Conflict of Laws Case Digests

Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Kitamura G.R. No. 149177 | November 23, 2007 FACTS: 1. Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments), entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura (Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines). 2. Agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year 3. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the contract with the Philippine government. 4. When the STAR Project was near completion, the DPWH engaged consultancy services of Nippon, for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project (Respondent named as the project manager) 5. Petitioner Hasegawa (Nippon’s general manager for International Division), informed respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA (only up to the substantial completion of STAR) 6. Respondent requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI Project. 7. Nippon refused to negotiate for the renewal of ICA because the respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had already expired 8. Respondent initiated a civil case for specific performance and damages with RTC Lipa City 9. Petitioners: - ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals thus complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction - The claim for improper pre-termination of respondent’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan ff the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus 10. In the meantime, DPWH approved Nippon’s request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Kotake (as project manager of BBRI Project) 11. RTC: denied motion to dismiss invoking that matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by law prevailing at the place of performance

12. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with CA 13. CA dismissed petition 14. Petitioners filed a 2nd petition for certiorari 15. CA affirmed RTC’s decision, that RTC was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis 16. Petitioners’ MR denied 17. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari ISSUE: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign national may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant rule, or forum non conveniens HELD: NO; RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail the jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. RATIO: In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated?; (2) Which law will the court apply?; and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law In this case, only the first phase is at issue jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule. Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

When a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,[76] be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. [77] Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [78]In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense

De Joya vs. Corona G.R. No. 162416 | January 31, 2006 FACTS: 1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in criminal case for violation of Art. 315, par. 2(a) of RPC in relation to PD 1689 2. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused - Hao induced Dy to invest more than a 100M in State Resources Development Management Corporation, but when the latter’s investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were dishonoured for being drawn against insufficient funds or that the account was closed 3. Documents presented to support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest - Report of NBI to Chief State Prosecutor as regards their investigation on the complaint filed by complainant Dy against Hao for syndicated estafa - Affidavit-complaint of Dy - Copies of checks issued by complainant in favor of State Resources - Copies of checks issued to complainant representing the supposed return of his investments in State Resources - Demand letter sent by complainant Hao - Counter-affidavits - Resolution issued by State Prosecutor Nicdao finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his other coaccused for syndicated estafa - Copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources Development Management Corp naming petitioner as incorporator and director of corp ISSUE: Whether or not HELD: RATIO: The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge tend to show that therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development Management Corporation; that he issued several

checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions. These are all that need to be shown to establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case, it is notable that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689 The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the exception. It may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It

should be remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

Perkins vs. Roxas G.R. No. 47517 | June 27, 1941 FACTS: 1. Respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the sum of P71, 379.90, consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. 2. Company filed its answer: - Withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner and by one George Engelhard 3. RTC ordered the respondent Perkins to include in his complaint as parties defendants petitioner and Engelhard. - Summons were served upon the non-resident defendants Perkins and Engelhard 4. Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint 5. Petitioner’s objection to the court’s jurisdiction over her person having been overruled by the trial court and by this court, petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question together with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and prays for various affirmative reliefs against the respondent 6. Perkins filed a demurrer on the ground that “the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York is res judicata 7. Petitioner’s demurrer having been overruled, she now filed in this court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus - "the respondent judge is about to and will render judgment in the above-mentioned case disregarding the constitutional rights of this petitioner; contrary to and annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner's favor by the courts of the State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all

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the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317, of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and which New York judgment the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to annul, amend, reverse, or modify in any respect whatsoever"; and praying that the order of the respondent judge overruling the demurrer be annulled, and that he and his successors be permanently prohibited from taking any action on the case, except to dismiss the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the Supreme Court of New York, and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, in civil case No. 53317 of the CFI Manila, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action HELD: YES RATIO: Idonah Slade Perkins in her cross-complaint brought suit against Eugene Arthur Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine. The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment "annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner's favor by the courts of the State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317," and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of

jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court — and the rightful exercise — of its jurisdiction.

Reyes vs. Diaz G.R. No. L-48754 | November 26, 1941 FACTS: 1. this case is certified to this Court by the CA upon the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue 2. Questions of jurisdiction: (a) Whether or not there is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy (b) Whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest HELD: Case remanded to the CA for further proceedings RATIO: Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue." It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense." Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land.

In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact — whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined. Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is involved. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court. Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is wellsettled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality.

Pantaleon vs. Asuncion G.R. No. L-13141 | May 22, 1959 FACTS: 1. Plaintiff Vicenta Pantaleon instituted this action in the CFI Nueve Ecija, to recover from Asuncion the sum of P2k 2. Summons originally issued was returned by the sheriff unserved 3. An alias summons was issued however unserved because Asuncion had left the tala estate 4. On plaintiff’s motion, the court ordered that defendant be summoned by publication; summons was published in the “Examiner” 5. Having failed to appear or answer within the period stated in the summons, defendant was declared in default 6. Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against said defendant 7. Defendant filed a petition for relief from said order, and from said judgment, and upon the ground of mistake and excusable negligence 8. Affidavit of Asuncion: - On September 26, 1955, at 34 Pitimine Street, San Francisco del Monte Quezon City, which is his residence, he received notice of a registered letter at the Post Office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence; - that he proceeded immediately to the latter municipality to claim said letter, which he received on September 28, 1955; - that the letter contained copy of said order of July 12, 1955, and of the judgment of September 8, 1955, much to his surprise, for he had not been summoned or notified of the hearing of this case; - that had copy of the summons and of the order for its publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court said summons and order would have reached him, "as the judgment herein had"; and that his failure to appear before the court is excusable it being due to the mistake of the authorities concerned in not complying with the provisions of said section. 9. Upon denial of said petition for relief, defendant perfected his present appeal, which is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned summons by publication had not been made in conformity with the Rules of Court. - copy of the summons and of the order for the publication thereof were not deposited "in the post office, postage

prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address", in violation of Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court 10. Plaintiff alleged: - provision applicable to the case is not this Section 21, but Section 16, of Rule 7, ROC - the requirement, Section 21, of an affidavit showing that copy of the summons and of the order for its publication had been sent by mail to defendant’s last known address, refers to extraterritorial service of summons in Section 17 Rule 7 ISSUE: HELD: RATIO: Said section 21, however, is unqualified. It prescribes the "proof of service by publication", regardless of whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or not. Section 16 must be read in relation to section 21, which complements it. Then, too, we conceive of no reason, and plaintiff has suggested none, why copy of the summons and of the order for its publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants, but not to resident defendants. We cannot even say that defendant herein, who, according to the return of the Sheriff of Nueva Ecija, was reportedly residing in Rizal — where he, in fact (San Francisco del Monte and Quezon City used to be part of Rizal), was residing — could reasonably be expected to read the summons published in a newspaper said to be a general circulation in Nueva Ecija. Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by publication, the onclusion is inescapable that the lower court had no authority whatsoever to issue the order declaring the defendant in default and to render the decision of Sept 8, 1955, and that both are null and void ab initio Apart from the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot —

consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant. The specification of the dates of payment, of the amounts paid each time, of the manner in which each payment was made, and of the number of the money orders in which eighteen (18) payments had been effected, constitutes a strong indication of the probable veracity of said allegation, fully justifying the grant of an opportunity to prove the same.

Gemperle vs. Schenker G.R. No. L-18164 | January 23, 1967 FACTS: 1. Sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker (acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact) filed with the CFI Rizal a complaint against plaintiff Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker’s allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages 2. Gemperle commenced the present action against Schenkers for the recovery of P300k as damages, atty’s fees and costs, and praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker “to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions” - Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman" ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker HELD: YES RATIO: Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an

answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint, respectfully aver", which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense. Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf. Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefore from is, likewise, untenable.

Sequito vs. Letrondo G.R. No. L-11588 | July 20, 1959 FACTS: 1. The complaint in this case was filed in court 2. The summons was served by police sergeant Borja upon defendant’s daughter (12 y/o) 3. Defendant failed to file an answer and so, upon plaintiff’s motion, he was declared in default. 4. Plaintiffs presented their evidence ex parte; same consists of plaintiff Sequito’s testimony only 5. Court rendered judgment appealed from 6. Defendant moved for new trial: he did not receive of the summons and that he came to know about the case only when he received a copy of the decision; attached to his motion affidavits of merit and a copy of a deed of sale of the land 7. Motion denied 8. Hence, this appeal ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for new trial (depends on whether or not there had been a valid substituted service of summons) HELD: YES RATIO: The record shows that the service of the summons was irregular. It was served by one police sergeant, Pacifico Borja, who was not a sheriff or a court officer, and who was not authorized by the court to deliver the summons. This violates the provisions of Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court. The proof of service is also not under oath as required by Section 20 of said rule. Moreover, even if the summons was really served upon defendant's daughter, still there was no valid substituted service because she, being only 12 years of age and a grade four pupil, could not have appreciated the importance of the paper delivered to her. We cannot say with certainty that the daughter was at the time of a

suitable age and discretion to be entrusted with so important a document as a court summons (Section 8, Rule 7, Rules of Court). As there is no evidence to show that defendant ever came to know about the case before he received the decision, the irregularity in the service was not cured. Defendant's failure to file his answer is, therefore, justified.

Jaranilla vs. Gonzales G.R. No. L-5629 | October 11, 1954 FACTS: 1. Puzons were the plaintiffs; Lourdes Vda. De Sison was the original defendant 2. Defendant stated that it would necessary to include all the children of the deceased Sison (husband of defendant) in substitution of deceased 3. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint by naming therein as co-defendants the children of deceased and requested that their mother be appointed as their guardian ad litem, but Antonio Jaranilla, was not included as one of the party defendants 4. No objection thus was ordered to issue the summons against new defendants 5. Summons was served on Lourdes Sison and on Lili Sison but none were personally served to each of the minors 6. The property object of the litigation was originally the conjugal property of the spouses Sison, which the plaintiffs Puzon claimed to have acquired from Josefa de Sison 7. Upon motion of the defendants therein, the CFI rendered an order dismissing the complaint after plaintiffs had introduced all their evidence and after the defendant had presented 5 witnesses, one of them being Lourdes Ichon who was still testifying but before the defense had completed their evidence 8. Plaintiffs brought up the case on appeal to CA 9. CA reversed order of dismissal and rendered decision in favor of plaintiffs 10. Copy of the motion for the execution of the judgment and copy of writ issued were served upon the attorney of record of defendants, but were not served personally again upon plaintiffs 11. In acc with the writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan placed defendants in possession of the land involved ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance of the attorneys in behalf of the minors in the action is equivalent to service

HELD: YES RATIO: There is no doubt that plaintiff Lili Sison Jaranilla is bound by the judgment rendered in civil case No. 8967 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 2903-R, because her husband was not a necessary party, the controversy therein involved being her share in the parcels of land which she had inherited from her deceased father. As to the second point raised and decided in favor of the rest of the plaintiffs by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, it appears that the plaintiffs who were minors except Lili Sison Jaranilla were not summoned in the action (civil case No. 8967), as provided for in section 10, Rule 7; that Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison, the defendant therein, represented to the Court that as her children were necessary parties they should be joined as defendants; that on 25 June 1946, as prayed for by the defendant therein, the plaintiffs therein amended their complaint impleading said children who, as the agreed statement of facts stipulates with the exception of Lili Sison who was of age, were minors over 15 years of age and Rufo, 12 years old; that on 1 July 1946 the Court admitted the amended complaint and ordered the new defendants to be summoned; that the summons issued on that date by the clerk of court was served on the 9th of that month upon Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison and on the 15th of that month upon Lili Sison Jaranilla; that on 17 July 1946 attorneys Perez, Gayagoy, Abenojar and Ignacio D. Castillo filed an answer to the amended complaint in behalf of the impleaded defendants Lili Sison Jaranilla, Lita Sison, Zenaida Sison, Bonifacio Sison, Jr., and Rufo Sison; that on 12 September 1946, as prayed for by the attorney appearing for the defendants therein, Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison was appointed guardian ad litem to represent her minor children and qualified as such by taking her oath before deputy clerk of court Genaro Ferrer; and that in the Court of First Instance, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, attorneys Perez, Gayagoy, Santos & Abenojar, Ignacio D. Castillo, Aquino & Allas and Porfirio V. Sison represented in all their pleadings that they were appearing for all the defendants therein. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the appearance of the attorneys in behalf of the

minors in the action is equivalent to service. The denial by the minors of having authorized said attorneys to represent them may be conceded but such denial does not destroy the presumption that the services of the attorneys had been engaged by the guardian ad litem not only to represent her but also the minors. If the duly appointed guardian ad litem, who is the mother of the minors, did not consider the summons served on her alone as a summons also on her minor children, or if she did not authorize her attorneys to represent her minor children, she should have raised the question in the case before or during the trial or thereafter but before judgment was rendered. The failure of the guardian ad litem and of her attorneys to raise the point of lack of summons service upon the minors personally is a waiver on the part of said minors represented by their mother, their guardian ad litem, to question the lack of such service upon them personally. As already stated, the voluntary appearance of the attorneys not only for Lourdes Ichon Vda. de Sison but also for the minors is equivalent to service.

Philsec Investment vs. CA G.R. No. 103493 | June 19, 1997 FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat. As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable.

Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement. While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value. Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action. The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case. Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens. The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia. ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court? HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati RATIO: NO While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the

judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides: Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished

copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata. Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens: First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance