Condominium Possession

Condominium - Possession

1. Condominium Corporation v. Campos Facts: The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation is a condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas. The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, “Solana”, in the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial, Incorporated bought the “Solana” unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against AguilarBernares Realty. The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The petitioner filed its opposition. The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a “holder of a separate interest” and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that “the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the corporation.” the motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the said orders be set aside. ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the claims filed by Sunset View, the condominium corporation. Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in the corporation. The Mater Deed determines when ownership of the unit and participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser. The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction. The share of stock appurtenant to the unit will be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has

not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon full payment of the purchase price. Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and the SEC has no jurisdiction over the claims. *now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes 4. Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals Facts: Placido Miranda and his wife were owners of a parcel of land. Upon their death, the land was administered by their son Maximo who, in 1957, sold it to Agerico. In 1984, a free patent title was issued to chariot, Agerico’s daughter. Since then, Agerico has been in possession and cultivation of the land in behalf of Charito who became a resident of USA. In 1991, the heirs of Placido entered the land and prevented Agerico from cultivating it. They claimed rightful ownership and possession contending that Maximo was merely the administrator of the land. Thus, Agerico and Charito brought an action for forcible entry against the heirs. Meanwhile, the heirs also filed a complaint for declaration of nullity, annulment of title and deed of sale, and cancellation of title and reconveyance with damages and partition against Agerico and Charito. As they involve the same parties and subject matter and related issues, these cases have been consolidated. Issue: Whether or not Agerico, and subsequently Charito, has acquired the land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Maximo? Held: Yes. 1.) Agerico acquired the land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by Maximo. Charito, towhom the land was transferred has the certificate of title, tax receipts, and evidence of p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e land for more than 30years. Tax receipt and declarati o n s o f ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription. 2.)Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by either ordinary or extraordinary prescription. On the one hand, ordinary prescription entails adverse possession by virtue of a title and in good faith for 1 0 y e a r s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , extraordinary prescription is uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or good faith. In this case, therefore, on the basis alone of possession for more than 30 years, Agerico and Charito’s ow nership, acquired through extraordinary prescription, is beyond question. 3.)The heirs contend that under Art. 1391, CC, they had a period of 4 years within which to Page 1 of 4

Condominium - Possession

bring an action for annulment and that this period commenced to run only from November 1991, when they allegedly discovered the fraud committed agai nst them. However, 1391, CC presupposes that no acquisitive prescription has set in, for after the favorable effects of acquisitive prescription have set in, rights of ownership over a property are rendered indisputable 6. Kasilag vs. Rodriguez Facts: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA). The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force. One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis are illegal and void agreements because such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land because it

is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874. xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated. The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF. The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties. 8. Caram vs. Laureta FACTS: On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract o f agricultural land covered by OCT No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s n o t r e g i s t e r e d b e c a use it was not acknowledged before a notary public or any other authorized officer. Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is in continuous, adverse and notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or stopped by any of the defendants or t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I n f a c t , Laureta had been paying realty taxes due thereon and had introduced improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. On May 5, 1947, the same land covered by OCT No.3 0 1 9 w a s s o l d b y M a r c o s M a t a t o Page 2 of 4

Condominium - Possession

defendant Fermin Z. Caram,Jr.p e t i t i o n e r h e r e i n . T h e d e e d o f s a l e i n f a v o r o f C a r a m w a s acknowledged before Atty. Abelardo A p o r t a d e r a . O n D e c e m b e r 9 , 1947, the second sale between Marcos Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr. was registered with the Register of Deeds. O n t h e s a m e d a t e , T r a n s f e r Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in favor of Fermin Caram Jr. Thed e f e n d a n t F e r m i n C a r a m J r . claimed that he has no knowledge or information about the previous en cumbrances, transactions, and alienations in favor of plaintiff until the filing of the complaints. ISSUE: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e k n o w l e d g e p e t i t i o n e r o f a p r i o r unregistered sale of a titled property a t t r i b u t a b l e t o p e t i t i o n e r a n d equivalent in law of registration of sale. HELD: Yes. There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency, C aram as principal, should also be deemed to have acted in bad faith. Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all. A possessor i n g o o d f a i t h i s o n e w h o is not aware that there exists in his t i t l e o r mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Laureta was first in possession of the property. He is also a possessor in good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in favor of Laureta was procured by force. Such defect, however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time the intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same. 9. MWSS vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Twenty three checks were deposited by the payees Dizon, Sison and Mendoza in their respective current accounts with the PCIB and PBC. Thru the Central Bank Clearing, these checks were presented for payment by PBC and PCIB to the defendant PNB, and were paid. At the time of their presentation to PNB these checks bear the standard indorsement which reads ‘all prior indorsement and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed. Subsequent investigation however, conducted by the NBI showed that Raul Dizon, Arturo Sison and Antonio Mendoza were all fictitious persons. NWSA addressed a letter to PNB requesting the immediate restoration to its Account No. 6, of the total

sum of P3,457,903.00 corresponding to the total amount of these twenty-three (23) checks claimed by NWSA to be forged and/or spurious checks. ISSUE: WON THE DRAWEE BANK WAS LIABLE FOR THE LOSS UNDER SECTION 23 OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW HELD: No. The NBI does not declare or prove that the signatures appearing on the questioned checks are forgeries. These reports did not touch on the inherent qualities of the signatures which are indispensable in the determination of the existence of forgery. There must be conclusive findings that there is a variance in the inherent characteristics of the signatures and that they were written by two or more different persons. Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. This was not done in the present case. Even if the twenty-three (23) checks in question are considered forgeries, considering the petitioner’s gross negligence, it is barred from setting up the defense of forgery under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. One factor which facilitate this fraud was the delay in the reconciliation of bank (PNB) statements with the NAWASA bank accounts. The records likewise show that the petitioner failed to provide appropriate security measures over its own records thereby laying confidential records open to unauthorized persons. We cannot fault the respondent drawee Bank for not having detected the fraudulent encashment of the checks because the printing of the petitioner’s personalized checks was not done under the supervision and control of the Bank. Under the circumstances, therefore, the petitioner was in a better position to detect and prevent the fraudulent encashment of its checks 10. GEMINIANO v. CA Lessor in good faith and Builders in Good faith are not synonymous. Article 1678 may apply to the former’s case and Art 448 may apply to the latter’s case. If a person knew that his stay would likely end or that he knew somehow that he is not the owner of the land then he is not a BPS in good faith. FACTS: The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of the petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished bungalow to the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to the latter. The property was later leased to the respondents for 7 years starting November 1978 for P40 a month as evidenced by their written lease contract. The respondents built their house and introduced some improvements in the lot. In 1985 petitioner’s mother refused receiving monthly rentals. It turned out that the lot in question was subject to litigation which resulted to its acquisition by Maria Lee which was sold to Salcedo, who further sold Page 3 of 4

Condominium - Possession

to Dionisio spouses. The property eventually came back to the petitioner when the Dinisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. As such, the lot was registered in the latter’s names. (petitioners never lost possession of the land because Lee and company never issued a writ of possession against them). In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents demanding them to vacate the premises and when the latter refused, petitioners filed in court. Respondents claim that they should be entitled to buy the land because of the promise of the petitioners to sell them the land and because they were builders in Good faith. The courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448 regarding builders and land owners in good faith or Art. 1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can be reimbursed half of the expenses of the improvements if the LO chooses to appropriate them and that such lessee have the right to retain in the premises until fully reimbursed. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good faith? 2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied? RULING: 1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that their stay would end after the lease contract expires. They can’t bank on the promise, which was not in writing, of the petitioners that the latter will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the alleged promise by petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to prove their claim. 2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if the lessor chooses to appropriate the improvements. But since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the private respondents can’t compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents’ sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further, Cruz had no account with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the check. EDCA went to the police, which arrested Cruz whose real name was Tomas de la Peña. EDCA sought the assistance of the police, and forced their way into the store of the Santos and threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books. Santos sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored. 2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books that were sold to Santos. HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. A contract of sale is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. 2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title to the books acquired by the Santos spouses. Therefore, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books and Santos had rights over the books.

11. EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books from EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. (EDCA), payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a check. Subsequently, Cruz sold 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who paid him after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her. Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College Page 4 of 4