a domestic licensed to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers abroad on behalf of its foreign principals on the non-payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts which where terminated prematurely, fringe benefits and refund of SSS. Respondent argued that the case has already prescribed in view of the Amari decree which provides that “A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry date of the contract.” But the MLRC ruled that the actions has not yet prescribed because the prescriptive period for filing of the claims was three years and not one year as provided in the Amari decree. ISSUE HELD

: Whether or not the Amari decree shall apply : As a general rule, a foreign procedure law (service of summons, period of actions, etc.) will not be applied in the forum which shall be governed by the laws of the forum. A law on prescription is sui generis in conflict of laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. “If by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Phil.” A borrowing statute shall not be applied if it is prejudicial to labor and to the constitution or obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.

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LWV CONS. CORP. vs. MARCELO DUPO G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009 FACTS : Respondent filed a complaint for payment of service award against petitioner before NLRC invoking Saudi labor Workmen’s Law. Petitioner offered payment and prescription as defenses that under Art. 13 of the Saudi Labor Law, action to enforce payment of the service award must be filed within one year from the termination of a labor contract for a specific period. However, the one year prescriptive period lapsed. ISSUE

: Whether or not the Saudi Labor Law on prescription of action will apply.

HELD

: No. Applicable law is Art. 291 of the Phil. Labor Code which provides that “all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued otherwise they shall be forever barred.” It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the labor code but also applies to claims of overseas contract workers. As held in the Cadalin case, procedural matters are governed by the laws of the forum even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law. Thus, respondent’s action has not prescribed.

6. The pleading and proving of the proper foreign law • if a duly proved foreign law has already been given a judicial interpretation in the country of origin, it must generally be given an identical interpretation in the Philippines, unless, we already have similar or identical internal law and said internal law has received a diametrically opposite construction before our own tribunals 7. The application of the proper foreign law to the problem II.

THE PROBLEM OF RENVOI (11) A. RENVOI, definition • procedure whereby a jural matter is presented which the conflict of laws rules of the forum refer to a foreign law, the conflict of law of which in turn, refers the matter back to the law of the forum (remission) or a third state (transmission) • literally means referring back : problem arises when there is doubt as to whether a reference to a foreign law – a. is a reference to the internal law of said foreign law; or b. is a reference to the whole of the foreign, including its conflicts rule B. VARIOUS WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF RENVOI SOLUTIONS TO THE RENVOI 1. Reject the renvoi • meaning, we do not want the problem to be sent back to us; that we do not want the matter to be referred back to us (Paras) • if the conflicts rules of the forum refer the case to the law of another state, it is deemed to mean only the internal law of the state. Thus, the court will apply the foreign law (Coquia) 2. Accept the renvoi

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apply or accept it by reference to the whole law, including the conflicts rule of the foreign law (Paras) if the conflicts rules of the forum refer the case to the law of another state, it is deemed to include the totality of the foreign law (internal law and conflicts of laws rule). Thus, the court will recognize the referral back and apply local law. (Coquia)

3. Follow the DESISTMENT THEORY (also referred to as the MUTUALDISCLAIMER OF JURISDICTION THEORY) • meaning, we desist or refrain from applying the foreign law because it is inadequate as it is founded on a different basis • the reason for the desistance is that the forum court upon reference to another state’s law sees that such law is limited in application to its own national and has no provision for application to a non-national(Paras) • the forum court upon reference to another state’s law sees that such law is limited in application to its own nationals domiciled in its territory and has no provision for application to nationals domiciled outside of the territory. Hence, the local court will apply local law. This has the same result as the acceptance of the renvoi but the process used by the forum court is to desist applying the foreign law. (Coquia) 4. Use “FOREIGN COURT THEORY” • meaning, the local forum, in deciding the case, will put itself in the position of the foreign court and whatever it does respecting the case, the Philippine court will likewise do. (Paras) • foreign court assumes the same position that the foreign court would take if the case is litigated in the foreign state: Hence – a. if the foreign court would accept the renvoi, the local court shall apply the foreign law. b. if the foreign law would reject the renvoi, the local court shall apply lex fori c. if the foreign court would apply the desistment theory, the local court shall apply the foreign law d. if the foreign court would use the foreign court theory, then international pingpong would ensue (Coquia) DOUBLE RENVOI • it is that which occurs when the local court, in adopting the foreign court theory, discovers that the foreign court accepts the renvoi TRANSMISSION • the process of applying the law of a foreign state thru the law of a second foreign state DOUBLE RENVOI versus TRANSMISSION • double renvoi deals with 2 countries while transmission deals with three or more countries • double renvoi deals with referring back while transmission with a transmitting SUGGESTED CONCLUSION • the theory to be adopted must consider the circumstances of a given situation that will best result in fairness, equity and justice

AZNAR V GARCIA 117 Phil 106, 7 SCRA 95 (1963) FACTS : Edward Christensen was a citizen of California. He came to the Phl. where he became a domiciliary till the time of his death. Before he died he executed a will instituting his natural child Maria as his only heir to his estate but left a legacy P3600 in favor of Helen also his acknowledge natural child. Helen claims that she was deprived of her legitime, she claims that our Phil. law that should be applied because Art. 16 par.2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied, that

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under California law the matter is referred back to the law of domicile, that therefore Phil. law is ultimately applicable, that finally therefore her share shall be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Maria contends that it is clear that under Art.16 par.2 of Civil Code, the national of the ceased must apply, our courts must apply the internal law of California that there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE

: Which law shall apply?

HELD

: Phil. law shall apply. There are two rules in California on the matter, the internal law which will apply to Californian citizens domiciled in California and the conflicts rule which will apply to Californian citizens domiciled n other states which states that “If there is no law to the contrary in the placed where personal property is situate, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. As the domicile of the deceased who was citizen of California was the Phil., the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child of the latter’s legacy should be governed by the Phil. law. Therefore Helen’s legacy shall be increased.

C. Usefulness of Renvoi (to avoid unjust results)

BELLIS VS BELLIS 20 SCRA 359 (1968) FACTS : Decedent Amos Bellis was a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. He made two wills before he died which are executed in the Phil., one disposing his properties in Texas and the other his properties in the Phil. Although respondents were given their shares in other properties, they were however deprived in the residuary estate of the decedent. They filed an opposition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes to which they would be entitled if the Phil. law were to apply. But the executor contended that since the decedent is a Texan citizen the Texas law shall be applied. There are no compulsory heirs under Texas law and therefore no legitimes. ISSUE

: Whether or not respondents entitled to that residuary estate of the decedent. Whether or not renvoi shall be applied.

HELD

: No, because under Art.16 of the NCC that in case of intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of success and to the amount of successional rights, and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provision and the capacity to succeed shall be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may b e the nature of the property and regardless of the place wherein said property may be found. Testamentary provisions that successional right to decedent’s estate would be governed by law other than the national law of the decedent is void. nvoi doctrine because the decedent is a resident and citizen of Texas at the time of his death. Renvoi can be applied only if the decedent is a citizen of one country but a resident in another at the time of his death. So that even if Texas has a conflict rule regarding successional right the same would not result in a reference back to Phil. law but would still refer to Texas Law.

VII. NOTICE OF PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW (RULE 132, RULES OF COURT; RULE 130, RULES OF COURT)

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A. Extent of Judicial Notice • Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court , Judicial Notice, when mandatory – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions •

Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court , Judicial Notice, when discretionary – a court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions

B. Proof of Foreign Law 1. Written Law (Constitution, Statute) • Official publication thereof or • By a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody 2. Unwritten Law (Constitution, Statute) • Oral testimony of expert witnesses or • By printed and published books of reports of decisions of the country involved, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts; • RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDMENTS •

a foreign judgment is recognized when it is given the same effect that it has in the state where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject matter of the action and the issued involved. Where the foreign judgment is being presented as a defense to the claim of the plaintiff, what is involved is the recognition of a foreign judgment

•

a foreign judgment is enforced when, in addition to being recognized, a party is given affirmative relief to which the judgment entitles him. When a plaintiff asks the court of one state to carry out and make effective a judgment obtained by him in another state, what is involved is the enforcement of a foreign judgment.

Requisites: 1. foreign judgment was rendered by a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal which had competent jurisdiction over the parties and the case in the proper judicial proceedings in which the defendant shall have been given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard; 2. it must be a judgment on civil and commercial matters; 3. the judgment must be valid according to the court that delivered it; 4. judgment must be final and executory to constitute res judicata in another action Elements of res judicata: a. Final b. Rendered by a competent court c. On the merits d. Involve the same parties, subject matter and cause of action 5. foreign judgment must not be contrary to the public policy or the good morals of the state where it is to be enforced 6. judgment must not have been obtained by fraud, collusion, mistake of fact or mistake of law 7. the foreign judgment must not be barred by prescription under the law of the state in which it was promulgated or under the law of the state in which its recognition/enforcement is sought DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

Courts will allow the foreign judgment to be presented as a defense to a local litigation

Plaintiff wants courts to positively carry out and make effective in the state a foreign judgment

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Involves merely the sense of justice Does not require either an action of a special proceeding May exist without enforcement

•

Virtually implies a direct act of sovereignty Necessitates a separate action or proceeding brought precisely to make the foreign judgment effective Necessarily carries with it recognition

For both recognition and enforcement, proof of the foreign judgment has to be presented. Moreover, the requisites or conditions for the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments must be present.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS • •

Under the Rules of Court, in case of judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title of the thing. In case of judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-ininterest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion or clear mistake of law of fact

C. Philippine Courts not authorized to take judicial notice of foreign laws

IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON 39 Phil 157 FACTS : Emil Johnson was a naturalized citizen of USA but he died in the Phil. He made a holographic will before he died but was witnessed only by two witnesses instead of three as required by Phil. law. A petition for probate was filed before the CFI of Manila by his executor, who contended that Johnson was a citizen of USA at the time of his death and that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois, USA which pursuant to the provision of the Civil Procedure, it can be probated here in the Phil. He then presented the proof of said law before the court which was admitted by the same. However, Ebba, the daughter of the late Johnson moved to annul the decree of probate and prayed for the commencement of intestate administration of the estate on the ground that Johnson was not a resident of the state of Illinois (became a resident in Manila, but offering only a general statement) and that the probated will was not in accordance with the laws of that state. ISSUES : 1. Whether or not Johnson is a citizen of USA. 2. Whether or not the will was valid according to the national law of the decedent. HELD

: 1. Johnson remains a citizen of USA. The petition does not deny the citizenship of Johnson but only asserts that he became a resident of the Phil. Mere residency in another country without any intention of renouncing his citizenship does not necessary follow that he will immediately acquire citizenship in the state of his new domicile. 2. Yes. The will was in accordance with the laws of USA. The trial judge was fully satisfied with the proof of such law presented by the executor of the deceased. Even presuming that the trial judge in taking judicial notice of the law of USA, such error is not available to the petitioner daughter because she did not offer any evidence as what the true law of USA is which would appear that the law found by the court is different from the true law of Illinois USA.

A.1. Exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law – When the foreign law is contrary to an important public policy of the forum  penal in nature

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 procedural in nature  purely fiscal and administrative in nature  application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum  the case involves real or personal property situated in the forum  contrary to good morals

PARDO V. REPUBLIC 85 Phil 323 FACTS : Petitioner Vicente Pardo was a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895. In 1905 he went to the Phil. and resides here wherein he married a Filipino and employed in Manila. Petitioner arrived in the Phil. when he was only ten years old and has already lived here for 44 years. Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization but it was opposed by the herein respondent on the ground that he did not or the evidence that he presented on whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizen of that country is not sufficient. Petitioner only presented a certificate signed by the Consul Gen. of Spain in the Phil. stating that in accordance with Art.17 and 25 of the Spanish Code, Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship in Spain besides court should have take judicial notice on this law. ISSUE

: Whether or not court shall take judicial notice.

HELD

: Yes, because mot of our laws comes from Spain, the court may take judicial notice. As the Civil Code has been and still the basic code in force in the Phil. Art.17 of thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges of the Phil. by reason of their, judicial functions and may be judicially recognized by them without the introduction of proof. A copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the applicant’s country does not conform to the requirements concerning the certification and authentication of such law. Proof of a foreign law on regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice under the Rules of court, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action, if in the light of all the circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.

PHIL. COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK V. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS : Spouses Charles and Linnie Hodges executed a mutual will wherein they mutually made a testamentary provisions in favor of each other. Both spouses resided in the Phil. at the time of the death of Linnie Hodges. The validity of certain testamentary provisions made by Linnie in favor of his husband, arose a question as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the time of death of Linnie. PCIB contended that since Hodges spouses were both residents of the Phil. at the time of the death of Linnie, Texan Law would result in the renvoi. The other party contended that no renvoi was possible therefore Texas Law shall be the applicable law. But PCIB previous admitted that under the laws of Texas that there is such a legitime of ¼ of said conjugal estate. ISSUES : 1. Whether or not there is a need to ascertain the laws of Texas. 2. Whether or not by previous admitted on what the Texas law is all about creates a estoppel?

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HELD

: 1. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned claim otherwise. 2.

Yes, it creates estoppel. The existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, such previous admission thereof creates estoppels in any further proceedings.

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. V. BOHONAN 106 Phil 997, January30, 1960 L-12105 FACTS : During the probate of the will and testament of C.O. Bohonan, it was not disputed that testator Bohonan was a citizen of Nevada and that his will shall be disposed in accordance with the law of Nevada. Proof of such foreign law having been offered and taken by the probate court. After the probate becomes final Magdalena and her children filed with the court contending that they have deprived of the legitime so they asked the court to present again the Nevada law to determine on whether or not the deprivation was in accordance with Nevada laws and to determine also whether the Nevada law shall apply. ISSUES : 1) Whether or not the court shall again take judicial notice on Nevada law 2) Whether or not Nevada law shall apply in the disposition of the estate of a foreign individual HELD

: 1)

Not anymore because it has already been presented and admitted in court during the probate of the will and that appellant did not dispute the said law. In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Thus, the court can taken judicial notice without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

2)

Nevada law shall apply. Art.16 of the Civil Code provides that the validity of testamentary disposition the amount of successional right the order of succession, the intrinsic validity of the will and capacity to succeed shall be the governed by the law of the person whose succession is under consideration regardless of the nature of the property and regardless of the place where the property is situated.

LIM V. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 36 Phil 472 FACTS : Two children(minors) born in China from a Chinese father and who were in the custody of their Filipino mother were denied by the respondent to enter into the Phil. on the ground that under Chinese immigration laws a certificate shall be necessary in order to enter into the Phil. Petitioners contended that they are entitled to enter, regardless of the provisions of the law since the are citizens of the Phil. and that their mother who is entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance and education, is clearly entitled to take up her residence in the Phil. and should not be required, to that end, to abandon her minor children. But petitioners failed to prove and present the Chinese law. ISSUE

: In the absence of any evidence of the Chinese law, what law shall apply.

HELD

: Infant children of a Filipino woman born in China out of lawful wedlock, whose father was a Chinese person, seeking entry into the Phil. in the custody and

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control of their mother for the purpose of taking up their residence here with her are not subject to exclusion under the Chinese Immigration laws. In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. Since the court was not advised of any provision of Chinese law which differentiates the status of infant children, born out of lawful wedlock, the court therefore assumes that China law is the same in Phil. law regarding the rights and status of infant children born out of wedlock.

BEAM V. YATCO 82 Phil 30 FACTS : A.W. Beam and his wife Lydia Beam were residents and citizens of California at the time of Lydia Beam’s death. But sometime during their marriage they resided her and acquired properties in the Phil. When Lydia Beam died half of her properties were inherited by the plaintiffs and consequently the defendant imposed an inheritance tax. Plaintiffs refused to pay or paid under protest on the ground that A.W. Beam was a Utah citizen, that under the law of Utah properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage belong to them separately however A.W. Beam failed to prove his citizenship. Defendant contends that since he failed to prove his Utah citizenship the law of the Phil. shall govern. And that since the properties in questions were acquired by them during their marriage, it should be considered as part of the community property and upon the death of the wife, the one belong to her passed by succession to her heirs in accordance with Art.1401 of the Civil Code and therefore subject to the inheritance tax. ISSUE

: Failure of A.W. Beam to prove Utah law, what law shall apply?

HELD

: When a foreign law is pleaded and no evidence has been presented as to said law it is presumed that Utah law is the same as in the law of the forum.

MICIANO V. BRIMO 50 Phil 67 FACTS : A Turkish national made a will wherein he stated that his property shall be distributed in accordance with Phil. laws and not that of his nation since the provisions of the will is void. When the judicial administrator of the Turkish filed a scheme partition proceedings, brothers of the deceased Turkish opposed on the ground that said provisions in the will is void being in violation of Art. 16 of the Civil Code. However, the oppositor failed to prove that the said testamentary provisions are not in accordance with the Turkish Laws and failed to present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. ISSUE

: Whether or not partition proceedings be refused. What law shall be applied.

HELD

: No, it shall not be refused because foreign laws shall be proved as a fact and in the absence of such proof, they are presumed to be same as these of the Phil. Thus partition proceedings may be continued. However, by failure to prove by the brother oppositor on what the Turkish law is all about, the court indulged in a presumption that Turkish law was the same as ours. And his estate shall be distributed in accordance with the Phil. laws but testamentary provision made by the testator shall be void for being contrary to the law.

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COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FISHER 110 Phil 636 FACTS : Stevenson was born in the Phil. of British parents and was married to Beatrice also a British national. Stevenson died and instituted his wife as his sole heir to certain properties acquired by both spouses while residing here in the Phil. when the wife filed a preliminary estate4 and inheritance tax return, she claims for a deduction of taxes on the ground that under the Phil. civil law, in the absence of

any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during the marriage, hence, the taxable net estate shall be reduced. But the petitioner contended that the property relation of the husband should not be governed by the Phil. but by the English law which does not recognize legal partnership between spouses, hence all properties acquired by the husband during the marriage shall belong exclusively to the husband, and therefore the taxable net estate is the whole of the decedent’s estate. But petitioner failed to prove said English law. ISSUE

: Whether or not English law shall be applied.

HELD

: No. The pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by the petitioner except for a mere allegation in his answer which is not sufficient. In the absence of such proof, it is presumed that the law of England on the matter is the same as our law.

YAM KA LIM VS. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 30 Phil 46 FACTS : Yam Ka Lim, of Chinese descent, arrived at the port of Manila from the port of Hongkong and sought admission into the Philippine Islands, claiming that he is the legitimate minor son of Yam Long Sai, a resident Chinese merchant. The board of special inquiry, questioned his right to enter the Philippines and after examining the evidence submitted by the petitioner and from the testimonies of the witnesses, refused to permit him to land upon the ground that they did not believe him to be the legitimate son of the said Yam Long Sai. Notice of the said decision was given to Yam Long sai and to his representative William Tracey Page, giving them 2 days to appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs. Later a bond was given for the release of the plaintiff. No appeal was taken from the decision of the board of special inquiry to the Insular Collector of Customs. Without having first decided whether the Collector of Customs had abused his authority, the lower court proceeded to hear evidence upon the question whether or not Yam Ka Lim was the legitimate minor son of Yam Long Sai. After hearing the evidence and taking into consideration the laws of China, without any proof as to what they were, the lower court decided that the said Yam Ka Lim was the legitimate son of the said Yam Long Sai and ordered him to be released from the custody of the Collector of Customs and that he be permitted to enter the Philippine Islands and that the said bond theretofore given be canceled. Hence this appeal. ISSUE

: Whether or nor the court erred in taking judicial notice of the laws of China relative to marriage and child legitimacy, which differ from those in force in the Philippine Islands.

HELD

: Yes, the lower court committed an error in taking judicial notice of what the laws of marriage in China are. The statutes of other countries must be pleaded and proved the same as any other fact. In the absence of such pleading and proof the laws of a foreign state will be presumed to be the same as our own.

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There was ample proof in the record to show, or at least to convince the board of special inquiry, that said Yam Ka Lim was not the legitimate minor son of the said Yam Long Sai.

PART THREE: PERSONAL LAW VIII. NATIONALITY  refers to membership in a political community.  The Philippines adheres to the nationality law Theory Nationality Law Theory • is a conflict of law theory by virtue of which jurisdiction over the particular subject matter affecting a person such as status of a natural person, is determined by the latter’s nationality (Coquia) • it is national law of the individual that regulates his civil status, capacity, condition, his family rights and duties, laws on succession and capacity to succeed Nationality vs. Citizenship • while nationality is membership in an ethnic, social, racial and cultural group, citizenship is membership in a political society NATIONALITY CONFLICT RULE •

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

A. DETERMINATION OF NATIONALITY • Each State has the prerogative and authority to determine by its own municipal law who are its nationals or citizens • The Hague Convention on Conflict of National Laws provides “it is for each state to determine who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other states insofar as it is consistent with international convention, international customs, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality. NOTE: Nationality may be acquired by birth or by naturalization The three kinds of citizens of the Philippines are – 1. 2. 3.

Natural Born Citizens Naturalized Citizens or Citizens by Naturalization Citizens by election

1.

NATURAL BORN CITIZENS – those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Native born citizen is one born in the country of which he is a citizen, hence, a child born to a Filipino mother in Germany is a natural born, but not native born citizen Article IV of the Philippine Constitution (1987), The following are citizens of the Philippines – a. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; b. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines; c. Those born before January 17. 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philppine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (within three years) d. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law

TWO THEORIES on whether place or ancestry determines citizenship

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1. 2.

JUS SOLI PRINCIPLE – the law of the place of one’s birth determine one’s nationality JUS SANGUINIS PRINCIPLE – one follows the citizenship of his parents; this is citizenship by blood

 The Philippine Constitution applies the Jus Sanguinis principle which means the rule of descent or blood.

TALAROC V. UY, 92 Phil 52 (1952) FACTS : Respondent Yu was elected as Municipal Mayor. However his election was questioned by the defeated candidate Talaroc, the herein petitioner, on the ground that Uy was a Chinese and therefore ineligible for the position. Respondent contended that his father is a Chinese citizen.while he was still a minor his father died and that his mother without expressly expatriating herself ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband. He thus followed his mother’s citizenship and is a citizen of the Phil. by the mere fact of his birth. ISSUE

: Whether or not Uy is Filipino citizen.

HELD

: Filipino, a Filipino woman married to Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband and that thereafter her minor children’s nationality automatically followed that of the mother’s. The rule applies only to minor children not to persons who are already in age.

CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP. 199 SCRA 692 FACTS : Private respondents Ong’s father was a Chinese citizen married to a natural born Filipina in 1932. They bore 8 children, one of whom is private respondent who was born in 1948. On 1955, private respondent’s father took his Oath of Allegiance and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984 and 1986 elections, he registered himself as a voter of Laoang Samar. The following year he ran in the elections for representative in the 2 nd district of Northern Samar in which he was proclaimed winner. Petitioner then filed protests on the ground that Ong, the private respondent was not a natural born citizen of the Phil. because he failed to file a statement or formal declaration when he reached the age of majority to elect Phil. citizenship which is required under the law. ISSUE

: Whether or not there is a need for Ong to file a sworn statement.

HELD

: Not anymore. He was already a citizen. Not only because his mother was a natural born citizen but also his father had been naturalized when the respondent was still a minor. He exercises his right of suffrage and established his life here in the Phil. The exercise of right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of Phil. citizenship.

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To require the respondent to elect Phil. citizenship, would not only have been superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it was the law itself that had already elected Phil. citizenship for him. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action of its nullity, not through a collateral approach.

CORDORA VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2008 FACTS : Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) filed a complaint against Gustavo S. Tambunting before the COMELEC Law Department that the latter was not eligible to run for local public office because he lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that Tambunting claimed that he is an American. According to Cordora, respondent acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. On the other hand, Tambunting maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father, further denying that he was naturalized as an American citizen and that he also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225. The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen which was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution, pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE

: Whether or not Tambunting is a dual citizen.

HELD

: Yes. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. The SC reiterated a previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the

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time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

2.

NATURALIZED CITIZENS or CITIZENS BY NATURALIZATION – those who are not natural-born citizens; those who become such through judicial proceedings

NATURALIZATION is the process of acquiring citizenship of another country; a. In the strict sense, it is a judicial process, where formalities of the law have to be complied with including a judicial hearing and approval of the petition b. In the loose and broad sense, it may mean not only the judicial process but also the acquisition of another citizenship by such acts as marriage to a citizen, and the exercise of the option to elect a particular citizenship (Paras) NATURALIZATION confers to an alien a nationality after birth by any means provided by the law. In the Philippines, naturalization is by judicial method under Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended by republic Act 530. (Coquia) QUALIFICATIONS OF NATURALIZATION a. The petitioner must not be less than 21 years of age on the date of the hearing of the petition; b. He must have, as a rule resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years; Note:

The minimum ten-year residence requirement is to enable the government to observe the applicant’s conduct and to ensure that he has imbibed the principles and spirit of our Constitution.

However, this period may be reduced to five years in any of the following cases:

(1) If the applicant has honourably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof; (2) If he has established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines; (3) If he is married to a Filipino woman’ (4) If he had been engaged as a teacher in a public or recognized private school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of two years; (5) If he was born in the Philippines. c.

He must be of good moral character, and believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the

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Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; d. He mush own real estate in the Philippines worth not less that Php 5,000.00, or must have some lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation; e. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages f. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public schools or private schools where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of the residence required of him, prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as citizen (Paras) YU KIAN CHLE V. REPUBLIC 13 SCRA 282 (1965) FACTS : Petitioner a citizen of China filed a petition for naturalization before the CFI of Manila. The petition was granted, thus the respondent appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen case to enable him to present Additional Documentary Proof of his Income, claiming that his income has risen from P3,000 in 1957 to P5,100 in 1960 and P1,000 in 1961. The respondent through the Sol. Gen. moved for the reversal of the decision on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that he has a lucrative income considering that the increase he received was due to the bonuses given by his employer. ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicant has a lucrative income.

HELD:

In considering whether an applicant for naturalization has a lucrative income, allowance and bonuses which may or may not be given to him as where they spring from purely voluntary actuations of his employer conditioned to the circumstance that the employer was making profits, should not be added to his basic salary.

3.

CITIZENS BY ELECTION – citizens by virtue of certain legal provisions, become such by choosing (or electing) Philippine citizenship after attaining the age of majority or within a reasonable time (within 3 years)

B. Procedure for Naturalization The following are the steps for naturalization – 1. A declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen must first be filed, with the Office of the Solicitor General, unless the applicant is exempted from this requirement; Exemptions to the filing of Declaration of Intention – • Persons born in the Philippines and who have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or private schools recognized by the government, and not limited to any race or nationality • Those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application • The widow and minor children of an alien who declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is actually naturalized 2. The petition for naturalization must then be filed 3. After publication in the official gazette or newspaper of general publication the petition will be heard 4. If the petition is approved, there will be a rehearing two years after the promulgation of the judgment awarding naturalization 5. Taking of the oath of allegiance to support and defend the constitution and the laws of the Philippines (Coquia) NOTE: The law provides for exemptions to the filing of declaration of intention. They are the following: (1) Persons born in the Philippines and who have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or private schools recognized by the Government, and not limited to any race or nationality;

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(2) Those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application; (3) The widow and minor children of an alien who declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is actually naturalized. Effect of Naturalization on Wife and Children VIVO V. CLORIBEL 25 SCRA 616 FACTS : Private respondent Chua Pre Luan, a Chinese mother and her minor children cam here in the Phil. and were admitted as temporary visitors with an initial authorized stay of three months. Meanwhile, her husband and the father of these aliens had applied for naturalization. After the expiration of their temporary stay, respondents petitioned for an indefinite extension stay however these was opposed by the petitioner Commissioner of Immigration. However they are given a two year extension. On the specified date of the expiration of such extension, respondent did not leave the country but instead filed for mandamus with injunction to implement the extension previously authorized by the Sec. of Foreign Affairs on the ground that the eventual conversion into naturalized Filipino of her husband will also automatically make her a Filipino citizen. The Immigration Commissioner in his answer alleged that even if her husband will become a Filipino citizen, she would not automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that she can be lawfully naturalized. ISSUE:

Whether or not the eventual conversion of respondent’s husband would also automatically make her a Filipino citizen?

HELD:

No, an alien woman, married to a naturalized Filipino citizen, does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of naturalization. By having misrepresented before Phil. consular and administrative authorities that she came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay permanently and for having intentionally delayed court processes prolong her stay, respondent demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications for naturalization that she must be of good moral character and must have conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during her entire stay in the Phil. As to foreign-born minor children, they are extended citizenship “if dwelling in the Phil. at the time of the naturalization of their parent.” Dwelling means “lawful residence.” In the case at bar, since their stay in the country was already expired, it cannot be said that they lawfully dwells herein the Phil. Hence, citizenship cannot be extended to them.

MOY YA LIM YAO V. COMMISSONER OF IM., 41 SCRA 292 FACTS : Petitioner Chinese citizen came to the Phil. and contracted a marriage with Edilberto Lim a Filipino citizen. Petitioner was allowed only to enter and stay in the Phil. until Feb. 13, 1962, a month after she got married to a Filipino citizen (Jan. 25, 1962). After the expiration of her authority to stay in the P.I. the respondent ordered her to leave and causing her arrest and deportation upon her failure to do so on the ground that “mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien woman does not automatically confer on the latter Phil. citizenship.” The alien wife must first posses all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. That is she must first present proof in the naturalization proceedings that she is not disqualified and that she possessed all the qualifications provided by law. ISSUE

: Whether or not mere marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino citizen automatically confer to the alien woman a Filipino citizenship.

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HELD

: An alien woman marrying a Filipino native-born (or naturalized) becomes ipso facto a Filipino provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Phil. under Sec. 4 Ipso facto means that it is no longer necessary for her to prove that she possessed the requisite qualifications in a naturalization proceedings. Likewise an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized her follows the Phil. citizenship of her naturalized husband provided she possesses none of the disqualifications provided by law.(Sec.4) These decisions in effect ruled that it is not necessary for an alien citizen to prove in a judicial proceeding that she posses all the qualifications set forth in Sec. 2 and none of the disqualifications under Sec.4.

C. Loss of Citizenship Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways (Pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No 106) by – 1. Naturalization in foreign countries 2. Express renunciation of citizenship 3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years old or more: provided, however, that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country; 4. Rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: 5. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization; 6. Having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon of amnesty has been granted and; 7. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner, if by virtue of the laws in force of her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality

FRIVALDO V. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245 FACTS : Petitioner Frivaldo was proclaimed as governor of the province of Sorsogon and subsequently assumed office. However his election was opposed by private respondent on the ground that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen having been naturalized in the US in 1983 and that he failed to repatriate himself after his naturalization in the US. Thus being an alien he was disqualified to hold any public office in the Phil. and his election did not cure the defect. Petitioner admitted the allegation but pleaded a special defense that he has sough American citizenship only to protect himself against Pres. Marcos, that his naturalization was not impressed with voluntariness but was merely force as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agents abroad and by actively participating in the election he automatically forfeits his American citizenship. ISSUE

: Whether or not by actively participating in the election, petitioner can automatically forfeit his American citizenship and automatically restore his Phil. Citizenship.

HELD

: No. There filing of certificate of candidacy does automatically restore his Phil. citizenship. And even if petitioner loss his naturalized American citizenship it will not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Phil. citizenship. Reparation requires an express and unequivocal act. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Phil. citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. That is by: 1) Naturalization 2) Direct act of Congress 3) Repatriation Phil. citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.

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FRIVALDO V. COMELEC 257 SCRA 727 FACTS : Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in 3 successive elections but was twice declared by the Supreme Court to be disqualified to hold office due to his alien citizenship. He now claims to have re-assumed his lost Phil citizenship thru repatriation. It was established that he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of PD 725 on June 30, 1995, much later than the time he filed his Cert. of Candidacy. ISSUE

: Whether or not Frivaldo reacquired his Phil citizenship thru repatriation

HELD

: Yes. Under Phil. law citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or repatriation. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. The SC holds that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. Being a former Filipino, he deserves a liberal interpretation of Phil. Laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

LABO, JR. V. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 FACTS : Petitioner Labo Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio. However his election was opposed by respondent Lardizabal on the ground that petitioner was not a citizen of the Phil. based on the administrative decisions rendered by the Commission of Immigration and Deportation stating that petitioner was not a citizen of the Phil. since it was contained in the official statement of Australian citizen by reason of his naturalization. Petitioner did not deny and admitted the allegations that he was indeed naturalized in Australia, however he contended that since his Australian citizenship has already been annulled, he has been therefore automatically reacquired and reinstated as a citizen of the Phil. ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner automatically reacquired his Phil. Citizenship on the ground that his Australian citizenship has already been annulled?

HELD

: No, the annulment of petitioner’s Australian citizenship did not automatically restore his Phil. citizenship. Lost Phil. citizenship may be reacquired only through: 1) Direct act of congress 2) Naturalization or 3) Repatriation It does not appear however that petitioner has reacquired his Phil. citizenship by any of these methods.

AZNAR V. COMELEC 185 SCRA 703 FACTS : Lito Osmeña filed his candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of provincial governor of Cebu however his candidacy was opposed by petitioner Aznar on the ground that his is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of USA considering that Osmeña was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Phil. by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Because of these petitioner assumed that private

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respondent is an American and being an American, private respondent must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the US Naturalization Laws. Private respondent on the other hand maintains that he is a Filipino citizen alleging that he is the legitimate child of a Filipino, that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Phil. passport and that he had been continuously residing in the Phil. since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months and that he has been a registered voter in the Phil. since 1965. ISSUE

: Whether or not by mere possessing Alien Certificate of Registration automatically renders Osmeña an American citizenship and automatically renounces his Filipino citizenship.

HELD

: No, considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Phil. citizenship cannot be presumed. Petitioner must first present proof that Osmeña had his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for by law namely: 1) By naturalization in foreign country 2) By express renunciation of citizenship and 3) By subscribing to an Oath of Allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country. Hence, the petitioner failed to present any of these direct proof, Osmeña remains a Filipino citizen.

REPUBLIC V. LI YAO 241 SCRA 748 FACTS : Respondent LiYao is a Chinese national and was naturalized as a Filipino citizen in 1952, the Sol. Gen. filed a petition to cancel Li Yao’s naturalization on the ground that prior to his naturalization he obtain unlawful acts which would disqualify for naturalization by maliciously evading the payment of his correct income taxes for 1946-1951. Respondent however alleged that he already settled his tax liability under PD.58 which granted tax amnesty and thereby rendered him free of any civil, criminal, or administrative liability. ISSUE

: Whether or not tax amnesty obliterates his lack of good moral character?

HELD

: No, tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization. Concealment of applicant’s income to evade payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character is not irreproachable

D. Dual allegiance and Dual Citizenship Through the application of the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles a child born of parents who are nationals of a country applying the principle of jus sanguinis, in a country applying the jus soli principle has dual nationality. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9255 – “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."

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Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 FACTS : Mercado and Manzano were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City. Manzano won but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Mamaril who allege that Maznzano was not a Filipino citizen but an American citizen. The COMELEC granted the petition and

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ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of MAnzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen invoking Sec. 40 of Local Gov’t. Code that person having dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. ISSUE

: W/N private respondent is a dual citizen?

HELD

: No. The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160, Sec. 40 refers to dual allegiance which differs persons with dual citizenship hence does not fall under the disqualification. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, manzano elected Phil. Citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Thus, the filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounced his American citizenship, effectively removing the disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

E. PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE 1. Dual or multiple citizenship •

In matters of status, he is usually considered by the forum as exclusively his own national, his additional foreign nationality is disregarded

•

In case the litigation arises in a third country, the law most consistently applied is at that of the country of which the person is not only a national but where he has his domicile or habitual residence, or in the absence thereof, his residence

•

In view of the rule set in the Hague Convention on Conflict of National Laws, each state determines who its own nationals are. Article 5 thereof provides “a third state shall, of the nationalities which such a person possesses, recognized exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country of which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the county with which in the circumstances he appears to be closely connected”. Any question as to whether or not a person possesses the nationality of a particular state shall be determined in accordance with the state’s internal law. Hence it is possible that an individual can be claimed as a national of two or more states.

•

Application of the jus soli and jus sanguinis – A child born of parents who are nationals of a country applying the principle of jus sanguinis, in a country applying the jus soli has dual nationality. Thus: A Filipino citizen who marries an alien may acquire the citizenship of his or her spouse if the spouse’s national law so allows. A Filipino citizen however, who marries an alien shall retain Philippine citizenship, unless by his act or omission, he is deemed under the law, to have renounced it by taking an oath of allegiance to the spouse’s country or by express renunciation. Another instance of dual or multiple nationalities is the case of an individual who is naturalized citizen of another state but has not effectively renounced his former nationality.

•

In the determination of the rights of an individual who may claim multiple nationalities in the third state, the International Court of Justice applied the principle of effective nationality.”

MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP ARISES DUE TO: a. through a naturalized citizen’s failure to comply with certain legal requirements in the country of origin b. from a combined application of jus soli and jus sanguinis principle c. by the legislative act of states d. by the voluntary act of individual concerned

OH HEK HOW V. REPUBLIC 29 SCRA 94

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FACTS : Petitioner a Chinese national filed a petition for naturalization as a citizen of the Phils. He was allowed by the court to take oath of allegiance and subsequently was issued a certificate for naturalization. Public respondent opposed on the ground that petitioner has failed to secure from Minister of the Interior Nationalist China a permission required by laws thereof for a valid renunciation of his Chinese citizenships. Petitioner contends that said requirements is no longer necessary and that the naturalization of an alien as Phil. Citizen is governed exclusively by Phil. Laws and not by any foreign law. ISSUE

: Whether or not a permission from the petitioner’s country is necessary for a valid renunciation is required for naturalization in the Phil.

HELD

: Yes. Sec. 12 of the CA 473 requires the petitioner to absolutely and forever renounce all allegiance to any foreign country particularly to the state of which he is a subject or a citizen. Therefore an applicant cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Phil. Without first validly renouncing his former citizenship. The purpose is to divest him of his former nationality before acquiring Phil. Citizenship because otherwise he would have two distinct sovereignties which our laws do not permit except: a) when a foreign country grants the same privilege to Filipino citizens, and b0 such had been agredd upon by treaty between the Phils. and that foreign state.

2. STATELESSNESS •

refers to an individual who has been stripped of his nationality by his own former government without having an opportunity to acquire another.

•

Stateless persons are generally subject to the law of their domicile or habitual residence, or in default thereof, to the law of their temporary residence

STATELESSNESS ARISES DUE TO: 1. Deprivation of his citizenship for any cause such as commission of a crime; 2. Renunciation of one’s nationality by certain acts, express or implied; 3. Voluntary release from his original state; 4. He may have been born in a country which recognizes only the principle of jus sanguinis -- or citizenship by blood, of parents whose law recognizes only the principle of jus soli -- citizenship by birth in a certain place. Thus he is neither a citizen of the country of his parents. •

However, the Hague Conference of 1928 on International Private Law suggested that personal law of stateless individuals shall be the law of the domicile or the law of the place of temporary residence.

•

NOTE: The Convention on the Adoption on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) mandates that the jus sanguinis country grants its nationality to person born within its territory if he would be otherwise stateless, and the jus soli country to extend its nationality to a person who would otherwise be considered stateless when any of his parents is a citizen of the contracting state

KOOKOORITCHIN V. SOLICITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 435 (1948) FACTS : Petitioner was born in Russia and grew up as a citizen of the defunct Empires of Russia under the Czar government. After WWII, he came to the Phils. and resided here and married a Filipina. He then petition for naturalization and the court granted his petition. The Solicitor General appealed contending that he is Russian and not a stateless person because he failed to show that under the laws of Russia, he had lost his Russian citizenship. Petitioner contends that he is a stateless person because the empire of Russian had already ceased to exist since the Czar was overthrown by the Bolshevists and that he disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government.

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ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner is a stateless person.

HELD

: The fact that the Czar’s government had been already overthrown and replaced by the Bolshevists to which he disclaims allegiance, he is deemed to be a stateless person. Knowing the history, nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship which is presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioners claims that he is a stateless person that his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist government and because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently resided in the Phils. after having established his life in the Phil., marrying a Filipina and joining the guerrillas during the Japanese Regime, it would be fair that his petition for naturalization be granted.

XI. DOMICILE •

Municipal Law concept is stated in the Civil Code :

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)

•

For juridical persons, domicile is determined by the law creating or recognizing it.

A. DEFINITION • One’s true, fixed permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning • To acquire a domicile, there must be concurrence of intention to make it one’s domicile and physical presence, while “residence” simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place (Coquia) Distinctions between residence and domicile 1. Residence is an act; while domicile is an act coupled with an intent; 2. Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which he has taken up his abode ceases; while domicile has no such intent, the abiding is animo manendi. Domiciliary Theory • Is the theory that in general the status, condition, rights, obligations and capacity of a person should be governed by the law of his domicile (Paras) Domicile vs. Citizenship or Nationality • Domicile speaks of one’s permanent place of abode, in general: while , citizenship and nationality indicate ties of allegiance and loyalty. A person may be a citizen or national of one state, without being a domiciliary thereof; conversely, one may possess his domicile in one state without necessarily being a citizen or national thereof

CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS 191 SCRA 229

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FACTS : Merito Miguel (respondent) run for the position of municipal mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan to which he was elected. However his election was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US not of Bolinao because on the back of the card, it printed that “Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the US. In his answer admitted that he hold a green card but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the US. He alleged that he obtained the green card only for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, that he voted in all elections including the plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. After hearing, the COMELEC ruled that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Phil. because in spite of his green card, respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in all previous elections. It is also averred that the act of filing of certificate of candidacy constitutes a waiver of status as a permanent resident/immigrant in the US. ISSUE

: 1. Whether or not possession of Miguel of a green card constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Phil. 2. Whether or not mere filing of certificate of candidacy constitutes a waiver of status as a permanent resident in the US.

HELD

: 1. Yes, Miguel’s immigration to the US constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Phil. for he did not go to US merely to visit his children but with the intention to live there permanently as evidence by his application for an immigrant’s visa. Base on that application he was issued by the US govt. the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. 2. No. His act of filing a COC did not constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant in the US. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to the filing of his candidacy and without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any elective office.

GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. L-40502, November 29, 1976 FACTS : Petitioner, Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging, inter alia that Amado Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna died intestate in Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna. Private respondent, Preciosa Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. She contended that the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado Garcia. On the contrary, Preciosa Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado Garcia was at 11 Carmel, Carmel Subd. Quezon City. Parentically, in her amended petition, Virginia Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. ISSUE

: 1. Whether or not the deceased’s last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna. 2. What does the term “resides” mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?

HELD

: 1. No. The SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence

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of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. 2. This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

SALUDO, JR. V. AMERICAN EXPRESS G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006 FACTS : Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers alleging inter alia, that plaintiff "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. Respondents raised the affirmative defenses that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo. Saludo asserted that such allegations was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. The court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents stating in its order that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the appellate court granted the said petition. Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE

: Whether petitioner Saludo was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

HELD

: Yes. Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. This is

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because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law. The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place.

UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC 95 Phil 890 (1954) FACTS : Petitioner Wilfred Uytengsu was born in the Phil. of Chinese parents. He began his studies here from primary school to college. He filed an application for naturalization but after the filing he immediately left the Phil. for the US not returning until several months after the first date set for the hearing of his application. Subsequently, the CFI of Cebu granted his application for naturalization.

The republic appealed on the ground that petitioner failed to meet the residency requirements laid down by law for naturalization that he will reside continuously in the Phil from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Phil. citizenship. Petitioner contends that the word residence laid down by law is synonymous with domicile which one acquired is not lost by physical absence until another domicile is obtained and that he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Phil. his purpose in staying in the US at the time was merely to study therein. ISSUE

: Whether or not for purposes of that law residence is synonymous with domicile.

HELD

: No. for purposes of naturalization law residence requires physical presence in that place for a longer or shorter period of time. Residence is used to indicate the place of abode whether permanent or temporary while domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, on has the intention of returning. Residence is not domicile by domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. Hence, absence during period intervening between the filing of application and hearing is an obstacle to petitioner’s naturalization.

B. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF DOMICILE MERITS –

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1. In cases where the individual who belongs to a country following the domiciliary theory is involved in a case before the Philippine courts, his personal status, capacity, condition, and family rights will be governed by the law of his domicile; 2. In cases of stateless persons who may claim dual or multiple nationality, in which case the court will have to refer to their domicile; 3. When an alien domiciled in the Philippines executes a will abroad DEMERITS – 1. One’s domicile is not ascertainable without first resorting to the courts to establish whether or not there is animo manendi 2. The notion of domicile differs widely with some states distinguishing between residence and domicile or attributing different meanings of domicile for different purposes; 3. If the law of the domicile of origin is given utmost significance, then it will give rise to the same problem as in nationality 4. In cases where the individual who belongs to a country following the C. GENERAL RULES ON DOMICILE 1. No person shall be without a domicile; 2. A person cannot have two simultaneous domicile since the very purpose for identifying one’s domicile is to establish a connection between the person and a definite legal system; 3. Domicile establishes a connection between a person and a particular territorial unit. 4. Once acquired, it remains the domicile unless a new one is obtained: a. by capacitated persons b. with freedom of choice c. with actual physical presence d. and provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, there should be animus manendi (intent to remain) or animus nonrevertendi (intent not to remain) 5. The presumption is in favor of the continuance of domicile. The burden of proving a change of domicile is upon whoever alleges that a change has been secured.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 FACTS : Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident of the place for seven months. Private respondent Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground that Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency. COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila. ISSUE

: Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin

HELD

: An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residence in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semipermanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.

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UJANO V. REPUBLIC 17 SCRA 147 FACTS : Petitioner Ujano was born of Filipino parent in Ilocos Sur. He left the Phil. for the US from which he acquired American citizenship by naturalization and resided there for 20 years. He returned to the Phil. and was admitted for a temporary stay. He filed a petition to reacquire his Phil. citizenship, intending to renounce his allegiance to the US. However his petition was denied by the court on the ground that he did not have the residence required by law, which is six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of the Phil. citizenship. ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner’s domicile is required to reacquire his citizenship.

HELD

: Yes. One of the qualifications for reacquiring Phil. citizenship is that the applicant shall have resided in the Phils. at least six months before he applies for reacquisition. Residence here has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as domicile. A place in a country where he lives and stays permanently and to which he intends to return after temporary absence, no matter how long. So an alien who has been admitted as a temporary visitor cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay her is only temporary and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished.

D. KINDS OF DOMICILE 1. Domicile of origin refers to a person’s domicile at birth. 2. Domicile of choice, which is also called voluntary domicile, is the place freely chosen by a person sui juris. 3. Constructive domicile or domicile by operation of law - that which is assigned to a person after birth on account of legal disability caused for instance by minority, insanity or marriage in the case of a woman

NOTE: The forum determines domicile according to his own standards

VELILLA V. POSADAS 62 Phil 624 (1935) FACTS : Arthur Moody was on American citizen who came here in the Phil. and domiciled therein. Moody died in India, but before his death he executed a will bequeathing all his properties, consisting mainly of bands and shares of stocks of corporations organized under Phil. law in favor of his only sister who was then a citizen and resident of US. The BIR imposed an inheritance tax over those properties inherited by Moody’s sister. Petitioner as administrator was a non-resident of the Phils. and the levy and imposition of inheritance tax over the properties of Moody constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law. ISSUE

: Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Phil. at the time of his death.

HELD

: Yes. There’s nothing on record which would appear that he adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila.

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To effect the abandonment of one’s domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. CARABALLO V. REPUBLIC 4 SCRA 1055 FACTS : Ricardo Caraballo, petitioner, an American citizen who lives in Clark Field, Pampanga by reason of his enlistment in the US air Force together with his wife to adopt a minor Filipino child. However this was apposed by the respondent on the ground that the petitioner is a non-resident-alien because being enlisted as a staff seargent in the US Airforce, his stay in the Phils.is merely temporary. ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner is a non-resident alien.

HELD

: Yes, petitioner is a non-resident alien thus disqualified to adopt. For purpose of adoption, person is deemed to be a resident of a place in a country where he has abode and lives there permanently. It is a place chosen by him freely and voluntarily, although he may later on change his mind and live elsewhere. A place in a country or stat where he lives and stays permanently and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence no matter how long is his domicile.

GO CHEN AND GO LEK V. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 65 Phil 550 FACTS : Petitioners were minor children of Go Tuan and Tan Bon. After Go Tuan’s death, Tan Bon married another Chinese. Shortly thereafter, she came to the Philippines with her second husband. She was admitted as the wife of a Chinese merchant, and has been residing in the Phil. For 8 years. Petitioners remained in china until Tan bon who is engaged in furniture business in Cebu asked them to join her in the Phil. Thereafter, Lek and Chen, arrived in Cebu and took up their abode with their stepmother and brother. ISSUE

: Whether or not Tan Bon is entitled to bring her minor children by her first marriage to the Phil.

HELD

: No. A man’s domicile is also a domicile of his wife and minor children and that he is duty bound to protect, support and keep them in his company. A Chinaman’s chinese wife and her minor children, then do not enter the Phil through their own right but by virtue of the right of the husband or father, unless the Chinese wife belongs to the privileged class. Tan Bon who seeks to bring in her minor children, did not enter the Phils. by her own right but by virtue of her second husband’s right thus, she is not entitled to bring in her minor children by another chinaman who never had a legal residence in the archipelago.

DE LA VINA V. VILLAREAL AND GALANO 41 Phil 13 (1920) FACTS : Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña, alleging That she was a resident of the municipality of Iloilo and that the defendant was a resident of Negros Oriental; that she was the legitimate wife of the defendant, having been married to him in Negros oriental that defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine

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and that the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established her habitual residence. Upon the said allegations, she prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of the conjugal property and alimony. Dela Vina filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that CFI, Iloilo had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant was a resident of Negros oriental and the plaintiff, as his wife, must also be considered a resident of the same province because under the law, the domicile of the husband is also the domicile of the wife. De la Vina asserted that the plaintiff, Geopano could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before their marriage was legally dissolved. ISSUE

: Whether or not Geopano cannot acquire a residence in Iloilo before their marriage was legally dissolved.

HELD

: No. It is true that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. However there are exceptions namely: 1.

The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical duty of the husband and wife is dissolved; or 2. Where the husband has given due course for divorce; or 3. Where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or 4. Where there has been forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband’s domicile. In the case at bar, defendant’s case comes under one of the exceptions. Therefore, Narcisa may acquire a residence or domicile separate to that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where her husband, de La Vina has given course for divorce.

X.

PRINCIPLES ON PERSONAL STATUS AND CAPACITY A. DEFINITION STATUS •

Status, is the place of an individual in a society and consists of personal qualities and relationships, more or less permanent, with which the state and the community are concerned

•

Personal status is the general term that includes both condition and capacity, and more specifically embraces such matters as the beginning and end of human personality, capacity to have rights in general, capacity to engage in legal transactions, protection of personal interests, family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, also transactions of family law, especially marriage, divorce, separation, adoption, legitimation and emancipation, and finally succession both testate and intestate.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS 1. Status is conferred principally by the state not by the individual; 2. Status is a matter or public or social interest 3. Status being a concept of social order, cannot easily be terminated at the mere will of desire of the parties concerned; 4. Status is generally supposed to have a universal character, when a certain status is created by law of one country, it is generally judicially recognized all over the world CAPACITY •

Capacity more often referred as Juridical capacity, is the fitness of a man to be the subject of legal relations while capacity to act is the power to do acts with juridical effects.

RECTO V. HARDEN 100 Phil 427 FACTS : Appelant Esperanza Harden engaged the professional service of Appealee Recto in an action against her husband Fred Harden for divorce whereby it was agreed that Mrs. Harden shall pay Recto 20% of the vale of her share in the conjugal partnership after liquidation. Pending litigation, several instruments were executed by Mr. Harden and Mrs. Harden, mutually releasing and forever discharging each other from all actions, debts and claims to the conjugal partnership. Subsequently Recto filed a manifestation in court that the purpose of said instrument was to defeat his claim of Attorney’s fees and praying that he be payed of Attorney’s fess. Counsel fro both spouses moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the agreement between Recto and Mrs. Harden could not bind the conjugal partnership because it was made without her husband’s consent and that the said contract has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce in violation of the Art. 1305, 1352, 1409 of the Civil Code. ISSUES : 1. Whether or not the agreement between Recto and Mrs. Harden binds the conjugal partnership. 2. Whether or not the said contract which is allegedly void shall be governed by Art. 1305, 1352, 1409 of the Civil Code? HELD

: 1. No. The wife merely bound herself and assumed the persona obligation. The contract neither gives any right to her lawyer whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid 2. No. Inasmuch as both spouses were citizens of USA, their status and the dissolution thereof shall be governed by Art. 15 of the Civil Code, that is by their nat’l law, by the laws of USA which sanction divorce. In short, the contract between Recto and Mrs. Harden are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

B. Legislative jurisdiction v. judicial jurisdiction • Judicial Jurisdiction is the power or authority of a court or administrative tribunal to try a case, render judgment and execute it in accordance with law while Legislative Jurisdiction which is the power of the state to promulgate laws and regulations and enforce them on all persons and property within its territory (Coquia)

BARNUEVO V. FUSTER 29 Phil 606 FACTS : Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain.On April, 1899, they made an agreement in a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart. Then, Constanza commenced divorce proceedings against her husband alleging his adultery. She prayed that she be granted a divorce that the conjugal society be liquidated that her share be adjudicated to her and payment of support be

40

ordered. The court then decreed the suspension of life in common between plaintiff and defendant, ordered payment of support and directed plaintiff and defendant that the communal property be divided. Both parties appealed in which both appeals have one common issue relating to the alleged dowry brought into the marriage by the wife in the amount of 30,000 spanish dollars in which Constanza as paraphernal. ISSUE

: W/N Phil courts may take cognizance of the case to decree the divorce on appeal.

HELD

: Yes. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance, Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce and have the authority to decide on questions concerning foreigners’ status by applying their national law.

FACTUAL SITUATION

POINT OF CONTACT

Beginning of personality of natural persons Ways and effect of emancipation Age of majority Use of names and surnames Use of titles of nobility Absence Presumptions of death and survivorship

National Law of the Child (Art. 15, of the Civil Code) National Law (Art. 15, of the CC) National Law (Art. 15 National Law (Art. 15 National Law (Art. 15 National Law (Art. 15 Lex fori (Arts. 43, 390, 391, CC; Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), Rules of Court

C. BEGINNING AND END OF PERSONALITY •

The determination of the exact moment personality begins is referred to the individual’s personal law. Articles 40 and 41 of our Civil Code give our internal rules on the beginning of human personality. Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a) •

As civil personality is commenced at birth, it is extinguished by death. Under the principle of personal law, a declaration of death issued by a competent court is considered valid for all purposes. Upon the death of a person, some of his rights and obligations are totally extinguished while others are passed on to his successors.

D. ABSENCE

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•

•

The domestic law of different countries do not treat absentees alike and this has given rise to difficult problems in conflict of laws. There are three suggested ways of dealing with the problem: first, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person is dead when he has been absent for a number of years; second, a person’s unexplained absence is judicially investigated and established which results in legal effects similar to those of death; and third, a judicial decree shall have to be issued declaring the person dead before legal effects of death take place. Philippine laws follow the rebuttable presumption of the common law. Our Civil Code states: Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n) Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. (n)

•

However, for specific purposes, our laws require that a declaration of death be issued before certain legal effects of death arise. For instance, article 41 of the Family Code requires that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse presnt must first institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse without which the subsequent marriage is void ab initio. E. NAME • The law expressly states that “no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.” Case law shows the courts have allowed petitions on grounds that the name 1) is ridiculous or tainted with dishonour or extremely difficult to pronounce; or 2) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion; 3) when the right to a new name is a consequence of a change in status; 4) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly hamper social and business life.

F. AGE OF MAJORITY • The legal disability attached to minority and rights recognized upn attainment of the age of majority are aspects of personal status. It is the individual’s personal law which determines whether he has reached the age of majority. Once emancipated, parental authority over the person and property of the child is terminated and he is qualified and responsible all acts of civil life save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases, such as the parent’s continued observance of their responsibilities under article 46 of P.D. 603. • Likewise, although Republic Act No. 6809 lowered the age of majority to 18 years from 21 years, it expressly stated that parental consent for contracting marriage is required until the age of twenty-one. G. CAPACITY • A person’s ability to act with legal effects is governed by his personal law. One’s personal law is viewed as best qualified to decide what restrictions should be imposed on the individual. Rules on capacity of an individual to bind himself

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INSULAR GOV’T. V. FRANK 13 Phil 236 (1909) FACTS : Mr. Frank an American citizen entered into a contract with the Phil. gov’t to serve as a stenographer for a period of two years. He only serve for six months hence petitioner filed a suit against him. Mr. Frank alleged that he was under Phil. law a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law. However, it was disclosed that the contract was entered into in USA in which Frank was considered an adult. ISSUE

: Whether or not Mr. Frank be held liable.

HELD

: He should be held liable, because his capacity to enter into a contract should be governed by his national law.

PART FOUR: CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS XI.

CHOICE OF LAW IN FAMILY RELATIONS A. MARRIAGE (13 & 14) •

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Marriage as a contract has two kinds of requisites: 1. Formal Requisites, generally do not affect the validity of the marriage. Art. 3 of the Family Code provides for three formal requisites namely – a. authority of the solemnizing officer b. marriage license c. marriage ceremony where the contracting parties appear before the solemnizing officer 2. Essential Requisites, affects the validity of the marriage. Art. 3 of the Family Code prescribes two essential requisites to marriage: a. legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be male and female b. consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer

THEORIES ON THE FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE – 1. Compulsory Theory – it is imperative for the parties to follow the formalities of the place of celebration (this is followed in the Philippines) 2. Optional Theory – parties may follow either the lex loci celebrationis or their national law. This rule is followed in most countries 3. Ecclesiastical Rule – The formalities of both the lex loci celebrationis and the national law of the parties must be complied with QUERY: Is a common-law marriage valid in the Phils. If between foreigners and if the relationship began abroad? ANS: Yes, provided it is valid according to their national and according to the place where the relationship began. To avoid injustice, particular conceptions of marriage in

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foreign jurisdiction must be considered provided it is not bigamous, polygamous or universally considered incestuous. UNIVERSALLY CONSIDERED INCESTOUS: 1.

Between ascendants and descendants, whether relationship is illegitimate or legitimate 2. Brothers and sisters – whether full or half-blood or legitimate or illegitimate If Turk brings to the Phils. 4 wives, validly married to him. Should all marriages be considered valid here? 1.

For cohabitation purposes, first wife shall be considered legitimate, the rest concubines. 2. For purposes and determining successional rights, all wives and children, considered as legitimate in view of the nationality theory.

Celebrated Abroad

FACTUAL SITUATION Between Filipinos

Between Foreigners

Mixed Celebrated Philippines

in

the

Between Foreigners Mixed

Marriage by Proxy Note: a marriage by proxy is considered celebrated where the proxy appears

POINT OF CONTACT G.R. Lex loci celebrationis Exceptions: 1. Art. 26 (solemnized outside the Philippines), Art. 35, par. 1, 4, 5 & 6, (void ab initio), Art. 36 (incapacity), Art. 37 (incestuous), Art. 38 (public policy) of the family code (bigamous, polygamous & incestuous marriages 2. consular marriages G.R. Lex loci celebrationis Exceptions: 1. Highly immoral (bigamous, polygamous & incestuous marriages 2. Universally considered incestuous, ie. Between brothers-sisters & between ascendants and descendants Apply rule on marriages between foreigners – to uphold the validity of the marriage National Law (Art. 21, Family Code) provided the marriage is not highly immoral or universally considered incestuous National Law of the Filipino (otherwise, public policy may be militated against) Lex loci celebrationis (with prejudice with the foregoing rules

3. Extrinsic validity of marriage RULES GOVERNING EXTRINSIC VALIDITY GENERAL RULE lex loci celebrationis 1. All states recognized as valid those marriages celebrated in foreign country if they comply with the formalities prescribed therein (Hague Convention) 2. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they were executed (Article 17, Civil Code) 3. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country they were solemnized and valid there as such shall also be valid in this country (Art. 26, Family Code) EXCEPTIONS:

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The following are void marriages between Filipinos even if valid in the foreign country where celebrated of in case of mixed marriages celebrated in the Philippines – 1. 2. 3. 4.

When either or both parties are below 18 years of age even with parental consent; Bigamous and polygamous marriages Mistake at to identity of contracting party A subsequent marriage performed without recording in the Civil Registry the judgment or annulment or declaration of nullity and partition and distribution of properties and the delivery of children’s presumptive legitimes; 5. Marriages where either spouse is psychologically incapacitated; 6. Incestuous marriages 7. Void by reason of public policy NOTE:

These exceptions put into issue the capacity of the parties to enter the marriage and therefore relation to the substantive requirements for marriage. since the personal law of the parties, e.g., the national law of the Filipinos, governs the questions of intrinsic validity of marriages between the Filipinos abroad, the above enumerations are exceptions to lex loci celebrationis precisely because they are controlled by lex nationalii

MIXED MARRIAGES ABROAD -between Filipino and Alien -marriages of first cousins abroad -considered valid not being universally considered incestuous -doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of marriage MIXED MARRIAGE IN THE PHILIPPINES - Filipinos national law shall be followed otherwise public policy may be militated against MARRIAGES BY POXY -if in the Phil. invalid due to required Physical presence-Filipinos and mixed marriages only -if foreigners, valid – if valid in their national law -if abroad, whether between Filipinos or foreigners or mixed , rule is lex loci celebrationis, place where proxy appears subject to exceptions. ADONG V. CHEONG SENG GEE 43 Phil 43 (1922) FACTS : Cheong Boo a native of China died intestate in the Phil. His estate was claimed on one hand by Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child of the former by virtue of marriage to Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand, Mora Adong also claimed the said estate by vertue of her marriage to the deceased in 1896 in the Phil. the trial court ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to establish the Chinese marriage. Respondent appealed contending that the alleged marriage in China could be sufficiently proven mainly by matrimonial letter. ISSUE

: Whether or not a marriage contracted in China, proven mainly by a matrimonial letter is valid in the Phil.

HELD

: No. The rule is that all marriages contracted outside the Phil. which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted are valid in the Phil. provided that it is first necessary to prove the existence of such foreign law and the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar there is no competent testimony what the laws of China concerning marriage were in 1895 and the respondent failed to prove the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage by a clear and strong and unequivocal evidence as to produce moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.

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PEOPLE V. MORA DUMPO 62 Phil 246 (1935) FACTS : Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo were legally married according to the rites and practices of the Mohammedan. Mora Dumpo allegedly contracted another marriage with another man without her previous marriage being dissolved. Respondent was then prosecuted and convicted of the crime of bigamy. Respondent appealed alleging that her second marriage was null and void according to the Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his consent thereto. ISSUE

: Whether or not she should be prosecuted for bigamy.

HELD

: No. it appears from the Mohammedan rites that before an Imam or Mohammedan priest could solemnize marriage, it is first necessary to secure the consent of the bride’s father or, in the absence thereof that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs for the marriage to be valid, otherwise absence of such consent would make the marriage void. In the case at bar there was a failure of the respondent to obtain such consent hence she should not be prosecuted for bigamy.

WONG WOO YU V. VIVO 13 SCRA 552 FACTS : In the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry, petitioner declared that she was married to Perfecto Blas a Filipino in China in 1929 an that their marriage was celebrated by a village leader. On the basis of such declaration, the BSI admitted her into the Phil. as a non-quota immigrant. However this decision was reversed by the new set members of the BSI on the ground that there was no substantial basis of a husband-wife relationship between Woo and Blas and that there was some discrepancies found in the statements made by them in sever investigations conducted by immigration authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929. ISSUE

: Whether or not the alleged marriage be given effect in the Phil.

HELD

: No. The rule that a marriage contracted outside the Phil. which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Phil. cannot be given effect in the case at bar because there was no proof presented relative to the law of marriage in China. In such case we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the foreign law, it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned under the law and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

4. Intrinsic validity of marriage RULES GOVERNING INTRINSIC VALIDITY  controlled by the parties personal laws (either domiciliary or nationality) 5. Effects of marriage a. personal relations between spouses

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MARRIAGE AS A STATUS  Marriage as a status carries with it implications in two fields: 1. Personal rights and obligations of the spouses – personal affair between husband and wife and will not ordinarily be interfered with the courts of justice. Includes mutual fidelity, cohabitation, respect, assistance and support; right of wife to use husband’s surname; duty to follow husband’s residence; GOVERNING LAW: National law of the husband.(given preference- Point of contact) Subsequent change of nationality of the spouses are proposed to have the following effects: (Effect of Change) a. if both will have a common nationality – the new one b. if only one will change – the last common nationality c. if there never was any common nationality – the national law of the husband at the time of the wedding (Hague Convention) (Paras) • it is governed by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PARTIES. • if the spouses are of different nationalities, generally the national law of the husband may prevail as long as said law is not contrary to laws, customs and good morals of the forum. • this includes mutual fidelity, respect, cohabitation, support, and the right of the wife to use the husband’s family name. • Art 69. of the Family Code reads: “The husband and the wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should lived abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.” CASE: Japanese woman came and admitted to the Philippines as transient. Her passport was found to have been forged. Deportation proceedings ensued. Later she married a Filipino. Could she still be subject to deportation? ANS: Yes. Mere marriage to a Filipino did not automatically make her a Filipino. It is essential that she must not be possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization. b. property relations of spouses GOVERNING LAW: in the absence of a contrary stipulation in the marriage settlement, national of the husband, regardless of the place of celebration of the marriage and their residence. (Paras) •

it is governed by the national law of the husband without prejudice to what the Civil Code provides concerning REAL property located in the Philippines

•

Art 80 of the Family Code provides: In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by the Phil laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. (Coquia)

However, this rule shall not apply: a. where both spouses are aliens b. with respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and c. with respect to the extrinsic validity of the contracts entered into in the Philippines not affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for their extrinsic validity (Art. 80, Family Code)

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NOTE:

The subsequent change of the nationality of the husband or the wife has no effect on the spouses’ original property regime EXCEPT when the law of the original nationality itself changes the marital regime, in which case the property relations should change accordingly. This is the DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY IN THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIME. Reasons: 1. Marital peace in property relationship shall be more or less guaranteed; 2. The spouse will not be able to prejudice creditors, who in turn cannot jeopardize the interest of the spouses; 3. Even the spouses may protect themselves from each other.

IMMUTABILITY OF THE REGIME DISTINGUISHED FROM THE MUTABILITY OF THE LAW 

While subsequent change of nationality does not affect the original property regime (doctrine of immutability) in the marital property relationship, it cannot be denied that when the law of the original nationality itself changes the marital regime, the property relations has to change accordingly.

B. DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT



Art. 26 of the Family Code provides that : All marriages solemnized outside the Phil, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country except those prohibited under Article 35, 37 and 38.



Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Phil. Law.

ANNULMENT/DECLARATOIN OF NULLITY – lex loci celebrationis 

Grounds for annulment (if the marriage is voidable merely) and grounds for declaration of nullity (if the marriage is void ab initio) are governed by the law alleged to have been violated; in other words, it is the law of the place of celebration (lex loci celebrationis) subject to certain exceptions, that furnished the grounds 1. Jurisdiction to annul - in practically all civil countries following the nationality principle nationals of the forum are permitted to sue for annulment irrespective of their domicile. In many countries today however, jurisdiction is vested in the court of the domicile of the parties Jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is not essential. It is the status of the plaintiff that is in issue. He should be domiciled in the forum.

2. The governing law – lex loci celebrationis (of the marriage) determines the consequences of any defect to form. Generally, the same applies with reference to substantive or intrinsic validity. But with regard to capacity of the parties to marry, their national law is determinative ABSOLUTE DIVORCES 

GENERAL RULE: our courts only observe relative divorce (legal separation). Any divorce sought in the Philippine courts will not be granted Filipino couples cannot obtain absolute divorces abroad and neither shall a valid divorce obtained abroad by Filipino couples be recognized here. EXCEPTIONS:

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1. Valid divorce abroad between foreigners whose national law allow divorce 2. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. 

Hague Convention provides that the granting of divorce or separation must comply with the national law of the spouses and the law of the place where the application for divorce is made



Grounds for annulment (if the marriage is voidable merely) and grounds for declaration of nullity (if the marriage is void ab initio) are governed by the law alleged to have been violated; in other words, it is the law of the place of celebration (lex loci celebrationis) subject to certain exceptions, that furnished the grounds

1. DIVORCE DECREES OBTAINED BY FILIPINOS

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355

FACTS

: On 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City Vicenta Escaño exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, was duly registered with the local civil register. The parents of Escaño, alarmed about the scandal that would ensue from the clandestine marriage sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage, however, the recelebration did not take place. On 24 June 1950, she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal. Escano’s parents filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter’s marriage with Tenchavez. Thereafter, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage. Then, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958. But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint against Escaño for legal separation and damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband. The lower court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting his wife, hence this appeal.

ISSUE

: W/N the divorce filed by Escaño is valid.

HELD

: No. It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought from the State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

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Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139 (1985) FACTS : Petitioner is a Filipina citizen while private respondent is an American citizen. They were married in Hongkong but thereafter obtained a divorce in the USA. Subsequently after the divorce petitioner remarried to another American citizen. Private respondent filed a suit against petitioner before the RTC of Pasig stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita, the Galleon Shop is their conjugal property and asking that petitioner should make an accounting because even if they have obtained a divorce in the US, the same is not valid and binding in the Phil. being contrary to law and public policy. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and she had no community property. ISSUE

: Whether or not the divorce is recognized as valid in the Phil.

HELD

: Yes. A divorce decree granted by a US court between a Filipina and her American husband is binding on the American husband and is recognized as valid in the Phil. Absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized as valid in the Phil. if valid under the national law of such alien. Only Phil. nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our public policy and morality.

This ruling does not apply if the divorce is obtained by the Filipina. An American granted absolute divorce in his country with is Filipina wife is stopped from asserting his right over property allegedly held in the Phils. as conjugal property by him and his former wife.

PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA 174 SCRA 653

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FACTS : Petitioner is a Filipina while private respondent Geiling is a German national. Both parties were married in Germany. Subsequently because of some marital disharmony Geiling filed a divorce suit in Germany. Thereafter, the German court granted the divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Subsequently after the divorce decree private respondent filed a complaint for adultery before the CFI of Manila against petitioner, alleging that while still married to him, petitioner had affairs with two other men. Petitioner filed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case3 because there is already a divorce decree between the spouses under the national law of his former spouse prior to the filing of the criminal complaint hence he cannot qualify as an offended spouse. ISSUE

: Whether or not the case be dismissed.

HELD

: Yes. The status of the complainant as well as the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse at the time of the filing of the complaint. In the case at bar private respondent being no longer the husband of petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case, since there was already a valid divorce obtained by him in his country by which its legal effects may be recognized in the Phil. insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS 300 SCRA 406 FACTS : Petitoner and Arturo Padlan were Filipino citizens and married under the Phil. laws. Because o some marital conflicts, petitioner obtained a divorce in US and subsequently contracted a second marriage still in US. When Arturo died petitioner claimed as a hereditary heir of Arturo contending that their divorce in US is invalid being contrary to law and public policy in the Phil. Private respondent Blandina Padlan on the other hand claimed that she was the lawful heir because Arturo’s previous marriage was already dissolved by virtue of divorce filed by the petitioner in the USA. When the case was elevated in the CA, the latter ordered to remand the case to the trial court because there was factual issue involved. However it was contended by the petitioner that there is no need to remand the case because there was no factual issue involved because what is only to be resolved is whom of them is the proper heir of Arturo. ISSUE

: Whether or not there was a factual issue involved as to remand the case to the trial court.

HELD

: Yes, there was, because there is still a need to determine as to what is the citizenship of the petitioner at the time of her divorce of his husband because: a) If she is no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce, then she is no longer entitled to inherit from her husband “because a divorce obtained by an alien abroad, is recognized in the Phil. provided they are valid according to his/her national law. b) But if she is still a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce, then she is still entitled to inherit from her husband because a divorce by a Filipino citizen abroad is not valid and binding being contrary to law and public policy.

REPUBLIC vs. CIRPRIANO ORBECIDO, III G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS : Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States with their son. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. In 2000,

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Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied (that said article is not applicable to the said case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage). Hence this petition for review. ISSUE

: W/N RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE

HELD

: Yes. The SC stated the twin elements for the application of par. 2, Art. 26: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus, Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. Par. 2, Art. 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically

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required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

LEGAL SEPARATION •

There is no obstacle to aliens in securing relative divorce in the Philippines, provided – 1. Their national law is willing to recognized Philippine jurisdiction 2. Separation is agreeable to the internal law of the national state o the parties NOTE: Grounds for legal separation are the cumulative grounds provided by the national law of the parties (lex nationalii)

2. Validity of foreign divorce between foreigners The foreign decree of divorce will be recognized as valid here only if the following conditions concur – a. The foreign court must have jurisdiction to grant the absolute divorce; b. The divorce must be recognized as valid by the national law of the parties NOTE: while there is no provision of law requiring Philippines courts to recognize a divorce decree between non-Filipinos rendered by a foreign court, such will be recognized under the principle of international comity unless to do so would violate an important public policy of the Philippines (Coquia)

C. ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY The grounds for annulment is governed by the law of the place of the celebration. The service of summons is governed by the state or the domicile or the residence of the parties. DISTINCTION: ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE; A voidable marriage is valid until it is annulled. The remedy here is therefore, Annulment. If the marriage is null and void, there is no need of a declaration of nullity, since there is nothing to annul.. D. Parental Relations 1. determination of legitimacy of child 2. common law principles on legitimacy 3. parental authority over the child

E. Adoption LEGITIMACY, LEGITIMATION AND ADOPTION FACTUAL SITUATION

POINT OF CONTACT

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Paternity and Filiation (including Parental Authority and Reciprocal Support) – legitimacy, legitimation, recognition, presumptions of legitimacy , rights and obligations of parents and children, including parental authority, and reciprocal support

Adoption – creation of the status of adoption; rights and obligations of adopter and adopted Guardianship 1. over the person a. appointing court b. powers of guardian 2. over the property a. appointing court b. powers of guardian

1. if legitimate – national law of the father (Art. 15, Civil Code) 2. if illegitimate – national law of the mother unless recognized by the father in which case, national law of the father (Art. 15, of the Civil Code) 3. determination of whether legitimate or illegitimate (national law of the father, as a rule) (Art. 15, Civil Code) Doctrine of Immutability of Status – change of parent’s nationality does not affect the status of the child In general, national law of the adopted NOTE: In the Philippines adoption by a Filipino does not confer Filipino citizenship on an adopted alien child court of the domicile of the ward coextensive with those of the appointing court (law of the appointing state) court where the property is found (lex rei sitae) coextensive with those of the appointing court (law of the appointing state)

3. over the person and over the property

see 3 (a) and 3 (b)

4. funerals

where the body is buried

GOVERNING LAW OF THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD • The legitimacy of the child is determined by the national law of the parents at the time of birth, Art. 15, NCC. If the parents belong to different nationalities, legitimacy of the child is determined by the national law of the male parent •

NOTE:

Presumptions of Legitimacy are not mere rules of evidence but are considered as substantive law, hence, governed as well by the national law of the male parent

RIGHST OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD: 1. to bear the surname of the father and the mother; 2. to receive support from their parents, brothers and sisters, in proper cases 3. to the legitime and other successional rights •

NOTE: The law governing the capacity to succeed and the amount of successional rights of the legitimate children are governed by the national law of the decedent

LEGITIMATION •

Is the act by which a person not born legitimate, is placed upon the same footing as a legitimate child

LAWS OF REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN LEGITIMATE/ LEGITIMATED CHILDREN AND PARENTS

GOVERNING LAW OF THE LEGITIMATED CHILD • The national law of the male parent at the time of the marriage shall govern a. whether legitimation has been effected b. whether or not the legitimation will have retroactive effect c. other connected matters

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•

Personal law of the father controls the rights and duties of parents and children; EXCEPT: parental interest in the immovable property of the child which may be regulated by the lex situs NOTE:

NOTE:

Reference to the personal law of the father may result in joint exercise of parental authority over the property of the child by father and mother (Art. 221, Family Code). Father’s personal law could grant parental authority to the mother of the illegitimate children (Art. 176, Family Code) Change in the nationality of the male parent affects the consequent relations between the parents and child

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS INVOLVED UNDER PHILIPPINE LAWS INCLUDE: 1. Personal Care 2. Parental Authority 3. Provide for Education 4. Reciprocal Support LAWS REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN • Relations between the mother and the illegitimate child are governed by the mother’s personal law. • If the child is later legitimated, personal law of the child follows that of the father RIGHST OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD: 1. to bear the surname of the mother; 2. to receive support 3. to legitime ADOPTION

• •

is the process of making a child whether related or not to the adoption, possess in general the rights accorded to a legitimate. (Paras) the act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between person not so related by nature. (Coquia)

NOTES: 1. Jurisdiction to Grant Adoption – The Philippine Courts shall have jurisdiction to grant petition for adoption but must apply the lex fori with respect to procedural matters 2. Capacity of Aliens to Adopt - The cumulative substantive requirements of the forum and of the national law of the adopter must be complied with (Principle of Cumulation) see Art. 184, Family Code, PD 603, RA 852, Domestic Adoption Act and RA 8043, Inter-Country Adoption Act 3. Effect or Consequences of Adoption – a. successional rights – governed by the conflict rules on succession b. parental authority – governed by the national law of the adopter 4. Recognition of Decree of Adoption - The Philippines recognized the principle of foreign adoptions validly rendered and recognized where effected. However, such adoption is still subject to municipal law, i.e. the obligation to register and adoption in the civil register, except, such adoption shall not be recognized if it is contrary to public policy or residents’ interest forbids its enforcement (Agpalo)

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 227 SCRA 401 FACTS : James Anthony Hughes as American citizen and his wife Lenita Hughes who was later naturalized as a citizen of USA jointly filed a petition to adopt Ma. Cecilia, and Neil and Mario all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors as well as their parents gave consent to the adoption.

ISSUE

: Whether or not the spouses can successfully adopt the three Filipino minors?

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HELD

: In the case of James being an alien he is not qualified to adopt because under the Family Code, an alien is not qualified to adopt except: a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse or c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. In the case of Lenita, although she is qualified to adopt under par. 3(a) of Art. 184 FC, the problem is under Article 185 of the said law, which requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife which is a condition that must be read along together with Art.184. Because Art. 185 of the Family Code provides that: “The husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: 1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child or 2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. They will not also fall under par.3(c) because Lenita is already naturalized in other country. For joint adoption, it must be necessary that one of them is a Filipino.

UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN V. REPUBLIC 12 SCRA 400 FACTS : Petitioners Uggi Lindamand a Danish subject who has been granted permanent residence in the Phil. and his wife Erlinda Blancaflor seeks to adopt the minor Charles Blanclaflor who is the natural child of Erlinda in the former marriage. It appears that the minor sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the marriage of petitioners and Uggi has treated the minor as his son. The Manila Juvenile and Domesti Ralations Court, denied the application on the ground that an alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the alien country. Petitioner-husband being an alien, he cannot adopt the minor who is a Filipino citizen, following that of his natural mother. ISSUE

: Whether or not the adoption of minor will prosper.

HELD

: Yes, the New Civil Code only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either: a) Non-residents or b) Who are residents but the Republic of the Phil. has broken diplomatic relations with their govt. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under the law. There is no requirement that in order for an alien to adopt, it must be that the adopted Filipino minor becomes a citizen of his country.

NG HIAN V. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 34 Phil 248 FACTS : Marcosa Jiongco was born in the Phil. of a Filipino mother and a Chine3se father. She was married to a Chinese citizen. Marcosa Jiongco adopted the child of his husband in the former marriage named Ng Hian, the herein petitioner. When Jiongco and her adopted child arrived at the port of Manila, the respondent refused Ng Hian, the petitioner, to enter the Phil. ISSUE

: Whether or not Ng Hian be allowed to enter the Phil.

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HELD

: Yes. In the case of Ex parte Fong Yim, the Federal Court of the United States held that “A Chinese merchant domiciled in the US has the right to bring into this country with his wife and minor children legally adopted by him in China, where it is shown that the adoption was confide and that the children have lived as members of his family and have been supported by him for several years.” In the case at bar, the fact that Ng Hian had been adopted by his stepmother who has the right to enter territory of the Phil., we are of the opinion and so hold that Ng Hian has also the right to enter the Phil. as her adopted son.

PART FOUR: CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS XII.

Choice of Law in Property (19) Synopsis of Conflict of Rules on Property FACTUAL SITUATION (1) Real Property (extrinsic and intrinsic validity of alienations, transfers, mortgages, capacity of parties, interpretation of documents, effects of ownership, co-ownership, accession, usufruct, lease, easement, police power, eminent domain, taxation, quieting of title, registration and prescription Exceptions: (a) successional rights (b) capacity to succeed (c) contracts involving real property but which do not deal with the title thereto (d) contracts where real property is given as security

POINT OF CONTACT (1) Lex re sitae (Art. 16, par. 1, Civil Code)

Exceptions (a) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par.2) (b) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par 2) (c) the law intended will be the proper law of the contract (lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis) (d) the principal contract is governed by the proper law of the contract (lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis) Note: The mortgage is governed by the lex re sitae.

(2) Tangible Personal Property (chooses in possession) (a)

In general, tangible personal property (extrinsic and intrinsic validity of alienations, transfers, mortgages, capacity of parties, interpretation of documents, effects of ownership, coownership, accession, usufruct, lease, easement, police power, eminent domain, taxation, quieting of title, registration and prescription Exceptions:

(a) Lex re sitae (Art. 16, par. 1, Civil Code)

(a) successional rights (b) capacity to succeed (c) contracts involving real property but which do not deal with the title thereto (d) contracts where real property is given as security

(a) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par.2) (b) national law of decedent (Art. 16, par 2) (c) the law intended will be the proper law of the contract (lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis) (d) the principal contract is governed by the proper law of the contract (lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis)

Exceptions

Note: The pledge is governed by the lex re sitae. (b) means of transportation 1) vessels

(b) 1) Law of the flag or in some cases the

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place of registration 2) Law of the depot (storage place for supplies) or resting place

2) other means (c) thing in transit (these things have a

(c)

changing status because they move)

1) Law of the destination (Art. 1753 of The civil code) 2) locus regit actum (where seized) because said place is temporary situs 3) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis because here there is contract

1) loss, destruction, deterioration 2) validity and effect of the seizure of the goods 3) disposition or alienation of the the goods (3) Intangible Personal Property (chooses in action) (a) recovery of debts or involuntary or garnishment of debts (b) voluntary assignment of debts

(3) (a) where debtor may be effectively serve with summons (usually the domicile) (b) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis (proper law of the contract Other theories: 1) national law of the debtor or creditor 2) domicile of the debtor or the creditor 3) lex loci celebrationis 4) lex loci solutionis

(c) taxation of debts (d) administration of debts

(c) domicile of creditor (d) lex situs of assets of the debtor ( for these assets can be held liable for the payment of the debts

(e) negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument

(e) the right embodied in the instrument (ex. In the case of Swedish bill of exchange, Swedish law determines its negotiability)

(f) validity of transfer, delivery or negotiation of instrument

(f) in general, situs of the instrument at the time of transfer, delivery or negotiation

(g) effect on a corporation of the sale of corporate shares

(g) law of the place of incorporation

(h) effect between the parties of the Sale of corporate shares

(h) law of the place of incorporation

(i) taxation on the dividends of Corporate shares

(i)

(j) taxation on the income from the sale of corporate shares

law of the place of incorporation

(j) law of the place where the sale was consummated

(k) franchises (k) law of the place that granted them (l) goodwill of a business and taxation thereon (m) patents, copyrights,trademarks, tradenamed\s

(l) law of the place where the business is carried on (m) in the absence of a treaty, they are protected only by the state that granted them Note: Foreigners may sue for infringement of trademarks and tradenames only in the Philippines only if Filipinos are granted reciprocal concessions in the state of the foreigners.

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A. The Controlling Law The old law on movables was mobilia sequuntur personam which meant that the rights over movables were governed by the law of the owner’s domicile. The applicable law is the lex situs. The conventional wisdom for lex situs is the execise of power, the state where the property is situated having the sole power to decide the validity and effects of the transfer of property. The rationale for the lex situs or lex re sitae rule now universally recognized is that being physically a part of the country, it should be subject to the laws thereof. B. Capacity to transfer or acquire property The capacity of the person to transfer or acquire real property is governed by the law of the place where the property is located.

LLANTINO V. CO LIONG CHONG 188 SCRA 592 FACTS : Petitioners spouses leased their lands in favor of the respondent who was a Chinese national. Knowing that the lease would end in 1967, the Llantinos requested respondent for a conference but the latter did not honor the request and instead informed them that he had already constructed a commercial building on the land, that the lease was for a period of 60 years and that he was already a Filipino citizen. Petitioners filed a case contending that respondent had, at the execution of the contract, no right to hold by lease the property involved for being an alien. ISSUE

: Whether or not the contract of lease is valid.

HELD

: Yes. A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Phil. citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid is if there are circumstances attendant to its execution which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition that is exemption if an alien is given not only a lease of but also an option to buy a piece of land without any condition that he is granted Phil. Citizenship. If the period of lease is unreasonable say 50 years or more, it may amount to an indirect circumvention of the restriction and will be construed as a sale, in violation of the constitutional provision.

CHEESMAN V. IAC 193 SCRA 93 FACTS : Plaintiff Cheesman, an American citizen got married in 1970 to Criselda, Cheesman, a Filipina, but separated in 1981. A deed of sale was executed in 1974 conveying a parcel of land and the house therein infavor of Criselda. Thomas, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. In 1981, Criselda sold it to Estelita Padilla. Thomas sued Criselda and Estelita and prayed for the annulment of sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. Defendants contended that the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her. That Thomas, being an American citizen was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land. Thus, Estelita was a buyer in good faith. ISSUE

: Whether or not Cheesman, an alien is capacitated to question the subsequent sale made by his wife.

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HELD

: No. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Sec. 14, Art. XIV of the l1973 Constitution ordains that ‚‘‘ Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals xxx qualified to acquire lands of public domain. Thus, he had no capacity or peronality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in doing so, he is merely excersing the prerogative of a husband in respect of a conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit in direct controversies of the constitutional prohibition.

The theory of lex sitae governs the following things connected with real property: a)the extrinsic validity of alientation b)Transfers c)Mortgages d)Capacity of the parties d)Interpretation of documents e)Effects of ownership f) Co-ownership g)Accession h)Usufruct i)Lease j)Easement k)Police power l)Eminent Domain m)Taxation n) Quieting of title o)Registration and p)Prescription Example: A Japanese donated in Germany in favor of a Filipino a parcel of land in the Philippines. (a) The law of which country governs the formalities of the donation? Why? Answer: The law of the Philippines – the lex re sitae governs the formalities of the donation. (Art. 16, par. 1, Civil Code). The law of lex celebrationis does not apply because the transaction relates to land and must therefore be governed by the law of the place where the land is situated. (b) The law of which country governs the capacity of the Japanese to make the alienation? Why? Answer: The law of the Philippines – the lex rei sitae – governs the capacity of the Japanese to alienate. (Art. 16, par. 1 Civil Code) Here the doctrine of national law under Art. 15, of the Civil Code yields precisely because the subject matter is land. (c) The law of which country governs the intrinsic validity of the donation? Why? Answer: The law of the Philippines – lex re sitae governs the intrinsic validity of the donation. (Art. 16, par. 1, Civil Code). The general rule of lex voluntatis or lex intentionis yields to the lex re sitae rule because the subject matter is land. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE IN THE CASE OF REAL PROPERTY 1.) In case of successional rights – national law of the deceased 2.) Capacity to succeed – national law of the deceased Example:

A Turkish citizen died leaving parcels of land in the Philippines. How should the court distribute the successional rights of his heirs to said real property? Suppose one of the compulsory heirs is a Chinese, what law governs the capacity of this Chinese heir to inherit land in our country?

Answer: The successional rights of the heir to the parcels of land in the Philippines shall be governed by the national law of the deceased that is Turkish law.

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The capacity of the Chinese heir to inherit Philippine realty is also determined by Turkish law for this is the decedent’s national law. 3.) Contracts involving real property but which do not deal with the title to such real property Example: In Manila, a German, owning land in Switzerland, agreed to pay as salary to a Japanese employee, 10% of the annual produce of the land in Switzerland, on condition that’s said land would not be expropriated by the Swiss authorities. It was the mutual desire of both parties that the stipulation of their employment contract should be governed by Philippine laws. What law governs the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of their agreement? Answer:

The extrinsic validity of the agreement is governed by Philippine law because the contract was celebrated in our country.The intrinsic validity shall also be determined by Philippine law for this was likewise the lex loci voluntatis. The fact that the contract involved land located in Switzerland is of no moment, for the agreement does not concern itself with any transfer of title thereto, at least as between the parties.

4.) Contracts where real property is given by way of security, the principal contract (generally the contract of loan) a) if the principal contract is valid, the validity of the accessory contract of mortgage is still to be determined by the lex res sitae. If the mortgage is void by the lex re sitae, the principal contract can still remain valid b) if tested by the lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis, the principal contract is void, the mortgage would also be void, even if considered independently by itself the mortgage would have been regarded as valid by the lex re sitae. Example:

Answer:

Two Frenchmen in France entered into a contract of loan, with Philippine land as security by way of mortgage. Assuming that in France, a contract of loan to be valid must be in public instrument, in the Philippines it does not have to be. Now, then if the contract of loan and contract of mortgage are in private instrument, can the mortgage be enforced in the Philippines? No. Since the contract of loan is in a private instrument and therefore void in France, the contract of mortgage is rendered automatically void in our country – for when a principal contract fails, the assessory obligations shall also be void.

C. Extrinsic And Intrinsic Validity Of Conveyance Formalities of a contract to convey property are likewise governed by the lex situs Rules: 2. Any transfer of property which requires registration of title cannot be accepted by the registry of property unless the formal requirements of the lex situs are complied with 3. Lex situs law applies to the essential validity of transfer unless the lex intentionis is clearly established. 4. Lex situs also governs the effects of the conveyance of properties. RULES FOR PERSONAL PROPERTY: Personal property may be tangible or intangible. The tangible are more appropriately referred to as choses in possession whereas intangible are more accurately known as choses in action. Example of Choses in possession that usually move: Query:

If, the contract certain limitations of liability as to as to the negligence on the part of the carrier are agreed upon, can the carrier invoke this clause of the contract at the point of destination, the laws thereof, as well as those of the place, where the contract was made, permitting such limitations, if the damage and negligence of the carrier which caused such damage occurred while the merchandise was in transit in a state which did not recognize the validity of such stipulation?

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Answer:

Yes, the carrier can invoke the clause in question. It does not matter that in the state where the damages occurred the stipulation is not recognized. What is important is the recognition given to the stipulation at the place of destination. Art. 1753 of the civil code provides that thelaw of country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.

Example of Choses in action in intangible personal property: 1) For recovery of debts or for the involuntary assignment of debts Example:

A German, domiciled and found in California, owes a Filipino in Manila in the amount of money. Generally, where should the Filipino sue for the recovery of the debt?

Answer:

Generally, the suit must be instituted in California because the debtor is domiciled and found there. However, should he be in Japan, for instance, litigation may be commenced in Japan because this is the convenient and practical solution.

2) Validity and effectiveness of a voluntary assignment of a debt depends on the lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis.In other words the proper law of the contract. Example:

A Filipino is the creditor of a German domiciled in Manila. The credit is the result of a business transaction entered into in Manila. Payment is stipulated to be in Manila. If the Filipino while vacationing in Japan assigns his credit in favor of a Russian, also domiciled in Manila. What law governs the validity and effectiveness of the assignment?

Answer:

The proper law that should control the validity and effectiveness of the assignment should be Philippine law, for it is evident that it is this law that the parties intended to be applicable . (lex loci intentionis)I

D. Exceptions to Lex Situs Rule There are at least three (3) exceptions to the application of the lex situs rule: (Co-quia) 1. Where the transaction does not affect transfer of title to or ownership of the land.The governing law is lex intentionis or lex voluntatisI 2. In contracts where real property is offered by way of a security for the performance of an obligation. Example: Mortgage of the land is governed by lex situs but the loan contract is governed by the rules on ordinary contracts. 3. Testate or intestate succession and capacity to succeed are governed by the national law of the decedent. E. Situs of Certain Properties 1. personal property for tax purposes ASIATIC PETROLEUM V. CO QUICO 69 Phil 433 (1940) FACTS : Co Quico entered into a contract of agency with Asiatic by virtue of which the former became the sales agent on commission of the latter. Respondent was in default in the sum of P2,213 and without rendering account to Asiatic left for China. Asiatic filed a complaint and after summons by publication Co Quico was decalred in default and thereafter Co’s deposit in the Bank was levied. Co’s counsel moved to declare the proceedings as null and void on the ground that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because the action is one in personam against a non-resident who was summoned by publication and did not appear. ISSUE

: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant

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HELD

: Yes. Although respondent was outside the Philippines at the time the action was instituted, he possessed property found and located here in the Philippines and such property was within the reach of our courts. It is well emphasized in this connection that all property within the state is subject to the jurisdiction of its courts and they have the right to adjudicate title thereto, to enforce liens therupon and to subject it to the payment of the debts of its owners, whether resident or not.

2. Money 3. Debts 2 kinds of movable property: a) choses in possession – embraces all types of tangible physical objects b) choses in action – refers to intangible objects 4. corporate shares of stocks CIR V. ANGLO CALIFORNIA NATIONAL BANK 106 Phil 903 FACTS : Respondent Calamba Sugar Estate Inc. (CSEI), represented by its trustee, the Anglo Cal. Nat’l Bank is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of California, duly licensed to do business in the Phils. Petitoner notified CSEI of an assessment for an alleged deficiency income taxes. Based on the allegation that the sale of its shares of stocks was perfected and payment took place in USA and that the sale was made in accordance with the laws of USA, the CTA absolved CSEI from liability on the ground that the capital gains which constituted income were derived from abroad and not subject to income tax. Petitioner appealed contending that the situs of shares of stock of corporation is considered to be at the domicile of the latter. ISSUE

: WON the situs of the corporate shares of stock is within the Philippines

HELD

: No. Shares of stock of corporation are considered as intangible personal properties. Sec. 24 of NIRC levies income taxes on foreign corporations only on income derived from sources within the Philippines and with respect to capital gains on the sale of personal properties. Sec 37 (e) of NIRC deems the place of the sale as also that place or source of capital gain. Moreover, income derived from sale abroad is not taxable here in the Phils. Only income within the Philippines are taxable.

F. Patents, Trademarks, Trade Name, Copyright Trademark – is the name or symbols of goods made or manufactured ex. Guess Trade name – the name or symbol of the store or business place ex. Rustan’s Service mark – the name or symbol of services rendered ex. Federal Express Copyright – the right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. A certificate of registration of a trade name or a trademark is prima facie evidence of the validity of such registration but the same may be rebutted. Generally, the protection is for 20 years renewable for another 20 years. Under the law, “any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade name has been registered or assigned under this Act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition or false designation of origin or false description whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under the corporation code, at the time it brings the complaint: provided that the country of which said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporations or juristic persons of the Philippines. The Court decided that although the company has bot done business in the Philippines, it has the right to protect its reputation.The Court sustained the well established rule that the right to the use of company’s corporate and trade name is a property right which may be asserted against the whole world.

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PHILIPS EXPORT BV V. CA 206 SCRA 457 FACTS : Philips Export B. V. (PEBV), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the Netherlands, is the registered owner of the trademark Philips and Philips Shield Emblem issued by the Philippine Patent Office. The other petitioner, Philips Electrical Lamps & Philips Industrial Dev’t Inc. authorized users of the trademark and logo, were incorporated and registered with the SEC. Respondent Standard Philips Corp. (Standard) on the other hand was issued a certificate of Registration by the SEC. Petitioners filed a letter of complaint with the SEC for cancellation of the word “Philips“ from Standard‘s corporate name in view of the prior registration with the Bureau of Patents of such trademark and logo. Standard refused to amend its articles of incorporation. Hence, petitioners filed with SEC a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injuction alleging inter alia, infringement of trademark. Private respondent contended that petitioner PEBV has no legal capacity to sue. ISSUE

: WON the foreign corporation although not doing business in the Philippines can sue action for infringement under the IPC.

HELD

: Yes. The Court declared that a corporation’s right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect against the world in the same manner as it may protect against the world in the same manner as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against tresspass or conversion. It is regarded, to a certain extent, as a property right and one whcih cannot be impaired or defeated by subsequent appropriation by another corporation in the same field.

EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING v. CA 251 SCRA 600 FACTS : Private respondent H.D. Lee Co. Inc., a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, USA filed with the Bureau of Patents Trademark & Technology Transfer (BPTTT), a petition for cancellation of registration for the trademark. “Stylistic Mr. Lee“ used on skirts, jeans etc. Issued in the name of petitioner Emerald Mnfg. Corp, a domestic corporation. Private respondent averred that petitioner’s trademark so closely resembled its own trademark “LEE“ as to cause confusion, mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods. Petitioner in its anwer, contended that its trademark was entirely and unmistakably different from that of private respondent and that its certificate of registration was legally and validly granted. As a defense Emerald questioned the capacity to sue of Lee Co., being a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the country. ISSUE

: Whether or not H.D. Lee Co., a foreign corporation had the capacity to sue action for infringement

HELD

: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the case that H.D Lee Co., Inc. had the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of its lack of license to engage in business in the Philippines but denied the company protection for it failed to prove actual use of the emblem in the local market, a requirement of Secs. 2 and 2-a of the of the same law. Finally, in 1998, the Intellectual Property Code of the Phils. (RA 8293) was passed into law. This law allowed foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Phis. to file civl or administrative action for opposition, cancellation, infringement or unfair competition.

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XIII.

Choice of Law in Contracts (21) SYNOPSIS OF CONFLICT RULES ON CONTRACTS FACTUAL SITUATION (1) Formal or Extrinsic Validity Exceptions: (a) alienation and encumbrance of property (b) consular contracts (2) Capacity of the Contracting parties

(3) Intrinsic validity (including interpretation of instruments and amount of damages for breach

POINT OF CONTACT (1) lex loci celebrationis (Art. 17, par. 1, CC (a) Lex situs (Art. 16, par.1, NCC) (b) Law of the Phils. (if made in the Philippines (2) national law (Art. 15, civil code) except estoppel or in the case of Insular Bank v. Frank, adhering the theory of lex loci celebrationis (3) the proper law of the contract – lex contractus meaning the lex loci voluntatis or the lex loci intentionis Other theories: (a) lex loci celebrationis – defect: this makes possible the invasion of the national law (b) lex nationalii – defect: this may impede commercial transactions (c) lex loci solutionis – law of the place of performance – defect: there may be several places of performance (d) Prof. Minor’s solution: 1) perfection – lex loci celebrationis 2) cause or consideration – lex loci considerations 3) performance – lex loci solutionis

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CONFLICTS RULES FOR SPECIFIC CONTRACTS FACTUAL SITUATION (1) Sales and Barter (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

POINT OF CONTACT (1) (a) lex situs (b) lex situs (c) lex situs

(2) Lease of Property (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

(2)

(3) Lease of Services (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

(3)

(4) Contract of Common Carriage of Goods (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity (d) liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in transit

(4)

(5) Contract of Agency (a) extrinsic validity

(b) capacity of parties to be principal or agent (c) intrinsic validity

(6) Simple Loan (Mutuum) (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

(a) lex situs (b) lex situs (c) lex situs lex (a) lex loci celebrationis (b) national law (c) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis (a) fixed situs of the carrier (depot) (b) fixed situs of the carrier (c) fixed situs of the carrier (d) law of the destination (Art. 1753) (5) (a) lex loci celebrationis (unless the agency deals with the conveyance or encumbering of property – in which case the lex situs of the property applies) (b) national law of the parties (unless the agency deals with the conveyance or encumbering of property – in which case the lex situs of the property applies) (c) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis (unless the agency deals with the conveyance or encumbering of property – in which case the lex situs of the property applies) (6) (a) lex loci celebrationis (b) national law (c) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis

(7) Commodatum (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

(7) (a) lex situs (b) lex situs (c) lex situs

(8) Money Deposits

(8)

Law of the place governs the deposit

(9) Contracts with Arbitration Clause

(9)

Forum that has been agreed by the parties

(10) Pledge, Chattel Mortgage, Real Mortgage and Antichresis (a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

(10) (a) lex situs (b) lex situs (c) lex situs

(11) Guaranty and Suretyship

(11)

Note: These are accessory contracts only, therefore, if the principal contract (generally the contract of loan) is defective, the accessory contract must also be deemed defective

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(a) extrinsic validity (b) capacity of parties (c) intrinsic validity

(a) lex loci celebrationis (b) national law (c) lex loci voluntatis or lex loci intentionis Note:These are also accessory contracts; if the principal contract is defective, the accessory contract is also generally defective.

A. Contract involving a foreign element By reason of these differing rules, the forum court presented with a contracts case involving a foreign element must be aware that the parties may have entered into a contract with a particular state law in mind, expecting it to govern questions that may arise from the contract. To do otherwise would defeat the parties reasonable ecpectations. B. Extrinsic validity of contracts Lex loci celebrationis governs the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts. Art. 17 “The forms and solemnties of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed”. These principles are derived from a broader proposition that the place governs the act (locus regit actum). Query:

How about contracts entered into by cablegram, telex or fax messages between persons from different countries? What is deemed to be the place of execution of the contract?

Answer:

Art. 1319 of the civil code states that “Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offeror except from the time it came to his knowledge”. The contract in such case is presumed to have been entered into the place where the offer was made.

Example: A Chinese sold in Chile to a Filipino a parcel of land in the Phils. The Philippine formalities of such a sale should be followed. (Art. 16 par 1 of the civil code) Bar Q:

Suppose our law provides that certain instrument shall be void and unenforceable unless they beat a documentary stamps, and a written contract is enteres into in the Phils. to be performed in France. The contract was not stamped in the Philippines as required by its law. The placing of stamp on written contract is not however required by the laws of France. In an action brought on the contract in France, may the defendant avail himself of the invalidity of contract?

Anwer:

Since the forum of the problem is France, the answer will depend not on Philippine Conflict of laws but on French conflict of laws. On the assumption that the French conflicts rule on the matter is identical with ours, it is believed that the contract should be considered valid, and the defense of invalidity cannot be sustained. The rule to apply is evidently lex loci voluntatis or the lex loci intentionis – that which was voluntarily agreed upon or intended by the parties.

C. Intrinsic validity of contracts The intrinsic validity of contracts including the considerations or cause thereof, the interpretation of the instruments, and the nature or amount of damages for breach or non-performance must be governed by the proper law of the contract (lex contractus). This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them expressly or implicitly (lex lcoci intentionis) 1. lex loci contractus or lex loci celebrationis The law of the place of the making or lex loci contractus refers to the place where the contract is made.

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2. lex loci solutionis The law of the place of performance calls for the reference to a law other than the place where the acts of offer and acceptance took place. All matters relating to the time, place and manner of performance, sufficiency of performance and valid excuses for non-performance are determined by lex loci solutionis which is useful because it is undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way. 3. lex loci intentionis The intrinsic validity of contracts should be governed by the law intended by the parties or lex loci intentionis. This intention may be expressed in the choice-of-law provision in the contract Art. 1306 of the civil code “The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public oerder or public policy” D. Capacity to enter into contracts The capacity of the parties to enter into contract is generally governed by the national law (Art. 15, civil code) Except in the case of alienation or encumbering of properties, both real and personal, for here the capacity is governed by the lex situs (Art, 16 par 1) Another exception. is that case of Insular Gov’t v. Frank which disregarded the nationality law principle. Frank had the capacity to enter into a contract whether in the US or in the Phils. since he was of majority age as determined by his national law. The SC held that in a case not involving property that instead of national law, what should determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci celebrationis. Bar Q:

X and Y entered into a contract in Madrid, Spain wherein it was agreed that X would construct for Y an apartment in Manila, in consideration being Y’s house and lot in San Francisco California. The laws of what country would govern the: (a)validity of the contract; (b) its performance and (c) its consideration?

Answer: (a) The validity of the contract would depend on the lex situs namely the Philippine law since the contract deals with a building to be constructed in Manila. Philippine law should govern everything about the contract. (Art. 16, par 1 civil code) (b)Prof. Minor however would say that the validity of the contract would be governed by the lex loci celebrationis – Spanish law; performance and damages in case of breach would depend on the lex loci intentionis – Philippine law; and the sufficiency of consideration would depend on lex loci considerationis – California law. E. Choice of law issues in conflicts contracts cases Under the principle of freedom of contract, the parties may stipulate on the law to govern their contract agreement.

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KING MAU v. SYCIP 94 Phil 784 FACTS : King Mau, as agent of defendant Francisco Sycip, sold and caused the shipment of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion to Jas Maxwell Fasset, under the agency agreement set forth in a letter in New York addressed to Sycip and accepted by the latter. King was made the exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of Philippine coconut oil and its derivatives outside the Phils., King filed this action to collect P50,089.92 as his share as agent in the sale of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion. Sycip however contends that the transaction for the sale of coconut oil emulsion was not covered by the agency contract because it was agreed upon in another contract and that it was an independent and separate transaction for which King has been duly compensated. ISSUE

: Whether or not there is conflict of laws involved in this case.

HELD

: No. There is no conflcit of laws involved in the case because it is only a question of enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract, and unless the enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced. The contention that as the contract was executed in New York, the CFI of Manila has no jurisdiction over this case, is without merit, becuase a nonresident may sue a resident in the courts of this country where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable upon execution in case of favorable, final and executory judgment. HSBC v. SHERMAN 176 SCRA 331

FACTS : Eastern Book Supply Service Co., a company incorporated in Singapore was granted by petitioner bank an overdraft facility of Singapore $200,000. As a security for the repayment, both private respondent Sherman, Reloj and a certain Lowe executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor or petitioner bank. The company failed to pay its obligation even after demand was made. Petitioner bank filed a case in the RTC of Quezon City. Private respondents claim that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case because a stipulation in their guarantee which states that “we hereby agree that the courts of Republic of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee“. ISSUE

: Whether or not the venue stipulation in the Guarantee divested of Philippine courts of jurisdiction

HELD

: No, becuase the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore to the exclusion of all the rest has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In international law, jurisdiction is defined as the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries, subject to certain exceptions. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them. Contracts with Arbitration Clause A multinational contract that contains an arbitration clause gives rise to the issue of whether one of the parties may compel the other to submit to arbitration.

PUROMINES INC. v. CA 220 SCRA 281 FACTS : Puromines Inc., and Makati Agro Track Inc., contracted with Philip Brothers Oceanic Inc., for the sale of prilled urea in bulk. The contract provided inter alia an arbitration clause which states that disputes arising therefrom shall be settled by arbitration clause in London. On May 22, 1988 "M/V Liliana Dimitrova“ loaded

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on board at Yuzhay UUSR, a shipment of 15,500 metric tons of urea fro transport to Iloilo and Manila to be delivered for Puromines. About 13,500 metric tons were discharged in Manila in bad order and condition. Damages were valued at P683,056.29. Puromines filed a complaint with RTC Manila for breach of contract of carriage against Maritime Factors Inc., as ship agent of the vessel in the Phils., while Philip Brothers was impleaded as charter of the vessel. It filed a motion to dismiss asserting the application of arbitration clause. ISSUE

: Whether or not the arbitration clause agreed upon in the Sales Contract is valid and applicable

HELD

: Yes. Whether the liability of respondent should be based on the sales contract or that of the bill of lading, the parties are nevetheless obligated to respect the arbitration provisions on the sales contract and/or the bill of lading. Petitioner being a signatory and party to the sales contract cannot escape from his obligation under arbitration clause therein.

CONTRACTS OF ADHESION It is one that is not negotiated by the parties, having been drafted by the dominant party and usually embodied in a standardized form. It is called a contract of adhesion because the only participation of the other party is in affixing her signature or adhering thereto. Likewise known as a “take it or leave it contract”

PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS v. RAPADAS 209 SCRA 567 FACTS : Jose Rapadas while standing in line to board the flight from Guam to Manila was ordered by a Pan Am Control agent to check in his samsonite attache case. He instead went to the tail end of the line trying to get through without having to cheack in his attache case. He was again spotted and for fear that he would miss the plane, he checked it in without declaring its contents or value. Unfortunately, it never arrived in Manila and Pan Am offered to settle the claim for $160.00. Rapadas refused and filed a case placing the value of the lost attache case and its contents at $42,403.90. In its answer, Pan Am acknowledged responsibility for the loss but asserted that the claim was subject to the “Notice of Baggage Liability Limitations“ forming part of the passenger’s ticket. ISSUE

: Whether or not the said notice (a contract of adhesion) be cosidered adequate under the circumstances of the case.

HELD

: Yes. There is no dispute that there was such a Notice appearing on page 2 of the airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or injury to passenger of the loss, damage or destruction to passenger’s luggage. The plane ticket is what is known as a contract of adhesion and these contracts are not entirely prohibited. The Court, finds the provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. If the passenger fails to adhere evidence to oversome the stipulaions, he cannot avoid tha application of the liability limitations. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. CA 255 SCRA 48

FACTS : Gilda Mejia shipped through PAL a one-unit microwave from San Franciso, California to Mania. Upon arrival of the unit, Mejia discovered that the front glass door was broken and the damage rendered it unserviceable. Oral and written demands were made for reimbursement of the value of the oven and transportation charges paid by Mejia to PAL, which the latter ignored. Mejia demanded through an Attorney P30,000 for actual damages, P10,000 for moral damages and P15,000 monthly loss for income in her catering and restaurant business. PAL alleged that there was no valid cause of action since it acted in good faith and in compliance with the Warsaw Convention and had exercised due diligence in the selection, hiring and supervision of its employees.

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ISSUE

: Whether or not the petitioner’s liability for damage to Mejia’s microwave should be limited by the provisions of the airway bill.

HELD

: No. While the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in the Philippines, being a treaty commitment by the government and as a signatory thereto, the same does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances when a carrier shall be liable for breach of contract or as an absolute limit of the extent of liability, nor does it preclude the operation of the Civil Code or other pertinent laws.

Contracts for International Air-Transportation Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air or known as Warsaw Convention. The Convention which applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by aircraft for hire, enumerate instances when the carrier is liable, fixing the maximum amount of damages to be included in each case. However, the limits of liability shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result provided in such case, it is proved that the servant or agent was acting within the scope of his employment.

KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES. v. CA 65 SCRA 237 FACTS : Spouses Mendoza went on a world tour with their children and niece. They were issued KLM tickets for their entire trip. However, their coupon for Aer Lingus, which would carry them from Barcelona Spain to Lourdes France was marked RQ or on request. When they checked in at the airport of Barcelona, only the young wards were allowed to take the plane to Lourdes while the spouses were loaded by the manager in an inhumane manner. So they had to take a train to reach their destination. The respondents filed a complaint against KLM as the principal of the Aer Lingus for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage and for the humiliating treatment they had received. The KLM sought complete exoneration on the ground that tickets issued to respondents stipulate that carriage thereunder is subject to Art. 30 of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that in case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers, the liability of carrier for damages shall be limited to occurrences on its own lines ISSUE

: Whether or not the limited liability condition printed on the respondents ticket is binding upon them.

HELD

: No. The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be sustained because the article presupposes the occurrence of either an accident or delay, neither of which took place at the Barcelona airport. What is here manifest instead is that the Aer Lingus through its manager there refused to transport the respondents to their planned and contracted destination. As noted by the CA that condition was printed in letters so small that one would have to use a magnifying glass to read the words.The KLM was chargeable with the duty and responsibility specifically informing the respondents of conditions prescribed in their tickets or in the vary least to ascertain the respondents read them before they accepted their passage tickets.

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XIV.

Choice of Law in Wills, Succession and Administration (20) SYNOPSIS OF CONFLICTS RULES FACTUAL SITUATION (1) Extrinsic Validity of Wills (a) made by an alien abroad

POINT OF CONTACT (1) (a) lex nationalii or lex domicilii or Philippine law (Art. 816, civil code) or lex loci celebrationis (Art. 17, par. 1) (b) lex nationalii or lex loci celebrationis (Art. 815, civil code)

(b) made by a Filipino abroad (c)made by an alien in the

(c) lex nationalii celebrationis (Art. 817, civil code)

Philippines (2) Extrinsic validity of Joint Wills (made in the same instrument) (a) made by Filipinos abroad

or lex

loci

(2)

(b) made by aliens abroad

(a)

lex nationalii (is void even if valid where made) (Art. 819, civil code)

(b)

valid if valid according to lex nationalii or lex domicilii or lex loci celebrationis

(c)

lex loci celebrationis therefore void even if apparently allowed by Art. 817 – because the prohibition on joint wills is clear expression of our public policy

(c) made by aliens in the Philippines

(3) Intrinsic validity of Wills (including the order of succession, amount of successional rights, and intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will) (4) Capacity to succeed

(3) lex nationalii of the deceased regardless of the location and nature of the property (Art. 16, par. 2, civil code) (4) lex nationalii of the deceased - not that of the heir ( Art. 1039, civil code) (5)

(5) Revocation of the wills (a) lex loci actus (of the revocation) (Art. 1039, civil code)

(a) if done in the Philippines

(b) 1) lex loci celebrationis (of the making of will, not the revocation) or lex domicilii (Art. 829, civil code)

(b) if done outside the Philippines 1) by a non-domiciliary

2) lex domicilii (Phil. Law) or lex loci actus (of the revocation) (Art. 17, civil code)

2) by a domiciliary of the Phils. (6)

(a) as

(6) Probate of the wills made abroad (a) if not yet probated abroad

lex fori of the Philippines applies to the procedural aspects – that is – the will must be fully probated here and due execution must be shown

(b) if already probated abroad

(b) lex fori of the Philippines agains applies the procedural aspects – that is – the will must also be probated here – but instead of proving the due execution, generally it is enough to ask for the enforcement here of the foreign judgment on the probate abroad

(7) Executors and Administrators (a) where appointed (7)

(a) place where domiciled at death

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(b) powers

or in case of non-domiciliary, where assets are found (b) co-extensive with the qualifying or appointing court – that is – powers may be exercised only within the territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned NOTE: These rules also apply to principal domiciliary or ancillary administrators and receivers even in non-succession cases.

A. Extrinsic validity of wills Extrinsic validity of will deals with the forms and solemnities in the making of wills; the number of witnesses; the form of the will – oral, private instrument, public instrument . Art. 17

“The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed”. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the RP in a foreign country, the solemnities established by the Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Art. 815

“ When a Filipino is in the foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines”

Art. 816 “ The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides or according to the formalities observed in his country or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes” Art. 817

“A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.

The following are our conflicts rules on the extrinsic validity of wills: 1. if the will was made by an alien abroad, he must comply with the formalities of the lex nationalii or lex domicilii or Philippine law (Art. 816, civil code) or lex loci celebrationis (Art. 17, par. 1, civil code) Example: If a Japanese domiciled in Argentina makes a will in Mexico while vacationing there, the will may be considered extrinsically valid by our courts, if it has complied with the formalities prescribed in Japan, Argentina, Mexico or the Philippines. 2. If a Filipino makes a will abroad, he may comply with the formalities of the lex nationalii (Philippine law) or lex loci celebrationis (law of the place where he may be or where he makes a will) (Art. 815, civil code)

3. If an alien makes a will in the Philippines, he is allowed to comply with the formalities of his own country (lex nationalii) or the law of the Philippines (Art. 817, civil code) EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF JOINT WILLS Art. 818 “Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person”.

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Art. 819 “Wills prohibited by the preceding article executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed” The following are the rules: 1. If joint wills are made by Filipinos abroad, the same shall be considered void in the Philippines even if they were valid in the place where they were executed. 2. joint wills made by aliens abroad shall be considered valid in the Philippines if valid according to the lex nationalii or lex domicilii or lex loci celebrationis 3. joint wills made by aliens in the Phils., even if valid in accordance with their national law, will not be countenanced in the Phils. because otherwise our public policy may be militated against. EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS The rules contained in Art. 816 & 817 on wills made by aliens abroad or in the Phils., apply to holographic wills. Art. 810 of the civil code defines holographic will as one entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is not subject to any other form, need not be witnessed and may be made in or out of the Phils. IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON 39 Phil 156 FACTS : A petition was filed for probate of the holographic will of Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the US, who died in Manila on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of Illinois, USA and that the will was duly executed in accordance with the law of Illinois, hence could be properly probated here in the Phils. pursuant to Sec. 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After the will was admitted to probate, an alleged daughter of Johnson moved for the annulment of the decree of probate and the commencement of the intestate administration of the estate on the ground that the deceased testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the probated will was not in accordance with the laws of said State ISSUE

: Whether or not order of probate be set aside on the ground invoked by the appellant

HELD

: No. The proof adduced by the trial court shows that the testator was at the time of his death a citizen of the US and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the Courts of the Phils., provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois. Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question such error is not available to the petitioner because the petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found.

B. Intrinsic validity of wills The intrinsic validity of the wills including the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will shall be governed by the lex nationalii of the deceased regardless of the location and nature of the property whether real or personal. (Art. 16, par. 2, civil code) Art. 16 par 2 “However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found” Example: A Chinese died in Manila leaving a BMW car and a parcel of land in Pampanga, Phils. The law of which country governs the successional rights of his heirs to both the car and land?

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Suppose the Chinese also left parcels of land in China and Cuba, what should our courts do? Answer:

The law of China, being the lex nationalii of the deceased, governs the successional rights to both the car and the parcel of land. (Art. 16 par. 2, civil code)

Our courts have no jurisdiction to award the Chinese and Cuban lands in favor of the heirs of the deceased since they are outside the Philippines. As a matter of fact, in the inventory of the assets of the deceased, these lands will ordinarily not be included unless the properties are themselves within the territorial jurisdiction of the Phils. (Gibbs v. Gov’t) CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS 129 SCRA 522 FACTS : Adoracion Campos died leaving Hermogenes Campos as the only compulsory heir. Nenita Paguia on the other hand, filed a petition of the reprobate of the will of the deceased, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as the administratrix of the estate. The will of the deceased was admitted to and allowed probate in the Phils. and Paguia was then appointed as administratrix. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes, the petitioner-father of the deceased argued that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would ran counter to the specific provisions of Philippine law. ISSUE HELD :

: Which law shall govern the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the Philippine law The private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was at the time of her death an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Therefore, the law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the will, as provided for by Art. 16 par 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

PAULA LLORENTE v. CA & ALLICIA LLORENTE 345 SCRA 592 FACTS : The deceased Lorenzo Llorente, an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy married to herein petitioner Paula Llorente was admitted to US citizenship in 1943. Upon discovery of petitioner’s adulterous relationship with his brother, he subsequently filed for a divorce before the Superior Court of California, which the court granted. Meanwhile, he returned to the Phils. and married respondent Alicia Llorente in Manila producing three children. In Lorenzo’s last will and testament, he bequeathed all his properties to Alicia and to their children. Paula then filed with the same court, RTC of Camarines Sur, a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. The Court declared the intrinsic disposition of the will as void and found that the divorce granted to Lorenzo is void and cannot be applied in the Phils. ISSUE

: Whether or not the will was intrinsically valid

HELD

: Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to the Philippine law. In this case, the court remanded the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

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C. Interpretation of wills Pursuant to the nationality principle in our Civil Code, the interpretation of a will or testament must be governed by the rules of interpretation of the decedent’s national law. In contracts, the principal rule in wills is that “where the terms are clear and unambiguous, the lex intentionis of the parties should be followed.” “When there are ambiguous provisions, the intention of the party or the exact meaning he may have ascribed to them can be inferred by referring to the context of the instrument or the testator’s contemporaneous and subsequent acts. In case a will admits of different dispositions, the interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be referred. D. Revocation Being a unilateral and purely personal act, a will is revocable at any timr before the death of the testator. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void. If a revocation done outside the Philippines by a person who does not have a domicile in this country is valid when it is done according to: 1. the law of the place where the wil was made (lex loci celebrationis) 2. the law of the place where the testator had his domicile at that time (lex loci domicilii) If a revocation is done outside the Phils. by one domiciled in the Philippines, the law of the domicile, which is Phlippine law or the law of the place of the revocation (lex loci actus) controls. Under the Philippine law, wills are deemed revoked except in the following cases: 1. by implication of law 2. by some will, codocil or other writing, executed as provided in the case of wills 3. by burning, tearing, cancelling or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself or by some other persons in his presence and by his express direction. QUERY:

When a testator revokes his will in the state where he is domiciled and then changes his domicile to another state where he dies. If the revocation of his will was valid by the laws of the State where he revoked it but invalid by the laws of the state of domicile at the time of his death, which law will control the situation?

ANSWER: Common law countries apply law of the domicile at the time of the testator’s death. However, Philippine law clearly provides the law of the place of revocation E. Probate Probate is an adjudication that the last will and testament of a person was executed with all the formalities required by law. Under Rule 70, Sec. 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, a will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: 1. If not executed and attested as required by law 2. If the testator was insane or otherwise incapable to make a will at the time of its execution 3. If it was executed under duress, the influence of fears and threats 4. If it was produced by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other person for his benefits

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5. If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick and he did not intend that the instruments should be his will at the time of fixing the signature thereat

SUNTAY v. SUNTAY 95 Phil 500 FACTS :

Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen died in China leaving real and personal properties in the Phils. and a house in Amoy China. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and Federico, the child of the deceased on his first marriage was appointed as an administrator of the estate. Subsequently, the surviving widow, filed a petition for probate of the will claiming that it has been executed and signed in the Phils. by the deceased. However, the petition was denied because the will was lost before hearing. After the war, Selvino, the son of the deceased on his second marriage petitioned for testate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in China in 1931, which he claimed was already probated there. CFI of Bulacan disallowed the alleged will. Selvino appealed contending that the wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such foreign countries, may be allowed, filed and recorded by the CFI in the Phils.

ISSUE

: Whether or not the will executed in China be probated here in the Philippines

HELD

: No. In the absence of proof that the municipal court of China is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided in out laws on the subject. Hence, in the absence of notice to the interested heirs residing in the Phils., probate of a will can be denied.

VDA DE PEREZ v.TOLETE 232 SCRA 722 FACTS : Jose and Evelyn lived in New York with their three children. They make a will executd separately but containing the same provisions that if any of them survived, theiir properties would go to their children with Rafael, brother of the deceased Jose as trustee. In January 1982, Jose and his entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Rafael filed a separate proceedings for the probate of the two wills in New York. They were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor. On the other hand, Salud, the mother of Evelyn filed in CFI Bulacan, a petition to reprobate the wills and insisted that the separate wills of Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. ISSUE

:

Whether or not joint probate be allowed

HELD

:

Yes. Sec. 1 of RRC provides that “the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings”. What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills. In this case, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. Moreover, the evidence necessary for the reprobate of the wills which have been probated outside the Phils. are as follows:

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1. the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws 2. the testator domiciled in a foreign country 3. the will has been admitted to reprobate in such country 4. the fact that the foreign tribunal id a foreign court 5. the laws on foreign country or procedure and allowance of wills

F. Administration of estates The administration of the estate of the deceased consists of the duties to manage and settle the decedent’s debts and distribute the residuum of the estate to the deceased’s heirs. When the will has been proved and allowed, it is the duty of the probate court to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person so named in the will upon the latter’s application The title of domiciliary administrator is of no extraterritorial force and extends only to assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted. An administrator appointed in one state has no power over properties in another state or country. An ancillary administrator is one appointed by the court of foreign country where the assets or property are located. TAYAG v. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED INC. 26 SCRA 242 FACTS : Perkins died leaving two stock certificates in the Benguet Consolidated Inc., a Phil. Corporation. The certificates were in possession of Country Trust Co. of New York, which was the domiciliary adminstrator of the estate of the deceased. Meanwhile, anciliary administration proceedings in the CFI of Manial were instituted and the court appointed Lazaro Marquez as anciliary administrator, wo was substituted by Renato Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciliary and anciliary administratoes as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates. The CFI ordered the domiciliary administrator to produce and deposit the certificates with Tayag or with the Cerk of Court, but the former did not comply with the said order. Tayag petitioned the Court to issued an order declaring the stocks certificates as lost, which the court granted. Hence, this appeal by the oppositor Benguet Consolidated Inc. ISSUE

: Whether or not ancillary administrator is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates

HELD

: Yes. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of is last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs. It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that anciliary administrato’s right to the stock certificates…standing in her name in the books of appellant-Benguet Consolidated Inc., be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Phil. Corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of the local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders

G. Trusts Trust is a right of property real or personal held by one party for the benefit of another. It may be created by deed during the lifetime of the settler or by will.

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Testamentary trusts depend for their extrinsic validity on the will which created them. The rules governing wills as to capacity and extrinsic requirements apply. Since a trust involves a property, the rule of lex situs determines the validity of a trust created by a last will and testament.

XV.

Choice of Law in Torts and Crimes (22 & 23) A. Synopsis of conflicts rules

•

FACTUAL SITUATION Liability and damages for torts in general

POINT OF CONTACT Lex loci delicti commissi (law of the place where the delict was committed)

NOTE: the locus delicti (place of commission of torts) is faced by the problem of characterization. In civil law countries, the locus delicti is generally where the act began; in common law countries, it is where the act first became effective

NOTE: liability of foreign torts may be enforced in the Philippines if: • the tort is not penal in character • if the enforcement of the tortuous liability would not contravene our public policy • if our judicial machinery is adequate for such enforcement

PHILIPPINE CONFLICT RULE ON TORTS Article 20 of the Civil Code provides “Every person who, contrary to law, willfully and negligently cause damage to another, shall indemnity the latter for the same.”

•

As a general rule, the liability and damages for torts are governed by lex loci delicti (law of the place where the delict was committed)

Characterization of the place of wrong (locus delicti) 1. Common law theory – looks at the place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort occurs (where the injury is sustained) 2. Civil law theory – view the situs of torts as the place where the tortuous act was committed Modern theories in tort liability 1. Obligation Theory – the tortuous act gives rise to an obligation, which is transitory and follows the person committing the tortuous act and may be enforced wherever he may be found 2. Doctrine of Elective Concurrence – either the laws of the state where the actor engaged in this conduct and where the injury was incurred may be invoked 3. Theory of Most Significant Relationship – the applicable law shall be the law of the country which has the most significant relationship to the situation. In determining the state which has the most significant relationship, the following factors are to be taken into account: a. place where the injury occurred b. place of conduct causing the injury

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c.

domicile, residence, nationality place of incorporation and place of business d. place where relationship between the parties is centered (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA, 297 SCRA 469)

4. State-Interest Analysis – this principle provides for the following methodology: a. determine false or spurious conflicts (i.e., internal laws of the different states have the same result or when only one state has an interest in applying its tort law. b. if there is true conflict: 1. if interested forum – apply the law of such State which has greater interest in upholding its tort law; 2. if disinterested forum – dismiss on the ground of non forum conveniens

5. Caver’s Principle of Preference – guideline on which rules on torts may be applied by states in absence of statutory provisionState-Interest Analysis – this principle provides for the following methodology: a. determine false or spurious conflicts (i.e., internal laws of the different states have the same result or when only one state has an interest in applying its tort law. b. if there is true conflict: a. where the state of injury provides for higher standard of conduct or financial protection against injury than the state where the tortuous act was done, the law of the former shall govern; b. where the state of injury and conduct provides for lowed standard and financial protection that the home state of the person suffering the injury, the law of the state of conduct and injury shall govern; c. where the state in which the defendant has acted has established special controls over conduct of the kind in which defendant was engaged, the special controls and benefits must he applied although the state has no relationship to the defendant; d. where the law in which the relationship has its seat imposed higher standard of conduct or financial protection than the law of the state of the injury, the former law shall govern. Conditions for the Enforcement of Tort Claims • The tort is not penal in character • If the enforcement of the tortuous liability would not contravene our public policy • If our judicial machinery is adequate for such enforcement Philippine Rule • Salonga suggests for the following methodology in solving tort problems in the Philippines: a. ascertain and weigh the purpose underlying the tort law of the forum. If the tort law of the Philippines embodies a social or economic policy, then the law of the forum on torts shall be applied; b. if the Philippines has no concern or interest in the application of the internal law and the other states have interest, apply the law of such state NOTE :

The state where an injury has occurred has interest in compensating the injured party. Whereas, the state where the action has acted has interest in regulating conduct of persons found in its territory

SPECIAL RULES 1. If the tort committed aboard a public vessel, whether on the high seas or in a foreign territorial waters, the country to which the vessel belongs is the locus delicti; the law of the flag is thus the lex loci delicti commissi; 2. if the tort takes place aboard a private or merchant vessel on the high seas, the law of the flag is likewise the lex loci delicti commissi; 3. if the tort concerns property, whether real or personal, the lex situs is usually also the lex loci delicti commissi; 4. maritime torts

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a. if the colliding vessels are of the same state, or carry the same flag, said law is the lex loci delicti commissi; b. if the vessels come from different states, whose laws however, on the matter are identical, said laws constitute the lex loci delicti commissi; c. if the vessels come from different states with different laws, the lex loci commissi is the general maritime law as understood and applied by the forum where the case is tried B. LIABILITY AND DAMAGES FOR TORTS IN GENERAL •

liability and damages for torts in general, are governed the lex loci delicti commissi (the law of the place where the delict or wrong was committed)

C. LOCUS DELICTI GENERAL RULE : The essential elements of a crime and its penalties are generally determined by the law of where the crime was committed (locus regit actum)

EXCEPTIONS: 1. crimes committed by state officials, diplomatic representatives and officials of recognized international organizations (base on the theory of state immunity from suits) 2. crimes committed on board a foreign vessel even if within the territorial waters of the coastal state, as long as the effect of such crime does no affect the peace and order of the coastal state; 3. crimes which, although committed by Philippine nationals aboard are punishable under the local law pursuant to the protective principle of criminal jurisdiction (Article 2 of the RPC) THEORIES TO WHAT COURT HAS JURISDICTION 1. Territoriality theory – where the crime was committed 2. Nationality theory – country which the criminal is a citizen or a subject 3. Real Theory – any state whose penal code has been violated has jurisdiction, where the crime was committed inside or outside its territory; 4. Protective theory – any state whose national interests may be jeopardized has jurisdiction so that it may protect itself; 5. Cosmopolitan or university theory – state where the criminal is found or which has his custody has jurisdiction; 6. Passive personality theory – the state of which the victim is a citizen or subject has jurisdiction NOTE : In the Philippines, we follow the territoriality theory in general. Hence, our penal laws apply only to crimes committed within the country. EXCEPTION: Article 2 of RPC, stresses the protective theory: a. Offense committed while in a Philippine vessel or airship b. Forging or Counterfeiting any coin currency note of the Philippines, or any obligation issued by the government; c. Introduction into the country of the abovementioned obligations and securities; d. While being public officers and employees, any offense committed in the exercise of their functions; e. Crimes against national security and the law of the nations as defined in Title 1 Book 1 of the RPC. CRIMES COMMITED ABOARD PRIVATE OR MERCHANT VESSELS 1. if the crime committed aboard a private or merchant vessel occurred on the high seas, the country of the flag of the vessel has jurisdiction. Thus, if the vessel carries the French flag, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction except, those provided in Article 2 of RPC. 2. If the crime aboard a private or merchant vessel of a foreign state took place inside Philippine territorial waters – two theories have generally been used to determine the question of jurisdiction: the English rule (which emphasizes the territorial principle) and the French rule (which stresses the nationality theory).

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a. The English Rule – here the territory where the crime was committed (Philippines) will have jurisdiction except:  

in matters relating to the internal order and discipline in the vessel and those which affect solely the ship and its occupants such as minor or petty criminal offenses committed by members of the crew.

c. The French Rule – under this rule, founded on the opinion of the French Council of State in 1806, the state whose flag is flown by the vessel, would have jurisdiction except if the crime affects the peace, order, security and safety of the territory.

FACTUAL SITUATION 1. essential elements of a crime, and penalties therefor

POINT OF CONTACT generally where committed (locus regit actum) THEORIES TO WHAT COURT HAS JURISDICTION 1. Territoriality theory – where the crime was committed 2. Nationality theory – country which the criminal is a citizen or a subject 3. Real Theory – any state whose penal code has been violated has jurisdiction, where the crime was committed inside or outside its territory; 4. Protective theory – any state whose national interests may be jeopardized has jurisdiction so that it may protect itself; 5. Cosmopolitan or university theory – state where the criminal is found or which has his custody has jurisdiction; 6. Passive personality theory – the state of which the victim is a citizen or subject has jurisdiction NOTE : In the Philippines, we follow the territoriality theory in general. Hence, our penal laws apply only to crimes committed within the country.

2. the locus delicti of certain crimes: frustrated and consummated, homicide, murder, infanticide, and parricide frustrated and consummated, homicide, murder, infanticide, and parricide bigamy theft and robbery

where the victim was injured (not where the aggressor wielded his weapon where the intended victim was (not where the aggressor was situated) so long as the weapon or the bullet either touched him or fell inside the territory where he was where the illegal marriage was performed where the property was unlawfully taken from the victim (not the place to which the criminal went after the

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conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion, or sedition note: other conspiracies are not penalized by our laws libel continuing crime complex crimes

commission of the crime) where the conspiracy was formed (not where the overt act of treason, rebellion or sedition was committed) where published or circulated any place where the offense begins, exists or continues any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took

D. CRIMES V. TORTS •

TORT is transitory in character and as such, liability is deemed personal to the tortfeasor and makes him amenable to suit in whatever jurisdiction he is found while CRIME is local in that the perpetrator of the wrong can be sued only in the state wherein he commits the crime

•

TORT is an injury to an individual who may be situated in any place, while a CRIME is an injury to the state where it is committed TORTS law assign liability to the perpetrators in order to indemnify the victim for injuries he sustained while PENAL laws are promulgated to punish and reform the perpetrators and deter them and others from violating the law

•

Bar Question: A French vessel in transit is anchored along a pier at Port Area, Manila. There was found in a cabin of one of the members of the crew, who is a Frenchman, a package of opium. The French sailor admitted possession of the same. May he be criminally prosecuted for illegal possession of opium in our courts? Why? Suppose the package opium was already lowered from the boat and placed on a banca that was floating on the water alongside the vessel ready to be brought ashore, amy a criminal prosecution be filed in the Philippines? Why? Answer:

(a) No prosecution will succeed in the case involving merely the illegal possession of opium because there is actually no disturbance of the public order in the Phils. (b) The act of placing the opium aboard that banca ready to be brought ashore is a violation of our public policy, morals, safety and order consequently the act should be punished. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. CA 297 SCRA 469

FACTS : Milagros Morada, a flight attendant of the petitioner SAUDIA was attemptedly raped by a certain Saudi national. Three years later after the said incident, before the departure of her flight from Riyadh for Manila, an officer of the petitioner brought her to the Saudi court where she was made to sign a document written in Arabic and interrogated by a judge. Petitioner assure her that these were merely a routine procedure necessary to drop the case against the two men who attemptedly raped her. But to her shock, she was sentenced to imprisonment and to 286 lashes of adultery, going to the disco and listening to the music and socializing with male crew, all in violation of Islamic law. Petitioner terminated her contract before she was allowed to return to Manila. Morada then filed a case for damages against the petitioner based on violations of these provisions which are actionable Art. 19 “Every person must in the exercise of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his dues and observe honesty and good faith“ and Art 21 “Ny person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage“ The petitioner questioned the jurisdcition of the Philippine courts to try the case for lack of substantial interest in the case and that Philippine law shall not govern this case. ISSUES : (1)Whether or not Philippine law shall govern this case

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(2)Whether or not Philippine court has jurisdiction to try the case. HELD

: (1)Yes, because Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place having the mist interest in the problem. It is in the Philippines where the petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. Under the State of the Most Significant Relationship Rules, the following contacts are to be taken into account: a. Place where the injury occured b. Place where the conduct causing the injury occurred c. Domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties d. Place where the relationship if any between the parties is centered. (2) Yes. Where the action is one involving torts, the connecting poin of contract could be the place where tortious conduct occurred. The RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. A party whose cause of action is based on a Philippine law particularly Arts. 19 & 21 has no obligation to plead and prove the law of another State.

TIME INC. REYES et al 39 SCRA 303 FACTS : Villegas and Enrile filed a case for libel against TIME Inc., a foreign corporation for an alleged libel arising from a publication of TIME magazine that Villeas was the source of graft and corruption and nepotism in Asia and that it was Enrile who helped Villegas borrow an amount without interest. TIME Inc., moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue relying upon the provisions of RA 4363 that if the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila, the proviso limits him to two choices of venue namely in the CFI of Manial or in the city or province where the libelous acrticle was printed and first published. However, the complaint was lodged in the CFI of Rizal despite the fact that the plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila. ISSUE

: Whether or not the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to try the case

HELD

: No. A libeled public official must sue in court of the locality where he holds office in order that the prosecution of action should interfere as a little as possible with the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only alternative allowed him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in the place where the offending article was printed and first published. Since the offending publication was not printed in the Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile who were the offended parties. Hence, the venue provisions of RA 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless tha question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which is not the case here.

LIANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 323 SCRA 692 FACTS : Petitioner is a foreigner and economist working with the Asian Dev’t Bank. Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the protocol submitted by the DFA to the counrt stating that the petitioner is covered by the immunity from legal process based on the agreement between the ADB and Philippine government regarding the headquarters of ADB in the country which provides that staffs and officers of the bank including the consultants and experts performing missions in the bank shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the bank waives the immunity. ISSUE

: Whether or not the said immunity clause can be invoked by the petitioner.

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HELD

: No. The mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute but subject to exception that the act was done in official capacity. The commission of the said crime is not part of of his official functions.

PEOPLE v. WONG CHENG 45 Phil 729 FACTS :

XVI.

Wong Cheng, a Chinese citizen, is accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the English mercahnt vessel Changsa, wile it was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shore of the city. Womg Cheng filed a demurrer to the information alleging lac of jurisdiction of the lower court, whcih granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the court has jurisdiction over the case because the crime was committed aboard merchant vessel within our jurisdictional waters.

ISSUE

: Whether or not Philippine courts acquire jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels within our jurisdictional waters.

HELD

: Yes. Under the English Rule, which is based on the territorial principle and followed in the US ‚“crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they were committed. Hence, if the passenger starts smoking opium within our territorial waters aboard a foreign merchant vessel that offense becomes a breach of public order and therefore triable in our courts.

CHOICE OF LAW AFFECTING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER JURIDICAL ENTITIES A. CORPORATIONS FACTUAL SITUATION Powers and Liabilities

Formation of the Corporation (requisites): kind of stocks, transfer of stocks to bind corporation, issuance, amount and legality and dividends and duties of members, stockholders and officers Validity of corporate acts and contracts (including ultra vires acts)

Right to sue and amenability to court processes and suits against it

POINT OF CONTACT General Rule: the law of the place of incorporation Exceptions: • For constitutional purposes – even if the corporation was incorporated in the Phil., it is not deemed a Filipino corporation and therefore cannot acquire land, exploit our natural resources and perate public utilities unless 60% of capital is Filipino owned • For wartime purposes – we pierce the corporation veil and go to the nationality of the controlling stockholders to determine if the corporation is an enemy (control test) law of the place of incorporation

law of the place of incorporation and law of the place of performance (the act or contract must be authorized by both laws) law of the place of incorporation provided that the public policy of the

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Domicile

Receivers (appointment and powers)

forum is not militated against If not fixed by the law creating or recognizing the corporation or by any other provision – the domicile is where its legal representation is established or where it exercises its principal functions (Article 15) Principal receiver is appointed by the courts of the state of incorporation; ancillary receivers, by the courts of any state where the corporation has assets (authority is co-extensive) with the authority of the appointing

Personal law of corporations The personal law of a corporation is the law of the State where it is incorporated. Since a corporation is an artificial being created by law, it possesses only the rights and powers conferred upon in its charter. Hence, if the law creating the corporation does not give authority to enter into certain contracts, such contracts made by it in another state shall e void despite the express permission given by the laws of that other state.

Matters where the personal law of the corporation governs: 1. Requisites for formation of the corporation and its legal character 2. Capacity and powers of the corporation; note: however two requisites should be asked in determining the legal effect of an act of a corporation: (a) is the corporation authorized by its charter to do the particular act? (b) is this act permitted by the law of the place where the act is done 3. Kinds of stocks allowed and transfer of stocks in a way that would be binding on the corporation 4. Issuance, amount and legality of dividends 5. The internal organization of the corporate enterprise, the rights and liabilities of shareholders, members, directors, officers, their relation inter se and stockholders’ participation in the management and in the profits 6. Alteration or modification of the charter and the dissolution of the corporation M.E. GRAY v. INSULAR LUMBER CO. 67 Phil 139 FACTS : Defendant Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws of New York and is licensed to engage business in the Philippines to which plaintiff is a stockholder. However, plaintiff M.E. Gray does not own 3% of the total capital stock nor does he represent stockholders who own 3% of its capital. Plaintiff asked the corporation to let him examine its books but the corporation refused on the ground that under New York laws, only stockholder owning at least 3% of the total capital stock are entitled to such right. Plaintiff contends that under the Philippine law, he is entitled to examine the books of the corporation to which he is a stockholder. ISSUE

: Whether or not Philippine law shall govern in this case giving the plaintiff the right to examine the books of the corporation.

HELD

: No. The stipulation of facts is binding upon the parties and cannot be altered by either of them.The plaintiff is bound to adhere the agreement made by him with the defendant corporation because the personal law of the corporation is the law of the State where it is incoporated.The defendant is a corporation under New York law licensed to do business in the Philippines. Under the laws of New York, the rights of a stockholder to examine the books of corporation organized under said laws consist in making a written request within 30 days. The plaintiff not

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being a stockholder owning at least 3% of the capital stocks of the defendant corporation has no right to examine its books and records nor to require a statement of its affairs. Exceptions to the rule of incorporation test a. Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions

• A state, if it sees fit, may by legislation exclude a foreign corporation altogether, subject to constitutional limitations or prescribe any conditions it may see fit as prerequisite to the corporation’s right to do business within its territory.

PALTING v. SAN JOSE PETROLEUM INC. 18 SCRA 924 FACTS : San Jose Petroleum, a Panamanian Corporation filed with the Philippine SEC a sworn registration statement for the registration and licensing for sale in the Philippine Voting Trust Certificates representing 2M shares of its capital stock with a par value of $0.35 a share at P1.00. allegedly, the entire proceeds of the sale will be devoted exclusively to finance the operations of San Jose Oil, Co. Inc., a domestic mining corporation. Petitioner Plating anf others, who were prospective investors in the shares of respondent corporation opposed on such registration and licensing on the ground that the tie-up between the issuer San Jose Petroleum Oil, Investment, a Panamanian corporation and San Jose Oil, a domestic corporation violates the Philippine Constitution that “the privilege to utilize, exploit, and develop our natural resources was granted to corporation 60% of its capital stock belongs to Filipino with parity rights granted to the US citizen. Respondent corporation contends that it was an American business enterprise entitled to parity rights in the Philippines as embodied in the LaurelLangley agreement. ISSUE

: Whether or not San Jose Petroleum, an American business enterprise is entitled to parity rights in the Philippines.

HELD

: No. Respondent corporation was not owned and controlled directly by the citizens of the US because it was owned and controlled by a corporation organized in Panorama. Neither it was indirectly owned and controlled by American citizens through Oil Investment , for the latter was owned and controlled by two Venezuelan corporation. The tie-up violates the constitution. Granting arguendo that these individual stockholders are American citizens, it is necessary to establish that the different status of which they are stockholders are citizens, allow Filipino citizens, or corporation or association owned and controlled by Filipino citizens to engage in the exploitation of the natural resources of said states.

b. Control Test during the war

•

In wartime, the courts may pierce the veil of corporate identity and look into the nationality of the controlling stockholders to determine the “citizenship” of the corporation

FILIPINAS COMPANIA DE SEGUROS v. CHRISTERN HUENEFELD 89 Phil 54 FACTS : Christern Huenefeld & Co., Inc. obtained from petitioner fire insurance in the sum of P100,000 covering merchandise contained in a building in Binondo Manila. In 1942, during the Japanese military occupation, the building and insured merchandise were burned. The total loss was fixed at P92,650.00. At first, the

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petitioner refused to pay the claim, however in pursuance of the order of the Director of the Philippine Executive Commission, it paid to the respondent the said amount of loss. The petitioner then filed in the CFI of Manila for recovery of the amount it paid to respondent on the gound that the policy issued in 1941 had ceased to be effective because of the outbreak of the war between the U.S. and Germany and that the payment made by the petitioner to respondent corporation during the Japanese military occupation was under pressure. ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover what was paid to respondent.

HELD

: Yes. In wartime, the courts may pierce the veil of corporate identity and look into the nationality of the controlling stockholders to determine the citizenship of the corporation. Under Phil. Insurance Law in Sec. 8 provides that “any one except a public enemy may be insure“. An insurance policy ceases to be allowable as soon as an insured becomes a public enemy. The respondent having become an enemy corporation on December 10, 1941, the insurance policy issued in its favor by the petitioner, a Philippine corporation had ceased to be valid and enforceable. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to recover what was paid to the respondent.

Domicile or residence of foreign corporation •

A foreign corporation that has been granted license to operate in the Philippines acquires domicile in the Philippines. The object of the Corporation Code in requiring a foreign corporation to secure a license to transact business in the Philippines is to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts.

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE INC. v. CITIBANK 203 SCRA 9 FACTS : Respondent banks, the Bank of America N.T., & Citibank N.A. and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation jointly filed with the CFI of Rizal for involuntary solvency of Consolidated Mines Inc., (CMI) on the ground that the latter committed specific acts of insolvency. The petitioners State Investment House Inc., & State Financing Center Inc. opposed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition because respondent banks are not resident creditors and they were merely licensed to do business and being branches in the Philippines could not be deemed as resident creditors as contemplated under the insolvency law. ISSUE

: Whether or not the respondent banks being branches in the Philippines may be considered “residents of the Phil Islands as that term is used in Sec. 20, of the Insolvency law.

HELD

: Yes. A foreign corporation that has been granted license to operate in the Philippines acquires domicile in the Philippines. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporation, duly licensed to do business here to the status of domestic corporations. What effectively makes such a foreign corporation a resident corporation in the Philippines is its actually being in the Philippines and licitly doing business here “locality of existence“ being to repeat the necessary element in the signification of the term resident corporation.

Jurisdiction over foreign corporations •

The prevailing rule is that with the consent of a state, a foreign corporation shall be recognized and will be allowed to transact business in any state which gives its consent. The consent doctrine is established in Secs. 125, 126, 127, & 129 of the Corporation Code.

•

Art. 29 of the Corporation Code mandates that all foreign corporations lawfully doing business in the Philippines shall be bound by all laws, rules and regulations applicable to domestic corporations.

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•

Service upon foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines may be made on: 1. Its resident agent 2. In the absence thereof, process will be served on the government official designated by law or any of its officers or agent within the Philippines 3. On any officer or agent of said corporation in the Philippines 4. Serving summons through diplomatic channels

Right of foreign corporations to bring suit •

The right of a private corporation to bring suit in the forum and its amenability to court processes and suits against it, are governed by the lex fori. From the theoretical viewpoint, the country like ours may completely prohibit a foreign corporation from transacting business in the Philippines; we may even prohibit it from filing suit here.

•

Acquisition by a foreign corporation of a license to transact business in the Philippines is an essential prerequisite for filing a suit of the corporation before our courts. This rule is embodied in Article 133 of the Corporation Code which says that “such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

Bar Question: A issued in the RTC of Manila by California Candy Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of California for damages in the amount of P5M arising from a breach of contract whereby A had agreed to sell to said corporation 500 tons of sugar to be delivered in San Francisco, where the contract was entered into. Would you grant A’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff corporation has no capacity to sue, it not having previously obtained a license to transact business in the Philippines? State your reasons briefly.

Answer:

I would deny the motion to dismiss. (1) The contract was an isolated transaction. (2) The plaintiff was not transacting business in the Philippines the contract having entered into in San Francisco and expressly agreed upon to be consummated there. So long, therefore as the jurisdictional requirements are complied with, the plaintiff’s suit may properly be entertained by our tribunals of justice.

Bar Question: A New York Corporation takes part in bidding for the construction of a building in Makati. The New York Corporation won the bid, but the construction company which opened the bid refused to sign the contract with the New York corporation for the construction of the building. The New York Corporation then sued. As New York Corporation had not expressly obtained a license to engage in business in the Philippines, the construction company moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that New York has no right or personality to sue in the Philippine courts. How should the motion to dismiss be resolved? Answer:

The motion to dismiss should be denied. To take part in the bidding does not constitute “transacting business” as the term is understood in the Philippine law – for this is an isolated act.

HOME INSURANCE v. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES 123 SCRA 424 FACTS : Petitioner Home Insurance was the insurer of the two consignees Atlas Consolidated Mining Dev’t Corp. and Hansa Transport Kantor, whose goods were transported by herein respondent shipping lines. When the shipments arrived in Manila, some of the goods were in bad order. Hence, the petitioner, a foreign insurance company paid for the damaged goods. Upon payment, petitioner became subrogated of the right to claim against respondent. Respondent in its answer to petitioner’s complaint however denied the latter’s capacity to sue by asserting that at the time the contract of insurance was

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entered into petitioner was not yet licensed to do business in the Philippines. Petitioner however contends that the company was duly licensed to do business in the Philippines through its agent Mr. Victor Bello. ISSUE

: Whether or not the petitioner has the capacity to sue before the Philippine Courts.

HELD

: Yes. The lack of capacity to sue at the time of the execution of the contract was cured by the subsequent registration and was strengthened by the procedural aspect of this case. A foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines has the right to bring suit before our courts. When the complaints in these two cases were filed the petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines. It could alreay file suits. Moreover, the general denials made by private respondents were inadequate to attack the foreign corporation’s lack of capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so. ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. CEBU STEVEDORING 17 Phil 1037

FACTS : Petitioners, both foreign corporations existing under the laws of the US sued Cebu Stevedoring Co., a domestic corporation for recovery of a sum of money. They alleged that the latter, as a common carrier undertook to carry a shipment of copra for delivery to Procter and Gamble in Cebu, however upon discharge, the copra was found damaged. Plaintiffs as subrogees to the shipper and consignee demand settlement from defendant due to its failure to comply with its obligation as carrier to deliver the copra in good order. Defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that plaintiffs had no legal personality to appear before Philippine courts and had no capacity to sue. ISSUE

: Whether or not the plaintiffs had the capacity to sue before our courts.

HELD

: No. Sec. 69 of the Corp. Law provides that no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Phils unless it shall have the license required by law and until it complies with this law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. Sec. 4, Rule 8 of RRC requires that “fact showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. In the case at bar, all that was averred was that they are both foreign corporations existing under the laws of the U.S.

Exceptions to license requirement: a.

•

Isolated Transactions

An isolated business is one which is occasional, incidental and casual not of a character to indicate a purpose to engage in business. A business is isolated if there is no continuity of conduct and intention on the part of the foreign corporation to establish a continuous business within the state.

b. Action to protect trademark, trade name, good will, patent or for unfair competition

•

A foreign corporation engaging in business without a license may file a complaint for unfair competition since that is essentially a suit enjoining the unfair trader from pursuing the unlawful competition and in order to allow the aggrieved party to recover damages. This rule is based on equity considerations.

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LEVITON INDUSTRIES v. SALVADOR 114 SCRA 420 FACTS : Private respondent Leviton Mfg. Co. Inc., a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of New York USA, is the largest manufacturer of electrical devices under the trademark,“Leviton“ Said electrical devices are being exported to the Philippines and well known to Filipino consumers under the trademark “leviton“. Petitioners Leviton Industries, a partnership organized in the Phils. began manufacturing electrical devices under the tradename “Leviton Industries“ and claimed that they had registered with the Philippine Patent Office the trademarks “Leviton Label and Leviton“. Private respondent filed a complaint for unfair competition against petitioner because the trademark on its products would cause confusion in the minds of the consumers. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that the private respondent failed to allege its capacity to sue and no license to business in the Philippines. ISSUE

: Whether or not private respondent has the capacity to sue for unfair competition before Philippine Courts.

HELD

: Yes. A foreign corporation engaging in business without a license may file a complaint for unfair competition since that is essentially a suit enjoining the unfair trader pursuing the unlawful competition and in order to allow the aggrieved party to recover damages. An action to protect trademark, trade name, goodwill patent or unfair competition is one of the exceptions to license requirement in bringing suit before the Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However Sec. 21-A of RA 166 is without qualification. Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the registration of the trademark of the suing foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office.

c. Agreements fully transacted outside the Philippines

•

A foreign corporation is allowed to maintain an action on a transaction wholly celebrated and consummated abroad. The vital policy of stabilizing commercial transactions will be greatly jeopardized if our laws deprived foreign corporations of this privilege.

HANG LUNG BANK v. SAULOG 201 SCRA 137 FACTS : Petitioner which was not doing business in the Phils. entered into two continuing guarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong whereby the latter agreed to pay on demand all sums of money which may be due the bank from Worlder Enterprise. When Worlder Enterprise defaulted its payment, petitioner filed a suit in Hongkong against Worlder and Chin San, a resident of Philippines and thereafter obtained a favorable judgment ordering Worlder and Chin San to pay the petitioner. A demand letter was sent by the petitioner to Chin San at his Philippine address but the latter made no reply. Petitioner then filed an action before RTC of Makati to enforce his claim for a sum of money which was perfected, esecuted and consummates in Hongkong. Chin San moved to dismiss the action on the ground that petitioner has no capacity to sue before our courts. ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner foreign bank has the capacity to sue before the Phil. courts.

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HELD

: Yes. A foreign corporation is allowed to maintain an action on a transaction wholly celebrated and consummated abroad. Petitioner may not be denied the privilege of pursuing its claims against private respondent for a contract which was entered into and consummated outside the Philippines. Otherwise we will be hampering the growth and dev’t of business relations between Filipinos and foreign nationals. The vital policy of estabilizing commercial transactions will be greatly jeopardized if our laws deprived foreign corporations of this privilege.

d. Petition filed is merely a corollary defense in a suit against it •

A foreign corporation is not maintaining a suit in our courts but is merely defending itself when it files a complaint for the sole purpose of preventing the lower court from exercising jurisdiction over the case. As suc, a foreign corporation is not required to allege and prove that it has capacity to sue.

PHILIPPINE COLUMBIA ENTERPRISES v. LANTIN 39 Phil 376 FACTS : Plaintiff Katoh & Co., Inc. is a foreign corporation organized in Japan while defendant is a domestic corporation. Plaintiff filed an action against the defendant for the collection of ten different shipments of steel products allegedly ordered by the defendant but the latter refused to pay after duly receiving the said shipments. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had not engaged in business in the Philippines and that the transactions were made and consummated in Japan. Hence, the plaintiff had no capacity to sue before the Philippine courts. Plaintiff contends that since defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, they would be recognizing the plaintiff’s legal capacity to sue. ISSUE

: Whether or not plaintiff has the capacity to sue before Philippine courts

HELD

: Yes. Petition filed is merely a corollary defense in a suit against it. The filing of a counterclaim, by a Philippine corporation does not constitute an implied recognition of the foreign corporation’s legal capacity. This is because in a counterclaim, the plaintiff (foreign corporation) in the main case becomes the defendant. Thus, the prohibition does not apply.

B. Special Corporation 1. Religious Societies and Corporation Sole

A religious society which is a corporate aggregate. A corporation Sole is an incoporated office composed of only one person. Art. 110 of the Corporation Code states “The chief archbishop, bishop, priest, minister, or other presiding elder of a religious sect may form a corporation sole for the purpose of managing its affairs, property and temporalities“

2. Transnational Corporations

Transnational corporations are clusters of several corporations, each with a separate entity, existing and spread out in several countries but controlled by the headquarters in a developed state where it was originally organized.

The personal law of the transnational corporation is that of the host country, the major decisions regarding its operation and management come from the parent corporation in the industrialized state.

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The main characteristic of a transnational is that all the locally incorporated branches are joined together by the common control and management of higher officials in the home state.

Query: Does a state has jurisdiction over a parent corporation by reason of the dact that it has jurisdiction over the parent’s subsidiary corporation as to extent to which a state has jurisdiction over a subsidiary by reason of the fact that it has jurisdiction over the parent.

Answer:The Restatement Seond on Conflict of Laws suggests that jurisdiction over the parent will exist if the parent controls and dominates the subsidiary. The American courts have ruled that jurisdiction over the parent corporation can be acquired when the separate existence of subsidiary has not been faithfully maintained. Theee activities of the subsidiary in the state will provide a basis for jurisdiction over the parent if these activities: •

Provide a basis for jurisdiction over the subsidiary

•

Can be said to have been done in the course for the parent corporation or on its behalf

C. Partnership The existence or non-existence of the legal or juridical personality of the partnership, the capacity of the firm to contract and the liability of the firm and partners to thrid persons are all governed by the personal law of the partnership – this is the law of the place where it was created. Philippine internal law provides that if the domicile of the partnership is not identified by the law creating it , it is deemed domiciled in the place where its legal representation is established or where it exercises its principal functions. FACTUAL SITUATION The existence of non existence of legal personality of the firm, capacity to contract, liability of the firm and the partners to third persons

Creation of branches in the Philippines; validity and effect of the branches’ commercial transaction and the jurisdiction of the court Dissolution, winding up and termination of branches in the Phil. Domicile

Receivers (appointment and powers)

POINT OF CONTACT the personal law of the partnership, that is, the law of the place where it was created (Article 15 of the Code of Commerce, subject to the exceptions given in the case of corporation) Exceptions: • For constitutional purposes • For wartime purposes Philippine Law (law of the place where branches were created) Article 15 of the Code of Commerce, Philippine Law (law of the place where branches were created) Article 15 of the Code of Commerce, If not fixed by the law creating or recognizing the partnership by any other provision – the domicile is where its legal representation is established or where it exercises its principal functions (Article 15) Principal receiver is appointed by the courts of the state of incorporation; ancillary receivers, by the courts of any state where the corporation has assets (authority is co-extensive) with the authority of the appointing

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D. Foundations Foundations are combinations of capital, independent of indiciduals, and organized principally for charitable, medical, or educational purposes . Query:

If a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines and obtains a license therefore, does it become a domestic corporation or does it remain a foreign corporation.

Answer: (a) If aside from doing business here and obtaining a license therefor, it is incorporated under our laws, it becomes a domestic corporation. It becomes anew juristic entity and its foreign personality and foreign charter are automatically disregarded. (b) If on the other hand, it becomes not a domestic corporation but a domesticated one, it could be considered a Philippine corporation in some aspects, and a foreign corporation in other matters. Domestication is the process whereby state effect a change in the status of a foreign corporation at least in legal effect that is for certain local purposes, a codition precedent to its being permitted to transact business within the State.

PART FIVE: FOREIGN JUDGEMENTS (4) XVII.

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Foreign judgment refers to all decisions rendered outside the forum and encompasses judgments, decrees and orders of courts of foreign countries as well as those of sister states in a federal system of government. A foreign judgment does not itself have any extra-territorial application. Thus, it may ordinarily be enforced only within the territory of the tribunal issuing it. For a foreign judgment to be effective in our country, it is imperative that it be proved in accordance with our prescribed rules on the matter. A. Distinction between recognition and enforcement RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

Courts will allow the foreign judgment to be presented as a defense to a local litigation Involves merely the sense of justice Does not require either an action of a special proceeding

Plaintiff wants courts to positively carry out and make effective in the state a foreign judgment Virtually implies a direct act of sovereignty Necessitates a separate action or proceeding brought precisely to make the foreign judgment effective Necessarily carries with it recognition

May exist without enforcement

Reasons why not all foreign judgments can be recognized or enforced in our country: 1. The requisite proof thereof may not be adequate 2. They may contravene our established public policies 3. They may contradict one another: obviously, we cannot be guided by contradictions 4. In some other countries the administration of justice may be shockingly corrupt

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B. Bases for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments a) Theory of Comity – under this theory, we apply the foreign law because of its convenience and finally because we want to give protection to our citizens, residents, and transients in our land.

b) Theory of Vested Rights or Obligation of Foreign Judgments – here we seek to enforce the final judgment not the foreign law itself but the rights that have been vested under such foreign law.

c) Theory of Local Law – foreign law is applied not because it is foreign but because our own laws, by applying similar rules, require us to do so, hence, it is as if the foreign law has become part and parcel of our own local law.

d) Theory of Harmony of Laws – this theory insist that in many cases we have to apply foreign laws so that wherever a case is decided, that is, irrespective of the forum, the solution should be approximately the same, thus identical or similar solutions anywhere and everywhere. When the goal is realized there will be a “harmony of laws”

e) Theory of Justice – the purpose of all laws, including Conflict of Laws, is the dispensing of justice, if this can be attained in many cases by applying the proper foreign law, we must do so.

Defects of Theory of Comity: 1. Theory presupposes the existence of an international duty. There is no such duty. Theoretically, every state may apply its own internal law exclusively.

2. The theory assumes, although in a minimal sense, a desire to show courtesy to other states. This is not true. The real reason for the application of proper foreign law id the avoidance of “gross inconvenience and injustice to litigants”, whether natives or foreigners. According to Prof. Minor, the basis of COL is something more than comity to the litigants. It is an answer to the demands of justice and enlightened policy.

3. Theory apparently leaves the application of the foreign law to the discretion of the forum. Clearly, this will prevent the adoption of definite rules and principles for COL.

Kinds of Comity:

1. Comity based on reciprocity – is simple. If the laws and judgments of the forum are recognized in a foreign state, the forum in turn will recognize the laws and judgments emanating from said foreign state.

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2. Comity based on persuasiveness of the foreign judgment – it says that if the forum is persuaded that a foreign judgment is meritorious and has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it will not hesitate to enforce that foreign judgment in the forum even if the foreign forum does not reciprocate Collateral Matters: The following collateral matters must first be examined before proper foreign law is to be applied: 1. Nature and Proof of foreign judgments 2. Nature and composition of conflicts rules 3. Characterization or classification of conflict rules and judgments 4. Various theories on status and capacity 5. Problem of the renvoi

C. Policies Underlying Recognition and Enforcement 1) Res Judicata – under this principle those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest and that matters once tried and decided with finality in one jurisdiction shall be considered settled as between the parties.

2) Bar and Merger

Merger – considers the plaintiff’s cause of action as merged in the judgment and as a result he may not relitigate that exact claim.

Bar – refers to a situation where a successful defendant interposes the judgment in his favour to avert a second action by the plaintiff on the same claim.

3) Doctrine of Collateral estoppel – renders conclusive all essential issues of fact actually litigated in the suit decided on by the foreign court. Whereas res judicata seeks to end litigation by disallowing a suit on the same claim; collateral estoppels is concerned with the issue preclusion by barring relitigation of an issue already litigated on a prior proceeding. D. Requisites for Recognition and Enforcement 1. There must be proof of the foreign judgment; for the recognition, there is no necessity for a separate action or proceeding 2. The judgment must be on a civil or commercial matter 3. There must be no lack of jurisdiction, no want of notice, no collusion, no fraud, no clear mistake of law or fact Note:

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a. Fraud here must be Extrinsic fraud – that is fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment was rendered

b. Regarding clear mistake of law or fact, the supreme court of the U.S. reversing the SC of the Phils., held that even if there is a clear mistake of law or fact, this alone will not prevent the recognition or enforcement of a foreign court (Hongkong) judgment which otherwise fulfils all the other requisites.

4. The judgment must not contravene a sound established policy of the forum. Note: a. An unfaithful mother, awarded by a US court custody of her child, was denied said custody by our Philippine courts b. A litigant not satisfied with the decision of a Philippine court, resorted to a foreign court to obtain another remedy. Failing in this foreign venture, he now seeks the enforcement of the Philippine decision which he had formerly abandoned.

HELD: The litigants, whether they are citizens or foreigners, should respect the decisions of Philippine courts, but if they choose to resort to a foreign court, asking for a remedy that is incompatible with the execution of a decision obtained in the Philippines and obtained a decision that is adverse, they should not be permitted to repudiate the decision of the foreign court and to ask the enforcement of the decision of the Philippine court which they have abandoned. To permit them to litigate in that manner is contrary to the order and public interest of the Philippines because it disturbs the orderly administration of justice.

5. The judgment must be res judicata in the state that rendered it.

The requisites for res judicata are the following: a. Judgment must be final b. The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties c. The judgment must be on the merits d. There must be identity of the parties, subject matter and cause of action – except that the recognition or enforcement of a foreign action is now the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment on the original cause of action

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Provisions of the Rules of Court on Foreign Judgments:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgments as follows: a) In case a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law

Whose judgment is really enforced?

It would seem that when our courts enforce a foreign judgment by allowing it, the effect is that it is really our own court’s judgment that we enforce. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES v. CA 241 SCRA 192 FACTS : Plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co., through its Japan branch entered into an international passenger sales agency agreement, whereby it authorized the latter to sell its airline tickets. Defendant was unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, hence plaintiff sued the defendant for the collection of the unremitted proceeds with a claim for damages in a Tokyo court. A writ of summons were issued against defendant at its office in Yokohama but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. The Tokyo court decided to have the writs of summons served at defendant’s head office in Manila, in which the defendant accepted but failed to appear at the hearings. The Tokyo court decided in favor of the plaintiff. However the judgment remained unsatisfied. Hence, petitioner filed a suit for the enforcement of judgment before RTC of Manila. Defendant filed its answer, and averred that the judgment of the Japanese court was void having been rendered without due and proper notice to them. The said case for enforcement was tried on the merits and defendant moved for demurrer of evidence on the ground that the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. ISSUE

: Whether or not the foreign judgment can be recognized and enforced under Philippine courts.

HELD

: Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings ang the giving of due notice therein. Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the processual presumption may be invoked. Apllying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private corporation doing business in the Philippines. Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, the service may be made:

1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose; 2) absence thereof, on the government offcial designated by law to that effect or

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3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

BOUDARD v. TAIT 67 Phil 170 FACTS : Mr. Boudard, as widow of Maria Boudard and as guardian of their children obtained a favorable judgment from the CFI of Hanoi, French Indo-China, for the sum of 40,000 piastras against Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial. Said judgment was based on the fact that Mr. Boudard, who was an employee of Tait, was killed in Hanoi by co-employees although outside the fulfillment of a duty. Boudard filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for the execution of the Hanoi judgment but the court dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Hanoi Court, Tait not being a resident of that country. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE

: Whether or not the judgment of Hanoi Court is conclusive in our jurisdiction.

HELD

: No. The exhibits presented by the appellant show that the summons alleged to have been adressed to the appellee, was delivered in Manila to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchwill & Tait Inc., which is an entity entirely different from the appellee. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings. The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.

RAMIREZ v. GMUR 42 Phil 855 FACTS : Samuel, a native of Switzerland and domiciliary of the Philippines for many years died in Iloilo, leaving a valuable estate which he disposed by will. He had one natural daughter Leona Castro. It was shown that in 1985, Castro married to Frederick Kauffman, a British subject. Three children were born of this marriage. In 1904, Kauffman went to Pari, France pusposely for obtaining a divorce from Castro under French law. A divorce decree was then issued. Castro married Dr. Earnest Mory in England. Two children were born of that marriage. In 1910, Castro died. Both sets of children claim that Leona Castro was the recognized natural daughter of Bischoff and she would have been his forced heir had she been alive at the time of her father’s death. ISSUE

: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in France be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippines

HELD

: No. The decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the Philippines. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands by persons domiciled here, such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevaling in this country. The claims of Mory children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded.

BORTHWICK v. CASTRO 152 SCRA 229

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FACTS : Petitioner William Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines owned real property interests in Hawaii. Private respondent Joseph Scallon sued Borthwick on the promissory notes which the latter issued and became due. Petitioner was declared in default by the Circuit Court of Hawaii due to his failure to appear and answer the complaint. However, private respondent failed to have the foreign judgment executed in Hawaii and California be enforced because petitioner had no assets in those States. The foreign judgment was sought to be enforced in the Philippines by filing before CFI of Makati, a complaint to enforce the same, on the ground that petitioner had real properties in Madaluyong City. Petitioner was again declared in default and was ordered to pay Scallon the amount prayed for. The court issued an amendatory order and upon receipt, petitioner moved for new trial but the same was denied. Hence, this petition contending that the foreign judgment was unenforceable in the Phils.for bwing rendered without jurisdiction over his person. ISSUE

: Whether or not foreign judgment is enforceable in Philippine courts.

HELD

: Yes, because both the Hawaii court and Philippine court accorded Borthwick the opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn the complaints against him which opoortunities he failed to do so, hence he was declared in default. It is true that the foreign judgment against the person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and rejection threof may be justified, among others by evidence of want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to impugn the judgment against him. Thus, the verdict must go against him. Absence fraud, collusion, a default judgment is as conclusive as adjudication between the parties as when rendered after answer and complete contest in open court.

QUERUBIN v. QUERUBIN 87 Phil 124 FACTS : Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino citizen, married petitioner Margaret Querubin in New Mexico, USA. They had a daughter named Querubina. Both spouses instituted a divorce proceedings against each other. The Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce decree filed by Margaret and the same court awarded “joint custody“ of the child. Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were restrained from taking Querubina out of California without the permission of the Court. Upon Margaret’s petition, an interlocutory decree was granted by the court awarding her the custody of Querubina. But Silvestre together with Querubina, left San Francisco and went to the Philippines and stayed in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the effects of her mother’s scandalous conduct. Margaret filed a petition for habeas corpus before CFI for the custody of Querubina under the interlocutiry decree of California court, granting her the child’s custody must be complied within the Philippines. ISSUE

: Whether or not the interlocutory decree can be given effect within the Philippine courts.

HELD

: No. The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstancess. Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines where the judgment is merely intelocutory, the determination of the question by the court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.

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ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO. v. GRAND INT’L AIRWAYS INC GR 140288, October 23, 2006 FACTS : Petitioner is a foreign corporation based in Singapore, engaged in the manufacture, repair and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts and respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in airline operations, executed an agreement whereby petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on respondent’s aircraft. They further agreed that the validity of the agreement shall be governed by the laws of Singapore and that any suit arising therefrom shall be submitted to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. Petitioner undertook the contracted works and billed respondent of the expenses. However, the respondent failed to pay despite repeated demands by the petitioner, which is in violation of the terms agreed upon. Petitioner then filed with the High Court of Singapore an action for collection of sum of money. The court issued a writ of summons to be served extraterritorially upon respondent thru the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect said summons to respondent. However, despite receipt of summons, the respondent still failed to answer the claim. The High Court of Singapore rendered a judgment by default against respondent. For the said judgment remained unsatisfied, petitioner petitoned with the RTC of Pasay City for the enforcement of said foreign judgment. Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, which was denied. On appeal, the CA granted the petition of the respondent. Hence, this instant petition before the SC contending that High Court of Singapore acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent and that the judgment of default rendered by the same is enforceable in the Phils. ISSUES : (1) Whether or not Singapore Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent (2) Whether or not foreign judgment by default is enforceable in the Phils. HELD

: (1) Yes. Generally, matters of remedy an procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori, which is the law Singapore. The service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with the Rules of Court of Singapore which provides that the originating process may be served: a. thru the gov’t of that country, where the government is willing to effect service b. thru a Singapore Consular authority in that country, except where service thru such authority is contrary to the law of the country or c. by a method of service authorized by law of that country for service of any originating process issued by that country In this case, the writ of summons issued by the Singapore Court was served upon respondent at its office at Pasay City and was received by Joyce Austria, Secretary of the General Manager of the respondent company. Considering, that the writ of summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our rules, the jurisdiction was acquired by Singapore High Court over its person. (2) Yes. Generally, in the absence of a treaty or special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal, however under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered effective under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in Philippine legal system is contained in Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:

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Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgment – The effect of a judgment of final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: a. In case of judgment or final order upon a specific ting, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing b. In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. In either case the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD v. CA GR 110263, July 20, 2001 FACTS : Petitioner, a Malaysian corporation filed a collection suit against private respondent, a domestic corporation before Malaysian Court in Kuala Lumpur. Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent, to guarantee the completion of the Felda project. The Malaysian Court decided in favor of the petitioner, but private respondent failed to pay the same. Petitioner instituted a complaint with the RTC of Pasay City to enforce the judgment of foreign court. Private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that said foreign judgment is unenforceable in the Philippines for want of jurisdiction over the person of private respondent. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition contending that Malaysian court acquired jurisdiction over the person or private respondent by its voluntary submission to the court’s authority thru its appointed counsel Mr. Tee, and that said foreign judgment should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines. ISSUES : (1) Whether or not Malaysian court acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent (2) Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to said foreign judgment HELD

: (1)Yes. The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that country in which the judgment is relied on. Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to service of summons or court process upon the defendant, is governed by lex fori, which is the law of Malaysia. In the instant case, records show that upon filing of the case, Messrs. Allen & Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors with address in Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional apperance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the writ of service of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served and that the matter was represented by their counsel Mr. Tee. Supported also by documentary evidence shows that summons in chambers abs affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee, counsel for private respondent. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, as alleged by it, is invalid. However in this case it did not. Accordingly, the presumption and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by Malaysian court must be respected.

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(2) Yes. There is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in the Philippines in view of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner is based. Considering that under Malaysian court, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalifate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

E. Grounds for non-recognition A foreign judgment is not conclusive if: 1) The judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law 2) The foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant 3) The foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter A foreign judgment need not be recognized if: 1) The defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend 2) The judgment was obtained by fraud 3) The cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state 4) The foreign judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment 5) The proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question settled otherwise than the proceeding in that court 6) In the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action (forum nonconveniens) F. Procedure for enforcement 1. A petition should be filed in the proper court attaching an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment to be enforced Authentication calls for the Philippine consul assigned to the country where the foreign judgment was decreed to certify that had been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction 2. The petition must comply with all the requisites of an enforceable judgment 3. A requirement to file action anew has been considered as “an attempt to reconcile the principle of territorial jurisdiction of courts which demands that the enforcement of judgment outside the territory of the rendering court must be placed upon some other basis than the authority of the rendering court which ceased at its jurisdictional limits – and the principle of res judicata. FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS RA 9285 incorporated the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) AWARD Model Law FEATURES OF RA 9285 APPLYING AND INCOPORATING THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW: 1. The RTC must refer to arbitration in proper cases.

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Under Sec. 24, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes that are properly the subject of arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause and mandates the referral to arbitration in such cases.

2. Foreign arbitral awards must be confirmed by the RTC

Foreign arbitral awards while mutually stipulated by the parties in the arbitration clause to be final and binding are not immediately enforceable or cannot be implemented immediately. Foreign arbitral awards when confirmed by the RTC are deemed not as a judgment of the foreign court but as a foreign arbitral award and when confirmed, are enforced as final and executor decisions of our courts of law.

3. RTC has jurisdiction to review foreign arbitral awards

While the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed upon by the parties, still the foreign arbitral award is subject to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject or vacate it.

4. Grounds for judicial review different in domestic and foreign arbitral awards

For foreign or international arbitral awards which must first be confirmed by the RTC, the grounds for setting aside, rejecting or vacating the awards by the RTC are provided under Art. 34 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

For final domestic arbitral award also need confirmation by the RTC pursuant to Sec 23 of RA 786 and shall be recognized as final and executor decisions of the RTC, they may only be assailed before the RTC and vacated on the grounds provided under Sec. 25 of RA 876.

5. RTC decision of assailed foreign arbitral award appealable

Sec. 46 of RA 9285. A decision of the RTC confirming, vacating, setting aside, modifying or correcting an arbitral award may be appealed to the CA in accordance with the rules and procedure to be promulgated by the SC.

The losing party who appeals from the judgment of the court confirming an arbitral award shall be required by the appellate court to post a counterbond executed in favour of the prevailing party equal to the amount of the award in accordance with the rules to be promulgated by the SC.

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Distinctions between foreign arbitral award from foreign judgment: 1. Foreign arbitral award is a better alternative because the same is readily enforceable whereas foreign judgment is not readily enforceable for it requires proof and allegations of a foreign law. 2. Foreign arbitral award, when confirmed by the RTC shall be recognized and enforced as foreign arbitral award and not as judgment of a foreign court, whereas foreign judgment when confirmed by the RTC shall be enforced as a judgment of the foreign court. 3. Foreign arbitral award when validly stipulated upon by the parties shall be final and binding whereas in foreign judgment there is no stipulation involved executed by the parties. 4. Foreign arbitral award is done thru alternative dispute resolution whereas foreign judgment does not involved alternative dispute resolution because the same should be done in regular courts proceedings.

Grounds for the rejection of a foreign arbitral award under Art. V of New York Convention:

a. Recognition & enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought proof that:

1. parties to the agreement referred to in Art. II were, under the law applicable to them under some incapacity or said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or under the law of the country where the award was made. 2. Party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or otherwise unable to present his case. 3. Award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration 4. Composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.

5. Award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority in which the award was made.

b. Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:

1. Subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country

2. Recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

KOGIES v. LERMA & PGSMC GR 143581, January 7, 2008 FACTS : Petitoner Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. (KOGIES), A Koren Corp. engaged in the supply and installation of LPG Cylinder manufacturing plants and private

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respondent Pacific General Steel Mfg. Corp. (PGSMC), a domestic corp., executed a contract in the Philippines whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG cylinder mfg. plant in Carmona, Cavite. For allegedly altering the quantity and lowering the quality of the machineries & equipment delivered by KOGIES, PGSMC cancelled the contract and would dismantle & transfer the machineries in Carmona plant. KOGIES asserted that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind the contract and that their dispute should be settled by arbitration as agreed upon in Art. 15, the arbitration clause of their contract. KOGIES then instituted an Application for Arbitration before KCAB in Seoul, Korea pursuant to said Art. 15 as amended and resolved said dispute in their favor. Meanwhile, KOGIES, filed a complaint for specific performance against PGSMC before RTC of Muntinlupa alleging among others that PGSMC violated Art. 15 of the contract by unilaterally rescinding the same without resorting to arbitration and thus praying that PGSMC be restrained from dismantling & transferring the machinery. PGSMC opposed to the TRO since Art. 15 was null and void for being against public policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction. The RTC denied said application of TRO and held that Art. 15 was invalid which later affirmed by the CA. ISSUE

: Whether or not arbitration clause Is valid

HELD

: Yes. Established is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is made governs. The contract was perfected in the Philippines. Therefore our laws ought to govern. Nonetheless Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or finality of an arbitral award. The arbitration clause was mutually agreed upon by the parties. It has not been shown to be contrary to any law or against public policy. OIL & NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. CA 293 SCRA 26

FACTS : Petitoner Oil & Natural Gas Commission, a foreign corporation controlled by the gov’t of India entered into a contract with private respondent PACEMCO whereby the latter undertook to supply petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement. The oil well cement was loaded on board by the ship MV Surutana Nava at the port of Surigao City. Due to a dispute between the shipowner & private respondent, the cargo did not reach its destination in India and instead it was withheld in Bangkok. Despite the fact the private respondent had already received payment and despite several demands, it failed to deliver the oil well cement. Petitioner then informed private respondent that they referred the claim to an arbitrator pursuant to clause 16 of their contract. The chosen arbitrator, one Shri Malhotra resolved the dispute in petitioner’s favor. To enable to execute the arbitral award, petitioner filed before the Court of Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India, praying that the decision of arbitrator be made “The Rule of Court” in India. The foreign court issued an order in favor of the petitioner, in which the said arbitral award shall be a part of the decree. Accordingly, petitioner filed a complaint with RTC of Surigao City for

the enforcement of the foreign judgment. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of valid cause of action and held that the referral of the dispute to the arbitrator is erroneous. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision declaring that arbitrator did not have jurisdiction, thus the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator’s award. Hence, this petition. ISSUE

: Whether or not the foreign judgment is valid and enforceable in the Philippines.

HELD

: Yes. The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the court’s of country in which the judgment was rendered differs from that of the court’s of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Matters of remedy & procedure are governed by the lex fori. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator’s findings, the same must be respected. MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. CA GR 155635, November 7, 2008

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FACTS : Vicente Bayot, A Filipino citizen and Rebecca Makapugay, identified as an American citizen were married in Mandaluyong City on April 20, 1979, & were later blessed with a child named Alix. Sometime in 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court issued Civil Decree on February 22, 1996 ordering the dissolution of their marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements but giving them the joint custody and guardianship over Alix. One year later, the same Court issued another civil decree settling the couple’s property relations pursuant to an agreement they executed which states that the conjugal property, which they acquired during their marriage consists only of real and personal properties at Muntinlupa. On March 14, 1996, Rebecca filed a petition before the RTC of Makati City for declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to said civil decree issued by the Dominican Court. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen and that since 1993 she and Vicente have been living separately. In 2001, Rebecca filed another petition before RTC of Muntinlupa for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. Vicente then moved to dismiss the case on grounds of lack of cause of action and that petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce which motion was denied. Rebecca on the other hand interposed an opposition insisting her Filipino citizenship as affirmed by the DOJ and that there is no valid divorce to speak of. On appeal, the CA effectively dismissed the petition of Rebecca. ISSUE

: Whether or not divorce decree is valid as to constitute res judicata.

HELD

: Yes. At the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose before, during & shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Being an American citizen she was bound by the national laws of the US, a country which allows divorce. Given the validity of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of divorce decree, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed. ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ 404 SCRA 495

FACTS : Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, A German citizen and resident of Germany married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina in Harmburg, Germany in 1980. Their marriage was subsequently ratified in Negros Oriental in 1981. In 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before RTC of Makati City. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case but the same was denied. On December 16, 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg-Blankenese, wherein the court awarded to him the custody of their two children. In view of said decree, petitioner filed a second motion to dismiss on action filed by private respondent on the ground that the trial court

had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent. The trial court thru public respondent Judge Salonga granted the motion. Private respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration praying that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of properties. Public respondent reversed her previous order and allowed the case to proceed. ISSUE

: Whether or not the case be allowed to proceed despite the decree of divorce already obtained in Germany.

HELD

: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are cognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof e.g. custody, care and support of the children must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody of petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment, had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds under Rule 39, Sec 50(now Sec. 48) of the Rules of Court.

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RULE 39, SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

QUASHA LAW OFFICE & LEGEND INT’L RESORTS LTD., versus SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF CA, KHOO BOO BOON & PICAZO LAW FIRM GR 182013, December 4, 2009 FACTS : Petitioner LIRL, a Hongkong corp., licensed to operate a resort Casino hotel in Subic Bay Phils. filed a complaint for annulment of contract, specific performance with damages & application for TRO before RTC of Olongapo against PAGCOR & SBMA on the basis of the agreement it entered into with the latter which was later amended which in effect suspend, limit, reduce, or modify petitioner’s license to operate the Subic Bay Casinos and from entering with any agreement from other entities for the operation of other Casinos in the Subic Free Port Zone. The trial court annulled the amendment of the aforesaid agreement. Meanwhile, petitioner LIRL’s companies filed before the Hongkong Court for winding up, which ordered the appointment of Kelvin Flynn & Borrelli, as liquidators of petitioner LIRL and further granting to them the power to manage its business. Pursuant to said orders, Flynn sent a letter to private respondent Boon, informing him that he had already been terminated as CEO of LIRL-Subic as well as private respondent Picazo law office notifying that its legal services had also been terminated. Petitioner LIRL later engaged the legal services of petitioner Quasha Law office as its new counsel to represent in all proceedings in the Phils. Petitioner Quasha Law Office filed its Entry of Appearance as counsel of petitioner in a case pending before the appellate court. The appellate court refused to recognize their appearance because being a foreign judgment, our courts could not take judicial notice thereof and further concludes that untill the alleged order of the Hongkon Court had been recognized before our local courts, it was still the private respondent Picazo Law Office was recognized as the only counsel entitled to represent petitioner LIRL. ISSUE

: Whether or not the order of the Hongkong Court can be recognized and enforced in our Courts.

HELD

: No. The act of terminating the legal services of private respondent Picazo law Office and engaging in its place petitioner Quasha law office was a mere exercise of petitioner LIRL’s prerogative, thru its appointed liquidators, which was an internal affair that requires no prior recognition in a separate action. Therefore, the court can no longer pass upon the issue.

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS INC. v. FASGI ENTERPRISES INC. 342 SCRA 722 FACTS : Based on their distributorship agreement executed in US, petitioner PAWI, a Phil. Corp., shipped 8,594 wheels to respondent FASGI, a Californian corp.,and the latter paid the FOB value of said wheels. After finding that the shipment was defective and in non-compliance with the requirement, FASGI filed an action against PAWI and FPS, an Italian corp., for breach of contract with recovery of damages before the California District Court. Pending resolution of the case, the parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby petitioner had to execute several letters of credit (LC) in favor of FASGI. However, dispite its assurances and FASGI’s insistence, PAWI still failed to open the first LC allegedly due to Central Bank inquiries and restrictions. The parties subsequently entered into a

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Supplemental Settlement of Agreeement and motion for entry of judgment, which was executed by FASGI’s president and PAWI’s counsel Mr. Thomas Ready. For failure again to comply with their agreement, respondent pursue the case with California Court, which obtained a favorable judgment. Unable to satisfy said foreign judgment, respondent filed a complaint for its enforcement before RTC of Makati City. The trial court dismissed the case on grounds that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud and clear mistake of law. On appeal, the CA ordered the full enforcement of the California judgment. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that the foreign judgment cannot be enforced because Mr. Ready had already terminated his services from them and that the motion for entry of judgment is void. ISSUE

: Whether or not foreign judgment is enforceable before the Philippine courts.

HELD

: Yes. From the time the stipulation for judgment was entered until the certificate of finality of judgment was issued by the California Court, no notification was issued by PAWI to FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready’s services. If PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready, who purportedly acted in collusion with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue before the forum which issued the judgment, in line with the principle of international comity. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be extrinsic, that is fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend an action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. The fraud involved in this case was intrinsic or that fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action – such as fraud in obtaining consent to a contract is deemed adjudged and therefore cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment. MIJARES v. RANADA 455 SCRA 397

FACTS : Plaintiffs filed a class suit with the US District Court of Hawaii against the estate of Pres. Marcos alleging that they suffered tortious acts in the hands of military forces during the Marcos regime. The US District Court awarded to the plaintiff class an amount of $1.96B, as compensatory & exemplary damages. Meanwhile, present petitioners filed a complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of foreign judgment, claiming that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor said foreign court awarded damages and that the same should be recognized and enforced in our courts pursuant to Rule 39, Sec, 48 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Marcos estate moved to dismiss the case raising nonpayment of correct filing fees. Petitioners however claimed that the required filing fees are exorbitant despite the fact that said action is not capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, respondent Judge Ranada ruled against

petitioners. In its present petition for certiorari, petitioners assailed the twin orders of respondent Judge and asserted that said action belongs to the class where the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation. CHR likewise intervened in this case asserting the immediate enforcement & execution of the said foreign judgment because once the case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality; it can no longer be relitigated in another country invoking principle of comity and vested rights. ISSUES : (1) Whether or not foreign judgment can be recognized in our courts as the same is capable of pecuniary estimation. (2) Whether or not foreign judgment should outrightly be enforced before our courts even without filing a separate action. HELD

: (1) Yes. The Court ruled that the complaint to enforce foreign judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation and that petitioners’ payment of docket fees of only P410.00 corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”

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(2) No. Sec. 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the final judgment is not conclusive yet but presumptive evidence of a right of petitioner against the Marcos Estate. Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence; if any of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in the aforesaid rule. The actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud or mistake of fact or law. As stated in Ferrer’s case. “If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation”. Moreover, there is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgment or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO. INC. v. SARMIENTO 75 SCRA 124 FACTS : Heller, an American citizen & Airman First Class of US Air Force, presently assigned and stationed at Clark Air Base, Pampanga, who sustained serious physical injuries due to bus collision filed an action for damages before CFI of Pampanga against petitioners Dangwa, a domestic corp. & owner of the bus company and James Gayot, the bus driver. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since Heller is not a resident of Pampanga in view of his allegation in the complaint. Heller opposed contending that he has the privilege to elect with court to file his action and he had chosen CFI of Pampanga because he is a resident thereof not only at the time of the commencement of present action but even before the accident happened. Respondent Judge Sarmiento ruled in favor of Heller declaring that his action was properly instituted in CFI of Pampanga because residence under this action need not be continuous, it is sufficient that a party, though a foreign subject has is actual residence in the place where the action was brought. Hence, this petition for prohibition. ISSUE

: Whether or not CFI of Pampanga’s order of dismissal is proper.

HELD

: Yes. There is no question that private respondent Heller has his fixed place of abode at Clark Air Base Pampanga. There is no showing that Heller has not resided consistently and with continuity in his place of abode at Clark Air Base at the time he filed his action. As held in Koh v. CA, the term “resides” as employed in the rule on venue on personal action filed with the CFI means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary of the plaintiff or the defendant as distinguished from domicile which denotes a fix permanent residence, to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. CA 514 SCRA 607

FACTS : Petitoner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando in 1950 in Mabini Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the USA and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, they divorced in April 1988. Orlando subsequently married respondent Merope in Calasiao Pangasinan. Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages before RTC of Dagupan City against respondents Orlando and Merope contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting

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marriage with Eusebio. Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real-party-in-interest, however it was denied. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence this instant petition for review contending that petitioner has the personality to file petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. ISSUE

: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

HELD

: No. Petitioner’s personality to file said petition cannot be ascertained because of the absence of divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. It is true that under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage however only a party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the same. The said petition must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Hence, the case was remanded to the trial court for reception of additional evidence necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage.

- nothing follows -

except the final examinations, hehehe!!!

break a leg pips!!!

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